The avalanche which killed Sqn-Ldr Peter Szypula, Flt-Sgt Michelle Hackett and her daughter Kathleen occurred on the trekking route between Machhapuchare Base Camp and Deurali Graphic by David Sibley, Army newspaper

BOI into Everest exercise ends

CA Lt-Gen Peter Leahy has accepted the findings and recommendations of the military Board of Inquiry into Exercise Everest 2001.

The board began its inquiry in 2001 into the conduct of the exercise, including the death of Sqn-Ldr Peter Szypula, Ft-Sgt Michelle Hackett and her daughter Kathleen in an avalanche in the Annapurna region of Nepal on March 24, 2001.

CA Lt-Gen Peter Leahy announced the result of the inquiry this week.

“Our thoughts and prayers are with the families of the three people that died. A copy of the report was given to them last week.” he said.

“The Board’s Terms of Reference required it to examine the planning and administration of the expedition and the events that occurred in the aftermath of the tragedy.

“This was a tragic event caused by an avalanche from the heights of the Hiunchuli Mountain during the first phase of the expedition, which was designed to assist the acclimatisation of the participants.”

The board made no findings of fault or blame on the part of the deceased, who were the victims of a massive avalanche.

The board received expert evidence from an eminent New Zealand academic and glaciologist, Dr Ian Owens.

Dr Owen’s expert opinion was that the avalanche was of a glacial-ice nature and this type of avalanche was completely unpredictable and could happen at any time of the day or night.

He visited the avalanche site and described this particular avalanche as a one in 50-year event.

Lt-Gen Leahy said the board’s recommendations would help Defence learn valuable lessons to ensure that immediate and lasting improvements were made to the conduct of similar adventurous training activities and to its response to critical incidents.

“Following comprehensive legal review and advice I have accepted the recommendations of the board. These recommendations cover a wide range of policy and administrative areas related to the planning and conduct of adventurous training activities,” he said.

“There were adverse recommendations made against individuals in respect to the management of the exercise.

“As a result administrative action will be initiated against these members.

“However, it is important to note that no offences have been committed.”

“The report also highlighted the excellent work of a large number of individuals and agencies for their support to Defence.”

In dealing with these matters the board made a number of adverse findings that were accepted by the CA.

• The medical planning for the exercise and its subsequent review by HQ Training Command were inadequate.
• There were a number of deficiencies in the process whereby approval for the conduct of the expedition was obtained from Commander Training Command. Among these were:
  • Policy documentation relating to the approval process changed without notice to some of the principal participants.
  • The Army Alpine Association (AAA) was not consulted about the changes and was not advised of them.
  • HQ Training Command incorrectly advised the AAA that the conduct of the exercise had been approved when the true position was that it had only been approved in principle.
  • HQ Training Command did not inform the AAA of the requirement for, or seek the submission of, a mounting instruction for the activity.
  • When the mounting instruction was finally submitted HQ Training Command had only three weeks to complete its review before the expedition was due to leave Australia.
  • Commander Training Command and his staff were not advised that family members were to accompany the expedition and participate on the trek.
  • The expedition leader approved the attendance of family members although he did not have the authority to do so.
  • HQ Training Command concentrated on the climbing phase of the expedition and gave inadequate consideration to the acclimitisation phase.
  • The avalanche risk in the area in which the trek was conducted was not addressed by HQ Training Command staff.
  • The expedition leader did not inform Commander Training Command that an expedition medical officer had not been appointed as late as three days prior to the scheduled departure from Australia.
  • Staffing by HQ Training Command was rushed and incomplete.
  • There were deficiencies in the risk assessment process, but these deficiencies did not cause or partly cause the deaths.
  • There were deficiencies in the procedures followed when it became necessary to advise the next of kin of the deceased about relevant events.

.