An Iraq family walks past a toppled statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad, Saturday 12th April. Photo by Dusan Vranic/AP

Winning concepts

By Maj-General Jim Molan

For all intents and purposes, the second Gulf War has passed a very strategic point. Even Iraqi diplomats in foreign countries are saying that it is over.

The Iraqi leadership is captured, in hiding or is dead. Coalition troops have a presence in almost every part of the country. The full nightmare of fighting through Baghdad did not eventuate. Specialists examine various sensitive sites that are suspected of being involved in WMD production.

The US is recovering all its prisoners of war. The coalition leadership now makes plans to stop looting and guard museums and hospitals, rather than wide sweeping armoured manoeuvre and the capture of bridges and airfields. The Australian C130s now haul relief supplies into the newly named Baghdad International Airport for the Iraqi people, and not warlike cargo, for the fighting troops.

Yet the challenge for the coalition and for the soldiers goes on, even though the politicians, diplomats and the policy makers are leading the way. The coalition leadership at the political level is working hard to transition from war to peace.
The media now examines the responsibility, under the Geneva Convention, of powers such as the US, UK and Australia may have in Iraq, post conflict. Our Government considers what will be the Australian national contribution to whatever happens after the war in Iraq. Australian wheat flows into Iraqi ports, Operation Baghdad Assist puts medicines into hospitals. The Fedayeed Saddam launches suicide attacks in Baghdad and in Tikrit and still soldiers die. The challenge for good soldiering continues, be it peace or war.

We have seen the statues of Saddam Hussein fall. Just to remind myself how one set of facts is seen so differently by each side, I watched both the Western and the Arab TV cable service coverage of this same event.

In particular, I saw the portrayal of the US soldiers innocently putting a US flag on the face of the Saddam statue before its destruction, being given a slant by the Arab media that was not helpful to coalition leadership.
I was reminded that often, what we at the coal-face think is a good thing to do, is not always helpful to our bosses at the strategic level. At every level of even the biggest army, every soldier must be sensitive to the appearance of what he or she does and how it will play out on the media at the strategic level.

A famous general once said that in peacetime, the emphasis is on eye-pleasing manoeuvre. But in wartime, soldiers remember the value of firepower. But this war has had large measures of both and has illustrated to us the fact that one complements the other. What we saw was the fundamental military beauty of joint operations, or what many call ‘jointery’. Land forces, air forces and maritime forces working as one to achieve the aim.

The CA, Lt-Gen Peter Leahy, as the professional head of the Army, is a great exponent of the importance of jointery. He reminds us continually of the connection between the ability of Army to do its business and the need that we have for the Army, the Navy and the Air Force to work intimately together.
What does ‘jointery’ mean to Army soldiers at the working level? Putting the banter to one side (“to fly well, pilots need eight hours sleep per day and any sleep they get at night is a bonus”), the Army depends for success on the Air Force and the Navy.

If we needed it, the Second Gulf War has reminded us that the Army cannot get to the fight without the ships and the Hercs. We cannot sustain the fight without ports and airfields. Nothing gains the attention of a group of enemy holding up a company advance as the likelihood of being hit with a laser-guided 2000lb bomb.

In many cases, by day and night, naval gunfire will be the only support available to the troops on the ground, especially in the early stages of an amphibious operation.

An Iraq T-55 tank burns along side a road in central Iraq after being destroyed by coalition forces

So what we must do is expand our winning concept of the combined arms team to make it a concept for the Joint Combined Arms Team.

We need to fight for opportunities to train with our comrades in arms in the other services and to understand the tactical effects on the battelfield and in the lines of communications that they can achieve for us. Just like the saying that ‘tanks win battles and save lives’, the same can be said of joint fire support. It is our ability to ‘do jointery’, that makes us different from most of our neighbours and many other armies in the world.

One of the most interesting aspects of operational evaluation that may come out of this war is to compare how the US Army’s V Corps went in its use of joint assets and how the US Navy’s 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (essentially a division plus) used their joint assets. Initial indications seem to say that the Marines may have done better and it might be because they have joint assets under their own command, which are part of them, and so they know how to use them.

My observation is that soldier for soldier and unit by unit, we are equally as good as the Marines, but I wonder if our ‘jointery’ is as good as theirs. The reason is that to a Marine, who is intimately linked to his ships and his planes every day, being ‘joint’ is not an issue.

At some stage in the future our troops will come home. We stand in admiration of their achievements and we wish them a safe return. For all of us, the real process of learning should now begin.

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