An in-depth commentary on El Alamein
Alamein - The Australian Story

by Mark Johnston and Peter Stanle. Published by Oxford University Press. 240pp. $55

Reviewer :: John Donovan

It is a sad commentary on the state of history teaching in Australia that very few people under the age of 40 would be likely to recognise the word “Alamein”, much less know its significance.

This book might go some distance towards rectifying that deficiency. However, its value is not just for the historically uninitiated. It also includes some lessons for the Army of today, particularly in relation to the way it selects its talent.

The book covers more than the battle that commenced October 23, 1942. It ranges across the whole period from July to early November 1942, during which there were three periods of intense action. In July occurred the battle sometimes referred to as First Alamein, which was dubbed by the British Battle Honours Committee the Battle of Ruweisat, but which to many Australians of the era was known as Tel el Eisa: they did not fight at Ruweisat. Then came Rommel’s last attempt to break through, at Alam Halfa at the end of August/early September, and finally the culminating battle, from October 23 to early November.

While these three periods are often described as separate battles (particularly the October period, which Montgomery effectively claimed as his own, and attempted to separate from the earlier engagements), the authors show how they were parts of a single campaign.

By bringing the whole period into focus, Johnston and Stanley put Montgomery’s offensive in a better context (albeit one that probably detracts from Montgomery's self-image of the October battle).

For example, we can see that the British tactical deficiencies of the earlier period were continued into the October battle, despite Montgomery's claims to have rectified them.

Indeed, as far back as late 1941, the British were apparently disconcerted to find that Australian units were “tending to draw away … in matters of … doctrine”. Somehow, the obvious solution, to correct their faulty doctrine, did not seem to occur to them.

The different views of regulars and wartime-citizen soldiers are perhaps also shown by the reaction of the GOC of 51st Highland Division to the less than formal approach of the 9th Division personnel who mentored the Highlanders after their arrival in the desert.

He did not like their standards of battle discipline, and instructed his brigade and unit commanders to ensure they were not copied.

Overall, this is an interesting book that provides a good description of the Australian contribution to some important events.

The book highlights some tragedies that were probably unnecessary, particularly the loss of the 2/28th Battalion at Ruin Ridge, after another failure of inter-arms coordination, and the casualties in the 2/24th and 2/48th Battalions during the attack towards Thompson's Post on October 30-31.

This latter was a complicated plan that, in retrospect, had little chance of achieving its stated objectives.

Victory at Alamein helped to transform Allied fortunes. Twenty-four years after the battle, Montgomery said that winning was only made possible by the bravery of 9 Div. For that achievement, their actions deserve to be better known.

The different styles of Johnston and Stanley show through, with Johnston’s frequent inclusion of personal anecdotes giving a feel for the cutting edge of the battle.

The editor seems to have done some strange things with military terminologies but this minor issue does not detract seriously from the quality of the book.

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