HMAS BRUNEI in Dili Harbour.

It is an old military saying that in any contingency more lessons are relearned than learned anew.

East Timor may have been Australia's most important experience of the realities of the "new wave" in world affairs, but it was no exception in terms of the lessons it taught.

Many of those lessons apply to the maritime environment and to naval operations and capability.

The importance of sea lift was understood from the beginning and manifest until the end.

Effective movement of personnel, vehicles, equipment and supplies would be the element upon which the success of the operation stood or fell.

The charter and commissioning of the high-speed catamaran JERVIS Bay was a timely measure that filled a key capability gap, but the whole operation would not have been possible without the presence of the heavy landing ship TOBRUK, the RAN's heavy landing craft and the smaller mechanised landing craft of the Australian Royal Army Corps of Transport.

The ADF would also have found it intensely difficult to support its logistic requirements and those of INTERFET as a whole if there had been no chartered merchant shipping.

While the processes for identifying and securing suitable merchant ships went smoothly and were completed in a timely fashion, this was an important reminder that effective sea lift in strategic terms rests even more upon the ability to access commercial tonnage than it does upon military vessels such as amphibious craft.

What is most striking about the vital function of sea lift is that, in terms of the Australian strategic circumstance, East Timor probably enjoys the most favourable proximity to Australian bases, airfields and ports of any locality.

The overall problem of transportation, with little more than 400 miles between bases and destination, was therefore much simpler than it would be in many other circumstances.

Even so, the challenge could not have been met by airborne means alone.

By historical standards, the East Timor operation was substantial, but by no means enormous.

Nevertheless, the dependence upon the sea of both the military and the relief effort was demonstrated by the fact that there were often no less than 18 ships in Dili Harbour, with two to three shipping arrivals a day.

Over 90% of military cargo and people went into and out of East Timor by sea and the lack of roads and infrastructure meant that sea transport was vital in-theatre as well.

For the military in particular, the demand for fuel and the need for large quantities to be readily available were manifest from the start.

Here, the replenishment ship SUCCESS played a vital role as a "floating gas station" for all environments.

Naval units, in fact, provided the only source of diesel and aviation fuel for the entire INTERFET force for the first three months of the operation.

Furthermore, although East Timor does possess a very basic port in the form of Dili Harbour, over the shore capabilities proved essential here and at many other points on the coast, particularly in the enclave of Oecussi.

In East Timor, as elsewhere within the region - and around much of the Australian coast - amphibious forces are essential to any realistic efforts to make land forces mobile over long distances.

The surface forces which supported INTERFET played vital roles throughout the operation.

The first key activity was that of presence.

The deployment of capable surface combatants operating in close co-operation with maritime patrol aircraft and other airborne forces was a clear signal of INTERFET's resolve and its capability to defend itself.

INTERFET maritime forces rapidly built up and maintained a comprehensive surveillance picture of the area of operations using both their organic and remote sensors.

They were able to locate and track contacts of interest and demonstrate that they would not be caught by surprise.

Furthermore, this effort could obviously be - and was - sustained for as long as it would be needed.

In all of this, maritime forces effectively created a protective umbrella, within which the land component could operate confident that it could concentrate on the job to be done in East Timor itself without the possibility of external interference.

The same capability and resolve were also apparent in terms of the air environment.

Although Australia's guided missile frigates (FFGs) and the British destroyer GLASGOW provided an important measure of air warfare surveillance and combat capability, AEGIS cruiser, the USS MOBILE BAY was a vital enabler in the opening stages of the operation.

Her long range air warfare systems, both in sensors and weaponry, and her excellent battle management and command capability meant that the force could contemplate any situation with a high degree of confidence, even without the continuous presence of friendly fighter aircraft.

Implicit in this activity was another important lesson, the requirement for interoperability and the important part which frequent and challenging exercises play in achieving and sustaining the required levels of that interoperability.

Bi-lateral and multi-lateral exercises pay huge dividends in this regard.

There was, however, a gap in interoperability and this was the absence of an Australian unit which could act as an offshore command and control facility.

Either MANOORA or KANIMBLA would have been able to fill that gap and provide the necessary degree of connectivity for the INTERFET headquarters in the critical early stages of the operation.

This would have allowed the senior commanders to remain onboard until the infrastructure for a shore based headquarters had been fully developed and its communications proven.

Much effort and many work arounds were required to achieve the marriage of the maritime surveillance picture with that on land.

The newly refitted LPAs represent a significant new capability for the ADF and it is one that must be developed to its full potential.

The connectivity with information and intelligence sources which the surface forces could provide certainly assisted considerably with the situational awareness of the land force, particularly in the early stages of the operation.

Here, as in other areas, the close integration of the naval component commander with the Commander INTERFET enabled a highly responsive coordination of naval units to achieve the best effects for the coalition force.

The grey hulls and guns of the surface combatants covered the insertion of INTERFET land forces at their most vulnerable time.

While the multinational units set up ashore and began to secure their positions in Dili and elsewhere around East Timor, the naval gunfire support capabilities of the frigates of the RAN and RNZN and the British destroyer GLASGOW provided the reassurance that effective firepower was immediately available if the situation demanded it.

This was not only a confidence builder for the INTERFET forces themselves, it also sent a very clear message to those in East Timor who might have disputed the arrival of the force.

The process was repeated for the arrival of INTERFET at the isolated enclave of Oecussi.

From the time that troops first went ashore until the final withdrawal of INTERFET, a frigate remained on patrol within sight of the shore.

The next major area of activity for surface combatants in particular was the protection of sea lines of communications. With the substantial and continuing sea lift effort, the uninterrupted passage of shipping was a key vulnerability and INTERFET maritime forces never lost sight of the need for its protection through constant patrols and the monitoring of shipping movement. The physical presence of surface combatants was also a very important measure of reassurance for chartered shipping.

Many merchant ships would have been loath to enter the area of operations without the confidence instilled by the constant patrolling of INTERFET's maritime forces.

A warship would thus maintain visibility on each merchant ship from when it entered the area of operations until it arrived at its anchorage.

In this way, dozens of merchant ship movements were allowed to achieve a safe and timely arrival at their destinations.

The RAN organic air units, operating from the FFGs, provided a valuable asset to the troops ashore and supplemented the efforts of the workhorse Sea King utility helicopters in TOBRUK and SUCCESS.

One S70B-2 Seahawk, operating from the on-station FFG, was ready to conduct aeromedical evacuation from the isolated Oecussi enclave if required.

Seahawks were also utilised for load-lifting stores and equipment on a regular basis.

Naval parties ashore took on a wide variety of tasks.

Hydrographic survey personnel were instrumental in determining navigable safe water for supply units and naval forces.

They completed surveys of all the main port and landing areas, as well as of the anchorages.

Amongst their productions was a comprehensive port guide.

RAN personnel became responsible from the outset for port control and management of Dili Harbour. Clearance diving teams were in great demand.

The Navy's Team 4 led the way until its relief by Team 1.

In addition to beach and wharf surveys, both overt and covert, the teams conducted dives in support of war crimes' investigations, detonated large quantities of ordnance which were beyond the capacity of shore Explosives Ordnance Disposal teams and provided emergency diving support in Dili Harbour.

One merchant ship was immobilised when its propeller fouled a mooring buoy, but naval divers were able to free the buoy and allow the ship to sail.

In a port the size of Dill, any delay would have had an immediate impact on the flow of supplies and the support of INTERFET and the relief effort.

There were other areas, less obvious, in which naval forces played a key role.

The ability of ships' companies to assist in repair and reconstruction is something that has been repeatedly demonstrated during disaster relief operations around the world and it came into play very rapidly in East Timor.

The technical skills and the enthusiasm of the naval teams resulted in some substantial successes for East Timor's reconstruction process, most notably in Oecussi, where the hospital, church and a number of other buildings were completely refurbished.

They had already done excellent work in supporting the establishment of the INTERFET headquarters and accommodation areas.

One of the hidden lessons of the East Timor operation was the way in which naval units could conduct so many apparently disparate activities concurrently and for extended periods.

On a typical day in theatre, a single frigate might, while acting in the presence and deterrence roles in a high state of combat readiness and contributing to the development and maintenance of the wide area surveillance picture, send parties ashore to assist with repair and rehabilitation work, act as a fuelling platform for maritime and land helicopters, provide onboard rest and relaxation for land component personnel, provide communications facilities and support logistics over the shore.

In all, East Timor demonstrated very clearly the progress that the ADF has made towards achieving joint capabilities at the same time as it has shown the areas which need improvement.

It showed the vital part played by maritime forces in protecting, supporting and sustaining any kind of expeditionary operation in a maritime-littoral region.

It also demonstrated - and just as clearly - the extent to which such operations depend upon the maintenance of a wide range of capabilities in all environments, upon effective combat capability, upon sustained logistic support, on versatility and readiness to adapt and upon interoperability with prospective, coalition partners.

By CAPT James Goldrick