Media Room: Defence Speech

 

RELEASE OF TWO INQUIRY OFFICER REPORTS INTO THE DEATH OF LT MICHAEL FUSSELL

 

Russell Offices, Canberra, ACT, Monday, 2 November 2009

 

 

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CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE, AIR CHIEF MARSHAL ANGUS HOUSTON:

 

Good morning ladies and gentlemen.

 

I’m here today to release details about the death of Lieutenant Michael Fussell who was killed on operations in Afghanistan on 27 November 2008.

 

In order to thoroughly examine the circumstances surrounding his death, two Inquiry Officer reports were conducted and today I am releasing their findings.

 

The first report was an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding his death in combat.

 

The second report was a subsequent inquiry into concerns identified in the initial inquiry regarding the preparation, training and leadership of the force element of which LT Fussell was a member.

 

LT Fussell was an officer in the Australian Regular Army. He was posted to the 4^th Battalion (Commando), The Royal Australian Regiment, which is now known as the 2^nd Commando Regiment. 

 

LT Fussell was an artillery officer and the senior Joint Terminal Attack Controller for his force element, serving with the Special Operations Task Group - known as the SOTG - in Afghanistan. His professional military training provided him with the qualifications and skills necessary to call-in and direct offensive air, artillery and mortar fire onto targets.

 

On the 26^th and 27^th of November 2008, the SOTG was conducting an offensive operation in central Oruzgan Province in Afghanistan.

 

LT Fussell was part of a force element tasked to clear compounds which were assessed as the likely location of important insurgent leaders.

 

The patrol was traversing rugged terrain at night, using night vision equipment and moving on foot to their destination. At approximately, 1:12am (local Afghan time) LT Fussell activated the pressure plate of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) causing it to detonate.

 

LT Fussell was wearing full body armour at the time of the incident, however the nature, force and direction of the blast meant that his body armour was unable to afford him life saving protection.

 

Two other members of the patrol were wounded. One Australian soldier suffered minor wounds and returned to duty in the Middle East Area of Operations.

 

A second Australian soldier suffered more serious wounds, and returned to Australia for further medical treatment.

 

The other patrol members secured the area and immediately commenced first-aid on the wounded soldiers. They cleared a safe route to LT Fussell, and then stretchered his body over a long distance to a point from which he was evacuated by helicopter to Tarin Kowt just before 6am.

 

I’ll now go through the key findings and recommendations of the first Inquiry Officer report into the death of LT Fussell.

 

The Inquiry Officer found he was killed instantly by the explosion.

 

The Inquiry Officer also found that despite the orders on the night being rushed and incomplete, they did not contribute to the death of LT Fussell.

 

Another significant finding was that a number of the patrol members were not complying with standard procedures in relation to track discipline in the minutes prior to the incident.

 

The Inquiry examined a number of factors which may have contributed to this, such as possible fatigue or speed of the march, but was unable to determine exactly why some of the patrol members were not strictly adhering to track discipline and why no patrol members stopped the unsafe practice.

 

The Inquiry Officer made five recommendations in his report into the death of LT Fussell:

 

Number 1: that concerns about leadership raised by members of the force element be passed to the chain of command for further examination;

 

Number 2: that the chain of command further examine evidence collected by the Inquiry in respect to personnel failing to stop an unsafe practice of not adhering to track discipline;

 

Number 3: that Defence examine the distribution of information concerning a fatality within Defence prior to the Next of Kin being informed and examine the right for wounded personnel to self notify next of kin.

 

Number 4: that Defence examine the role the Australian Defence Force Investigation Service plays in the investigation of combat deaths; and

 

Number 5: that a Commission of Inquiry was not required into the death of LT Fussell.

 

I accepted all these recommendations.

 

However, given the serious nature of the first two recommendations, I felt it necessary to investigate them further and conduct a new inquiry separate to the chain of command.

 

I appointed Christopher Ritchie, AO, a retired Vice Admiral of the Royal Australian Navy, to lead the inquiry into the leadership, preparation, training and track discipline of this force element.

 

Today, I am also releasing the findings and recommendations of Vice Admiral Ritchie’s report.

 

But before I do so, I would like to provide some details about this force element and their deployment to Afghanistan.

 

In 2008, 1 Commando Company, a Reserve unit, was selected to provide the bulk of a SOTG force element in Afghanistan over the winter months of 2008 and 2009. 

 

1 Commando Company was supplemented with the requisite military support capabilities needed to perform its role and tasks.

 

During their tour of Afghanistan, this force element conducted numerous combat missions against insurgents in a complex, demanding and high risk environment.

 

They seized a number of insurgent caches which directly reduced planned IED attacks in the province.

 

They also took part in a mission which significantly disrupted insurgent operations in Oruzgan province and resulted in the death of a senior Taliban insurgent commander, Mullah Abdul Rasheed. Mullah Rasheed was identified as a primary IED facilitator, responsible for coordinating IED emplacements throughout Oruzgan province.

 

I’ll now detail some of the findings and all the recommendations of Vice Admiral Ritchie’s report.

 

Vice Admiral Ritchie found that the initial planning and direction given for the individual training and administration of the force element was appropriate, satisfactorily supported and conducted.

 

He did, however, find shortcomings in the support and supervision of the collective training and certification of this force element prior to its deployment to Afghanistan. I note for you, that certification is the clearing of a force element for deployment as they have met all the necessary standards.

 

In particular, Vice Admiral Ritchie found that the certification process in Australia had deficiencies in that it was incapable of providing a true picture of the force element’s capability.

 

He also found there was a lack of higher Headquarter or senior officer input into the collective training of the force element.

 

Too much responsibility for the planning and conduct of the Mission Rehearsal Exercise was left with the force element command team.  He also found that consistent unit command oversight of the training was disrupted by a posting.

 

However, it is very important to note that Vice Admiral Ritchie found that many of the shortcomings in training were identified and rectified when this force element arrived in Afghanistan.

 

This is because when they arrived in theatre, the force element underwent a standard, detailed handover program with the outgoing force element. The culmination of this handover training was the conduct of a Full Mission Profile.

 

Now, the intent of a Full Mission Profile is to assess a force element’s readiness and capability to commence in-theatre operations.

 

This particular Full Mission Profile identified some issues requiring further training. Consequently, a second Full Mission Profile was conducted to rectify these issues, and ensure the force element was ready for operations. Advice received from the members of the force element was that this training was effective, appropriate and well conducted.

 

I am encouraged that Vice Admiral Ritchie found that many of the shortcomings identified in the force preparation and certification of this particular force element in Australia have subsequently been addressed and rectified by Special Operations Command.

 

This was validated through the attendance of one of the Inquiry Assistants, who observed the Mission Rehearsal Exercise in Australia for the force element currently in Afghanistan. 

 

He reported that the Mission Rehearsal Exercise was a well supported, well orchestrated, realistic and effective activity, which provided a suitable means by which the force element could be assessed and certified as ready for deployment.

 

This finding has also been supported by the findings of an audit conducted by Major General John Cantwell which I will discuss with you shortly.

 

Vice Admiral Ritchie was also tasked to inquire into the training and use of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) employed by force element members when moving on foot in a high threat IED environment.

 

Vice Admiral Ritchie found that the movement procedure employed on the night LT Fussell died was appropriate, and that LT Fussell was appropriately trained in the use of the TTP.

 

He also concluded that the level of training on the use of the TTP received by the force element both in Australia and after deploying to Afghanistan was adequate.

 

As I said earlier, the initial inquiry into the death of LT Fussell found that track discipline by the patrol in the minutes prior to his death was inadequate and that a number of patrol members may have been in a position to stop an unsafe practice.

 

Vice Admiral Ritchie found that the failure to prevent an unsafe action could be attributed to a combination of:

 

a)confusion on the part of those personnel behind LT Fussell who assumed the way in front of them was either clear or was relatively clear;

b)      a less than rigid enforcement of track discipline;

c)the route diversion was only minor and was difficult to identify;

d)      an inability by some members of the patrol to clearly determine that someone was not necessarily walking where they should have been; and

e)a lack of control of the force element.

 

This last factor highlights another issue that was raised by the first Inquiry, namely leadership of the force element.

 

First, let me say the issues regarding leadership in both reports do not relate to LT Fussell. He was a very fine junior officer who was highly regarded by those who served with him.

 

Let me also make the point that commanding troops is one of the most difficult and challenging roles a military officer can face.  This is made even more difficult when you have soldiers operating in a very dangerous and extremely demanding combat environment like Afghanistan. Commanders who are tasked with leading personnel in this situation are under constant pressure.

 

In relation to leadership concerns raised in the initial Inquiry Officer’s report, Vice Admiral Ritchie concluded that these concerns had a basis of fact.

 

Vice Admiral Ritchie’s report indicated that nothing in the force preparation or certification process identified the leadership weakness in the force element.

 

Furthermore, Vice Admiral Ritchie found the leadership concerns were not conveyed to higher command in Australia before the force element deployed.

 

Subsequent to this incident in theatre, these leadership issues resulted in a change of command of this force element.

 

Vice Admiral Ritchie found that the initial Inquiry Officer identified that the immediate and direct cause of LT Fussell’s death was his contact with the pressure plate of an IED causing it to detonate thereby killing him.

 

However, he said this wasn’t the sole cause of death. Deficient training, certification and leadership operated to increase the risk that such a casualty might occur. Therefore, he concluded those deficiencies materially contributed to the death of LT Fussell.

 

In relation to this finding, the Special Operations Commander, Major General Tim McOwan, sought legal advice from the Judge Advocate General.

 

You have been provided with a copy of that legal advice. The Judge Advocate General’s advice said and I quote:

 

“The Inquiry Officer’s findings, in my view, entitled him to conclude, as he did, in a general sense, that the deficiencies which he identified in the training, assessment certification and leadership of the force element operated to increase the risk that a casualty might occur on operations in Afghanistan. What his findings did not, in my opinion, entitle him, as a matter of law, to conclude was that these deficiencies led to the breach of track discipline on the part of LT Fussell on the night of his death.”  End quote.

 

I’ve had the opportunity to thoroughly review both the Inquiry Officer Reports in the context of the advice from the Judge Advocate General. Accordingly, my conclusions are as follows:

 

The direct cause of LT Fussell’s death was not in question. The initial Inquiry Officer’s Report into the death of LT Fussell by Colonel McCullagh identified that the immediate and direct cause of LT Fussell’s death was his contact with the pressure plate of an IED causing it to detonate thereby killing him.

 

This was confirmed by Vice Admiral Ritchie’s Report.

 

The precise extent to which other factors may have borne on this result is, in the circumstances, impossible to fix with precision. What is clear from Vice Admiral Ritchie’s Report is that the risk of a casualty occurring in Afghanistan was increased by the deficiencies in training, assessment, certification and leadership identified by Vice Admiral Ritchie.

 

On the basis of the Judge Advocate General’s advice, I accept it was not open as a matter of law to conclude that the deficiencies in training, assessment, certification and consequently leadership of the force element led to the breach of track discipline on the part of LT Fussell on the night of his death.

 

However, it was open to Vice Admiral Ritchie to conclude in a general sense that the deficiencies in training, assessment, certification and consequently leadership of the force element operated to increase the risk of a casualty occurring in Afghanistan. It is these deficiencies and the resulting increased risk that concerned me.

 

Therefore, I accept Vice Admiral Ritchie’s finding that the risk of a casualty occurring in Afghanistan was increased by the deficiencies in training, assessment, certification and leadership.

 

Vice Admiral Ritchie made five recommendations in his report. I have agreed to implement all of his recommendations.

 

Of the five recommendations, four were Army-specific and I have tasked them to the Chief of Army. He has advised me that work has commenced on implementing these recommendations. I will now go through each of them.

 

First, Vice Admiral Ritchie recommended that Army conduct a thorough review of its system for assessing officers for command appointments and review the processes used to train, assess and certify those officers in the course of their force preparation.

 

Secondly, he recommended that Army consider the need for a manpower liability cover for the establishment of appointments to allow for the conduct of the Mission Rehearsal Exercise and pre deployment assessment of the force element.

 

Thirdly, Vice Admiral Ritchie recommended that Army formalise documentation covering the training and use of the TTP employed in theatre on the night of LT Fussell’s death.

 

Fourthly, he recommended that Army conduct an audit of Special Operations Command’s processes for force preparation and certification, benchmarking it against its methodology for non Special Forces units.

 

In relation to this recommendation, the Chief of Army appointed Major General John Cantwell to conduct this audit. Last week he delivered his report, which the Chief of Army and I have considered. In summary, the audit found:

 

a.                   the overall concept of Special Operations Command force preparation is sound and is appropriately sequenced, and the deficiencies evident in the preparation of the force element of which LT Fussell was part have been fully remediated in Special Operations Command.

b.                  That Directives and Orders relating to current force preparation are comprehensive documents and provide appropriate guidance, but would benefit from minor modifications to improve the precision of language and descriptions, and improved staff work to ensure they are released in a more timely fashion.

c.                   The training and Mission Rehearsal Exercises used to confirm the force preparation, particularly the two Full Mission Profiles, are high quality, effective activities.

d.                  The establishment of an Exercise Control organisation to manage Special Operations Command mission Rehearsal Exercises and provide higher control and lower control input works well and provides a realistic and challenging training environment for the deploying force element.

e.                   The current Special Operations Command certification process provides a suitable and effective basis for  determining the readiness of deploying force element.

f.                    Special Operations Headquarters should publish a single definitive Special Operations Command Certification Directive, containing all relevant information, checklists and reporting templates.

g.                   With regard to resourcing for Special Operations Command Mission Rehearsal Exercises, they were appropriately resourced, are supported by key non- Special Operations Command and non-Army assets where possible, and where shortfalls occur these are overcome by simulation or surrogates.

 

Vice Admiral Ritchie’s final recommendation was that the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry into the circumstances leading to the death of LT Fussell was not warranted.

 

Based on the recommendations of both Inquiry Officer reports, I have recommended, and the Minister for Defence has agreed, that a Commission of Inquiry into the death of LT Fussell is not required.

 

Unclassified versions of both Inquiry Officer reports have been placed on the Defence website. So too, has the Judge Advocate General’s legal advice to the Special Operations Commander, Major General McOwan, and Major General John Cantwell’s audit.

 

Redactions have been made in order to protect our personnel conducting operations and the privacy of the individuals involved.

 

Last week, I met with LT Fussell’s family and spoke with them about the tragic loss of their son, and the findings and recommendations of both Inquiry Officer reports. I have also provided them with copies of the reports.

 

LT Fussell was a dedicated, highly professional soldier. He was well-regarded by his peers, subordinates and superiors alike. His death is keenly felt by his many friends in the Army and indeed, all of us in the Australian Defence Force. Once again, I offer our condolences to his family and friends. LT Fussell’s sacrifice will not be forgotten; he died fighting to ensure the security of all Australians.

 

I’ll now take your questions.

 

 

Media contact: Defence Media Liaison: 02 6127 1999 or 0408 498 664