Media Room: Defence Speech

 

RELEASE OF INQUIRY OFFICER’S REPORT INTO THE DEATH OF PRIVATE GREG SHER

 

Press Conference, Thursday 7 May 2009

 

 

E&OE

 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARK EVANS:

 

Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. I am here today to release the findings of the inquiry officer’s report into the death of Private Gregory Michael Sher in Afghanistan on the 4 January this year.

 

The Chief of the Defence Force conducts inquiries into all operational deaths in order to determine the facts of the incidence. The release of the report into the circumstances and facts surrounding the death of Private Sher is part of this process and was led by Colonel Donald(*) Cousins with the help of two inquiry assistants.

 

Before I discuss the key findings of the report, I think it’s important to open with information about the environment and the operational context that surrounded the tragic events of Private Sher’s death.

 

The area in which the incident occurred was within a forward operating base located in the narrow Baluchi Pass which is dominated by maintenance across each side of the river. The area is sparsely populated and concentrated along the irrigation zone. The temperature range at the time was between minus ten and ten degrees Celsius and the incident occurred in the middle of the day and the visibility was good.

 

The winter in Oruzgan Province, this last season, was unusually mild. The Afghan National Army and our international security assistance force, including our own troops, were able to use this to their advantage by maintaining pressure on the Taliban insurgents, dominating areas where the Taliban thought that they had freedom of manoeuvre.

 

From late December into January, there was constant, intense and prolonged engagement by the Afghan and ISAF troops against the insurgents. These operations were aimed at pressurising the Taliban and its leadership and forcing them out of hiding.

A standing target for Afghan and Australian operations was Mullah Abdul Rasheed and non- improvised explosive device and rocket attack facilitator. On the 7 January, he was positively identified and subsequently targeted and killed.

 

Now, if I can turn to the details of the inquiry officer’s report. Private Greg Sher was a member of the Sydney-based first commander regiment and at the time of the attack; he was with the special operations task group patrol that had deployed from Tarin Kowt to a forward operating base in the Baluchi area.

 

Members of the patrol conducted a deliberate planning process for the operation which included an assessment of a range of insurgent and environmental threats.

 

Prior to their departure from Tarin Kowt, members of the patrol were given a thorough and detailed briefing which included actions which should be taken in the event of rocket attacks.

 

On the 2 January a rocket impacted about one kilometre from the patrol base and on the same day, another special operations task group patrol undertaking an operation further up into the Chora Valley was subjected to a rocket attack.

 

These had been the first rocket attacks for several months within this area of operations. When the patrol arrived at the forward operating base on the evening of the third of January, they were given a local threat assessment of a likely increase in insurgent rocket attacks over the fourth and fifth of January.

 

On the morning of the fourth, a special operations task group made their assessment that the likelihood of an effective rocket attack against the base was low. This was based in part, on the Taliban’s previous inaccuracy with this rocket system.

 

The inquiry officer concluded that this assessment was consistent with the information that was available at the time.

 

The inquiry officer found that pre-operational planning, orders and preparation were all adequate and did not contribute to the incident. The threat of the 107 millimetre rocket strike was considered, and appropriate risk analysis was conducted regarding the threat.     

 

In addressing the threat of rocket attack, our forces conduct constant patrols and surveillance to dominate potential firing points, they physically reinforce the areas where they work and live, issue personal protective equipment and adopt appropriate procedures to reduce the threat of wounding from a rocket attack.

Rockets are inherently inaccurate and this is amplified when improvised launches are used as shown on this slide.

 

The error rate for rockets increases between three to five times when an improvised launcher is used. The insurgents use improvised launchers and rudimentary timers that cause the rockets to function unpredictably.

 

They also fire them from long-distances due to our patrolling regime which creates further inaccuracy.

 

The 107 and 122 millimetre rockets are area weapons rather than designed to be used against pinpoint targets, they’re indiscriminate and are as much a threat to the local population in those areas as they are to our own soldiers.

 

The special operations patrol had stropped at the base in order to rest and conduct preparations for their forthcoming mission to disrupt insurgent operations further into the valley.

 

On the afternoon of the 4 January, the patrol base came under rocket attack from Taliban insurgents. There were two 107 millimetre rockets fired. One rocket fell short, but the other landed within the patrol base and struck Private Sher.

           

He received major trauma to his upper body. Soldiers in close proximity, and those who attended to him, believe that he was killed instantly. Not withstanding this, the treatment only ceased when it was obvious that Private Sher was not capable of being revived.

 

No other solider was wounded in this attack. At the time of the attack, a patrol was conducting its preparation and resting. Consistent with the perceived low threat of an effective rocket attack, Private Sher was not wearing a helmet or body armour at the time that he was struck by the rocket.

 

Not wearing body armour, in this instance was appropriate to the tactical situation. However, wearing body armour would not have saved Private Sher’s life, in this instance.

 

Following the rocket attack, the special operations task group called for an immediate aero medical evacuation.

 

However, once it was established that Private Sher had died of his wounds, the request was resubmitted at a lower priority.

This is standard practice for incidents involving death as it allows helicopters to attend other critical tasks and to assist those whose lives may be saved if they receive immediate medical attention.

 

The inquiry officer agreed that the steps undertaken in requesting the evacuation of Private Sher to Tarin Kowt were appropriate.

 

The inquiry officer included that the special operations task group was conducting an operation in accordance with its issued orders, established tactical procedures, and with due regard to the assessed risks.

 

The inquiry officer found that while no matters required immediate attention, a review of three defence documents was required. The inquiry officer noted that these reviews did not have any connection with the death of Private Sher.

 

The Chief of Defence Force has acted on the inquiry officer’s recommendations and these are to conduct a review of the joint task force standing instructions for forced protection, to make available for quick assess the existing defence instruction on mortuary affairs, and to staff and release a draft, defence instruction, regarding deceased members’ personal effects as a matter of priority.

 

It was a view of the inquiry officer that a commission of inquiry was not warranted in this instance.

 

Private Sher’s family, his partner, and the units involved have been briefed on the outcomes of the inquiry office’s report. His death is deeply felt by all of us in the Australian Defence Force.

 

And we, again, offer our condolences to his family and friends. Private Sher’s death was an unfortunately and un –highly unlikely occurrence. It as an extraordinary and tragic event. While our soldiers are well-trained and well equipped, conflicts such as this always come with great risks and sadly there will always be a possibility that we will lose good soldiers like Private Sher.

 

Now an unclassified version of the inquiry officer’s report will be available today for download from the Defence website.

 

And reductions have made – have been made to the original report in order to protect our operating procedures. With that in mind I am not prepared to take questions on the death of Private Sher.

 

 

 

 

 

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