Media Room: Defence Speech

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL ANGUS HOUSTON, CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

 

SPEECH TO RUSI CONFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, 16 MAY, 2007

 

Introduction

It is a great pleasure to be here this morning.

 

I extend my thanks to Major General Hartley, from RUSI, and Brigadier Dawson, from the Australian Defence College, for the invitation to speak here today.

 

I also extend my thanks to Dr Ryan for his kind words of introduction.

 

It is my intention to speak on the topic of ‘The ADF of the Future’. However, before looking at the future, I would like to begin my remarks with some commentary on ‘The ADF of the Present’.

 

The ADF of the Present

The Australian Defence Force stands in defence of Australia and our national interests.

Our work is serious and difficult, and far too often, arduous and dangerous.

 

We are called upon to perform diverse challenging tasks in fulfilling our mission—some very close to home and others further afield. The world in which we operate is complex and unpredictable.

 

Yet, our purpose is very clear: we are responsible to the Government of Australia for the protection of Australia, our people and our national interests, whenever and wherever those interests lie.

 

In undertaking this mission the Australian Defence Force (ADF), enabled by the Defence Organisation, might act independently, or it might contribute to a broader effort of other Australian or international civilian agencies or military forces.

 

The first few years of the 21st century have demonstrated that the dangers confronting us can take many forms.

Some dangers are traditional, and relate to state-on-state tensions over territory, resources or the balance and distribution of power.

 

Some are old challenges in new guises, such as the emergence of new terrorist groups and potentially pandemic diseases.

 

Some challenges are entirely new, such as climate change and the impacts of global demography.  And some are natural dangers, such as cyclones, earthquakes and tsunamis, to name just a few.

 

There’s no question that the ADF’s tempo of operations has lifted markedly in the last decade or so.

Between 1980 and 1989 there were 16 ADF operational deployments involving just over 1,000 personnel.  Between 1990 and 1999 there were 82 operational deployments involving nearly 17,000 personnel. 

 

Of course, since then, our tempo has only increased.

 

More than 35,000 ADF personnel have taken part in the deployments between 2001 and 2007. This peaked in June last year when we had 5,200 personnel deployed around the world.

 

We currently have about 3,850 ADF men and women deployed on operations, with another 500 deployed on security tasks in our maritime protection zone.

 

It is a testament to the complexity of our current security environment that our people are involved in an array of situations, using a wide variety of the skills from war fighting to peace keeping.

 

They are undertaking border surveillance, fisheries protection, support to United Nations mandated operations, coalition operations, some national support tasks, and third country deployments.

 

Overall, I could not be more pleased with how all our operations continue to progress and how well we are able to achieve our many and varied tasks.

 

Of course, I remind you that when the Australian Defence Force (ADF) commits personnel to overseas service, it is not only the military facets of Defence that are affected.

 

The flow-on effect to the rest of our organisation—policy, logistics, intelligence, the three services, people, health and strategy, to name just a few—is significant.

 

Moreover, in addition to the normal stresses caused by deployments, some of our recent operations have been quite complex in nature, requiring a high level of interaction with other nations, international organisations and other Australian Government Departments.

 

This additional collaboration makes these operations even more intricate for our organisation.

Needless to say, our people here at home are doing an exceptional job enabling our operational commitment.

The reputation of the ADF as a world-class fighting force is due, not only to our performance as a defence force overseas, but also to our performance as a defence organisation here at home.

 

I deeply appreciate the way in which Aussie servicemen and women are supported before, during and after deployment.

 

Of course it goes without saying that people are my number one priority. I continue to work tirelessly for their welfare and strive to empower them in order for them to perform as well as they can.

 

That said, there are a number of areas in which we are currently striving to improve as an organisation.

 

Last month the Secretary and I agreed to implement nearly all the recommendations of the Defence Management Review, or DMR.

 

Initiated by the Minister in August last year to investigate organisational efficiency and effectiveness, the report made 53 recommendations as to how our department can improve.

 

Of these 53 recommendations, the Secretary and I agreed to implement 50 recommendations fully and two in part.

 

The DMR identifies the success Defence has had over the past decade in an unprecedented period of high operational activity.

 

But it also notes the stress this has placed on Defence to deliver administratively when its main focus is on supporting military operations in deployments around the world.

 

This report makes some frank criticisms about our performance in some key areas.

 

There is clearly a need for greater clarity in our accountabilities; there is a need to be more responsive in supporting our ministers and the government of the day; we need to continue the development of our long term planning; we need to streamline our governance systems so that we come up with a better way of making decisions; and we need to better understand our business systems and processes, most particularly in the area of service delivery and Information and Communication Technology. 

 

I want it to be clear that the Secretary and I welcome this report and its recommendations.

We are totally committed to implementing the recommendations that we have accepted and believe the DMR is a good opportunity for our organisation to get better at the way we do business.

 

Additionally, in talking about the ADF of the present it would be remiss of me not to mention the single biggest strategic issue confronting the ADF—that is of course, retention and recruiting.

 

We are currently implementing a number of innovative strategies whereby we can compete effectively in a very competitive market.

The ADF needs to grow to a full time strength of 57,000 by 2016, an increase from the approximately 51,000 we currently have.  To achieve this, enlistment to the full time force needs to increase from around 4,670 personnel per year to 6,500.  And we will need to retain more people by reducing our separation rate from over 11 to below 10 per cent per year. 

 

At the end of last year the Prime Minister announced $1 billion of new funding over the next decade towards stabilising, growing and maintaining our Defence Force.  This was the first phase of a major overhaul of ADF recruitment and retention strategies, with further phases being developed this year.

 

This package focuses on streamlining the ADF recruitment processes, making a career in the ADF more accessible and financial retention incentives to maintain the ADF as an employer of choice. We are achieving some early successes.

 

In terms of retention bonuses, 86% of those offered Army expansion bonuses have accepted them and 81% of those offered a critical employment category bonus of $25,000 to stay in a critical trade have accepted them.

 

In terms of ADF recruitment, full-time General Entry recruitment is at 92%; overall full-time recruitment is at 88%; and Fulltime and Reserves overall entry is at 86%.  What this means is that the ADF has recruited 1004 more full time and Reserve personnel this year than at this time last year.

 

The Budget this year tripled the amount of money allocated to specific Recruiting and Retention Bonuses raising the total above 3 billion dollars.

 

These new measures include not only medium term financial incentives but also enduring improvements in conditions of service to systemically fix the environment in which our young men and women work and live.

 

Specifically we are allocating money to:

·        A modern and more flexible pay structure for other ranks;

·        Enhanced assistance through a new Defence Home Ownership Assistance Scheme;

·        Further reforms to Defence Force Recruiting and improved Service marketing and branding;

·        The introduction of a new Defence Apprenticeship scheme and improvements to Cadets; and

·        Further investment in our Navy and in the professional development of our Defence medical officers.

 

This commitment is being positively received by our work force. There is still work to be done, but I believe these promising early figures show we are on the right track.

 

But that is enough about our current issues; I hope I have given you a very broad overview of where today’s ADF is currently situated.

 

I will turn now to the topic at hand, that is—“The ADF of the Future”.

 

The ADF of the Future

My vision for the future is one where the ADF is a balanced, networked and deployable force, staffed by dedicated and professional people, that operates within a culture of adaptability and excels at joint and coalition operations.

 

In order to ensure the Australian Defence Organisation is embarking on a journey that will steer the ADF towards achieving this vision, today I release the departmental document, Joint Operations for the 21st Century.

 

This document describes how we will best utilise the capabilities of our force to respond to the challenges, the opportunities and the uncertainties of the future in order to meet our commitments to the Australian Government.

 

It provides guidance for how we should operate across a spectrum of activities—from humanitarian assistance and the provision of logistics support, to high-intensity combat.

 

In the future, we know that we must be able to fight well—but we know also that in an increasingly complex world, we will have to do more than fight.

 

Joint Operations for the 21st Century paints a picture of a joint force operating effectively as part of an integrated national response to events.  This force will act to reach, know and exploit the future operating environment.

 

The purpose of this document is to act as a spur to our thinking about how we will fight in the future.  In particular, this document orients every man and woman in Defence toward the future – it gives us all an understanding of where we will stand in the world in 2030 and the kinds of things we will be called upon to do.

 

It also describes the attributes of the future force – not what we will have in terms of capability necessarily, but how we will behave.

 

My vision of a balanced, networked and deployable force is supplemented here with qualities that include being integrated and interoperable, survivable and robust, ready and responsive.

 

In many ways, of course, these are already features of the Australian approach to warfighting, but for the future force, as we shall see, these are ever more important qualities, ones that we must foster if we are to continue to thrive in the challenging future environment.

 

The shape of the future strategic environment

Of course, before we can position ourselves to thrive in the future environment, we must ask ourselves what shape this future environment will take.

 

Predicting the future is tricky business, and as such we can only begin to sketch the contours of what we will face come 2030.

That said, we can safely predict that armed force will remain an important element of international affairs, and we cannot guarantee that Australia will remain free from threat to our national security in the long term.

 

While the international system can act to constrain the use of force, we cannot dismiss the possibility of major conflict between states.

 

Other threats to Australia’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and broader national interests could also challenge our security in a way that requires the application of military force.

 

Global factors (such as terrorism, pandemic disease, resource depletion and the security impacts of climate change) and regional factors (such as state fragility, poor governance and economic underdevelopment) may affect Australia’s security interests, both directly and indirectly.

 

These threats may be compounded by factors such as the impacts of globalisation, the rise of new military powers, newly emerging technologies, or the growth in other non-traditional challenges.

 

Singly, any one of these threats could disrupt the military balance between states or present non‑state actors with an opportunity to challenge state power.

 

Together they shape the new security environment within which the ADF must operate. In particular, we face an environment in which rapid rates of technological change and the altering human organisation of warfare have the capacity to substantially enhance the capabilities of our future adversaries. These challenges include:

 

·        readily available ‘low-tech’ capabilities;

·        increasingly secure and sophisticated command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems;

·        increasingly lethal, survivable, and deployable conventional platforms; and,

·        increasingly available Advanced Conventional Weapons.

 

The increasing lethality and precision within certain battlespaces (particularly those principally suited for maritime and air force elements) means that we will seek to reduce both the footprint and the vulnerability of deployed forces.

 

At the same time, the ADF should expect to be involved in more operations that are low-intensity, particularly stabilisation operations, that require a demonstrably visible presence on the ground.

 

This tension between force presence and force protection will be a principal issue for the ADF in the foreseeable future.

 

At a national level we can also identify a number of trends that will require us to adapt the way we operate in order to operate successfully into the future.

 

Our deepening interdependence with our allies and the global military-industrial system, for example, will require us to alter our definition of self-reliance from one that calls for self-sufficiency, to one that understands the ADF will operate with support from multiple global sources, in the form of enabling capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as in terms of the supply of essential war stocks and sustainment.

 

What we will be called on to do

This brings us to the question of what we will be called on to do in the future.

While armed conflict will continue to involve the application of organised force in combat environments, the conduct of joint warfare will include both violent and non-violent applications of military power.

 

In 2030, the ADF will need to be able to do the following.

 

Firstly, in keeping with long-standing Government policy, we will need to be able to defend Australian territory against credible threat without relying on the combat forces of other countries.

 

Secondly, we will need to be able to provide joint forces to contribute to, or lead, coalition operations in Australia’s neighbourhood.

 

Thirdly, the future force will be called upon to contribute to coalition operations further away.

We will also continue to support United Nations activities and honour other longstanding multinational commitments; contribute to crisis response as part of a coalition effort in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; as well as routinely work with other government departments to provide options to Government to protect and promote Australian interests.

 

Finally, we will continue to be called upon to provide regional situational awareness to a global commitment of military force.

 

As is apparent, many of the things we will be called upon to do are responses to contingencies that could arise with little to no notice. The brevity of warning time almost ensures that we will join the fight with a ‘come as you are’ force.

 

This means that our future force will need to be appropriately structured to manage the risks posed by our uncertain future strategic environment.

 

In particular, this means the ADF will need to be structured such that we can provide Government with key strategic response options, as well as perform necessary pervasive and ongoing strategic actions.

 

These include maintaining and enhancing our ability to:

·        understand the geopolitical and operational context and maintain appropriate situational awareness;

·        shape (and deter) the choices of potential adversaries seeking to directly attack Australia or its interests;

·        defeat any potential adversary seeking to launch attacks on Australia;

·        deny operational freedom to any potential adversary or security threat within the immediate neighbourhood; and,

·        quickly and decisively assist the civil authorities of Australia by providing military assistance;

·        Understanding and shaping our environment; deterring, defeating and denying our adversaries; and assisting Australia’s civil authorities – these are the core strategic response options that the future force will provide to Government.

 

A National Effects-Based Approach

In order to perform these key strategic tasks, the future force will build on our already substantial commitment to a national-effects based approach.

 

A national-effects based approach views our nation and our enemy as operating in one global system with political, economic, military and social dimensions, where actions in one dimension, for example the economic dimension, can have direct impacts on another, including the military dimension.

 

Therefore, tasks performed by the ADF – and Defence more generally – are but one component of the suite of tools that can be used by the Australian Government as it goes about protecting and promoting our national interests.

 

For the ADF, seeing ourselves as a single integrated tool in service of the Government has a number of implications.

 

Firstly, it means that in fact we need to be a fully integrated force, so that our actions work together to enhance the effects that we seek to produce.

 

The ADF has already embraced network-centric warfare as a key enabler of our capability through generating tempo, precision and combat power.  Network-centric warfare therefore is one step on the road to a fully integrated force, one which goes beyond simply jointness.

 

Another step includes the creation of the integrated Headquarters Joint Operations Command at Bungendore, NSW.

 

Secondly, we need to be part of an integrated whole-of-government response. Defence may not always be the lead agency for dealing with security challenges, and we need to be prepared for, and highly capable at, working with other government departments.

 

We need to go from using an inter-agency approach to ‘get through’ a crisis, to using a multi-agency approach, where we work together on an ongoing basis to meet the Government’s goals through providing an integrated response.

 

This is a big move forward for the future, and Defence will need to take a number of steps to achieve this for 2030.

 

 

As a start, we may need to include agencies with recurring and major roles in response operations, such as the Australian Federal Police and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in our planning and operational processes.

 

Representatives of such organisations should not be involved simply as liaison officers but rather should be integrated parts of the planning and operations staff.

 

Another real challenge will be to extend our network to agencies outside of the ADF and Defence.  These will need to be tailored to allow external agencies to perform their roles and tasks relative to the contingency.

 

One method might be to distribute a baseline capability that can be expanded rapidly to meet changing circumstances.

 

Multi-dimensional Manoeuvre

However, despite the need to consider the whole-of-Government dimension of our responses, the ADF and Defence bring a formidable set of strategic response options to Government in our own right.

 

Our abilities to understand and, to a certain extent, shape the security environment, to deter, defeat and deny potential adversaries, and to assist civil authorities are unmatched thanks both to our scale and our rather unique capabilities.

 

To make best use of our capabilities, we need to think carefully about how we will apply them in the future.

 

Our new Joint Operations for the 21st Century document replaces the old Future Warfighting Concept. The Future Warfighting Concept articulated for the first time the principle of Multi-dimensional Manoeuvre as our approach to future warfare.

 

Multi-dimensional Manoeuvre seeks to negate the adversary’s strategy through the intelligent and creative application of an effects-based approach against an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.  It uses an indirect approach to defeat the adversary’s will to oppose us.

 

Multi-dimensional manoeuvre focuses on achieving effects which create a dilemma for our adversary that they cannot resolve.  This task requires a deep understanding of an adversary, the environment and the capability of our own forces.

 

In particular, we need to understand how the adversary views their goals and their own capabilities.

 

Achieving this understanding – and then finding the right tools to create the necessary effect – will of course require Defence to share information and plan collaboratively with other government agencies.

 

But we will also need to be able to generate sufficient tempo to undermine our adversary, be sufficiently agile to recover from the inevitable surprises of our future, and be able to achieve effects simultaneously across the spectrum of the adversary’s activities.

Perhaps in some ways against the prevailing wisdom, Multidimensional Manoeuvre sees possibilities for a conventional military force to fight asymmetrically – through tailoring our operations so we do not fight like with like, or avoiding battle on unfavourable terms altogether.

 

Further, deception and surprise are parts of an asymmetric attitude that refuses to accept conflict on the adversary’s terms.

 

Achieving Multi-dimensional Manoeuvre relies on the effective utilisation of what we term the joint warfighting functions. That is, to undertake defence operations, we need to be able to generate and sustain, deploy, protect and apply our forces.

 

We also need to be able to command and control that force, as well as we need to achieve knowledge dominance. Knowledge dominance is not, as it might seem, the simple gathering and dissemination of ever more information.

 

It is a human driven component of warfighting: it is about using modern information technology and network-centric warfare to enable humans to better understand their environment, themselves and their enemy. People are the key to warfighting capabilities, and knowledge dominance enables our people to do their jobs better, faster and in ever more challenging circumstances.

 

However, knowledge dominance will involve recognising that information is both a boon and a burden in hierarchical organisations like the ADF – we need to get the right level of detail to the right person at the right time, no more and no less.

 

A Joint Operations Concept

Knowledge dominance, and each of the joint warfighting functions, will enable the future force to perform multidimensional manoeuvre.

 

However, simply describing what Multi-dimensional Manoeuvre hopes to achieve and the functions of the future force does not provide us with a sense of how the future force will operate.

 

At the heart of Joint Operations for the 21st Century, phrased in an appropriately straight-forward manner, there is a description of how the future force will operate.  The future force’s actions will be described by our ability to reach, know and exploit.

 

Reach describes the future force’s ability to operate in multiple spatial dimensions and across the physical, virtual and human domains in order to achieve our strategic objectives.

 

Here in Australia, the breadth of our territory requires us to pay close attention to our ability to reach: sometimes it is not even a matter of reaching far flung places, but simply a matter of reaching forward positioned bases.

 

But physical distance is not the only dimension of reach, since our ability to reach across other domains – particularly the human domain – will require us to be part of the integrated whole-of-government response I spoke of earlier.

Knowing is related to our ability to achieve knowledge dominance, and will require us to turn information into knowledge that is timely, relevant and accurate.

 

Knowledge will need to be acquired, refined, prioritised, refined and shared vertically (across strategic, operational and tactical levels) as well horizontally (within the joint force and as part of multi-agency efforts). However, reaching and knowing are in themselves not enough. Together, they must enable the future force to identify and create effects that must ultimately be exploited.

 

Conclusion—Attributes of the Future Force

In conclusion, if we can effectively utilise the operating concept of reach, know and exploit to achieve multidimensional manoeuvre, then we should be poised to take on the uncertainties of our future strategic environment.

 

However, the future is just that – uncertain –and no concept can pretend to survive contact with the enemy.

 

In fact, concepts are just an idea of how we might do something, a vision for the future. They need to be developed and challenged and extrapolated. They need to be tested and refined.

 

Joint Operations for the 21st Century describes what we want from our future force.

 

It is an iteration of the Future Joint Operating Concept as described in Defence’s Strategic Planning Framework, and it will guide our concept development and experimentation, our doctrinal development, and the testing of our future capabilities.

 

The future force it describes is a recognisable development from our current force. This future force is balanced, networked and deployable.

 

As we have seen, this force is integrated and interoperable; survivable and robust; ready and responsive; agile and versatile.

 

However, to achieve the effects we think will be required into the future, this force also needs to be persistent and poised; sustainable; and capable of concurrency. It is a future force designed to achieve our mission of defending Australia and our national interests well into this unpredictable century.

I will leave it there for today. I am now happy take any questions you may have for me.

 

 

Media contacts:

Defence Media Liaison                                     02 6265 3343              0408 498 664

 

 

For a free subscription to Defence Direct, the Minister for Defence's monthly e-newsletter, please follow this link:

http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/defencedirect/spt/subscribe.html