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        As well as that, we do have a small force deployed in Baghdad undertaking security detachment operations.
        With the reduced likelihood of compromised missions, it's now appropriate to pass on some information about the achievements of the Special Forces Task Group on Operation Falconer.  However while it's immediate tasks may have finished, the tactics, techniques and procedures of the task group are still extremely sensitive.  So you will understand that I can't go into a lot of technical detail of the operations conducted.  This detail needs to be protected to maintain our decisive edge into the future.

        I can, however, give you a broad sense of the tasks carried out by the task group and the conditions in which they operated.  I'll also highlight a couple of the more interesting operations and activities that they got up to.

        As you know, the main element of the Special Forces Task Group deployed to the Middle East in mid-February under the auspices of Operation Bastilles.  The aim was to acclimatise and prepare for possible roles in the war against Iraq.

        At the same time, an Australian Special Operations Forward Command element stood up in theatre to command all Special Forces operations in the Middle East.  The Special Forces Task Group was manned by personnel from Headquarters Special Operations, the Special Air Service Regiment in Perth, 4RAR Commando, the Logistics Support Force, the Incident Response Regiment, the 5th Aviation Regiment, numerous support folks from the Army and a couple from the Royal Australian Air Force.

        The SF Headquarters was part of a clearly defined command chain which ensured that Australian Special Forces were always commanded by Australians.  The headquarters not only commanded the Special Forces Task Group, but provided an important command link to Headquarters Australian Theatre in Sydney and the Australian National Command Headquarters.

        It was also linked closely to the equivalent Special Operations Command element for the United States, and was co-located.  This was critical to ensure a full observation and transparency of Coalition Special Forces activities and, from all reports, the relationship worked exceptionally well.

        By early February our Coalition planning had evolved to give us a clearly understood role of what we might have to undertake should the ADF commit forces.

        Let me dwell on this role for a moment.  In accordance with clear government guidance, it was agreed that if there was an eventual Australian commitment, the task group was to conduct special operations in western Iraq as part of the Coalition effort to defeat the weapons of mass destruction threat.

        Specifically our job was aimed at denying Iraq the ability to launch theatre ballistic missiles in the west.  Other missions included harassing operations, destruction of critical command and control nodes, and operations to prevent freedom of movement of the Iraqis in the theatre.  Now, all of these sub-missions - essentially sub-missions - contributed to that role to prevent the launch of theatre ballistic missiles.

        Let me talk briefly about the lead up in theatre.  When our main contingent arrived in the Middle East in early February, it started training on the premise that it might be committed.  To think otherwise would certainly risk failure if we were committed.

        Consequently, the task group conducted what is known as 'Full Mission Profile Exercises' by day and night.  Stepping through the full range of contingencies that could expect, if committed, to Iraq.

        This intensive realistic training period enabled the soldiers to acclimatise in the environmental conditions that they might expect, and to hone their skills.  This acclimatisation period proved to be a fundamental effort to the eventual success on their operations.

        Additionally, Coalition interoperability was critical to the operation.  Being able to understand and work with both the UK and the US was crucial as we relied heavily upon their close air support.  Any doubt about or confusion about your location in relation to your Coalition partners in today's fast-moving battlefield is a recipe for disaster and could easily end up with friendly casualties.

        Our thorough preparation and interoperability equipment prepared us for any potential problems we may have experienced.

        A word or two about each of the task units before focusing on events in Iraq.  Of course whilst the acclimatisation training was taking place, the task group was establishing a logistic support infrastructure to support the forces once deployed on operations.  The Combat Service Support Group was primarily responsible for this effort.  The group consisted of 77 people drawn from nine Army units across all different States.  It had the pivotal role of providing communications support, ordering stores, warehousing, managing freight distribution and providing resupply to our deployed forces, and that resupply was normally by air.

        Among other support services, workshop mechanics logged over 500 hours a month servicing the wide-range of vehicles used by the Special Air Service Regiment.

        Strong winds gusting up to 50 kilometres per hour challenged the group's patience, blowing away tents and getting dust into everything.  Fortunately communications and computer networks held up in the same demanding conditions.

        The CH47s provided critical combat service support in the rear areas to free the US and the UK aircraft for combat tasks.  As you can imagine, landing a helicopter in a vast dust and sand pit where the pilot's vision is virtually totally obscured is not an easy task to master.  Fortunately our pilots mastered it expertly.

        Overall, they made a considerable contribution to the Coalition effort, and were greatly appreciated and were an integral part of the task group and, as I said earlier, the Coalition effort.

        The Incident Response Regiment was co-located with the Commando Alert Force.  Its task was to deploy into Iraq at short notice to assist in the detection of weapons of mass destruction associated with materials that may have been discovered by the SAS.  These guys are highly skilled in what they do and they have an equipment suit that provides an excellent detection capability. 

        As it eventuated, the detachment did deploy to Alisad* to conduct a search of this massive facility. The process took days and fully tested the detachment's overall ability to systematically search an enormous areas.  It was scattered with buildings, bunkers and a massive amount of equipment was littered around the base.

        No weapons of mass destruction were found.  But the fact that the task group could undertake this task without relying on our coalition supporters, under-ride the robust stand-alone capability that Australia had deployed to this area.

        The Commando element could have been regarded as the cavalry of the task force.  If the SAS or others got into strife they could deploy to help out.  To achieve this they established an alert force capability which could be reacted in the event of an emergency such as a downed or lost aircrew, recovery of wounded personnel, or assistance to threatened SAS patrols.

        The alert force also included helicopter assets, medical support and the Incident Response Regiment detachment.  It was reassuring for the SAS to know that if they got into trouble we had an alert force manned by the commandoes, all Australians of course, who could come in and support them.

        While the alert force was never activated in anger, the commandoes were tasked, towards the end of the campaign, to assist the SAS in clearing the large Alisad Air Base.  They've also been used in Baghdad to secure the Australian mission, and also were one of the first Australian elements into Baghdad with Operation Baghdad Assist, where the medical supplies were flown in.

        Let me now focus on the SAS contribution.  Firstly the conditions.  The western desert of Iraq is an inhospitable place.  It's open and bare with few places to hide.   As such, it's difficult to move anywhere without being detected by the Bedouins or local Iraqis.  The SAS Task Group experienced all the extremes that a desert can offer.  Early on the temperatures dropped to minus five degrees, and that's not taking into account the wind chill factor.

        Later in the operations, temperatures exceeded 40 degrees Celsius.  On one occasion sandstorms blew constantly for two days with winds averaging 30 kilometres an hour, reducing visibility to 10 metres.

        On another occasion, it rained so heavily that the task group's weapons systems were being clogged and jammed by wind-blown mud.  Apart from that, you can say it was perfect weather.

        Let me break down my presentation here into three parts.  Firstly in the insertion:  Secondly, a heavy combat phase:  And, lastly, highway interdiction and the security of Alisad Air Base. 

        I won't go into absolute chronological detail, as I'd have you here all day.  But what I want to do is capture a few highlights of each of those phases.

        Firstly in the insertion.  This in itself was quite an achievement.  The force inserted by night by vehicle and helicopter into areas remote from friendly conventional forces.  The intent was to insert clandestinely and get deep into the assigned area before the sun came up.

        The vehicle insertion involved breaching an earth and boom and trench system in negotiating a network of Iraqi guardposts undetected. This was achieved successfully, however 30 kilometres inside Iraq the force bumped into a number of enemy vehicles.  These were engaged by fire and then detained.

        As they later found out, this was one of the first ground contacts of the war.  This was the incident where the SAS medics rendered first-aid to a couple of wounded Iraqi soldiers. 

        Now, due to the need to continue the mission, the enemy were released and the force moved on. 
        They arrived where they planned to be just on first light without further mishap. 
        Let's have a look at the helicopter insertions.  These were also successful conducted.  But the difficulty and risk of these types of activities should not be underestimated.  The US helicopter force carrying our people flew over 600 kilometres from the SAS staging base deep into Iraq.  By night, and it was poor weather and much of it was at very low altitude.

        In the process they had to conduct a difficult air-to-air refuelling activity, as well as negotiate an extensive enemy air defence system.  You should also note that when our people hit the ground, they were at that time by far and away the closest coalition ground elements to Baghdad, and they remained that way for a number of days.

        So much for the insertion.  The troops may have thought the insertion was demanding and exhilarating, but there was  lot more to come and what followed certainly set the tone for the campaign.  The intention of the commander on the ground was not to sit back and wait for the enemy to come to him, or wait for him to deploy his scud missiles.  Rather, he undertook to commit to aggressive operations to unmask the enemy in terms of his intent, his location and his strength.

        Now, this involved high tempo offensive patrolling in a controlled sequence across the area of operations.  Now, at the same time, he needed to maintain a static surveillance on the main access roads down which the enemy could deploy his scuds or the main larger conventional reaction forces.

        This phase coincided with exceptional heavy period of activity in the first week of the war.  Virtually every day the SAS were in some form of heavy contact with the enemy.  This was no accident.  The enemy was clearly seeking out the Australian force in a coordinated and well-drilled fashion.  Whilst at the same time the SAS were intentionally meeting him head on with unpredictable shock engagements.  However, the enemy couldn't keep pace with this high-tempo shock activity and were ultimately beaten in this phase.

        On the second night in Iraq, a good proportion of the SAS force was involved in a raid on what turned out to be a well-defended radio relay station.  This was a carefully planned and coordinated activity.  It was conducted by night and it involved a very methodical ground and airborne surveillance activity to collect as much information about the site as possible.

        The attack used carefully placed cut offs and a sequenced assault to clear the facility, and then it was followed by close air support to destroy the tower.

        Surprise was achieved, and a sharp but one-sided firefight ensued with a significant number of casualties from the enemy.  The facility was destroyed, as planned.  This operation immediately decreased the Iraqi theatre ballistic missile capability, and also sent a very strong message to the Iraqi leadership in Baghdad.

        As expected, that activity stirred up a hornets nest.  And on the following morning an SAS element was involved in a running firefight for a significant number of hours.  They were engaged by five or six armed vehicles, but the SAS used superior tactical manoeuvre and an application of heavy weapons to destroy most of the force.  The enemy in disarray eventually withdrew through a number of buildings, but they were pursued by well-directed close air support and were ultimately defeated.

        Throughout this firefight, and other firefights, the enemy were engaged by the SAS using a significant number of weapons.  We used javelin rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, Mach 19 grenade launchers and sniper rifles.  This heavy lay down of fire power, coupled with the aggressive front foot approach of the SAS, and extensive use of close air support, was enough to break the spirit of the most demanding enemy assault.

        On a separate occasion in the first few days, another small element was confronted with a force of about 50 enemy.  They were mounted in civilian four-wheel drive vehicles and trucks.  This force aggressively assaulted the Australians using rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and machine guns.  The SAS held their ground, and despite stoppages on main weapons systems, destroyed the four-wheel drive vehicles and forced the enemy to dismount from their vehicles and trucks, which made them extremely vulnerable.

        The SAS pushed forward aggressively and routed the enemy.  It was here that one soldier, due to the stoppage as I mentioned earlier, used all four of the available weapon systems mounted on his long-range patrol vehicle.  Systematically moving from weapon system to weapon system, he was able to engage the enemy targets at vastly different ranges at enemy in different circumstances.  Certainly testament to the skill of the SAS soldier.

        There were a number of other engagements similar to this in the first three or four days, which quite clearly set the enemy on the back foot from the outset and from which I can honestly say they didn't recover.

        The intensity of this phase was such that the SAS were on full throttle without any real sleep for 96 hours.  In contrast to the frantic pace, another SAS element had been concealed in observation positions overlooking highway ten.

        And testament to their skill, they remained undetected throughout the period.  This was a significant and equally demanding task given the environmental demands, the numbers of enemy around and also the nomadic bedouin that move around in this area.

        The contrast was striking.  On the one hand, I've just described, our large force moving at a million miles an hour, daily engaging the enemy with aggressive firefights.  And, on the other hand, we have a separate force operating with equal skill, equal daring, but with great skill and great stealth.  Both were an important contribution to the campaign.

        In the early stages of the campaign it was apparent that the kilometre 160 feature - which is essentially a cross roads and a truck stop that you can see in the centre of the map there - needed to be neutralised.  At one stage upwards of 200 enemy defended the feature.  The SAS, using high-powered optics standing off from the target, called in air support on to pinpoint targets over a 48 hour period to destroy the facility.

        They then assembled a large vehicle-mounted force to assault and clear the installation.  Unfortunately, but as expected, the remaining enemy had withdrawn under cover of a sandstorm.

        The SAS's standoff capability as agents for air power was critical to provide pinpoint guidance against targets which were indistinguishable from the air.

        Now, just as importantly, the SAS were able to confirm that this target, this important target, had been neutralised.

        Thus less than a week into the war, enemy opposition within the Australian area of operations was effectively neutralised.  The enemy's pro-active and coordinated counter special operations tactics that could have worked well against an ill-prepared force was ineffective in the face of an exceptionally aggressively and high tempo warfare waged by the Australians.

        At this point it was clear that the enemy's ability to launch theatre ballistic missiles from the west had been neutralised.  The psychological impact was also significant upon the Iraqis.  Quite clearly they were unhinged.  It was the Special Forces tactic, and this objective was also clearly achieved.

        About a week into the campaign the area quietened down  and the SAS became more and more involved in highway interdiction tasks.  Basically the task here was to deny enemy escape routes of high value targets, but also at the same time to deny foreign regime supporters from moving in to Baghdad.  So you can effectively see we've got people moving from both sides of these potential checkpoints.

        Therefore it wasn't without its risks, and particularly given the suicide bomber threat and the SAS needed to approach it with a very cautious and thorough manner.  They had to constantly change their locations and methods so as not to set a pattern.  Clearly if you set a pattern this gives the opposition the opportunity to prepare themselves with some sort of suicide bomb capability.

        The experienced success on a number of occasions culminated in the capture of a significant number of likely Feda'eyan and Ba'ath Party members, along with considerable amount of cash as they tried to exit the country.  They also apprehended convoys carrying communications equipment's and gasmasks.

        The last significant activity involving the SAS was the capture of the massive Alisad* Air Base.  This enormous facility was one of Iraq's largest air bases.  The SAS found it defended and occupied with a large number, in the order of 100 or so, armed looters requiring comprehensive and forceful operations to secure.

        The operation therefore required both boldness and cunning for such a small number in the Special Forces Task Group to take such a large air base manned by such a large number of forces.

        In one engagement, to avoid unnecessary casualties and despite being engaged by the looters heavy weapon, the SAS Command had ordered his snipers to place well-aimed shots quite close to the looters to scare them away.  Fortunately it had the desired effect.

        Upon securing the base, they conducted a very lengthy and potentially highly dangerous room by room clearance of the facility.  There was always the danger of mines and booby traps and therefore this taken into consideration and the size of the base, it took at least 36 hours to clear.  The facility contained in excess of 50 MiG jets, and 7.9 million kilograms of explosive ordnance.

        While the SAS were operating to secure the air base, flying overhead we had Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18 fighter jets providing overwatch.  Shortly afterwards, the commandoes and the Incident Response Regiment came into assist securing and searching the base.  Over the following days the task group cleared and repaired the runways to allow an air link to be established and the first fixed wing aircraft into Al Asad was an Australian 36 Squadron C-130 aircraft. 

        Significantly at this point probably the largest gathering of Australian Special Operations Forces ever deployed into hostile territory was gathered at Al Asad.  And appropriate was being supported by Royal Australian Air Force fighter and transport aircraft.

        This was a very proud moment for the Special Forces Task Group and I think for the Australian Defence Force as well.

        You might also be aware that this is where we hosted the CDF, the Minister and the Chief of Army.  And, once again, we were very proud to be able to do that.  And it's also the area in which we commemorated our Anzac Day Service.

        I think I'll finish on that high note.  I hope I've given you an insight into what the Special Forces Task Group was involved in on Operation Falconer.  We headquarters folk are enormously proud of what the task group have been able to achieve, and we're certainly looking forward to having them back all safe and sound over the next couple of weeks. 

        I'd be more than happy to take any of your questions.
QUESTION:       Mark Forbes from The Age, Colonel.  You talked about that initial engagement as being one of the first exchanges by ground forces.  There were some suggestions, I think, emanating from a fellow called George Bush that it might have actually been the very first engagement on the ground in Iraq.

        If that is correct, do you know - can you tell us roughly the time and date of that occurring?  And can you also now tell us when the insertions that you described there actually occurred?  At what point was the first time that SAS forces actually entered Iraq?

QUESTION:       So at what time did that actually occur?  What was the time and date of that actually happening?
COLONEL MANSELL:        As I said, it was the first period of darkness after the government announced that Australia would be - commit to operations in support of the US against Iraq.

QUESTION:       Which part of the highway did we have?
COLONEL MANSELL:        We were generally in the area between Ramadi and Ar Rutba. 
QUESTION:       Colonel, Jo Ball.  In the insertion period you said the SAS engaged the enemy, detained them and let them go.  Were they not then, the SAS were not concerned then that the mission could be compromised?

        On the other hand he's got to weigh up just how much danger he's going to incur by releasing these folks to potentially go and alert forces to the fact that they're on the way.  Ultimately they decided that speed and the need to get into the area of operations was of greater risk if they arrived late than the likelihood of these folks letting others know that we're on our way in.

        Most importantly, the idea was to focus on defeating the launch of ballistic missiles.  And, you know, whether you fire 10 javelins or 20 is incidental to achieving that aim.

        We did see some what we believe to be surface to air missile launches, and they were neutralised by calling in air strikes.  To date I'm not aware of any scud - certainly no scud missile launches were observed.

        Probably the most important way that we defeated the launch of the scud missiles was firstly to dominate the are so that we could observe any likely movement of the Iraqis in the area, particularly down that main highway.  And, secondly, was to very early on destroy that command and control network.  So the idea was to defeat that command and control network so that they couldn't actually give orders to launch the missiles.

QUESTION:       Colonel, was there any concrete proof at all that the Iraqis actually had any scuds to fire?
COLONEL MANSELL:        The initial thoughts were that there was a pretty strong potential that he could.  Based on historic experience in the first Gulf war, this was an area where scud missiles had been launched from.  And with air photographs and so on there was that potential.

QUESTION:       Was there any actual evidence uncovered at all?
COLONEL MANSELL:        Oh, sorry.
QUESTION:       A single scud in Iraq by that campaign?
COLONEL MANSELL:        In our area I'm not aware - and I must emphasise 'our area' - I'm not aware of any scud launched from our particular zone.

        I think in one incidence certainly potentially they were - when they were set upon by the 50 enemy mounted on vehicles, it wasn't until they'd established enough of a gap between the SAS and the assaulting forces that they could actually safely call in close air support.

QUESTION:       That was after the battle, was it...
COLONEL MANSELL:        That was towards the end of it, yes.  Towards the end of the battle.  It's not a new tactic.  It's something that we've been seeking to perfect over many years and certainly preparing to deploy and preparing for operations in Afghanistan we conduct a lot of forward air control training with the Royal Australian Air Force.  We send our patrol commanders and soldiers overseas to familiarise themselves with US air control procedures and so on.  So, yeah, in summary it is an important element or dimension of SAS operations.

OFFICIAL:       Ladies and gentlemen, are there any questions?
QUESTION:       Can you tell us any more now about where the SAS were based from during this operation?
COLONEL MANSELL:        I can't say where they were based from.  The important thing to focus on were the operations that they were conducting.

COLONEL MANSELL:        YES.
QUESTION:       You said - used an interesting phrase about their not language skills but communication skills across barriers.  I'm not sure, do we have Arabic speakers in the SAS?  And were they there on the ground?  Or was there some other way we were communicating other than English, I presume?

QUESTION:       It would have to be in the hundreds really from what you're talking about?
COLONEL MANSELL:        As I've said earlier, we're still collating our reports and son and I can't say.
QUESTION:       Just briefly, what was the - obviously there was resistance in the early stages that we're talking about.  But what was the reception of these local people to the SAS?  I mean did they become seen as liberators and friends?  Or were they hostiles after the initial sort of firefights and so on?

        If we detain folks for a long period of time, we're going to be distracted.  We just didn't have the numbers out there to look after detainees and prisoners of war.  It was a matter of letting them go or handing them over to coalition authorities.

OFFICIAL:       We'll take one more question, ladies and gentlemen.
QUESTION:       Without going into operational sensitivities, could you give us a bit of a sense of the high technology elements of this operation as far as the Special Forces are concerned?  I mean could you sit in Sydney actually see what our forces were seeing on the ground in Iraq and interact with them in that sense?  I mean can you just give us a sense of that?  We've talked a lot.  We've heard the CDF talking about our network enabled warfare, and this has been the 21st Century war here.  To what degree was that present in the operations of the Special Forces?

        Actually on operations I think the accuracy with which we were able to call in close air support, this is testament to the connectivity that we achieved and is even more so of importance that we were able to do it using a foreign air force.  So that the communications fit.  We are extremely well fitted with communications, firstly to communicate with our own headquarters.  Secondly to communicate with aircraft above, normally carrying emergency radios in case the folks are separated from their patrol.  And that's not to mention the high technology of the equipments that the soldiers were actually carrying.

        We were extremely well equipped by the Army prior to deployment, and I think this is the thing that's allowed Special Forces to maintain a cutting edge and to provide a relevant capability to the Australian Defence Force.

COLONEL MANSELL:        No, I'm sorry, I'm totally unaware of that incident.
OFFICIAL:       Thanks very much, ladies and gentlemen.

Issued by Ministerial Support and Public Affairs, Department of Defence,
Canberra, ACT
Phone: 02 6127 1999
Fax: 02 6265 6946
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