ADF Health November 2007 - Volume 8 Number 2ViewpointThe use of tourniquets in the Australian Defence Force
CURRENTLY, AROUND 3850 Australian Defence Force personnel are deployed overseas. When considering the various operational deployments in which the ADF is involved, the variation in time and distance in the evacuation of ADF personnel from the battlefield to level 2 and level 3 treatment centres is great. This raises questions regarding the application of tourniquet guidelines within the ADF as part of the evacuation procedure. Between Units, Corps or Forces, there has not been a unified approach to tourniquet model, training or implementation. We propose a model for the use of appropriate battlefield tourniquets and training for ADF deployments. Modern combat casualtiesHistorically, 20% of combat casualties are killed in action, defined as being killed before reaching a treatment facility. 1 Exsanguination (50%) and central nervous system injuries (36%) are the leading cause of death, 2,3 with the remainder being from devastating multiple injuries. The single major cause of death in salvageable battlefield casualties is haemorrhage, 4 and about 20% of these deaths are preventable if bleeding can be controlled promptly. 5 Haemorrhage before evacuation accounts for 49% of overall combat casualty deaths, whereas haemorrhage after evacuation accounts for just 1%. 4 Despite this relatively low figure, haemorrhage remains one of the leading causes of salvageable late death. Improvements in body armour have been associated with decreased mortality secondary to thoracic, abdominal, and head trauma. 6 As a result of these advances, more combatants are surviving battle injuries than in previous conflicts, but they are incurring severe extremity injuries. In addition, the spectrum of injuries sustained in recent conflicts has tended to be predominantly multiple, as opposed to single battlefield injuries, and has tended to vary depending on combatants’ weaponry. Recently, fuel–air or thermobaric weapons have been used by the Russians in the Second Chechen War, 7 resulting in injuries that are internal, and may not be noticed initially by the medic or doctor. These weapons are designed to create an aerosol cloud that consumes oxygen, creating a fireball with a rapidly expanding wave front, which sears the surrounding area and flattens all objects within close proximity of the epicentre. 8 A thermobaric strike on a unit in an urban conflict is likely to be very bloody. The flame, overpressure or airborne debris potentially causes pressure-related injuries, including air emboli, concussions, multiple internal haemorrhages, lung collapse, eardrum rupture, as well as crush injuries, burns, and fractures. In Iraq, explosively formed penetrator devices have been used by insurgents in attempts to penetrate Coalition armoured vehicles from a stand-off distance and cause casualties. Injuries secondary to improvised explosive devices, small arms and rocket-propelled grenades have been the most common reported, with motor-vehicle accidents also accounting for a high percentage of injuries. 9 Additionally, there has been an increase in the number of complex axillary–inguinal wounds reported, perhaps secondary to the use of Kevlar body armour in the Iraqi urban combat zones. On modern battlefields, most injuries requiring surgical intervention involve injuries to the upper and lower limbs. 10-12 In previous wars, such as Korea and Vietnam, evacuation strategies were fairly rigid and field hospitals were close to the front lines. The trend in modern warfare is toward rapidly non-linear battlefronts and urban conflicts, 13,14 with terrorist activities and guerilla warfare replacing more traditional combat. The difficulty of placing a level 3 surgical facility (for life- and limb-saving surgery) near the front line of battle in the dispersed asymmetrical guerrilla-style urban and remote war scenarios that exist in Iraq and Afghanistan presents complex challenges for military planners. 15 However, in Iraq, despite these challenges, prompt evacuation of the injured has led to improved survival. 16 All combat medics in the US are being trained in the use of tourniquets and all soldiers are issued with tourniquets; they are being used frequently. In Iraq, the number of combat casualties who died after having been retrieved has been low, 17 with the average evacuation time being 45 minutes by helicopter, 18 and with seriously injured personnel being evacuated to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany. 19 The pattern of injuries in Iraq suggests peripheral wounds should be anticipated, and managed by compression and an effective dressing. If haemorrhage cannot be controlled, the addition of a combination of a haemostatic agent and the judicious use of a tourniquet has been proven to be lifesaving. 20 Holcomb (US Army) and other senior US military medical authorities have reported that preliminary analysis shows that the early use of tourniquets is associated with a lower mortality than later use, and that pre-hospital use is better than hospital use. Palsy and amputation rates from tourniquet use are about 1% each. 21
Modern tourniquet useThe value of the tourniquet in the exsanguinating patient on the battlefield is irrefutable. However, not all combat casualties who have a haemorrhagic wound are exsanguinating, and consequently many are not in need of a tourniquet. There is controversy relating to the appropriate use of tourniquets in combat casualties with poorly controlled haemorrhage, and in those whose evacuation may be prolonged. Theoretically, early and effective haemorrhage control is even more important in these situations and can save more lives than any other measure. As a result, the Israeli Defence Forces advocate the liberal use of tourniquets, 22 as do members of the US Special Forces. 23 In contrast, in civilian emergency medicine, the fear of tourniquet-related complications secondary to prolonged application has all but eliminated their use. Despite the known risks, tourniquets have been used effectively on the battlefield in Iraq because of their judicious use and the rapid evacuation of casualties. However, the scenario of fast-moving military units with no clearly defined warfront, with the possibility of blocked support lines and the threat of random attacks at any time, is likely to cause unpredictable delays in casualties reaching surgical support. 15 As a result, issues regarding tourniquet use in large frontline operations have been raised, and recommendations based on these experiences have been implemented by US Forces. In response to the changing combat casualty care, tourniquet substitutes (ie, haemostatic substances) for the control of exsanguinating haemorrhage have recently been reviewed and approved for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. 24 Haemostatic agentsA variety of haemostatic substances have been developed, to be applied in the form of a dressing or powder. All these substances induce coagulation, with different intervention points within the coagulation system. Many substances are available, with no ideal agent yet being identified. 20 Ideally, a haemostatic agent should be effective, easy to use, safe, logistically preferable, and durable. Some ADF members recently deployed with US Forces in Iraq have been issued either HemCon dressings (mainly US Army) or QuikClot sachets (being trialled by US Marine Corp). HemCon (Box 1) is 95% effective, 26 but is expensive, at $90–$100 per dressing; QuikClot (Box 2) is equally effective at $20 per application (efficacy 92%, but the field experience by various providers was 100% 27). Celox (Box 3) is a newer haemostatic product that is reported not to have the same exothermic reaction effects that QuikClot casualties report. However, data are lacking to support this claim, or the superiority of Celox. These tourniquet adjuncts or substitutes have been reported to be most useful on areas where tourniquets cannot be applied to control bleeding. Furthermore, they have been reported to be most difficult to use in extremity injuries, where they cannot be placed easily onto or into the wounds. Combat casualty control of peripheral haemorrhageBrigadier Jeffrey Rosenfeld (Chair, General Surgery Consultative Group) recently attended the Battlefield Surgery Conference at the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences in Washington, where damage control resuscitation (including haemostatic agents) was one of the three themes. Although the effectiveness of these alternative products appears promising, Rosenfeld recently commented that
These views are “shared by the Orthopaedic Consultative Group” (Lt Col Andrew Ellis, Chair, Orthopaedic Consultative Group). As a result of discussions, the Consultative Groups agreed to introduce and train ADF personnel being deployed on operations in the application and indications for the use of QuikClot. However, there remains no standardised protocol as to when to use bandaging alone for haemorrhage control, when to apply a tourniquet and for how long, and when to apply a haemostatic agent. The role of the modern tourniquet and the effectiveness of new haemostatic products were reviewed at a recent symposium, Extremity War Injuries II: development of clinical treatment principles. 29 Most literature concerns the experience of US Forces, and the resources and infrastructure that are available to those forces on deployment. These differ from those used by the ADF, and the applicability of this experience to ADF deployments remains debatable, and requires resolution. This raises the question whether such potentially detrimental lifesaving protocols need to be addressed by the military medicine specialists.
Brigadier Robert Atkinson (Former Assistant Surgeon-General - Army) represented the ADF at this symposium and has called for a review of the ADF policy on tourniquet use. He has highlighted the uncertainty that time and distance in transport to a combat medical facility may pose, and suggested that Medical Officers be involved in the decisionmaking process as part of a definite protocol. Following this, the Orthopaedic and General Surgical Consultative Groups discussed the issue of “tourniquets and their use in the emergency setting” in an e-forum, with remarks from members of the Trauma and Anaesthetic Consultative Groups being noted. Rosenfeld posed the questions of tourniquet use, including indications, time limits for how long they should be applied, who should carry the tourniquets, and who should have the authority to use the tourniquets. It was also suggested that “the use of tourniquets needs to be adapted for the circumstances of a particular operation” (Rosenfeld). Although most ADF specialists agree that combat tourniquets are potentially lifesaving devices, there remain divided opinions on their implementation.
Commander Hamish Foster agrees, but states: “The indications are probably few and limited; the potential for harm with indiscriminate use is great: direct pressure on bleeding points should still be the mainstay of emergency/ first aid control of haemorrhage”. Despite most ADF medical specialists advocating judicious use of tourniquets, there are scant formal guidelines to control their use. Indeed, although there is a standard Australian Army protocol for the use of tourniquets, the implementation and methods of training are not uniform between Units. Lt Col Paul Myers (General/Vascular Surgeon SSO, RAAMC) has pointed out additional factors that need to be contemplated when considering the use of a tourniquet:
Indeed, continuation of care is rarely applicable in the military environment, further supporting the necessity for guidelines to control implementation of tourniquet use and institute accountability. As a result of the stimulated debate on the subject, several amendments to the Australian Army protocol have been suggested. Some of these are summarised here. Sect 4-3. Management of external bleedingFirst aid training should include the application of a haemostatic substance by any ADF member rendering assistance, preferably a trained medic under a medical officer’s supervision, if a standard dressing fails to stop an external haemorrhage. This should be incorporated into standard soldier training, and medical assistant and medical officer training courses, as an adjunct for management of injuries where other methods have failed to achieve haemostasis. All deploying personnel should be equipped with QuikClot (or an equivalent) and trained in its use (Box 4). An amendment to the “Management of Bleeding” flow chart 30 should be made, to include an algorithm for the indications for, and application of, QuikClot (or an equivalent). Sect 4-4. Management of uncontrolled haemorrhageIdeally, only ADF medics (or similarly trained personnel) or more qualified personnel may apply a tourniquet. Application should only be as a last resort to control exsanguinating haemorrhage; when a standard bandage and application of a haemostatic substance has failed to stop the haemorrhage and when the wound is on a peripheral limb. The tourniquet of choice is the Combat Application Tourniquet (Box 5), and all medics and approved personnel should be trained in its application. The guidance of a medical officer should be sought at the earliest practicable time, for approval to continue the use of the tourniquet, as this is where serious complications can arise. The medic is responsible to note the time of tourniquet application by writing “TK” (referring to tourniquet) and the time of application on the casualty’s forehead with a permanent marker (which probably should be issued with the tourniquet). After 30 minutes while awaiting transport to a medical facility, the tourniquet should be removed slowly and the wound examined for bleeding. The tourniquet may be left off if there is no sign of bleeding; or if bleeding continues, an attempt should be made to control bleeding with a dressing, with reapplication of the tourniquet if bleeding cannot be controlled (noting the time of reapplication). This procedure may be repeated twice while awaiting transport to a medical facility. Where evacuation may be prolonged (ie, longer than 90 minutes), the treating medic must seek authorisation from a medical officer to continue the use of the tourniquet (preferably a medical officer from the facility to which the casualty is to be evacuated). Ideally, tourniquets are not to be applied longer than 90 minutes. SummaryThese recommendations aim to simplify the decisionmaking process and maintain a high standard of medical treatment in the ADF. In summary, only when a standard bandage and application of a haemostatic substance has failed to stop a haemorrhage, should an ADF medic or more highly qualified person attempt to apply a combat application tourniquet. Additionally, a standardised tourniquet training protocol should be instituted by all ADF Units, aimed at educating personnel on the benefits and risks of tourniquet use, and to ensure correct training in application procedure and tourniquet-monitoring procedure. The guidance of a medical officer should always be sought at the earliest practicable time. References
(Received 24 Apr 2007, accepted 15 Aug 2007)
Captain James McLean joined the Army Reserve in 2003. In September 2007 he accepted an appointment as an SSO Medical Officer at 3HSB. He is currently completing a Masters of Surgery at the University of Adelaide, with the support of a Royal Australasian College of Surgeons Foundation Scholarship. He has a special interest in upper limb and trauma surgery, and ultimately plans to serve as a Reservist Orthopaedic and Trauma Surgeon. Brigadier Robert Atkinson graduated in medicine from University of Adelaide in 1970 and saw active service with the Australian Regular Army in South Vietnam. He then trained in orthopaedics in Adelaide. His military service continued with two Commands and active service in the Gulf War, Rwanda, Bougainville, East Timor and Banda Aceh. He was Assistant Surgeon General and is now Emeritus Consultant in Military Surgery to the ADF. He gained a Master of Defence Studies in 2001. Dr Luke Mooney completed a medical degree at the University of Adelaide in 2006. In January 2007, he accepted an internship at the Royal Adelaide Hospital. On completion of his internship, he plans to assume an SSO Medical Officer position in the Army Reserve. He has a special interest in trauma surgery, and ultimately plans to undertake General Surgical Training and serve as a Reservist Trauma Surgeon. Corporal David Lovett joined the Australian Regular Army in 2000, and was appointed to the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps. In 2002 he completed specialised training as an Operating Theatre Technician. He has deployed to East Timor in 2003, the Solomon Islands in 2003, Sumatra in 2005, and Timor Leste in 2006. He is currently posted to 2HSB. Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA.James M McLean, MB BS, Surgical Registrar; Robert Atkinson, RDF, MB BS, MA, DCH, FRACS, FAOrtho, Orthopaedic Surgeon; Luke Mooney, MB BS, Intern. 2nd Health Support Battalion, Enoggera, QLD.David Lovett, Corporal. Correspondence: Brig Robert Atkinson, Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, University of Adelaide, Modbury Public Hospital, Smart Road, Modbury, Adelaide, SA 5092. rob.atkinson@surgeons.org
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