Joint Strike Fighter: under Project AIR 6000, a new air combat capability will replace the air superiority and strike capabilities currently provided by the F/A-18 Hornet and F-111 aircraft fleets.
On 10 April 2007 the United States (US) Department of Defense released its annual Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) to the US Congress.
The SARs provide an update on the estimated price of major US Defense projects and included a report on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. The data in the acquisition reports is current up to December 2006, which leads to the reference to the documentation as the December 2006 SAR.
The report identifies that the estimated total cost of the JSF Program has increased to US$299,824 million ‘Then Year’. This estimate is an increase of approximately US$23,365 million ‘Then Year’ since the December 2005 SARs, an increase of approximately 8.5 per cent.
A major component of the increase in the ‘Then Year’ price is due to the extension in the time over which the Department of Defense intends to acquire its JSF aircraft – the US Services’ production run is now planned to extend to 2034 rather than 2027 in the original plan. These ‘Then Year’ figures must be converted to a fixed reference point to determine the real cost impact of the increase.
The fixed reference point for the JSF Program is Business Year 2002 (BY02), the year when the project was approved. The latest estimated JSF Program cost is US$209,560 million, BY02, which represents an approximate four per cent increase of US$7,831 million, BY02, since the December 2005 SARs.
This four per cent increase is a ‘real’ increase as it takes into account actual changes in the JSF Program, not the effects of inflation for the duration of the Program. The primary factors that have contributed to the expected ‘real’ Program cost increase of four per cent are:
- the increased cost of materials such as aluminum and titanium (which is generally applicable to all fighter production programs);
- the slower acquisition rate by the US Services – noting this does not represent a reduction in total numbers – has led to a slower ‘learning curve’ for production costs; and
- revised cost estimates based on maturation of the JSF design and production of the first aircraft
The four per cent cost increase is an average across the entire JSF Program, involving approximately 3100 aircraft of all three variants being produced. Importantly, the Australia-preferred Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) variant has experienced a lower real cost increase of around two per cent. The reasons the CTOL variant has experienced a lower cost increase than either the Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) or Carrier Variant (CV) are that:
- the CTOL will be acquired in considerably larger numbers; and
- the CTOL is considerably less complex and lighter overall, requiring less materials.
The two per cent cost increase in the CTOL variant is in line with cost increases anticipated at the time of First Pass approval for the New Air Combat Capability (NACC) Project in November 2006. The price increase is well within project contingency levels. Defence can therefore still afford to acquire up to 100 CTOL JSF – including reasonable contingency levels - within original project provisions allocated in the 2000 Defence White Paper.
Ongoing analysis of the JSF reaffirms Defence’s original assessment that the JSF will mature to meet Australia ’s future air combat needs in the most cost effective way. The recent decision to acquire 24 F-18F Super Hornets will considerably de-risk the transition from the Royal Australian Air Force’s F-111 and ‘classic’ F/A-18 aircraft to the JSF.
A final decision on acquisition of the JSF is planned for late 2008 when Government will consider Second Pass approval for the NACC project.
| 
