Defence Magazine

Ninety years ago a small army of Arab Bedouin guerrillas defeated the fourth largest army in the world. Their unconventional leader was T. E. Lawrence, a British Army Liaison Officer who was immortalised in the 1962 classic movie, Lawrence of Arabia. He later wrote The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, which described his experiences as the leader of the insurgent force.

At the height of World War I in 1916, Lawrence was sent to support the Great Arab Revolt against the Turkish Army, then the world's fourth largest and a German ally.

Lawrence devised and led the guerrilla campaign, which eventually ground the conventional Turkish Army into defeat.

Within The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence recalls what made his Arab insurgents difficult to defeat:

At a recent address to the National Security Conference in Canberra, Special Operations Commander—Australia, Major General (MAJGEN) Mike Hindmarsh, quoted these words and told guests he knew of few other passages that so clearly and succinctly encapsulated the difficulties of counterinsurgency.

'To me it also confirms just why Special Operations Forces have such an important role to play,' MAJGEN Hindmarsh said.

'Because, unlike conventional forces, Special Forces can employ the same techniques—those characteristics of intangibility, of drifting like a vapour—they too can be an idea getting inside the minds of their adversaries.'

Through their combined utility, skills and professionalism, Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) units provide greater effects against asymmetrical threats to Australia's national security.

MAJGEN Hindmarsh told the Security Conference that the very nature of asymmetric warfare was essentially what SOCOMD now works with.

Asymmetric warfare manifests itself in many guises and is the central characteristic of numerous types of conflict including unconventional warfare, insurgency and counterinsurgency. It is not a new phenomenon; it has been around since Goliath was 'king-hit' by a flyweight David who used his small size, agility and sleight of hand to outwit and throw off balance his heavyweight but unwieldy adversary.

MAJGEN Hindmarsh says that Australian Special Forces will not always target the obvious 'Goliath'.

'Undeniably the modern trend is for the Davids to be the adversary, the fleeting insurgents who use their agility to threaten legitimate governments through guerrilla and terrorist tactics—insurgent tactics.'

However, he asserts that Australian Special Forces have the ability to match those qualities.

'Our Special Forces possess similar agility and endurance both physically and mentally, and are not tethered to large logistic anchors.'

Not surprisingly, MAJGEN Hindmarsh says that the defeat of global terrorism is SOCOMD's toughest challenge yet.

'For the Special Forces community it means we need to be matching, if not exceeding, the operational and psychological agility of the terrorists.

'The winning of this war is not about numbers for and against; it's about the excellence of our individual soldiers and their ability to deny the enemy a sense of safety and cut his sources of support and sustainment.

'To achieve this, we need to recruit highly intelligent and practical soldier diplomats who possess the attributes of not only courage, determination, innovation and teamwork, but also compassion and contextual awareness and understanding of the environment they are working in.'

SOCOMD provides Australia with increased discrimination in the application of force, as shown in recent and current operations. This includes Afghanistan, where Australia's contribution of a 200-person SFTG is assisting with the mission to develop democracy and to enhance its security and stability. The SFTG, which contains an equal number of Commandos and Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), is located in a particularly hostile region, which harbours large anti-Coalition militia sanctuaries.

SASR and 4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Commando) (4RAR (Cdo)) complement each other in their combat capabilities, and MAJGEN Hindmarsh sees it as unfortunate that the Sydney-based Commandos don't receive the same recognition as SASR, stating that within their own role they are equally good at what they do.

He says that the SFTG is making a meaningful contribution to the stability of Afghanistan and that, once again, the Australian diggers are proving to be highly effective, since they are fundamentally compassionate and genuinely concerned about the welfare of the Afghan people.

Special Forces capability

In 2002, the formation of Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) streamlined command and control of the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) domestic and international terrorism response and provided cost-effective, coordinated training and capability enhancement for Australia's Special Forces.

SOCOMD is home to 1 Commando Regiment (1 Cdo Regt), SASR, 4RAR (Cdo), Incident Response Regiment (IRR), Special Forces Training Centre and the Special Operations Combat Service Support Company (SOCSSC). It is ably supported by 171 Aviation Squadron.

The organisation's lead combat units, SASR and 4RAR (Cdo), provide specialised capabilities across the full spectrum of potential conflict.

SASR is a clandestine unit, which has as its primary role surveillance and reconnaissance, usually behind enemy lines or in high-threat areas, operating in very small groups independently for long periods. It is a highly versatile unit that can turn its hands to most things, ranging from humanitarian assistance, 'hearts and minds' activities, through to harassment and general offensive operations as seen in the Western Desert of Iraq in 2003.

4RAR (Cdo) are highly skilled and aggressive soldiers; they provide a different capability from the SASR. They are not clandestine troops; unlike SASR, they don't usually try to remain undetected. Their role is to get into a target area quickly in overwhelming force to achieve their mission and then get out again. They operate in platoon- and company-sized groups and are exceptionally well armed and equipped. They are instrumental in seizing points of entry for conventional and other Special Forces, conducting raids deep in enemy territory, combat search and rescue, and remaining on standby for quick-reaction tasks.

The IRR was originally raised to support the 2000 Olympics for chemical, biological, radiological (CBR) detection and decontamination response purposes before transferring to SOCOMD following 9/11 and the Bali bombing. It provides an exceptional niche capability in the CBR threat environment as well as in the handling of improvised explosive devices and mines. The IRR has both a domestic and an international response and support role, and is one of the world's lead units of its type. The Holsworthy-based sappers currently contribute personnel to the Special Forces Task Group (SFTG) in Afghanistan.

SOCOMD's oldest serving unit is also the ADF's premier Army Reserve unit, 1 Commando Regiment (1 Cdo Regt). Its major role is to round out and reinforce its regular sister unit 4RAR (Cdo) on operations. 1 Cdo Regt is populated by extremely highly motivated and professional part-time soldiers, many of whom possess professional civilian skills that complement and enhance the commando capability.

The SOCSSC was raised in 2003 and provides second- and third-line logistic support to other elements of SOCOMD. This logistics unit's capabilities include supply and distribution of stores and equipment, forward recovery and maintenance support, terminal operators, environmental health and medical support, and financial and catering services.

SOCOMD also provides a world-class counter-terrorist capability to react to state or territory requests for support made to the Australian Government. These include land forces, air and sealift, medical support, and designated counter-terrorist capabilities.

SOCOMD maintains excellent cooperation with Australia's allies to ensure that our current terrorism response personnel have access to the most up-to-date techniques and training. The TAGs conduct recovery operations beyond the range and capability of other ADF units, including recapturing structures, freeing hostages and supporting high-risk search teams.

Lessons from the Dhofar experience

MAJGEN Hindmarsh draws on lessons learnt 30 years ago by UK Special Forces who successfully combined compassion and lethality in a textbook counterinsurgency operation.

The 1970–76 Dhofar Campaign is probably the least known of these counterinsurgency operations but was certainly one of the most successful, and is relevant in many ways to the current challenges facing the SFTG in Afghanistan. Dhofar is the southern province of the Middle Eastern state of Oman.

In the late 1960s public grievances that had been simmering for some years developed into open conflict. The neighbouring communist state of Yemen encouraged and supported the Dhofarian uprising. By 1970 the situation had deteriorated into a full-scale guerrilla insurgency.

Britain decided to intervene, concerned about the prejudicial effects the insurgency could have on their decision to withdraw from the Arabian Gulf in 1971 as well as the potential risk to the flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz.

In 1970 a small Special Forces advisory team deployed to Dhofar to produce a long-term plan to defeat the communist insurgency. The plan was based on the method of combining military operations with a coordinated 'hearts and minds' campaign to win over the sympathy of the people to the government cause.

It consisted of five basic elements: a vigorous but well-coordinated military campaign that avoided indiscriminate actions or reprisals; a medical campaign to provide aid to the fifty-thousand people living in the Dhofar mountains; a veterinary campaign to improve farm stock, including the provision of fresh water; a comprehensive intelligence-gathering operation; and a psychological operation to persuade the rebels to change sides.

At first the British Special Forces team in Dhofar consisted of only one SAS troop of 15 men restricted to intelligence gathering, advisory and community projects. The troop split into small two- and three-man teams, often accompanied by a doctor or veterinary surgeon, and worked among the local population along the coastal plain. The results were promising, with small numbers of guerrillas choosing to defect.

Gradually as the numbers of defectors increased, the team's role changed. Their focus switched to the grouping and training of these defectors into anti-guerrilla units, which became known as Firqas.

Eventually the SAS contingent was increased to squadron strength and deployed entirely with the Firqas. Thereafter their role became largely offensive and they gradually began to loosen the guerrillas' grasp on the interior. By December 1975, some five years after the counterinsurgency operation began, the last rebel stronghold was neutralised and the conflict successfully resolved.

Undoubtedly the SAS's ability to firstly win the confidence of the local community and then mobilise the defectors into potent anti-guerrilla forces proved decisive and provides a useful template for counterinsurgency operations.

MAJGEN Hindmarsh says that the Dhofar experience attests to the argument that countering insurgencies demands a multifaceted, extremely well coordinated and carefully managed long-term campaign approach.

'This successful outcome was achieved not just in terms of the fear and uncertainty of physical security but also perhaps by getting inside the hearts of those that would support and nourish the insurgents. The Dhofar experience bears this out.

'We need to match our adversary's conviction and clarity of purpose and show that we are more dedicated to protecting civilised life than terrorists are to taking it.'

Defence

Army

Inside enemy minds

Special Forces capability

Lessons from the Dhofar experience