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"An extraordinary year for this Australian General"

In the 2006 Australia Day Honours, Major General Jim Molan AO was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC). The citation recognised MAJGEN Molan for distinguished service in command and leadership in action while serving as Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Operations and Deputy Chief of Staff Civil Military Operations with Multi-National Force - Iraq from April 2004 to April 2005, during Operation Catalyst.

In August 2005, MAJGEN Molan was invited by the Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Houston, to speak to the Defence Senior Leadership Group. This is an edited version of that address...

Major General Jim Molan AO DSC
Photo provided by Public Affairs

I must start by expressing my disappointment that we are not having this conference in four days time. If we were having this conference on 8 August, I could have very cleverly reminded everyone that it was the anniversary of the day in 1918 described by German Commander-in-Chief Ludendorff as "the worst day for the German Army in all of World War One". And I guess in World War One, to say that you had a bad day means that you probably had a really bad day.

One of the main reasons why Ludendorff was having a bad day was the generalship of an Australian, LTGEN John Monash, and the five Divisions of the Australian Corps, that is some 203,000 soldiers.

British military strategist Liddell Hart said of Monash:

"He was in some ways an utter contrast to the traditional idea of a great military commander. He, more than anyone, fulfilled the idea that developed in the war - that the scale and nature of operations required a big business type of commander, a great constructive and organising brain. His views were as large as his capacity".

"Contrast to tradition", "scale and nature of ops", "big business type", "constructive and organised brain". This quote resonates for me especially in relation to Iraq, a much different war that the CDF has asked me to speak about today.

I was the Chief of Operations for the US Commanding General, who commanded a Coalition Force of up to 170,000 soldiers from 30 countries, as well as the new Iraqi Army of 130,000, at a time of tough fights and significant, counter insurgent style victories. On behalf of General Casey, I ran all military and many other non-military operations at the theatre strategic level for all forces, across all of Iraq.

What I believe more closely links Monash and this Iraqi chapter of the Jihadist War, is firstly the continued importance of competent operational generalship capable of seeing war in its broadest form without losing the detail, and secondly, using today's terminology, the continued importance of combined arms operations with joint fires and joint intelligence.

I was reminded that Monash gave us an Australian example of operational generalship that cannot be separated from his advocacy and use of innovative tactics. An intimate knowledge of tactics remains the responsibility of the strategic and operational level warfighting general today, as much as it ever did, possibly more.

In the months leading up to August 1918, Monash led his army towards a new military tactic - combined arms operations. Like the excellent ADF that we have now, Monash was working with the Australian Imperial Force (AIF), a quality organisation, but his ideas and his leadership allowed him to capitalise on the men and the evolving materiel, and move them even closer to perfection.

For those that are not familiar with such an esoteric term, "combined arms operations with joint fires and intelligence" means that each element in the battlespace, regardless of where it comes from or who owns it, must work seamlessly with every other part according to a central idea. If you say it fast, it sounds easy. In Monash's time, this was evolutionary and possibly revolutionary, but very hard to execute. Today it is not new, but it remains desperately hard to achieve.

In Iraq, the core of the Coalition Force, the US military, has progressed the technique of combined arms operations with joint fires and joint intelligence to a kinetic peak, but Monash would still recognise the fundamentals. The twist in Iraq is that we conducted such sustained close combat operations in cities, amongst the people, not in Flanders fields, and we did so in a counter insurgency campaign against an asymmetric enemy. Because of this, the war in Iraq, from a technical point of view, needs to be thought of as something approaching a new form of warfare. And the US knows more about it than anyone.

The issue of morality confuses many goodhearted observers of the war in Iraq. The morality of the prosecution of the war was brought home to me early when I attended a day long planning session with the then Commanding General, Lieutenant General Ric Sanchez and the Marines in Fallujah, just after I arrived, about mid-April 04.

The Marines had just had a very unsatisfying two week combat experience in Fallujah, involving a large number killed and many more wounded. I came away from the meeting saying to myself that I had just witnessed the most professional, moral and level-headed assessment of the situation and options, spanning the theatre strategic to the tactical level, that one could ever reasonably expect.

Major Rudi Poldoja recites The Man from Snowy River for the troops on Australia Day at Camp Smitty, the base for the Australian Task Group in the southern Iraqi province of Al Muthanna. Around 1330 ADF personnel remain committed to Operation Catalyst, the ADF contribution to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq.
Photo provided by Public Affairs

There were no stereotypes here. The Marine leadership was thoughtful and clever in their tactics, continually aware of the rights of non-combatants and fully adjusted from conventional war. There was no panic even though in the week before and the insurgents had blown five key bridges that had essentially cut us off. It was indeed great operational generalship in the 21st Century.

Was it perfect generalship? Nothing human ever is. But it was world standard, and for me it was the first of the many instances over the next year that sets a benchmark for operational generalship and leadership.

The question remained for me: Was the war winnable?

I did not conclude that the war was winnable until after August 2004. I still hold the view that we are winning. August 2004 was when we first effectively used the political, information and economic lines of operations against the Shia Militias, to the same level of effectiveness that we used the kinetic weapons that we had.

The broadening of the attack on extremist ideas from just military responses was, in itself, a true revolution, as was an understanding of how each line of operation (diplomatic, information, military and economic) was linked. Ironically, our ability to bring the other lines of operation to bear in August 04 was only facilitated by two weeks of intense fighting, culminating on one critical day with the decisive application of several smart bombs into a key defended hotel next to the Imam Ali Shrine. On that day, for the first time, we impacted on the enemy's mind as much as on the hotel full of fighters. I knew then that we could now apply all lines of operations, and after four months in Iraq, I began to think that we might actually be able to win for the Iraqi people.

When I think of leadership in Iraq, what comes to mind immediately are the faces of those who were prepared to lead: Sanchez; Bremer; Rumsfeld; Abizaid; Casey; Negroponte, Allawi and his Defence and Interior Ministers. People who made a difference. Not perfect people who did perfect things perfectly but real people, who could lead, were willing to lead and did lead. Leadership in the real world is not only conferred by position and authority, it must be accepted by each individual and then exercised effectively. I saw too many people in Iraq who held leadership positions but would not lead, so we never knew if they were competent.

Leadership of course, is derived from the individual. Just as you cannot take Monash the engineer out of Monash the General, or you cannot take the Arab out of Minister of the Interior Naqib, neither can you take the human factor out of leadership and command in the 21st Century warfare that is raging in Iraq, and may test us in other parts of the world.

The one overwhelming theme from my time at the centre of the war in Iraq, and now from a period of active consideration of how to train others to do it, was one that I know is acknowledged in this room - that people and ideas remain central, even in the most advanced military in the world in this, the most intense 21st Century conflict.

The question that I have struggled with is how do we achieve competence in sustained close combat, and operational generalship, without actually doing it?

We can simulate parts, and that is incredibly and increasingly important. We have looked back at those Australians who commanded and did close combat so superbly, even as far back as Monash and the AIF spoiling Ludendorff's day.

In my view, we must now take the next step to institutionalise our ability to learn from the most experienced in the Western world, the US, and we now have a unique opportunity to do so. In my view, we must look at least at the two areas that I have highlighted: sustained close combat variously defined, including how a Reserve fights, and operational command at every level, but particularly operational or joint generalship.

Fortunately for every one of us in this room, there are many anecdotes that I now do not have time to recount. Such as the fight for the infrastructure in Iraq. I am extraordinarily proud of what my command team and my 20,000 closest Iraqi friends achieved in the fight for the infrastructure against a concerted, year long campaign. The Iraqis looked for leadership, I had a mission, I took the authority and they responded to me.

I remembered that one inconsequential little operation for one rail bridge over about a month near Latifiyah, cost us about 17 killed, including two US marines, and many wounded. We recognised and accepted the task even at great risk, not once, but over a sustained period of time, and averted disaster.

The Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) has been part of the formal Australian Honours system since 1991.
Image supplied by PM&C

I could also tell you about the nightly time sensitive targeting that dislocated the terrorists and was critical in setting the conditions for the successful attack on Fallujah. An extraordinarily complex joint process, a unique use of unusually combined capabilities, particularly in a counter insurgency. What is enormously significant is that it applies asymmetry to our asymmetrical enemy, and they did not have a clue. It is stunning in its effect. I cannot stress enough that regardless of the equipment, the process and the electrons, what was extremely important was the trust in the relationship between the human beings: the US Special Forces Group commander; me; and my Commanding General.

It was my responsibility to manage the US special forces protecting the top five Iraqi leaders. We fought to keep the oil pipes and the power lines open. Overall, we planned and executed the rotation of about 100,000 US troops every year and most of their equipment. I was responsible for issuing all written orders and in my time we issued close to 2000. Planning for the election began in May 04 with a four man informal planning group and culminated in January 05 with the successful election secured by 300,000 troops, the political manifestation of our real success in Iraq.

And the fighting did not lessen as we approached the election - it intensified much to my concern. During the week before the election we were attacked 800 times across Iraq, more than in any period in the Iraq war so far. On election day, we were attacked 260 times, still the highest one day total of the war. It came down to an issue of leadership and nerve.

Based on what I saw and did in Iraq, and what I have recently seen in Germany, given the progress that the ADF has made in the reorganisation of our strategic level of operational leadership, and considering the likely nature of future operational challenges, in my view it is time to review how we manage and conduct joint training in the ADF. The real challenge remains to tightly align joint training, concepts, doctrine, exercises and education in a way that gives meaning to our joint rhetoric, and to learn from Iraq in a way that meets future challenges and matches recent advances in our strategic command architecture.

I would like to end by talking briefly about the leadership of my boss, the Commanding General MNF-I, General George Casey. The CG was an inspirational leader and I learnt much from him about leadership, operational command and 21st Century warfare. He was an intuitive leader and came up with most of the really good ideas in the campaign himself. Like all US commanders that I got to know, he was highly principled, experienced at command, very well educated and understood the use of power. But every human interaction in the Multinational Force was affected by how tired everyone was. He hated detail, and my life as Chief of Operations was all about detail. He travelled extensively to lead and to know, and came back in every night and briefed us on what was going on in the real world. He drove all of us at a frantic pace, and was continually trying to get ahead of the enemy. As head of current operations, I would reach a physical and mental culminating point and in his mind the CG was well into the next operation, leading us physically and intellectually.

He was Monash-like. He was not traditional, not stereotypical. He understood scale and had a great constructive and organising brain. His views were as large as his capacity but he was still, in all ways, human. His words of encouragement will ring in my ears for ever - "Jim" he would say, "I want you to do such and such, but don't make a career out of it".

So, bearing in mind my General's advice, I will not make a career out of this speech. I will end with the comment that my year in Iraq was an extraordinary year for this Australian General. But if we are willing to seize the moment, our experience and our relationship with the US now presents us with a golden opportunity for the ADF to move even closer to joint operational perfection.

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