Defence Magazine

Two years ago rival ethnic militant groups had made the Solomon Islands a no-go area - thugs with guns ruled the capital Honiara, the Prime Minister was living in fear of his life, and the government was effectively bankrupt. The Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) had broken down under the pressure, struggling with internal corruption and unable to match militant firepower.

Following an appeal for assistance from the Solomon Islands Government a combined force of soldiers and police arrived on 24 July 2003 to a warm welcome from the locals. RAMSI comprised a 'Whole-of-Government' response from Australia, as well as police contingents from 11 countries and military support from five countries.

Assistant Commissioner Paul Jevtovic, the National Manager International Deployment Group - the area responsible for managing the Australian Federal Police (AFP) international deployment - believes that much of RAMSI's success can be attributed to this combined approach.

"Everyone recognised very early that the problems in the Solomon Islands could not be addressed by any one arm of government, that it really needed a collective approach," he says.

"From a law and order perspective, the combined approach of Defence and Police has proven to be a successful formula. I have no doubt that without that combination, we wouldn't have enjoyed the rapid manner in which we were able to achieve a much safer environment in the Solomon Islands."

Assistant Commissioner Ben McDevitt echoed this sentiment during his presentation at the recent Rowell Seminar; Confronting Asymmetry: Military Conflict in the Early 21st Century. He acknowledged that having a military presence in the Solomon Islands was necessary to give the mission 'teeth'.

Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen, who commanded the military forces deployed to the Solomons during the first four months, spoke at the same seminar. He explained that unambiguous rules of engagement were necessary in order to ensure that the military would not be portrayed as an invading force. In accordance with this, it was determined that the police would be the 'public' face of RAMSI and would always be present when the military interacted with the Islanders. As such, the military role was strictly to provide security and support for the police.

A good example of how this relationship worked is the first patrol that took place in the market place - only 1 hour and 40 minutes after arrival on the island. To establish RAMSI's presence, two unarmed policemen - one from the participating police force (PPF) and the other a Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) officer - patrolled the markets, a high-profile trouble spot. While they presented a friendly face on patrol, heavily armed riot police followed in a car with the windows up so that no guns were visible. Behind the scenes, military support was on stand-by should it have been required.

The partnership worked well. According to Ben McDevitt, there was a high level of awareness amongst the people of the Solomon Islands that RAMSI was arriving. In fact, people had started to hand in guns before the RAMSI contingent arrived and there were even stories of cars that had been stolen years before suddenly turning up in driveways. While there was widespread support for the mission from the general public, this was counter-balanced by the large number of well-armed militants and thugs present throughout the Solomons. For this reason, the surrender of warlord Harold Keke, was regarded as a turning point for the success of the mission.

Communicating and engaging with the people of the Solomon Islands was an important part of the mission's success. Much time was devoted to meeting with local leaders and community members to promote an understanding of the why, who and what aspects of RAMSI (see side story "Communication as a tactic").

"If we didn't have the support of the community, law and order would still be a significant issue. But the good will, and the desire, to fix the problems existed within the community itself - RAMSI built on that," Federal Agent Jevtovic says.

"When we work in the provinces, we very much work with the local chiefs of villages and the elders, and without them we wouldn't be successful. So it is very much a self-acknowledgment of the problem within the country, and then the willingness to work with us. I think that's been the key to the success."

With the restoration of law and order, the main focus is now on capacity building - this means rebuilding both the Solomons' police force and public service. Federal Agent Jevtovic says that Commander Sandy Peisley, who has taken over from Assistant Commissioner Ben McDevitt, is working hard to ensure this phase is as successful as the first. From a policing perspective, this means there is a focus on rebuilding the law enforcement skills of the Royal Solomon Islands Police and restoring public faith in the force.

To date 400 corrupt police, including two Deputy Commissioners - or 25 percent of the force - have been removed and 74 arrests covering 378 criminal offences charged. New standards of operation have been introduced and 30 recruits across all ethnic groups, including 16 females, have recently been inducted.

"I think there has been good work done, but there is still a lot of work to be progressed in continual capacity building. Mentoring and coaching are going to be a significant part of the phase that we're in and in future phases," he says.

According to Fedeal Agent Jevtovic, Defence's role has been pivotal to the success, and the lessons learned for both Defence and the AFP will carry over to future missions.

"I think there has been a lot of learning take place in the two years that we've been in the Solomon Islands. We needed to learn and understand Defence culture and processes. Likewise Defence has had to understand how we work as a law enforcement agency," he says.

"This is a whole new world for all of us. We have police going and doing work in some difficult environments offshore. Environments where some of the criminals have firepower that far exceeds some of the things that police are accustomed to in normal community policing. So it was extremely important that we had a Defence presence - it still is extremely important. Working together gives us all confidence in our ability to execute our duties on the ground. That's something you can't measure.

"This lays the basis for the future as well. We've now got a better understanding of our roles, what we can deliver and how we deliver it. This prepares us for future Australian assistance packages anywhere in the world."

RAMSI: The Defence Perspective

By Kathryn Fitch

The dramatic change to have been brought about in the Solomon Islands is particularly noticeable to Brigadier (BRIG) Paul Symon, Director General Pacific, International Policy Division.

"I was there for the first 100 days, and going back two years later, seeing the people's pride in their country restored and the optimism in their faces, is the best testament to success. It's fantastic," he says.

"When you step back and look at the situation on the second anniversary, you can see how far we've come from the predicament that the Solomon Islands Government found itself in July 2003. It's a very, very impressive achievement."

He says the Army has progressively drawn down to a point where the Australian Defence Force (ADF) foot-print is now quite small.

Logistics support - which was initially handled by ADF due to their ability to deploy and establish a logistics framework quickly - has been successfully outsourced and is now operated by a civilian company.

The ADF is still providing some security support, however. Australia is currently sharing the responsibility for providing a quick-reaction force of 32 men with the four other regional countries - troops from a new country take up the responsibility every three-months.

The ADF also provides an external security presence at the prison. There is concern that if the high-profile prisoners who are being held there were liberated it would very much signal a backwards step. But BRIG Symon says he is keen to ensure that the Royal Solomon Islands Police commence focused training to enable them to take responsibility for providing that presence.

He stresses that the ADF won't leave prematurely. As long as there are militants with weapons out there, the ADF will continue to "overmatch their capability". He does say however that the security provided by the ADF is not a long-term option, and that it is important for people to understand that the ADF is not part of the long-term vision. He is firm in his agreement with Paul Jevtovic (from the AFP), that the focus should now be about training local capability.

"The Solomon Islands are a military-free country. It is important to understand that the vision the Solomon Islanders have for themselves isn't inclusive of an army," BRIG Symon says.

"They have got to have respect for their own institutions and we've got to help them professionalise - for people to gain that respect. That's got to be the main effort now.

"In the early stages of the operation the police simply didn't have the equipment to overmatch the threat. That threat has been substantially neutralised but there is still a small number within the community who have access to weapons - and, as I say, our intent is to remain overmatched in capability.

"We're working very hard on this, and our assessment is that the equation is close to reaching the point where the police forces are capable of dealing with all known threats in the Solomon Islands."

Communication as a tactic

In July 2003, I commanded the regional military intervention force as part of the Australian-led 'strengthened assistance' mission to the Solomon Islands. I was responsible for the military operations of Combined Joint Task Force 635 from 24 July until 18 November 2003 - during which time we achieved a dramatic turn around in the law and order situation in the Solomons.

The mission was a good example of the subtle employment of military force in support of other government agencies in a synchronised way, with careful regard to the tone of military operations and how they are perceived.

Police are the appropriate force to deal with law and order - but a firm yet friendly military force in support permitted them to do so. We were prepared for the worst on arrival but fortunately no resistance was offered.

Much of the success of this operation depended on messages - on us communicating intent, ability and resolve while retaining public goodwill. In striving to maintain the almost universal popular support we were afforded on arrival, we placed particular focus on an information campaign with associated engagement activities.

The Special Coordinator, the Police Commander and I conducted numerous visits to remote areas to convey the mission's aims personally. This included meetings with community groups and the all-important local chiefs to hear their questions and concerns.

While still carefully managing military presence in public areas, we conducted public displays, or 'open days', from quite early on in the mission. We played sports against the local community and later organised a major public concert to celebrate 100 days of the mission. We sought projects that helped people help themselves without developing an 'aid' mentality. Unexploded ordnance disposal was one example of such a project. Another highly visible one was the sponsorship of a 'Clean-up Honiara Day' that relied on local participation.

The open days proved particularly effective. The first open day in Honiara - held within ten days of our arrival - attracted over 10, 000 locals and cemented our firm but friendly reputation. Throughout these events, we promoted awareness of our technological edge over potential adversaries. Public displays of our capabilities, particularly those that could lead us to hidden weapons, such as ground detection radar, and our night vision capabilities had a profound effect on the local people and were very popular.

Our working dogs were a tremendous psychological tool that emphasised skill and sophistication. Highly trained powerful dogs resonate deeply in the psyche of those who might face them. Similarly, our tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or UAVs, were also a potent psychological tool that clearly played on people's minds. We openly displayed our abilities and the imagination of the locals took over from there.

Rumours, or the 'jungle drums' as we called them, passed quickly through towns and villages. Soon many knew not only of our capabilities, but were trading in fictitious tales of our success in locating concealed weapons. Our decision to advertise these capabilities, and possibly overstate their merits, was deliberately taken to place pressure on those considering concealing weapons beyond the end of the amnesty. It was a gamble, which fortunately, proved successful.

Defence

Cover story

Working together for peace and stability

This month the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is celebrating its second anniversary - and by all reports there is a lot to celebrate.

RAMSI: The Defence Perspective

Communication as a tactic