Defence

Chief Joint Operations

Increasing our offshore maritime security

One of many recent border protection and maritime security initiatives is the establishment of the Joint Offshore Protection Command (JOPC). The JOPC initiative was listed among the Defence Priorities 2005. The Director-General of Coastwatch and Commander of the Joint Offshore Protection Command, Rear Admiral Russ Crane, discusses the new role ...

With a coastline of approximately 37 000 kilometres and an Exclusive Economic Zone approaching 4 million square nautical miles, Australia has a formidable challenge in its quest for maritime security.

Prior to the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001, the primary focus within the Australian maritime domain was on safety, the environment and law enforcement. In the post September 11 era, we recognise that any maritime conveyance could transport or constitute a security threat. In this new environment, Australia has to identify such threats, deter and/or prevent attacks, and be prepared to respond to and recover from maritime security incidents.

It is worth remembering that Al-Qa'ida has successfully demonstrated their capability and intent in the Middle East in 2000 and again in 2002, in carrying out attacks against the maritime sector.

As a result of the September 11 attacks, the Australian Government initiated a number of measures to improve domestic security. One such measure was the establishment in July 2004 of the Taskforce on Offshore Maritime Security.

The Taskforce was led by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and comprised members of that department, as well as senior ADF officers and representatives of the Australian Customs Service.

The Taskforce reported to the Prime Minister in November 2004 and in December, following Cabinet consideration, the Prime Minister announced a number of initiatives to further strengthen Australia's offshore maritime security. These initiatives included the establishment of the Joint Offshore Protection Command (JOPC); implementation of the Australian Maritime Identification System (AMIS); and augmented security patrols (ASP).

The Minister for Justice and Customs and the Minister for Defence formally opened the Headquarters Joint Offshore Protection Command on 30 March 2005. The Headquarters is co-located with the Coastwatch Division of the Australian Customs Service in Canberra and comprises staff drawn from both Customs and the Australian Defence Force. A number of staff are physically dispersed from the HQ in Australia's north.

The Joint Offshore Protection Command links the Australian Defence Force responsibility for offshore counter-terrorism prevention and response, with the existing civil maritime surveillance, response, response co-ordination and enforcement roles undertaken by Customs.

The JOPC is not charged with the enforcement of any JOPC specific legislation - it relies on client legislation. Its purpose is to strengthen planning, as well as command and control arrangements for military offshore maritime protection functions as well as civil maritime surveillance and response.

The Command draws on the full range of ADF and Customs capabilities. It is an important step in ensuring that any terrorist threat to Australia's maritime assets and our coastline can be detected and defeated.

As the Director-General of Coastwatch, I am also the Commander of the Joint Offshore Protection Command. The Command has a joint accountability structure. Whilst my directive as Commander JOPC has me reporting directly to the CEO of Customs, as a military component of the Joint Operations Command I am required to report through CJOPS to the CDF.

JOPC does not have any long-term ownership role with assets (vessels or aircraft) under its control. JOPC will use assigned Customs and Defence assets to execute a particular operation. The Commander of the JOPC will operate assigned assets in accordance with the Rules of Engagement (ROE) promulgated by CDF and by the CEO Customs.

Using this approach, the JOPC asset base is quite large, although the JOPC must compete (in a priorities sense) for access to these assets. We have 17 Coastwatch aircraft normally dedicated to civil maritime surveillance but available for tactical tasking; 8 Australian Customs Vessels normally multitasked; 15 Navy Fremantle Class Patrol Boats with about 30% normally tasked in respect of border control and maritime security functions, as well as a range of Defence land and air units. The 15 FCPB will be replaced by 14 new Armidale Patrol Boats over the next 3 years.

The number and type of asset assigned to the JOPC will vary, depending on the nature of the operation, as well as Customs and Defence tasking priorities and requirements.

For military operations and combined exercises, the Chief of Defence Force assigns ADF forces to the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS). Within any constraints imposed by CDF, CJOPS will command the operation or activity directly, or may nominate the Commander JOPC as the commander of an operation or exercise.

The majority of the operations and response role will be undertaken within the Operations and Response Group, by a combination of Coastwatch and Defence personnel.

This approach was recently trialled successfully during Operation Clearwater. Clearwater was a concerted effort by both civil and defence assets against illegal fishing vessels in and around the Gulf of Carpentaria.

The conceptual model for how we plan to operate the JOPC is based on several premises, namely:

• that this new command should be able to transition seamlessly from a civil to a military response.
• that both Customs and Defence have substantial core businesses that are outside the scope of offshore protection.
• that the JOPC was to leverage off the Coastwatch model i.e. the agency not owning its own assets but rather having them assigned for a specific purpose.

Maritime Awareness

An initial priority for the JOPC will be an increasing understanding of events and patterns in our maritime approaches through a concept known as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).

A key problem identified by the Taskforce on Offshore Maritime Security was the lack of centralised coordination and integration of all information relevant to the maritime domain held by a number of Commonwealth and State agencies. No single picture currently exists to provide sufficient information to confidently assess all activities in Australia's maritime domain and to support proactive action to deter terrorists from offshore oil and gas platforms.

As such, a key initiative in increasing our maritime domain awareness is the Australian Maritime Identification System (AMIS).

Based on cooperative international arrangements and in accordance with international and domestic law, the JOPC proposes to establish AMIS as a mechanism for compiling information on vessel identity, crew, passengers, cargo, location, course, speed and intended port of arrival.

The AMIS is first and foremost about information - gathering and synthesizing large amounts of information and specific data from many disparate sources to gain knowledge of the maritime domain.

Australia, like all other countries, is bound by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the development of AMIS is consistent with that convention.

Like the skies, the world's oceans are global thoroughfares. A cooperative international approach involving partnerships of nations, government agencies and commercial shipping interests is essential - with all parties acting collaboratively to confront broadly defined threats to our common and interdependent maritime security.

Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have a crucial interest, by virtue of their maritime geography, in seeing that maritime terrorism is controlled. Terrorists have declared war on the global economy and have started to shift their strategy towards economic targets such as commercial shipping lanes.

In developing the AMIS, JOPC is aware that it will require the growth and development of strong partnerships with other nations, Australian government agencies and the maritime industry.

Augmented Security Patrols

An important task for the JOPC is to program and execute augmented security patrols by Defence and Customs patrol assets in Australia's oil and gas fields in the Timor Sea and on the North West Shelf. Our presence in these high-risk areas demonstrates intent to protect our assets.

International demands on primary energy resources continue to grow. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that global demand will grow at an average annual rate of 1.7 per cent over the next three decades.

Australia's offshore oil and gas industry provides 93% of Australia's oil and 83% of gas production. It employs some 14 000 people and in 2003/04, Australia exported oil and gas worth $8.8 billion. Much of this product is sold in forward contracts, up to 20 years into the future. An important advantage for Australia in securing these contracts is the reliable supply of energy, because Australia is seen as a safe and stable country.

The economic value and strategic significance of Australia's offshore oil and gas industry places these offshore facilities at risk from terrorist attack.

However, responsibility for the protection of these facilities fell between the gaps in the established roles of Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies. The Government accepted the Taskforce on Offshore Maritime Security recommendation that the Commonwealth take direct responsibility for offshore maritime security.

The objective of augmented security patrols is to increase the level of security within the patrol areas and deter those who may be contemplating or planning an attack on these offshore platforms.

The benefit of augmented security patrol is its apparent unpredictable timing and location. This 'pulsing' technique, which involves the saturation of selected areas with patrol assets for pre-determined periods, substantially reduces costs if compared to longer periods of blanket air and surface coverage. The same approach will be adopted to support the offshore interdiction of ships in Australia's maritime approaches.

Augmented periodic security patrolling is planned and executed by the JOPC.

The first two augmented security patrols were conducted in the Timor Sea and North West Shelf between 28 March and 1 April 2005.

Affected industry members were alerted prior to the commencement of patrols through their industry association.

The patrol was successful in terms of testing communications, procedures and protocols between Coastwatch and Defence assets, as well as with oil and gas installations. Lessons learnt are being reviewed and will be rolled into planning of future augmented security patrols.

The JOPC is an important means of protecting Australia's offshore oil and gas facilities and detecting and defeating terrorist threats to Australia's maritime assets and coastline.

Taken from a speech to the United Services Institute by Rear Admiral Russ Crane, Director- General CoastWatch, on 4 May 2005.

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