Defence

Air Force

Air Power Doctrine - are we there yet?

By WGCDR Glendan Krause

The fifth edition of the Air Force doctrine is due to be published next year. Since the first edition, published as the Air Power Manual (APM) in 1990 at the direction of AM Furnell, the document has been revised on a regular four-year cycle.

The fourth edition released in 2002 saw both a new title (Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power - AAP) and a new, contemporary format. What could the writers add in this next version to make any impact on our organisation? Perhaps yet another format change, or a new chapter on some emerging topic? I suggest they should be re-examining some of the basic elements.

AAP suggests that the "beginning of wisdom is calling things by their right names" (page 1-3). Defining terms such as capability, role, mission, task and sortie would be an important element in setting out our doctrine. Yet the AAP states that "a role is a specific function"; "missions are defined where a role can consist of a number of discrete functions"; "a mission is a specific task" and later states that "the missions ... are defined within each role". This creates confusion about whether a mission is a subset of a role, comprises a number of roles or is some entirely different entity.

A key issue is the distinction between concepts and conduct, between theory and practice. Both are important but doctrine should lean a little to the side of conceptual thinking. Capabilities and roles are concepts. They are key elements in the strategic dialogue on preparedness planning, and are used throughout the organisation - as part of the training programs and aircrew categorisation schemes at wing and squadron level.

Missions and tasks are very much about the implementation and employment of Air Power. They are about packaging capabilities and roles through a combination of platforms, weapons and crew competencies. Missions are how operations are conducted. Most missions involve multiple roles, particularly where the platforms have multiple crew members. While we like to describe the F/A-18 as a multi-role aircraft, a change of role traditionally involves a change of configuration. That is to say that each sortie is role specific, but that the aircraft (and qualified crew) are capable of being adapted to a number of roles on different sorties. Whereas a P3 or AEW&C platform is multi-role on almost every sortie since there are a number of crew members performing concurrent and discrete functions that each contribute to sortie success.

While this distinction is disappearing as platforms are becoming more complex and functions automated, we should still be able to articulate the discrete roles being performed. A number of documents have attempted to set out a definitive list of air power roles. These include the old AAP1010, the four editions of the Air Power doctrine and the current Capability Management Plans. In some areas such as Air Lift there is a relatively stable list, but in other areas the roles have been expressed quite differently depending on the personal preferences of the authors. Emerging areas such as combat support and battle space management are still bound by very platform specific terminology.

Let me outline one example of a poorly expressed role and one that is missing. Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) is not an air power role - but rather a term for a platform and a mission type. It is clearly several roles (functions) conducted concurrently. An AEW&C platform is foremost a surveillance system. Most platforms would include EW intelligence gathering, multi-source data validation and fusion, and communications relay functions. Perhaps the important aspect is the 'control' or force direction aspect that assists combat elements with target acquisition and engagement solutions.

It is an unfortunate fact that none of the previous four editions of our doctrine have explicitly acknowledged the fighter control role (function) of the Air Defence category. In fact there is no formal doctrinal basis for the RAAF's Control and Reporting Units other than a liberal interpretation of the surveillance role.

Force direction should be acknowledged as an important role for aerospace power. Early examples of force direction include artillery spotting (First World War) and the pathfinders (Second World War). Today force direction includes fighter control, laser target designation (from ground forces or buddy aircraft), forward air control, as well as target passing from P3 to F-111 for maritime strike.

What makes AEW&C such a potent force enhancement capability is the combination of a good surveillance system with the force direction function. We should correct the oversights of the past and be clear about the true roles (specific functions) for aerospace power. Force direction (or whatever other label you choose to apply) is a function that is distinguishable and occurs in a number of forms, not just Forward Air Control.

These thoughts are personal observations intended to prompt some coffee room debate. Are we there yet? If you can see some areas for improving our formal doctrine then contact the Air Power Development Centre.

WGCDR Glendan Krause is currently the Assistant Air Attaché with the Australian Defence Staff in Washington DC. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.

Contact: Air Power Development Centre (APDC) www.raaf.gov.au/airpower.

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