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Previous Chiefs' Speeches/Presentations

CDF Opening Statement to the Senate Enquiry into a 'Certain Maritime Incident'

Friday, 12 April 2002

SENATORS, THANK YOU FOR GIVING ME THE OPPORTUNITY AS CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS SELECT COMMITTEE.

BEFORE I ADDRESS SPECIFIC ISSUES, I WANT TO REFER TO MY ROLE AS THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISER TO THE GOVERNMENT.

THE DEFENCE ACT OF 1903 DESCRIBES THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF CIVIL AUTHORITY OVER THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE.

SECTION 8 OF THE ACT COVERS THE POWERS OF THE MINISTER. IT SPECIFIES THAT "THE MINISTER SHALL HAVE THE GENERAL CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEFENCE FORCE, AND THE POWERS VESTED IN THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE, THE CHIEF OF NAVY, THE CHIEF OF ARMY AND THE CHIEF OF AIR FORCE BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 9, AND THE POWERS VESTED JOINTLY IN THE SECRETARY AND THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 9A, SHALL BE EXERCISED SUBJECT TO AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANY DIRECTIONS OF THE MINISTER."

SECTION 9 COVERS THE COMMAND OF THE DEFENCE FORCE AND THE ARMS OF THE DEFENCE FORCE, AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEFENCE FORCE. IT STATES, INTER ALIA, THAT "SUBJECT TO SECTION 8, THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE SHALL COMMAND THE DEFENCE FORCE, AND THE SERVICE CHIEF OF AN ARM OF THE DEFENCE FORCE SHALL, UNDER THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE, COMMAND THE ARM OF THE DEFENCE FORCE OF WHICH HE IS THE SERVICE CHIEF."

IT GOES ON RELEVANTLY TO STATE THAT "IT IS A FUNCTION OF THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE TO ADVISE THE MINISTER IN SUCH A MANNER AS THE MINISTER DIRECTS, ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE COMMAND BY THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE OF THE DEFENCE FORCE..."

ON ADMINISTRATION SECTION 9A STATES THAT "SUBJECT TO SECTION 8, THE SECRETARY AND THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE SHALL JOINTLY HAVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEFENCE FORCE EXCEPT WITH RESPECT TO:

(A) MATTERS FALLING WITHIN THE COMMAND OF THE DEFENCE FORCE BY THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE OR THE COMMAND OF AN ARM OF THE DEFENCE FORCE BY THE SERVICE CHIEF OF THAT ARM OF THE DEFENCE FORCE; OR

(B) ANY OTHER MATTER SPECIFIED BY THE MINISTER."

IN TURN MINISTER REITH HAD SET OUT IN GENERAL TERMS HIS DIRECTION TO THE CDF AND THE SECRETARY IN WRITING. IT IS DATED 9 APRIL 2001. LET ME QUOTE THE RELEVANT PARTS:

"ACCOUNTABILITY: YOU ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO ME FOR DEFENCE'S PERFORMANCE, HAVING REGARD TO OUR STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES. ANY AUTHORISATION OR DELEGATION OF MY AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO DEFENCE IS THROUGH YOU, WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS BELOW.

RESULTS: I EXPECT YOU TO DELIVER:

  1. SUCCESSFUL JOINT CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE CDF RETAINING THE SOLE COMMAND AUTHORITY;
  2. PROVISION OF CAPABILITY TO ENABLE OUR ARMED FORCES TO DEFEND AUSTRALIA AND ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS;
  3. TIMELY AND RESPONSIVE ADVICE;
  4. PROPER STEWARDSHIP OF PEOPLE AND OF FINANCIAL AND OTHER RESOURCES, INCLUDING ACHIEVEMENT, OR BETTERING, OF BUDGETED OPERATING RESULTS; AND
  5. A DEFENCE PLAN FOR MY APPROVAL INCORPORATING THE ABOVE.

LIMITATIONS: YOU MAY PURSUE THESE RESULTS IN ANY MANNER, AS LONG AS:

  1. YOUR ACTIONS ARE NOT IMPRUDENT, UNLAWFUL OR UNETHICAL;
  2. YOUR ACTIONS ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH

    1. GOVERNMENT POLICY,
    2. THE SECRETARY'S ROLE AS PRINCIPAL CIVILIAN ADVISER AND WITH HIS STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT 1997,
    3. THE CDF'S ROLE AS PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISER AND HIS STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY AS COMMANDER OF THE DEFENCE FORCE UNDER THE DEFENCE ACT 1903."

THUS, I AM CLEARLY ACCOUNTABLE TO THE MINISTER, UNDER THE ACT. IT SHOULD NOT BE OTHERWISE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. IN TURN HE IS ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PARLIAMENT FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES.

UNDER AUSTRALIAN LAW IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DELEGATE COMMAND AUTHORITY TO ANY PERSON WHO IS NOT A MEMBER OF OUR ARMED FORCES. AXIOMATICALLY, IT FOLLOWS THAT WHILE THE MINISTER DIRECTS CDF AND THE SECRETARY IN THEIR RESPONSIBLITIES FOR ADMINISTRATION AND IN THE EXERCISE OF COMMAND, THE MINISTER HIMSELF DOES NOT HOLD ANY COMMAND AUTHORITY.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING MY ROLE AS PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISER IS:

AS COMMANDER OF THE ADF, I:

I WAS APPOINTED AS CDF ON 4 JULY 1998 FOR A TWO-YEAR PERIOD. IN 2000 I WAS RE-APPOINTED FOR A FURTHER TWO YEARS.

MY SERVICE IN THE NAVY BEGAN ON 31 JANUARY 1961 SO I HAVE OVER 41 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN MY CHOSEN PROFESSION. MY CAREER HAS INCLUDED MANY COMMAND AND STAFF APPOINTMENTS, AS WELL AS AN OCCASIONAL ACADEMIC OPPORTUNITY AND ONE DIPLOMATIC POSTING. I HAVE SERVED IN NUMEROUS PARTS OF THE WORLD, ON SHORE AND AFLOAT. EVERY ONE OF THESE POSITIONS HAS REQUIRED AND TRAINED ME TO MAKE PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENTS INVOLVING THE EVALUATION OF INFORMATION PROVIDED TO ME.

DURING MY TENURE AT THE TOP OF ONE OF AUSTRALIA'S MOST COMPLEX ENTERPRISES, I HAVE WORKED WITH FOUR MINISTERS FOR DEFENCE AND THREE COLLEAGUES AS SECRETARY OR ACTING SECRETARY. DR ALLAN HAWKE AS THE SECRETARY IS MY COLLEAGUE: AND WE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK IN PREPARING THE DEFENCE FORCE AND THE DEPARTMENT TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY.

I EXPECT THAT THIS COMMITTEE WILL BE VITALLY INTERESTED IN OPERATIONS AND THE COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS, TO WHICH I NOW TURN.

IN JULY THIS YEAR WHEN I WILL COMPLETE MY SECOND TERM AS CDF I WILL HAVE COMMANDED THE ADF FOR FOUR YEARS. IN THAT TIME WE HAVE CONDUCTED OVER 60 OPERATIONS. ALL OF THEM HAVE BEEN AN OUTSTANDING SUCCESS BY ANY STANDARD. SOME OF THEM HAVE BEEN A SERIOUS TEST OF OUR CAPABILITIES AND THE REFORMS AND CHANGES PUT IN PLACE PARTICULARLY OVER THE LAST 15 YEARS.

AS AT 10 OCTOBER 2001 OUR CURRENT OPERATIONS WERE AS SET OUT IN THE DOCUMENT THAT I SEEK TO TABLE.

WE HAVE BUILT UP AN EXTRAORDINARY LEVEL OF EXPECTATION THAT THE DEFENCE FORCE CAN DO ALMOST ANYTHING. THIS EXPECTATION LIVES IN OUR COMMUNITY. IT LIVES IN THE MINDS OF OUR PARLIAMENTARIANS. OUR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ALSO OCCASIONALLY THINK THAT WE CAN DO ALMOST ANYTHING, LEADING TO VIGOROUS DEBATES FROM TIME TO TIME. IT IS A POTENTIAL PROBLEM FOR ME BECAUSE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE, SHOULD IT OCCUR, WOULD BE VERY DEMANDING.

THERE ARE MANY PEOPLE IN OUR COMMUNITY WHO DO NOT UNDERSTAND THAT THIS OUTSTANDING RECORD SAYS A GREAT DEAL ABOUT THE QUALITY OF THE PEOPLE IN THE DEFENCE FORCE AT ALL LEVELS. IT ALSO SAYS A GREAT DEAL ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM. FRANKLY WE COULD NOT HAVE DELIVERED AN OPERATION SUCH AS INTERFET WITHOUT HAVING IN PLACE AN EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM, AND THE HIGH QUALITY PEOPLE WHO MAKE IT WORK.

I AM AWARE THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS TAKEN EVIDENCE ON THE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE SYSTEM WE USE, SO I WILL PLACE MY VIEWS ON THE RECORD.

THE MATTER BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE DID NOT INVOLVE ANY FAILURE IN OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE. QUITE THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE IF WE ACCEPT THE PICTURES PAINTED FOR US BY COMMANDER BANKS AND REAR ADMIRAL SMITH. WHAT WE ARE DISCUSSING IS A FAILURE IN A SUBSIDIARY FEATURE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL, NAMELY REPORTING BACK.

A COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM IS PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN THE EXECUTION OF LAWFULLY ASSIGNED TASKS. IT MUST COMPRISE THE MEANS OF PROVIDING THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY FOR THE USE OF FORCE AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES AS DIRECTED, AND WELL AS THE MEANS OF CONCENTRATING THE FORCES WHERE THEY ARE REQUIRED. IT MUST BE FORWARD LOOKING - HAVING A CLEAR PERSPECTIVE ABOUT WHAT WE HAVE TO DO TOMORROW. I ACKNOWLEDGE IT IS ALSO ABOUT REPORTING BACK, THAT IS RECORDING YESTERDAY AND TODAY'S STORY.

BUT BEFORE MOVING ONTO OTHER MATTERS I WANT TO PUT THESE OPERATIONS IN CONTEXT FOR I THINK THIS IS HIGHLY PERTINENT TO OUR PRESENT PRIORITIES FOR ACTION.

IN OCTOBER OF LAST YEAR, THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE WAS COMMITTED AS NEVER BEFORE, TO FULLING ITS PARLIAMENTARY AND GOVERNMENT CHARTER TO "DEFEND AUSTRALIA AND ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS".

WE WERE BARELY OVER THREE WEEKS OUT FROM THE BRUTAL IMAGES OF AIRCRAFT SMASHING INTO THE WORLD TRADE CENTRE IN NEW YORK, AND WERE ABOUT TO JOIN THE LAUNCH OF A DANGEROUS MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. IT COMMENCED IN OCTOBER 2001 AND CONTINUES TO THIS DAY. IN SHORT I WAS FOCUSED ON THE IMMINENT WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE URGENT NEED TO SAFEGUARD OUR HOMELAND FROM POSSIBLE TERRORIST ATTACK, THE RISK OF WHICH I CONSIDER REAL AND UNPRECEDENTED.

AS WELL, WE WERE IN TIMOR, AS WE ARE NOW AS PART OF OUR COMMITMENT TO PEACEKEEPING, HAVING PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE THERE, IN THE INTERFET DAYS. WE WERE, AS WE ARE NOW, IN BOUGAINVILLE, PRESERVING THE PEACE. AND IN BOSNIA, THE MIDDLE EAST, IN CYPRUS, IN EGYPT, IN SIERRA LEONE, AND IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS.

IN ADDITION, WE WERE SUPPORTING, AS REQUIRED, THE GOVERNMENT'S BORDER PROTECTION POLICY.

I EMPHASISE "SUPPORTING". DEFENCE WAS NOT AND IS NOT RUNNING THE GOVERNMENT'S BORDER PROTECTION POLICY. THAT IS A FUNCTION OF OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS. DEFENCE'S ROLE WAS AS AN AGENCY DIRECTED TO SUPPORT A POLICY BEING FORMULATED AND IMPLEMENTED BY OTHER AGENCIES, SUCH AS THE DEPARTMENTS OF PRIME MINISTER & CABINET, IMMIGRATION, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT.

ON THE NIGHT OF 6 OCTOBER 2001, HMAS ADELAIDE INTERCEPTED SIEV 4. YOU HAVE HEARD EVIDENCE ABOUT THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FROM OTHERS. I PROPOSE FOR THE INFORMATION OF THIS COMMITTEE TO SUMMARISE THE COMMUNICATIONS WITH ME.

DURING THE NEXT 48 HOURS, THE CAPTAIN AND CREW OF THE ADELAIDE PERFORMED GALLANT WORK IN RESCUING MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM THE SEA, WITHOUT LOSS OF LIFE. AND I FEEL IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE SAKE OF ALL OF US, AND THIS INQUIRY, TO UNDERPIN YOUR THOUGHTS WITH THIS ONE OUTSTANDING FACT: NO LIVES WERE LOST.

AS CDF, MY ROLE WAS TO EVALUATE ALL OF THE INFORMATION, AND WHERE NECESSARY, ADVISE MY MINISTER BY PLACING THE INFORMATION IN CONTEXT. THIS INFORMATION WAS USUALLY NOT CONFIRMED IN WRITING. I DID NOT SEE ANY MESSAGES FROM THE SHIP.

ACTIONS BETWEEN 7-11 OCTOBER 2001

THE FIRST INFORMATION REPORTED TO ME ABOUT SIEV 4 WAS WHEN COMMANDER AUSTRALIAN THEATRE, REAR ADMIRAL RITCHIE, TELEPHONED ME AT HOME ON THE MORNING OF SUNDAY 7 OCT. MY BEST RECOLLECTION OF THE CONVERSATION WAS THAT HE REFERRED TO " PEOPLE " HAVING BEEN THROWN OVERBOARD. IN THE CONVERSATION COMAST MAY HAVE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO A CHILD OR CHILDREN HAVING BEEN THROWN OVERBOARD, I CANNOT NOW REMEMBER PRECISELY. I ASSUMED THAT THE INFORMATION HAD COME THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, OBVIOUSLY INITIATING WITH THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE ADELAIDE, COMMANDER BANKS.

AFTER RECEIVING THIS INFORMATION I TELEPHONED MINISTER REITH. MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT I SAID TO HIM THAT I HAD BEEN ADVISED BY COMAST THAT SIEV 4 HAS BEEN INTERCEPTED AND PEOPLE HAD BEEN THROWN OVERBOARD. I DO NOT RECALL PRECISELY WHETHER I SAID "PEOPLE" AND/OR "CHILDREN". I CERTAINLY SAID "PEOPLE". HE TOLD ME THAT HE ALREADY KNEW ABOUT THIS. HE GAVE ME TO UNDERSTAND HE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN WITH MINISTER RUDDOCK WHO HAD RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM THE TASK FORCE. MY VERY CLEAR IMPRESSION FROM THE CONVERSATION WAS THAT HE ALREADY KNEW AS MUCH OR MORE ABOUT THE EVENT THAN I DID. I ALSO SAID TO HIM, AS PEOPLE WERE IN THE WATER MY PRIORITY WAS SAVING LIFE.

LATER THAT DAY I WAS ADVISED, I THINK BY HEAD - STRATEGIC COMMAND DIVISION, AIR VICE MARSHAL TITHERIDGE, THAT EVERYONE WAS SAFELY RESCUED. THE DETAIL OF HOW THEY CAME TO BE IN THE WATER WAS NOT RAISED.

ON THE NIGHT OF MONDAY 8 OCTOBER, COMAST TELEPHONED ME TO ADVISE SIEV 4 WAS SINKING, LIFERAFTS FROM HMAS ADELAIDE WERE IN THE WATER AND THERE WAS AN OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY. OVER TWO HUNDRED PEOPLE WOULD NEED TO BE RESCUED FROM THE WATER. I WAS ALSO ADVISED THAT THE ADELAIDE'S COMMANDING OFFICER HAD CALLED FOR URGENT ASSISTANCE FROM CHRISTMAS ISLAND.

SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I HAD A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR. MAX MOORE-WILTON, SECRETARY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET. HE TOLD ME TO MAKE SURE THAT EVERYONE RESCUED WENT ON BOARD HMAS ADELAIDE. I SAID TO HIM THAT WE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT, AND SAFETY OF LIFE WAS TO BE THE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION. IN THIS EMERGENCY, IF PEOPLE HAD TO BE RESCUED, AND LANDED AT HRISTMAS ISLAND THAT WOULD HAVE TO HAPPEN. THE CO HAD ALREADY CALLED FOR URGENT ASSISTANCE FROM THE ISLAND FROM WHATEVER ASSETS WERE AVAILABLE. IT WAS FOR THE COMMANDER OF THE ADELAIDE TO MAKE THE CALL.

AFTER THAT CALL, I IMMEDIATELY TELEPHONED MINISTER REITH AND TOLD HIM OF THIS DISCUSSION. THE MINISTER SAID MY APPROACH WAS APPROPRIATE.

TOWARDS MIDNIGHT, I WAS ADVISED THAT THE RESCUE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND THAT EVERYONE HAD BEEN SAVED.

ON TUESDAY 9 OCTOBER, I ATTENDED A WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING. THE TOPICS INCLUDED THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, THE RESPONSES IN OUR REGION TO THE US OPERATIONS THERE AND OTHER MATTERS. SIEV 4 WAS NOT DISCUSSED.

ON 10 OCTOBER IN THE AFTERNOON, MINISTER REITH TELEPHONED ME ABOUT THE RELEASE TO THE MEDIA THAT AFTERNOON OF CERTAIN PHOTOS THAT HE HAD IN HIS POSSESSION. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD NOT SEEN ANY PHOTOGRAPHS. BUT BECAUSE THE OPERATION WITH SIEV 4 HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED I COULD SEE NO REASON WHY PHOTOGRAPHS SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SUBJECT TO A SECURITY CHECK BY HSC THAT THE IDENTITIES OF ADF PERSONNEL INVOLVED WERE NOT COMPROMISED.

I THEN TELEPHONED HSC ABOUT THE MINISTER'S REQUIREMENTS AND TASKED HIM TO VET THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND ADVISE THE MINISTER APPROPRIATELY.

ON THE NIGHT OF 10 OCTOBER COMAST TELEPHONED ME AT HOME ABOUT THE MINISTER'S APPEARANCE ON THE "7.30 REPORT", WHICH I HAD NOT WATCHED. HE TOLD ME THAT THE MINISTER HAD RELEASED SOME PHOTOGRAPHS BUT HAD CONNECTED THEM TO THE WRONG EVENTS.

HE SAID THAT THE MINISTER HAD CONNECTED THE PHOTOGRAPHS TO CHILDREN BEING THROWN OVERBOARD ON 7 OCTOBER WHEN THEY DID NOT RELATE TO THAT EVENT.

THAT NIGHT I ALSO RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE CHIEF OF THE NAVY, VICE ADMIRAL SHACKLETON, WHO GAVE ME THE SAME INFORMATION AS COMAST.

THE FOLLOWING DAY, I HAD A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER REITH ABOUT PHOTOGRAPHS. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD BEEN ADVISED THAT THE PHOTOGRAPHS HE HAD PUT OUT DID NOT DESCRIBE THE EVENTS HE PORTRAYED ON 7.30 REPORT. I CANNOT REMEMBER HIS PRECISE RESPONSE, SAVE THAT WE HAD A DISCUSSION ABOUT THERE BEING A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION ABOUT THE PHOTOGRAPHS. BUT I DO RECALL THAT OUR CONVERSATION WAS TESTY. IT CONCLUDED WITH AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN US THAT NEVER AGAIN WOULD WE DISCUSS PHOTOGRAPHS WITHOUT ENSURING THAT WE BOTH HAD THE SAME PHOTOGRAPHS IN FRONT OF US.

LATER THAT DAY I WAS TELEPHONED BY COMAST. MY RECOLLECTION OF IT WAS THAT HE TOLD ME THAT THERE WERE NOW DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER CHILDREN WERE EVER THROWN OVERBOARD. I DO NOT REMEMBER HIS BEING MORE DEFINITE THAN THAT.

I RECALL THAT HE REFERRED TO THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND TO THE VIDEO, AND WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE CONCLUSIVE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. I SAID TO HIM THAT PHOTOGRAPHS ALONE ARE ONLY PART OF THE EVIDENTIARY MATERIAL, AND UNTIL HE COULD PRODUCE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT WHAT HAD BEEN ORIGINALLY REPORTED TO ME WAS WRONG, I WOULD NOT CHANGE MY ADVICE TO THE MINISTER.

I ALSO SAID TO COMAST THERE WAS OBVIOUSLY CONFUSION ABOUT WHAT TOOK PLACE. I DIRECTED COMAST TO ENSURE THAT WHILE THIS WAS FRESH IN EVERYONE'S MIND THAT WITNESS STATEMENTS AND ANY OTHER EVIDENTIARY MATERIAL SHOULD BE COLLECTED.

BEFORE HMAS ADELAIDE DEPARTED FOR THE NORTHERN ARABIAN GULF LATER IN THE MONTH, I RECALL CHECKING TO SEE WHETHER THIS HAD BEEN DONE. I WAS ADVISED THAT THE MATERIAL WAS ASSEMBLED AND WAS BEING HELD IN PERTH.

ON 25 OCTOBER I WENT TO EAST TIMOR FOR A SHORT VISIT. ON 29 OCTOBER I WENT TO SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA, AND THEN HAWAII BEFORE RETURNING TO AUSTRALIA ON 10 NOVEMBER.

PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE (AND POSSIBLY ON 17TH OCTOBER) I HAD A CONVERSATION WITH THE MINISTER IN WHICH I INFORMED HIM THAT I HAD BEEN TOLD BY CN AND COMAST THERE WERE DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER CHILDREN HAD EVER BEEN THROWN OVER THE SIDE OF SIEV 4. I SAID TO HIM THE DOUBTS SEEMED TO BE BASED ON WHAT THE PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWED OR DID NOT SHOW, AND AN INCONCLUSIVE VIDEO. I SAID THAT I HAD INDICATED TO THEM MY POSITION WAS THAT UNTIL EVIDENCE WAS PRODUCED TO SHOW THE INITIAL REPORT TO ME WAS WRONG, I WOULD STAND BY IT. AS AT THAT DATE NO FURTHER EVIDENCE HAD BEEN PROVIDED TO ME

PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE OVERSEAS I DO NOT RECALL THE ISSUE BEING RAISED WITH ME OTHERWISE, EITHER WITHIN THE ADF OR BY THE MINISTER. NOR DO I RECALL THE ISSUE BEING RAISED SPECIFICALLY IN THE MEDIA OR AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCED AUSTRALIA'S COMMITMENT TO THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM. NOR DO I RECALL THE ISSUE BEING RAISED FORMALLY OR INFORMALLY IN THE COURSE OF A FEW MEETINGS WITH, AND BRIEFINGS THAT I PROVIDED TO THE THEN LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION.

PERIOD 10 NOVEMBER TO 28 FEBRUARY.

I RETURNED TO AUSTRALIA ON SATURDAY 10 NOVEMBER FROM HAWAII, FOLLOWING MY ATTENDANCE AT A CHIEFS OF DEFENCE CONFERENCE AND DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF PACIFIC AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE US JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. IT WAS THE SAME DAY AS THE ELECTION.

ON MONDAY 12 NOVEMBER I SPOKE BRIEFLY TO AIRMSHL HOUSTON ABOUT A RANGE OF MATTERS, SOME OF WHICH HAD ARISEN WHILE HE WAS ACTING CDF. HE CEASED TO BE ACTING CDF ON 8 NOVEMBER WHEN GENERAL COSGROVE TOOK OVER. I RESUMED THIS DUTY FROM THE LATTER ON 10 NOVEMBER.

AMONG MANY OTHER THINGS, WE DISCUSSED SIEV 4. HE BRIEFED ME ABOUT ADMIRAL SHACKLETON'S MEDIA STATEMENTS ON 8 NOVEMBER. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT ON THE PREVIOUS DAY, HE HAD ADVISED MINISTER REITH THAT, IN HIS OPINION, CHILDREN HAD NOT BEEN THROWN OVERBOARD. OUR CONVERSATION ON THIS LATTER ISSUE WAS BRIEF. WE DID NOT DISCUSS THE BASIS OF HIS ADVICE TO THE MINISTER.

AS A RESULT OF WHAT AIRMSHL HOUSTON TOLD ME, AND MY DOUBTS ABOUT WHAT HAD OCCURRED IN FACT, I DECIDED TO COMMISSION AN INQUIRY TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS AND SEE IF ANY CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS NEEDED.

ALTHOUGH GENERAL POWELL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE WERE FINALLY SETTLED ON 20 NOVEMBER THE NECESSARY STEPS TO BEGIN THE PROCESS BEGAN ON 14 NOVEMBER.

AROUND THIS TIME, I BECAME AWARE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CABINET WAS INTENDING TO UNDERTAKE ITS OWN INQUIRY - HEADED BY MS BRYANT.

MAJGEN POWELL HANDED HIS REPORT TO ME ON OR ABOUT 17 DECEMBER. WE HAD A CONVERSATION IN WHICH HE BRIEFED ME ABOUT THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS IN HIS REPORT. HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REFER ME TO ANY OF THE VOLUMINOUS DOCUMENTS IN THE ENCLOSURES. HE DID NOT REFER ME TO ENCLOSURE 33 WHICH I NOW KNOW TO BE THE 10 OCT 01 SIGNAL REPORT FROM THE CO HMAS ADELAIDE.

BASED ON THAT BRIEFING AND A READING OF THE TEXT OF THE REPORT, I MADE THE JUDGEMENT THAT, BEFORE ANALYSING THE EVIDENCE AND DEALING WITH HIS RECOMMENDATIONS, I WOULD AWAIT THE BRYANT REPORT. THIS REPORT WOULD ALSO BE COVERING MANY OF THE ISSUES, AND WAS EXPECTED BY LATE DECEMBER. I THOUGHT THE MOST EFFICIENT AND RELIABLE WAY TO GET TO THE B OTTOM OF THINGS WAS TO HAVE THE BENEFIT OF BOTH REPORTS, AND THE ENTIRETY OF THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THEY WERE BASED.

TO ENSURE THAT MS BRYANT WAS FAMILIAR WITH RESULTS OF GENERAL POWELL'S INVESTIGATIONS AND HIS FINDINGS, I SENT A COPY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET.

ON 7 JANUARY 2002, I LEFT AUSTRALIA TO MEET UP WITH MINISTER HILL ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE NORTHERN ARABIAN GULF. THE BRYANT REPORT HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED AND ITS COMPLETION DATE HAD SLIPPED UNTIL LATER IN JANUARY.

ON 17 JANUARY THE MINISTER AND I VISITED HMAS ADELAIDE ON OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN GULF. WE WERE ACCOMPANIED BY OUR NATIONAL COMMANDER OF OPERATION SLIPPER, BRIGADIER GILLESPIE TO BE BRIEFED ON MULTILATERAL INTERCEPTION FORCE OPERATIONS. THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS TO SHOW OUR MINISTER THE KINDS OF OPERATIONS WE WERE UNDERTAKING IN THE GULF.

I UNDERSTAND THAT COMMANDER BANKS HAS SAID IN EVIDENCE TO THIS COMMITTEE THERE WAS A CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIM AND ME DURING THE BRIEFING ONBOARD ADELAIDE ABOUT BOARDING OPERATIONS IN THE GULF. AS PART OF INFORMING THE MINISTER ABOUT THE RANGE OF BOARDING OPERATIONS THAT ADF PEOPLE CARRY OUT, I ASKED HIM TO EXPLAIN BRIEFLY TO THE MINISTER THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE OPERATIONS AND OPERATION RELEX BOARDINGS. HE INQUIRED WHETHER I WANTED A FULL DESCRIPTION OF WHAT HAPPENED WITH SIEV 4. I WANT TO EMPHASISE THAT WHEN HE ASKED THAT QUESTION, HE DID SO IN A NORMAL WAY THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN HEARD BY ALL THOSE PRESENT.

AS THE FOCUS FOR THE BRIEFING WAS ON BOARDING OPERATIONS IN THE GULF I DID NOT THINK IT WAS NECESSARY TO GO INTO TOO MUCH DETAIL ON THE SIEV 4 OPERATION, BUT RATHER TO POINT TO THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THE TWO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. I CAN ASSURE THE COMMITTEE THAT THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT CHILDREN WERE OR WERE NOT THROWN OVERBOARD WAS NOT UPPERMOST IN MY MIND.

I RETURNED TO AUSTRALIA ON 19 JANUARY AND DEPARTED ON LEAVE OVERSEAS ON 27 JANUARY. THE DEPARTMENT OF PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET DID NOT INFORM ME THAT MS BRYANT HAD CONCLUDED HER REPORT PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE. SO FAR AS I AM AWARE THAT REPORT WAS RECEIVED BY THE SECRETARY OF THAT DEPARTMENT ON 24 JANUARY 2002, AND IT WAS NOT OTHERWISE DISTRIBUTED UNTIL ITS RELEASE INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ON 13 FEBRUARY, WHEN IT WAS TABLED IN THE PARLIAMENT ALONG WITH THE POWELL REPORT.

I RETURNED TO AUSTRALIA ON 19 FEBRUARY AND APPEARED AT THE SENATE LEGISLATION COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON 20 FEBRUARY.

IN THE COURSE OF THE SENATE LEGISLATION COMMITTEE'S HEARING, I BECAME AWARE OF AND READ FOR THE FIRST TIME THE MESSAGE FROM THE CO ADELAIDE OF 10 OCTOBER 2001.

THAT WAS NOT THE ONLY MESSAGE SHOWN TO ME IN THE COURSE THE HEARING. I WAS ALSO SHOWN AND READ OTHER MESSAGES THAT APPEARED TO BE CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH THE EVENTS OF 7 OCTOBER AND WHICH REFERRED TO "MAN OVERBOARD" REPORTS AND "SUNCS" JUMPING OR BEING THROWN OVERBOARD. THE COMMITTEE WILL BE FAMILIAR WITH THESE MESSAGES.

HENCE THERE WAS AN OBVIOUS DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WHAT THE CO WAS REPORTING IN WRITING WHEN THE EVENTS WERE OCCURRING AND HIS MESSAGE OF 10 OCTOBER WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY A RECONSTRUCTION OF EVENTS SOMETIME AFTER EVENTS HAD TAKEN PLACE, AND WAS NOT A TRANSCRIPTED LOG.

MOREOVER, HAVING READ THE MESSAGE THERE WERE MANY QUESTIONS I WANTED TO ASK THE CO WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ASKED BY GENERAL POWELL, WHO HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO INTERVIEW THE CO OR CREW OF ADELAIDE; AND WHICH MS BRYANT MAY NOT HAVE ASKED. BY WAY OF EXAMPLE:

THESE WERE ALL MATTERS ABOUT WHICH I WANTED TO BE SATISFIED BEFORE I WAS PREPARED TO CONCLUDE THE INITIAL REPORT TO ME SHOULD BE REGARDED AS WRONG.

THE VERY PROCESS THIS COMMITTEE HAS UNDERTAKEN IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS INDICATES THE DIFFICULTIES IN UNDERSTANDING WHAT REALLY HAPPENED.

WHEN I LEFT THE SLC HEARINGS I WAS ACUTELY CONSCIOUS THAT I WOULD HAVE TO DETERMINE ABSOLUTELY ONE WAY OR ANOTHER WITHIN A SHORT SPACE OF TIME WHETHER OR NOT CHILDREN WERE THROWN OVER THE SIDE.

OVER THE WEEKEND, I READ THROUGH THE MATERIAL AVAILABLE TO ME TO SEE WHETHER IT WAS SUFFICIENT TO ANSWER ALL MY QUERIES ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED. IN PARTICULAR, I WANTED TO BE SATISFIED NO ONE HAD DROWNED.

AS THE MATERIAL DID NOT SATISFACTORILY RESOLVE ALL THE ISSUES IN MY MIND ON THE EVENING OF SUNDAY 24 FEBRUARY 2002 I ARRANGED THROUGH MARITIME COMMAND IN SYDNEY FOR THE SHIP TO TELEPHONE ME. I THEN SPOKE TO CMDR BANKS.

WE DISCUSSED THE EVENTS OF 7 OCTOBER 2001, AND HE INFORMED ME THAT HE WAS SURE THAT NO CHILD HAD BEEN THROWN OVERBOARD. I QUESTIONED HIM CLOSELY TO TEST THE BASIS FOR HIS ASSURANCE.

UPON THE BASIS OF THIS CONVERSATION WHICH PUT TO REST THE CONCERNS THAT I HAD ABOUT THE WRITTEN MATERIAL, I WAS CONVINCED THAT, DESPITE THE INITIAL REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, IN FACT NO CHILD HAD BEEN THROWN INTO THE WATER FROM SIEV 4 ON 7 OCTOBER 2001.

I CALLED THE PRIME MINISTER IMMEDIATELY. I INFORMED THE PRIME MINISTER OF MY CONVERSATION WITH CMDR BANKS. I SAID TO HIM THAT I WAS NOW PERSUADED THAT NO CHILD HAD BEEN THROWN OVER THE SIDE FROM SIEV 4, AND THAT I WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THAT INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC. THE PRIME MINISTER THANKED ME FOR THE ADVICE, AND ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTY THAT THIS WOULD PRESENT FOR ME.

ON MONDAY 25 FEBRUARY I DISCUSSED THE OUTCOME OF MY CALL TO CMDR BANKS AND THE CONSEQUENCES WITH MINISTER HILL.

ON MONDAY AND TUESDAY I CONDUCTED TWO MORE INTENSIVE DAYS OF INQUIRY IN CONJUNCTION WITH MY SERVICE CHIEFS. THIS LED ME TO CONVENE A TASK FORCE TO FOLLOW UP THE COMMUNICATION GAPS AND OTHER MATTERS OUR OWN INQUIRY HAD REVEALED. DURING THIS PROCESS WE RECEIVED A BRIEF FROM AIR COMMODORE EKIN-SMYTH ABOUT THE MANAGEMENT DISTRIBUTION OF DIGITAL IMAGES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS INCIDENT.

ON WEDNESDAY 27 FEBRUARY I WENT PUBLIC WITH MY ADVICE TO GOVERNMENT, FIRST TO THE DEFENCE LEADERSHIP AT OUR SENIOR LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE; AND THEN TO THE MEDIA AT A PRESS CONFERENCE.

AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE, I ALSO ANNOUNCED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE HEADED AT TWO STAR LEVEL, SO THAT WE COULD GET ANSWERS ABOUT THE PROBLEMS WE HAD AND PUT IN PLACE SOLUTIONS TO THEM.

THIS IS AN ON-GOING ACTIVITY AND I ANTICIPATE THAT THE TASK FORCE WILL NOT COMPLETE ITS WORK UNTIL THE SECRETARY AND I ARE SATISFIED THAT A PROBLEM SUCH AS THIS CANNOT RECUR.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

IN SENATE ESTIMATES I WAS ASKED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF CORRECTING THE PUBLIC RECORD IN THIS SITUATION, AND WHETHER DEFENCE HAD FAILED IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO DO SO.

I CAN CONFIRM TO YOU THAT BY DIRECTION EMANATING FROM THE FORMER MINISTER'S OFFICE, NO MEMBER OF THE ADF, MYSELF INCLUDED, COULD MAKE ANY PUBLIC COMMENT ON OPERATION RELEX, OF WHICH SIEV 4 WAS A PART. THAT DIRECTION WAS INCORPORATED IN THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN FOR OPERATION RELEX.

THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN MANY CONCERNS ABOUT THE PRESCRIPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE NATURE OF DEFENCE INSTRUCTION DI(G) ADMIN 08-1, WHICH RELATES TO PUBLIC COMMENT BY MILITARY PERSONNEL. WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE PRESENT DEFENCE MINISTER, THIS INSTRUCTION HAS BEEN REVISED AND HAS BEEN REISSUED.

MAJOR GENERAL POWELL, IN HIS REPORT TO ME RECOMMENDED, AND I QUOTE: "THERE IS SCOPE TO REVIEW THE COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE DEFENCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND CORPORATE COMMUNICATION DIVISION TO ENSURE THAT AN APPROPRIATE MIX AND LEVEL OF BOTH MILITARY AND COMMAND AND CORPORATE COMMUNICATION SKILLS ARE POSITIONED IN THE CLEARANCE CHAIN THAT SEES SENSITIVE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION, BE IT WRITTEN OR PICTORIAL, RELEASED TO EXTERNAL SOURCES".

IN RESPONSE TO THIS RECOMMENDATION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF ARE TO BE EMBEDDED INTO THE STRATEGIC COMMAND WATCHKEEPING SYSTEM. THIS INTEGRATION WILL ENABLE THE COORDINATION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ISSUES WITH THE MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONS.

THIS ACTION IS INTENDED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF MULTIPLE INFORMATION SOURCES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR OPERATIONAL INFORMATION BY THE MINISTER.

AT PRESENT, WE HAVE UNDER CONSIDERATION A PROPOSAL TO SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE THE MILITARY COMPONENT IN DEFENCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

WE HAVE PUT IN PLACE ELABORATE PROCEDURES AND SAFEGUARDS RELATING TO PHOTOGRAPHIC, ESPECIALLY DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHS AND OTHER VISUAL MATERIAL COLLECTED BY DEFENCE. THIS PROCESS WILL PREVENT IMAGES BEING SEPARATED FROM IDENTIFYING DATA AND ALSO PREVENT MANIPULATION OF THESE IMAGES. IT ALSO EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF DUE PROCESS IN MANAGING ANY MATERIAL THAT COULD BE EVIDENTIARY IN NATURE, AS WELL AS THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS.

IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ME TO DEAL WITH THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF POLITICISATION OF THE ADF.

I REJECT THE ALLEGATION THAT THE ADF HAS BEEN POLITICISED.

IT IS OUR DUTY TO SERVE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY AND TO CARRY OUT ITS DIRECTIONS ABOUT THE USE OF THE DEFENCE FORCE TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY. PROVIDED, OF COURSE, THAT ANY REQUIREMENT GIVEN TO US IS LAWFUL, AS CDF I MUST EXECUTE THE DIRECTIONS I HAVE BEEN GIVEN.

IN MY EXPERIENCE, WHATEVER IT'S POLITICAL PERSUASION, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY WANTS ITS DEFENCE FORCE TO GO ABOUT ITS DUTY APOLITICALLY. THIS IS A KEY REASON WHY BIPARTISANSHIP ON CRITICAL DEFENCE MATTERS IS SO IMPORTANT.

WHILE I AM ON THE SUBJECT OF POLITICISATION, I WANT TO ADVISE THE COMMITTEE THAT I HAVE INSTRUCTED THE HEAD OF MY TASK FORCE TO IMPLEMENT ALL THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE POWELL REPORT, BAR ONE. THE RECOMMENDATION THAT WE PLACE A SENIOR MILITARY OFFICER IN THE MINISTERIAL OFFICE IS IN MY VIEW QUITE FLAWED. THAT STEP WOULD LEAD TOWARDS A POLITICISATION OF THE MILITARY. I ALSO AM CONSCIOUS THAT THIS VIEW IS SHARED BY EXPERIENCED FORMER MINISTERS FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE HOUSE.

NEXT I WANT TO DEAL WITH THE ALLEGATION THAT, AS CDF, I HAVE ALLOWED MYSELF TO BECOME POLITICISED. TO THE CONTRARY, I REGARD MY ROLE AS APOLITICAL, BUT SUBJECT TO MY OBLIGATION UNDER THE DEFENCE ACT, FAITHFULLY AND WITH COMPLETE INTEGRITTY TO SERVE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY, WHATEVER ITS POLITICAL PERSUASION. AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, THIS IS ESSENTIAL TO THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR DEMOCRACY.

BECAUSE THE ALLEGATION HAS BEEN MADE, I WANT TO EMPHASISE THE PRIORITY I PLACE ON THE NEED FOR IMPARTIALITY. IN REALITY THIS NEED EXTENDS TO HAVING GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUR COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. IN THIS REGARD, I WANT TO PLACE ON THE RECORD MY OWN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FORMER LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION. I SAW HIM FORMALLY AND INFORMALLY ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. I WOULD HAVE SUMMARISED THAT MY RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM WAS AS SOUND AS IT WAS WITH ANY OF THE FOUR MINISTERS OF DEFENCE I HAVE SERVED AS CDF.

I DID NOT RECEIVE DIRECTION FROM ANY MINISTER OR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT MATTER, TO IGNORE OR NOT TO FOLLOW UP THE ISSUES OF WHETHER CHILDREN HAD BEEN THROWN OVERBOARD FROM SIEV 4.

LOOKING AHEAD

LIKE ANY ORGANISATION, DEFENCE MAKES MISTAKES. BUT IT LEARNS FROM THEM. IT CANNOT BE OTHERWISE, OR WE SHALL BE TOO BUSY PREPARING FOR THE LAST WAR WHEN THE NEXT ONE STRIKES US. WE SHALL PUT IN PLACE EVERY SENSIBLE MEASURE DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT WE DO NOT REPEAT THE PROBLEMS WE CONFRONTED ON THIS OCCASION.

IN MANY RESPECTS, OF COURSE, THE TYPES OF OPERATIONS WE ARE CARRYING OUT FOR BORDER PROTECTION ARE QUITE DIFFERENT TO THE CLASSICAL MILITARY PROBLEM OF DEALING IN CONFLICT. AS SENATORS WILL KNOW, WE PLACED A GREAT DEAL OF EMPHASIS ON THE BELIEF THAT IF WE TRAIN HARD FOR WAR FIGHTING THEN WE WILL BUILD OUTSTANDING CAPABILITIES FOR PEACEKEEPING.

BUT A BORDER PROTECTION OPERATION IS DIFFERENT, EVEN FROM PEACEKEEPING. FIRST WE DO NOT MAKE THE POLICY IN THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT. WE ARE IN EFFECT A TOOL OF GOVERNMENT TASKED TO CARRY OUT POLICIES DECIDED ELSEWHERE. I HAVE MADE THIS POINT ALREADY. SECOND, IT IS HIGHLY LIKELY THAT OUR ABILITY TO USE FORCE WILL BE EVEN MORE CIRCUMSCRIBED THAT IT IS IN PEACEKEEPING.

I THINK THAT IT IS VITAL THAT WE LEARN TO MANAGING THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND MEDIA MANAGEMENT ASPECTS OF BORDER PROTECTION OPERATIONS BETTER.

WE ARE PRESENTLY DEPLOYED ON CONVENTIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. WE ARE ON THE RECORD AS ARTICULATING THAT IN THE 21ST CENTURY WE MUST BEGIN PREPARING OURSELVES TO DEAL WITH SUB-NATIONAL CONFLICT, TRANS-NATIONAL CRIMES, PROTECTION OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS AND A RANGE OF OTHER LESS CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS. INDEED WHEN I REVIEW THE TYPES OF OPERATION WE HAVE CONDUCTED OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS I CAN SEE A DISCERNIBLE TREND IN THIS DIRECTION.

WE ARE LOOKING TO THIS INQUIRY TO DELIVER FOR US SOMETHING POSITIVELY. IF THE ADF OF TOMORROW IS GOING TO BE ADEQUATELY PREPARED AT ALL LEVELS TO MATCH THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS PEOPLE AT THE COAL FACE, THEN WE MUST REMEDY OUR FAILURES OVER THE SIEV 4 INCIDENT AND MOVE ON TO TEST AND EVALUATE THE NEW PROCEDURES WE PUT IN PLACE.

MR CHAIRMAN, SENATORS BEFORE I CLOSE I WISH TO PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONALISM OF THE MEN AND WOMAN OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE. AUSTRALIA OUGHT RIGHTFULLY BE PROUD OF ITS YOUTH.

SECONDLY, I WISH TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE OUTSTANDING SUPPORT I HAVE RECEIVED CONSISTENTLY FROM THE VICE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE, THE CHIEF OF NAVY, THE CHIEF OF ARMY AND THE CHIEF OF AIR FORCE.