OUTCOME PERFORMANCE

I am responsible to the Government for delivering Army capabilities that contribute to the ADF's capability to defend Australian territory from any credible attack, to enhance the security of Australia and contribute to international coalition forces in support of Australia's wider strategic interest.

During 2005–06, the Army's operational tempo increased significantly, with the Army undertaking a wide range of tasks simultaneously, sometimes at short notice and in complex urbanised terrain. Within Australia, the Army continued to contribute to border protection operations by providing transit security elements in support of the apprehension of illegal boat arrivals, and by Regional Force Surveillance Units patrolling the north of Australia.

Within the region, the Army's presence in Timor-Leste significantly increased through Operation Astute following a number of civil disturbances and clashes between the police and military. Operation Astute included the contribution of a Brigade Group based on the 3rd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment as well as engineer, logistic, aviation, Special Forces and headquarter elements.

Following a breakdown in law and order over the period of national elections, the Army contribution to RAMSI, increased from approximately 40 personnel to a battlegroup of around 350 Australian soldiers. The Army's commitment subsequently drew down to a company group which continues to support RAMSI.

Operations in the Middle East were sustained and included the Special Operations Task Group in Afghanistan under Operation Slipper. In Iraq, the Army maintained the Baghdad Security Detachment. The 450-person Al Muthanna Task Group in south eastern Iraq provided security for the Japanese Iraqi Reconstruction Group and training for the Iraqi Security Forces. The Australian Army Training Team Iraq provided training for the Iraqi combat and logistic personnel. The Army also contributed to the Force Level Logistic Asset in Kuwait, Joint Task Force Headquarters in Baghdad, and provided personnel in a number of embedded positions and liaison positions with our coalition partners.

The Army provided forces for peacekeeping tasks, assisted with natural disasters and contributed to the national domestic security response to terrorist chemical, biological, radiological or explosive incidents. The Army maintained its assistance to non-regional support operations with the United Nations and Multi-National Force and Observers in the Middle East. In addition to these operations in Afghanistan, Sinai, and Israel, the Army supported the United Nations Mission in the Sudan by providing observers and staff.

The Army also maintained high readiness counter-terrorist response forces drawn from the Tactical Assault Group (West), Tactical Assault Group (East), and the Incident Response Regiment, as well as high readiness conventional forces.

The diversity of our recent deployments reflects a significant change in world politics. The result has been increasing complexity in the conduct of military operations across a very broad spectrum of conflict. The Army must be prepared to undertake a wide range of activities, from the conventional defence of Australia, to peacekeeping, peace making, nation building, humanitarian operations, and tackle the threat of terrorism.

The Army requires a force with increased flexibility, adaptability and agility. The Army must be proficient at operating in rapidly changing structures, where joint, coalition and multi-agency operations are a matter of course. The Army must develop highly adaptable and well-protected forces to fulfil all potential operational demands.

The Hardened and Networked Army program, which was announced in December 2005, will enhance the Army's protection, mobility, firepower and communications. It is through the Hardened and Networked Army that I will ensure that the Army meets its current commitments and prepares to meet the challenges of the future. It will be the means by which the Army can provide an increased range of options to the Government in order to deal with an increasingly demanding and complex future.

The Hardened and Network Army is based on the philosophy of the combined-arms approach to combat, whereby infantry, armour, artillery, aviation and engineers work together to support and protect each other. The Hardened and Network Army is a philosophy that extends beyond the Army and combined arms, to the joint and whole-of-government approach to the modern dynamic security environment. The Army is continuing to increase its capacity to deal with a wide range of operational commitments. Critical to this initiative is the successful introduction and integration of new equipment delivered under the Defence Capability Plan.

During 2005–06, the following was achieved:

• Procurement of the M1A1 Abrams tank through a Foreign Military Sales arrangement with the United States. Initial deliveries occurred in September 2006, with formal introduction into service occurring in 2007.
• Acceptance of Bushmaster infantry mobility vehicles into the Army, and their successful deployment to support a variety of overseas operations.
• Upgrade of the M113 armoured personnel carrier fleet, planned for introduction into service in 2007.
• Introduction into Army service of the fixed modular bridge system.
• Deliver and acceptance into service of additional Javelin direct fire guided weapons for the infantry and cavalry force.
• Commencement of operational test and evaluation of simulation enhancements to support the Army's combat training centre.
• Delivery and deployment on operations of land force combat identification equipment.
• Enhancement of Army's maritime capability by acceptance of the last of six Army Watercraft.

Through the Hardened and Network Army initiative, the Army will seek to revitalise the Army Reserve to ensure that it can make a significant and meaningful contribution to the Army's operational tasks. The Army Reserve has been re-roled to provide specific individual and collective capabilities to support, sustain and reinforce the Army's operational forces. The Army will develop a High Readiness Reserve capable of supporting all Hardened and Networked Army operational capabilities.

The Army met all of the tasks required of it by the Government during 2005–06. The Army's combat forces generated combined arms battlegroups based on the headquarters of an infantry battalion and armoured units. In addition, the Army maintained six Reserve Response Forces to enhance the Army's domestic security response capability. Personnel and equipment issues continued to be addressed in 2005–06 and in future years as part of the Army's long-term strategic remediation plan.

Capability Performance Information

Output 3.1: Capability for Special Operations

The special operations capability contributes to the strategic tasks of defending Australia, securing our immediate neighbourhood, supporting wider interests and supporting peacetime national tasks. This output was achieved by providing forces to conduct evacuation and special recovery operations, counter-terrorism and consequence management operations, and support to conventional land operations.

This capability employs techniques that are discreet, do not provoke, and avoid collateral damage, particularly in support of Government domestic security operations. The special forces operations capability is maintained at a high degree of readiness.

Output 3.2: Capability for Medium Combined Arms Operations

The medium combined arms operations capability is achieved through engaging the enemy in close combat enabled by force protection and essential firepower, and provides forces at high to medium readiness. These forces can be deployed in combined arms teams from company to battalion size. These combined arms teams are drawn from armoured, mechanised infantry, medium artillery, combat engineers, army aviation and combat support units. This capability is based on the 1st Brigade in Darwin, Northern Territory.

Output 3.3: Capability for Light Combined Arms Operations

The light combined arms operations capability is achieved by providing light, air-mobile forces, at high readiness, available for immediate deployment. These forces can be deployed in combined arms teams from company to battalion size. These combined arms teams are drawn from an armoured sub-unit, light infantry units, light artillery, combat engineers and combat support units and can also be supported by armoured and aviation units from other Army, Navy, and Air Force outputs. This capability is based on the 3rd Brigade in Townsville, Queensland. It uses strategic, operational and tactical mobility to exploit its flexibility, adaptability and utility across the spectrum of conflict. The capability achieves this through surprise, rapid action and the ability to seize and hold ground.

Table 2.23 Capability for Special Operations

Performance Targets	Performance
Achieve levels of preparedness directed by the Chief of the Defence Force for military response options with a warning time of less than 12 months.	Achieved. The special operations capability was able to meet all preparedness requirements for military response options.
Achieve a level of training that maintains core skills and professional standards across all warfare areas (including counter-terrorism).	Achieved. All training requirements were met.
Special Operations Command, comprising: a command headquarters; a Special Air Service Regiment; a Regular Army commando regiment; an Army Reserve commando regiment; an Incident Response Regiment; a Special Forces Training Centre and a Special Operations Logistic Squadron.	Achieved.4 Royal Australian Regiment (Commando) is on target to reach full maturity in December 2006.

 

Table 2.24 Capability for Medium Combined Arms Operations

Performance Targets	Performance
Achieve levels of preparedness directed by the Chief of the Defence Force for military response options with a warning time of less than 12 months, including the provision of a battalion-sized group within 90 days readiness notice.	Partially Achieved. The medium combined arms operations capability was unable to meet all allocated preparedness requirements for military response options during 2005–06. Deficiencies in some limited areas of equipment, personnel numbers in key trades, and commitments to operations affected preparedness levels for some response options, but a credible level of capability was available for all of the military response options. This was demonstrated by the deployment of the Al Muthanna Task Group, and contributions to the Security Detachment in Baghdad, Solomon Islands and the preparation of a Reconstruction Task Force and force elements for Timor-Leste. Limited equipment deficiencies and personnel shortages continued to be addressed, including the purchase of upgraded ASLAVs, a new main battle tank, an upgrade of the M113 armoured personnel carriers and personnel retention and remediation initiatives.
Achieve a level of training that maintains core skills and professional standards across all warfare areas.	Partially Achieved. A number of training activities had to be reduced in scope due to operational commitments. Personnel shortages in a number of key trades and equipment deficiencies continued to affect the achievement of some core skills.
1st Brigade, comprising: a brigade headquarters; an armoured regiment a cavalry regiment; a medium artillery regiment; a combat engineer regiment; a combat support regiment; a mechanised infantry battalion; and a combat service support battalion.	Substantially Achieved. The medium combined arms operations capability continued to have deficiencies in personnel and equipment holdings that affected its capacity to complete all possible tasks. Recruiting and retention initiatives have been introduced to ease these shortcomings in the future.

 

Table 2.25 Capability for Light Combined Arms Operations

Performance Targets	Performance
Achieve levels of preparedness directed by the Chief of the Defence Force for military response options with a warning time of less than 12 months, including the provision of a battalion-sized group within 90 days readiness.	Achieved. The light combined arms operations capability met the levels of preparedness for all military response options. It provided force elements for the Baghdad Security Detachment and for operations in Iraq, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. The capability also provided personnel, as the transit security element, to border protection operations in the apprehension of illegal immigrants.
Achieve a level of training that maintains core skills and professional standards across all warfare areas.	Substantially Achieved. Most training requirements were met. Most airborne, airmobile and amphibious training was restricted due to reduced availability of joint assets as a result of operational commitments.
3rd Brigade, comprising: a brigade headquarters; an armoured personnel carrier squadron; a field artillery regiment; a combat engineer regiment; a command support regiment; three infantry battalions; and a combat service support battalion.	Achieved. This target was achieved. Personnel and equipment availability for units in this output were sufficient to meet preparedness requirements.

Output 3.4: Capability for Army Aviation Operations

The capability for Army aviation operations is achieved by providing aircraft and personnel at high readiness levels for tactical troop lift, counter-terrorist support, command and liaison and reconnaissance operations. The capability is drawn from aviation units based primarily in the north of Australia.

The capability is based on a brigade of two aviation regiments and two independent aviation squadrons consisting of Kiowa, Iroquois, Black Hawk and Chinook helicopters, and new fixed-wing King Air B300 aircraft. The Kiowa helicopters are being progressively replaced by two squadrons of Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters. The Iroquois helicopters will be replaced with MRH90 additional troop-lift helicopters commencing in 2007.

 

Table 2.26 Capability for Army Aviation Operations

Performance Targets	Performance
Achieve levels of preparedness directed by the Chief of the Defence Force for military response options with a warning time of less than 12 months.	Achieved. The Army aviation operations capability met all levels of preparedness for military response options as proved in Pakistan, Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands. The capability also provided a significant contribution to the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter and Project Air 9000 Troop Lift Helicopter projects.
Achieve a level of training that maintains core skills and professional standards across all warfare areas.	Achieved. The achievement of the level of training has been supported by mission preparation and training for operations. Additionally, the capability has been heavily committed to operations both offshore and domestically that has provided the opportunity to practise core skills and professional standards across most warfare areas.
6 CH-47D Chinooks—1,270 flying hours	1,091 hours (86 per cent). This reflects the reduced availability of aircraft while a significant modification program was undertaken to prepare the fleet for an operational deployment.
35 S-70A9 Black Hawks—7,500 flying hours	6,918 hours (92 per cent). This was due to the flow-on effects of increased unscheduled maintenance tasks during programmed servicing.
41 B-206 Kiowas—11,000 flying hours	7,719 hours (70 per cent). This was due to higher than expected failure rates on the basic flying courses at Tamworth, which resulted in fewer trainees requiring instruction. Unforeseen delays in the delivery of the 1st Aviation Regiment facilities in Darwin prevented flying operations being conducted at Robertson Barracks until late March 2006. Shortages of senior maintenance supervisors at the 1st Aviation Regiment slowed maintenance and further reduced the flying hours.
25 UH-1H Iroquois—4,090 flying hours	3,949 hours (97 per cent).
6 ARH Tigers—515 flying hours(1)	464 hours (90 per cent).Reflects delays in the acceptance testing regime and the training program.
3 B-300 King Airs—1,000 flying hours	481 hours (48 per cent). A slippage in the scheduled delivery of the new aircraft from the United States, and the flow-on impacts on the Australian modification, affected the full service release resulting in flying being conducted under very tight constraints.

Output 3.5: Capability for Ground-Based Air Defence

The ground-based air defence capability is achieved by maintaining a flexible and mobile capability that is able to provide surveillance and defend airspace in conjunction with other land and joint elements. This capability provides air defence weapon systems at high to medium readiness, which can be deployed on land or on board ships, to protect high-value targets from air attack, as part of a combined arms team. It is part of the Joint ADF Air Defence System. This output is drawn from the 16th Air Defence Regiment based in Woodside, South Australia. The Regiment maintains a ground-based air defence capability consisting of the Saab Bofors RBS-70 Air Defence Missile system, combined with integral radar and command elements.

Table 2.27 Capability for Ground-Based Air Defence

Performance Targets	Performance
Achieve levels of preparedness directed by the Chief of the Defence Force for military response options with a warning time of less than 12 months.	Partially Achieved. The ground-based air defence capability was unable to meet all preparedness requirements as directed in the military response options. The air defence capability is being upgraded through the delivery of additional RBS-70 and radar systems, along with logistic and ammunition requirements. The phased delivery of this equipment and ammunition was affected by the manufacturer's capacity which in turn affected levels of preparedness and sustainment for all military response options.
Achieve a level of training that maintains core skills and professional standards across all warfare areas.	Substantially Achieved. Most training activities were achieved.
An Air Defence Regiment consisting of: a regimental headquarters; an RBS-70 battery; and a Rapier battery(1).	Partially achieved. Due to upgrades in equipment, the Army was only able to provide a reduced capability. Current equipment and ammunition projects will address this issue for the full Regiment capability in early 2007.

Output 3.6: Capability for Combat Support Operations

The capability for combat support operations is designed to enhance the conduct of operations through effective communications, surveillance and specialist support (in particular, construction engineering, topographical support, intelligence and electronic warfare operations). The combat support operations capability provides forces at medium readiness with some elements held at high readiness to support the high readiness units in other outputs. This capability is drawn from combat support units based throughout Australia.

Table 2.28 Capability for Combat Support Operations

Performance Targets	Performance
Achieve levels of preparedness directed by the Chief of the Defence Force for military response options with a warning time of less than 12 months.	Substantially Achieved. The capability met most preparedness requirements as directed in the military response options. Equipment deficiencies and personnel shortages in key trades affected some preparedness requirements. The personnel shortages are being progressively addressed through the critical trades remediation plan. Equipment deficiencies will be resolved through new acquisition projects and some limited redistribution of assets.The capability provided significant support to forces deployed on operations throughout the year. A construction squadron provided considerable assistance to the Army Aboriginal Community Assistance Program through the construction of facilities for the indigenous communities in the northern peninsula area of far north Queensland.
Achieve a level of training that maintains core skills and professional standards across all warfare areas.	Substantially Achieved. Operational deployments and shortages in personnel in critical trades affected the achievement of some training requirements.
Combat support units include: a surveillance and target acquisition battery; an engineer support regiment headquarters; two Army Reserve engineer construction regiments; two Regular Army engineer construction squadrons; a construction engineer works section; a topographical survey squadron; a signals regiment; an intelligence battalion; a military police battalion; and a combat training centre.	Substantially Achieved. The combat support operations capability had sufficient personnel and equipment to provide a reduced, yet credible, capability.

Output 3.7: Capability for Regional Surveillance

The capability is maintained by providing forces to patrol the north of Australia in support of the national surveillance effort. These forces are predominantly Army Reserve personnel drawn from the local communities and the indigenous population throughout the north of Australia, from the Pilbara to Cape York. The capability for regional surveillance is drawn from three regional force surveillance units: Norforce, the Pilbara Regiment and the 51st Far North Queensland Regiment.

 

Table 2.29 Capability for Regional Surveillance

Performance Targets	Performance
Achieve levels of preparedness directed by the Chief of the Defence Force for military response options with a warning time of less than 12 months.	Achieved. All levels of preparedness for military response options were achieved. The three regional force surveillance units provided support to border protection operations in support of Operation Cranberry.
Achieve a level of training that maintains core skills and professional standards across all warfare areas.	Achieved. All training activities were achieved.
Three regional force surveillance units.	Achieved. The regional surveillance operations capability had the personnel and equipment holdings necessary to complete the required tasks.

Output 3.8: Capability for Operational Logistic Support to Land Forces

The operational logistic support to land forces provides supply, transport, and health functions in support of combat operations at high to medium readiness. Some elements are held at high readiness to support the high readiness units in other outputs. The capability is grouped in 17 Combat Service Support Brigade which is an organisation consisting of Regular Army and Army Reserve units located throughout Australia.

 

Table 2.30 Capability for Operational Logistic Support to Land Forces

Performance Targets	Performance
Achieve levels of preparedness directed by the Chief of the Defence Force for military response options with a warning time of less than 12 months	Partially Achieved. The capability provided significant support to forces deployed on operations throughout the year in all theatres. A substantial number of logistic personnel deployed to support relief operations in Pakistan, and to provide training for elements of the Iraqi Army. As a result of the continued support to operations and personnel shortages in critical trades, the capability was unable to meet all preparedness requirements as directed in the military response options.
Achieve a level of training that maintains core skills and professional standards across all warfare areas.	Partially Achieved. Operational deployments, limited exercise opportunities, and personnel shortages in a number of key trades affected the achievement of all training requirements.
Logistic support units including: one logistic force headquarters; two signals squadrons; a petroleum company; a recovery company; two regular Army and one Army Reserve force support battalions; a deployed forces support unit; three health support battalions; and a psychology unit.	Partially achieved. The logistic support capability had insufficient personnel and equipment to achieve all of the tasks required of it. A reduced yet credible level of capability was maintained.

Output 3.9: Capability for Motorised Combined Arms Operations

The motorised combined arms operations capability complements the 1st and 3rd Brigades by providing a range of highly mobile forces to conduct land manoeuvre operations utilising surprise, offensive action and concentration of force to disrupt or destroy enemy forces' plans, cohesion and morale. The capability provides forces at high to medium readiness which can be deployed in combined arms teams from company to battalion size. Combined arms teams are drawn from an armoured unit, a motorised infantry unit, artillery, combat engineers and combat support units, and can be supported by armoured and aviation units from other outputs. The capability is based on the 7th Brigade, an integrated formation of Regular Army and Army Reserve personnel, based in Brisbane, Queensland.

 

Table 2.31 Capability for Motorised Combined Arms Operations

Performance Targets	Performance
Achieve levels of preparedness directed by the Chief of the Defence Force for military response options with a warning time of less than 12 months, including the provision of a battalion-sized group within 90 days readiness.	Partially Achieved. The motorised combined arms operations capability provided elements of the 6th Battalion and 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment to support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and for the Commonwealth Games. The remainder of the capability was not able to support all military response options due to equipment deficiencies and personnel shortages in key trades, and sustainability issues. Personnel shortages are being addressed through enhanced recruiting and retention programs. Equipment deficiencies will be progressively addressed through the reallocating and acquisition of new equipment, including upgraded ASLAV and Bushmaster vehicles.
Achieve a level of training that maintains core skills and professional standards across all warfare areas.	Partially Achieved. Most training activities for the 6th Battalion were unable to be completed due to operational commitments, training and introduction into service of the Bushmaster vehicle. The commitment to the Commonwealth Games was, however, an opportunity to prove the mounted (not yet motorised) capability of a company group.Most activities for 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment collective training were reduced in scope due to operational commitments, and deficiencies in equipment and personnel.
7th Brigade, comprising: a brigade headquarters; a cavalry regiment; a field artillery regiment; a combat engineer regiment; a command support regiment; a Regular Army infantry battalion; two Army Reserve infantry battalions; and a combat service support battalion.	Substantially achieved. Regular Army units achieved the required staffing levels and provided a credible level of preparedness proven by the assumption of Ready Battalion Group requirements.Partially achieved. Army Reserve units achieved lower than expected staffing, which affected the capability.

Output 3.10: Capability for Protective Operations

While retaining long-term utility for defence of Australia tasks, the protective operations capability also provided reinforcements for Regular Army units. Elements of this capability are also trained to assist in domestic security incidents. The protective operations capability provides forces at high to low readiness. The capability is grouped in 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 11th and 13th Brigades, which are Army Reserve formations based across Australia.

Table 2.32 Capability for Protective Operations

Performance Targets	Performance
Achieve levels of preparedness directed by the Chief of the Defence Force for military response options with a warning time of less than 12 months.	Achieved. The protective operations capability achieved the levels of preparedness directed for the six Reserve Response Forces drawn from 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 11th and 13th Brigades. In 2005–06, the output provided personnel for Operation Acolyte, the transit security element in support of border security operations, and provided a section for security tasks in Solomon Islands. The output also provided personnel to supplement Regular Army units both in Australia and on operations.
Achieve a level of training that maintains core skills and professional standards across all warfare areas.	Partially Achieved. Most training activities were successfully conducted. Some collective training activities had to be reduced in scope due to circumstances such as the cancellation of Regular Army and overseas exchange exercises.
The 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 11th and 13th Brigades, each comprising: a Brigade headquarters; two or three infantry battalions an armoured reconnaissance unit; and combat and logistic support units.	Partially Achieved. The Reserve Response Forces were provided during 2005–06. While there were personnel shortages in the remainder of the capability, personnel from the output still provided a reinforcement capability for the combat force component of the Army.

Cost to Government

Table 2.33 Outcome Three—Army Capability for the Defence of Australia and its Interests

	Budget Estimate(1)	Additional Estimate(2)	Actual Result	Variation(3)	Variation(3)
	2005–06	2005–06	2005–06	2005–06	2005–06
	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	%
INCOME
Revenue
Goods and services	76,828	145,057	211,668	66,610	45.9
Interest	–	–	–17	–17	–
Other revenue	75,909	94,382	23,442	–70,940	–75.2
Total Revenue	152,738	239,439	235,093	–4,347	–1.8
Gains
Net foreign exchange gains	–	–	–	–	–
Assets now recognised	10,696	123,362	219,981	96,618	78.3
Net gains from sale of assets	–	–	–	–	–
Other gains	–	–	4,055	4,055	–
Total Gains	10,696	123,362	224,036	100,674	81.6
Total Income	163,434	362,802	459,129	96,327	26.6
Operating Expenses
Employees	2,952,868	2,701,566	2,651,692	–49,874	–1.8
Suppliers	1,904,309	1,935,776	1,979,439	43,663	2.3
Grants	602	3,416	2,808	–608	–17.8
Finance Cost	14,400	13,766	25,625	11,859	86.2
Depreciation and amortisation	684,789	762,454	721,576	–40,878	–5.4
Write down and impairment of assets	19,392	118,944	264,252	145,308	122.2
Net foreign exchange losses	–	–	719	719	–
Net losses from sale of assets	–	–6,893	–11,473	–4,580	66.4
Other expenses	–	10,562	1,669	–8,893	–84.2
Total Expenses	5,576,361	5,539,590	5,636,306	96,716	1.7
Price to Government for Outcome Three	5,412,926	5,176,788	5,177,177	389	0.0

Table 2.34 Breakdown of Outcome Three by Output

	Budget Estimate(1)	Additional Estimate(2)	ActualResult	Variation(3)	Variation(3)
	2005–06	2005–06	2005–06	2005–06	2005–06
	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	%
Output 3.1—Capability for Special Operations	500,281	499,767	489,658	–10,110	–2.0
Output 3.2—Capability for Medium Combined Arms Operations	926,273	841,130	816,120	–25,011	–3.0
Output 3.3—Capability for Light Combined Arms Operations	1,030,887	983,791	964,166	–19,625	–2.0
Output 3.4—Capability for Army Aviation Operations	577,197	544,755	527,805	–16,950	–3.1
Output 3.5—Capability for Ground-Based Air Defence	129,625	109,898	107,658	–2,241	–2.0
Output 3.6—Capability for Combat Support Operations	384,632	372,252	378,485	6,233	1.7
Output 3.7—Capability for Regional Surveillance	124,492	130,831	127,481	–3,351	–2.6
Output 3.8—Capability for Operational Logistic Support to Land Forces	575,652	570,362	556,601	–13,761	–2.4
Output 3.9—Capability for Motorised Combined Arms Operations	550,510	549,217	535,943	–13,274	–2.4
Output 3.10—Capability for Protective Operations	613,377	574,783	673,261	98,478	17.1
Price to Government for Outcome Three	5,412,926	5,176,789	5,177,177	389	0.0

 

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