



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected Readings from the World's Military Journals

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CONTENTS

Rethinking the Defence of Australia

Some Military Lessons from Iraq

The Death of Strategy: Effects-Based Air Operations

Sun Tzu and the War on Terrorism

Factors of Conflict in the Early 21st Century

Urban Warfare in the Information Age

Fourth Generation Warfare

**Asymmetric Warfare: Martin van Creveld and Ralph Peters
Revisited**

The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "A. Lee", with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

Editor's Note

The next issue of the SOPD will be published in July 2003.

Article Title	‘Rethinking the Defence of Australia’
Author	Paul Monk
Publication Details	Austhink website, www.austhink.org/monk/dibb.htm , downloaded 13 June 2003. The article also appeared in the <i>Australian Financial Review</i> , Friday 6 June 2003, under the title ‘A strategic changing of the guard’

Synopsis

Dr. Paul Monk was a North and East Asia specialist in the Defence Intelligence Organisation in the 1990s, before moving to Austhink, an organisation that promotes critical thinking skills. His article cuts to the core of the ongoing debate surrounding the optimal capabilities and structure of the Australian Defence Force.

Monk begins with an examination of the evolution of Australia’s Defence policy since the Vietnam War, following its shift from Forward Defence to Defence of Australia (DoA). This conceptual movement was explicated by the Dibb Review, undertaken in 1986 by then Joint Intelligence Organisation senior analyst Paul Dibb. This high-tech, platform-based strategy was based on denial of the ‘sea-air gap’ to encroaching threats through the ‘arc of instability’. According to Monk, the DoA strategy has three fundamental flaws:

- *The level of Defence expenditure:* the DoA school based its economic argument on a sustained level of 2.8% of GDP. The real figure has been less than 2%.
- *The need to defend Australia from a credible conventional threat approaching through the archipelagic screen:* Indonesia has neither the capability nor the intent, and China could only be resisted with US intervention.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

- *The block obsolescence of current systems*: block obsolescence linked to a narrow security focus will result in a ponderous and demoralised Defence organisation.

Monk explores the efforts of the Howard government to reassess Defence policy and its implementation, noting in particular the creation of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. He welcomes the appointment of Paul McClintock, Jim Wallace and Alan Dupont to counterbalance the influence of DoA advocates such as Hugh White, author of the 2000 White Paper. White and Dobbie have clashed publicly with Wallace and Dupont over defence policy and, according to Monk, ‘this is a clear signal that the thinking of the institute is going to be edged in the government’s preferred direction.’

Monk examines the central principles of DoA, which he finds irrelevant to current security realities. Basing his argument on the ‘arc of crisis’ and the 1999 INTERFET operation, Monk highlights the capability predicament that confronted the ADF at that time. He praises the development of ‘amphibious, logistical and special forces capabilities for engaging the actual ... regional challenges we face (such as East Timor); and for participating in *coalition* operations against major enemies (such as Iraq, Korea or the Taiwan Strait)’. [original emphasis]

Furthermore, Monk points to a possible reassessment of the purchase of 100 Joint Strike Fighters as a significant cost-saving measure, particularly as a similar capability could be provided using unmanned aerial vehicles. He argues that there are three crucial tenets for the establishment of a new set of force structure priorities:

- A willingness to accept that capital equipment programs can be cancelled.
- Preparedness to shape our force structure according to our strategic commitments, rather than the other way around.
- The nerve to leapfrog the block obsolescence problem by embracing a paradigm shift in defence thinking.

Adopting such tenets would enable Australia to reposition itself for the world of protean, asymmetric warfare, especially in the ‘arc of instability’. In addition, such an adjustment would not involve massive increases in defence spending but ‘simply a bold, but prudent reallocation of defence resources from the prodigal and misconceived to the vital and forward looking’. The author concludes that the demise of the DoA school is due

Senior Officer Professional Digest

to a dogmatic failure to adapt to strategic reality and states, *'they [Dibb and White] are being moved aside not, as they claim, because of thoughtless meddling with strategic realities by others, but because they have shown an abiding unwillingness to rethink fundamental assumptions'*.

Article Title	'The "Instant Lessons" of the Iraq War'
Author	Anthony Cordesman
Publication Details	Center for Strategic and International Studies, (CSIS) Washington DC, www.csis.org/features/iraq downloaded 3 June 2003, 281pp.

Synopsis

Professor Anthony Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy at the CSIS, is a leading US defence analyst. His impressive draft study of Iraq covers nearly 300 pages and is devoted to capturing as many 'instant lessons' as possible. There is much in Cordesman's analysis to warrant long and careful reflection. Topics include an assessment of the forces involved, the course of the war and the interaction of joint forces, the development of the war plan, the 'Powell Doctrine' versus the 'Rumsfeld Doctrine' debate, the argument over a 'new American way of war', grand strategic issues and nation building.

The author is at pains to point out that his analysis is incomplete and tentative in such areas as land-air interaction and the role of special forces. His study is a guide to issues in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* that are likely to take years to resolve. For uniformed professionals, the most interesting chapters in this long study are those devoted to military operations and lessons from the conduct of the war in both the single service and joint realms of activity. Some salient points:

- Synchronicity, simultaneity, speed, jointness and combined arms and their integration were all vital in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

- C4ISR was the glue in joint operations and more than 100,000 Precision Lightweight GPS Receivers (PLGR) were employed in the 2003 campaign.
- Space-centred warfare is the wave of the future and much has been learned at the operational level in this area over the past decade.
- Land power reinforced air power and vice versa – highlighting the combined arms/joint warfare aspects of the campaign.
- Improved ISR and targeting allowed for EBO and ‘effects based bombing’ to paralyse the enemy’s C4ISR.
- The combination of protection and firepower of the M-1A1 Abrams main battle tank was important in ground combat.
- Precision artillery is linked to precision air power – towed tube artillery and 155mm howitzers were vital in ground combat.
- New interactions between special forces, precision air power and advanced ISR are redefining the role of special forces as a critical element in joint warfare, particularly in an era of asymmetry.
- At the battle of Najaf, contrary to prevailing US Army doctrine, armour moved swiftly through modern cities without forward screening by infantry patrols.
- Manoeuvre warfare should be exploited to the maximum in order to avoid urban defences.

* *Editor’s Note:* Professor Cordesman will visit Australia in September-October 2003 as a Visiting Fellow in the Australian Defence Studies Centre at ADFA. He will attend the Chief of Army’s Conference on 1-2 October to speak on the subject of ‘The Lessons of the Iraq War’.

Article Title	‘The Death of Strategy: Effects-Based Air Operations’
Author	Nick Cook
Publication Details	<i>Jane’s Defence Weekly</i> , vol. 39, no. 24, 18 June 2003, pp. 52-57

Synopsis

This article by Nick Cook, Aerospace Consultant for *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, examines the latest US Air Force thinking on effects-based operations (EBO) in the wake of the 2003 Iraq campaign. Cook argues that EBO has come of age since Afghanistan and that it will define Western air doctrine for the foreseeable future. The article quotes a definition by Major General David Deptula, Director of Plans within the USAF Air Combat Command, that EBO is ‘the end of strategy’ – in the sense that attrition, force-on-force warfare can be replaced by discriminate targeting and selective destruction.

Unlike the older form of linear, sequential warfare by air assets as in World War II, EBO is based on non-linear, ‘parallel warfare’ – simultaneous strikes on multiple key targets. Both Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan and Operation *Iraqi Freedom* in Iraq were non-linear campaigns using EBO. In Iraq, air, land and sea operations were mounted ‘in parallel’ as joint operations. General Deptula believes that the coupling of PGMs to an EBO strategy yields parallel warfare and is the ‘defining event’ of the Revolution in Military Affairs.

The article also analyses the theory of ‘shock and awe’ based on the idea of rapid dominance against the idea of EBO. While rapid dominance and EBO are similar, the latter has more subtlety and flexibility. The author cites the ‘decapitation strike’ against Saddam Hussein as an example of the flexibility of EBO. In the future, the E-10A Future Multi-sensor Command-and-Control Aircraft, the RC-135 ‘Rivet Joint’ signals intelligence platform and directed energy (DE) weapons will drive RMA development – particularly DE weapons whose effect can be delivered from space as a ‘zero CEP weapon’.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Article Title 'What would Sun Tzu say about the War on Terrorism?'

Author Christopher Coker

Publication Details *RUSI Journal*, February 2003, vol. 148, no. 1, pp. 16-21

Synopsis

Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is a military classic read not only by strategists but by political radicals and sports coaches such as Osama bin-Laden, Luiz Felipe Scolari (coach of the World Cup winning Brazilian soccer team) and Rod MacQueen (former mentor of the World Cup winning Wallaby rugby team). In this essay, Christopher Coker of the London School of Economics, a prolific and insightful writer on war, points out that the Chinese approach to war is very different from that of the West. While Westerners view war as an instrumental device with 'ends and means' to be waged with maximum force, the Chinese see war as a necessary evil that should emphasise minimum force.

For Western readers to understand *The Art of War*, they must first appreciate that the book is steeped in Taoist philosophy, 'the way of nature'. Taoism stresses restraint and skill and Sun Tzu is a Taoist philosopher of distinction. Taoism explains Sun Tzu's use of paradox throughout *The Art of War* in which philosophy is used to make practical points. Some examples:

- '*Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true acme of excellence*'. The meaning of this paradox is that to keep war limited one must be prepared to make it total using all the state's resources.
- '*The highest realisation of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; the next is to attack his alliances; the next to attack the enemy; the worst is to attack his fortified cities*'. The meaning of this axiom is that war must involve subversion, propaganda and bribery. According to Coker this was the strategy used by the US in Afghanistan to win over warlords to its cause and such techniques are necessary in the global war on terrorism.
- '*Preserving the enemy's state is best; destroying it second best. Preserving its battalions is best; destroying them second best*'. This paradox refers to Sun Tzu's fear of escalation and destruction in war.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Complete victory may mean exhaustion and one must gauge one's strength and use it wisely to avoid defeat as much as to secure victory. In Sun Tzu's teaching the object of war can never be total security which requires total victory but as Coker puts it 'only a better kind of insecurity'. Sun Tzu would view the US aim of the total defeat of Islamic terrorism as an unrealistic objective; a better objective would be to promote a reformed Islamic world that constrains the growth of terrorism.

- *'Wresting victories which all proclaim your excellence is not the acme of excellence'*. Sun Tzu has little patience with wars to appease public opinion. Playing to the gallery may lead to an insistence on unlimited victory at the cost of unlimited war. The essence of victory is winning in the dark, an approach that is alien to the Western tradition of Great Captains. In the war on terror the US and its allies must learn the art of silent war and absorb the *Tao Te Ching*: *'the way that can be spoken of is not the true way'*.

* *Editor's Note*: Dr Coker, whose latest book, *Waging War Without Warriors* has been nominated for Britain's Westminster Medal for Military Literature, will attend the Chief of Army's Conference in October 2003 to speak on the subject of 'The Western Way of War and Post-Modern Conflict'.

Article Title	'Factors of Conflict in the Early 21 st Century'
Author	Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Leonhard, USA, Ret.
Publication Details	<i>Army Magazine</i> , January 2003, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 31-42

Synopsis

Robert Leonhard, author of *The Art of Maneuver* and *Fighting by Minutes* has been one of the leading uniformed intellectuals in the US Army. This article attempts to identify the dominant factors in early 21st century warfare and the extent to which they are enduring or transient. Leonhard argues that 21st century conflict is likely to be characterised by *'low-frequency, high amplitude conflict'* as opposed to the late 20th century

Senior Officer Professional Digest

model of *'high-frequency, low-amplitude conflict'*. Amplitude of conflict is defined as 'the combat power associated with any given event'.

US force structure needs to change to meet the challenge of 'low-frequency/high-amplitude'. Armies need to be optimised for operational-strategic mobility rather than high-speed tactical momentum, because *'early 21st century warfare is witnessing the death of the formation'*. Factors in 21st century conflict may include:

- *Western sensors and joint fires*: these are so preponderant that any hostile formation can be destroyed in open combat.
- *Modern communications*: these permit network warfare to synchronise lethal effects from distributed locations. *'In place of physical formations are cybernetic organisations capable of tapping into combat power on a global scale'*.
- *The use of prototype technology over mass production*: this development will require innovation and flexibility by warfighters.
- *Warfare will be more about detection*: land warfare will become analogous to submarine warfare, in the sense that detection followed by destruction will be a key.
- *War will become post-Jominian, formationless and distributed with complex terrain becoming the new battlefield*. The coming of *'formationless warfare'* will require investment in information, surveillance and reconnaissance systems.
- *Tactics will link directly to strategy*: campaign planning will have to take into account many non-military factors while, *'like the bayonet charge, operational art will become a relic – but one that some will not want to leave behind'*.
- *Small-scale high-amplitude actions will proliferate with enemies using non-combatants as shields*. As a result, armies need to shift focus from attrition-based mass to purpose-based distribution, from apocalyptic, episodic fires to high-fidelity, continuous sensors.
- *The US Army must embrace 'small force theory'*: this should be based on brigade-sized battle groups: *'The small force of the future – fast, flexible and attended by a pillar of cloud and smoke (that is joint fires) wherever they go – must become the principal expression of Army combat power'*.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

- In small force theory, operational art is irrelevant but legal issues will be important and must become part of grand strategy to permit efficient military operations in new military conditions.

Article Title 'Urban Warfare in the Information Age'

Author Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Leonhard, USA, Ret.

Publication Details *Army Magazine*, January 2003, vol. 53, no. 1, pp.38-44

Synopsis

In this article Lieutenant Colonel Robert Leonhard examines urban warfare as 'the fight of the future'. He calls for new thinking on the subject. Leonhard takes issue with Sun Tzu's advice in *The Art of War* that, '*the worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative*'.

Leonhard argues that because of the lethality of American firepower, future opponents will move into cities for protection, making the new battlefield an urban one. In these conditions, future war should not be viewed as an American football game with neat lines of scrimmage but as a soccer game in which there is continuous motion with forces intermixed. Yet, the current US approach to urban warfare is anachronistic since it is based either on World War II's Stalingrad or the Russian experience of Grozny in the 1990s.

The American experience of Mogadishu is a better model because it presents the most likely scenario of the future: a combination of combat and peace-support missions and transition between these along with a need for escalation management. Urban operations should be viewed as follows:

- Urban operations have the potential to foster sustained military and interagency success if the city is seen as an opportunity for manoeuvre.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

- Military integration in urban terrain is likely to unfold at the tactical level.
- The interagency task force rather than a joint force should become the basis for future urban operations. Such task forces would be built around a Marine expeditionary unit or an Army brigade, reinforced by joint fires. They would include participants from various US Government departments (CIA, FBI, Justice, Health, Labor, etc.).
- Military tactics in urban terrain (MOUT) require revision and should be adapted around siege warfare principles in ‘information age siege operations’ and the use of medium weight forces. Leonhard comments:

As for force structure, we must get beyond the great myth of urban operations that city fighting calls for light infantry . . . the optimum solution is a medium weight, mechanized force . . . The protected mobility of mechanized infantry, combined with the firepower and mobility of tanks, make a good basis for force structure

Ultimately, the US Army must ignore Sun Tzu and learn to grasp urban operations: *‘just as the Army learned to own the night instead of fearing it, so also must we own the city. Tomorrow’s objective is not the top of a hill; it lies in the middle of a city block, surrounded by noncombatants’.*

Article Title	‘Fourth – Generation Warfare Minus Five’
Author	Lieutenant Colonel David W. Szelowski, USMCR, Ret.
Publication Details	<i>Marine Corps Gazette</i> , May 2003, vol. 87, no. 5, pp. 66-68

Synopsis

Lieutenant Colonel Szelowski’s article critically examines the debate surrounding Fourth Generation Warfare. His central assertion concerns an overemphasis on the distinctive features of Fourth Generation Warfare

Senior Officer Professional Digest

which, he believes, could blind military and strategic establishments to ongoing or re-emergent threats. The author challenges the prevalent assumption that the shift to Fourth Generation Warfare is a result not of technological or operational change, but of movement within global structures. Such movement has seen globalisation nullify long-standing political and international relations theories producing the need for a new concept of warfare.

The four generations of warfare are:

- *1st Generation Warfare* - the Napoleonic era of *levee en masse* and close order formations;
- *2nd Generation Warfare* - a military version of the Industrial Revolution which sees equipped mass armies fighting wars of attrition, exemplified by the First World War;
- *3rd Generation Warfare* - the evolution of manoeuvre operations and combined arms, most frequently associated with the Second World War;
- *4th Generation Warfare* - presumed to be inherently asymmetrical, fuelled by globalism, leading to the rise of trans- or non-state actors and the decline of the nation-state monopoly on war.

Szelowski notes that the overlap between generations is significant: the Eastern Front in World War I saw the frequent employment of manoeuvre warfare and the Allies defeated their World War II European and Pacific enemies with sophisticated attrition warfare.

The author examines the crucial definition of the nation-state and the evolution, through international law, of normative assumptions regarding their actions and interactions. These norms are purely Clausewitzian, offering a regime in which the politics of the ruling elites can translate to open conflict between elites (and hence armies) of other states. The nation-state became enshrined with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which also discriminated between combatants and non-combatants – purely Western notions that managed European war with artificial restraints.

Any examination of Fourth Generation Warfare necessarily explores the use of violence by non-state actors to achieve political ends; herein lies one of the author's central arguments. He identifies the inherent

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Clausewitzian principles and builds a case that warfare cannot have changed radically if these traits remain discernible. The de-legitimisation of non-self defensive war through institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations has left its mark on ethnic, religious or ideological struggles. These groups are now without legal means to prosecute their cause when peaceful means have failed, having been suppressed or overcome through the application of military force by the nation-state. This directly contradicts the Wilsonian ideal of ‘self-determination’.

The author notes that there is nothing new in the modern concept of the guerilla or terrorist movement, as “the last two centuries” have associated these terms “with revolutions, civil wars, or colonial struggles”. Indeed, in ancient times, both Alexander the Great and the Roman Empire were regularly plagued with these forms of insurgencies.

Szelowski examines groups such as the Taliban, the Chechens and the Palestinian National Authority, locating points at which they could be considered national actors rather than more pejoratively labelled ‘guerilla’ or ‘terrorist’. The author argues that, given the exercise of governmental controls such as the provision of education, and the resultant aura of legitimacy that characterises these groups, they are more properly described as ‘national actors’. To varying degrees, these groups also represent the Clausewitzian trinity of government, people and army. The article further argues that the rapid defeat of the Taliban was due to a weakening of its legitimacy in the eyes of its people, a similar process that led to the US defeat in Vietnam.

The author considers the reformation of the principles of war in the Fourth Generation framework to be “*the greatest danger*” inherent in this theory, as it allows the pursuit of “a cabinet war without properly mobilizing the people.” He concludes by asserting that “[a] *more realistic analysis is that war has again shifted to an older style as a practical response to overwhelming military strength.*”

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Article Title	<i>'The Transformation of War Revisited'</i>
Author	Martin van Creveld
Publication Details	<i>Small Wars and Insurgencies</i> , Summer 2002, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 3-15

Synopsis

This article by Israeli military historian and strategic analyst, Martin van Creveld, is part of a special edition of *Small Wars and Insurgencies* on the subject of 'No-State Threats and Future Wars'. Van Creveld considers the ideas advanced in his 1991 book, *The Transformation of War* against the conditions of the early 21st century. In *The Transformation of War*, van Creveld predicted the end of inter-state conventional war and the demise of Clausewitzian 'trinitarian war' (the nexus between armed forces, people and government). He focuses on what was correct and what was wrong and why.

Noting that the great military alliances of the Cold War have '*disappeared like snow under the sun*', van Creveld argues that the 1991 Gulf War was an overrated victory against a third-rate opponent. Its main lesson was an ominous one as noted by an Indian Army Chief of Staff: 'don't fight the US unless you possess nuclear weapons'. Moving to Afghanistan a decade on, the war was not so much against a state, as two organisations, the Taliban and al Qaeda. If the Taliban had possessed even a crude nuclear weapon capable of reaching Islamabad or another regional capital, the war may never have been undertaken. Van Creveld uses these examples to state, '*to generalise, the main thesis of The Transformation of War, namely that major armed conflict between major powers is on its way out, seems to have been borne out during the ten years since the book's publication*'.

Nuclear weapons are the true currency of military power and as they proliferate so war will be driven downwards to become 'non-trinitarian'. He states, '*the prediction that history is witnessing a major shift from trinitarian to non-trinitarian war seems to have fulfilled itself*'.

Van Creveld admits that a major shortcoming of *The Transformation of War* was its failure to anticipate the RMA and information-age warfare.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

However, he points out that since information warfare makes geography irrelevant, attacks do not need a base or complex logistics. In this way, information warfare accelerates the historical shift from major war between major states to the world of non-trinitarian war. Debunking Clausewitz, van Creveld goes on to argue that war is less a continuation of policy than ‘*a form of sport such as football or chess*’ – not a means to an end, but an end in itself. As a result, the picture painted of future war in *The Transformation of War* 1991 was ‘broadly correct’.

Article Title	‘The New Warrior Class Revisited’
Author	Ralph Peters
Publication Details	<i>Small Wars and Insurgencies</i> , Summer 2002, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 16-25

Synopsis

Ralph Peters’s celebrated essay ‘The New Warrior Class’ was originally published in 1994 and its vivid description of an anti-Western world of asymmetric foes seemed to anticipate the character of an important area of future conflict. In this essay, part of *Small Wars and Insurgencies*’ analysis of ‘Non-State Threats and Future Wars’, Peters revisits his predictions. He argues he underestimated the unconventional threat to the West, but with the attacks of September 11 2001, ‘the high water mark of terrorism may have been reached and passed’. In any event, the seriousness of the unconventional threat is now recognised. Peters draws a distinction between *practical terrorists* and *apocalyptic terrorists*. The first fights to change a political system, the second wants to ‘expedite the Day of Judgment’. The apocalyptic terrorist ‘*cannot be rehabilitated, and must be killed or forever locked away. And killing him is better*’.

Peters sees irregular combatants coming from five socio-psychological pools:

- *Warriors from the underclass* for whom violence is an outlet and a form of self-meaning.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

- *'Course-of-Conflict' joiners* – young men who join a program of violence in the short-term but who may reintegrate into normal society.
- *Entrepreneurs of conflict* or opportunists of violence.
- *Hardcore believers* such as convinced nationalists or religious fanatics.
- *Mercenaries*, or former soldiers who polish the destructive power of the collective.

All five categories emerged in Afghanistan in either al Qaeda, the Taliban or in the warlord militias. Peters argues that *'you cannot defeat warriors gently'*. He rejects the notion of creating martyrs by stating *'better a dead martyr than a living inspiration . . . there always have been, and always will be, some of our fellow human beings who need killing for the common good of the rest'*. Despite the West's air power precision, ground forces remain vital in defeating warrior classes around the world. Since the warrior is a basic human archetype, professional soldiers, as ever, will be required to fight them. For Peters, the great challenge will come from the Islamic world that will produce millions of Muslim males prone to violence and recruitment as warriors. The key to defeating warriors lies in resolution of purpose. The author ends by stating:

If we truly wish to increase our domestic security and global safety, we would do well to cast aside a lovely, but utterly-false Western myth: That human life is precious. Human life is incalculably cheap . . . though we may value the lives of our countrymen, he [the warrior] does not share our prejudice . . . Our security can never be bought solely with money or even with the most skilled diplomacy, and it certainly cannot be secured with good intentions. A healthy state must cultivate a discriminating appetite for killing.