

***THE SECOND FIFTY YEARS:
THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY 1947-1997***

***THE ARMY IN TRANSITION:
THE DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY, 1965-1986***
Brigadier MPJ O'Brien

An Army is an institution not merely conservative but retrogressive in nature. It has such natural resistance to progress that it is always insured against the danger of being pushed ahead too fast. Far worse and more certain, as history abundantly testifies, is the danger of it slipping backward.

Captain Basil Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War*, 1944

This essay covers the development of the Australian Army from the period of the abandonment of its Pentropic Division structure to the issue of the Dobb Report.¹ A list of the major events during that period is at Appendix 1. A table listing the size of the Army at Appendix 2.

The method that this paper uses to trace developments is to categorise the performance of the Army: whether it was effective and whether it was efficient. While this method may seem less satisfactory to those more chronologically inclined, it has the advantage of appearing more systematic and methodical for a subject so complex. Of course, this analysis suffers from all the prejudices of a serving soldier, and, worse still, the likely to be uninformed views of a relatively junior officer during that period. There are, of course, considerable dangers in examining events so close to the present day: perhaps the most risky element of this is the lack of access to official papers. It is also a disadvantage that little has been written about this period.

At beginning of this period, the Australian Army was one that expected to be deployed into southeast Asia as part of a SEATO force to stem a communist advance. Its counter-insurgency capability was of primary importance, while maintaining a capacity to tackle conventional war. Such operations were the predominant role of Army as a single service. After the 1976 *White Paper on Australian Defence*, Army capabilities were essentially limited to operations seen as more likely in our own neighbourhood as joint operations as part of the Australian Defence Force.

The Australian Army during the period had three components: Regular, Reserve and civilian; it is important not to forget the significant administrative, technical and engineering contribution of this last group.

The taxonomy of categorisation that has been chosen to deal with the performance of the Army in this paper is at best arbitrary and far from orthogonal. It is by no means certain that it is comprehensive, though it is to be hoped that it deals with the most important and relevant facets. It has been decided to leave discussion on the important issue of the performance of Army Reserves to General Cooke's paper. A large number of categories of performance have been chosen: the consequence of this choice is that the opinions offered in each topic are quite abbreviated.

Operational Effectiveness

The most important measure of the effectiveness of an Army is its performance in combat. The Australian Army had an internationally recognised reputation for good performance in combat at unit and sub-unit level in counter-insurgency operations such as in Vietnam and Malaya, though as an Army rather than as part of a joint force. It gained an enviable reputation for the strength of its junior leadership and particularly for the capability of its noncommissioned officers. This reputation was complemented by the respect the Army gained by its involvement in peacekeeping operations, though this performance was often based on an assessment of the performance of individuals.

Training—Battle Discipline—Professionalism

Perhaps in contrast to some of the experiences of the Second World War, the system of training units for operational service used by the Army was very effective. That system, which in brief consisted of close to a year of unit training followed by sub-unit testing under demanding conditions and instructors at the Jungle Training Centre and a Divisional test exercise prior to operational deployment, served the Army very well indeed. To a large extent, this approach had been devised by Brigadier GT Solomon in the Directorate of Military Training in Army Headquarters. It built on the capabilities of the Jungle Training Centre as the main catalyst for the inculcation of battle discipline. Units deployed to Vietnam (for example) were well prepared: there were many individuals who complained that they trained 'too hard'—all commanders know this is not possible!

At the level of individual training the Army adopted the 'Systems Approach to Training' based on US Army experience in the later 1970s. This approach analysed training needs extensively and reduced courses to their bare essentials. The 'system' was overdone and tended to neglect the feedback loop of training validation by end users of trained individuals. It also tended to put some 'essentials' down to 'on-the-job' work at unit level, risking uneven training or, worse, no training at all. An example of this analysis taken to its extreme was the removal of navigation in infantry basic training—a development at odds with the experiences gained in years of counter-insurgency wars. The 'Systems Approach' was also applied to collective (or unit) training in too few instances. One isolated example of its success was its effective application to artillery unit training.

Organisation and Structure

It is a principle of a democracy that its armed forces shall be subject to the control of the government as the representatives of the people and the Australian Army has always followed that model. It is debatable, at best, that this principle should be viewed as implemented by civilian control of the military. There were periods, particularly after the implementation of the Tange Report (December 1972), where there was increasing public service control of the services, which were, no doubt, weakened by their own rivalries.

In the latter part of the period under review, in contrast with the RAN and RAAF, Army could be seen as being equipped and structured for lower levels of conflict. While a reflection of a maritime strategy, this situation did not seem to accord with a need to be able to resolve conflict on any land mass, particularly the continent of Australia.

At the organisational level, organisation for units essentially like the Tropical Warfare establishments altered little during the period. There was no real move away from fundamental UK organisational roots for most units and formations but some realignment of corps responsibilities (transport, ordnance and engineers, for example). (Perhaps the most obvious example of this adherence to UK models was the great reluctance to adopt the US staff responsibility system despite the closer alignment with this ally.) The formation of the regional surveillance unit Norforce marked perhaps the first organisation change in this period really adapted to Australian circumstances, and even it was a throw-back to what had worked well in the Second World War.

It could also be claimed that the management methods used by the Army, which can be seen in several dimensions as being ahead of civilian practice, lost this ascendancy during the period. Army, for example, was well aligned with qualities leadership and work study analysis practices, but slow to adopt a functional leadership or output management approach.

Army Development

The Army invested a considerable effort in combat development (which includes the shaping of the size of the Army, its structure and primary equipment) during this period. There were two extensive studies which successively produced what were called 'The Combat Development Guide' and 'The Army Development Guide'. In each case the guides produced results that were progressively approved by the higher level of the Army, but which did not receive Defence endorsement. Inevitably these studies were quoted to Defence committees as justification for the types and quantities of equipment to be procured. Almost as inevitably, the assumptions behind the 'justifications' were questioned and rejected. Army's efforts to steer future development were hardly likely to succeed unilaterally. Not only did such studies need progressive agreement (which would have caused some fundamental thought to be put into areas where Defence had not yet ventured) but also the active agreement of the other Services would have been needed. Such studies also ignored the relationship between project approval (to undertake an acquisition) and expenditure approval (to allocate funding), processes which were, at least at the time, essentially separate. Much staff effort was wasted on single service approaches when a departmental approach (though much more tedious) could have been more successful.

Joint and Combined Operations: Tri-Service Relationships

The culture of inter-service cooperation after the Pentropic Army was uneven but generally poor. After all, Army could undertake relatively independent operations given sufficient air support from the existing fixed wing assets of the Air Force. Both these services were poorly prepared for the catalyst for change: the necessity for close cooperation brought on by the advent of the rotary wing Iroquois. Nevertheless, there was a reservoir of strong goodwill between the services at the 'front line' which overcame many artificial obstacles.

Relationships with Allies

The America-Britain-Canada-Australia Armies Agreement (ABCA) established in 1964 provided great value to the Army for relatively little investment. Its outcomes included that Army was ready in interoperability terms for both Malaya and Vietnam. As the period progressed it was clear that the emphasis was altering and that the relationship with the US Army was becoming the more important one, an object well achieved under ABCA without the expense of divergence from British models that were preferred in many instances.

Army-to-Army talks with the United Kingdom and New Zealand were of limited use because, unlike the ABCA scheme, the interface was only at top levels. The strong relationship with the New Zealand Army was maintained throughout. New Zealand's confidence in that relationship reached an apex unlikely to be repeated when New Zealand sub-units were integrated into Australian units in Vietnam.

Throughout the period the strength of allied Army relationships was reinforced by effective exchanges and exercises, though the individual exchanges with the British Army seemed to be too predominant at the expense of exchanges with the US Army and US Marine Corps.

Regional Engagement

In recent years, the importance of maintaining personal and institutional relations with regional nations has been emphasised. It is fair to say that Army's involvement with our region has been generally in advance of the strategic guidance in this area. While this is perhaps more obvious with nations such as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in the context of SEATO, there were many examples of cooperation and relationships with other southeast Asian nations such as that of Colonel C East as a student at Indonesian Staff College during Confrontation. The extensive investment in the continuing development of Papua New Guinea's Pacific Islands Regiment up to the transition to independence in 1975 was a further example of the extensive regional links fostered by the Army.

Doctrine and Debate

At the commencement of this period production of the *Division in Battle* series pamphlets (as well as complementary doctrine for counter-insurgency such as the now classic *Patrolling and Tracking and Ambush and Counter Ambush*) were produced. Though based on British experience this doctrine was timely and relevant. There was a much greater lag in the development of doctrine for defence of Australia—but that was not only an Army problem.

The demise of the Pentropic organisation led to a healthy discussion conducted in the pages of the (then restricted) *Army Journal*. Since that time there has been little informed discussion and debate on organisational or doctrinal matters. This contrasts with the continuing and constructive debate in the US Army about its fundamental doctrine. It is perhaps time to encourage such an Army-wide internal discussion and to have the courage for it to be exposed to occasional wider scrutiny. Perhaps a re-born *Army Journal* is needed.

Expansion Capacity

The National Service scheme could be seen as one below the critical size that could cater for an effective individual and unit reinforcement policy. The Army capacity was over-extended to support three combat battalions when it did not have sufficient strength to maintain a ratio of two full strength out-of-combat units to one deployed unit. It is hoped that this lesson of the size of a force needed to sustain a long combat period will be well remembered.

Organisational Flexibility

In this period (as in almost any other) Army continued to demonstrate its flexibility at the tactical level by grouping and regrouping for particular tasks, and, of course, particularly using this capability during conflict. However, this capacity was frequently overlooked by those seeing Army from 'the outside', who often perceived the Army as being constituted from rigidly structured units.

The adoption of Functional Commands in 1972 was an effective and perhaps overdue restructure that recognised the capability of modern communications to overcome the barriers of distance. Each of the commands was set up as a focussed and output-oriented entity contributing to higher standards of training and readiness.

The decision to move to brigades that had a measure of role specialisation was a further key move during this period. General Dunstan's decision ensured that a wide range of appropriate skills (such as parachute, amphibious, light infantry and mechanised infantry) were retained at both unit and formation level. The decision also aligned Army's capabilities with Defence needs and contingency plans. The major effect, that of bringing the Operational Deployment Force based on the 3rd Brigade to an appropriate degree of readiness, provided a Army-wide focus on the key issues of readiness and sustainability. The role specialisation was also the commencement of the end of Army's adherence to the need for a divisional structure and can be viewed as the beginning of the development of an independent brigade group capability.

Equipment and its Strategic Relevance

Throughout this period Army was served by a good, methodical (if slow) acquisition process, supported by a well trained core of technical staff officers. Acquisition skills improved considerably in later years. However, the defence community continued to express doubts about the strategic relevance of Army's higher capability equipments such as tanks and medium artillery. Arguments in justification seemed to centre on relative parity rather than superior tactical firepower and mobility, perhaps underlying an inability to convince the Defence Department of some of the fundamentals of conflict resolution in the ground environment.

Use of Technology

It may be fair to say that the Army did not exploit technology well during this period and that its performance was substantially worse than the Navy or Air Force, even allowing for the natural difference of technological emphasis. Officers with technological qualifications were generally sent to the materiel areas dealing with the mechanics of procurement: though an appropriate employment, this meant that the overall usefulness of technology was poorly understood throughout the force. The capacity of technological elements of Defence were not harnessed well to Army's aims: both research and development capacities were not exploited to their capabilities. The Operational Research Group deployed to Vietnam was poorly utilised. Successive deployments did not include elements with the capacity to suggest what technology could do to increase combat power. It is to be hoped that Army's future in this area is better handled.

Discipline

The light of retrospect cast on the system of military law prior to the enactment of the *Defence Force Discipline Act* would show that Army discipline had been governed by an outmoded *Defence Act* and (while on active service) *Army Act* for far too long. There were elements of the inequitable that bordered on the unjust in these acts: from the perspective of commanders, they were unable to sustain charges raised against individuals that were 'guilty'; from the perspective of soldiers, they were subject to being underrepresented and more than occasionally over-punished.

History

The appreciation of Australian military history in the Regular Army may well have been less than optimal because that segment of the Army had fewer traditions and links to the past than the reserve.

The need to record this history had been recognised in a succession of Staff Duties pamphlets, making the keeping of war diaries mandatory from the time of warning of a unit for active service. The standard of war diaries has always been uneven and though they were of generally reasonable quality in the Vietnam conflict, some lacked the essential narratives. Few diaries included photographs. The Australian War Memorial has more photographs from Australia's involvement in the Gulf War than for the entire Australian involvement in Vietnam. It was an exceptional unit that recorded its history in peace, however sketchily. Perhaps the example of the RAAF needs to be followed and a rudimentary framework of recording made compulsory, even in peace time.

The postwar Army was not noted for production of books on military history and those few published were not of high scholarly quality. In the period under examination this changed radically. The History Department at RMC and later at ADFA; particularly the notable example by gifted historians such as Alec Hill, nurtured a generation of military historians that have gained international respect. Whether these writers have been in or out of uniform, they have served the cause of Australian military history well.

The Army should consider the collection of military history as part of any of its operational detachments. The remit of such small teams should be broader than the recording of tactical lessons learned.

Officer Education

The Regular Officer Development Committee of 1979 was a watershed in the systematic examination of the careers of Army officers. Though many of its key recommendations were accepted and implemented, many, and particularly those with structural alteration or cost increase implications, were put aside. It has taken many years to catch up on this opportunity for change.

An examination of the tertiary qualifications of senior officers at, for example, the Military Board or CGS Advisory Committee level (with all the imperfections of such a measure) at the beginning and end of this period shows clearly that the academic qualifications of the officer corps had risen considerably and had reached equivalence with civilian senior counterparts in the Defence Department. At other levels, the major changes included the very high proportional increase in tertiary qualifications of all Army officers and the highly desirable trend towards officer education in a joint environment.

Aborigines and Minorities

Though perhaps not generally acknowledged, those soldiers of Aboriginal extraction were generally very well respected and very well integrated into the Army. There were a few Aboriginal soldiers who had served in all conflicts from the Second World War to Vietnam. Of course, it must also be said that their group was under-represented and most particularly so in the commissioned ranks.

The Army became a more representative organisation for other minority communities in Australia during the National Service scheme. It is not always recognised that this is a particular advantage of such a scheme, even a selective one. The Army inevitably became less ethnically representative when the scheme was terminated.

Women

It may be fair to state that the Army was too slow to appreciate the usefulness of females to its overall effectiveness. In this regard (as with many trends in society) the Army seemed to be behind the attitudes held by the community. For most of the period, women were discriminated against because of the demonstrably poorer commissioning and other courses available to them as well as employment restrictions in areas where females had amply shown their capabilities in the Second World War. From 1982 the employment of women in the Army spread to most non-combat jobs.

Retention of Lessons Learned

A strong feature of conflicts in Malaya and Vietnam was the retention of the lessons learned in conflict. For example the regular production of Training Information Bulletins followed the reports of combat actions and were translated into practical training at the Jungle Training Centre with little or no delay. This habit was perhaps too connected with combat and its practice has tended to diminish. It is far from certain that the lessons for peacekeeping from, for example, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia, are preserved in a fashion that will be taken up by those undertaking a similar task in the future.

This point needs to be extended to relate to the lessons derived from training in peace and particularly exercises. While exercise reports distil valuable lessons, they are relatively inaccessible documents to most junior leaders in a short time thereafter, and memories tend to fade towards zero in a two-year posting cycle. A system like the US Marine Corp's 'Combat Lessons Learned' arrangement is needed to preserve experience for the future.

Service Conditions

Service conditions were subject to two pivotal examinations during this period. The Kerr-Woodward inquiry set up pay structures based on the existence of an Armed Services Industry, while the Jess committee set up a demonstrably better retirement scheme that took account of the early retirement age. These fundamental examinations provided a basis for much improved service conditions. In contrast, Army housing for married couples remained poor throughout the period.

Public Relations and Psychological Operations

It can be shown that Army's Public Relations effort had been poorly focussed in Vietnam. If, for example, the majority of press releases at a time such as 1970, when the Australian involvement in the war had matured, were devoted to listing casualties without balancing releases on the many positive achievements of the force, then this service was not performing as it should. It is tempting to attribute this shortcoming to a departmental public relations effort that had too great a civilian influence, though commanders at higher levels must also share responsibility for these outcomes.

The skills of psychological operations which were effectively learnt in Borneo and Vietnam seemed to be quickly forgotten thereafter. It is questionable whether these important skills can be regenerated at short notice.

Medical

The high standard of health care maintained throughout this period, particularly during the Vietnam conflict, despite a shortage of Regular doctors, was notable. There was an influx of National Servicemen at a very high standard complemented by a very sensible use of reservists providing good surgery, nursing and specialist skills. The standard of battle medical care was excellent in Vietnam and up to the best US standards. Despite this, and perhaps as a consequence of community standards, the post-stress counselling given was either poor or non-existent. This was a shortcoming that was especially relevant to National Servicemen.

Marksmanship

The standard of individual rifle marksmanship was satisfactory in Malaya but almost uniformly poor in Vietnam. There is little evidence that this major shortcoming was redressed after that conflict.

Leadership and the Production of Leaders

The Army was strongly led at its highest levels throughout this period. In several instances, Chiefs of the General Staff introduced fundamental but necessary alterations to the Army, but in addition they successfully protected their commanders and the Army as a whole from arbitrary and ill-informed direction by some politicians and public servants.

The Army continued to be characterised by the strength of its junior leaders during this period. This was particularly so of the levels of junior and senior non-commissioned officers, the standard of which became the envy of many other armies. The system of non-commissioned officer training, however, became stressed to breaking point in the latter days of the Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam, when many fine soldiers had become worn out.

Further leadership successes included the products of the Officer Cadet School at Portsea and particularly the Officer Training Unit at Scheyville. The young officers who graduated from these establishments were a fine tribute to those who trained them.

Technical Competence of Arms and Services

The Army deployed on operations in Malaya and Vietnam was an efficient all-arms team, with all the technical competence that this simple term implies. Peace is not a time that nurtures these skills, nor do short-duration exercises. The decline in these skills is always one that must receive particular attention from commanders at higher levels.

National Service Effectiveness and the Aftermath of Separation from the Service

The National Service scheme initially swamped the Army but this situation soon improved. National Servicemen became very well integrated into the total force of the Army, producing very good soldiers and junior non-commissioned officers. National Servicemen were indistinguishable from their Regular counterparts in Vietnam. The expansion to three training battalions was well managed.

The mode of separation of National Servicemen from the Army was poorly handled. Many returned from war to civilian occupations without any further Army contact, including being asked to accompany their former units' return marches through capital cities. Counselling for trauma was close to non-existent, and should have been much more important for those in transition back to former occupations. Post Vietnam care for wounded ex-National Servicemen by the Army was poor to the extent of negligence—does the Army have any contact with its former wounded still in Repatriation care today?

Resources Management

There are several observations that can be made about financial controls on the Army during this period. Few Army officers were concerned by financial or resource management issues at the earlier part of this period: the responsibilities lay with civilian representatives of the secretary. In many instances this financial control was unnecessarily parsimonious, concentrating on the money spent rather than the combat power generated. Delegations of financial power were rarely effective. This attitude undertook a revolutionary alteration at about the time of General Dunstan's stewardship of the Army. The contrast was great: staff officers and sometimes commanders considered costs and outcome, managed budgets and were held accountable.

The tools for management of resources developed too slowly. Initial budgeting methods were poor and too much based on historical spending rather than needs. In this skill area, Army (and perhaps the Department) were well behind civil practice in many areas such as accrual accounting, activity based costing and performance measurement. The management skills of an Army must not be allowed to lag behind those in the business community.

Relations with the Community

In 1965 the Army was generally held in low public esteem. This status altered when the Army became employed in its prime role in times of war and emergency. Nevertheless, there was strong community empathy with military service prior to Vietnam. Whilst much, perhaps the majority, of the public supported the Army during that conflict (as opposed to supporting the war) there was certainly a period when the external signs of military service, such as wearing uniform in public places, was avoided.

In contrast the support given to Army was always good in situations such as the disaster relief operation mounted after the Darwin cyclone.

The attitudes of those serving in the Army seem to have been less polled. Those examples that exist reinforce the subjective impression of many of those serving that the Army and its members had considerable pride in the service they were providing to the nation.

Logistics

There was an overburden of logistic installations in the mid-1960s that had carried over from the Second World War. It took too long to review this structure and the stockholdings and procedures that underpinned them.

Conclusions

This analysis of the performance of the Australian Army during a period where it faced great challenge could lead to many conclusions. In the context of this conference several findings are perhaps worthy of consideration.

This important period deserves much closer treatment than that given by this introductory analysis. More historical study is needed. Fortunately, there would appear to be a high level of interest in such studies. When such studies are undertaken, it may well be found that the fundamental documents are less than complete. At the risk of drawing a conclusion outside the period of reference, it would appear that the compulsory keeping of unit narrative records (or war diaries) in peace, on operations such as peacekeeping and in conflict should be mandated. To extend this point of the need for fundamental documentation further, a medium for active and healthy written debate within Army (and in addition to the *Defence Force Journal*) is required. The Army needs its *Army Journal* again!

APPENDIX 1 Chronology

- 1962-1972 Australian Army advisers deployed to South Vietnam.
- 1965- Army contributions to UNMOGIP (Pakistan, to 1985), UNCMAC (Korea, continuing), UNIPOM (India & Pakistan, to 1966).
- 1964-August Australian Army contribution to operations against Confrontation in peninsular Malaysia and Borneo.
- 10 November 1964 The Prime Minister (RG Menzies) announced the reintroduction of selective National Service, expansion of the CMF and the expansion of the Regular Army in North Queensland and Papua New Guinea.
- November 1964 Report by Major-General JS Anderson recommended abandonment of the Pentropic Divisions organisation.
- 1965-1966 *The Division in Battle, Pamphlet No 11, Counter Revolutionary Warfare, Patrolling and Tracking and Ambush and Counter Ambush* published.
- January 1965 3RAR and an SAS squadron deployed to Borneo to counter Confrontation.
- May 1965 1RAR deployed to Bien Hoa Province, South Vietnam.
- May 1966 1st Australian Task Force deployed to Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam.
- August 1966 Confrontation ended.
- 1967 The ninth battalion of The Royal Australian Regiment raised.
- 1970 Commencement of Army withdrawal from South Vietnam announced.
- 1971 The Five Power Defence Agreement for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore came into effect.
- January 1972 Army reorganisation based on functional commands and administrative military districts based on the Hassett Report.
- December 1972 Whitlam Labor Government elected. End of National Service and withdrawal of remaining Australian forces from Vietnam announced. Tange Report published.
- 1973 Infantry battalion and artillery battery withdrawn from ANZUK force in Singapore.
- September 1973 South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) military planning function phased out.
- November 1973 Department of the Army and Military Board abolished.
- March 1974 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces published.
- April 1975 The majority of the Australian Army contingent in ANZUK withdrawn from Singapore, though a rifle company continued to be rotated through Butterworth, Malaysia.
- 1976 Defence White Paper tabled, emphasising increased self-reliance and the core force concept.
- 1977 Initial Army contribution to UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) (Syria-Israel), continuing.
- 1977 Report of the Regular Officer Development Committee issued.
- 1979 Counter-terrorist role introduced for the SAS Regiment.
- 1979-80 Army provides a 152-man detachment to the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia.
- 1981 Specialised roles for Regular Army Task Forces adopted.
- 1982 Women enter a wide range of non-combat appointments.
- 1982 Commencement of Army contribution to Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai.
- 1982-1984 Army contribution to Commonwealth Training Team in Uganda.
- October 1982 Report of the Defence Review Committee (the Utz Report) published.
- 1982-1984 Army contributed a small team to the Commonwealth Military Training Team - Uganda.
- 1982-1986 Army contributed a contingent to the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai.
- 1984 Women's Royal Australian Army Corps disbanded and females allocated to other corps.
- March 1986 Dibb Report published.

APPENDIX 2
The Size of the Army 1965-1986

Year	Regular Army	Reserve	Civilian
1965	25 314	28 146	6447
1966	32 702	32 046	7280
1967	41 464	34 670	8147
1968	42 944	35 762	9052
1969	44 051	34 256	9670
1970	44 533	31 397	10 331
1971	43 769	29 364	10 639
1972	41 290	26 578	10 951
1973	33 990	22 592	11 383
1974	30 235	19 531	9684
1975	31 514	20 374	-
1976	31 430	21 183	-
1977	31 988	21 641	-
1978	31 883	23 164	-
1979	31 813	22 978	-
1980	32 321	23 986	-
1981	32 898	31 125	6136
1982	32 876	31 706	6364
1983	33 072	33 277	-
1984	32 278	29 021	-
1985	32 460	23 846	-
1986	31 834	23 145	-

Endnotes

1. Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister for Defence* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, March 1986).