

***THE SECOND FIFTY YEARS:
THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY 1947-1997***

FIFTY YEARS OF AUSTRALIAN ARMY PEACEKEEPING
Peter Londey

Beginnings: Indonesia 1947

In opening this conference, General Sanderson mentioned the significance of 13 September 1947 as a key date in the development of the concept of an Australian regular army. By an amazing coincidence, that date was also of critical significance in the history of Australian peacekeeping, for on that day the four officers whom I would regard as our very first UN peacekeepers arrived at Batavia, capital of the Netherlands East Indies, to take up a role as 'military assistants', essentially military observers, for a body set up by the UN, the Consular Commission.¹

The Netherlands East Indies were in a state of civil war between the Republican Indonesians, seeking independence, and the pre-war colonial masters, the Dutch. In 1947, two years after the Japanese surrender, the Dutch had still not re-established control, and negotiations dragged on. They then resorted to what they termed a 'police action', in reality an invasion of Republican territory. This finally prompted United Nations intervention, resulting in the establishment of a Consular Commission, consisting of the diplomatic consuls in Batavia representing Australia, Belgium, China, France, the UK and the US; and a UN Good Offices Committee (UNGOC), consisting of Australia, Belgium and the US.

Australia, still under Labor, was sympathetic to the Indonesian cause and believed that the delay was favouring the Dutch who were steadily consolidating their position. So when the Consular Commission called for its member states to provide military observers to report on and monitor the situation, Australia proved eager enough to fly its four observers to the NEI within a few days, and as a result they arrived before those of any of the other countries.

The four were a distinguished group.² Their leader was Brigadier LGH Dyke, Director of Artillery at Army HQ in Melbourne. Dyke had been to the Netherlands East Indies before, commanding Timor Force which accepted the Japanese surrender on Timor in 1945.³ The second Army officer was Major DL Campbell. The RAN provided Commander HS Chesterman, who had been decorated by the Americans for his role as a liaison officer in the Pacific during the War.⁴ Finally, Squadron Leader LT Spence was a distinguished fighter pilot who had won the DFC in the Middle East, and was later to be killed while commanding No 77 Squadron in Korea.⁵

So at 8.15am on the morning of Sunday, 14 September, the four boarded an RAAF plane and flew from Batavia to Djogjakarta, the capital of the breakaway Indonesian Republic, to be greeted rapturously by the Indonesian Republicans. Next day Chesterman and Campbell flew on to Surabaya, to spend the next two weeks observing in the Dutch-controlled enclave in eastern Java, while Dyke and Spence stayed to report on the Republican areas.⁶

Each pair travelled widely and interviewed as many officials as possible, though the language barrier made it difficult to communicate with the general population. On their return they wrote a report, not to the Consular Commission but in the first instance to the Australian Consul-General. The report dealt with general conditions in the areas visited, but also argued fairly fully the case that the ceasefire was unworkable and that there was no peace to observe.⁷ In an interim report, Dyke and Spence had summed it up: 'As each party to the dispute is using a different set of rules, it is certain that no umpire can function effectively.'⁸

A week or so after their return to Batavia, Spence became our first peacekeeping casualty, evacuated home ill with fever. The other three stayed on, working with the other nations' observers on joint reports and conducting further investigations, until replaced and augmented over the coming months.⁹ With the Renville Agreement of January 1948, the observers' role became specifically one of monitoring the ceasefire line between Dutch and Republicans, investigating incidents, and liaising with the forces on either side.

Thus began UN peacekeeping, though similar developments were taking place at much the same time on the other side of the world in northern Greece. There is, of course, a history of pre-United Nations peacekeeping, not perhaps stretching quite back to classical antiquity, but certainly to the League of Nations and maybe beyond.¹⁰ In general, however, it is only with the much wider participation in international affairs achieved under the United Nations that peacekeeping has been able to develop in the varied forms seen today.

Inventing Peacekeeping

Yet peacekeeping, as has often been observed, is nowhere defined, or even mentioned, in the UN Charter. The invention of peacekeeping has often been seen as a workaround imposed by the Cold War, given the UN's impotence when its actions might be vetoed by either of the US and the USSR.¹¹ That is probably an over-simplification. The greater problem was that the UN Charter, written while the Second World War was still being waged, fundamentally focussed, as far as security was concerned, on the problem of overcoming inter-state aggression through a collective security regime. No doubt its authors had before their minds the great failures of the League of Nations, in Manchuria and Abyssinia, while Germany's conquest of Europe allowed people to ignore the question of what they would—or should—have done about a Nazi regime that had stayed within its borders.

Obviously, inter-state aggression has occurred since 1945. In two cases, Korea and Kuwait, the UN has been able to deal forcefully with the problem, within the terms of the Charter, though for practical reasons acting through proxies in each case. In other cases Cold War rivalries have prevented the UN from taking any effective action.

But in most cases, including some early ones, the conflicts faced by the Security Council did not conform to a simple A-attacks-B model. In several cases problems arose in the course of decolonisation: in Indonesia, the conflict was between the colonial power and those seeking independence; in Kashmir, and in even more complicated fashion in the Middle East, neighbours disputed where the post-colonial boundaries should run. Sometimes the wars have been civil wars, as in the Congo, or more recently Western Sahara or Rwanda. Or Yugoslavia, where war broke out over the boundaries of the successors to a disintegrating state. In these sorts of cases, the boundaries of right and wrong are not clear enough to make simple collective security arrangements adequate: more subtle and varied arrangements are needed to deal with them.

Then there are cases in which UN or other multinational forces have helped to ease the transition from colonial rule to independence, for example in Zimbabwe and Namibia. In West New Guinea the UN took over the entire rule of the territory for a transitional period, a forerunner in a sense of UNTAC (but without the elections). Again, this calls for a type of force not envisaged in the Charter.

Even in cases where there is clearcut aggression by one side, it is not necessarily obvious that fighting a war to eject the aggressor would not prove to be a cure worse than the disease. To eject the Turkish forces from northern Cyprus, or the Indonesians from East Timor, would have involved a degree of fighting and possibly a horrifying level of civilian casualties, though in both cases the problem has subsequently proved so intractable that many might be tempted to argue that forceful action 20 years ago, if politically possible, would have been worth it.

But my point overall is that, if the UN wanted to be an effective agent to promote peace and limit suffering in the postwar world, then it was going to have to invent a range of peacekeeping options, Cold War or no. Two factors ensured that the UN would be busy. First the steady progress towards decolonisation created continuing instability in many of the areas affected (and mirrored in a sense by more recent changes in the post-Soviet world). Secondly, the UN was imbued (much more even, I think, than the still largely eurocentric League of Nations) with a vision of a world in which all peoples should share in the ideal of living in peace (and perhaps prosperity, though the West has never made any serious attempt to share that). That greatly expanded the number of conflicts which would seem worthy of international attention.

Definitions

So far I have avoided the ugly problems of terminology, but unfortunately we cannot ignore the issue altogether. Peacekeeping has not escaped modern man's obsession with cautious exactitude in naming things, whereby we are afraid to call spade a bloody shovel in case somewhere there is a manual earthmoving implement which remains undefined. In the usual way that we have today of making adjectives do the work we are afraid to give to nouns, we now have 'peace operations' and even 'peace support operations'. The public, however, in its overwhelming innocence, continues to use the word 'peacekeeping' to represent a whole range of activities which we might summarise as having the following linking features:

- they are preventing, or stopping, or dealing with the effects of fighting (as against natural disasters, etc);
- a peacekeeping operation will include a substantial military element, needed for the special skills, both individual and organisational, which the military can bring to bear;
- the peacekeepers themselves have no vested interest in the conflict, other than to save people from it;
- mainly in order to demonstrate impartiality, peacekeeping is done by nations grouped together in multinational forces, usually under the umbrella of some international organisation;
- the use of force is kept to the minimum needed to achieve the operation's mandate.

There is a great distance between the most primitive of all impulses, for groups to resort to violence to get their own way, and the complex set of material securities and interpersonal trusts needed to allow a modern state to function. We are less inclined than, say, the ancient Greeks to accept cross-border raiding, ravaging of crops, or being captured by pirates and sold into slavery as normal events within relatively civilised society. At the same time, technology has made destruction too easy, with bombs and guns and landmines readily available to all. This means that the range of tasks involved in ending conflict and reconstructing nations is vast. The institutions of what we regard as civilised life need to be assembled or rebuilt, whether by holding elections, setting up criminal justice systems, or whatever. Even before that can happen, a transition may be necessary to the point of trust between people to allow such institutions to exist at all: ceasefires may need to be assured through monitoring, guerrillas assembled and disarmed, third-party negotiation may be needed to help settle local disputes. Then too the physical environment may need repair, whether through rebuilding transport and communications systems, removing hazards such as landmines and unexploded ordnance, or building amenities such as schools, hospitals and prisons.

All this the public rightly wants a simple term to cover, and by general usage that term is 'peacekeeping'. The technocrats, on the other hand, would like to keep the word 'peacekeeping' for a more limited set of operations, mainly observer missions, armed if at all only for self-defence, in the field with the consent of all the parties, essentially monitoring an agreement or ceasefire already reached. This view distinguishes between 'peacekeeping' and 'peace enforcement', with 'peace support', 'peace building' and a range of other terms added to the doctrinal mix. Quite a few attempts have been made to construct all-embracing terminological systems,¹² and no doubt this is useful in an entomological sort of way, but in the end every operation is going to have its own unique set of problems and to require a

purpose-designed force structure and purpose-written set of rules of engagement. The issue of consent is less, I think, a matter of objective description than a political statement, and is by and large a red herring. I will come back to it later. For now, I will continue to use 'peacekeeping' to refer to the whole range of what others may call 'peace operations'.

Australian and the Invention of Peacekeeping

The Australian role in the development of peacekeeping is neglected because the academic fraternity interested in these matters has tended not to count the Indonesian operation as peacekeeping at all.¹³ This is unfair. Australia's first group of four observers in Indonesia, whom I discussed earlier, went there as 'military assistants' for the Consular Commission, a body set up by the Security Council when it became clear that the parties, and especially the Dutch, were not adhering to the ceasefire agreed to some weeks earlier. The Commission, consisting of the six career consuls in Batavia (from Australia, the US, Britain, France, Belgium and China), was to report back on 'the observance of the cease-fire orders and the conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between the parties'.¹⁴

Peacekeeping did not exist, it had to be invented, not only by the states involved but also by the individual military officers on the ground. A key point in this development occurred when participants ceased to be primarily servants of their own governments and moved towards being servants of the multinational body employing them. Now Australia was keen to send its military observers to Indonesia because the government had its own strong views about the rights and wrongs of the situation, but above all, one might say, because of a belief in the value of transparency: one side was being favoured by the lack of information getting back to New York about what was going on on the ground in Indonesia. Two of the observers (Dyke and Spence) were briefed by John Burton, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, prior to their departure, but we do not know what he said.¹⁵ (Burton was later to clash with Richard Kirby, Australia's representative on the Committee of Good Offices, over whether Kirby should take instructions from Australia.¹⁶).

Once in Indonesia, the observers' first report was to the Australian Consul-General, Charles Eaton, but once the other observers turned up they were soon working in cooperation with them, and all the observers planned a joint report through the Consular Commission to the Security Council. This was prevented only by the Americans, who arrived last with instructions from the State Department to report only to the American Consul-General.¹⁷ In a handy pointer to the future, UN peacekeeping was born with the Americans already reluctant to subsume their interests into those of the group. Despite this, over a short time the operation assumed a genuinely multinational character.

A Military Executive Board, or Milex, was set up to control the observers, consisting of the senior observers from the US, Australia and Belgium.¹⁸ In 1948 the Australian member was Brigadier Ted Neylan. By March 1948 Milex felt that things had settled into enough of a pattern to organise a conference of observers in Batavia, in order to codify current practice. The Directive which resulted, 'General instructions for military observers', of 20 March 1948, represents one of the earliest formulations on paper of the duties of a UN military observer.¹⁹ The 'cardinal principle' was that observers were representatives of the UN, and must do nothing to embarrass the Committee of Good Offices (to whom they were by now attached): impartiality was essential. Moreover, the observers had no power to give orders, and must not even appear to do so: rather, they were to bring the parties together 'through the use of initiative, a sense of fair play, ingenuity and common sense'. They were to work in teams of mixed nationality, each under the control of a team coordinator. The teams were to operate as units, located at intervals along the 'status quo line' and (unlike many subsequent observer groups) operating on both sides of the line: each team was to divide its time as equally as possible between the territory of the two parties (thereby, it would seem, emphasising their active role as communicators and intermediaries rather than simply as remote observers). All this is surely peacekeeping. Whether or not it was directly under the control of the Secretary-General is irrelevant. Peacekeeping was being invented, not in New York, but on the ground in Java.

The History of Australian Peacekeeping

Since then, Australia has always been involved in peacekeeping, largely but not entirely under UN auspices.²⁰ If we look at the number of Australian peacekeepers in the field over time, then it is obvious (and well known) that Australian peacekeeping hit one great peak, in 1993, when for a time we had large contingents in both Cambodia and Somalia. But there is a lot more to it than that. First, it is clear that Australia has been a consistent peacekeeping nation, but scarcely a prolific one. The more than 30 multinational peacekeeping operations in which we have participated have taken us into more conflicts than we have visited as belligerents—a proud record, I would think. We have been involved in peacekeeping on every continent except North and South America (though we have been to both Central America and the Caribbean) and Antarctica. But for much of this time the numbers of personnel involved have been low, as indeed they are at present. Many other nations have provided much larger peacekeeping forces over time than we have. Compared to others, Australia has shown a marked reluctance to send anything approaching battalion-size forces to peacekeeping operations.

Smaller, often specialised contingents have been our way. In the 1950s, we initiated long-running commitments of observers to Kashmir (providing the force commander, Major-General—later Lieutenant-General—Nimmo, from 1950, and observers from 1952) and to the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East from 1956. Since 1964 we have had anything up to 50 police in Cyprus (though the number today is about 20). Then in the 1970s the scale of commitments started to increase, with the deployment of four Iroquois helicopters to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) II in the Sinai, from 1975 to 1979, and an infantry force of 150 to the non-UN Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe (1979-80). Following the end of UNEF II, there was a hiatus before the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), a non-UN mission set up to supervise implementation of the Camp David accords, got off the ground. Australia and New Zealand provided eight helicopters from 1982 to 1986.

There was then a major decline in our peacekeeping, as a post-Vietnam Labor government sought to end overseas military commitments, pulling out of Kashmir and the Sinai as soon as it decently could. By the late 1980s, however, things began to move again, with a deployment of 300 engineers and others to Namibia in 1989-90 (an operation which had almost taken place a full ten years earlier, before peace negotiations broke down) and a new commitment of observers, this time to the Iran-Iraq border, commencing in 1988. After that there was a steady rise, with contributions of deminers to the UN Mine Clearance Training Team (UNMCTT) in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1989 to 1993, doctors to Operation HABITAT in northern Iraq in 1991, weapons inspectors to UN Special Commission in Iraq since 1991, and signallers to the Western Sahara from 1991 to 1994.

In 1992-93 came the large scale deployments to Cambodia and Somalia. Some 600 Australian troops, including the UN Force Commander, Lieutenant-General John Sanderson, participated in the work of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, while a force of over 1000, based around 1RAR, operated in Somalia in the US-led Unified Task Force. With contributions still being made to sanctions enforcement against Iraq, observers still in the Middle East, police still in Cyprus, with personnel in Western Sahara, Iraq and even a few in the former Yugoslavia, and with a new commitment, this time of Army personnel, to the MFO, 1993 represented easily the high point of Australian peacekeeping.

Since then, there has been a most significant decline. One more major operation was to come: the deployment of 300 medical and support personnel to Rwanda in 1994-95. Smaller commitments were made to Haiti and Mozambique. Today we have 27 Army personnel in the MFO, 12 with UNTSO, 20 police in Cyprus, a few seconded to S-FOR in the Balkans, a few de-miners operating in what might or might not be called peacekeeping operations, and that is about it. Australia has very nearly ceased, as of 1997, to be a peacekeeping nation.

The Australian Experience of Peacekeeping

Mercifully few Australian peacekeepers have died. General Nimmo died in 1966 while commanding the UN operation in Kashmir, but he was 72 at the time. Captain Peter McCarthy was killed by a landmine in Lebanon in 1988. Lance-Corporal Shannon McAliney was killed accidentally in Somalia in 1993, and Major Susan Felsche was killed in a plane crash in Western Sahara in the same year. In addition, three police have been killed, all in Cyprus, one by a landmine and two in road accidents. I should also mention Stuart Cameron who served as an observer on the Iran-Iraq border, later left the Army, went back to Iraq as a worker with Care Australia, and was killed in an ambush, also in 1993.

Our peacekeeping has also been carried out in a great variety of settings, ranging from the tropics of Cambodia and Rwanda to the snows of Afghanistan and the deserts of Western Sahara and the Middle East.

All Australians I have spoken to about peacekeeping say (a) that we are particularly good at it, and (b) that we make up for the lack of numbers involved with the high quality of the people we send. These observations may or may not be true, but it is certainly the case that the Australian Army has been able to bring to bear a great range of specialist skills in peacekeeping. Throughout Australia's 50 years of peacekeeping, there have been, for example, military observers: in Indonesia, until 1951; in Kashmir, from 1950 to 1985; in the Middle East, as part of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), from 1956 to the present; and in the late 1980s on the Iranian side of the Iran-Iraq border. These peacekeepers are doing something directly for local security, by providing (to the extent they are able, and without complete cooperation from the parties) that transparency which the Australian government wished to bring about in Indonesia 50 years ago. They are also in a general sense adding to Australia's security by minimising the chance of war in a volatile area.

At the other end of one spectrum are the peace enforcers, the infantry on patrol to establish their dominance on the ground, to provide a secure space in which other activities can go ahead. This function was most obvious in Zimbabwe and Somalia, but was also one among other functions in Cambodia and Rwanda.

However, while the creation and maintenance of secure conditions are obviously a cardinal peacekeeping activity, they represent only a beginning in creating a peaceful future. Many operations have had to deal with the problems of landmines, unexploded ordnance, and in the case of Iraq the stockpiling of all sorts of weapons. Landmines were a problem in Namibia, in Cambodia, in the Middle East, in Cyprus. UNMCTT was specifically tasked to provide mine clearance training and mine awareness training to returning Afghani refugees.

But rebuilding takes many other forms. Building returnee camps, schools, hospitals in Namibia, communications systems in Cambodia, improving hygiene and water quality in Rwanda—all these are also ways of ending war and building for peace. Then there are the less physical structures, such as the expression of political consensus through elections, in Cambodia, for example, or Namibia. Equally important is the direct contact between peacekeepers and the people they are helping, sometimes rendering assistance, getting information, or just having a chat. Peacekeeping at heart is about people, and the direct relationship between peacekeepers and those they are helping is fundamental. The so-called 'revolution in military affairs' may well be of very limited importance to peacekeeping (and as a result may represent a threat to future military peacekeeping, as soldiers focus more than ever on the technological side of their craft).

Problems

The experience of the Second World War created a climate of opinion in Australia favourable to the idea of giving teeth to a system of collective security. In 1944 an opinion poll found that two-thirds of the Australian public favoured proposals to give the League of Nations armed forces after the war.²¹ In 1945 there was overwhelming support for Australia's ratification of the United Nations charter, while just over half the population favoured UN control over the former Japanese mandated territories north of the Equator, with their clear security implications for Australia.²²

But peacekeeping has gone well beyond the idea of collective security, if it ever had much to do with that at all. Peacekeeping is really about people, not states, but it is bedevilled by the twin ideas of sovereignty and consent. Short of a completely failed state such as Somalia, it is argued that the consent of the parties is necessary, either on moral grounds to avoid breaching sovereignty by intervention within someone's borders without their consent, or on practical grounds that the necessary force cannot be put on the ground to make such an undertaking acceptably risk-free. The first argument is morally vacuous, because it ignores the fact that in any situation where peacekeeping is needed, the real conflict is not between the partisans of the two sides but between on the one hand those who want to continue the cycle of conflict and violence and, on the other, those on both sides who want peace, cohabitation and the rebuilding of society. The keys of sovereignty are generally in the hands of the bully boys on one or both sides; the consent we are seeking is their consent. Time and again we have simply abandoned the people who want peace while we wait for the warmongers to be ready to stop. To take an extreme example, the Paris peace accords came too late for all too many Cambodians. Nor is Australia innocent here. Our government delayed for weeks in 1994 in announcing a commitment to Rwanda, when an early decision could have helped international efforts to build a multinational force, and while thousands were dying.

As to the question of risk, ultimately that does presumably come down to a question of resources. The Gulf War was probably justified in conception, though not entirely so in manner of execution, but public disquiet with it probably reflected an expectation that other situations, less clearcut as far as national boundaries were concerned, but involving greater human suffering, would not receive any remotely comparable level of resources. By and large, that expectation has been met.

Another side of the sovereignty coin is the problem of lines of command within UN forces, as national governments contribute forces but retain considerable control over them, often I would imagine to the frustration of force commanders, and sometimes with disastrous results. But this problem is well-known, and I do not propose to discuss it further here.

In the end, these are problems which may not be remedied without major (and unlikely) surgery to the UN. A standing UN force seems the only plausible way of reacting quickly to crises. Can we imagine an Australian prime minister who had to react to a threat of invasion by going off and asking the state premiers to contribute some units to an ad hoc force to meet the threat? (On the other hand, the two AIFs did work, but we are here to celebrate regular armies!) Secondly, the UN Charter opens with the words, 'We the peoples of the United Nations', but never mentions the peoples again. The UN is a club for national governments, many corrupt, only some democratic, and most imbued with an amoral ethos which values pursuit of their own (perceived) interests ahead of any genuine interest in common good. Only the replacement of the Security Council and the General Assembly with a directly elected General Assembly could solve this problem, but I imagine that solution lies some way in the future.

One other serious problem is the perception that peacekeeping operations have tended to drag on, and in some cases even become an element in the situation militating against a settlement. This is sometimes said, for example, of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Yet one must balance any apparent entrenching of the situation at UNFICYP's hands against the many ways in which, for example, Australia's police in Cyprus have improved individuals'

lives, by assisting in settlement of local disputes, by helping people cross boundaries when necessary, by generally creating a greater belief in societal order than would exist without them. The alternative sometimes touted about is a short, sharp war to sort things out. This is a nonsense. We could leave UNFICYP there for 100 years without incurring anywhere near the human and economic cost of the shortest, sharpest war.

There is an opposite view, probably of more validity, that we are today in too much haste to withdraw peacekeeping forces before they become bogged down. Robert Patman has argued convincingly that the attempt to find a quick solution to a very complex political situation was a major cause of the disastrous results of peacekeeping in Somalia.²³ We will never be able to guarantee the future of any state, no matter how successful a peacekeeping operation has been; Cambodia is a sad example of that. But looking for a quick fix greatly reduces our chances of establishing anything lasting. The current arguments over the future of S-FOR in the former Yugoslavia are a good example of this.

Opportunities

So what does peacekeeping offer us, apart from problems? I do not believe it adds greatly to our security, and the cry of good international citizenship is the plea of those who judge that pseudo altruism is less embarrassing to our society than true altruism. The fundamental advantage we gain is simply the chance to build a little more of the sort of world we would prefer to live in, the world which we believe, morally, should exist. That in itself should be an adequate justification for the use of resources.

Indeed, if we accept the Samuel Huntington view that future history will unfold as a 'clash of civilisations', with inevitable conflict over basic cultural values, then peacekeeping represents one of the best ways for us to attempt to disseminate our values. That is not to deny for a moment that peacekeepers must be sensitive to local culture; yet as soon as we intrude a preference for non-violence, or for the absence of landmines, or for schools and prison systems, or for elected governments, we are in fact promoting a set of cultural beliefs which are our own.

But there is more. Peacekeeping is about people, not only those we are helping, but also our own peacekeepers. To send any group of young Australians to areas of conflict will add immeasurably to our national understanding of a world beyond the TV screen. The Army and other services benefit from real world experience which no training exercise can match, and in an age of marketing campaigns and superficial hype, our soldiers must benefit from making a genuine contribution to the end of conflicts and participating in the rebuilding of nations and communities. As Professor O'Neill has suggested, these are the sort of range of activities in which soldiers of the future will have to be proficient.

More than that, in an age in which the public is probably increasingly cynical about the existence of direct threats to Australia, peacekeeping in its broadest sense may come to be seen by many as the chief justification for having an army at all.

Endnotes

The author acknowledges with gratitude the assistance of a research grant from the Australian Army.

- 1 . On the situation in Indonesia in general, and Australia's reaction to it, see the useful summaries, in P Dorling (ed), *Diplomasi: Australia and Indonesia's independence: documents 1947* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994; hereafter *Diplomasi*), ix-xxii; and P Dorling and D Lee (eds), *Australia and Indonesia's independence: The Renville Agreement: Documents 1948* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1996) (hereafter *Renville*), ix-xiv.
- 2 . The four were chosen within five days and arrived in Batavia five days after that. Cf Shedden to Dedman, 3 September 1947, *Diplomasi* no 311; Department of External Affairs to Eaton, 8 September 1947, *Diplomasi* no 321.
- 3 . Gavin Long, *The final campaigns* (Australia in the war of 1939-1945: Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1963), 570-72.
4. Australian Archives (hereafter AA) , A816: 66/301/122; AAA1066/4: IC45/35/1/8.
- 5 . Robert O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War, 1950-53: vol. II, Combat Operations* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985), 311-12.
6. 'Report by Cdr HS Chesterman RAN on duties as a Military Observer on the staff of Australian Consul General Batavia Sept 1947-Jan 1948', AA MP1049/5:1877/17/63; for dates, see especially Enclosure (iii).
7. 'Report of Australian military observing officers to the Consul General for Australia on the military situation in Java, August-September 1947', date approx 1 October 1947, AA AA4355: 7/1/7/6. Part of this document appears as *Diplomasi*, no 360.
8. 'Report submitted to the Deputy Consul General for Australia in Batavia by military observing officers in the Jogjakarta area', September 1947, Pt 1.13, AA A4355: 7/1/7/6.
9. For example, in December 1947 Chesterman and another Australian observer, SQLDR LN Kroll, the replacement for Spence, took part in a joint Australian, Belgian and US inspection of the situation on Madura ('Report submitted by the Madura observation team to the Committee of Good Offices', 8 January 1948, UN document S/AC.10/86, AA A4357:48/255 pt 3).
10. A number of League of Nations' actions were clear forerunners of the development even of complex peacekeeping under the UN, most notably perhaps the multinational force of over 3000 men which maintained order in the Saar territory in the period leading up to a plebiscite on reunification with Germany in 1935. See, (or example, DW Wainhouse, *International peace observation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 20-29.
11. SM Hill and SP Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations* (Aldershot: Brookfield, 1996), 14 (to cite one recent example among many).
- 12 . See recently, for example BR Pirnie and WE Simons, *Soldiers for peace: an operational typology* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). A significant Australian contribution was Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for peace: the global agenda for the 1990s and beyond* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), *passim* but with a summary of terminology at 8-13.
13. Thus recently, for example, Hill and Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations*, 27-32, discuss the origins of peacekeeping entirely in terms of UNSCOB, UNTSO and UNMOGIP. Nor does the UN itself include the two Indonesian operations, UNGOC and UNCI, in its lists of peacekeeping operations.
14. UN Security Council Resolution 525(I), 25 August 1947.
15. Shedden to Department of the Army, 9 September 1947, AA MP742/1: 251/1/2942.
16. Kirby to Burton, 19 November 1947, *Diplomasi* no 424; Department of External Affairs to Kirby, *Renville* no 43; Kirby to Burton, *Renville* no. 50.
17. Eaton to Department of External Affairs, 1 October 1947, AA A4355: 7/1/7/3; Eaton to Burton, 3 October 1947, *Diplomasi* no 364.
18. Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question, 'Summary record of the sixty-sixth meeting', 26 January 1948, AA A4357:48/255, pt 3.
19. MILEXBOARD Directive no 4, 'General instructions for military observers: Committee of Good Offices', 20 March 1948, AA A10158: 62.
20. The best available summary of Australian peacekeeping operations to 1993 is at NF James, 'A brief history of Australian peacekeeping', *Defence Force Journal* 104 (January/February 1994), 3-18.
21. N Harper and D Sissons, *Australia and the United Nations* (New York: Manhattan Pub, 1959), 90.
22. *Ibid*, 92.
23. RG Patman, 'The UN Operation in Somalia', in R Thakur and C Thayer (eds), *A Crisis in Expectations: UN peacekeeping in the 1990s* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 113.