

***THE KOREAN WAR 1950-53:  
A 50 YEAR RETROSPECTIVE***

***'BUT TO THIS DAY I STILL ASK MYSELF, WHY DID I SERVE IN  
KOREA?':***

***THE FORMATION OF K FORCE***

**Richard Trembath**

In 1951 the Korean War was a year old. John 'Bushy' Burke from Geelong turned twenty that year and enlisted in the Army for fourteen months service in Korea and Japan. As he describes it, his employment to that time had been varied, he had been a 'casual labourer on the waterfront and anything else that was going'. His education was limited to primary school in West Geelong. Recalling his decision to volunteer specifically for service in Korea, Burke wrote:

I was a volunteer. Joined K Force in 1951. I was anti-communist, young, adventurous. And didn't give a stuff for anything. I was told by my platoon commander I was a good front line digger. But out of the line hard to handle.

After his army service Bushy Burke returned to the wharves in Geelong where he rose to high position within the union movement, serving six years as a Federal Councillor with the Waterside Workers' Federation. He 'completed nearly forty years as a wharfie' and was 'proud of it'. Yet Korea remains the greatest experience of Bushy Burke's life and he has been active in the affairs of the Korean Veterans Association (KVA) as a delegate from the Geelong area for many years. Events such as the time a good mate jumped in front of him during a mortar attack and, at the cost of great personal suffering, saved Bushy's life, feature prominently in his account of his war. At one point in his memory telling he addressed the author personally as if that were the only way of conveying his real meaning:

You had to be there Richard. The cold—the stinking heat—the hills—the water. No showers for weeks at a time. And yet I've never heard one vet say he wouldn't do it again. The mateship in action. You always felt safe with another Aussie watching your back.<sup>1</sup>

Stanley Bombell, another who volunteered specifically to serve in Korea, was ten years older than Bushy Burke, celebrating his 30th birthday on the peninsula in April 1951. Although a farm worker at the time of enlistment, he had previous military experience, having been a member of the AIF for much of the Second World War. His motives for going to Korea were different in many ways from those of Bushy Burke's:

During four years in the 2nd AIF we were told to train hard for we'd soon be in action against the enemy. Having earned the right to fight, we were denied the opportunity. I had wanted to join the Permanent Army after the War but I felt I was not a real soldier, so I took my discharge in 1946. The outbreak of the Korean war and the raising of a Special Force to fight there gave me an opportunity to see action and, partially, to regain lost face.<sup>2</sup>

A young man who wanted to fight Communists and participate in an adventure. A more mature man who felt the need to make up for something that had been offered to many but snatched away from him. These memories represent two aspects of a complex situation—why individual Australians served in Korea. A third aspect is suggested by the story of Major General JC Hughes.

At the time of the Korean War Hughes was not a Major General but rather was a 'newly commissioned staff officer' at the commencement of a distinguished military career which was to take him to various battlefields including Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam. As well as being a regular soldier and an officer he differed in other ways from Burke and Bombell. For example, he was better educated, including secondary schooling at a distinguished private school (St Peter's in Adelaide), and had trained at the Royal Military College, Duntroon. In contrast to the more personal accounts of Burke and Bombell Hughes wrote soberly of his reasons for going to Korea. He was going 'to obtain experience in [his] chosen career'. For the young platoon commander the war was a natural career move, a step up a long ladder.<sup>3</sup>

This essay examines the composition of the force that went to Korea, a force that numbered in all less than 20,000 persons. Approximately 11,200 of these served in the army, 6000 in the RAN and 1115 in the RAAF.<sup>4</sup> As the above selection of recollections from former members of the Australian forces in Korea demonstrates, those who served in that conflict came from varied backgrounds and there was a range of factors behind their decisions to enlist. Previous analyses of Australia's Korean War have neglected such topics as why people volunteered to fight in Korea, the participants' employment history and what it meant to be a member of a force so often described simply as K Force. By focussing on the experiential elements of the conflict—the war as seen by those who comprised Australia's small forces on the peninsula—we can more fully understand the nature of the combat and how traditions forged in earlier wars were manifested and maintained in a Cold War climate.

The material analysed here is derived from a number of sources. These include secondary treatments of the war, or specific aspects of it such as particular battles, for the relatively small scale of Australia's contribution to Korea when compared to this country's contribution to the two World Wars often enables a commentator to focus on small groups of people. The sources also include some published and unpublished reminiscences of veterans, a number of which offer powerful and intimate accounts of individuals' perception of war. A significant contribution to our knowledge of this area comes from the responses to oral and written interviews conducted with former veterans, supplemented by follow-up discussions and in a number of cases by written material submitted by participants. These recollections—sometimes sparse, often rich—provide important insights into areas to which we might otherwise not obtain access.

A note of caution should be sounded here about drawing definitive conclusions concerning Australia's Korean forces on the basis of a restricted selection of veterans' stories. Similar exercises which focussed on earlier wars in which Australia participated have attracted some criticism. For example, Jeffrey Grey has described Robson's study of the origin and character of the 1st AIF as of limited value because of the tiny size of the sample chosen for study.<sup>5</sup> Again, in the case of the 2nd AIF, Barrett's *We Were There* is a fine and moving account of the recollections of diggers from that war, but without the supplementary work in that field from such as Johnson, Charlton and Barter, or the sustenance provided by campaign and strategy studies, the sheer size of the body of people under discussion raises awkward questions concerning the validity of the analysis.<sup>6</sup> We are more fortunate in the case of Korea. For several reasons we can proceed with some confidence that the analysis will yield some significant perceptions about the veterans. Firstly, the available 'pool' of service personnel in the case of Korea is much smaller than those of the World Wars. Secondly, as far as possible the sample is representative of a wide range of different personal characteristics of the Korean forces—different Service (army, navy, air force); different unit within the main Service in Korea (the army); whether or not the soldier had seen action before Korea; state of origin of the soldier; and finally whether the individual volunteered specifically for Korea or was a regular.<sup>7</sup>

Before examining the Korean situation it is useful to examine the reasons—such as we can discover them—for enlisting in earlier conflicts in which this country has taken part. For the First World War we know who the soldiers were better than why they were there. We know that in 1914, in Robson's words, when 'the recruiting depots opened they received an embarrassment of riches'.<sup>8</sup> Quotas were filled with ease; unless they met strict physical criteria applicants were rejected—at least in the early days of the war before slaughter and

changing attitudes rendered the task of the recruiter more difficult. Robson stresses the influence of Imperial sentiment in motivating Australian men to offer their lives thus but the analysis ends there. Gammage takes the matter further providing a clutch of reasons why Australians joined up in 1914. These reasons are firstly 'adventure'—'most of that early avalanche of volunteers was roused by a sense of adventure ... many eagerly seized a fleeting opportunity'.<sup>9</sup> Then comes obligation or duty. Both these factors, according to Gammage, were generally expressed in imperialistic terms, Australia's cause and the cause of Empire being often seen as identical or at least closely related. For many, not volunteering was simply not conceivable. In Grey's neat expression Australia 'regarded the war as just and service in it as both obligation and privilege'. As the war progressed hatred of Germany, hatred of 'Kaiserdom', grew more prominent as a factor in enlistment.<sup>10</sup>

Barrett's more probing study of 'the thing to do' in the Second World War establishes a wide range of reasons why men joined up between 1939 and 1945. In several respects the 2nd AIF (despite providing so many of K Force) is less like Korea than the 1st AIF was. The most significant difference between 1939-45 and Korea is that in the former war conscription was introduced in 1943 for the AIF and compulsory call-up for the militia had existed from the commencement of hostilities. Twenty-two per cent of the respondents to Barrett's survey entered the army through this avenue. Many of those who served in the Second World War were not volunteers whereas all who served in the army in Korea were, strictly speaking—even if some members of BCOF in Japan may have felt 'pressure' to volunteer given that all their mates had done so. Barrett concludes that 'for most men what took them into the army was a sense of duty, their Australian nationalism, which easily combined with empire loyalty, the impetus of the Anzac tradition (including its mateship), and the eagerness of young men to prove themselves and have a share of excitement'.<sup>11</sup>

It is now time to turn our attention to Korea and examine the circumstances in which K Force originated. As is well known Australia was prompt in committing air and naval forces to the Korean conflict within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities. The decision to extend the commitment to ground forces was less certain and was more or less made on the run. In fact, an atmosphere of improvisation and expedience permeated the first days of the raising of K Force. The initial announcement from Canberra of the commitment of ground forces on 26 July 1950 was vague, little more than an in-principle statement of intent:

In response to the appeal of the United Nations, the Australian Government has decided to provide ground troops for use in Korea. The nature and extent of such forces will be determined after the conclusion of discussions which the Prime Minister will have in New York.<sup>12</sup>

It is not surprising that most of the significant details were omitted from the above statement. At a political level the statement's authors faced the problem of talking around the Prime Minister in whose absence the decision had been made and who subsequently gave a rather grumpy acquiescence to his colleagues' actions.<sup>13</sup> At the operational level there were major problems. The outbreak of the Korean War caught the Australian armed forces in the middle of a period of major restructuring. There had certainly been no lack of planning for Australia's defence needs under either the Labor or Coalition governments. Demobilisation and return to the civilian work force had commenced before the end of the Second World War and though post-war domestic needs always took priority over those of defence or international commitments there was recognition on the part of both the Chifley and the Menzies governments that the minimal forces of the inter-war period were insufficient for a climate in which imperial responsibilities intertwined with new demands brought about by the advent of the Cold War. Re-equipping of the RAN and the RAAF was planned and in a significant break with tradition, three battalions of a new force, the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR), were established. For the first time in its history Australia was to have regular infantry units. However, despite the elaborate plans for defence re-equipping and much bi-partisan political agreement as to what was required, the reality was that in 1950 none of the services was at full-strength. It has been suggested that part of the problem was that wages in the forces lagged behind those to be found in civilian employment. Possibly too, Menzies' introduction of National Service which was planned for 1951 dissuaded some potential volunteers who

considered that there was little point in joining the regulars when they would experience at least some aspects of the soldier's life through the militia. More significantly, the lack of interest in a military career probably reflected traditional Australian reluctance to serve in the peacetime armed forces. For many Australians armies were created in wartime for overseas service.<sup>14</sup>

Eventually, the main ground unit selected for service in Korea was 3 RAR then serving as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in Japan. Grey slates bluntly that at this time 3 RAR was at half-strength and was 'under-trained, underequipped and in no way ready for war'.<sup>15</sup> To add to the state of confusion, for some time after the commencement of the Korean War, this battalion acted under the belief that instead of going to war it would in fact be going home. This situation had arisen because of the decision in March 1950, three months before the outbreak of the Korean War, to bring the battalion back from Japan at the end of the year. Not until early August 1950 were the men of 3 RAR formally informed that instead of returning to Australia they had become this nation's forward fighting unit. Some more confused decision making followed. In July and August 1950 the pressure exerted by the North Korean advance towards Pusan and the Naktong Perimeter was enormous and Australian troops were not there to assist. In such a climate an early decision to send the under-strength troops of 3 RAR virtually immediately to Korea was understandable though this was sensibly rescinded and the Government delayed the battalion's transfer until it had been brought up to strength, had trained more fully and had a new commander with considerable operational experience in the Second World War.<sup>16</sup>

3 RAR's strength was supplemented in two main ways—absorbing intakes from other units of the Regular Army and through volunteers who responded to a recruitment campaign which commenced in August 1950. Thus, a tried and true method of enlisting for an overseas expeditionary force was used once again, though the call for volunteers, as announced by Josiah Francis, the Minister for the Army and the Navy, was couched in a different form from that of the Second World War. Applicants must have reached the age of 20 and be under 40 and the period of service was set at three years. It was essential to have served previously in some section of the Army whether infantry, artillery, signals etc. The situation—with both the seriously undermanned 3 RAR and the threatened UN forces in South Korea—demanded a prompt intake and hasty refresher training of soldiers with prior experience though this 'experience', as we have seen in the case of Stanley Bombell, need not have involved action. A thousand volunteers were called for and by November 1950 this number had been achieved. Thus K Force came to consist of a mixture of regulars and non-regulars, those with experience under fire and those without. In many cases the more recent volunteers, those who had enlisted following August's call, were those with the battle experience.<sup>17</sup>

In these circumstances it is scarcely surprising that the early days in the camps at Puckapunyal in Victoria and Ingleburn in New South Wales could be hectic. Jack Gallaway, a regular already in the army, watched the sudden influx of recruits under the special K Force condition of three years' service including one in Korea. Everything had to be done quickly. Military life had settled into a routine for many soldiers after 1945 but according to Gallaway 'the majority of their newly enlisted comrades were quite unrefined'. He considered that the 'K Force recruits flooding into Pucka from Australia's four southern states retained the attitudes acquired in a rougher environment and there was no time to do very much about it'.<sup>18</sup> Equipment was in short supply and much of it—like K Force itself—was recycled from the Second World War. Even the tan boots provided to the recruits were leftovers from the previous conflict but now they had to be darkened with raven oil. The speed of training was not lost on the new members of K Force. Immediately upon the outbreak of war Max Eberle left his secure job as a linesman with the Bowral Municipal Council in New South Wales as the 'thought of being in a United Nations Police Force had considerable appeal'. A former member of the 2nd AIF he viewed the 'training' he received at Ingleburn as part of K Force with some cynicism. He wrote that:

With the training received within Units of the AIF in the Second World War it was an almost automatic reaction when most volunteers adapted to their military life so readily. Much like riding a bike—once learnt, never forgotten. Not much training was

done, a couple of days on the rifle range to zero our rifles and numerous lessons on concealment. 'Go down into the bush and conceal yourself until lunch time etc'. ... My training completed, I was placed on draft to Japan approximately three weeks after enlisting. The three weeks in Australia was [sic] more to do with being issued with kit, dental appointments and immunisation and the rifle range exercise mentioned above.<sup>19</sup>

Preparations for 3 RAR's transmission to Korea quickened. The recruitment campaign had commenced in August 1950, Lieutenant Colonel CH Green, the new commander of 3 RAR, arrived in Japan on 10 September, and a day later the battalion reached full strength. Reinforcements were flown from Australia to Japan, a departure from the slower transport of preceding conflicts, adding to the sensations of speed and urgency, and incidentally providing many individuals with their first plane flight. For some with experience of the Second World War going to war by airliner and by way of a comfortable hotel in Manila was an unexpected introduction to the new conflict.<sup>20</sup> As selection and recruitment continued in Australia the battalion in Japan embarked in pouring rain for Korea on 27 September. When they arrived at Pusan a day later they were received by no less than three bands, one Afro-American, one local and one drawn from their own battalion, and flag waving locals.<sup>21</sup> The first echelon of Australian infantry to reach Korea then transferred from ship to motor transport and finally onto a train for the trip from Pusan to Taegu near the site of much of the previous month's fighting. It was, noted Max Eberle, 'only five weeks since my enlistment day'.<sup>22</sup> As the Communist forces were now retreating from the resurgent United Nations forces some of the men may have shared the belief of their battalion commander that the real fighting was all but over. 'It seems as if the Korean war will soon be over'. Green had written to his wife on 16 September 1950, 'big things are happening right now and the feeling here is that it will not take long'.<sup>23</sup>

Many of the soldiers Green commanded may have been disappointed that in this hectic period of rapid UN successes (between the repulse of the initial North Korean thrust and the Chinese intervention in November 1950) it looked as if the war was effectively over. While a career in the peacetime Army was unpopular it appears that the Korean War with its prospect of 'real' fighting was attractive for many men.<sup>24</sup> Some care must be exercised in making too much of this 'enthusiasm' for war: the numbers concerned are small, very small, when compared with the scale of recruitment for earlier wars in which Australia participated. For example, the Federal Government called for 1000 volunteers in August 1950 whereas in September 1939 the first recruitment target for the 2nd AIF was 20,000.<sup>25</sup> More generally, Niall Ferguson's analysis of one of social history's great 'facts'—the mass enthusiasm for the onset of the First World War—demonstrates that energetic enlistment rates may conceal a range of conflicting factors beyond simple unquestioning support for war.<sup>26</sup> Yet it is true that peacetime deficiencies in numbers were rapidly made up when action in Korea seemed imminent. Commentators have claimed that recruitment to K Force was 'very successful' with volunteers thronging 'the desks of the recruiting offices' and it appears that this claim is justified.<sup>27</sup> The initial quota of 1000 was met easily. When recruiting commenced on 8 August 1950 some men commenced queuing at 4 am at the Royal Park Depot in Melbourne though the doors did not open for another five hours.<sup>28</sup> The Army could afford to be fussy and as a consequence three out of four applicants were rejected, a number of them for possessing criminal records. Photographic evidence is further evidence of this initial outburst of enthusiasm for K Force with pictures of grinning would-be soldiers lining up for the first stages of processing, though one should always be suspicious of staged 'media stunts' of which there were a number in the early stages of the Korean War.<sup>29</sup> It appears too that the Government milked some of this early enthusiasm for volunteering to keep the process rolling after the first objective of bringing 3 RAR up to strength had been achieved. For example, a newsreel from November 1950 shows detachments from all three Services marching through Sydney to promote recruitment as another detachment prepares to depart for Korea.<sup>30</sup> Crowds gave tumultuous and emotional farewells to the troops in the early and later stages of the war.<sup>31</sup> Significantly, those already in the Army tried their hardest for the most part to get to Korea. Those already serving under their original conditions of service which restricted their area of operations to Japan for example, were formally required to 'volunteer' for Korea. One former member of 3 RAR explained this situation:

Volunteered for service in Korea as a member of the Occupation Force and the Australian Regular Army. Almost 100% of soldiers serving with 3 RAR in the Occupation Force volunteered for Korea service. No pressure was placed on members to volunteer & to the best of my knowledge only two men declined.<sup>32</sup>

Before discussing why Australians volunteered for service in Korea it is important to note that not all Australian participants in the Korean War were volunteers in the sense of enlisting specifically for that conflict. This is particularly true of members of the RAN and the RAAF and it was units from these services who were committed first to the conflict. These were members of the armed forces who went to Korea because that was where their units were sent. For example, Ian McDonald, who served off Korea between August 1950 and October 1951, when asked why he went to Korea stated simply that as a 'member of the permanent Navy [he] was drafted to HMAS *Warramunga* for her Korean service'.<sup>33</sup> As many of the recollections of veterans emphasise the 'volunteer' nature of the force, with all the resonances this has for Australians aware of the traditions in which the 1st and 2nd AIFs were raised, it is important to emphasise that for many sailors and air force personnel the war was a natural extension of an earlier decision to enlist in a particular service. There is not a hard and fast division between different services. There were regular soldiers who regarded this volunteering business when one was already in the forces as a bit of a fiction and there were personnel in the RAN and RAAF who worked very hard at getting to Korea. Jack Verdon, for example, who was attached to No 77 Squadron at Kimpo, stated that he sought to join to RAAF to get to Korea after the Army had rejected him as medically unfit—'yeah, I was looking forward to it', he affirmed.<sup>34</sup>

These caveats aside, one of the most significant things that can be said of many Australians who served in Korea—predominantly in the Army—is that they were volunteers, the last in a line of Australian volunteers for overseas service that stretched back to the time of the Maori wars.<sup>35</sup> The participants themselves make much of this point, thus aligning themselves at the outset with previous Australian volunteer expeditionary forces:

Many of the K Force recruits had been among the AIF's thirty-niners and all of them were similarly sharp of hearing in 1950. When their country sounded the bugle call for volunteers, they heard its first notes. Twice they had heard its clarion call, and these Diggers of K Force were be the last who would ever hear it. When next Australia needed troops for an expedition overseas, they would be found from among the ranks of the Regular Army. Later, when a major commitment was made to the war in Vietnam, the concept of a volunteer force was passe and conscription was deemed to be the way to go.

This was to be the last and final call of the bugle, for them or any Australian, ever. These men ... would be the last of their kind who enlisted under the traditional terms for the Australian volunteer, three years or the duration.<sup>36</sup>

Why did those who volunteered for Korea choose to go?

Reg Saunders, a commissioned veteran of the Second World War who had returned to civilian life but who then found the lure of a new war irresistible, examined with the journalist Harry Gordon the mixture of men Australia sent north after 1950. Some of the types described are familiar from the selection of memories with which this paper opened. Gordon recalls the discussion:

Once I asked him why he had come to Korea. 'Certainly, not because I'm a great patriot', he said. 'I love Australia, but that's got nothing to do with this. And I don't have very strong convictions about Communism. Maybe it's just because I like a certain amount of excitement'.

That was a fairly common state of mind among the Australians in Korea. Because they were all volunteers, unlike the Americans and the British, it was widely felt that they had lofty ideals about the war. Most of them would admit, though, that they didn't. They were there because

they were young Duntroon graduates who were making the army their career, or because they were Second World War men pathologically unable to adjust themselves to civilian life ... because they simply liked combat, because their wives nagged them at home, or because they wanted to qualify for War Service housing loans. Or for any one of a dozen other motives, some of them a little selfish.<sup>37</sup>

Factors influencing volunteering for Korea may be broken down into five broad groups. These are the wish for adventure; career advancement; the belief that Communism needed to be repelled; the desire for secure employment; and something rather inchoate and difficult to classify which is here called 'dislocation'. These factors are not listed in any numerical order though some idea of the relative significance of the different factors may be obtained from consulting Appendix 1 to this essay where the major reason supplied by questionnaire respondents is listed. As the italics in the previous sentence indicate many veterans supply a combination of reasons for going to Korea—overlap between factors is both considerable and predictable.

Before attempting to tease out discrete factors behind volunteering for Korea it is important to note that often specific reasons are not supplied. Many participants simply recorded that they had volunteered and left it at that—the significant fact for many veterans is the volunteering itself, not the reason for doing so. At the time these soldiers felt that by volunteering they were attaching themselves to a tradition. Now, in hindsight, they view themselves as the culmination of that tradition.

A large number of those who volunteered for Korea did so out of a spirit of adventure. This general explanation can be broken down into sub-reasons such as a wish to participate in a war like earlier members of one's family, a desire for a 'stoush', or a wish to make up for limited service in the Second World War (or missing out altogether). The sense of establishing continuity with the Australian military tradition is strong.

Many of those surveyed or interviewed cited as their reason for joining up the wish to be an Anzac or be like the Anzacs or diggers of previous conflicts. For example, in explaining his reasons for volunteering Murray Inwood first described his father and uncles who had served in the First World War, his uncle Roy Inwood winning the Victoria Cross at Polygon Wood:

That's my family history and that's what I grew up with ... So having grown up with military, or Army really, Army stories, all the time, all the time ... and then suddenly the Korean War started. And I could not wait, could not wait. It started on the 25th June and my enlistment date was 27th July ... I was down in Adelaide like a shot.<sup>38</sup>

Murray Inwood's is not the only instance of the wish to add another link to a family tradition. Vic Dey, now active in the affairs of the Korean Veterans' Association in Victoria, had joined the Army in June 1948. Two years in the forces when war broke out, it took him 'another two years to transfer from the RAASC [Royal Australian Army Service Corps] to the infantry to enable me to go to Korea. Three brothers, one sister in the 2nd World War, and I just wanted to do my bit'.<sup>39</sup> The links with earlier generations or siblings were occasionally manifested in more idiosyncratic fashion. For example, Major Alec Weaver who had been born in Germany was a lieutenant when he went to Korea in 1953. His family connection with earlier conflicts included an elder brother who fought with the German Army in the Second World War.<sup>40</sup> More common is the young man whose family and the social milieu in which he moved respected Anzac and saw it as something that was a privilege to take another stage.

The wish for a 'stoush', the desire just to experience adventure, was also strong. Reasons, motivations, explanations abound in this area and intertwine, yet repeatedly adventure is given as the most significant factor behind joining up. Tasmanian George Hutchinson posed the question to himself—'Why did I serve in Korea?' and answered:

Looking for adventure, travel but this day I still ask myself why did I serve in Korea. But one of the greatest rewards today is having reunions, functions etc with the greatest bunch of mates that ever will be.

Hutchinson's desire for adventure matched that of other veterans. Often the replies under this rubric are laconic, as if 'adventure' is a sufficient explanation.<sup>41</sup> Occasionally as with Ronald Smith, who served with 3 RAR in Korea in 1951-52, veterans were able to expand on their original statements concerning motivation. Like many other volunteers Smith had previous military experience, his service in the British Palestine Police between 1946 and 1948 counting as that vital ingredient of prior service when he applied to join K Force. He states that in 1950 he was:

Working in Papua at the time and was becoming restless. Advent of Korean conflict offered further travel and adventure; an ideal opportunity to further test myself.

Later this veteran expanded upon his reasons for enlistment in a partly satirical, partly realistic attempt to generalise about the reasons why his comrades were there in Korea beside him. In many ways Smith's account resembles that of Reg Saunders though the former's view point is more that of one serving in the ranks rather than that of an officer with much service in the Second World War behind him. Patriotism and political conviction are given short shrift in Smith's analysis. While the Anzac legend is referred in terms of approval the overall emphasis is on mateship and disregard for authority. It is necessary to quote here at length to obtain the full flavour of the original:

My part was relatively minor. I was an adventurer. Wounded at the battle of Kapyong and awarded the Military Medal; wounded at the battle of Maryang San. I like to think I, and my comrades upheld the finest traditions of the ANZACS.

In my platoon there was a hard core of diggers who had served in the desert and N. Guinea during WW2. I learnt a lot from these soldiers. Why did they join K Force? They were bored with civilian life after WW2. Adventurers.

I can't recall any of us having political discussions. In those days the diggers had a healthy cynicism regarding the bullshit produced by the politicians of the day. Indeed, the regimental song of those days had a final stanza:

'We're a pack of bastards,  
Bastards are we,  
We'd rather fuck  
Than fight for liberty.'

I think that rather sums it up.<sup>42</sup>

Well, perhaps not, but Ronald Smith encapsulates one strand of the Australian experience of Korea, a strand that has a long history, that reaches back to Bean and other commentators on the digger of the 1st AIF, was given new life in the Second World War and has been much discussed since.<sup>43</sup> Bean in his description of the digger in 1918 on the Western Front which opens his final volume describes characters who in many ways are like those described by Smith with the former's account of Australian recruits 'drafted in like half-wild colts, many with an almost complete disrespect for custom and authority' and who were bound to each other 'by a tense bond of democratic loyalty—a man must "stand by his mates" at all costs'. The adventurer portrayed by Bean is a paradox like that portrayed by Smith—at the one time a rugged individual and on the other constrained, willingly it seems, within the social coils of mateship. One noticeable difference between the two accounts is that Bean at least attributes some interest on the part of the digger in the purported causes for which the war was being fought—to defeat German aggression apparently—whereas Smith describes a state of total apathy, if not hostility, towards political statements and analyses.<sup>44</sup> (This question of the political beliefs of the Korean participants will be discussed below.) How much Smith, and

other Korean accounts which emphasise the search for adventure and action, are the result of memories and anecdotes being refined over half a century and consciously or unconsciously emulating earlier writers, is impossible to determine. We have seen that some Australian volunteers for Korea were deliberately placing themselves within a military tradition. Perhaps, we can discern a parallel process whereby those remembering the Korean War also place the oral and written forms of their stories within an established tradition—in this case a literary and historical one.<sup>45</sup>

Making up for missing out on action—or much action—in the Second World War was cited as a reason for enlistment by a number of K Force veterans. Several veterans emphasised this point or returned to it several times in their narrative. Brigadier JJ Shelton, a regular army officer, experienced the frustration of still being in training at Duntroon when the Japanese surrendered. He stated that it 'was not easy being an infantry officer who had not seen active service, when a high percentage of all ranks had had combat experience'. Upon the outbreak of war in 1950 Shelton with several of his colleagues 'kept volunteering for Korea until ... finally posted to 3 RAR'. The narrative of another veteran who does not wish to be named and here is simply described as H draws together a number of the components that have been placed together under the heading of 'adventure'. Born in 1927 H successfully enlisted in the army in December 1941, two months before his fifteenth birthday. He lasted only five months in the 2nd AIF before being caught out and discharged as under age. Immediately he turned 18 he rejoined the army, this time legally, and served five years until in March 1950, tired of inaction, he left. He was in New Zealand when the Korean War commenced. H 'had spent five years in the army and had never heard a shot fired in anger during the time'. Finally, the frustrations were over and he 'came back and enlisted in Sydney'. The military was clearly H's metier for he stayed on after Korea to serve in Malaya and then served in the RAAF in Vietnam. H was not alone in his enthusiasm for army life. Mick Everett, now a passionate defender of Korean veterans' entitlements, admitted that in some ways Korea occurred at just the right time—he 'was looking for an excuse to get back to the Army'. Almost exactly the same terms were used by Queensland veteran, James Geedrick, who stated that he 'wanted to get back into the Army ... Korea provided the mechanism'.<sup>46</sup>

The Australian Government had restricted K Force volunteers in 1950 to those with prior military experience. It is interesting to note that respondents to the questionnaire who had seen action in the Second World War had almost all experienced that action in the last year of the war, for example, in the campaigns at Wewak and Bougainville. Though Gallaway has claimed that many thirty-niners answered the call of the Korean bugle none of the respondents in our study were 'thirty-niners' or had participated in the early Australian actions of the Second World War such as Bardia or Greece.<sup>47</sup> Firm conclusions should not be drawn from this limited sample of veterans but one could suggest that an additional element to volunteering for Korea was perhaps a sense on some people's parts that the 'Unnecessary Campaigns' of 1945, costly as a number of them were, did not constitute a 'real' war. This is surmise only. Perhaps the Army in having ample applicants to choose from simply decided to dispense with older soldiers.<sup>48</sup>

Seeing action could even mean that a man felt that he was truly a member of his social group. Stanley Bombell felt that he was regaining 'lost face' in finally experiencing battle and this sentiment was shared by Dr John Bradley who had graduated MB, BS from the University of Melbourne in 1947 and who found that service with the Citizens' Military Forces—Monday night parades and two weeks camp at Seymour—was insufficient to assuage feelings that 'something' was lacking. Dr Bradley then 'volunteered specifically for Korea' to fulfil the 'desire to see active service' which he 'had missed in World War 2 but which most fellows of [his] age experienced'.<sup>49</sup>

The second factor influencing volunteering for Korea was career advancement which is recalled as a reason chiefly by those who were young officers at the time of the Korean War. The language used to describe their reasons for serving in Korea is very similar among this group of veterans, often being terse or truncated. The statement from Major General Jim Hughes cited at the beginning of this essay is typical. So is that of Brigadier Phillip Greville whose story combines a number of the themes already discussed in connection with

volunteering—limited service in the Second World War, desire for further experience, the wish to hone one's professional skills. Receiving his commission late in the Second World War Greville went to Wewak with 2/8 Field Company in July 1945 in the last weeks of the New Guinea campaign. He served in Korea with 1 RAR between April 1952 and September 1953, the majority of this time as a POW after being captured while mending a minefield fence in Samichon Valley. After Korea Greville's career in the Army was to last until August 1980, which included a period as Acting Commander 1st Australian Task Force Vietnam. Greville said of Korea that 'like most regular officers' he 'wanted to serve there' and when he discovered 'that RAE was to supply the entire assault pioneer platoon for 1 RAR' he 'sought the job'.<sup>50</sup> Adventure, a 'stoush', a wish to 'get stuck in'—these are factors which are not raised in the professional's account. What is raised is the need to 'get operational service ... very important from a career point of view'.<sup>51</sup>

It appears that there is a shared belief here that reasons for being in a war do not have to be explained at length when one has decided on a profession in which battle is not so much an occupational hazard as the chance to finally test one's training. The opportunity to hone their skills which many young career soldiers saw in Korea was at this level at least vindicated. The junior officers who went to Korea provided the backbone of Australian military leadership throughout the wars of diplomacy that culminated in Vietnam. According to one commentator a 'generation of young officers in all three services gained their first operational experience in Korea'.<sup>52</sup> Brigadier Greville emphasised the importance for subsequent Australian military commitments of the Korean experience. He declared that:

Fortunately the Australian Army believed in training for war rather than training for one situation, so although there were lessons learned from the Korean War they did not overwhelm our philosophies, force structure or equipment. Our commitment to Malaysia [sic] in 1954 and to Vietnam in 1962 ensured that counterinsurgency operations were stressed in our training.<sup>53</sup>

Another significant factor in recruitment to K Force was antipathy towards communism, which was variously expressed as the wish to repel world communism or the wish to protect Australia from communism. We have seen that some soldiers dismissed political talk as so much hot air (which in most cases would be a euphemism). However, we should not take Ronald Smith's statement as evidence that all soldiers lacked interest in political matters or were uninfluenced by political factors in deciding to serve in Korea. Currently research is taking place in the United States concerning political awareness among American soldiers during the Korean War and though this is incomplete one opinion is that references to politics in contemporary diaries and letters are 'rare'.<sup>54</sup> In Australia the contemporary record is not rich and references to political matters are also rare but this is not always true of the narratives of the veterans examined for this study. What factors are at play here?

The anti-communist factor is almost always combined with other reasons for enlistment in the memories of veterans. Nevertheless the belief that monolithic Communism had to be stopped somewhere, preferably some distance from Australia, was strong. Dick Woodhams was a fencing contractor in Western Australia before he served in Korea with 3 RAR between August 1952 and August 1953. Like many of the soldiers who served in Korea in the later stages of the war he had no prior military experience, except (in Woodhams' case) for school cadets. Korea marked his only experience of war. At several points in his narrative he attempted to unravel the combination of reasons why he went 'north'. He stated:

I joined up specifically for Korea. As a young man I was very concerned about the Communist threat to Australia. I suppose I also enlisted for adventure as I was an orphan. I have never regretted my decision as even though my health is not as good as I would like the mates I made will be with me until I depart this earth.

The question of his motivation nagged at Dick Woodhams for he returns to it several times. Adventure or the need to keep communism at bay—both seemed important. At one point he decided that 'looking back now I suppose adventure was the major reason for enlisting'. But he also declared that 'you have only to compare all Asian countries which were menaced by Communism to see our service was worth it'.<sup>55</sup>

That last sentence of Woodhams raises an important matter. A significant component of the anti-communist factor in veterans' memory narratives is that of retrospective vindication. A number of veterans felt that their decision to volunteer has been vindicated by the South Korean economic 'miracle'. The strongest expressions of anti-communist sentiment are in fact those which are linked to the subsequent economic development of South Korea and the simultaneous impoverishment of the North. The thesis here is that stopping communism on the 38th parallel was a necessary precursor to the current happiness and wealth of our Korean allies. In this view the war was almost a 'good thing' for 'it brought a depressed country (being South Korea) into a competitive industrial country and also one of prosperity'.<sup>56</sup> Another veteran stated that 'the war in Korea did contain Communism from spreading to the South, and like all countries that have been ravaged by war you only have to study or visit South Korea to appreciate or see the vast difference from then to now of their lifestyles, their industries and exports'.<sup>57</sup> John Lewis, another Korean veteran with experience of other Cold War conflicts (Vietnam), looked back on his time with 3 RAR and stated:

I returned to Korea on a visit in 1995 ... seeing how the southern half of that country has progressed in the last forty years and the high living standards of the South Koreans, as against the obvious poverty of the north. We definitely achieved our goal of preventing Kim Il Sung and Gen. Nam IL from taking over the south with their Communist forces and making them slaves.<sup>58</sup>

What is difficult, perhaps impossible, to disentangle here is how much events since the war have modified memories of the original reasons for enlistment. Korean veterans, when confronted with the question as to why they went away to a war that has now receded from public memory in Australia (and much of the rest of the world) and which was in many ways inconclusive, have one major advantage over those who served in Vietnam (some of whom had served in Korea too). Korean veterans can call upon recent history to help them. The apparent massive contrast between the post-war fortunes of the two Koreas is a powerful tool in shaping memories and also provides narratives, which are often shot through with graphic perceptions of the suffering of the local people, with their ideological justification. As one veteran expressed it: 'Truman's containment doctrine was certainly carried out ... the contrast between South and North Korea today probably justifies the war in retrospect'.<sup>59</sup> We are faced with the inescapable problem of memory. As we sift through the stories looking for 'the construction of memory' where 'new layers of meaning are added and old identities are reworked or shed' we discover the problem which is perhaps obvious but still significant: 'the evidence for these changes is contained in stories that are related in the present; stories overlaid with retrospective meanings'.<sup>60</sup>

Memory, however, is not always deceptive. 1950 was one of the high points of anticommunist feeling in Australia in the period of the Cold War. The outbreak of the Korean War, following the triumph of the communists in China in 1949, seemed to many in Western societies to mark the commencement of a new and dangerous phase of international relations throughout the world and in East Asia in particular. In the United States the events of 1949 and 1950 helped precipitate a reorientation in defence and strategic thinking that among other things saw America's defensive perimeter extended to include Korea and an increase in defence spending of immense proportions. In Australia too the turn of the decade with accompanying regional tensions and intermittent talk of nuclear war often provided an alarming context for otherwise peaceful activities.<sup>61</sup>

Such states of civic apprehension were not constant, of course. As the Korean War became static, and the newspapers were filled with dreary accounts of armistice negotiations that seemed to stretch on for an eternity, the sense of imminent threat faded and the war started to slip from many people's consciousness. Yet it remains true that in 1950 anti-communism was a strong undercurrent within large segments of Australian society and was a significant influence on young men who volunteered for service in Korea. The victory of the Liberal-Country Party coalition in the Federal elections of December 1949 may be attributed in part to a suspicion amongst the electors that the 'influence' of the Australian Communist Party was growing, and that the conservatives' campaign promise to ban the Communist Party was justified. For many, too, communism wherever it existed was still one entity, emanating

ultimately from Moscow: whether communists were to be found in Melbourne or Korea they were still communists and though the direct chain of command might be difficult to discern Moscow's hand was probably there somewhere. Certainly, Australians for the most part did not question that the Soviet Union was directly responsible for causing the Korean War. And many did not question, especially in the early stages of the war, that Korea could potentially blow up into something worse. Menzies may have been overstating his case for political purposes but he was touching upon real anxieties when he spoke in these terms in Parliament in 1950:

[M]ost of the people of this country believe that Communists are enemies of Australia, and very few people in this country believe ... that this country is neither at war nor in any danger of war. The whole foundation for this piece of legislation is that Australia is in a cold war, if that term means a war in which Australian lives are being lost in action, and is also in a state of imminent danger of what people might call a hot war.<sup>62</sup>

To this point, we have discussed several factors for the enthusiastic response by Australian volunteers to the Korean War—the desire for adventure, the wish to advance one's career, the perceived need to repel Communists. There are two other significant factors that require examination: an economic motivation; and 'restlessness' or social dislocation. The link between the two factors is strong and in the following account the difference between them is often only a matter of degree or emphasis.

The narratives of Murray Inwood, a young vineyard worker from South Australia before enlistment, have been referred to several times already. On a number of occasions he stepped back from the description of his own life story to view the Korean War's place in popular memory and to lay bare why it differs from other wars in which Australia has participated. Inwood was reflecting on the differences between the Korean and the Vietnam wars when he stated:

The Vietnam war, if you think about it, is made up of blokes who were very well educated and some who were just average educated. The Korean War was made up of blokes who were, first of all, out of a job, they were Second World War veterans, they were blokes who were Regular Army, and blokes who were looking for adventure. That's the last group that I come into. Now, none of those would really be considered as being a highly educated group. They weren't ...<sup>63</sup>

There is an implication in this testimony, and in some of the other soldiers' testimony, that 'restlessness' in some of the participants shaded off into anti-social, fringe or outsider behaviour. Alec Weaver, a regular and an officer, when asked to describe his new charges in Korea, was quite blunt:

K Force was made up of those who couldn't get a job, remittance men, killers and criminals.<sup>64</sup>

This, of course, is only one man's judgement and perhaps we can see something of the regular officer in it, perceiving a need to crack down on 'civilian' habits and make them amenable to Army discipline. However, the claims are still worth investigating. First, was there an economic impulse to volunteering for service in the Korean War? Secondly was K Force constituted to some degree of those from the outskirts of Australian society? The period immediately before the Korean War, and just after its commencement, was marked by full employment but high inflation—the cost of living increased by 18 per cent between 1947 and 1949 and by 1950 the inflation rate was at 10 per cent per annum.<sup>65</sup> Post war shortages in capital facilities (eg in building materials) were partly due to import problems and partly due to rationing, although the most notorious (at least in popular memory) instance of rationing, petrol, was abolished by the incoming Menzies government in 1949. Other features of the post-war period have also passed into legend. They include the expansion of immigration schemes to include those of non-British origin and programs of rehabilitation and re-education for returning soldiers. Between 1947 and 1950 Australia received 350,000 migrants, another factor placing a strain on a housing sector crying out for materials.<sup>66</sup> It was an era when government intervention in the economy was expected by the population—a state of affairs which was in no way altered by the change of Federal government in 1949.

Equally well known is the fillip the Korean War provided to the Australian economy. The most notorious of the stimulated sectors was the pastoral industry where the price of wool, detonated by the demand for warm clothing in Korea and massive American spending on Australian products, rose rapidly. The average price per lb at the NSW wool auctions increased from 61.8d in 1949-50 to 140d in 1950-51 and to 190.5d in March 1951.<sup>67</sup> Inflation had been a problem for the Chifley Government—rising wool prices made it an even bigger one for Menzies and his Treasurer Fadden who were faced with a increase in the retail price index in one year between 1950-1951 which was almost equivalent to the increase between 1951 and 1964.<sup>68</sup> Writing in 1970 Menzies lamented the situation his government inherited in 1949, 'a position in which prices were rising rapidly and inflation was making its unhappy mark'. Then the Korean War commenced 'and the great wool boom got under way' fuelled in part by the US State Department giving 'orders that large quantities of wool for uniforms and the like should be bought in Australia in a limited period of time'.<sup>69</sup> Deflationary budgets caused credit squeezes as the government attempted to rein the rises in. High inflation was not matched with high unemployment rates. Male unemployment in this period for civilian wage employees ranged from 2.4 per cent in 1949-50 to 1.5 per cent increasing to 3.9 per cent in the last year of the Korean War in 1952-53.<sup>70</sup> These are of course low figures when compared to the unemployment rate immediately prior to the commencement of the Second World War yet the rise in prices and regional variations meant that some groups were feeling greater pressures than others.

Despite the best of intentions, despite scheme and program, a certain percentage of men seem to have found it difficult to adjust to post-war society. Perhaps, the clue lies in what Murray Inwood suggested above—education. The efforts made by the Chifley and Menzies governments to push through reconstruction training schemes, which one historian has described as having 'a profound effect on Australian society', might not have been appreciated by those with a history of little formal education, low expectations as to social advancement and who perhaps had worked chiefly in labouring/itinerant jobs.<sup>71</sup>

Admittedly, few of the Korean veterans explicitly stated that they joined K Force because they were looking for a job. 'Economic conscripts' are hard to tease out though there is the occasional exception. Charles Cornell from Greenbushes in Western Australia was born in February 1933. A farm labourer after he left school at 14 he promptly joined the army on his 18th birthday in Perth 'owing to credit squeeze (NO JOBS)' before serving in Korea between June 1952 and June 1953. Slightly more cryptic is the statement advanced by Percy Dale of Queensland whose employment history prior to Korea had been remarkably varied, this veteran having been a telegram delivery boy, a railway porter, a labourer on a pineapple farm and a sand miner on the Gold Coast. His fifth job was the Army in which he enlisted when he was 19, joining K Force 'when they needed them not just feeding them' and when he needed 'a steady job'. Even more cryptic is the statement of 3 RAR member, James Geedrick, who described his work before Korea as 'wandering Australia'.<sup>72</sup> An interesting contrast may be drawn with the cohort who joined the 2nd AIF in 1939 who have been described as economic conscripts, refugees in a sense from a state of chronic high unemployment within Australia. It has been pointed out that with the thirty-niners conflicting evidence makes it difficult to judge just how significant the economic compulsion was in early recruitment. The case is similar with Korea. Despite the confident generalisations of Murray Inwood and Alec Weaver few veterans appear to have chosen K Force *just* for a job.<sup>73</sup>

As far as an economic motive for joining K Force is concerned more significant than unemployment was a background of blue collar/manual work with frequent changes of job. Analysis of veteran responses indicates that the war was a golden opportunity for a group of men unable to find settled employment or settle down to regular employment. Why this was so is difficult to determine. The stories of several we have examined in this essay indicate that some men were perhaps (to paraphrase Harry Gordon) pathologically unable to settle into the patterns of civilian life either because they had got a taste for the army which they had not yet expunged, or because Korea, following so closely on the end of the Second World War, seemed to promise an excitement not possible in civilian employment. This is the restlessness or dislocation referred to above. Other veterans' stories indicate that permanent employment and the promise of action were a tempting attraction for some men. Such a statement needs to be qualified for one is making a number of assumptions on limited

evidence especially the assumption that inability or reluctance (for whatever reason) to work in one long-term job was a significant factor in enlistment for Korea. Given these reservations it is noticeable that of seventy veterans whose employment details prior to Korea are known more than a quarter had had two or more jobs immediately prior to enlistment in the army. Almost all of these men had been working in rural or 'industrial' jobs—in factories or as process workers or as labourers.<sup>74</sup>

Fluctuations in employment prior to the war—that seems to be in the background of many veterans. As for the more extended claims made by such as Alec Weaver about remittance men and criminals (even if we use less colourful adjectives) it is hard, probably impossible, to say. There is an occasional Australian reference to a criminal element who were members of K Force, or who least attempted to enter it.<sup>75</sup> One British commentator considered the Australians to have a rather 'soldier of fortune' look, and another—also a British commentator—considered them to be brutal and violent in attack (aren't soldiers supposed to be?).<sup>76</sup> One Australian officer considered them to be as dangerous as the enemy, only happy when attacking, less happy when confined to trench warfare, and guilty of fragging (murdering) unpopular officers.<sup>77</sup> A British officer who was in command of the brigade to which 3 RAR belonged described the Australians' evident enjoyment of killing their first enemy:

As the Australians drove them [the North Koreans] off the hills, they got down into the paddy and were hiding in the paddy, in the ditches, everywhere sniping and being an infernal nuisance. Then I saw a marvellous sight. An Australian platoon lined up in a paddy field and walked through it as though they were driving snipe. The soldiers, when they saw a pile of straw, kicked it and out would bolt a North Korean. Up with a rifle, down with a North Korean, and the Australians thoroughly enjoyed it! They did that the whole day, and they really were absolutely in their element.<sup>78</sup>

It is noteworthy that this rather unpleasant passage was not written by an Australian (though it is an Australian Official Historian who cites it with evident approval). None of the veterans participating in the current project spoke of their relish for violence or mentioned any criminal tendencies of their own! One occasionally unearthed statements, or fragments of statements, emphasising a certain knock-about larrikinism, a certain indifference to the finer social virtues, but even this is relatively rare. Perhaps we are seeing a bias in our sources for we are after all dealing in many cases with men with a strong sense of self-identification as 'Korean veterans', or men who enjoyed long careers in the Army, or those who fall into both of these categories. Therefore we have a population which lays great stress on such military characteristics as training, professional performance under fire and co-operation with allies, or broader personal characteristics such as standing by one's mates which easily can be related to the military factors.<sup>79</sup> Jane Ross's analysis of the modern Australian soldier (which she interprets as post-Second World War including Korea) asks—then answers—a crucial question:

But does the military of today perhaps still provide an environment wherein the old-style digger virtues may flourish? Today's regular army is self-consciously 'professional'. Professionals feel threatened by the old idea of amateur soldiers being equal to them in fighting prowess; and modern soldiers are at pains to stress the importance of thorough training.<sup>80</sup>

In terms of individuals' motives for enlisting Korea demonstrates continuities and dissimilarities with earlier conflicts. Some factors present in the two great wars are not present because the historical circumstances are completely different. Expressions of fervent nationalism or imperial sentiment are totally lacking in K Force members. However dark was the (potential) nuclear cloud over the world during the Korean War, however dangerous the perceived machinations of the communists, the threat to Australia in 1950 was often seen as distant or as something that the great Powers would have to sort out—possibly through nuclear warfare. In addition, there are factors present in Korea which are not present in the previous conflicts. Most noticeable of these is the desire to advance one's career in the military. The creation of a properly constituted regular army, the advent of a limited war providing the requisite opportunities for practice (and promotion), and the growing sense of a

professional tradition within that army, meant that earlier, more rough hewn, AIF traditions became the stuff of Anzac Day and the fuel for the Anzac legend rather than the inspiration for the modern Australian army.

Yet, this essay has shown that there is considerable continuity in the reasons why Australian men have gone to war, especially in the first half of the twentieth century. A sense of adventure—war, after all, being the 'great' adventure—inspired many to go to Korea as it had inspired many to go to Gallipoli or to the Middle East. This was often mixed with a sense that volunteering for overseas service was if not an obligation or duty in the case of Korea then a privilege which if not taken advantage of might be snatched away by an untimely peace.

This essay commenced with brief passages from the memory narratives of three veterans, illustrating the range of factors which induced a relatively small group of Australians to volunteer for fighting in Korea. Let it conclude with a fictional account of an Australian soldier, though a fictional account based on the recent experiences of its author, a former-member of K Force. Perhaps, this passage sums up well how those men, who had enlisted out of a spirit of adventure, intending in many cases to renew the bonds of group solidarity and institutional esprit de corps they had experienced in the Second World War, felt as the Korean conflict dragged on through Static War and protracted armistice negotiations. This account is written in 1958 and is also an early attempt to justify the war and extract out of it what value one could, themes which must be pursued elsewhere. Two Australian soldiers are speaking, Tom Woods and his mate, 'the tall man'. Woods asks a vital question:

' Why send anyone at all, then?' Woods demanded after thinking it over for a while. ' Why not all sit down and wait for the bloody war to finish? What're you trying to prove?'

'I dunno' the tall man said musingly. 'Perhaps I'm trying to prove along with a few thousand other blokes that the Gooks can be stopped here. And they've got to be, you know'. ...

Aloud he said: 'Yes I can justify my actions to myself—and perhaps to you ...

The missus might go crook, though ... '

'Yeah', Wood said. 'They think different'. He changed the subject abruptly. 'Feel like a beer?'<sup>81</sup>

## Appendix 1: Korean Veterans—Reasons for Service

Name	Reasons for Volunteering
James Shelton	Regular Army officer and had served previous term with BCOF. Enthusiastic to go to Korea as being officer without active service was problem.
Patrick Knowles	Had been with BCOF. Enlisted mainly to get back to Japan and for adventure.
Keith Langdon	Prior BCOF experience. Specifically volunteered for K Force.
Ron Land	Was with BCOF and volunteered for Korea.
Mick Servos	Had served with BCOF. Rejoined specifically for Korea and to defeat communism. Claims all who served in Korea were volunteers.
Edward (Curly) Schunemann	Volunteered specifically for Korea.
Kenneth Ward	Volunteered as member of BCOF. Claims almost 100% of 3 RAR in Japan did volunteer though there was no pressure. Two men declined.
Richard Woodhams	Volunteered specifically for Korea. Was concerned about Communism. Also for adventure.
Reg McCormick	Saw ad. for ex-servicemen so volunteered specifically for Korea.
Thomas Jubb MM	Only served with K Force.
Charles Neil	Twin and he tried to enlist for BCOF at age of 15.. Former succeeded. Volunteered for K Force. Claimed drank, smoked too much.
William Ryan	Was with BCOF—volunteered for Korea.
Alex Bates	Volunteered specifically for K force when volunteers with previous military experience were called for.
H	Volunteered as he had spent five years in Army and had never seen action.
Robert Harley	Volunteered.
George Hutchinson	In Army and volunteered for adventure and travel. Best bunch of mates ever.
Richard Long	Member of the Regulars.
John Bradley	Volunteered specifically for Korea as had missed out on active service in WW2 which many of his friends had experienced.
GS Hill	With BCOF in Japan when he went to Korea.
Stanley Bombell	Chance to regain lost face and see action after WW2 service had denied him this chance.
John Burke	Volunteered specifically for Korea. Anti-Communist, young and adventurous and carefree.
Major-Gen. JC Hughes	New officer and needed career experience.
Ian McDonald	Member of RAN and was drafted to vessel for Korean service.
Dennis Robinson	As regular served wherever he was posted.
Lesley Foote	Volunteered for post-war Korean service, destroying mines etc.
W	Had served with BCOF. Volunteered for K Force after twice failing university exams.
Edward Green	Enlisted when govt asked for volunteers for Korea.
Victor Dey	Took him 2 years to transfer to Korea bound infantry. Brothers and sister in WW2—wanted to do his bit.
Patrick Gilligan	Had been in BCOF. Already in Army.
John Thomas MM	Already in Army—had to serve anywhere.
Maj-Gen RL Hughes	Regular soldier—was posted to Korea.

Charles Cornell Clement Kealy	Joined Army because of credit squeeze (no jobs). Didn't volunteer but did not object when sent as reinforcement. No regrets.
John Godden	Volunteered for Korea then transferred to Regulars.
Allan McInnes	Already in Army.
Norman Glenn	Volunteered for Korea, not a member of BCOF.
Reginald Garrigan	In BCOF. Was required to go to Korea.
Christian Petersen	Just says 'volunteer'.
Roy Freeman	Ex-RAN. Volunteered specifically for K Force.
William Baldwin	In Army—considered it career progression to gain service experience.
John Portener	Signed on with K Force for 2 years.
Jack Blankley	Was with BCOF in Japan.
Victor Lowe	Rejoined Army specifically to go to Korea. Only joined when it was obvious that he would see action.
John Munro	Former alcoholic. Had served with BCOF. K Force volunteer.
Robert Parker	As regular was sent to serve in Korea.
James Geedrick	Had served with BCOF. At time of war was with CMF when govt called for ex-servicemen volunteers. Thought it his duty and did not like Communists.
Angus Campbell	Joined K Force 1950. (Specific volunteer?)
John Martin	Was already in Army and volunteered to go Korea.
Ray McKenzie	Had served with BCOF. Volunteered.
John Lewis	Service at Cowra, BCOF.
Kevin Dutton	Was with BCOF and like every other member of that force had to actually volunteer for Korea. Claims that all volunteered with exception of half-dozen.
Norman Grose	Special enlistment for two years in K Force.
Charles Thwaites	Volunteered.
Phillip Greville	As member of RAN was posted there.
Neil Miller	Officer in Army—professional reasons though had to volunteer like evcrbody else. POW.
William Rowley	Was already member of RAN but volunteered specifically for service in Korea. Adventure probably—that's what he had joined RAN for.
Ronald Smith	Was member of RAN serving with occupation forces.
Ronald Williams	Restless. Travel and adventure, chance to test himself.
Dorus Van Itallie	Already in RAN.
Max Eberle	Volunteered specifically for 2 year penod with K Force.
Peter Balzary	K Force specifically.
Leon Greville	Volunteer for K Force.
Norm Goldspink	Officer in Army—had served in BCOF—operational service essential from career point of view.
	Joined Reg Army to learn plant operating—ended up in infantry.

Keith Eberle Already serving. Chance for adventure in big war. Had to wire parents for permission.

Richard Garrett K Force volunteer—2 years.

Ron Perkins Already in Army. Considered it his duty.

Percy Dale Joined K Force when they needed them not just feeding them. Steady job. Perhaps also glory or excitement.

James Broderick Volunteer for K Force—2 year enlistment.

David Irving Looking for excitement.

Peter Cook Regular Army officer. Posted to Korea.

## Appendix 2: Korean Veterans—Employment Prior to Service in Korea

Name	Employment Prior to Korea Service
James Shelton	Regular Army officer.
Patrick Knowles	Fitter and Turner
Keith Langdon	Bricklayer
Ron Land	Process worker; Army after that.
Mick Servos	Carpenter
Edward (Curly) Schunemann	Farm hand; Labourer; Plant Operator.
Kenneth Ward	Truckdriver; Farm hand.
Richard Woodhams	Farm work; bulldozing; fencing; shearing; wool classing; fencing contractor.
Reg McCormick	Boot/Shoe Factory worker; Fire Brigade.
Thomas Jubb MM	Baker, Station hand, SEC linesman.
Charles Neil	Leading chainman, Vic Lands, Department.
William Ryan	Engine assembler at aircraft factory.
Alex Bates	Stamp battery operator at NT gold mine.
H	-
Robert Harley	Upholsterer
George Hutchinson	Labourer (shift worker), farm hand.
Richard Long	Dental technician.
John Bradley	Medical practitioner.
GS Hill	PMG.
Stanley Bombell	Farmer.
John Burke	Casual labourer. On the water front. Anything else that was going.
Major-Gen. JC Hughes	Newly commissioned regular officer.
Ian McDonald	Victorian Railways lad porter, regular navy.
Dennis Robinson	Regular army.
Lesley Foote	Regular army—prior to that a clerk.
W	Medical student (failed).
Edward Green	Tradesman in glazing, shopfitting, leadlighting.
Victor Dey	Plasterer.
Patrick Gilligan	BCOF.
John Thomas MM	Farm hand and rabbit trapping, NSW Railways, Concord Hospital, Malco Industries (foundry).
Maj-Gen RL Hughes	Soldier.
Charles Cornell	Farm labourer.
Clement Kealy	Boiler maker, timber contractor, dairy farmer.
John Godden	Work for Pool Petroleum.
Allan McInnes	Compositor.
Norman Glenn	Timber worker.
Reginald Garrigan	Builder labourer.
Christian Petersen	Student and labourer.
Roy Freeman	Army staff cadet, then army officer training K Force recruits.
William Baldwin	Department of Main Roads, NSW.
John Portener	Farm worker.
Jack Blankley	Various.
Victor Lowe	Wharf labourer.
John Munro	Motor trimmer-upholsterer, garage hand.
Robert Parker	Pre WW2: Radio Lab Asst. Pre-Korea: PMG Linesman.
James Geedrick	Wandering Australia.
Angus Campbell	Station hand jackeroo.
John Martin	Farm labourer, Vacuum oil company.
Ray McKenzie	Carpenter, railway sleeper cutter, dairy farm, app steel moulder.

John Lewis	Prior to 1949 was a farm worker and a timber cutter. Then joined the army.
Kevin Dutton	Milk vendor.
Norman Grose	Junior cabinet maker, stuffing mattress and pillows, making radiators, prospecting, cleaner and fireman (WAGR).
Charles Thwaites	Merchant navy (seaman).
Phillip Greville	Regular soldier (mainly student)
Neil Miller	Bank officer, merchant seaman.
William Rowley	Garage attendant, aircraft assembler, apprenticeship/ boilermaker tradesman.
Ronald Smith	Oil rig worker (PNG).
Ronald Williams	RAN as Flight Deck SBA.
Dorus Van Itallie	Farmer.
Max Eberle	Leading hand electrician linesman.
Peter Balzary	Customs agent.
Leon Greville	Regular Army officer.
Norm Goldspink	Labourer in vineyards and wheat and sheep farm.
Keith Eberle	Telegram messenger, postman, exchange operator.
Richard Garrett	Farming.
Ron Perkins	35mm projectionist, battery repair worker.
Percy Dale	Telegram delivery, railway porter, labourer on pineapple farm, sand mining.
James Broderick	Carpenter.
David Irving	PMG linesman.
Peter Cook	Regular Army officer.

## Endnotes

1. Questionnaire response, John Burke.
2. Questionnaire response, Stanley Bombell.
3. Questionnaire response, JC Hughes.
4. I have taken my numbers from the Preliminary Nominal Roll though this gives a greater figure for Army personnel in Korea than that given in the Official History which is 10,600. This apparent discrepancy is explained by the fact that the Nominal Roll is not restricted to the period of the war but includes those who served in Korea in the years immediately after the Armistice (1953-1956). Commonwealth Department of Veterans' Affairs, *Preliminary Nominal Roll of Australian Veterans of the Korean War* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1999).
5. Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 282. The Robson study referred to is LL Robson, 'The Origins and Character of the First AIF, 1914-1918: Some Statistical Evidence', *Historical Studies* 15 (October 1973): 737-49, where the sample size is 'only 0.5% of the total enlistment group'.
6. John Barrett, *We Were There: Australian Soldiers of World War II Tell Their Stories* (Ringwood: Penguin, 1987); Mark Johnson, *At the Front Line: Experiences of Australian Soldiers in World War II* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Margaret Barter, *Far Above Battle: The Experience and Memory of Australian Soldiers in War 1939-1945* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994).
7. I have been guided here by Alan Bryman and Duncan Cramer, *Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS for Windows: A Guide for Social Scientists* (London: Routledge, 1997), especially chs 1, 4 and 6.
8. Lloyd Robson, *The First AIF: A Study of its Recruitment 1914-1918* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1982, first published 1970), 23.
9. Bill Gammage, *The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War* (Ringwood: Penguin, 1975, first published 1974), 7.
10. Ibid. 7-11. See also B Ziino, 'Journeys to War: Experiences of Australian Recruits in the Great War', MA thesis, University of Melbourne, 1999.
11. Barrett, *We Were There*, ch 7. 'The Thing To Do', at 154.
12. Robert O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War 1950-1953*, vol I, *Strategy and Diplomacy* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981), 76.
13. Ibid, 77-80.
14. Ibid, ch 3; Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 192-204.
15. Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 204.
16. Robert O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War 1950-1953*, vol II, *Combat Operations* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985), ch 1 for the transfer of 3 RAR to Korea in 1950.
17. There is much confusion in the published sources concerning the dates of the call for volunteers. O'Neill, trusting on a personal communication, states that the Army launched a recruiting campaign on 21 August 1950. Adam-Smith, in an error-ridden passage which has the war start on 25 January 1950, states that the recruiting offices opened their doors on 8 July, almost three weeks before the decision to commit Australian ground troops. Backed by newspaper sources I prefer the description of the recruiting campaign in Lieutenant Colonel Neil C. Smith, *Home by Christmas: With the Australian Army in Korea 1950-1956* (Gardenvale, Victoria: Mostly Unsung, 1990), 10-13. See also O'Neill, *Combat Operations*, 18; Patsy Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War: From Gallipoli to Korea* (Ringwood: Penguin, 1992), 712.
18. Jack Galloway, *The Last Call of the Bugle: The Long Road to Kapyong* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1994), 13.
19. Max Eberle, 'My Korea Service 1950-1951', unpublished manuscript, 1-2. Max Eberle, a veteran of the Borneo campaign of 1945 was Private 2/400124 in 3 RAR and served in Korea until injured late in 1950.
20. Harry Gordon, *The Embarrassing Australian; The Story of an Aboriginal Warrior* (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1962), 143, describing the journey of Captain Reg Saunders to Korea.
21. Olwyn Green, *The Name's Still Charlie* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1993), 253.
22. Eberle, 'My Korea Service', 5. Eberle was one of those who found their first flight (in a QANTAS Skymaster) an exhilarating experience.
23. Green, *The Name's Still Charlie*, 251. This was one day after the Inchon landing. For a similar belief amongst the Canadians that they would miss out on the action see John Melady, *Korea: Canada's Forgotten War* (Toronto: Macmillan Paperbacks Edition, 1988), 47. Eventually the Canadian ground forces went into action in February 1951 when MacArthur's promises of an early finish to the conflict had long been dispelled.
24. Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 196, describes how in 1949 the planned operational brigade—the Royal Australian Regiment—had only 1000 of the 3000 men it needed to be at strength.
25. Gavin Long, *To Benghazi* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1961, reprint with corrections; first published 1952), xi.
26. Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War: Explaining World War I* (London: Allen Lane, 1998), ch. 7.
27. O'Neill, *Combat Operations*, 18.

28. Smith, *Home by Christmas*, 11.
29. Adam-Smith, *Prisoners of War*, 379 facing, has a photograph of a long queue of potential K force members which I take to be Royal Park. For an example of a media stunt involving troops in training enthusiastically slaughtering bags stuffed with straw see Eberle, 'My Korea Service', 2. Another (and later) example may be found in *Cinesound Review* No 1060, 22 February 1952, National Film and Sound Archive (NFSA), Canberra. This is less gory but concentrates on troops in training dashing across creeks and climbing rock faces. In my interpretation of photographic and film evidence I have been guided by John Berger, *About Looking* (London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1980); Alan Trachtenberg, *Reading American Photographs: Images as History. Matthew Brady to Walter Evans* (New York: Noonday Press, 1990), Prologue and ch. 2; Bruce Cumings, *War and Television* (London and New York: Verso, 1992), especially ch 1.
30. *Movietone News*, 21:51 (21 November 1950), NFSA, Canberra.
31. See for example *Movietone News*, A1159, 3 June 1952 (1 RAR leaving Sydney); *Cinesound Review* 1114 (3 June 1953) (farewell parade to 2 RAR in Melbourne); *Movietone News*, A1239, 3 December 1953 (same battalion, this time in Sydney): all in NFSA, Canberra.
32. Questionnaire response, Kenneth Ward.
33. Questionnaire response, Ian McDonald. Also see questionnaire responses from Charles Thwaites and Ronald 'Doc' Williams.
34. Interview with Jack Verdon, 23 August 1996. For two soldiers who thought that 'volunteering' was really a misnomer see questionnaire responses from John Thomas MM and Charles Cornell.
35. Appendix 1: Korean Veterans—Reasons for Service, provides in précis form the reasons for going to Korea provided by 70 respondents to the questionnaire developed for my forthcoming PhD thesis.
36. Gallaway, *The Last Call of the Bugle*, 14.
37. Gordon, *The Embarrassing Australian*, 145-46.
38. Interview with Murray Inwood, 3 August 1996. Also see questionnaire responses from Shelton James, H John Bradley, Stan Bombell and Vic Dey. For the story of Roy Inwood, VC, see Lionel Wigmore in collaboration with Bruce Harding [second edition revised and condensed by Jeff Williams and Anthony Staunton], *They Dared Mightily* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1986), 71-72.
39. Questionnaire response, Vic Dey.
40. Interview with Alec Weaver, 4 August 1996.
41. Questionnaire response, George Hutchinson. Also see questionnaire responses from Patrick Knowles, Richard Woodhams, Charles Neil, Jack Blankley, Neil Miller, Keith Eberle (brother of Max cited above but a regular soldier prior to the war), Percy Dale, David Irving and John Burke. For Dave Irving and Bushy Burke also see newspaper interviews in the *Age*, 15 October 1998. For Irving and Woodhams also see follow-up telephone discussions of 31 January 1999 (Irving) and 9 November 1998 (Woodhams).
42. Questionnaire response, Ronald Smith.
43. The literature on the 'characteristics' of the Australian digger—whether in the First World War or later—is extensive. One of the most useful because it discusses changes in the characteristics over time, and some of the reasons behind these changes, is Jane Ross, *The Myth of the Australian Digger: The Australian Soldier in Two World Wars* (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1985). In an area where surmise and generalisation can easily displace analysis Ross's account is well-balanced. On the continuity of the representation (especially in fiction) of the Australian soldier see Robin Gerster, *Big Noting: The Heroic Theme in Australian War Writing* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1987).
44. CEW Bean, *The AIF in France 1918, Volume VI of the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1942), 5-6.
45. See Peter Burke's discussion of 'schemata' in the transmission of social memories, 'History as Social Memory', in Thomas Butler, ed, *Memory: History, Culture and the Mind* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 97-113, especially 102 ff. Burke is talking about collective or group memory but his treatment of how events or people are represented in terms of other (generally earlier) events or people is illuminating for all aspects of memory representation.
46. Questionnaire responses, James Shelton and H; interview with Mick Everett, 5 December 1996; questionnaire response, James Geedrick.
47. Gallaway, *The Last Call of the Bugle*, 14.
48. A fascinating, often brilliant treatment, of how men in ODC of the 'thirty-niner' battalions (the 2/2nd of the 6th Division) reacted to the 'unnecessary' Aitape-Wewak campaign of 1945 is given in Barter, *Far Above Battle*, 224, 234-35, 242, 254-55. Barter uses the Official History to suggest that the 'uselessness' of this last campaign was a popular sentiment amongst veteran 6th Division members, a sentiment that was not shared by younger, less experienced soldiers on Bougainville and New Britain. Older soldiers also felt that they had done enough. See Gavin Long, *The Final Campaigns* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1963), and for a similar suggestion that 'older soldiers' had had enough of war by 1945, see D Hay, *Nothing Over Us: The Story of the 2/6th Australian Infantry Battalion* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1984).
49. Questionnaire response, Dr John Bradley; telephone discussion, Dr Bradley, 24 April 1997.
50. Questionnaire response, Phillip Greville. Brigadier Greville also completed the section on Australian POWs in Korea for the Official History which also provides some interesting details concerning

- Australian soldiers' attitudes to the political questions of the war. See O'Neill, *Combat Operations*, ch. 23.
51. Questionnaire response, Brigadier Leon Greville, DSO (brother of previous respondent cited, and to complete a family circle, the uncle of Jeffrey Grey).
52. Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 209.
53. Questionnaire response, Phillip Greville.
54. See H-NET Military Discussion List: Subject: US Soldiers' Political Views in Korean War (H-WAR@H-NET.MSU.EDU). The opinion that political references were 'rare' amongst US servicemen in the Korean War derives from Janet Valentine, a PhD candidate at the University of Alabama whose subject is American soldiers' experience of that war.
55. Questionnaire response, Richard Woodhams. Also see follow-up telephone discussion of November 1998 and letter to author of 14 September 1997. For similar statements from other veterans (that they volunteered at least partly to fight communism) see questionnaire responses, Mick Servos, John Burke and Bob Parker.
56. Questionnaire response, Keith Langdon.
57. Questionnaire response, William Ryan.
58. Questionnaire response, John Lewis.
59. Questionnaire response, Dr John Bradley.
60. Alistair Thomson, 'Embattled Manhood: Gender, Memory and the Anzac Legend', in Kate Darian-Smith and Paula Hamilton, eds, *Memory and History in Twentieth Century Australia* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994), 158-73, at 159. A detailed discussion of remembering and forgetting and the Korean War is the subject of ch 6 of my thesis. A full list of relevant sources on memory will be found there.
61. For anti-communism in Australia in the early 1950s the chief sources have been John Murphy, *Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), ch 3; David Lowe, 'Menzies and the Great World Struggle': Australia's Cold War 1948-1954 (Sydney, UNSW Press, 1990), esp ch 2; Leicester Webb, *Communism and Democracy in Australia: A Survey of the 1951 Referendum* (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1954); Stephen Alomes, Mark Dober and Donna Hellier, 'The Social Context of Postwar Conservatism', in Ann Curthoys and John Merritt, eds, *Australia's First Cold War 1945-1953* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 1-28; Frank Cain and Frank Farrell, 'Menzies' War on the Communist Party, 1949-1951', in the same collection, 109-34; David Lee, *Search for Security: the Political Economy of Australia's Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995), ch 4.
62. Robert Menzies speaking to the Communist Party Dissolution Bill in October 1950, cited in Lowe, *Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle'*, 67.
63. Interview with Murray Inwood, 3 August 1996.
- \*\* Interview with Alec Weaver, 4 August 1996 \* Geoffrey Bolton. '1939-1951', in Frank Crowley, ed. *A New History of Australia* (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1974), 496; Lee, *Search for Security*, 142. Also see Bruce McFailanc, 'Australian Postwar Economic Policy, 1947-1953', in Curthoys and Merrill, eds, *Australia's First Cold War*, 29-45
66. Lee, *Search for Security*, 142.
67. Ibid, 'NSC-68 and the beginning of hostilities in Korea had a spectacular effect on the Australian economy'. NSC-68 (National Security Council Report No 68) of 7 April 1950 called for a massive increase in American defence spending in order to contain Communism. Accompanying this were changes in American economic policy whereby the United States purchased an increased amount of goods from 'friendly' nations.
68. WJ Hudson, '1951 -1972', in Crowley, ed, *A New History of Australia*, 507.
69. RG Menzies, *The Measure of the Years*, 98.
70. M. Keating, *The Australian Workforce, 1910-11 to 1960-1961* (Canberra: ANU, 1973), 377. Keating's figures may differ slightly from official statistics of the period as he has attempted to correct some distortions in data from the two Workforce Series but the fluctuation (or lack of it) in the figures is common to all authorities. The comparative figure for 1938-1939, just before the Second World War, is for males 13.8% reducing to 1.7% by 1943-1944. These figures are for employees only.
71. Bolton, '1939-1951', 479.
72. Questionnaire responses, Charles Cornell, Percy Dale and James Geedrick.
73. For the thirty-niners as economic conscripts see Peter Charlton, *The Thirty-Niners* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1981). For Grey's shrewd comments on the difficulties associated with interpreting the enlistment data of the 6th Division, see *A Military History of Australia*, 142-43.
74. See Appendix 2: Korean Veterans—Employment Prior to Service in Korea.
75. For example see Eberle, 'My Korea Service', 2.
76. Eric Linklater, *A Year of Space, A Chapter in Autobiography* (London; Reprint Society, 1954, first published 1953), 135; Reginald Thompson, *Cry Korea* (London: Macdonald, 1952, first published 1951), 164,177. Linklater, a popular writer of the period, was in Korea on a semi-official capacity. Thompson was a highly experienced war journalist whose writings on Korea are among the most compassionate of Western journalists.
77. Interview with Alec Weaver, 4 August 1996.
78. Bartlett, *With the Australians in Korea*, 31. The commentator here was no less a figure than Brigadier Basil Coad who commanded the 27th Commonwealth Brigade to which 3 RAR belonged.

79. I owe this characterisation of veterans who identify themselves strongly as such to Rachel Jenzen whose forthcoming MA thesis (University of Melbourne) on US Marines' memories of Australia in the Second World War has influenced significant parts of this study. Until the MA is completed see Rachel Jenzen, "'Over-Sexed, Over-Paid and Over here"? Cross Cultural Memories of the American Presence in Wartime Victoria', in Martin Crotty and Doug Scobie, eds, *Raiding Clio's Closet: Postgraduate Presentations in History 1997* (Melbourne: University of Melbourne History Department, 1997), 185-93.

80. Ross, *The Myth of the Digger*, 203.

81. AM Harris, *The Tall Man* (London: Cassell, 1958). Harris wrote another novel set in the Korean War, *Grains of Sand* (Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1968). His first novel, under its original title *No Flowering Road*, won a literary prize offered by the *Sydney Morning Herald* though its author afterwards pursued a business career with Myer Stores. Both novels are highly sympathetic to the plight of the Korean citizenry caught up in a murderous war. The Nominal Roll and O'Neill supply details for AM Harris, MM, one of whose trips with Korean agents into enemy held territory in the last months of the war is graphically described by O'Neill. See O'Neill, *Combat Operations*, 272, 645.