

**THE KOREAN WAR 1950-53:
A 50 YEAR RETROSPECTIVE**

**FROM KOJE TO KOSOVO:
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CANADIAN NATIONAL COMMAND
ELEMENT**

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The Koje Island prison riots were one of the great military cockups of the Korean War, a war which in general provided a rich source of military cockups. The American leadership of United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea sought to turn the stigma of the Koje Island disaster from an American cockup into a United Nations cockup. The involvement of Canadian troops in this process forced Canadian national command arrangements on combined operations to adopt a form which has endured and expanded with the increase in number and complexity of post-Cold War peace operations.

Canada has never taken military leadership as a nation. As part of the French, then British, then arguably American empires, Canada has historically provided forces to be commanded by others in what today are called combined or multinational operations. When French Canada was attacked in the Seven Years' War, it was the French Empire that defended its property against the British Empire. When the Fenians invaded in the 1860s, it was the British Empire defending its own. If tomorrow the armies of Absurdistan attacked Canada, chapter VIII of the North Atlantic Treaty would make the very defence of Canadian soil a NATO task, calling upon traditional Canadian allies such as Hungary and Italy.

As a result of this history, the Canadian armed forces have always been structured to generate forces and place them under the command of others. Even when Canadian soldiers were commanded by Canadian generals, whether in Northwest Europe 1945 or Rwanda in 1994, the Canadian generals worked for bosses like Bernard Law Montgomery and Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

This is not to say, however, that Canadian governments have been willing to give Imperial or UN commanders *carte blanche* to dispose their Canadian troops. The experience of the South African War demonstrated to Canada that the Dominion was not wise to entrust its young men and, perhaps more important, its expenditure on them, to the British Army. As such, when Canada contributed to the British Empire's efforts in the First World War, it was with carefully constructed reservations.

The Canadian contingents sent to Europe from 1914 through 1918 were given to British generals on terms that current NATO doctrine calls 'operational control' (OPCON) defined as:

The authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location, to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.¹

Canadians sent to Europe became discreet formations of the British Empire's army from an operational point of view; but administered, paid, equipped and supplied by Ottawa. They were only to be deployed as a group, first as a division, then a corps, though one regiment, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) was initially deployed within a British brigade. Significantly, Colonel (later Major General) John Carson, a representative of the Canadian Minister of Militia, was sent to London to administer national support and provide what today is called national command. Later, after the dismissal of Sir Sam Hughes as Minister of Militia, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, Sir George Perley, was made a member of the Canadian cabinet with responsibility for overseas forces (Minister for Overseas Military Forces of Canada or more usually 'Overseas Minister').²

Thus, while operational control of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) was vested in British corps and army commanders, command remained vested in the Canadian Governor-in-Council, via the Overseas Minister.³ While at first the administration of the CEF might appear not to relate to operational matters, it must be kept in mind that the top Canadian in London was responsible for training the CEF; as well as for appointing officers to CEF commands on the Continent. After March, 1917, the Imperial War Cabinet included the Canadian Prime Minister, giving the CEF much more the appearance of an allied nation rather than a colony. Also in 1917 a Canadian officer was promoted to command the Canadian Corps. Thus the senior Canadian officer in theatre commanded Canadian forces in theatre. The picture is very much one of a Canadian formation which in modern NATO-speak was under OPCON to a British field army.

During the Second World War, speaking very roughly, Canadian forces were under a similar arrangement. Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London was the administrative link to Ottawa, while Canadian forces deployed were kept together in Canadian formations under what we now call operational control of British generals. The concept of command and control of a multinational alliance was that 'Canadian Forces serving with the British army had the right, as a last resort, to refer any matter concerning them to the Canadian Government'.⁴ Stephen Hart emphasises that 'Although [General Harry] Crerar strove to establish in principle the constitutional relationship between the British and Canadian armies, he did not believe that this principle would actually be required'.⁵

During the Second World War, Canadian troops were kept together but their theoretical right of referral to Ottawa was kept theoretical. Crerar cited the principle when appealing not to Ottawa but to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London: it was a bargepole which Crerar could use to keep Montgomery away when convenient.

This appears to have been the guiding principle which took Canada into the Cold War. Canadian forces had been committed fully in the Second World War with a general proviso that Canadian formations remain together and with only a theoretical right of referral to Ottawa. Just so, the Canadian contribution to UN operations in Korea was initially made in the tradition of commitment to a grand alliance. Canadian soldiers committed to Europe would be commanded by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and Canadian soldiers committed to Korea would be commanded by UNC.

It was demonstrated early in the Cold War that Canadian participation could not be taken for granted. When the British and American air forces were stretched to the limit by the 1949 Berlin airlift, they requested Canadian aircrew to provide personnel depth for the operation. Canadian Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent was disinclined to provide individual Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) personnel to the Royal Air Force (RAF), since like his predecessor Mackenzie King he thought it implied a subordinate role for Canada within the Commonwealth. While Australian honour and independence seemed to survive 6000 Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) flight hours running the blockade, Canada temporised until the blockade ended.⁶ This was mirrored years later when the Canadian Army opted out of the 1990-91 Gulf War by offering up horrific casualty estimates until the idea of sending land forces was dropped.⁷

In 1951, General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe, asked for a clear statement from the Canadian government as to whether he had 'the authority to order the troops under his command into action without reference to national governments'. 'He has in mind, for example', said Canadian Minister for External Affairs Lester 'Mike' Pearson, 'a situation where Danish troops might be attacked and he would wish to order the Canadian brigade into action'. Pearson thought that Eisenhower *did* have the authority, but very carefully left the question unanswered.⁸

Similarly, the RCAF official historian describes the command of 1st Canadian Air Division in 1953 vaguely: 'operational control is vested in the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) ... commanded by a US officer ... However, the direction of the Canadian Air Division is almost entirely a Canadian affair, because Fourth ATAF is mainly concerned in promoting effective

co-operation and ... assumes full operational command only in an emergency'.⁹ The RCAF contribution to NATO is described in terms which emphasize its independence; while acknowledging that when push came to shove, this independence would become no more than a matter of NATO theology.

The physicist Schrödinger posed a thought experiment in which a cat in a box might or might not be killed by a quantum event, but until the box was opened the cat was neither alive nor dead. Like the unfortunate cat, the right of referral might or might not have been in the box, but it was a box which everybody found it convenient to leave shut.

Korea

Commonwealth Division was in a command relationship with Eighth US Army which only a few years later NATO would call OPCON. Major General (later Field Marshal Sir) James Cassels, GOC 1 Commonwealth Division, was told:

You will carry out loyally any orders issued by [Head of the United Nations Unified Command, Korea] or by any American Commander subordinate to him under whose command you have been placed ...

Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Occupation Force [BCOF Tokyo] will act as Theatre Commander for the purpose of non-operational control and general administration of the United Kingdom, Australian and New Zealand Army and Air Force and Canadian and Indian Army Forces which have been or may be made available to the United Nations for operations in Korea.¹⁰

So although the term 'command' is used, the second phrase makes it clear that this is a statement of operational control.

This British directive set forth a chain of referral through CinC BCOF (later BCOF/BCFK, still later BCFK [British Commonwealth Forces Korea]) Tokyo (Lieutenant General William Bridgeford of Australia) to the Head of UNC Korea. This chain of referral reported to, among other places, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), Ottawa, via the Canadian Military Mission (CMM) Tokyo. This referral chain was to be used before an order which General Cassels found 'not to accord with the object of the United Nations operations in Korea'. If an order from the Americans would 'imperil the safety of the Commonwealth troops under your Command, to a degree exceptional in war', then Cassels could report through this chain *after* executing the order.

In Canadian terms, this directive considered the Dominion and Indian contributions to be part of an Imperial force rather than a force contributed by a group of equal UN member states. It is not surprising, in view of Canadian reluctance to be so considered,¹¹ that when a referral was made, it did not follow this chain.

Notwithstanding the British instructions to Cassels, the Canadian forces' administrative chain went from General Bridgeford (via CMM in Tokyo) to the Canadian COSC in Ottawa and thence to Canadian forces deployed.¹² This reflects the likely path of administrative requirements which, if they could not be met by Commonwealth resources in theatre, would be met from Canada rather than from London or Canberra. The instructions to the first brigadier of 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (25 CIBG) made it clear that he (and not the brigadier at CMM in Tokyo) was national commander of the Canadian contingent in Korea, and that he had unlimited right of referral directly to Ottawa.¹³

Issues of Canadian command in the context of UN control arose before 25 CIBG was fully deployed to theatre. When 2nd Battalion, PPCLI, deployed to Korea, Ottawa held back the rest of 25 Brigade, hoping it could be used to requite Canada's obligation to NATO.¹⁴ Lieutenant General Walton Walker, Commander Eighth US Army, planned to move 2 PPCLI rather briskly into 29 British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade (29 BCIB) reserve near Seoul.

The Patricia CO reported at the time that on explaining to Walker that 2 PPCLI required eight weeks' training before moving into a forward area, he was favourably surprised by General Walker's 'gracious' acquiescence.¹⁵ The cat had been kept in the box; but after the Koje Island contretemps a different spin was put on this non-incident.

When the rest of 25 CIBG arrived in theatre, in May 1951, the next but one Commander of Eighth US Army, General James van Fleet, wanted the Canadians to relieve a US infantry regiment near Suwon. The battle diary of 25 CIBG makes it clear that this was conducted in a straightforward manner: a warning order was received, the assignment accepted, and a reconnaissance group (R Gp) was conducted including Brigadier John 'Rocky' Rockingham then in command of 25 CIBG and General van Fleet. Again, no referral was made to Ottawa, but again the story of the incident changed after the deployment of Canadians to Koje.¹⁶

Koje

The American-run UNC prisoner-of-war (POW) camp at Koje Island, South Korea, went from American control over to North Korean control early in 1952. The Canadian involvement in this incident caused Ottawa to open the box rather violently to demonstrate that Canadian forces were indeed commanded from Canada and not from London, Washington, New York or Tokyo. A thorough analysis of the Canadian involvement has been made by Professor David Bercuson of the University of Calgary; initially presented at Kingston, Ontario, in 1993 as a case study in alliance friction.

Koje Island, Koje-do in Korean, is a large, rocky island off the coast of South Korea near Pusan. A POW camp designed to hold 38,400 was opened there shortly after the Chinese entry into the war,¹⁷ and by the end of 1951 it housed over 130,000 Koreans and 20,000 Chinese in compounds of 5000 or more prisoners each.¹⁸ The guard force consisted of 9000 US and South Korean troops, only 60 per cent of the number requested by the camp's parent organisation, US 2 Logistical Command. General Farrar-Hockley notes in the British official history that UN prisoners in North Korea were each guarded by two guards; whereas on Koje Island there were forty-eight prisoners to each guard.¹⁹

As Pyongyang gained control of the compound by infiltrating cadres and communications equipment, the US proved unable to resist. On 18 February 1952 a battalion of infantry suffered one killed and 38 injured by POW action, replying by opening fire and causing 200 POW casualties.²⁰ The British official history of the Korean War details the story of the capture of US Brigadier General Dodd by inmates of Koje-do Compound 76.²¹ The result was that the loss of control of this enemy POW camp was a well-publicised failure of American forces in Korea. General Mark W Clark, Supreme Commander of UN forces, called the incident 'the biggest flap of the whole war'.²²

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) suggested that General Clark consider making the American failure to control Koje Island into an international failure by 'employing representative proportion of UN Forces along with United States in this capacity. Having forces from other UN countries share this responsibility has definite political advantages ...'.²³ Since the guard force on Koje was already under strength, this employment would be in the nature of augmentation rather than replacement.

Clark took up this suggestion and sent the Netherlands Battalion, a Greek company and two British Commonwealth companies to Koje Island. General Bridgeford tasked Commonwealth Division, which told two infantry brigades (28 British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade [28 BCIB] and 25 CIBG) each to find a company to help restore order on Koje. One was B Company, 1st Battalion, King's Own Shropshire Light Infantry. The other one was B Company, 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (1RCR).²⁴

The command and control relationships which transmitted this order were similar to what one might have found in the Second World War, but writ smaller. The RCR were under command of Canadian 25 Brigade. The brigade was under OPCON of 1 British Commonwealth Division.

Commonwealth Division was, as discussed above, under OPCON to US I Corps, which was under command of Eighth US Army. Small national units and sub-units in Korea were supplied and equipped by the US. Moving Dutchmen or Greeks from one US formation to another was unremarkable from the point of view of command or administration. Brigadier Taylor at 28 BCIB does not seem to have been concerned with this tasking either.

The order was glaringly inappropriate from a Canadian point of view. Since the First World War, the principle had been maintained: Canadian formations were not broken up. Canadian units fought under Canadian command. Brigadier Pat Bogert's predecessor as Brigadier 25 CIBG, Brigadier Rockingham, had had instructions which recognised that groupings and taskings were a matter for operational command, but told him to preserve the Canadian entity of the brigade.²⁵ This was not exceptional nationalism: Americans operated along similar principles. Nor is it purely a matter of national pride or mistrust of imperial commanders: resupply and reinforcement become very difficult for a unit or subunit operating with foreign forces. Below a certain level of command (generally division or brigade), national forces were supposed to stay together.

Brigadier Bogert, commanding 25 CIBG, signalled Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, the Canadian Chief of General Staff (CGS) at 15:20 Ottawa time on 22 May (GMT -5 or NATO time zone Romeo; Korea is in GMT +9 or NATO time zone India, where it was 05:20I on 23 May). Bogert's message told the CGS that "on instruction comwel div and by request UN command" he had ordered 'B' Company of the 1st RCR to Koje Island'.²⁶ Brigadier Bogert does not appear to have referred the matter through 1 Commonwealth Division to General Bridgeford in parallel. The company entrained less than six hours later, at about 11:00 hours Korean time.²⁷

On the same day in Tokyo, an American UNC liaison officer spoke with Brigadier AB Connelly, Commander, Canadian Military Mission, Far East, 'to inform him of what Clark had planned and to see if he had any objections'. Connelly later claimed that he thought he should consult Ottawa, but was told that 'the UN Command hoped it would not be necessary to consult governments'. Since Connelly believed that Canada's forces in Korea were 'at the disposal of the Unified Command ... [to] go wherever they were sent', he did not insist on a delay to give him time to consult Ottawa. He did, however, indicate that he 'wanted the matter referred to [Brigadier, 25 CIBG,] Bogert'.²⁸ The chain of referral through Commonwealth Division to General Bridgeford in Tokyo appears to have been ignored again.

Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes, the Chairman of the COSC, did not, according to Bercuson, think there was anything that could be done about the order: 'no objection could be made to this order on military grounds'.²⁹ Foulkes does not seem to have divined the subtle purpose of the American chiefs of staff in suggesting to Clark that he 'internationalise' the Koje problem. Foulkes later spoke with Chairman of the US JCS, General of the Army Omar Bradley, and came away convinced that Clark had dispatched the non-Americans on his own hook.³⁰

At the next level up from General Foulkes, the Minister of National Defence was not so phlegmatic. Nor was the Prime Minister, nor was the Government's *eminence grise*, Clerk of the Privy Council Jack Pickersgill. Perhaps the top men, Defence Minister Claxton, Prime Minister St-Laurent and the powerful Pickersgill, saw through the American dodge. Bercuson concludes that growing uneasiness with American conduct of the war made defence minister Claxton and foreign minister Pearson uneasy with the idea of being too closely connected with what promised to be a messy American failure. Devoid of Foulkes' soldierly 'wilco' attitude, Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent telephoned his ambassador in Washington and told him to blackmail the Americans: unless the order to Baker Coy 1 RCR was countermanded, 'it would be more difficult to have our people agree to any additional contribution that may be required of them in Korea'.³¹

The North Koreans had gone to a great deal of trouble to get their cadres on to Koje Island. The Canadian Government went to a lot of trouble to get Baker Coy off. The Canadian Government argued first that the order to the non-American units was political; and therefore

should have been cleared through the Canadian political authorities. The second argument was that the Canadian brigade should not have been broken up. The Americans realised that the second reason was bogus: they taunted the Canadians by suggesting that all of 25 Brigade could be sent to Kojé.³²

In the aftermath of the incident, Brigadier AB Connelly, Ottawa's man in Tokyo, was not only sent home and forcibly retired, General Simonds took care to rubbish him to at least one prospective civilian employer.³³ General Bridgeford's directive 'was amended to require explicit consultation with national governments in regard to the employment of their forces'.³⁴ Jeffrey Grey notes that the problem might easily have been averted had the Canadians been more forthcoming with staff officers to serve at BCFK.³⁵

Major EL Cohen's Baker Coy 1RCR marched into the Kojé Island POW camp as ordered by their operational chain of command. The soldiers wore red berets, their cap badges sported big stars, and they sang a Communist marching song, earning them applause from the Communist POWs.³⁶ It was certainly in the interests of the POWs to show that as soon as the Americans were replaced things went back to normal, and the disturbances on Kojé Island ceased directly. Quiet diplomacy through the US State Department did not get Baker Coy off the island, nor did a formal diplomatic note, both delivered in Washington and read out in the Canadian House of Commons. After completing the intended period of service at the prison camp, on 14 July, Baker Coy marched away.

With the Kojé Island contretemps in mind, earlier interfaces with non-Canadian higher headquarters were rewritten. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Stone, CO 2PPCLI, recalled his 'gracious' interaction with General Walker as a confrontation between Walker and the Stone:

[Stone] knew that, with the memory of alleged unpreparedness at Hong Kong in 1941 still fresh in Canadian minds, the Government meant him to resist any pressure that would put his half-trained battalion into action in time to participate in a disaster. Since verbal explanation had not succeeded, he produced his instructions. The Army Commander [Walker] at once agreed to allow the Canadian battalion to proceed with the eight weeks training [the Patricia CO] considered necessary.³⁷

Brigadier Rockingham's straightforward R Gp with General van Fleet before relieving 65/3 US Infantry Division was depicted differently, post-Kojé:

Brigadier Rockingham protested the order, on the ground that his troops would not have sufficient time to prepare for action. Throughout the night, the Chiefs of Staff at [I US] Corps and [Eighth US] Army continued to repeat the order, which the Brigadier continued to protest, suggesting at one stage that he was prepared to be relieved of his command rather than commit his troops before they were ready. Although he did not resort to his direct channel to the CGS on this occasion, he very nearly did so.³⁸

In both cases, Bercuson is inclined to accept the less-confrontational contemporary battle diary accounts of these incidents over the later reminiscences. Even if one suggests that, on the contrary, battle diarists self-censored the confrontational elements out of the on-the-spot accounts; and that later accounts in the participants' interviews with the Canadian official historian were therefore more accurate; one can see the difference in the way these tales were spun by the participants before and after the Kojé Island contretemps.

The Canadian government had been able to finesse the question of national command for forty years. When an unpopular incident in an unpopular war threatened to make the Government unpopular, Dr Schrödinger's cat had to be taken out of the box and well and truly slaughtered. Clear lines of national command would be drawn to future Canadian deployments.

UN Operations After Koje

The experience of Korea demonstrated to Canadian authorities that in order for OPCON to represent credible terms on which to offer small formations to combined command, full command including not only the right of referral, but responsibility for discipline, administration and logistics, had to be clear.

In the squeaky-clean halls of NATO, the relationship between Canada's contribution and both their operationally controlling headquarters and their national command authority was clear. Canadian Forces Europe and its pre-unification avatars were commanded by a Lieutenant General who exercised national full command of Canadians deployed under OPCON to British and American formations. The air and naval elements provided to the Coalition forces in the 1990-91 Gulf War also had the advantage of a clear national command link through the Canadian commodore in theatre, to respective Canadian Forces (CF) Air and Maritime commands. United Nations operations, on the other hand, have always been prepared ad hoc.

Margaret Cecchine Harrell and Robert Howe have published a very concise description of the difficulties of command and control engendered by the conflicting concepts of UN and national control of contingents deployed on UN operations.³⁹ They identify in particular the pathology that the more requirement there is for rapid response of contingents to the military orders of the UN force commander, the more likely it is that national contingent commanders will make time-consuming reference to national authorities at home. Cecchine Harrell and Howe refer to this as a dual chain of command: one formal chain going through the UN commander, and one informal chain going to national authority. In the Canadian case, the chain of national command has, since Koje, been both a formal chain, and one which Ottawa expects commanders to use.

The first Chapter VI non-observer peace operation was established four years after the Koje Island riots. In the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF, later UNEF I), each contingent was under its own national commander. 'The commander of each unit is militarily subordinate to the commander-in-chief [of UNEF], but is permitted to communicate with his government on questions concerning the contingent'.⁴⁰ Once again, we are seeing a relationship to the mission currently described by NATO as OPCON.

The Canadian Contingent commander was given a direct line of command to Ottawa. It is noteworthy that the national contingent commander appears not to have been Major-General Tommy Burns, commander-in-chief of UNEF and senior Canadian officer in theatre, but Colonel Don Rochester, the commander of the Canadian contingent (and a veteran of the operations in Korea). The UN owned Burns (who was serving at the time as COS United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, Palestine (UNTSO), but the Canadian Army owned Rochester, and only loaned him and his troops to Burns.

This changed with later peacekeeping missions. The accepted practice was to 'doublehat' the senior Canadian officer in theatre as commander of the Canadian contingent. In larger deployments such as the Canadian logistics element CANLOG of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights (UNDOF) or battalion deployments to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) the senior Canadian officer was a unit commander, sufficiently resourced and staffed to function as the link to Ottawa. In smaller deployments, such as the air transport element of the United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM), the senior commander of a transport aircraft was little troubled to act both as aircraft commander and contingent commander.

Problems have, however, arisen when Canadian officers have been appointed to senior posts on UN operations:

Canadian desires and reputation often result in that being a very senior officer, indeed typically a chief of staff, deputy force commander or even a force commander. This often results in an almost impossible situation, most unfair at once to the Canadian troops, the Canadian senior officer and to the UN. We have seen a COS UNPROFOR [Chief of Staff, UN Protection Force, Major-General Lewis Mackenzie] trapped under artillery fire while NDHQ [National Defence Headquarters] was demanding reports of the status of Canadian deployments, and we have seen a Force Commander UNAMIR [UN Mission in Rwanda: Major-General Romeo Dallaire] hunting about in Africa for the French force commander while NDHQ sought his authority to return a C-130 to Canada.⁴¹

Since unification of the Canadian Forces in 1968, national command of Canadian forces on UN operations has been vested in the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff. The National Defence Operations Centre (NDOC) at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) directly commanded Canadian contingents through the double-hatted senior Canadian officer.⁴²

Post-Cold War UN Operations

As UN missions evolved into a different form with UNPROFOR, the theoretical right of referral began to be a factor as it had not been before.

All of the principal troop contributors in the former Yugoslavia, including the United Kingdom, France, Spain and the Nordic countries, have on occasion either refused (or imposed their own conditions on) orders issued by the Force commander. While this practice is hardly unique to the history of peacekeeping, its effects in the unique circumstances of Yugoslavia have made the exercise of full operational control by the Force Commander impossible.⁴³

In UNPROFOR and UNAMIR Canadian national command arrangements were better suited to the more leisurely requirements of UNEF and UNFICYP rather than the more rapid tempo of decision-making required by post-Cold War UN operations. As well, the nature of the deployment to UNPROFOR, with two battalion-sized combat-arms units deployed independently with a single service battalion, was less easy for General Mackenzie, COS UNPROFOR, to 'command' as a Canadian contingent. This 'kluge' means of command meant that national command was provided by Canadian NDOC, OPCON by the UN force commander, but operational command by nobody.⁴⁴

In general consistent doctrine is meant to make command and control easier. The Canadian contribution to NATO land forces was configured as a brigade group, with its structure of command and control and its scale of personnel and equipment clearly defined by doctrine.

With UNPROFOR and the NATO Implementation Force/Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR), however, Canadian units deployed at variance from doctrine. Unlike Cold War-Era deployments, which sent formed units with the equipment they were doctrinally expected to have and to use, the Canadian contribution to UNPROFOR and its successors was always equipped and trained *ad hoc*.⁴⁵ Notably, many units and subunits which were doctrinally equipped with tracked vehicles have been 'lightened' with more-transportable wheeled vehicles for deployment in UNPROFOR and IFOR/SFOR. Contrariwise, the Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed to Somalia in 1993 after rapid re-rolling from light infantry to wheeled mechanised infantry. *Ad hoc* equipment and organisation taxes already-weak[ened] national command capability.

Deployments in Bosnia were over much greater areas than envisioned by the developers of doctrine. The Canadian battle group's area of responsibility (AOR) in SFOR is roughly 10,000 km², which under NATO doctrine is a division-sized area. The same was observed by Canadian deployments on UNPROFOR.⁴⁶ Again, the counterdoctrinal nature of post-Cold War UN operations taxes national command capabilities.

These strains on traditional means of national command led to the development of the National Command Element (NCE) as a means of staffing and resourcing support for an officer whose primary responsibility was acting as national commander of the Canadian contingent.

The Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group deployed as part of the Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNTAF) in OP FORWARD ACTION, 1992. For this operation the Canadian government first deployed an NCE under Colonel Serge Labbé to provide and staff a command link between the Canadian forces deployed under operational control of UNTAF and the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff in Ottawa.⁴⁷ It is ironic that, like Brigadier Connelly in Tokyo, Colonel Labbé was a convenient scapegoat for national authorities when the operation experienced difficulties. Colonel Labbé's once-imminent promotion to Brigadier-General has been postponed indefinitely, and he has been exiled to NATO Staff College in Rome.

A similar cell was set up to command the elements of 5ème Group-brigade mécanisée Canadien (5eme GBMC) deployed to Haiti in 1993. The deployment of a signals company to UNAMIR in 1994 was, on the other hand, not provided with an NCE, probably because of its apparently manageable size.⁴⁸

OP KINETIC, the Canadian contribution to Kosovo in 1999-2000, was a NATO deployment made after the folding-up of Canadian Forces Europe. Colonel Michael Ward was national commander of the Canadian contingent on deployment, supported by a National Command Element in Skopje, Macedonia, which deployed alongside a National Support Element and a two-person National Intelligence Element.⁴⁹ The last was required in order to sustain American-British-Canadian intelligence links insulated from NATO's KFOR intelligence network which included less-trusted nations. The deployment of a fully-staffed NCE provided sufficient command and control capability for the Canadian contingent to retain its engineer capability under national command. The rest of the Canadian contingent was OPCON to KFOR Multinational Brigade (Centre).

Limited War: Limited Control

Total war subordinated other considerations to the requirements of victory. When fighting total war it was possible to keep the cat in the box. Multinational operations in total war did show alliance friction, but it was generally managed without direct referral to national capitals.

The founders of the United Nations envisioned standing UN forces given without reservation by member nations to full command of the UN Military Staff Committee. Lester Pearson viewed this as a realistic goal, and through the early years of the Korean War saw Canadian contribution to UNC as the beginning of an era in which the means of war were put beyond the reach of mere national governments. As he became disenchanted with UN command exercised by people like Douglas MacArthur, and in missions called 'OP KILLER', it became clear to him that the Utopian vision of supranational control of armed forces had given way to just another set of imperial obligations.

As conscious limitation was imposed on military operations after 1945, the varying goals of nations with respect to collective security and collective defence made it impossible to expect overarching goals to unite national contingents on the battlefield. While the expedient of standard OPCON was developed to enable national contingents to coexist for the purpose of executing operations, it did not replace the requirement of a nation to exercise national command over its own armed forces.

The United States has met this requirement by insisting that its forces remain directly under US command and control. For a nation like Canada, with a maximum deployment in peacetime of no more than a brigade group, this is not an option. Like other small nations, Canada's forces are generated at home for deployment under others' command; and other means have had to be found to ensure national command.

The Kojé Island assignment was an American attempt to spread the blame for a job poorly done. Sending Baker Company 1RCR to Kojé did not unacceptably endanger nor even inconvenience Canadians compared with the alternative of remaining in brigade reserve. The conflict arose from considerations in Ottawa, not from considerations in theatre. The contretemps served, however, as an opportunity for Ottawa to put its foot down: to demonstrate that Canada directly exercised national command over its soldiers; and that operational control was no more than a very limited loan of troops to multinational command.

Canada had bought its freedom within the Empire by lavish and relatively uncritical expenditure of blood in 1914-18. It had confirmed its national independence by insisting on participating in the Second World War on its own terms. Canada could not accept relegation to the role of imperial subordinate in Korea, and thus had to flex its tiny sovereign muscles over the petty issue of guarding Kojé Island. The UN was a community of member states, said Canada, and whatever the arrangements were for the World Wars, and however subject Canada was to American and British bullying over contributions to NATO, Canada would retain national command over her soldiers.

When Mike Pearson proposed and Tommy Burns disposed the first UN peacekeeping force in Egypt, the command and control arrangements were shaped by the requirement to keep national forces under national command. The romantic vision of unreserved contribution to UN standing forces had been eliminated in no small part by the Korean War. The resulting structure of UN operations, and especially of Canadian participation in UN operations, has developed in response to the realities of the interests of contributing nations, so clearly demonstrated by Pat Bogert's response to the order to send his people to Kojé in 1952.

Endnotes

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6. James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, vol 3, *Growing Up Allied* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 50-51.
7. Sean M Maloney, *War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993* (Toronto: New York: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd, 1997).
8. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Defence Liaison Division memorandum, 'SHAPE'S Authority to Order Troops into Action', 20 December 1951, DEA file 50030-ab-40, quoted in Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, 213.
9. DJ Goodspeed, ed, *The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967: A Century of Achievement* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), 223; cited in Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, 222.
10. Anthony Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War*, vol II, *An Honourable Discharge* (London: HMSO, 1995), 441.
11. See, *inter alia*, Jeffrey Grey, *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). 92-3.
12. David Bercuson, 'Kojé-do and the Canadian Army: A Case History in Alliance Friction', unpublished paper read at Kingston, Ontario, 1993, unpaginated. An abridged version of this paper appears in Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 199-205.
13. Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills*, 81.
14. Lester Pearson hoped that the Canadian Army Special Force raised for Korea would not only become Canada's contribution to NATO, but would eventually serve as part of a standing UN force. George Egerton, 'Lester B Pearson and the Korean War: Dilemmas of Collective Security and International Enforcement in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1950-53', *International Peacekeeping* 4:1 (Spring, 1997), 55.
15. Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills*, 68-70.
16. Ibid, 116-18.

17. William Roskey, 'Koje Island: The 1952 Korean Hostage Crisis', Land Warfare Paper No 19 (Arlington, VA: US Army Institute of Land Warfare, 1994), 1.
18. Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), 192.
19. Farrar-Hockley, *An Honourable Discharge*, 283n.
20. Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 192.
21. Farrar-Hockley, *An Honourable Discharge*, 286-87. The hostage-taking is also described in Roskey, 'Koje Island', and in Hal Vetter's colourful *Mutiny on Koje Island* (Rutland, VT: Charles E Tuttle Company, 1965).
22. Cited from Clark's memoirs in, *inter alia*, Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 191.
23. Farrar-Hockley, *An Honourable Discharge*, 288, citing *Foreign Relations of the United States* (1984) XV: 210. That this tactic was at least partly successful is shown by Vetter's clear description of the incident as a UN failure to guard a UN camp.
24. *Ibid*.
25. Bercuson, 'Koje-do', citing Canadian Department of External Affairs file 50069-J-40 'Command Instructions', 13 April 1931.
26. Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 192-93.
27. Bercuson, 'Koje-do', np.
28. *Ibid*, citing US Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) files, Box 318, file CD092 (Korea), Memorandum for Escott Reid (Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs), 7 June 1952.
29. *Ibid*, citing Department of External Affairs file 50069-J-40, Memorandum for file, 23 May 1952.
30. *Ibid*, citing OSD files, Box 318, file CD092 (Korea), Matthews to Lovett and attachments, 24 May 1952.
31. *Ibid*, citing Canadian Department of External Affairs file 50069-J-40, Wrong to SSEA, 6 June 6 1952.
32. *Ibid*, citing OSD box 318, file CD092 (Korea), Matthews to Lovett and attachments, 24 May 1952.
33. *Ibid*, citing Simonds papers, Simonds to Donald Gordon, 4 February 1953.
34. Grey, *Commonwealth Armies*, 156.
35. *Ibid*, 114.
36. GR Stevens, *The Royal Canadian Regiment*, vol II, 1933-1966 (London, Ont: London Print & Lithographing Co, 1967), 242 et seq. See also CP Stacey, *100 years: The Royal Canadian Regiment 1883-1983* (Don Mills, Ont: Collier-Macmillan, 1983).
37. Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 53-54, citing an interview with Lieutenant Colonel JR Stone, 30 November 1954.
38. *Ibid*, 98, citing an interview with Brigadier Rockingham, 17 November 1952.
39. Margaret Cecchine Harrell and Robert Howe, 'Military Issues in Multinational Operation', in Donald CF Daniel and Bradd C Hayes, eds, *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 189-204.
40. Gabriella Rosner, *The United Nations Emergency Force* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 136.
41. JV Arbuckle, 'Command and Control of the Canadian Forces: Doesn't Anyone Know How to Play This Game?', *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 24:2 (Winter, 1994), 26-27. Colonel Arbuckle was J3 Operations at National Defence Operations Centre at the time.
42. *Ibid*, 24.
43. Mats Berdal, 'United Nations Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia', in *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, 239.
44. Arbuckle, 'Command and Control of the Canadian Forces', 26.
45. Canada, Army Lessons Learned Centre, 'Common Observations and Issues OP PALLADIUM Rotations Zero to Four' (Kingston, Ontario: 1997), 3.
46. *Ibid*, 9.
47. Arbuckle, 'Command and Control of the Canadian Forces', 28.
48. *Ibid*.
49. Michael Ward, Ed Gallagher, Doug Delaney and Hugh Ferguson, 'Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment', *Canadian Military Journal* 1:1 (Spring, 2000), 67-8.