

THE KOREAN WAR 1950-53: A 50 YEAR RETROSPECTIVE

PROPAGANDA, THE MEDIA, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: THE KOREAN WAR

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The Korean War saw extensive use of propaganda on all sides, both within the theatre of war and beyond it; together with systematic psychological operations that were to have consequences for some years after the war itself. It also marked some changes in the manner in which the mass communications media of the western world, most particularly that of the United States, reported war from within the theatre, and the impact of this reporting on the home population. (Given the domination of the United States over the wartime United Nations coalition, many observations about American attitudes may be taken, *mutatis mutandis*, as being valid for other countries, including the United Kingdom and even Australia. Cases of American exceptionalism are noted in the text.)¹ If the Korean War remains 'the unknown war' in this aspect as in many others, it is largely because these issues and developments, which were given their full weight at the time, have since been eclipsed by the much larger events of the Second World War and of the war in Vietnam.² Korea has also been characterised as 'the worst reported war of modern times',³ an accolade that it shares with almost every war of the twentieth century in its immediate aftermath, in each case usually with some justification.

It is one of the unremarkable clichés about all wars that they resemble their predecessors in some respects, and their successors in others. Korea falls extremely well into this categorisation. In one sense its media-military experience was very much a product of the Second World War, particularly in the manner that it was fought by the United States and its allies within the United Nations Command. The relationship of deference given by the reporter in the field towards the government and higher military command which had been established in both world wars had certainly not expired by 1950. Although Korea was categorised as a 'police action' (and later as a 'limited war') few members of either the military or the press acknowledged any real departure from the conventions of the Second World War, particularly as the fighting in Korea carried the fear of escalation to a Third World War. There was in practice no limitation placed on the expectation of the governments of the United States and other belligerent nations that the reporters should also be patriots in their support of the war effort. This was a position very largely shared between governments, armed forces, media and home populations. If, as has been suggested, 'the perceived rights and obligations of the citizen in time of limited conflict might be changing', then this only became evident after a further major war in Vietnam and a considerable exercise in hindsight.⁴

The chief news media by which events from the theatre of war were communicated to the home populations were still for Korea, as they had been for the Second World War, the newspaper, radio and to a lesser extent the cinema newsreel. Many reporters, also, as veterans of the Second World War, were comfortable in their relationship with the armed forces, and understood how to work within it. The approach adopted by most reporters was well described by the firebrand British reporter James Cameron, a veteran of Korea and many other wars, in his account of an early incident, 'The Communists were doing their cause no good by excesses of a particularly brutal and idiotic kind: by binding captured GIs and shooting them in the back and leaving them where their mutilated bodies could be discovered and photographed, thus providing the American Press with precisely the propaganda that they badly needed. Less publicised, naturally, were the excesses of the other side, who also shot prisoners in considerable numbers'.⁵

This willingness to co-operate in propaganda and to suppress inconvenient facts did not imply complete subservience of the press to the military command, something which was equated in western thought with totalitarian rather than democratic media methods; it implied only an acceptance by the press of a co-operative position within which a degree of negotiation was permitted and expected. If, in the words of one critic, 'the reporters were not prepared to back the war wholeheartedly and without reservation' throughout its course, then this was also in

keeping with the tradition of the two world wars.⁶ Despite Cameron's observation, there was in fact a significant debate between the UN higher command and some reporters over the issue of shooting prisoners by the ROKA; a good example of how journalists and the military high command could legitimately disagree on where the boundaries of patriotism lay. Reporters who felt strongly on such issues, and who found that newspapers would not take their material, were often able to get their version out in book form at home while the war was still being fought. Reginald Thompson's *Cry Korea* (1951) and IF Stone's *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (1952) are two of the more famous examples.

The western reporters' attitude towards the military is particularly well illustrated by the MacArthur era of the war. At first there was no military control of the press, and individual reporters made their way to Korea as best they could, filing stories on what they had seen of the North Korean offensive. By the first few weeks there were an estimated western 270 reporters in the theatre. Subsequently, some of their reports of American disasters were criticised by General MacArthur's headquarters, and a temporary ban on reporting introduced, although soon lifted after complaints in Washington to be replaced at Far East Command by a confused system of voluntary regulations. It was the reporters themselves who demanded—at first unsuccessfully—that if this was to be considered a real war and not a 'police action', then when working alongside all United Nations forces they should have enforced military censorship of their work at source. The advantage to the reporters was that, with fixed censorship, they also got consistency, smoother use of military communications, and the reassurance that whatever they filed as stories could not jeopardise the lives of American troops; it was the arbitrary nature of MacArthur's vetting system that they disliked. MacArthur's relaxation of the vetting procedures and adoption of special measures to ensure that laudatory press reports of the successful Inchon landings reached the outside world as rapidly as possible were also entirely in keeping with his behaviour towards the press in the Second World War.⁷ Compulsory censorship along Second World War lines was finally introduced in December 1950, and remained in force for the rest of the war. Despite the common belief to the contrary (due to the lax use of the word 'censorship' in subsequent wars), Korea was in fact the last war fought by western powers to see coercive censorship of this kind imposed and accepted.⁸

Later in the war, as the front stabilised, a regular if rotating contingent of about sixty front line correspondents continued to report the war, many of them preferring to go armed in the light of North Korean attitudes towards their supposed non-combatant status. In effect, the only way to report from the front line was temporarily to become a combat soldier as part of a military unit, with all the implications of that action for press impartiality. As well as American and British reporters, it has been noted that 'the Australians were out in force, probably because the Australian government was well aware of how important good relations were with the USA at a time when Britain, the "Mother Country", was beginning its withdrawal east of Suez',⁹ or perhaps more simply because of the geographical proximity of the war to Australia, compared to Europe or the United States. However, after about July 1951 the political and military strategies of both sides meant that there was often little new to report, except highly personal experiences of the front line. Together with the cult of deference and the censorship, this had the effect of neutralising conventional mass media reporting of the war, with some unforeseen consequences.

Within its context as part of the Cold War and the broader American political strategy of containment, the propaganda and media side of the Korean War took on a new and important significance, at least after the dismissal of MacArthur in April 1951, and the recognition that there was little prospect of a complete United Nations victory. As Henry Kissinger has correctly observed, 'In measuring America's success in Korea, [Dean] Acheson was less concerned with the outcome on the battlefield than with establishing the concept of collective security'.¹⁰ The onset of the Cold War had led to arguments that the confrontation between East and West would be fought out as much in terms of ideology as by any conventional military methods. This was a position that would increase in importance following Korea, with the 'New Look' strategy of the Eisenhower presidency. Along with this, it was accepted that nothing approaching an impartial investigation of many claims about the Korean War could ever take place, and that 'the truth' would never be established with any degree of certainty. In the context of the Cold War, how both individual events and the war itself were presented

both to home populations and to the wider world (including the increasingly important post-colonial 'third world'); and how the war would be remembered in the short term of the 1950s, became important as political objectives.

American and other western political leaders also held what seemed to them legitimate concerns not only as to whether they should subject their peoples to the strain of further wars of containment, but whether democratic institutions and populations were resolute and cohesive enough not to collapse under the strain of such wars.¹¹ The argument that the American people would not tolerate a 'die for tie' strategy was one of the principal criticisms made of the conduct of the war by MacArthur in his evidence to Congress after his recall. To the surprise of some of its political leaders, American public opinion held up remarkably well in the face of being asked to endure an inconclusive war. Developments in opinion poll techniques and more sophisticated analysis of the results in the 1950s have allowed quite a good picture of American public opinion during the Korean War to emerge. In particular, it was the experience of Korea that showed clearly for the first time that a simplistic division into supporters and non-supporters of the war effort ('hawks' and 'doves') was entirely inadequate to describe the types of interaction and shifts in public support that accompany the outbreak, conduct and conclusion of a war. For example, and against expectations, American left wing intellectuals as a group supported the war, chiefly as being part of their continuing battle against Stalinism; while opposition to the war came more from the radical or extreme right wing in American politics. Support for American involvement in the war from the population as a whole ran as high as 77 per cent in its first few weeks, dropped after the Chinese intervention to about 50 per cent, but remained virtually unaffected by any further events until the end of the war, hardly fluctuating except for a slight rise at the end.

This kind of opinion poll data is directly connected, in terms of an important historical debate, with the manner in which the American media reported the Korean War in comparison with the Vietnam War, and the controversial claim that television coverage of Vietnam affected American public support in some way. Again contrary to common belief it was actually Korea, and not Vietnam, that was the world's first television war. The first television service had begun in Great Britain in the 1930s, but had been suspended for the Second World War. By the time of Korea, television was beginning to establish itself in the United States, but had not achieved the degree of penetration and dominance over other means of mass communication that marked the 1960s, and large areas of the United States had no television reception. Television news reporting from the Korean theatre of war functioned very much as the cinema newsreels did, by recording film on location and then shipping it back to the United States. Given the context of the early Cold War and the tradition of deference inherited from the Second World War, it is not surprising that government and military authorities believed that they had less opposition from the mass media during Korea than Vietnam.

However, the most detailed and authoritative of the studies made comparing American public opinion during the two wars rejects completely the idea of a close connection between television reporting of Vietnam and its outcome. Instead, the poll data 'clearly show that whatever impact television had, it was not enough to reduce support for the [Vietnam] war below the levels attained by the Korean War, when television was in its infancy, until casualty levels had far surpassed those of the earlier war'.¹² Indeed, what is striking is how closely public opinion patterns for the two wars resemble each other, suggesting that comparisons between them as both 'limited wars' of the same era have considerable validity when applied to the attitude of the home population. One further distinctive feature of the Korean War, and also American attitude not apparently shared by other belligerents, was that at a high point in November 1951 a slim majority (51 per cent) of people supported the use of atomic bombs on military targets. 'In this instance, mass culture and popular attitudes mirrored thinking at the highest levels of government'.¹³

In terms of defensive propaganda aimed at one's own people, the greatest efforts of the Korean War almost certainly came from Mao Tse-Tung's fledgling People's Republic of China. In the course of the war a new government association was created in Peking (Beijing) to produce newspapers, wall displays and communal readings in support of government policy regarding the war; this organisation was later estimated as employing more than 1.5

million people. Mobile film projector units were introduced around the country to boost film attendance in China from fifty million to 1.39 billion people, the most frequently shown film being a propaganda picture about the war, entitled *Resist America, Aid Korea*.¹⁴ In this context it should not be forgotten that Hollywood also produced a considerable number of propaganda films about the war while it lasted, including the John Ford documentary *This Is Korea* (1950) and the feature film *Retreat, Hell!* (1952). American feature films made about the Korean War were generally supportive of the war in the later 1950s, just as public support for American involvement in the war rose slightly in its aftermath. It was not until the later establishment of the metaphor of 'Korea-as-Vietnam', exemplified by Robert Altman's classic film *M*A*S*H* (1969) that films set in the Korean War began to appear critical of the war itself.

Evidence for organised propaganda directed by western governments towards their own people or those of neutral countries at the time of the Korean War (as opposed to open government demands for what was then seen as legitimate support from the media) has only appeared in recent years and is still being evaluated. Among other claims, it has been suggested that American criticism that Great Britain was failing to 'pull its weight' in committing military forces to Korea was offset by the British taking a larger role in such clandestine propaganda activities worldwide. Where such propaganda campaigns existed, in both the United States and Great Britain and elsewhere, they seem to have been directed at the much wider issue of the Cold War as a whole rather than specifically at the Korea issue, very much in keeping with official views of the time; but the evidence remains open to debate.¹⁵

The Korean War also marked an important point in the development of what are generically called 'non-lethal' methods of warfare. Propaganda, using the word in its widest sense, had been for centuries a weapon of war directed chiefly at one's own armed forces and people, as a means of encouraging them to support the war effort. The concept of propaganda used systematically by countries as a weapon with which to attack the morale of each other's armies and people dates from the First World War, or perhaps a little earlier. In the course of the Second World War this form of offensive propaganda was refined into a more direct form of non-physical attack on the morale and conduct of enemy troops and civilian population, based loosely on the theories of human behaviour of the day. This involved chiefly such methods as leaflets, and loudspeaker and direct radio broadcasts, and was seen very much as something to be practised by people in uniform, and to be kept separate from (if also co-ordinated with) conventional propaganda. By the end of the Second World War the preferred British term for this activity, 'political warfare' (as in the Political Warfare Executive or PWE) had given way to the American 'psychological warfare'—variously rendered as 'psywar' or even 'psychwar', or 'psyop(s)' for psychological operations.

Psychological warfare in this period was closely linked, through such institutions as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its successor after 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with covert or 'shadow' military operations in their much wider sense, and with espionage. Such activities attracted some fairly colourful practitioners (and, sad to say, some fairly credulous writers in their wake), as well as producing considerable amounts of 'disinformation' or propaganda themselves. One problem with studying the Korean War is that although by definition the media coverage is part of the public record, much that was done in the name of psychological warfare is still far from clear. In practice, psychological warfare was also so closely tied up with propaganda in this period that they cannot be easily disentangled. General MacArthur himself is supposed to have told American reporters that they had 'an important responsibility in the matter of psychological warfare'.¹⁶ But just as they reacted against the idea of being under government control, so both reporters and media institutions strongly opposed any attempts to involve them in such activities. The inability of some military figures to make this distinction was also to become a persistent source of friction in military-media relations throughout the twentieth century, starting with Korea.

Conventional western military thought of the day held that major wars were decided chiefly by firepower on the battlefield. Nevertheless, given the immense destructiveness and human cost of such methods, senior Allied commanders late in the Second World War began to take seriously any low-cost method which might induce the enemy to surrender or to fight less

effectively. Psychological warfare, when used in conjunction with conventional military methods, had achieved some successes by the end of the war. In Europe a sustained propaganda and psychological campaign 'to win the war by non-military means' earned praise from Eisenhower for its contribution to victory in 1944-45. Even more impressively, by the very end of the war against Japan, American psychological warfare was starting to produce significant results in the form of battlefield surrenders. This was particularly important, since conventional wisdom held that the gap between western and Japanese cultures, which contributed to the savagery of the jungle and island war, presented an insurmountable obstacle to understanding the enemy, and so exploiting his weaknesses.¹⁷ If American psychological operations could work against the Japanese, there was hope that they could work against the Communist North Koreans and Chinese as well.

In 1950 President Truman created a Psychological Strategy Board in the White House, the State Department created an International Information Administration, and in 1952 a Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee was also established in Washington.¹⁸ American military strategies for both propaganda and psychological warfare were based on a belief that human behaviour, both as individuals and in the mass, was highly volatile and susceptible to outside influence. The prevailing 'stimulus/ response' model of human behaviour was derived partly from behaviourism (then at its height of respectability), and partly from the practical experience of such developing phenomena as advertising and opinion poll forecasting. Changing human behaviour through propaganda and psychological warfare was, in this model, largely a question of identifying individual or mass vulnerabilities, and then targeting those vulnerabilities through various media. It has been fairly pointed out that perhaps no-one in a position of authority ever completely believed in this pessimistic 'magic bullet' view of the human spirit. But the broad ideas behind it provided an intellectually satisfying explanation for the rise through popular support of the totalitarian dictators of Europe before the Second World War, as well as for certain individual preferences and behaviour.¹⁹

Despite considerable advances in theories of human perception and the impact of the media after the Korean War, the United States' military propaganda and psychological operations campaign in Vietnam was also based largely on the same methods—leaflets, loudspeaker aircraft, radio broadcasting—and measured by the same criteria as in Korea. Although the United States criticised its psychological operations campaign in Vietnam as a failure, this was attributed to poor strategy and planning, rather than to any inherent fault in the underlying concept.²⁰ Later experiences and changes in ideas about human behaviour have produced a more realistic (or pessimistic) view of psychological warfare. In the words of one practitioner writing about Korea, 'judging the impact of a PSYWAR operation is almost impossible. Often the effects are cumulative, achieving a surrender after repeated efforts co-ordinated with several military attacks. There is usually no immediate and observable link between the cause (the PSYWAR) and effect'.²¹ The same conclusion was reached at the very end of the twentieth century by the Australian War Memorial in assessing propaganda in Korea, 'although much effort was put into propaganda on both sides, it is difficult to measure whether it had any real effect'.²²

In contrast to this later realism, United States' thinking at the time of the Korean War was so imbued with the idea of the psychological 'magic bullet' that commonplace and even obsolescent military behaviour on the part of the Chinese Communist forces was dignified with the name of psychological warfare. This included practices which had not entirely died away—at least in the German and Imperial Japanese armies—in the Second World War, such as the use of bugle calls and other military music on the battlefield, augmented by loudspeakers. A widespread phenomenon which seems to have been unique to Korea was 'Bedcheck Charlie' (also known by more vulgar names). Operating particularly in the war's last six months, these were Chinese light aircraft (characteristically Soviet-made Polikarpov PO-2 biplanes dating from the 1920s) that carried out small air raids often by individual aircraft, dropping bombs and propaganda leaflets on American positions shortly after nightfall. This was seen by the Americans as a deliberate psychological weapon meant to deprive them of sleep, and they resorted to special aircraft tactics in order to eliminate the problem; but it is not clear from the available descriptions that the 'Charlies' were not simply particularly inept conventional raiders.²³

The first months of the Korean War produced an unexpected crisis of confidence for the United States in its armed forces, made all the worse because it seemed directly related to such issues of propaganda and psychological warfare, and of the ability of democratic soldiers to resist Communism in a war of containment. This was not entirely an American affair, but neither the problem nor the reaction to it by the Americans found many parallels from other United Nations contingents. Within days of capture by the North Koreans, American enlisted men and even officers gave propaganda radio broadcasts on behalf of their captors, denouncing the war. This was not, as was claimed at the time, a phenomenon unique to Korea, that 'in every war but one' United States troops had behaved impeccably on surrender,²⁴ but it had never before attracted such attention. Collaboration with the enemy was rapidly linked to 'bug out fever' in the face of attacks, and 'give-upitis' as evidence of mysteriously low morale among American troops.

At least one principal reason for this low morale and poor combat performance was quite mundane, and was reported at the very start of the war. The United States had entered the Korean War extremely ill-prepared, and sent to Korea troops whose inadequacies in strength, training and equipment made them at first almost easy prey for the North Koreans. Although the situation improved in the course of the war, and some American units sent to Korea were of very high quality, the overall standard remained poor; and men often went into action demoralised and angry.²⁵ This anger at the unpreparedness of American forces was, of course, the story that the Far East Command refused to let the journalists run in the early weeks of the war. In the absence of accurate reporting, speculation took hold that the North Koreans and later the Chinese had some new and terrible psychological weapon with which to turn the minds of American troops. The term 'brainwashing' was first used as early as September 1950 in the United States by Edward Hunter, a journalist and CIA propagandist. Amid considerable exaggerations about the number of American prisoners who had collaborated, the CIA itself was to spend much of the 1950s looking for the secret of brainwashing. Stories of its activities and concerns leaked into the media to inspire, among other things, the satirical novel and feature film *The Manchurian Candidate* (1958 and 1962 respectively).²⁶

The real North Korean and Chinese achievement in breaking American prisoners owed something to the theories of behaviourism, but more to a tradition of warlordism that had prevailed in China for some centuries, and had been particularly important in the recent civil wars. Captured troops, in the warlord system, were a valuable asset if they could be made to renounce their old masters and change sides. This was accomplished by a combination of intense psychological pressure and physical violence or threats. The Chinese adapted some of these methods in order to identify suggestible American prisoners and employed them for propaganda purposes.²⁷ From the first shock of the radio broadcasts, this issue dragged on to the very end of the war when twenty-one American prisoners and one Briton refused repatriation and demanded sanctuary in Communist China. This number was slight, in the context of the troops involved, but in terms of propaganda and beliefs about brainwashing it had a major impact.

One of the most problematic, and persistent, propaganda claims of the later part of the war from both the Soviet Union and Communist China was that the United States was practising large-scale bacteriological warfare in Korea. The first announcements in February 1952 were carefully timed to co-incide with a temporary failure in the talks over prisoners at Panmunjon, and backed by 'confessions' from American airmen about dropping canisters of infected flies or similar objects over North Korea and China. The resulting controversy is a fine case-study in three enduring truths about the value of propaganda. The first is that it is seldom sufficient to respond to such accusations with a dignified silence, as the United States at first chose to do. The second is the difficulty of replying to what may be a complete fabrication, since if the Americans were utterly innocent, 'how could they provide information on something that they had not done?'²⁸ The third is that a well-mounted propaganda campaign of this kind, if it cannot convince sceptical and impartial observers, can create such a degree of doubt that the truth can no longer be determined. It is known that the Japanese experimented with germ warfare in Manchuria in the Second World War, that the United States took over the research at the end of the war, protecting some of those who had carried it out. Some authors on the propaganda of the war dismiss the Soviet and Chinese claim out of hand, even arguing that it

was cover for a Communist biological warfare campaign instead; others remain not so sure. The issue has never been publicly resolved to the present day. Various claims and counter-claims continue to be made, including the startling suggestion that the pilots' alleged confessions were authored for the Chinese by the British journalist Alan Winnington of the *Daily Worker*, then the newspaper of the British Communist Party, and Wilfred Burchett of the *Paris Ce Soir*, both of whom were reporting on the peace talks for the North Korean-Chinese delegation.²⁹

In purely technical and administrative terms, the United States itself was in 1950 better prepared for a propaganda campaign in Korea than for almost any other form of military intervention. Within a day of Truman's decision to intervene in Korea, American aircraft were dropping freshly-printed propaganda leaflets on the advancing North Korean troops; and a day after that the first radio broadcasts were being made in Korean from American bases in Japan. Following the Second World War, in 1947 Far East Command had retained a Psychological Warfare Section, based on the unit that had worked against the Japanese, and in 1950 it consisted of 35 people. Also in 1947 the US Army had decided to retain a small psychological operations unit of 20 personnel, based at Fort Riley as the Tactical Information Detachment. This joined Eighth Army in Korea at the war's start, reorganised as 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, to provide tactical and battlefield propaganda, in co-operation with a number of specialist air units. One of these, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, 'The Kyushu Gypsies', had the unusual distinction in the latter part of the war of combining crews from the United States, Greece and Thailand, 'making it the only three-nation unit in Korea'.³⁰ The main focus of these battlefield propaganda units was trying to induce enemy surrenders, in which they had some successes.

Strategic propaganda was not provided until much later in the war, by the new 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group, sent to Korea from Fort Riley in July 1951, of which the Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) Company was a part. This produced in excess of 200 million leaflets a week, usually air-delivered, and assumed responsibility for the 'Voice of the United Nations Command' radio (originally broadcasting as the 'Voice of General MacArthur's Headquarters!') in Japan. With the war's stalemate, a number of high-profile operations were also mounted of the kind that win applause from fellow psychological warfare specialists rather than win battles. Particularly noteworthy was the widespread announcement in April 1953 that any Soviet or Chinese MiG-15 pilot who would surrender with their aircraft would receive \$50,000 and political asylum, under 'Operation Moolah'. The offer was not taken up, but American psychological warfare teams claimed a victory of sorts in their belief that the temptation as well as bad weather grounded Soviet MiG pilots in the last months of the war. (One North Korean MiG pilot defected with his aircraft shortly after the war's end.)

The experience of these units in the course of the Korean War, together with a belief that the Chinese enemy was practising psychological warfare on a large scale, led in 1951 to the establishment in the Pentagon of an Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, and in 1952 to the creation at Fort Bragg of the Psychological Warfare Center. Significantly in terms of the continued blurring between propaganda, psychological warfare and 'shadow' or 'unconventional' warfare in American thinking, many of those involved in these formations came from an OSS background. Fort Bragg included not only a training school and broadcasting and leafleting units, but also 10th Special Forces Group, the US Army's first 'unconventional warfare' unit. In 1956 the centre's name was changed to Special Warfare Center, and its purely propaganda function downgraded.³¹

By way of a conclusion, the following observations are offered on the nature of the Korean War, perhaps more as points of departure for further debate than as fundamental truths. Korea was the last war of the twentieth century to exhibit the cult of patriotic deference towards the higher command of the armed forces from war correspondents that had been created during earlier wars of the twentieth century and refined in the course of the Second World War; but at least part of the reason for this was a shared assumption that the fighting in Korea might itself be the preliminary to a much larger war. Because of the adoption of a strategy of stalemate or limitation by the United States on behalf of the United Nations, Korea became the first of a pattern of wars in the second half of the twentieth century in which

representation through the media, both at the time and in the war's aftermath, would become increasingly important as a war aim. The Korean War saw for the first time the issue emerge of the relationship between the conduct by armed forces of clandestine military activities, and the attitude of the armed forces towards their own country's mass media; the continuing problems evident in this issue may be traced to the blurring of the distinction between propaganda, psychological operations, and military-media relations that occurred at the time of the Korean War.

Endnotes

1. For comparison with other countries and their attitudes towards the war, the Australian War Memorial website award-winning online exhibition on the Korean War, launched in the year 2000, includes a section on propaganda and psychological warfare. See website <http://www.awm.gov.au/korea> visited on 1 September 2000.
2. 'The unknown war' is the subtitle of Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea, *The Unknown War* (London: Penguin, 1990). See their own comments on propaganda and the media, and also Cumings' very personal account of making a television history of the Korean War in the 1980s for an American network: Bruce Cumings, *War and Television* (New York: Verso, 1992).
3. Trevor Royle, *War Report* (London: Grafton, 1989), 223.
4. Peter Young and Peter Jesser, *The Media and the Military from the Crimea to Desert Strike* (Melbourne: MacMillan, 1997), 274.
5. James Cameron, *Point of Departure* (London: Grafton, 1986 edn), 112.
6. Philip Knightley, *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth Maker from the Crimea to Kosovo* (London: Prion, rev edn, 2000), 385, and quoted in Haliday and Cumings, 161. Knightley's reissue of his popular book of 1975 has sadly not corrected its many flaws.
7. Young and Jessel, *The Media and the Military*, 48; Duncan Anderson, 'Douglas MacArthur and the Philippines', in Brian Bond, ed, *Fallen Stars* (London: Brassey's, 1991), 181-2.
8. Derrick Mercer, Geoff Mungham and Kevin Williams, *The Fog of War: The Media on the Battlefield* (London: Heinemann, 1987), 250-4. See also (forthcoming) Stephen Badsey and Philip M Taylor, 'The Experience of Manipulation: Propaganda, the Press and Radio', in Peter H Liddle, John Bourne and Ian Whitehead, eds, *Lightning Strikes Twice*, vol II (London: Harper Collins, 2001). Although it is often loosely stated that 'censorship' has been operated by the United States or other western powers in military operations since Korea, what has actually been used is voluntary prior security review, a related but fundamentally different activity.
9. Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 380.
10. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 490.
11. Betty Glad and Philipp Rosenberg, 'Bargaining Under Fire: Limit Selling and Maintenance During the Korean War', in Betty Glad, ed, *Psychological Dimensions of War* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 181-200.
12. John E Mueller, *War; Presidents and Public Opinion* (New York: Lanham, 1985), 167; Susan L Carruthers, *The Media at War* (London: MacMillan, 2000), 108-20, 152.
13. Paul Bover, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 340.
14. Oliver Thompson, *Easily Led, A History of Propaganda* (Thrupp: Sutton, 1999), 289.
15. For recent revelations see the still controversial Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War 1948-1977* (Thrupp: Sutton, 1998), 41-48, and Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 1999); see also Susan L Carruthers, *Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, The Media, and Colonial Counter-Insurgency 1944-1960* (London: Mansell, 1995).
16. Quoted by Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 367.
17. Philip M Taylor, *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 192-224; Alison B Gilmore, *You Can't Fight Tanks with Bayonets: Psychological Operations against the Japanese Army in the Southwest Pacific* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 1-8.
18. Carnes Lord, 'The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy', in Carnes Lord and Frank R Barnett, eds, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US Approach* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), 14.
19. Stephen Badsey, 'The Influence of the Media on Recent British Military Operations', in Ian Stewart and Susan L Carruthers, eds, *War, Culture and the Media* (Troubridge: Flicks, 1996), 8-9; Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 7-9.
20. Robert W Chandler, *War of Ideas: The US Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981), 251-5.
21. Stephen E Pease, *Psywar: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1992), 12.
22. Australian War Memorial Website exhibition 'Out in the Cold' (see Note 1).

23. Pease, *Psywar*, 131-36.
24. The phrase comes from the title of one of the books which popularised the idea of Communist Chinese 'brainwashing' of American troops, Eugene Kinkead, *Every War But One* (New York: Longman, 1959). See also Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper*, 319-20.
25. Roy K Flint, 'Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal 5-19 July 1950', in Charles E Heller and William A Stoft, eds, *America's First Battles 1776-1965* (Lawence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 266-99; Edwain P Hoyt, *America's Wars and Military Encounters from Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: Da Capo, 1987), 424-47; Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 366-7.
26. John Marks, *The Search for the 'Manchurian Candidate': The Story of the CIA's Secret Efforts to Control Human Behavior* (London: Allen Lane, 1979), the reference to Hunter is p 125; see also Susan L Carruthers, "'The Manchurian Candidate' (1962) and the Cold War Brainwashing Scare", *The Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 18:1 (March 1988), 75-94; Stephen Badsey, *The Manchurian Candidate* Cinetek Series (Trowbridge: Flicks, 1998).
27. Pease, *Psywar*, 147-53.
28. Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731, *The Japanese Army's Secret of Secrets* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989), 235-85, at 240.
29. Seymour M Hersh, *Chemical and Biological Warfare: The Hidden Arsenal* (London: Panther, 1970), 300-2; Halliday and Cumings, 182-86; Pease, *Psywar*, 139-42; Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (London: Guild Publishing, 1987), xv-xvi; William B Breuer, *Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea* (New York: John Wiley, 1996), 200-7; Garth S Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (Newbury Park, CA; Sage, 1992), 200-1; Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 387-88.
30. Pease, *Psywar*, 29.
31. Alfred H Paddock Jr, 'Military Psychological Operations' in Lord and Barnett, eds, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*, 45-65; Pease, *Psywar*, 15-25.