

# ***THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND THE VIETNAM WAR 1962-1972***

## ***THE MAKING OF TIGERS: SOUTH KOREA'S EXPERIENCE IN THE VIETNAM WAR*** **Kil J. Yi**

### **Introduction**

In February 1965, at the request of the US government, President Park Chung Hee<sup>1</sup> of South Korea dispatched 2000 military engineers to South Vietnam with some solemn words: 'You must keep in mind the fact that the honor of your fatherland and the expectations of your 27 million fellow countrymen rest on your shoulders.' Eight months later, in the fall of 1965, when Korea dispatched an infantry division named the Tiger Division, Park invoked Greek mythology.<sup>2</sup> Their posterity would be as proud as those old Greeks whose ancestors were the 'brave soldiers who fought in the battle of Troy'. These remarks were more than the hyperbole that military commanders casually use to motivate foot soldiers marching into battlefields. In Park's mind his soldiers had every reason to be proud in mythological proportions because Korea's future depended on the quality of the help being rendered to Americans and South Vietnamese.<sup>3</sup>

In the early 1960s, South Korea was at the height of insecurity, not because of an imminent threat from its mortal enemy, North Korea, but from the changing policy outlook of its patron, the United States. The so-called liberal nation builder in the Administrations of John F Kennedy and Lyndon B Johnson faulted America's foreign aid policy heretofore for concentrating on conventional military buildup in its client states without a vision for long-term economic and social improvements. As a result, despite receiving billions of dollars in aid, America's clients remained mostly poor, dependent, and under the rule of anti-Communist strongmen in command of large military forces. In these countries, corrosive socio-economic problems engendered pro-Communist, anti-American sentiments, and in some cases, armed resistance to the US-supported government. In the words of one of the chief architects of nation building, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the American people needed 'a new program that they could support with good conscience and some degree of enthusiasm'.<sup>4</sup> That program would need to build a functioning and free society in America's client states and 'graduate' them from US assistance program.<sup>5</sup>

South Korea was one of the first countries to be scrutinised by these liberal nation builders because of the gulf between the magnitude of help rendered and the depth of underdevelopment. In the words of Robert Komer of the National Security Council, one of the most vocal nation builders in Washington, South Korea was 'a mess[,] one of our [America's] great failures despite billions in pump priming'.<sup>6</sup> America's involvement in South Korea since 1945 had nurtured 'an unstable US stepchild'.<sup>7</sup> These harsh words were not entirely misguided. A former Japanese colony, South Korea became independent in 1948 after three years of American occupation. Two years into its existence, North Korea attacked the South, forcing American intervention that lasted for three years. The Korean War, which cost nearly 40,000 American lives, ended in neither victory nor peace for the allies, mostly made up of US and Korean soldiers. Failing to sign a peace treaty, belligerents remained in a state of war under an armistice agreement, requiring continued American presence and assistance. In addition to financially supporting Korea's 600,000-strong armed forces, the US also had 50,000 of its own soldiers stationed in Korea. At the same time, American economic aid was averaging \$200 million per annum yet barely keeping South Korea's economy afloat. In essence, Korea became a mendicant nation stricken with poverty but in possession of one of the largest military forces in the world.

Usually underdevelopment engenders political upheaval, and South Korea was no exception. In the spring of 1960, protests by mostly university students toppled the US-backed regime of Rhee Syngman, South Korea's first president and its self-proclaimed founding father. Korea's Second Republic that replaced Rhee's rule, also supported by Washington, was short-lived. A

group of junior officers of the South Korean military launched a coup and ended it only one year after its birth. The revolution of 1960 and the coup of 1961 demonstrated to the US that Korea's social and economic problems contained enough revolutionary firepower to topple governments it had unequivocally and generously supported. The liberal nation builders now asked: What had gone wrong in Korea? The answer was not difficult to find.

Washington's assistance deterred North Korea's takeover of the South and kept it anti-Communist. However, US aid could not remedy 'the lack of national direction or sense of responsibility of the Korean people or their leaders'. In other words, Koreans developed an addiction to American handouts that were offered as long as their armed forces remained 'solidly on the side of the Free World'. This state of dependency in exchange for South Korea's military confrontation with North Korea, however, came under increasing attacks from 'the mounting forces of nationalism, of unfulfilled expectations, and of youthful impatience'. Out of this frustration, some liberal elements in South Korea began to assert that, perhaps, North Korea's socialist approach to nation building was a correct path for the Korean people. The US was at a crossroad; without a genuine reform and development these forces were certain to seek 'an outlet in further revolutionary action, in courses which would further instability, and possibly in accommodation with the Communist north'.<sup>8</sup> In Kennedy's words, 'the economic and political situation in and about Korea were such as to present a hopeless situation'.<sup>9</sup>

Washington's nation builders saw a reduction in Korea's conventional forces as the solution to Korea's problems. Without relocating part of the resources that went into maintaining Korea's bloated armed forces, US officials argued, the Koreans would not be able to 'put their own house in order'.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, in order to put America's own balance of payment in order, liberal nation builders insisted that the US reduce its military presence in Korea. This blueprint for reducing the allied military forces caused uncertainties and anxieties in Park's government. Born of a military coup in a country with a strong Confucian tradition, in which generals were expected to be at the service of the gentry-scholar rulers, Park was viewed with suspicion, if not derision. Realising this sentiment, the coup plotters rationalised their action as a revolutionary act to rescue Korea from the hands of ineffective civilian leaders who could neither defend nor feed the nation. The junta pledged to neutralise Pyongyang's threat and eradicate poverty, all at the same time. These bold promises, of course, were predicated on a continuing military buildup in Korea, which not only deterred possible North Korean attack but also guaranteed the flow of hard currency from the US in the form of military-assistance. Washington's insistence on military cutbacks, therefore, threatened the very survival of the Park government. As Park pleaded with Rusk, 'in Korea it was impossible to switch from one to the other at once'.<sup>11</sup>

The Seoul government's escaping act from this predicament was the US-Korean alliance in the Vietnam War. Between 1965 and 1973, South Korea dispatched about 320,000 soldiers to Vietnam, slightly more than ten per cent of the American commitment. At the height of Korea's involvement, its soldiers in Vietnam numbered 50,000. Korean casualties include 4600 killed-in-action and 15,000 wounded.<sup>12</sup> In the process, South Korea repositioned itself from a defensive to offensive player in containment and the staunchest ally of the US in Asia. Seoul thereby placed itself on the top of the Communist world's enemy list and exposed itself to a campaign of intimidation from North Korea that was certain to exploit South Korea's diversion of forces to Indochina. Now Washington had no choice but to commit itself deeper to the militarisation of Korea. In essence, South Korea's intervention in the Vietnam War was a classic example of seeking safety in the heart of danger.

The inconclusive end to the Korean War in 1953 was responsible for South Korea's large conventional forces. Since the armistice, North Korea turned unification of the peninsula into its *raison d'être*. In order to prevent Pyongyang from launching a second attempt at unification of the peninsula, South Korea built 'the largest military establishments in proportion to population in the entire world'.<sup>13</sup> The US, on the other hand, had a different strategic calculation. It was convinced that Russia and China, North Korea's patrons, would no longer support Kim Il Sung's fanatical desire to become the sole ruler of the peninsula. Washington had a rationale for this conclusion. Unlike in the days before the outbreak of the Korean War,

there could not be speculation on the part of the communist bloc as to whether the US would commit itself to defend South Korea. The US military was already in place on the peninsula, defending the most likely route of North Korea's southbound push. The next time around, the US would not have to secure a UN authorisation of a 'police action', and then intervene. Also, America's improved capacity to bring in reinforcements from other areas, plus air superiority, precluded Kim Il Sung's contention that North Korea's main military objectives would be achieved before the arrival of large scale American forces. In addition, unlike 1950, the South had more than enough men in arms—double the size of North Korean forces—to hold the line until the arrival of American reinforcements. If, however, Park had any fear of the Communist side introducing nuclear weapons into the war, he should not worry, said Kennedy. The US had the capability to 'deliver a more crippling blow to the Soviets than they had originally launched', about three to eight times 'quantitatively and far ahead quality-wise'.<sup>14</sup>

The US found Park vulnerable to its pressure to scale back Korea's military establishment because of his precarious hold on power. As one US official described deridingly, Park's revolutionary council was composed of 'a bunch of lieutenant colonels' who had no experience governing a nation. They also had enough enemies within Korea's military and the political establishment. The Kennedy Administration's withholding recognition or interrupting the flow of aid to Korea would have guaranteed Park's unraveling. After all, as noted by American officials, in Korea, 'the United States was the only game in town'.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, following Park's coup, the administration's Task Force on Korea urged Kennedy to mix 'friendship and firmness', or more commonly speaking, carrot and stick. It should be made known to Park that the US was willing to 'contribute significant additional assistance', but also that it was 'ready to withhold such assistance if necessary to force appropriate Korean action'. That action included a 'substantial reduction in [South Korean] forces'. In conjunction, the smaller forces of Korea should now contribute more to internal security, civil works and economic growth. The nation builders of Washington wanted Korean soldiers to be utilised for 'National Construction Service and other appropriate civil works projects'. They would learn the 'skills and vocations' with which they could make 'a greater contribution to [building] Korean infrastructure' during and after their military service, insisted Washington.<sup>16</sup> According to this plan, Korean soldiers would spend more time with shovels than rifles, and learn to operate bulldozers rather than to fire howitzers. Also, Washington hoped to cut the corners of its military aid by requiring Seoul to procure the part of its military needs that could be produced in Korea rather than relying on the shipments from the US. And the biggest ticketed item: the Koreans living with a smaller US military presence in its midst.

To Park, Washington's nation builders were misreading and misleading Kim Il Sung and his patrons in Moscow and Beijing, and underestimating the value of Seoul's contribution to containment in Northeast Asia. Park saw another Achesonian debacle on the horizon. In the minds of most Koreans, including Park's, Dean Acheson, President Harry Truman's Secretary of State, was the root cause of the Korean War. In January 1950, only a few months after the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea, Acheson enunciated during a National Press Club speech that South Korea was out of America's 'defense parameter' in Asia. It meant that an attack on South Korea was not necessarily a declaration of war against the US, which was the case with Japan and the Philippines who were guaranteed of American intervention. Five months after the speech, South Korea was attacked. A veteran of the Korean War, Park believed that Washington's talk on the reduction of the Korean forces and American presence in Korea would embolden Kim Il Sung to try to accomplish what he had failed in the Korean War. Park was apt to say, Koreans 'learned about the savagery and atrocities of communism not through books but through direct bloody physical experience' of the Korean War that killed one million of his compatriot. Koreans did not need another learning experience to know the brutalities of a Communist invasion.<sup>17</sup> When Park met with Kennedy in Washington in November 1961, six months after his coup, he insisted that Korea's 600,000-strong army was a 'must' in order for his country to remain 'the staunchest anti-Communist country' in the world, and deter North Korea. Diverting his soldiers away from military barracks to construction sites was possible but only when 'their primary duty was not imperiled'.<sup>18</sup> Park's entreaties, however, failed to reverse the downward slope of the projected American assistance. One of the reasons, Park was told, was the Kennedy Administration's spending 'a great deal more money' in Southeast Asia than originally planned.<sup>19</sup> True to the liberal nation building doctrine, the US military assistance program to Korea in 1962 dropped

to \$143 million from \$202 million in the previous year.<sup>20</sup> The message was clear: Park had to reduce his conventional forces.<sup>21</sup> Despite the drop, one of his aides told Kennedy, 'Korea continues to be our most expensive military satellite'.<sup>22</sup> Kennedy asked rhetorically, 'Why did we [the US] ever spend so much on ROK [Republic of Korea] forces instead of shoring up SEA [South East Asia] more?'<sup>23</sup>

Lyndon B Johnson was equally determined to reduce US aid to Korea. In the words of McGeorge Bundy, the nation's security advisor, Johnson was 'most anxious'<sup>24</sup> to do this because South Korea was no longer 'a high priority target as to tie up a large proportion of US assets'.<sup>25</sup> The 'plain fact of the matter' was that Southeast Asia had emerged as a 'big danger area' requiring increased US commitment.<sup>26</sup> And the US no longer had 'the dough to sustain' the existing military commitments abroad.<sup>27</sup> The combination of reduction in Korean forces with reconstitution of 'one (or even two)' US divisions currently stationed in Korea into a strategic reserve for Southeast Asia to be stationed in Hawaii would reduce the 'gold drain' in Korea, noted one internal memo from the Johnson Administration.<sup>28</sup> The administration had to live with the fact that a 'high defense budget necessitates [the] most efficient use of all resources available to meet US responsibilities worldwide'.<sup>29</sup> In other words, Ho Chi Minh, not Kim Il Sung, was the one who had to be contained immediately. It was Saigon, not Seoul, that needed more bolstering. Formalised as National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 298, Johnson instructed the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom to study the possible withdrawal of one US division from Korea by 1 June or, at the latest, 1 December, 1964.<sup>30</sup>

The State Department's vocal opposition delayed the proposed cuts in the allied military presence on the peninsula. Rusk warned that diverting US troops away from Korea would likely be interpreted by the Communist side as American intention to 'disengage' from the area at a time when, necessitated by the conflict in Vietnam, America's commitment to defend its friends and allies came under scrutiny. Robert Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, warned that if the withdrawal took place, Park's ability to govern would be 'seriously impaired' and 'the possibility that the government might be overthrown by a coup or revolt would be substantially increased'.<sup>31</sup> If cuts had to be made, the State insisted, the size of the Korean forces should be determined without reductions in American military presence for the time being. The Defense Department retorted that Americans would want to see their sons come home rather than the sons of Korean families going back to theirs earlier than expected. Unable to come to a decision, Johnson agreed to 'hold in abeyance' the troop redeployment issue.<sup>32</sup> Temporarily putting the troop reduction issue on hold, however, was no comfort for Park who realised that when the war in South Vietnam intensified, the issue would resurface.<sup>33</sup>

At this point, South Korea offered a helping hand in South Vietnam to a patron that had become less generous and more indignant towards a slow rate of nation building in Korea.<sup>34</sup> Park told US officials that his country had 'a million men well trained in [guerrilla] type of warfare', who could be sent as regular soldiers, or, if the US preferred, as volunteers.<sup>35</sup> Washington's nation builders, however, saw Park's offer for what it was—an attempt to win continued American support for his conventional military buildup. 'We would have to pay for this, and we might as well pay the Vietnamese to do the job themselves', came the response, Kennedy's Defense Department.<sup>36</sup> When Park forwarded the same offer to the Johnson Administration, he was rebuffed again: South Korea had 'no significant military contribution' to make as far as the Vietnam War was concerned.<sup>37</sup> Also, there was the concern that Korean soldiers in Vietnam would look like 'mercenaries ... pulling US chestnuts out of the fire rather than coming to the aid of beleaguered fellow Asian'.<sup>38</sup>

Washington's ambivalence toward Korea's participation in the Vietnam War began to wane as America's allies in the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation either resisted getting involved or lacked soldiers to contribute. SEATO members' inaction or inability upset Johnson who wanted to boost the morale of Saigon and overwhelm Hanoi with his so-called 'more flags' campaign. Johnson vented his frustration on his ambassadors who were given the task of convincing their host governments for assistance to Vietnam: 'I am gravely disappointed by the inadequacy of the actions by our [American] friends and allies in response to our request that they share the burden of Free World responsibility in Viet Nam.' He averred that

Americans 'should not be required to continue indefinitely, alone and unassisted, to be the only champions of freedom in Viet Nam today.'<sup>39</sup> Johnson now had no choice but to turn to the country his aides derided as America's unstable stepchild.

A turning point in the US-Korean Alliance in the Vietnam War came in the form of major floods that hit the north and central coastal regions of South Vietnam at the end of 1964. As the extent of the damages became apparent. Rusk inquired of ambassador Maxwell Taylor in Saigon whether Washington should use the floods as a pretext for dispatching American military engineers, accompanied by 'appropriate combat forces for security purposes'.<sup>40</sup> Taylor was opposed to the dispatch of American forces that would give the Saigon government the wrong impression that 'the US is prepared to take over more of the responsibilities' of the war. Therefore, the ambassador proposed, the damages from the flood should be used as 'a means of trying to obtain third country military engineer aid'.<sup>41</sup> Rusk agreed and on 17 December, the US ambassador to Seoul, Winthrop Brown, was instructed to solicit 'military engineers or additional military medical units' because there was 'much road repair and bridge-building to be done in flood-damaged areas of Central Viet Nam'.<sup>42</sup> To the shock of the envoys Park volunteered 'two combat divisions ... at any time they might be needed'.<sup>43</sup> For the time being, however, Park had to be satisfied with sending non-combat soldiers. In late February 1965, the first contingent of 600 military engineers arrived in South Vietnam. Two months later this force grew to 2400 soldiers, consisting of a high quality, hand-picked group' that made 'an excellent impression'.<sup>44</sup> South Korea had now become the second largest foreign presence in South Vietnam after the US.

Until the summer of 1965, the Johnson Administration was in denial. When Park offered combat forces, he was often presented with lessons on the nature of guerrilla warfare. The Vietnam War was not 'that kind of war' where regular units from foreign countries could confront the enemy on the battlefield.<sup>45</sup> In the words of State Department experts, the

struggle against [the] Viet Cong is a guerrilla war in which [the] enemy is elusive and difficult to find and fix. He seeks to attack by surprise ... When being pursued he often melds into [the] population. Under such circumstances it is difficult even for [the Vietnamese] forces.<sup>46</sup>

Therefore, until the summer of 1965, America's choice of weapon against this enemy was aerial bombing over North Vietnam. These operations whose codenames included FLAMING DART, BARREL ROLL, and ultimately, ROLLING THUNDER, however, failed to live up to their planners' strategic calculation that destruction in the North would pressure the guerrillas in the South to cease action.<sup>47</sup> The bombing campaigns certainly were not as deadly as their codenames suggested. As the bombing went on, one Johnson biographer noted, 'there were clearly more of them [the enemy] than before' on the ground.<sup>48</sup> By spring of 1965, the triumvirate of America's Vietnam policy, Robert S McNamara, secretary of defense, McGeorge Bundy, national security advisor, and Dean Rusk, secretary of state, had to concede that 'a substantial allied ground force' must be committed, as Park had insisted all along:

[A] force which had Australians, Filipinos, Thais, Koreans and conceivably even Pakistanis would give real international color to the defense of South Vietnam and would also have a substantial braking effect on any possible Communist escalation.<sup>49</sup>

However, 'major forces could come only from Seoul' while 'small Australian and New Zealand participation' could be expected.<sup>50</sup> On April 2, during an NSC meeting, Johnson authorised an '18,000 to 20,000-man increase in US military support forces' and 'urgent exploration' with Korea, Australia, and New Zealand for a 'rapid deployment of significant combat elements' in proportion with American escalation.<sup>51</sup> Since the US had only a slim chance of getting sizable forces from the latter two, this instruction was essentially a proposal for a US-Korean military alliance in Vietnam.

Park's state visit to Washington in mid-May 1965, which coincided with the fourth anniversary of his coup, opened the formal negotiations for South Korea's intervention in the Vietnam War. It was Park's moment of personal triumph. Four years earlier Washington sought to exploit Park's insecurities to undertake measures that, in the short run, threatened the survival of his government. Now, Park was a state guest of a US that was confronted with the most tenacious enemy it had encountered but without the commitment of meaningful assistance from its treaty partners. Reflecting his sense of urgency, Johnson requested from Park a combat division at four different points throughout their conversation. In return, Johnson assured Park that 'Korean aid to Viet Nam would mean that there would be kept in Korea a military strength equivalent to that at present so that Korean security would not suffer'. At the same time, Johnson pledged to 'see to it that troops and money enough will be provided to ensure' Korea's security.<sup>52</sup> With this statement Johnson made a dramatic turnabout in his policy vis-a-vis South Korea. As late as two months prior to the meeting, the Johnson Administration was going forward with the decision to 'subtract 9,000 spaces from present authorized strength of 8th US Army amounting to 51,000'. No longer would Johnson seek a reduction of forces in any form. The American president in essence notified Park that his administration's campaign to de-conventionalise the Korean forces would halt as long as South Koreans were fighting in Vietnam.<sup>53</sup> The following day Park returned to the White House for a second meeting with Johnson and confided that South Korea's 'well-trained and well-disciplined [soldiers] really formed part of [the] US forces'. Korean soldiers were 'ready to fight against Communism' and that 'they would be with the United States'. Park also reminded Johnson that his forces were 'dependent on US assistance'. Park's assurance was 'very heartening', said Johnson.<sup>54</sup> Five months later the first contingent of Korean combat forces left for South Vietnam. After eleven years of rebuffing Korea's offer to enter the fray, and failing to win significant troop commitment from SEATO allies, the US embraced South Korea as a combat-sharing partner in the jungles of South Vietnam. By the end of 1966, there were 50,000 South Korean soldiers fighting in South Vietnam. At this point, in terms of the ratio of soldiers dispatched to Vietnam and its population size. South Korea became the largest troop contributor among the nations assisting South Vietnam.

As promised by Johnson, the US-Korean alliance in the Vietnam War accelerated, rather than decelerated, Korea's conventional arms buildup. For South Korea's first division to South Vietnam, the US agreed to 'No US or ROK reduction in Korea without prior consultation', and to finance 'complete replacement' of the division sent to Vietnam. In addition, the Johnson Administration promised not only to maintain the existing level of the Military Assistance Program (MAP), but also to underwrite a comprehensive modernisation of the Korean forces' 'fire power, communications and mobility'. Furthermore, the US pledged resource for South Korea to upgrade three reserve divisions to the status of active division. In 1966 when South Korea committed a second combat division, the US pledged 'substantial items of equipment for the modernization' of the Korean forces, plus resources necessary for improving Korea's anti-infiltration capability, ammunition production, and air transport capability.<sup>55</sup>

The US-Korean alliance, of course, failed to stop the communist takeover of South Vietnam. However, for the Park government, it removed the primary sources of its insecurities. Korea was no longer under pressure to convert its conventional military forces into nation builders. Actually, South Korea came to occupy the position that it had never been in: the most committed partner in America's containment policy in Asia who deserved a large share of US military assistance. As one White House official noted. 'None of our [America's] other friends has nearly as good a record [as the Koreans]. A good deal more would *not* (italic original) be unreasonable for the Australians, New Zealanders, Filipinos, Thai, Malaysians—to say nothing of our "staunch" European friends.'<sup>56</sup>

For all intents and purposes. South Korea intervened in the Vietnam War in order to impress a US that was willing to reward the Seoul government with additional military aid. It was imperative on the part of South Korea to demonstrate its value to the war effort in Vietnam and increase its leverage vis-a-vis Washington. In the words of US officials, they wanted to 'present a credible Korean image'.<sup>57</sup> This goal affected the way in which South Korean soldiers fought and behaved in South Vietnam. South Korea's desire to prove its worthiness as an ally became more intense because, in the beginning, the US military commanders were not enthusiastic towards the Korean combat troops. As noted by officials in the US embassy

in Saigon, American generals had 'very little zeal' regarding troops from countries like Korea: '[T]he care and feeding of these third country elements has always proved far more trouble than it is worth.'<sup>58</sup> Indeed, the orders were tall. The US was expected to provide ammunition, fuel, and rations as well as ordnance, automotive and communications equipment. Also, American logistics units had to transport men and material.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, American officials were sceptical of Koreans' ability to fight a guerrilla war. Rusk once told Park, who had just volunteered his soldiers for Vietnam, that Korean forces had no 'suitable role' to play in that conflict because of their lack of experience in guerrilla warfare and of 'skilled cadres ... with command of English/or French, who might be most useful against the Vietcong'.<sup>60</sup> In any event, the US military decided to assign base security duties to Korean units that would allow American soldiers to conduct offensive operations: Koreans 'appear to be sensitive to the possibility of heavy casualties and would be pleased to take over the security mission at the major logistic bases of Cam Ranh and Qui Nhon. They can profitably be used there to extend the secure areas and reinforce the ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] in that populous and important province' along the coastal areas of central Vietnam.<sup>61</sup> With the bases protected by the Koreans, envisioned Westmoreland, American soldiers could be used for 'sustained combat against the new PAVN [People's Army of Vietnam] forces' in the region.<sup>62</sup> Accordingly, South Korea's first division, the Tigers, entered the war essentially as sentries at the American *entrepôt* in Vietnam.

By the middle of 1966, however, the ROK's tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) was extended far beyond the periphery of the port facilities. Korean soldiers now controlled areas north of Qui Nhon to the base of Phu Cat Mountain, a distance of roughly twenty miles. To the northwest, the Korean forces extended their control about 35 miles inland near the town of An Khe (An Tuc). Towards the south, the Korean Marine brigade, the Blue Dragons, operated along Highway 1 between Qui Nhon and Tuy Hoa, a distance of nearly 50 miles, to keep it open. Eventually, the official Army history records, Korean forces 'provided protection to the South Vietnamese for a distance of several hundred miles up and down the coast', from Da Nang in the north to Phan Rang in the south.<sup>63</sup> In a testimony to America's reliance on the Koreans (and perhaps, to its desperation to find any help possible), General William C Westmoreland, commander of US forces in Vietnam, remarked, 'I would be happy with any additional Koreans, regardless of what type or unit. The Koreans have done a magnificent job.'<sup>64</sup>

South Korean soldiers, who were instilled with their *raison d'être*—to make their country a worthy ally of the US by contributing visibly to the war effort—were told to behave in the following manner: 'Brave and fearsome to the enemy, polite and kind to the Vietnamese, well disciplined and reliable to our allies.'<sup>65</sup> Were they? In March 1966 about five months after the arrival of the first contingent of Korea's combat soldiers, Westmoreland's MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of the Korean units. The commander of the American forces in Vietnam was impressed with the Koreans despite some problems. First, in terms of their combat effectiveness, Koreans were reported have achieved a kill ratio of about 16:1 against the enemy. They 'excelled in defending and securing installations and routes'. They were also 'very effective in maintaining security over an area, either alone or in coordination with ARVN units'. US officials as well as the Vietnamese agreed that the 'social behavior' of the Koreans was 'excellent' and perhaps, 'better than that of Americans'. The Koreans were observed to have spent leisure time playing 'volley-ball rather than in bars', even in Saigon where there were, certainly, 'more bars than volley[-]ball courts'.<sup>66</sup> In other words, they were satisfying the first and third conditions—to be effective and dependable. The Korean forces' record on the second condition—to be polite and kind to the Vietnamese—however, did not receive unanimous approval from their Vietnamese and American allies.

The Koreans' skills and reliability as a fighting force were palpable at least in their casualty reports. According to official accounts, after one year of operation, Korean units in Vietnam recorded to have inflicted the following casualties on the enemy.<sup>67</sup>

**Enemy casualties inflicted by Korean Units  
(as of 18 October 1966)**

	<i>Tiger</i>	<i>Blue Dragon</i>	<i>Dove</i>	<i>White Horse</i>	<i>Misc</i>	<i>Total</i>
Killed (Verified)	3584	1112	47	10	5	4758
Killed (Presumed)	1138	108			6	1252
Captured VC	1292	133	6			1431
Detained	3515	1516	56			5087
Voluntary Surrender	57	140		1		198
<b>Total</b>	<b>9586</b>	<b>3009</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	

Meanwhile Koreans suffered casualties of 354 killed, 992 wounded, and ten missing.<sup>68</sup> It meant there were 13.4 enemy killed in action, for every Korean soldier killed in battle, not counting presumed ones. Some US officials did question the validity of this successful record in the beginning. Westmoreland for one had 'initially suspected' that the numbers were 'not accurate'. However, he concluded them to be 'reasonably factual based on the opinion of Americans now stationed with the Republic of Korea forces and working with the units on a liaison basis'.<sup>69</sup>

Koreans attributed their success in battle to the so-called 'cut and destroy' strategy with its heavy emphasis on psychological operation in contrast to the 'search and destroy' strategy of the American units.<sup>70</sup> This is how a typical operation by Korean units unfolded: prior to undertaking military actions, Korean forces often relocated a large number of villagers, for the purpose of 'denying the fish the water'. Then, they undertook preliminary psychological operations designed to persuade the enemy not to resist, and, at the same time, collect information on them. Here, in the eyes of American observers, Korean units undertook some novel approaches to psychological operations. For one of the relocated populations, Koreans sent back the wives or mothers of suspected Vietcong operatives or sympathisers to the villages in the hope of persuading their husbands and children to give up 'if they really cared for their lives'.<sup>71</sup> Another type of preliminary psychological operation was called market strategy. Before commencing military action, Korean units set up a 'market facility' where 'villagers from the VC controlled areas, as well as from the GVN controlled areas were allowed to trade and, occasionally, provided with food and medical treatment' by the Korean soldiers. The main goal was to dispel the image of the Koreans as a hostile occupation force in the minds of the villagers, some of whom were Viet Cong operatives or sympathisers. Also, the markets allowed people to prepare themselves for the upcoming military campaigns that were certain to disrupt the flow of goods. The Korean military commanders boasted that the market strategy encouraged many 'ralliers and refugees' to enter into the friendly areas and provide information that was of great help in planning the upcoming military operation. In many ways, the market was similar to neutral Switzerland where enemies trade and spy on each other. When told of this particular strategy, Westmoreland commented excitedly that it was 'the most sophisticated psywar plan' that he had heard of in Vietnam.<sup>72</sup> Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was equally impressed. He cabled Johnson, 'This is the kind of clever politics, plus clever soldiering which our side must do. It is what I have been dreaming of for three years. And now it has happened. We are going all out to get the word around so that others may do the same.'<sup>73</sup> Only after conducting such psychological operations did Korean units embark on search and destroy operations.

Once the operation was underway, the Korean units' modus operandi was invariably described as 'meticulous', 'deliberate', and 'harrowing'. For example, Henry McPherson, Johnson's special assistant, sent to Vietnam to report on America's third country allies, wrote back, 'God, they [Koreans] are a tough bunch. They have a method of seal-and-search that is the epitome of war psychology; it is slow, harrowing, and effective.' He told Johnson that his only hope vis-a-vis Koreans was that he would 'never meet one in a rice paddy some night without the right set of credentials'. McPherson also visited an Australian unit, where the commanding officer himself recognised that Aussies were 'too cautious' and that their 'effectiveness was being diminished by their conservatism'. There were problems as well. Because of the Koreans' tough approach to weeding out the enemy, McPherson reported, some US officials felt that they 'created as many problems as they solved' by being 'too brutal and careless of civilian life'.<sup>74</sup>

What caused such rumblings, even among American allies, that Koreans could be doing more harm than good? The problem was the Koreans' extensive dealings with civilians for propaganda and intelligence gathering, which led to an unusually large number of 'detainees' generated by their units. According to the table provided earlier showing what the Koreans accomplished, the number of people who were detained under the suspicion of being enemy elements was almost equal to the verified kills. For example, as of October 1966, the Tiger Division reported to have killed 3584 while generating 3515 detainees. The Korean Marine Brigade, the Blue Dragons, reported 1112 enemy killed while reporting 1516 as being detained. According to a study done by two generals. Lieutenant General Stanley Robert Larsen and Brigadier General James Lawton Collins Jr, who had successively commanded the US I Field Force in Vietnam, and worked closely with the Koreans on a liaison basis, 'Detainees were a valuable source of information' for Korean units. 'They were retained in one central area until the Koreans were convinced they had been properly exploited. There was no rush to release the people to return to their homes, the theory being that if held long enough they would provide the desired information.' During interrogations, 'Koreans used rewards routinely to elicit information. They fed and provided medical attention to those people from whom they sought information. They also used bribes of food, money, candy, and cigarettes to soften the more likely subjects (women and children).' After the interrogation, the study noted, 'villagers themselves were employed to point out Viet Cong dwellings and the location of weapons, booby traps, and enemy equipment'.<sup>75</sup>

Korean units at times employed controversial methods of identifying Viet Cong sympathisers and family members. According to Kim Ki Tae, a 31 year old commander of the 7th Company, 2nd Battalion, of the Blue Dragon Korean Marine Brigade, who served in Vietnam from September 1966 to November 1967, soldiers under his command took the quality of garments that villagers were wearing as a possible clue in identifying family members as Viet Cong operatives. Captain Kim related that once soldiers under his command detained a young woman in her twenties who claimed ignorance on her husband's whereabouts. When the soldiers noted that she was wearing what they thought to be fancy imported under-garments, they suspected her to be the wife of a high-ranking Communist official, reasoning that the wife of an ordinary peasant could not afford such fine articles of clothing in the middle of a war. As a suspected wife of a VC commander, evidenced by what she was wearing, she was detained.<sup>76</sup> Because of the large number of detainees generated by the Korean units and their controversial method of identifying enemy elements and sympathisers, as well as extracting information from them, Korean units' modus operandi was increasingly seen as controversial.

South Korean units were not free from accusations of wanton and blatant killing of civilians. According to the US Embassy in Saigon, 'when sniped at or otherwise provoked, by mines or booby-traps', Koreans showed a tendency to 'react in a very tough manner, sometimes destroying [the] offending hamlet'.<sup>77</sup> Nearly a quarter century after the end of the war, one Vietnamese villager recalled that '[m]eeting a Korean was like meeting death'.<sup>78</sup> Testimonies by Korean soldiers concerning civilian casualties are as rare as the stories of their heroic pursuits and gestures of kindness are abundant. Yet one unusually vivid testimony is available. Again, according to Kim Ki Tae, a marine captain, his company took part in a 'cut and destroy' operation named YONG AN in Quang Ngai province in November 1966. During the early phase of the operation, Kim testified after nearly 35 years, his soldiers entered a hamlet, rounded up between 40-50 villagers, and collected their names while giving out candies and cigarettes to children. Kim, feeling that the entire operation had already caused an alarming number of civilian casualties, ordered his men to 'let them go'. However, soon after giving that order and moving away from the group, he heard rifle shots and exploding hand grenades. He turned around and found the situation to be as irretrievable as 'water spilled on the ground'. Under the circumstance the best he could do was to order his men to make sure that there would not be any survivors to tell the story. Kim also related that sometimes children, after being given candies and cigarettes, were killed by the more experienced soldiers in order for them to demonstrate to the fresh recruits the cold-heartedness required of a soldier in Vietnam. Such killings of children were rationalised as eliminating the next generation of VC who would seek revenge for what was done to their villages and families.<sup>79</sup>

Could this be an exaggerated confession of a disillusioned veteran attempting to expunge his guilt by painting himself and his experience as demonic as possible in order to make his redemption more dramatic? Actually, Kim did retract part of his testimony after protests from the Korean veterans of the Vietnam War. Kim's story, however, bears remarkable resemblance to testimonies collected from the villagers by a Quaker couple, Diane and Michael Jones, who conducted extensive interviews with Vietnamese villagers in 1972. Testimonies from Captain Kim and the villagers are identical in terms of the location—Quang Ngai province, Son Tinh District, date—between 9-14 November 1966, and actions taken by the Korean soldiers although they are separated by nearly three decades. The following is what one villager related to the Jones:

That afternoon [of 9 November 1966] I and most of the people in Dien Nien [Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province] went to stay near the Nui Tron outpost [under the control of South Vietnamese forces] until the Koreans were finished with their operation. But more than 50, perhaps up to 100, women and children stayed in their homes. At evening the Korean soldiers came back from An Tho and again gathered these people into a group. They passed out cakes and candies to the children. Then with machine guns and grenade launchers they killed them all. They left the bodies in a large pile. There were no survivors. We know they passed out candy because the men who went down from the hill and discovered the bodies two days later found pieces of it in the mouths and hands of the dead children.<sup>80</sup>

It is less important whether what happened above was actually committed by Kim's company.<sup>81</sup> What is significant is the pattern of behaviour; rounding up of civilians, separating women and children who were given 'bribes' because they were deemed 'more likely subjects' from which information could be extracted.<sup>82</sup> Also men were interrogated for a sustained period. In any event, regarding the YONG AN operation, the Korean marine commander reported to Westmoreland that his soldiers were 'proceeding deliberately in clearing their TAOR' and at the same time 'making friends with the people'.<sup>83</sup> He did not seem to question that these two objectives seldom went hand-in-hand in the Vietnam War.

There is another case of the possible killing of civilians by Korean Marines, the Blue Dragons, about which Korean veterans and the surviving Vietnamese villagers provide similar testimonies. This particular incident, which took place near Da Nang, lacks confessions by actual participants that place the smoking guns in the hands of Korean soldiers. Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming. According to recent testimonies given by the veterans of the 1st Company of the 1st Marine Battalion of the Blue Dragons, a group of Vietnamese civilians was found dead after a patrol by Korean units. During a retaliatory campaign after the famous Tet offensive of 1968, Korean units were on patrol near Phong Nhi village adjacent to Highway 1 in Dien Ban District of Quang Nam Province. Tensions were high as the Koreans sought to punish the enemy for the harassment they had suffered during Tet. First, the testimonies from the soldiers who were in the patrol. In the early morning of 12 February (14 January in the Lunar Calendar), the 1st Platoon approached the village and encountered enemy fire coming from the village. Immediately, the Korean soldiers commenced a search and destroy operation in Phong Nhi. When the 1st and 2nd Platoons entered the village, the enemy had already fled and only the women, children, and elderly, about 70-80 in number, remained. They were ordered to leave the village and walk toward the rear, in the direction of Highway 1 where the 3rd Platoon was moving up toward the village. Soon after the 1st and 2nd Platoons left the village, rounds of gunfire were heard in the rear. The following day, the leader of the 2nd Platoon, Lieutenant Lee Sang Woo, found 40-50 dead bodies covered with straw mats by their family members near Highway 1, the area to which the villagers were ordered to evacuate the day before. Lee testified, after more than 30 years, that he heard from others that his comrades in the rear had massacred the evacuating civilians. It could be deduced from this testimony that the villagers could have encountered the 3rd Platoon on their way to the rear area and met their fate. This, however, remains only a strong possibility because of the lack of concrete evidence that the members of the 3rd Platoon actually fired the shots at the civilians. The leader of the 3rd Platoon testified that he could not remember clearly what had happened, but that smoke was already coming out of

the village before his unit arrived. The commander of the 1st Company that took charge of the attack on Phong Nhi, Captain Kim Sok Kyun, who also claimed not to have a clear recollection of the operation, was shipped back to Korea after the killings were publicised.<sup>84</sup> The results of the Korean government's own investigation remain sealed.

There is the villagers' version of the same incident that paints Koreans as reacting in an erratic and bloodthirsty manner. According to the villagers, a detachment of Korean soldiers struck a land mine a few hundred yards from Phong Nhi, rather than coming under fire. Shortly after the explosion Korean soldiers entered village, rounded up people, and shot them. They also killed some who remained in their homes and set fire to the hamlet. '[S]ome of the bodies, including those of children, had been disemboweled with knives', one witness claimed to have seen. Another related that there were 'naked bodies of small children who appeared to have been literally torn apart by people pulling on both legs'.<sup>85</sup> Phong Nhi, incidentally was a 'secure' village where even the families of South Vietnamese soldiers, the allies of the Koreans, lived. Their denunciation of the actions of the Korean forces prompted the Saigon government to lodge complaints against the Seoul government. Therefore, stories of the Phong Nhi killings were less likely to have been instigated by Communist propaganda.

US officials were aware of the fact that Korean patrols employed heavy-handed measures and often produced a large number of civilian casualties. Regardless, US military personnel showed remarkable nonchalance. For one, MACV claimed that the 'Vietnamese seemed to approve this tactic, saying toughness was necessary, and noted that villagers now tend to keep VC [Viet Cong] elements away and that as result Koreans do not get sniped at much any more'.<sup>86</sup> There is evidence that US military commanders might have indirectly encouraged such behavior. For example, Westmoreland reported to Washington that 'It is significant that Highway 1 has remained open through the length of the Korean TAOR during the [Tet Offensive]'.<sup>87</sup> Realising the importance that their American allies attached to the opening of Highway 1 the Koreans once held a public ceremony 'observing re-opening of Route [Highway] 1 between Cam Rahn and Toy Hoa', throughout which Korean units held the enemy in check and repaired the road. US officials found this ceremony to be 'most unusual', for it could have invited the enemy to disrupt the road again and net a propaganda victory. Nevertheless, this show of self-confidence on the part of the Koreans was a 'welcome' event.<sup>88</sup> It should be noted that in trying to keep Highway 1 open, the Korean forces ended up being implicated in such incidences as the Phong Nhi killings.

There was another problem with the Koreans' *ruse de guerre*, 'heavy use of artillery'.<sup>89</sup> Here, too, the Koreans were not squeamish about such practices. For example, the commander of South Korea's second division, the White Horse, noted during a conference among the commanders of the allied forces that one of the significant characteristics' of his division's operations was 'the concentration of firepower on successive objectives'. He insisted that the 'enemy should be neutralized within the ring of encirclement with continuous bombardment to prevent organized resistance'. The Korean commander expressed a '[s]incere appreciation' to US units for providing the 'fire support'. Such an assertion was in contrast to a report from an American field commander who had just completed Operation ENTERPRISE that '[v]ery careful control must be exercised over fire support means. There are lots of people in the area, few free fire zones [which are considered enemy territory], and very restrictive rules of engagement.' The Australian commander, Major General Tim Vincent, on the other hand, felt that 'a major problem to face is providing freedom for the people in the ATF [Australian Task Force] area'. This particular conference ended with Westmoreland's remark, which the Korean commanders probably understood as an approval of their tactics: 'We have been our own worst enemy in advertising civilian casualties. The press picks up reports and people in the US think there are more civilian casualties than anytime in history. Actually, there are fewer than ever. Commanders and troops have exercised the greatest restraints'.<sup>90</sup>

When confronted with the accusation that his soldiers had brutalised the Vietnamese civilians, the commander of the Korean expeditionary forces to Vietnam, Major General Chae Myung Shin, held the enemy's modus operandi responsible: 'Even I, the commander, suffered two terrorist attacks, from which I survived barely. [In one occasion,] the female who approached me with a hidden bomb was about twelve or thirteen years old. When the commander [who is

well protected] was subject to such an attack, try to imagine what the enlisted men were going through' during their patrol. Chae concluded that Vietnam was 'a difficult war where even God could not identify' combatants from noncombatants:

A cute seven-year old approaches [the soldiers] in a playful gesture, then, drops a hand grenade and runs away. Soldiers who could not escape will fall, and shots will be fired [by the surviving soldiers] toward the direction [of the child.] In any war, there are circumstances where such a reflexive retaliation could take place, and the Vietnam War was the worst case. That does not mean our soldiers killed civilians indiscriminately.<sup>91</sup>

In any event, according to some recent research that is disputed by the Seoul government, Korean soldiers might have killed somewhere between 8000 to 9000 civilians in South Vietnam.

Technically, at least, the US military command should assume partial responsibility for the South Korean forces' excesses. First, the Korean forces' operations were coordinated with American field forces and, second, within this arrangement, MACV's 'requests' were 'honored as orders' by the Korean units.<sup>92</sup> In case of the Korean Marine Brigade, the Blue Dragons, against which accusations of civilian killings were most frequently levied, it was under the 'de facto operational control' of the 1st US Marine Division. Actually, Westmoreland boasted of securing an assurance from Park that the Korean president was 'happy that the Koreans are under your [Westmoreland's] command', and that he was ready to use this statement to keep the commanders from Seoul in line. In return for the Korean commanders' taking orders from him, Westmoreland once admitted that he had to 'scratch their backs'.<sup>93</sup> Such arrangements, plus the Koreans' reliance on the US forces for airmobile and tactical fire support, made Washington partially responsible for the conduct of the Korean forces. The US military command in Vietnam was in a position to know about Korean units' modus operandi and demand corrective measures. However, American commanders not only acquiesced to the practice but showered the Koreans with what one US commander called 'studied flattery' to the Korean generals.<sup>94</sup>

One unique aspect of the way Korean units operated in South Vietnam that set them apart was their heavy involvement in pacification. In many cases Koreans stayed in the villages after they were 'secured' and tried to contribute to rebuilding the community, something that US soldiers were not encouraged to do because of the danger of appearing to be an occupying army. But not the Koreans. As explained by the Korean military, its soldiers had three post-combat objectives: '(1) to provide a secure environment and prevent enemy infiltration; (2) to conduct extensive civic action, and (3) to support revolutionary development efforts of the RVN'.<sup>95</sup> In the process Korean soldiers were put in a position where they had to deal closely with civilians.

The Korean pacification campaign also began with a psychological operation. The Tigers certainly took 'pride in the number of VC killed' during combat operations, but also realised that 'the number of family [sic] who cry over the death of the VC will increase accordingly to such an extent that they would not try to understand or sometimes even deplore the war efforts of Free World Forces in Vietnam', said one Korean commander. Therefore, Korean soldiers were encouraged to pay a 'condolence call on the bereaved VC family, in an effort to express our regrets, explain the inevitability of our action which resulted in such a sorrowful consequence and deliver to them relief goods and money in our gesture of consoling their broken-hearts'.<sup>96</sup>

It is difficult to imagine that families and relatives of Communist operatives were comforted by seeing the soldiers who had killed their loved ones return with food and money. More often Korean units undertook relief actions including food distributions, dispensation of medical services and small-scale construction services, to win the 'hearts and minds' of the villagers while maintaining security parameters. According to Chae's estimate, he had invested 70 per cent of the manpower under his command into these civic actions. In his mind, such strategy made the Korean forces stand out in contrast to the corrupt South Vietnamese forces, alien Americans, and demanding Communist forces.<sup>97</sup>

One advantage the Koreans claimed to have over other forces aiding Vietnam was their understanding of the Vietnamese culture. Westmoreland once took a tour of a Korean forces' pacification site where soldiers repaired the pagoda of a Buddhist temple. He noted: 'There seemed to be an excellent relationship between the Koreans [a large number of whom are Buddhists] and the [Buddhist] Monks.'<sup>98</sup> Buoyed by such scenes of success, the Koreans were praised as a 'distinct asset' that has contributed 'magnificently toward pacification efforts'. Johnson was pointed to Phu Yen Province, south of Qui Nhon where the ROK's Tiger Division was based, as evidence of the Korean soldiers' effectiveness: 'the Viet Cong controlled 75 percent of the rice growing land and 80 per cent of the people in 1965. Now [in 1967], the Province is nearly completely under the control of the Government of South Vietnam.'<sup>99</sup> Bunker in particular was impressed with the military aspect of the Korean units' pacification efforts:

In three different areas the Republic of Korea forces are conducting an experiment in which they send a ten man liaison team to a selected village. These soldiers assist in military training of the regional and popular forces and support the RD teams. This may result in improved Vietnamese performance, not only because of the additional training, but because of the example the Koreans hopefully will set.<sup>100</sup>

The Koreans' success in pacification could be attributed, explained Shin Sang Chul, the South Korean Ambassador to Saigon, to the fact that they shared with the Vietnamese a similar 'custom' based on 'Confucian influence and belief in [the] strength and security of the family'. Korean soldiers also tried hard to be 'polite' to the villagers and demonstrated 'special respect' to the local customs such as refraining from disturbing graves in building of camps'. They showed 'special respect to elderly people [by] consulting them and providing refreshments to them after entering villages'. Finally, the Koreans showed sensitivity to traditional customs by 'refusing cigarettes to youth'. Vietnamese elders feared that an increasing number of young people were picking up the habit because of a wartime breakdown of traditional social mores.<sup>101</sup> Indeed, Koreans, as part of psychological warfare, dropped leaflets that read, 'Dear citizens! We, Koreans, are the same Asians as you. We preserve the similar traditions and customs as you. We respect the aged people, protect weak females, and love children ...'.<sup>102</sup> Essentially, the Korean government argued that its soldiers had won the 'hearts and minds' of the South Vietnamese. That, of course, was one achievement that eluded American troops throughout the war. Impressed, Johnson inquired from aides, 'Why not get Korean civilians into Pacification[?]'<sup>103</sup>

There were also different views on Korea's role in pacification. The US Army's official history noted, 'Korean pacification efforts have been the subject of a certain amount of controversy over the years'. In the early years of the war, Americans held 'highly favorable' attitude towards Koreans' role in pacification. However, eventually, doubts began to be cast over whether Koreans were actually contributing to rebuilding the villages ravaged by the war or under the threat of Vietcong intimidation. The US Army noted that, although Koreans provided excellent local security', they did not receive the unanimous approval of their American allies for their ability to help the Vietnamese to become ultimately responsible for the security and reconstruction of their own communities. Otherwise, pacification was nothing more than another form of foreign assistance. Koreans were faulted for devoting 'scant attention to upgrading Vietnam government territorial forces'. Therefore, there was 'insufficient co-ordination and co-operation in dealing with the Vietnamese'. Some US officials also found the pride of the Koreans' pacification campaign—civic actions including food distribution, medical services, and construction—'inadequate'.<sup>104</sup> One of the reasons, as related by a Korean war correspondent, was that soldiers from his country often by-passed the village leaders and officials when distributing foodstuffs and other relief materials to the people, thereby undermining the authority of local leaders. He found this behavior arrogant and counterproductive to winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese.<sup>105</sup> Also there was the issue of 'alleged corruption on the part of Korean officers and units'. More importantly, Koreans could not shed the image of being brutal to civilians suspected of being Communist sympathisers. The 'neutralization activities' of the Korean units were 'shrouded in secrecy', records the US Army history. Reading between the lines it is clear that the suspected enemy elements were treated in a manner that did not correspond to official guidelines. Actually, South Korean soldiers reminded some Vietnamese of the Koreans who were part of the

Japanese military that occupied French Indochina at the end of the Second World War. Regardless of the fact that Japan had colonised Korea and that those soldiers were forced into service, they were considered Japan's 'mercenaries'. Ultimately, these inadequacies and problems led to 'hamlet regression', which was the surest sign of the failure of pacification.<sup>106</sup>

## Conclusion

The Korean soldiers in South Vietnam were there to impress their patron, the US. Certainly they did so. First, the Koreans were remarkably forthcoming with their troop dispatch, setting them apart from America's other allies. Ambassador Winthrop Brown once wrote,

We first asked for a small medical unit and got it. Then we asked for non-combat troops and got 2,000. Then we asked for a combat division and got that. Before the ink was dry on the agreement for the first combat division we asked for a second combat division and ultimately got that.<sup>107</sup>

Second, Koreans impressed Americans with their combat effectiveness. Regardless of the accusations against Korean soldiers of brutalising the Vietnamese civilians, they earned high praise from their American allies. General Creighton Abrams, successor to Westmoreland as the commander of US forces, once compared the war effort in Vietnam to orchestral music: 'It is sometimes appropriate to emphasize the drums or the trumpets or the bassoon, or even the flute.' Koreans, he noted, played mostly one instrument— 'the base drum'. Notwithstanding the overwhelming and indiscriminate show of force that characterised the Korean units' combat style, in the eyes of American commanders, the net 'results' of their modus operandi was 'generally good', and that was 'what count[ed] in the end'.<sup>108</sup>

Knowing that their actions impressed most of their American allies, Koreans were never squeamish about advertising the ferocity that invited accusations of brutalities against civilians. Johnson himself was told, 'the Korean forces have proven themselves to be a highly effective fighting force, without which, the Vietnamese Armed Forces (South) and other free world forces would be severely pressed to maintain control of this important part of the eastern coastal plains'.<sup>109</sup> The Administration's attitude toward the contributions the Korean units were making in Vietnam was well captured in the following reassurance Johnson was given: 'there are lots of Americans who don't give a damn how much it costs to support foreign soldiers so long as it enables an American boy to stay home'.<sup>110</sup> After all, as one Johnson aide insisted, 'the total cost to the US for equipping and paying' for Korean soldiers was 'peanuts compared to what it would be for a comparable number of Americans'.<sup>111</sup> The surest sign of product approval, of course, is continuing demand. In 1967, the US entered into negotiations to secure a third division from South Korea. The dispatch of the so-called light division, which was to be composed of 11,000 combat soldiers and about 5000 paramilitary logistics personnel, did not materialise because of the disagreement between Washington and Seoul over how much the US should pay the paramilitary personnel. Also, North Korea's capture of the American intelligence-gathering ship *Pueblo* and the failed commando attack on Park in January of 1968 heightened tension on the Korean peninsula and prevented Seoul from committing deeper to the Vietnam War.

The retreat of the alliance began in 1969 with the advent of the Nixon administration. The alliance was built on the agreement the South Korea's troop commitments in Vietnam would be rewarded with America's assistance to South Korea. This equation also meant that the weakening of Washington's military commitment to South Korea would cause a decrease in Korean involvement in the war. This is what had happened when Nixon announced what was known as the Guam Doctrine, which stated that, although the US would honour its treaty obligations, countries under Communist threat such as South Korea should assume primary responsibility for their own defence. In March 1971, eighteen months after the declaration of the Nixon doctrine, 20,000 US soldiers were withdrawn from South Korea. Seoul's vocal protest was placated with the promise of funds for the modernisation of Korean forces in the future. The US troop withdrawal from Korea, combined with the Vietnamisation of the war effort, and the Paris peace talks, shifted the gears of South Korea's involvement in the Vietnam War into reverse. Park understood these developments as the retreat of America's

overall commitment in Asia and reacted to them by cutting down on large-scale operations by the Korean forces in Vietnam. For example, combat operations involving battalions or larger forces dropped from 300 in 1970 to 256 in 1971, and finally, to 54 in 1972. Small unit operations of the company and platoon level dropped from 130,294 in 1971 to 40,381 in 1972.<sup>112</sup> Also, in the 70s, Korean soldiers who were sent to Vietnam were 'lower quality than the "cream of the crop" of the entire Korean Army' which Seoul contributed in the 1960s.<sup>113</sup>

The Pulitzer Prize winning chronicler of America's debacle in Vietnam, Neil Sheehan, detected a hint of conspiracy in the Korean units' inaction: Koreans were 'reneging on their Hessian role because of secret instructions from Seoul to avoid casualties'. He related that at this point, Koreans 'would not even keep open the road that was II Corps' main supply route from the docks at Qui Nhon to the depots at Pleiku'. Therefore, the American commander had to 'curse at the Korean generals for two weeks to get them to reopen the road (Highway) I', relates Sheehan.<sup>114</sup> Disappointing though it might have been to the Americans that Korean soldiers were winding down their involvement prematurely and conspicuously, the Seoul government saw no alternative. Actually, it was the logical thing to do. To the Koreans it was the US that first negated the quid pro quo exchange equation that held the alliance together. Furthermore, there was no reason for South Korea to protect the supply route that would soon see no supplies.

## Endnotes

1. Korean names are written surname first, to be followed by given and middle names. For example, president Park's full name is written Park Chung Hee rather than Chung Hee Park, which is a westernised style. Korean names that appear in this article follow the traditional Korean style.
2. Although Korean soldiers in South Vietnam were affectionately called 'tigers' or ROKs, after Republic of Korea, they were organised into Tiger, Blue Dragon, White Horse, and Dove units. The Tiger Division was the first combat force unit to arrive in South Vietnam.
3. Bum Shik Shin (comp.), *Major Speeches by Korea's Park Chung Hee* (Seoul: Hollym Publishers, 1970), 237, 281.
4. Memorandum of Conversation: Korean-United States Tour d'Horizon, 14 November 1961, *Foreign Relations of United States 1961-1963*, Vol. XXII, *Northeast Asia* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), 532. This volume will hereinafter be cited as FRUS 1961-1963, *Northeast Asia*.
5. Walt W Rostow (Special Assistant to the President) to Lyndon B Johnson, 6 March 1967, 'Vol IV, 1/67- 8/67', Box 255, Korea, Country File, National Security File (hereinafter cited as Korea Country file), Lyndon B Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereinafter cited as LBJL).
6. Komer to McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs), 26 March 1964, 'Memos, Vol I, 11/63-6/64', Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL.
7. Komer to Johnson, 31 July 1964, 'Memos, Vol II, 7/64-8/65', Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL.
8. Presidential Task Force on Korea: Report to The National Security Council, 5 June 1961, Box 4, Vice-Presidential Security File, National Security File, LBJL, (hereinafter cited as Presidential Task Force on Korea), 12.
9. Notes of the 485th Meeting of the National Security Council, 13 June 1961, *FRUS 1961-1963*, *Northeast Asia*, 481.
10. Komer to Bundy, 20 December 1961, *ibid*, 549.
11. Memorandum of Conversation, Korean-United States Tour d'Horizon, 14 November 1961, *ibid*, 533.
12. Detailed statistics on South Korea's participation in the Vietnam War are found in the website of the Institute for Military History of South Korea's defense ministry < w w w mnd.go.kr >.
13. SNIE (Special Intelligence Estimate) 42-61, 21 March 1961, *ibid*. 433.
14. Memorandum of Conversation: US-Korean Relations, 14 November 1961, *ibid*, 537.
15. House Committee on International Relations, *Investigation of Korean-American Relations; Report of the Subcommittee on International Organization*, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978, 164.
16. Presidential Task Force on Korea, 1-9.
17. Bum, *Major Speeches by Korea's Park Chung Hee*, 36.
18. Memorandum of Conversation: Korean-United States Tour d'Horizon, 14 November 1961, *FRUS 1961-1963*, *Northeast Asia*, 533.
19. Memorandum of Conversation: US-Korean Relations, 14 November 1961, *ibid*, 537.
20. Young Soon Yim (ed), *Handbook on Korean-US Relations: Centennial Edition* (New York; The Asia Society, 1985), 283.
21. The Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced the strongest opposition to cuts in the allied military presence in Korea citing the danger of 'encourag[ing] the very aggression we [the] US seek to deter'. See Lyman L Lemnitzer (Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to Robert S McNamara, *FRUS 1961-1961*, *Northeast Asia*, 554. Also, the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 did not help the liberal nation builders.
22. Komer to Kennedy, 31 May 1963, *ibid*, 648.
23. Komer to Carl Kaysen (Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs), 26 September 1962, *ibid*, 607.
24. McGeorge Bundy to Alexis Johnson (Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs), 20 December 1963, 'Memos Vol 1, 11/63-6/64', Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL.
25. Untitled, 7 December 1963, 'Memos, Vol 1, 11/63-6/64', Box 254, Korea Country file, LBJL.
26. Komer to Johnson, 22 January 1964, 'Memos, Vol 1, 11/63-6/64', Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL.
27. Komer to Bundy, 9 December 1963, 'Filed by the LBJL', Box 256, Korea Country File, LBJL.
28. Untitled, 7 December 1963 'Memos, Vol 1, 11/63-6/64', Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL.
29. Cable 1538 to Tokyo, 16 December 1963, 'Cables, Vol 1, 11/63-4/64', Box 250, Japan, Country File, National Security File, LBJL.
30. 'Study of Possible Redeployment of US division now stationed in Korea', NSAM 298, 5 May 1964, Box 4, National Security Action Memorandum, National Security File, LBJL.
31. Robert W Barnett (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) to Robert W Black (Chief of the Military Assistance Division of the Agency for International Development), 5 October 1964, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXIX, Part I, *Korea* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2000), 52. This volume will hereinafter be cited as *FRUS 1964-1968*, *Korea*.
32. Bundy to McNamara and Rusk, 9 June 1964, NSAM 298—Study of Possible Redeployment of US division Now Stationed in Korea', Box 4, National Security Action Memorandum, National Security File (hereinafter National Security Action Memorandum), LBJL.

33. 'Memorandum for the President', 8 June 1964, 'NSAM 298—Study of Possible Redeployment of US division Now Stationed in Korea', Box 4, National Security Action Memorandum, LBJL.
34. Park's predecessor, Rhee Syngman, had first linked Korea's intervention in the conflict in Indochina to America's underwriting of expansion of Korea's armed forces. In February of 1954, Rhee offered a combat division to the embattled French forces in Vietnam in exchange for Washington's financing of a 75 percent increase in Korea's military forces, from twenty to 35 divisions. The offer was turned down. See, Memorandum of Discussion. 185th Meeting of NSC, 17 February 1954, in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1984), 1054-56.
35. Memorandum of Conversation: US-Korean Relations, 14 November 1961, *FRUS 1961-1963, Northeast Asia*, 536.
36. Edwin W Martin (Political Advisor to the Commander in Chief, Pacific) to Sterling J Cottrell (Director of the State Department's Vietnam Task Force), 19 January 1962, in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol II, Vietnam* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), 54. The US allowed South Korea to send a group of intelligence experts whose arrival in Vietnam in May 1962 marked the beginning of South Korea's involvement in the Vietnamese conflict. Worth H Bagley (Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative) to Maxwell D Taylor (President's Military Representative), 3 May 1962, *ibid*, 374.
37. Cable 838 to Seoul, 18 March 1964, 'Cables, Vol V, 3/64', Box 2, Vietnam Country File, LBJL. The US had more reasons than its discomfiture with Korea's anticipation of material rewards, to refuse Park's offer of troops for South Vietnam. For example, South Korea's deeper involvement threatened the US-backed rapprochement talks between Seoul and Tokyo, two vital US allies that did not recognise each other largely because of Seoul's refusal to establish formal relations with its former coloniser.
38. Cable 3456 from US Mission to UN, 20 March 1964, 'Memos, Vol XI, 3/64', Box 3, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
39. Circular Telegram 14, 2 July 1964, 'Cables, Vol XIII, 6/64-7/64, Box 6, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
40. Cable 1065 to Saigon, 12 November 1964, 'Cables, Vol XXI, 11/1-15/94', Box 10, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
41. Cable 1502 from Saigon, 14 November 1964, 'Cables, Vol XXI, 11/1-15/94', Box 10, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
42. Cable 531 to Seoul 17 December 1964, 'Cables, Vol II, 7/64-8/65', Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL.
43. Cable 552 from Seoul, 19 December 1964, 'Cables, Vol II, 7/64-8/65', Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL; Chester L Cooper (Member of National Security Council) and Bundy to Johnson, 22 December 1964, 'Memos, Vol XXIV, 12/19- 25/64', Box 11, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
44. Situation report on South Vietnam, 3 March 1965, 'Memos, Vol XIX, 3/1 - 8/65', Box 14, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
45. Cable 531 to Seoul, 17 December 1964, 'Cables, Vol II, 7/64-8/65', Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL.
46. Cable 12 to Seoul, 3 July 1964, 'Cables, Vol II, 7/64 - 8/65', Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL.
47. Johnson did not authorise the bombing of North Vietnam's urban centres and industrial facilities that his generals recommended out of fear of provoking Beijing. See Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air War: American Bombing of North Vietnam* (New York: Free Press, 1989), 73-88.
48. Merle Miller, *Lyndon: An Oral Biography* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), 464.
49. Bundy to Johnson, 6 March 1965, 'Memos (A) Vol XXXI [2 of 2], 3/12-31/65', Box 15, Vietnam Country File, LBJL Ambassador Taylor warned that US ground forces in Vietnam would engender criticism that the US had assumed 'the old French role of alien colonizer and conqueror'. Cable 3003 from Saigon, 16 March 1965, Memos (A), Vol XXXI [1 of 2], 3/12-31/65', Box 15, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
50. 'Key Elements for Discussion, April 1, 1965 at 5:30 PM', Tabs 120-140, Deployment of Major US Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Vol 2, Box 41, National Security Council Histories, National Security File, LBJL.
51. NSAM 328, 6 April 1965, reprinted in US Department of Defense, *Pentagon Papers*, Senator Gravel Edition, vol. III (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 702-3.
52. Memorandum of Conversation; US Korean Relations, 17 May 1965, 'Memos, Vol II, 7/64-8/65', Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL.
53. Telegram 866 from Seoul, 15 March 1965, *FRUS 1964-1968, Korea*, 61.
54. Memorandum of Conversation: Visit of President Park, Communique Meeting, 18 May 1965, 'Memos, Vol II, 7/64-8/65', Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL.
55. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Republic of Korea Hearings before a Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970 (hereinafter cited as *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*), 1549-50, 1569.
56. Brown to Rusk, 2 November 1966, *FRUS 1964-1968, Korea*, 216.
57. Cable 3169 from Saigon, 2 March 1966, 'Cables, Vol XLVIII, 3/1-16/66', Box 28, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.

58. William H Sullivan (Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs) to Bundy, 24 June 1964, 'Memos, Vol 12, 6/14-27/64', Box 5, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
59. CINCPAC (Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command) 222149Z, 22 April 1965, 'Cables, Vol 33, 4/21-30/65', Box 16, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
60. Cable 12 to Seoul, 1 July 1964, 'Cables, Vol II, 7/64-8/65', Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL; 'Research Memorandum Third Country Assistance to South Vietnam', 28 August 1964, 'Memos, Vol XVI, 8/16-31/64', Box 7, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
61. JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) 10969, 13 June 1965, 'Cables (B), vol 35, 6/1-21/65', Box 18, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
62. COMUSMACV (Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) to CINCPAC 64435, 23 November 1965, 'Cables, Vol XLIII, 11/23-12/19/65', Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
63. Stanley Larsen and James L Collins Jr, *Allied Participation in Vietnam* (Washington, DC: Department of Army, 1975), 136, 145.
64. 'Background Briefing Presented By General Westmoreland', 29 June 1967, #18 History File, 1 June-1 July 67 [1], box 12. Papers of W C Westmoreland, National Security File (hereinafter cited as Westmoreland Papers), LBJL.
65. *The New York Times*, 9 November 1972, 3.
66. Cable 3169 from Saigon, 2 March 1966, 'Cables, Vol XLVIII, 3/1-16/66', Box 28, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
67. Gukje Munje Yonguso (Institute for International Affairs), *The Vietnam War and Korea's National Security* (Seoul: Gukje Munje Yonguso, 1966), 111. South Korea's second division, the White Horse, arrived in South Vietnam in August, 1966, which explains its insignificant combat contribution shown in this table.
68. 'Memorandum for the President', 11 October 1966, 'Memos (B) Vol 60, 10/66', Box 37, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
69. 'Mission Council Action Memorandum No 163', 1 February 1967, Vietnam Memos (B) Vol 65, 2/1-16/67', Box 40, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
70. Dong Wook Lee, 'Interview Chae Myung Shin, The Former Commanding General of ROK Forces in Vietnam', *Wolganchosun*, August 2000, 352-67. *Wolganchosun* is a leading monthly news magazine in Korea that is considered right of centre in terms of its editorial stance.
71. 'Operation Oh Jak Kyo', 11 June 1967, "#18 History File, 1 June-1 July 1967 [I], box 12, Westmoreland Papers, LBJL.
72. 'Memorandum for Record MACV Commanders' Conference, 22 January 1967', '#12 History File, 13 December 1966-26 January 1967 [II] Box 10, Westmoreland Papers, LBJL.
73. Cable 16456 from Saigon, 25 January 1967, 'NODIS, Vol 5(B) 1/67-4/67' Box 47. Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
74. Henry McPherson (Special Assistant to President) to Johnson, 13 June 1967, 'Vietnam-1967 (part 2) [3 of 3], Box 29, Files of Harry McPherson', National Security File, LBJL.
75. Larsen and Collins Jr, *Allied Participation*, 156.
76. Sung Chul Hwang, 'Haebiyong Jungdae Jangui Kobaek (Confession of A Marine Company Commander)', *Hankyoreh* 21, 35-37. *Hankyoreh* 21 is one of the leading weekly news magazines in Korea that is considered generally left of centre in terms of its editorial slant.
77. Cable 3169 from Saigon, 2 March 1966, 'Cables, Vol XLVIII, 3/1-16/66', Box 28, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
78. Ron Moreau, 'Apocalypse Then: Vietnamese villagers mournfully remember a pattern of atrocities by South Korean soldiers', *Newsweek* (International Edition, Asia), 10 April 2000. This article is available on the following website: <<http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/nw-srv/printed/int/asia/a18168-2000apr3.htm>>.
79. Sung Chunil Hwang, 'Haebiyong Jungdae Jangui Kobaek', *Hankyoreh* 21, 35-7.
80. Frank Baldwin, Diane Jones, and Michael Jones, *America's Rented Troops: South Koreans in Vietnam* (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1976), 20-1.
81. There is one major difference in the two testimonies mentioned here. According to Kim, the Korean units encountered the villagers in the afternoon, in the villagers' story the killings look place in the evening.
82. Larsen and Collins Jr, *Allied Participation*, 156.
83. 'General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 11 November 1966', #11, History File, 13 Dec 66 - 26 Jan 67 [I], Box 10, Westmoreland Papers, LBJL.
84. Kyung Tae Go and Sang Chul Hwang, 'Yangmin Haksal, Jungang Jungbobueso Josahaetda (Civilians Killings: The Korean Central Intelligence Agency Had Conducted Investigations)', *Hankyoreh* 21, 4 May 2000, 18-22.
85. Baldwin and Jones, 'America's Rented Troops', 29.
86. Cable 3169 from Saigon, March 2, 1966, 'Cables, Vol XLVIII, 3/1-16/66', Box 28, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
87. Earl G Wheeler (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) to Johnson, 11 February 1968, 'Vol 61, February 10-13', Box 29, Walt Rostow, Memos to the President, National Security File, LBJL.
88. Cable 12711 from Saigon, 7 December 1966, 'NODIS, Vol 4(A) 7/66-12/66', Box 47, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.

89. Cable 3169 from Saigon, 2 March 1966, 'Cables, Vol XLVIII, 3/1-16/66', Box 28, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
90. MACV Commanders' Conference, 2 April 1967', #15 History File, 27 March - 30 April 1967', Box II, Westmoreland Papers, LBJL.
91. Dong Wook Lee, 'Interview: Chae Myung Shin, The Former Commanding General of ROK Forces in Vietnam', *Wolganchosun*, August 2000, 352-67.
92. Larsen and Collins, Jr, *Allied Participation*, 134.
93. 'Mission Council Action Memorandum #129', 5 October 1966, 'Memos (B), Vol 60, 10/66, Box 37, Vietnam Country File, LBJL Throughout its involvement in the Vietnam War, South Korea sought, without success, to establish a 'combined command', in which American and Korean commanders would maintain equal standing and collectively make decisions regarding the execution of the war.
94. Larsen and Collins Jr, *Allied Participation*, 151.
95. Memorandum for Record: MACV Commanders' Conference, 22 January 1967', #12 History File, 13 December 1966-26 January 1967 [II]', Box 10, Westmoreland Papers, LBJL.
96. 'Operation OH JAK KYO', 11 June 1967, '#18 History File, 1 June -1 July 1967[II]', box 12, Westmoreland Papers, LBJL.
97. Dong Wook Lee, 'Interview, Chae Myung Shin, The Former Commanding General of ROK Forces in Vietnam', *Wolganchosun*, August 2002, 352-67.
98. 'General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 11 November 1966', '#11 History File, 13 December 1966-26 January 1967 [I]', Box 10, Westmoreland Papers, LBJL.
99. Bromley Smith (Executive Secretary of the National Security Council) to Johnson, 16 August 1967, 'Vietnam, Memos to the President (Vol 2), 8/3-27/67 (1 of 2)', Box 56, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
100. Ellsworth Bunker (US Ambassador to South Vietnam) to Johnson, 7 June 1967, 'Vietnam 8B(A) Bunker's Wkly Rpt to the President', Box 104, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
101. Text of Cable 25255 from Saigon, 11 May 1967, 'Memos (A), Vol LXXI 5/9-22/67', Box 71, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
102. Robert W Chandler, *War of Ideas: The US Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 218.
103. Text of Cable 25255 from Saigon, 11 M a y 1957, 'Memos (A), Vol LXXI 5/9-23/67, Box 71, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
104. Larsen and Collins, Jr, *Allied Participation in Vietnam*, 157-9.
105. 'Panel Discussion: Issues in Vietnam-Korea Relations', SaSanggye, January 1968, 200-01.
106. Larsen and Collins, Jr, *Allied Participation in Vietnam*, 157-9, Cable 3169 from Saigon, 2 March 1966, 'Cables, Vol XLVIII, 3/1-16/66', Box 28, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
107. Brown to Rusk, 2 November 1966, *FRUS 1964-1968, Korea*, 219.
108. Larsen and Collins, Jr, *Allied Participation*, 153.
109. Bunker to Johnson, 7 June 1967, 'Vietnam 8B(A) Bunker's Wkly Rpt to the President', Box 104, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
110. 'Memorandum for the President', 5 January 1968, '5D(1) Allies: Troop Commitments, Other Aid (General Material) 3/67-1/69', Box 85-91, Vietnam Country File, LBJL.
111. Jack Valenti (Special Assistant to the President) to Johnson, 25 February 1966, 'CO 151, 6/2/65 - 8/8/ 66', Box 49, EX CO 151, Confidential File, White House Central File, LBJL.
112. These figures are available in the website of the Institute for Military History, Defense Ministry, the Republic of Korea: <[www.mnd.go.kr](http://www.mnd.go.kr)>.
113. Larsen and Collins Jr, *Allied Participation*, 151.
114. Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988), 776-7.