Preface

This volume brings together the papers delivered at the third Australian Army annual historical conference, held in Canberra on 30 September 1996. The conference is held at the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, and was organised by members of the School of History at the University College, Australian Defence Force Academy, in conjunction with the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis.

The theme of the conference was strategic planning, and the subject was examined both in light of historical experience and with an emphasis on thematic considerations. There were approximately 100 participants, mostly from Army, and with a sprinkling of retired senior officers who again offered perspectives based on their own, often considerable, involvement in the higher levels of army planning. The papers delivered on the day have been supplemented by an additional offering by Professor Roger Beaumont, who was scheduled to deliver his paper but was forced through personal circumstances to drop out of the programme.

At a time when force structure, roles and missions and the strategic basis of defence policy are under scrutiny in most western armies following the end of the Cold War, it is timely to be reminded of the importance of sound strategic planning in the evolution of military policy. The Australian Army's experience in this area has not always been a happy one: in the interwar period successive Chiefs of the General Staff were largely ignored in the strategic debates of the day, while during the Vietnam War the key decisions which governed Australian involvement were made without much reference to military advice at all. The consequences bear out the observation, by Alfred Thayer Mahan, that as in a building, which however fine its appearance is imperfect if built on insecure foundations, so too, 'if the strategy be wrong, the skill of the general on the battlefield, the valor of the soldier, the brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of their effect'. But as a number of the contributions here remind us also, the processes of strategic planning are long and involved, and the long-term neglect of them in peacetime cannot be made up quickly when circumstances demand.

In running the conference and publishing the proceedings, we acknowledge the assistance of Colonel Richard Howell and the staff of the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis, especially Captain Russell Parkin. Elizabeth Greenhalgh has again undertaken the technical side of production with her accustomed skill. Lastly, we thank the contributors, who have produced their papers to tight deadlines, and all those who attended on the day.

Contents

Contributors: Contributors

Introduction
Lieutenant-General John Sanderson: Sanderson

Joint Strategic Planning: An Historical Perspective
Roger Beaumont: Beaumont

From Vietnam to the Gulf and After: Logistics and US Army Strategic Planning Since 1945
Charles R Shrader: Shrader

US Strategy and Joint Strategic Planning: The Need for 'Hedging' and 'Shaping'
Thomas-Durrell Young and Douglas C Lovelace Jr : Young and Lovelace

Australian Army Strategic Planning Between the Wars
David Horner: Horner

Australian Strategic Planning During the Vietnam War
Peter Edwards: Edwards

From Defence to Security: Continuity and Change in Australian Strategic Planning in the Twentieth Century
Michael Evans Evans

Army's Future Plans/ Strategy
Major-General John Hartley: Hartley