The Paladin: with its emphasis on Sir John Gellibrand's experience of the Great War, is an important new contribution to Australian military history. Peter Sadler demonstrates that as well as being one of the outstanding leaders of the 1st AIF, Gellibrand was also one of its most interesting personalities.

Born into the Tasmanian establishment, but raised and educated in England and Germany, Gellibrand discovered the Paladins as a child and lived his life in service to others, according to the philosophies of those medieval knight errants. He graduated from Sandhurst, then saw active service during the Boer War and attended Staff College before leaving the British Army in 1912 to settle in Tasmania. In August 1914 he joined the AIF as a provisional captain and left it five years later a knighted major-general.

Because of his British Army service, Gellibrand was better trained and more experienced than most of his Australian colleagues. As a staff officer in Australia, in Egypt, and on Gallipoli, Gellibrand helped to raise, train, and administer this new force, then won renown as a brigade and divisional commander in France. Peter Sadler argues that if ill health in December 1916 had not denied him divisional command, Gellibrand might have commanded the Australian Corps from May 1918 instead of Monash. Gellibrand's writings, especially his correspondence with C.E.W. Bean, Australia's official war historian, reveal new information about the AIF's workings and personalities.

After the Great War, Gellibrand served as Tasmania's Public Service Commissioner, Victoria's Police Commissioner, and a member of Federal Parliament. In 1939 the Federal Government sought Gellibrand's advice on defence matters.

Review

Reviewer: John Donovan

This book is a very good addition to the Army Military History series. It focuses on the life, and particularly the military career, of Sir John Gellibrand, but also covers both his early life and his post-military career.

The book reduces to their proper scale some myths about Sir John. Having seen him described as a Tasmanian apple farmer who became one of the First AIF's best generals, I was interested to note that he spent less than two years as an orchardist between his separation from the British Army in 1912 and his appointment to the First AIF in August 1914. I suspect that the nineteen and a half years as a regular officer may well have had more influence on his AIF performance than the 18 months as an apple farmer!

But what would be the reaction now of an officer who was still a Captain after such an extended period of Regular service? Gellibrand seems to have been sustained during this period (and other difficult periods of his life) by his ideal of the Paladins, who were "not leaders of the nation so much as exemplary public servants". His image of them "was not one of super-men, physically, mentally or morally, but rather of men without reproach, positive doers …" These are ideals to which all public employees, not just military personnel, should aspire.

The author makes an attempt to compare the two Sir Johns (Monash and Gellibrand), and suggests that Gellibrand, in different circumstances, might have been a competitor for the command of the Australian Corps in 1918. However, the comparison ignores the very factor that caused Gellibrand to miss out on a divisional command in 1917 – the health problems, including a certain psychological fragility, that plagued him for much of his life. The argument therefore is interesting, but not really convincing. Gellibrand clearly showed great skill in the commands he held, but he also seemed to lack the physical and psychological robustness needed to sustain a commander during extended periods of action. This problem was also evident in his post-war life.

One area where the author is convincing about Gellibrand is in his assessment of Gellibrand the prophet (but one who suffered from the curse of Cassandra in not being believed). Given current concerns about maintaining an Army of a suitable size, his comment on the Squires report of 1939 "They will give us a Regular Army, and at the same time make it impossible to have an Army" has a certain resonance. The intense dislike of the Sandhurst graduate Gellibrand for the concept of a select regular army officers school, because he believed the officers produced stood aloof from the nation, also has its resonance in the 1995 Parliamentary report on ADFA, an organisation which one of the Committee members described as a "military nunnery". Truly, a prophet is not without honour …

In summary, a good book, both for its perspective on Australian military history, and for the insight it gives to a man who was once well known, but now (except for a street name in the Canberra suburb of Campbell) has largely been forgotten. Highly recommended.

John Donovan worked in the Department of Defence for over 32 years, principally in the fields of intelligence, force development and resource management. He also served for several years in the Australian Army Reserve.