In order to understand Australia’s attempts to develop its defence policies it is necessary to examine the generally accepted proposition that Australian foreign policy towards Japan in the postwar period was dominated by a fear of a resurgent Japan.

     The primary Australian motive behind the Australian contribution to the BCOF was rather to ensure a profitable participation in whatever peace settlement was arranged with Japan. In practical terms, however, the tasks set for the BCOF were directed towards the expeditious demilitarisation of Japan. Following Chifley’s announcement on 31 January 1946 of the US Government’s acceptance of the BCOF, Dr Evatt urged a firm policy of demilitarisation, had described Japan as still a menace, decried the tendency to treat war criminals leniently and called for the extraction of full reparations.

     The spectacular successes of the Japanese in the early stages of the war, the intensity of the subsequent conflict and the outrage as the full extent of the brutal Japanese treatment of civilian and military prisoners became known, were all factors that had moulded Australian attitudes towards Japan. On the other hand, as the tide of war turned against the Japanese after 1942 and the military power of the United States gradually exerted itself, the myth of Japanese superiority was destroyed.

     The total cost to Japan of an allied victory was a very heavy one and was made even more so by the American use of atomic bombs against the mainland of Japan. Even though the full significance of the atomic bomb and its effects upon the conduct of war would take some time to be realised, the reality was that the US possessed atomic weapons and used them to end hostilities. Japan would not be a threat to the peace while such a strategic and technological imbalance lasted.

     Nevertheless, there remained a possibility that the occupying forces could have been faced with a military problem of a type that could not be resolved by further use of the atomic bomb. The nature of the conflict to that point, the ferocity of the Japanese defence as the Allies moved closer to the Japanese homeland and the suicide mentality of the Japanese troops, coupled with the uncertainty surrounding the absolute position of the Emperor, were all matters which cast doubts upon any official Japanese guarantee to surrender.

     Despite these misgivings during the last stages of the war, the US occupation proceeded without any military upheaval on the part of the Japanese and the primary military tasks of the Allies were those of dismantling the vast Japanese war machine and that nation’s industrial power to wage war. The decisions of the US military government were obeyed. The finality of the Japanese acceptance, at all levels, of the terms of surrender and the totality of the US hold on the Japanese machinery for war put beyond any question the possibility of the Japanese not observing the surrender agreement. The US Government insisted on arrangements for the occupation of Japan which gave the US Supreme Commander, MacArthur, exceptional powers. The US Government also kept control of Japanese territories outside the mainland under strategic trusteeship conditions linked to the wider US defence deployment in the Pacific. These provisions were a guarantee that the Japanese would not become a threat to the peace in the near future.

     The overwhelming US presence in Japan confirmed the inadequacy of the proposition that Japan could constitute a threat to Australia, or that Australia’s military contribution was of any consequence in the total allied military presence in Japan. The Australian contribution to the BCOF accorded with what had been the Labor Government’s policy for some years: that Australia had to be represented at peace settlements and an Australian military presence in Japan was a symbolic reminder of that policy.

     By 6 November 1946 the Australian Government’s policy towards Japan was being expressed in the following terms: ‘the peace in relation to Japan is of primary and supreme importance to the Australian people and has the broad objective of building Japan into a democratic and peace loving nation.’1 Thus, while the Australian Government appeared to be increasingly anxious about the likelihood of obtaining a return on its contribution to the war, and while the Minister for External Affairs, Evatt, expanded this theme at the time during the Address-in-Reply debate, there was also a growing measure of concern for the rehabilitation of the Japanese people rather than the earlier strong view of imposing penalties. The Australian Government was falling into line with the developing allied view that Japan should be treated as a potential ally within the changing strategic balance, rather than too harshly as a defeated enemy.

     There were signs, even in the November 1946 debate, of a weakening of the resolve to identify Japan as a probable threat, but those speaking in the debate tended to couch their arguments in general terms or to qualify them.2 Nevertheless, Australian spokesmen found it convenient to reiterate, for domestic political purposes, the initial harsh line taken by the Australian Government.

     US awareness of Japan’s importance as a bastion against the Soviet Union preceded the end of the war in August 1945. However, as the disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan had been substantially completed by 1 December 1945,3 the success of this task raised ‘a grave and perplexing question — how was demilitarised Japan to be defended, in the immediate present and in the future?4 The presence of Soviet forces in the Kuriles, Siberia and North Korea made a demilitarised Japan vulnerable without allied military power to protect it. Although the occupation force in Japan implied a counterweight to the Soviet pressure, the purpose of the force was to demilitarise Japan, not to protect it against a foreign power.

     In February 1947 MacArthur sent Dean Acheson, a political adviser to MacArthur, to the State Department in Washington to present a recommendation for a peace treaty with Japan which could be signed by July 1947. The State Department prepared a draft treaty in March 1947, again in July 1947, and again in January 1948. Each draft prohibited the creation of either a regular Japanese military force or an aircraft industry. These drafts nevertheless provided for a coast guard and a police force, and also included reference ‘to resurgent Japanese militarism as Asia’s greatest menace’.5

     The Japanese Government initially favoured the permanent neutralisation of Japan with Japan’s neutrality to be guaranteed by the Great Powers.6 By way of preparation for the expected peace treaty the Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshida, had authorised a study of Japan’s security which envisaged US guarantees for Japan’s security in exchange for US bases on Japanese soil. A proposal to this effect put forward by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ashida, in June 1947, was rejected by MacArthur’s senior advisers, Acheson and Whitney.7 By mid-June 1947 Ashida had launched the following initiatives: a call for the return of Japanese territory; a small reparations obligation; the provisions of a skeleton army and the idea of Japan as an ally against communism as well as springboard for Asiatic operations.8

     These proposals were in conflict with Australian policies towards Japan. Australia had sought to extract reparations from Japan as a penalty for its conduct during World War II; Australia had sought, in exchange for US concessions on Manus, to assist the US Government in its takeover of Japanese or mandated territories; Australia had sought the complete demilitarisation of Japan and expressed its fear of a resurgent and rearmed Japan as the most probable threat to the peace of the Pacific.

     Robertson found himself caught up in the debate being conducted by the Americans over ‘the duties of the Occupation Force in Japan and whether or not those duties included the defence of Japan against external aggression’.9 He ‘insisted that no matter what powers might have been signed away to General MacArthur under the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement which had been ratified by the various Governments concerned, that sovereignty of the British Governments did not allow them to hand over the unrestricted use of their forces to any allied commander no matter how close the relations might be’. Robertson’s reservations were part of his broader dissatisfaction with the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement, which he described as ‘an iniquitous document’ and which had been forced upon Northcott by MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, Sutherland, in exchange for British Commonwealth participation in the occupation.11

     Despite the monotony and the vehemence with which Australia put its views, there were increasing signs of US concessions to the Japanese viewpoint. Even before Ashida’s initiatives, questions were asked in the Australian Parliament as to whether the Japanese Government was seeking to establish an army 100,000 strong, as well as a small air force.12 On 26 June 1947 there was speculation in the Australian press of a Japanese request to establish a coast guard. On 2 July 1947 The Age reported that members of Japan’s new Government has been canvassing senior officers at General MacArthur’s headquarters and members of allied missions in Tokyo for the return of Japanese ex-servicemen to New Guinea, the Netherlands East Indies, British Borneo and Malaya in order to assist the development of these underdeveloped areas. The Japanese Foreign office was also reported to be supporting a campaign for the return of Japanese territory and Yoshida drew the attention of the Allies to Japan’s overcrowded conditions.13 At this same time MacArthur announced, in accord ance with allied occupation policy, ‘that the most essential requirement — the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan — has already been completed and that, even without external controls, Japan could not rearm for a modern war “for a century”.14

     In spite of the cautious nature of the US response to Japanese overtures, Ashida made another attempt in September 1947 to interest the US Government in guaranteeing Japan’s security from external aggression and the senior US army commander in Japan, General Eichelberger, submitted a proposal to the US State Department on behalf of General MacArthur, that a Japanese national police force be created to deal with problems of civil insurrection. This proposal was rejected.

     From time to time Robertson ventured to General Mueller, MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, the opinion that the BCOF’s seven squadrons of first-class aircraft ‘seemed a little too numerous’. Mueller ‘viewed with horror any suggestion that any fighter air craft should be removed from Japan’. Robertson became aware that by mid-1947 US strength in Japan was so low that some US commanders were contemplating, in the event of war with Russia, Japanese use of US mobilisation stores positioned in Japan and sufficient to equip a force of 500,000 men over and above the occupation forces.15 Later Robertson was also to become aware that US plans were based on striking at Russian air fields first and that ‘they expected to use my seven squadrons of fighters as the protection to their bombers during this phase. One officer informed me that they intended to use the BCOF squadrons to destruction in the first 24 hours, at the end of which time they hoped that the known Russian air force on existing aero dromes within reach of Japan would have been rendered non operative.'16

     During 1948 there were more signs of further and marked changes in US and Australian policies towards Japan.17 In Washington on 10 March 1948 reference was made to the ‘Strike Report’, prepared under contract for the US Army, which recommended a scrapping of the allied policy on Japanese reparations and the rebuilding of key Japanese industries.

     MacArthur, in conversations with the US Under Secretary of the Army, William Draper, on 21 March 1948, recognised that the prospects for an early peace treaty had faltered, but he pressed for one as early as practicable even if it meant excluding the Russians. During this same conversation Draper revealed that there was a ‘general trend in recent War Department thinking towards the early establishment of a small defensive force for Japan, to be ready at such times as US occupation forces leave the country’.18 MacArthur pronounced himself as ‘unalterably opposed to any such plan’ and outlined his concept of a main US defence line based upon Okinawa from which the US forces could defend Japan from external aggression without stationing US forces on Japanese soil.19

     The American diplomat George Kennan, in a later comment on the conversations he had had with MacArthur, noted that MacArthur saw the only acceptable permanent solution to the problem of Japanese security as ‘complete demilitarization under an effective international guarantee’.20 Kennan was concerned about the vulnerability of Japanese society to communist propaganda, and on 25 April 1948 American troops were called out, for the first time in the history of the occupation, to quell riots when Korean residents in Japan refused to accept new Japanese school regulations. This rioting led to deaths and injuries and involved an estimated 15,000 Koreans who had threatened Japanese authorities in the prefectural office in Osaka. It also led to the implementation of American plans to meet further large communist-inspired uprisings which were expected to begin on 1 May 1948.21

     Two other incidents occurred which confirmed these trends in Japan. The first was a protest by Patrick Shaw, the British Commonwealth representative on the ACCJ, at the failure of MacArthur to consult the council on the provisions of the Japanese Maritime Safety Authority Act, under which Japan was to have a coast guard of 125 ships of 50,000 gross tonnage.22 The chairman of the ACCJ, William Sebald, argued that as MacArthur was the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers it would have been entirely improper for the council to have discussed the bill. This claim led to a heated discussion, not only over the principle involved concerning consultation, but regarding the possibility of Japan building up its naval strength under the guise of developing a coast guard.23

     The second incident was a statement by the Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshida, to the Japanese Diet in which he claimed that the new decentralised police system was not effective for the maintenance of law and order in Japan and that he would try to have the law amended. Apart from this statement there were reports, attributed to senior police officials, that lack of arms had prevented the police from taking effective measures against rioting Koreans in Kobe and Osaka.24

     These pressures to relax strict policies towards Japan led to the US State Department concurring in a recommendation by Kennan to establish a coast guard in Japan. This concurrence was given on the grounds of ‘economic’ value, and agreement to the strengthening of the police force was given to enable it to cope with ‘communist pressures of disorder’.25

     Australia’s unease about these developments was expressed by Evatt during a debate in the House of Representatives on 8 April 1948, when he said: ‘it would be wrong for Japan to be converted into an arsenal that would ultimately be turned in the direction of the South Pacific’ and it would be an ‘evil day for Australia if Japan is given capacity to rearm’.26

     The public debate in Australia on Japan stepped up noticeably when on 8 May 1948 General Blamey was reported in the Melbourne Sun to have ranged himself with those Americans who saw Japan as a ‘buffer against the spread of Soviet imperialism’. Quite apart from the significance of a statement by Blamey, who had played a major role in the war against the Japanese, equally significant were the divisions which his statement revealed within the RSL. Blamey’s statement was condernned by the Federal Pres ident of the RSL, Mr Milihouse, KC, who stated that ‘the Japanese are entirely unpredictable and might, out of revenge, desire to use their strength against those who defeated them’.27

     Blamey’s statement was supported, however, by the South Australian State President of the RSL, Brigadier A.S. Blackburn, who believed that the Soviet Union had designs on Japan and questioned what would happen if the allies refused to allow the Japanese a defence force. Blackburn, noting a natural reluctance on the part of Australia, or its allies, to be involved in any plan that would risk Australian lives in the defence of Japan, proposed that the Japanese be allowed some form of defence under strict allied control.28

     In Tokyo on 10 May 1948 there was a report that recent British interest in normalising Japan’s international relations had raised hopes in Japan that the peace treaty would be settled in the near future. This was followed by a report which credited Evatt with the view that ‘while Japan must not be placed in a position to rearm or to recreate a dangerous war potential, restrictions on the Japanese economy should not go beyond what is necessary for military security and that Japan should have a workable economy’. 29

     A useful summary of US policies towards Japan at this time is to be found in a Reuters report published in The Age of 8 June 1948. The report described US activities in Japan as a new phase in the occupation of Japan not in order to keep down a defeated enemy, but to man the western bases of the US in the Pacific. In support of this phase the US was actively strengthening air and sea power facilities in Japan to transform Japan into a military base and while the US Government denied any suggestions that Japan should be regarded as a military ally, it was actively encouraging Japanese economic revival.31

     It became increasingly evident, however, that the US Government would not support early finalisation of the Japanese peace settlement and a call by MacArthur to this end was not supported either by the US State Department or the Army Department. Sir Esler Dening at the British Foreign Office proposed on 2 June 1948 to W. Walton Butterworth at the US Department of State that it was unlikely that a general peace treaty could be signed with Japan in 1948 and that the US Government should secure its strategic interests in the western Pacific by the conclusion of a US-Japanese bilateral pact. Such a pact, according to Dening, could give the US the right to station forces in Japan and could be drawn up secretly in advance of the more general treaty and not discussed during treaty negotiations. Butterworth questioned the feasibility of this proposal but was reassured by Dening that Evatt, for example, was ‘quite receptive to the idea, being keenly interested in security considerations’.32

     Meanwhile, there had been a fundamental review of the purposes of the Australian contribution to the BCOF. On 28 April 1948 the CGS requested guidance from the Council of Defence as to the attitude to be adopted in the event that the Australian forces in the BCOF received orders from the US Commander, Japan, ‘the execution of which might be capable of provoking an international incident with, for example, Soviet Russia’. Chifley, by way of reply, reaffirmed that Australian forces in Japan were there for occupation purposes only.

     The background to this request by the CGS was that there had been changes in the status of US forces in Japan. Under orders issued by SCAP on 17 April 1948 planning commenced ‘with a view to placing all occupation troops in Japan in a state of readiness to meet any possible eventualities’.33 The new US policy marked a fundamental shift in the purposes for which US forces were maintained in Japan. Robertson had been reassured by HQ SCAP that these new arrangements should not necessarily apply to the forces under his command. However, it had become obvious that this change had led to some cooling in attitude by US commanders in Japan and, according to a press report in the Sydney Sun on 20 June 1948 had led to an angry reversal by Robertson of a US directive to arm Australian fighter aircraft.34

     During Robertson’s absence for consultations and leave the US Commander, Japan had ordered that all aircraft were to fly armed and the acting C-in-C, BCOF, had agreed to a modified version of this arrangement. Robertson, upon his return, had this decision amended to an arrangement whereby operational proce dures required that for the BCOF the ‘weapons and ammunition carried ... should be as ordered by the C-in-C BCOF’.

     In June 1948 Robertson again sought guidance and under a revised directive, issued in July 1948, was authorised to defend BCOF forces, if attacked, and ‘to engage in full staff discussions with the Americans in Japan on the basis that they involved no government commitment’.35 In the event of US forces being attacked he was required to seek direction from the Australian Government.

     Further investigation showed the revised directive to be inadequate and to turn on the question of the ‘right’ to determine what would be ‘an act of war involving Australia and to commit Australian forces to engage in hostilities’.36 Under the revised directive, issued in November 1948, the C-in-C, BCOF, was authorised ‘that for the purpose of planning and consultation with SCAP it may be assumed that in the event of an attack on Japan, BCOF will act in full co-operation with American forces’.37 To this end Robertson arranged with the ‘American air force for their com plete air warning and control system to be extended to include the BCOF air force, and their main signal lines were brought in and connected up to the back of our switchboards. It only needed a matter of a few seconds then to make the additional connection to bring our system in as part of the overall air system for Japan’.38

     The C-in-C, BCOF, was still required, in the event of an attack, to seek directions from the Australian Government. This revised directive was approved by the Prime Minister and the acting Minister for External Affairs, but was not considered by the Council of Defence until 7 June 1949 when it was ‘noted’.39

     In effect, the Australian force in Japan had fallen into line with the new status accorded US forces, i.e., that of ‘protective power’. As the Australian Head of Mission in Japan, Shaw, was to observe:

    Shaw also referred to his scepticism of the claims made by SCAP of radical changes in Japan and his own reservations about ‘accepting our former enemies as a bulwark’.

     At a meeting of the ACCJ on 5 January 1949 the Soviet delegate, referring to reports in Washington that General Eichelberger had recommended a Japanese police force of 275,000 personnel, accused the United States of using the Japanese police force to provide the nucleus of a new Japanese army.41 The chairman, also the US Government representative on the ACGJ, dismissed the Soviet allegations as ‘rumours and propaganda’. The UK and Chinese members of the council said they were reassured to learn that ‘there was no danger of Japanese rearmament at the moment’ and requested that caution be continued to prevent Japan’s re-emergence as a military power. The Australian representative, Shaw, also requested alertness ‘lest the police force become the grounds of authoritarian control’.

     US initiatives were to set off a major debate on existing policies on the occupation of Japan. In Tokyo on 7 February 1949 the US Under Secretary for the Army, Kenneth Royall, approved in effect the recommendation of General Eichelberger to increase Japan’s police force to 150,000 armed police ‘to maintain security and help the United States occupation force guard vital points’.42 This duality of task put beyond doubt the US intention to give the Japanese force a paramilitary role.

     The second issue to surface publicly as a result of Royall’s visit to Japan was a US denial in Washington on 11 February 1949 that the US Government intended to withdraw at an early date all its occupation forces from Japan.43 The US denial was associated with reports that some leading US military personnel in Washington regarded Japan as indefensible and unworthy of defence, as well as being unsuitable as a base for attacks on the Soviet Union. The reports also draw attention to the persistent US attitude that Europe had a higher strategic importance than the Pacific.44

     On 13 February 1949 in Washington the acting Secretary for the Army issued a denial that a plan existed to withdraw US occupation forces from Japan.45 However, on the same day reports emerged from Tokyo of a secret press conference held in Tokyo during Royall’s visit and at which, it was claimed, he made the following statements: ‘I don’t think we have a single obligation to these [Japanese] people for anything’; ‘some surprising people like the Filipinos and Australians will scream if we leave Japan’; ‘I tend to the opinion that it [Japan] is valueless in the case of war with Russia’; ‘It might be better to pull them [US troops] out before war starts’. Royall was also reported to have said that no decision had been made to withdraw US forces but ‘if we pull out of Japan we can shovel in dollars’.46

     Royall, on his return from Japan, said in San Francisco that he knew ‘of no plans to reduce our forces in Japan’, although he told a journalist that the Army Department had turned down a request from General MacArthur for more troops. Much more significant was his claim that he had held ‘no off the record press conference in Tokyo of any kind whatsoever’.47

     On 16 February 1949 the Washington Post directly attributed the recent reports from Tokyo, regarding the possible withdrawal of American troops from Japan, to Royall and described the incident as the ‘Royall indiscretions’. Following further denials by Royall of statements attributed to him, it became necessary for US Secretary of State Acheson to deny on 17 February 1949 that the US contemplated the withdrawal of US troops from Japan ‘then or during a war’. He also told a press conference that the US Government did not regard Japan ‘as indefensible in a future war’. 48

     The importance to Australia of the Royall incident was that it demonstrated yet again how dependent Australia was upon the US with regard to policy decisions concerning Japan. At this point Australia could not claim any recent progress on its earlier efforts to secure a peace treaty with Japan and the Royall incident illustrated the helplessness of the Australian position. Australia’s participation in the occupation of Japan had been to enhance Australia’s status with regard to future participation in the Japanese peace treaty, but as the New York Times correspondent in Tokyo remarked:

    The Australian Opposition used the Royall incident to seek clarification of the Government’s current policies with regard to Japan and it was Spender who pointed out that Evatt, in his international affairs statement of 9 February 1949, had ‘said not one word about the position of Japan’. J.T. Lang, MHR put his finger on the affirmation in the Acheson statement that the US intended to remain in Japan, and as Lang put it: ‘Japan might well prove to be a forward base in the western Pacific for those defending western democracy’.51

     Surprisingly, the Opposition did not make more of the Government’s failure to achieve more progress on a peace treaty with Japan and of the insignificance of the Australian contribution to the occupation force. This had been a constant theme of the Opposition in the postwar period. Menzies later acted quickly to deploy Australian troops to Korea in 1950, however, the insignif icance of the BCOF was past the point of being rectified by the deployment of additional Australian troops to Japan.

     Evatt repudiated any suggestion that ‘Australia is a satellite of the United States of America’, but in his defence of the stalemate on the peace treaty had to admit that ‘the treaty is ready to be signed but it cannot be signed until these difficulties are healed’.52 He did not elaborate upon ‘these difficulties’.

     The weight of Australian policies towards Japan since 1945 had been focussed upon the suppression of those elements in Japanese society which had helped launch Japan into World War II. These elements — military, conservative, right-wing, industrial — had been the target of postwar occupation policies strongly supported by Australia but gradually weakened by the passing of time. This Australian support was purely symbolic as the implementation aspects were strictly a matter for the US. While the Australian Government continued to fear a revival of these elements, the Australian Opposition was concerned by the growing significance of the communists in Japan.

     There had been some evidence to support these Opposition fears. In the Japanese elections held in January 1949, the com munists gained about 9.6 per cent of the vote cast and won 35 seats compared with four seats held in the previous Diet. In Washington on 22 February 1949 Eichelberger added more fuel to fears in Australia of a communist threat, when he was reported as saying ‘if the communists gained domination in Japan, Russian led Japanese troops might overrun the Pacific in a few years’.53 Eichelberger’s remarks were followed by a report from Tokyo on 23 February 1949 that documents in the hands of the occupation authorities ‘show the Communists in Japan expected their projected general strike of last August [1948] to turn into an armed revolt by October [1948] and so result in the formation of a communist people’s government by February this year’.54

     MacArthur, in an interview with a Daily Mail correspondent on 2 March 1949, commented on a number of issues which had recently received so much publicity.55 He stated that ‘America in its strategy never intended Japan to be an ally. All it wanted Japan to do was to remain neutral’. Nevertheless, MacArthur saw a complete transformation in American strategy as a result of the war and the move of US strategic dispositions from the west coast of America to the ‘chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia’. He also played down the capacity of the Soviet Union to attack Japan, but said that if Japan was attacked then ‘America would certainly defend her’.

     MacArthur dismissed suggestions that the Japanese police were to be the nucleus of a future army, claiming that their task was ‘simply to preserve internal peace’ and pointing out that ‘not more than 20% even had pistols’. He dismissed as insignificant a communist threat to Japan pointing out that they could only lay claim to 35 seats in a Diet of 466 seats.56 In a reference to the UK and Australia, MacArthur expressed the warmest feelings and while he ‘regretted’ the reduction in the size of the BCOF, said he understood the reasons which made this necessary.

     Reassuring though MacArthur’s comments may have been to the Australian Government, the uncertainties about the situation in Japan continued. In Tokyo on 10 March 1949 there were press reports of US plans to switch from military to civil control within six to nine months, although the army would remain at its present strength, and of the expected retirement of MacArthur. A similar report on civilian control appeared in Washington on 16 March 1949 and it was not until 24 March 1949 that the Secretary of State, Acheson, announced that the US Government had no plans to transfer control of Japan from military to civil authority.57

     Apart from a warning by Calwell on the dangers of a rearmed Japan at a luncheon on the Royal Commonwealth Society in Melbourne on 22 April 1949, at which he envisaged Japan as a giant aircraft carrier to be used by the US in the event of a third world war, interest in Japan remained low in Australia until the US Government confirmed on 6 May 1949 that it had called on the FEC to relax its control on Japan’s foreign trade and economic and commercial affairs.58

     Meanwhile, changes in US policies towards Japan continued. There were US announcements on 13 May 1949 that the removal of Japanese industrial plant as reparations was to stop and of a plan to allow the setting up of ten Japanese trade offices overseas.59 On 11 May 1949 MacArthur declared he considered Japan ‘the Switzerland of the Far East’. However, as Van Eduard noted, Acheson had introduced a new policy during 1949, the so-called policy of Situation of Strength, but this policy was seen to be unconvincing as he did not indicate how he intended to substantiate the policy nor the place of Japan in this.60 Also in May 1949 the US representative on the FEC stated ‘I wish to emphasize that the US Government maintains fully and categorically its support of the principle adopted by the FEC that Japan’s war making capacity should be eliminated’.61

     During 1949, when attention was drawn to the communist successes in China, there were also further signs of increasing communist influence in Japan. On 11 June 1949 there were communist-inspired disturbances in Tokyo and on 14 June 1949 MacArthur accused the Soviet Union of ‘inciting disorder and violence in an otherwise orderly Japanese society’.62 The British Manchester Guardian went so far on 16 June 1949 as to claim that ‘Japan had most of the ingredients which, in communist theory, make the country ripe for a communist government’.63

     Statements by Australian leaders revealed wide divergences of opinion concerning Japan. Major General W. Bridgeford, a recent visitor to Japan, claimed in Melbourne after his return to Australia that ‘Japan would turn to communism unless she was allowed her fair share of the world’s trade’ and in Darwin, another visitor to Japan, Cardinal Gilroy, reported ‘the desire is expressed every where that Japan should be admitted into the world family of nations so that she can contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world’.64 Evatt, in a statement made in the Parliament on international affairs in June 1949, referred to Japan in the following terms:

    Meanwhile, public interest in communist activities in Japan continued. In Tokyo on 24 June 1949 the Japanese Attorney General, Shunkichi Euda, declared that ‘only the presence of occupation troops kept Japanese communists from throwing the country into turmoil’66 and in Washington a State Department official on 29 June 1949 claimed ‘Russia was pushing an active calculated campaign to communise Japan from within’.67 The State Department used as support for its claim the activities of some 2000 Japanese prisoners of war who chanted communist songs on their return from captivity in Soviet hands. Japanese concern at the level of communist activity within Japan reached a high point when in Tokyo on 8 July 1949 Prime Minister Yoshida told the Japanese Cabinet he was prepared to proclaim a state of emergency if necessary to halt violence and unrest in Japan.68

     In spite of these developments, the US continued with policies which made possible a return to normality in the conduct of Japanese affairs. In July 1949 MacArthur ‘issued an instruction requiring a new attitude on the part of the occupation forces in view of the facts, as stated by General MacArthur, that:

    In late July 1949 MacArthur announced the withdrawal of 42 military government teams by the end of 1949. In early August 1949 the despatch of yet another whaling expedition to Antarctica was announced and on the 19 August 1949 the US State Department revealed that it had instructed MacArthur to help Japan establish direct relations with other countries. This directive was given effect by HQ SCAP on 25 August 1949.

     MacArthur continued to bypass the FEC on matters of substance but by way of a sop to the allies, on 1 September 1949, US Under Secretary for the Army, Voorhees, revived hope of a peace treaty with Japan.70 He announced that there would be no reduction in the size of the US occupation force, the chief function of which was described by MacArthur as ‘a military garrison’. On 23 September 1949 the US lifted restrictions on fraternisation between US personnel and the Japanese, a prohibition which the Australian Government reaffirmed on 30 September 1949 for Australian personnel in Japan.

    The Australian Parliament adjourned on 27 October 1949 for general elections scheduled for December 1949. Australian policies towards Japan remained stalemated and the longstanding Australian attitudes of fear and revenge were fanned by what was seen as the increasing communist influence, domestic and international, upon the future of Japan. The significance of Australia’s contribution to the BCOF had faded and Australia had been unable to achieve a peace settlement. Australia had sought an appropriate level of cooperation with the US and the UK but both demonstrated a total disregard for Australian ambitions. Little had changed since 1945.

     The Liberal-Country Party which assumed Government following the general election held in December 1949 moved quickly to review the future of the BCOF in Japan and a Cabinet submission on this matter was circulated during March 1950 by the Minister for Defence, Mr E.J. Harrison.71

     As at 1 March 1950 the Australian contribution ‘was 2356, consisting of one Army battalion, one RAAF squadron, and the naval port party plus administrative personnel’.72 The review noted that the terms of the original agreement provided that ‘BCOF might be withdrawn wholly or in part upon agreement between the Governments of the United States and Australia, or upon six months’ notice by either party’.73 It also noted that, when in May 1948, US agreement to a reduction in the Australian contingent to 2750 was sought, the US had requested that the force ‘be maintained at a strength of 10,500 men’. The Australian reduction in forces was further ‘regretted’ by the US in February 1949.

     During its review of the situation in March 1950, the Defence Committee was mindful that ‘in April 1948 it stated that the minimum useful contribution to the occupation of Japan from a military point of view would be a force of 7000 men which, however, could not be maintained because of the Army reinforcement position ...74 and the then (March 1950) examination of the National Service Scheme. The Defence Committee therefore put the following views:

    Three other factors were included in the Cabinet submission: the recent Colombo Conference agreement that work be under taken on the terms of a peace treaty with Japan; acknowledgement of pressures from the Australian services for resumption of the movement of families of BCOF personnel to Japan, suspended in March 1948; and the consideration of developments whereby ‘it was vital to our own security and hers that we should render all possible support in assisting the United Kingdom to fulfil her commitments under the Western Union and North Atlantic Pacts ...'.76

     The Australian Cabinet moved quickly and on 17 April 1950 the Australian Ambassador in Washington was instructed to seek the agreement of the US Government to the early withdrawal of the BCOF. This agreement was forthcoming and the Australian Prime Minister, Mr R.G. Menzies, announced the decision in a public statement on 26 May 1950. In his statement Menzies stressed the Government’s intention to proceed with a national service scheme and the demands this would place upon the Australian services. He also foreshadowed that ‘some time will elapse before actual movement of men and stores commences and the whole operation will extend over a considerable period’ .77

     Paradoxically, the Australian Cabinet decision to withdraw the forces from Japan, on the grounds of meeting domestic military commitments in Australia, was taken at a time when the military situation on the nearby Korean Peninsula was volatile. Moreover, two Australian military observers were provided as part of the United Nations’ Commission on Korea (UNCOK) to monitor a situation that was clearly deteriorating.78 The day after these two officers reported ‘No reports ... had been received of any unusual activity on the part of the North Korean forces that would indicate any imminent change in the general situation on the parallel’, the North Korean Army attacked South Korea on 25 June 1950.79

     By 27 June the Australian Government was caught up in a spiral of events due to which two Australian warships in Japanese waters (HMAS Bataan and Shoalhaven) were committed to operations in Korea on 28 June; 77 Fighter Squadron, the RAAF component of the BCOF, was allocated to operations in Korea on 30 June; and approval was given for Australian Army officers in the BCOF to be sent to Korea as observers and the question of the deployment of the BCOF infantry battalion was under consideration.80 On this last matter the C-in-C, BCOF, was ‘to do whatever was possible to ensure that a request for the employment of the Army component was not made by SCAP and that no publicity was given to this matter by BCOF Headquarters’.81

     Following yet another spiral of desperate events the Australian decision to commit the BCOF battalion (known as 3 RAR) to operations was announced on 26 July 1950 and C-in-C, BCOF, warned to prepare 3 RAR for active service in Korea. Effectively, Australia’s military commitment to Japan in terms of the occupation, as distinct from Australian interest in the peace treaty had had no relevance after MacArthur’s statement of July 1949, concerning the changed ‘character’ of the occupation.

     The events of June 1950 merely confirmed this situation and with the redeployment of the principal Australian combat elements to support the war in Korea the rump of the BCOF became in effect merely a convenient forward base from which to support these deployments. The technicalities germane to this new situation were made formal in agreements arising from the establishment of a C-in-C, British Commonwealth Forces, Korea; the replacement of Robertson by W. Bridgeford in November 1951; and the disbanding of the BCOF on 28 April 1952 when the ratification of the peace treaty with Japan took effect.

     From July 1950, 3 RAR was raised and equipped to war establishment and commenced its work-up operational training at Haramura prior to embarkation for Korea on 27 September 1950. Arrangements were put in place for the light anti-aircraft protection of Iwakuni, the base from which 77 Squadron, RAAF mounted operations in Korea. The Australian administrative and support units in the BCOF were committed to support Australian and British Commonwealth operations in Korea and new units were also raised and based in Japan for this specific purpose.

     There were in September 1950 some 1612 AMF, 328 RAAF, 42 RAN personnel, 64 Australian civilians and 122 families remaining in Japan.82 This was in addition to the 1050 Australians by then in Korea. However, the technical distinctions between support for residual BCOF obligations and support for the pressing UN operations in Korea were blurred by the urgency of the operational situation in Japan at least until the formal cessation of the BCOF commitment on 28 April 1952.