The future of the BCOF in Japan was reviewed by the Australian Defence Committee in early 1947 following a query by the NZ Government as to its value.1

THE REVIEW

    The Australian Defence Committee commissioned the Joint Planning Committee (JPC), in conjunction with the staff of the JCOSA, to prepare an appreciation of the value of the BCOF. The JPC also took into account the views of the Australian Department of External Affairs, which had prepared a response to NZ proposals to reduce the size of the New Zealand army component within the BCOF and to Indian proposals to withdraw all Indian forces from the BCOF. In addition, the Department had made an assessment of the preparedness of the British Government to participate positively in any appreciation of the future role of the BCOF.

     Despite this unanimity of opinion amongst Australia’s partners in the BCOF to reduce substantially, or completely, their commit ments, the Defence Committee, at its meeting on 17 April 1947, endorsed generally the JPC’s ‘Appreciation of the Value of the BCOF’.2

      The ‘Objects and Role of the BCOF’, as agreed at the inception of the BCOF in 1945, were re-endorsed as follows:

     The military role of the BCOF also remained unchanged and it included the following duties:

    The Committee also recognised the value of the BCOF as a further development in British Commonwealth Defence cooperation. In summary, the purposes of the BCOF were directed specifically to the subjection of Japan to allied, and particularly to British Commonwealth, authority.

     Following a survey of the various political, military and economic aspects of the situation with regard to the future value of the BCOF, the Defence Committee also drew a number of conclusions. Firstly that:

    This statement alone contained a number of inconsistencies. In paragraph 14 of the appreciation it was agreed that item (b) of the military role, i.e., demilitarisation, had been long completed without resistance by the Japanese. Secondly, item (a) safeguarding of allied resources, was primarily the result of the occupation, rather than the cause of it. Also in paragraph 14 of the appreciation, reference was made to the SCAP view of the necessity for allied unity as a guarantee against the Japanese ‘giving trouble’.3

    The most significant endorsement given to the JPC assessment by the Defence Committee was the reiteration of the longstanding Australian aim to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan which would secure Australia’s future against a resurgence of Japanese militarism, and to give an additional guarantee whereby Japan was secured against Soviet exploitation. The Defence Committee was thereby accepting the assessment by the JPC of the possible military threat posed by the Soviet Union, an assessment first set out in a British military assessment as early as 1945, but rejected by Chifley in 1946. In other words, the Australian military assessment of the threat had shifted from Japan as a likely threat to Australia to the Soviet Union as the likely threat and, more remotely, a combined Soviet and Japanese threat.

     The second major conclusion by the committee was that:

    In paragraph 6 of the appreciation, the suggestion had been made that ‘the withdrawal of the BCOF from Japan might lead to a public demand in the US for the withdrawal of the US forces in conformity with the withdrawal of the BCOF’.4 It was admitted that such a public demand would not of itself be sufficient to cause the withdrawal of the US forces, nor would it be possible to evaluate the claim. But a late comment in the appreciation reveals a more substantial reason for Australian concern regarding a possible US withdrawal:

    It was therefore in Australia’s interests to do nothing that might reduce the effectiveness of US interests in Japan. The question must then be asked: did Australian officials seriously overestimate the importance of the BCOF as an occupation force and the effect its withdrawal would have upon US public opinion? From the evidence already presented in respect of the history of the force, it appears that this claim was not soundly based.

     The third and fourth conclusions were closely related and concerned the prestige of the British Commonwealth in Japan and as ‘principals in the formulation of the Japanese peace treaty’. The question has again to be asked: did the Australian Government overestimate its own significance? The Japanese, cognisant of the absolute power exercised by MacArthur, deliberately minimised the importance of the BCOF. The frequent and substantial reductions in the size of the BCOF had confirmed a scepticism amongst US officials about the seriousness of the British Commonwealth commitment. However, Australia had vigorously played a leading role as a representative of the British Commonwealth both with regard to Japan and for the Pacific region generally, and at this time of reassessment maintained its strong stand, in the face of the pressures by its British Commonwealth partners, against any reductions in the size of the force. In this, the Australian Government was unsuccessful.
The size of the Australian military contribution had always represented an important proportion of the overall force and this Australian military contribution had always been seen as primarily a symbol of the Australian Government’s determination to be an active participant in the peace settlement with Japan. This commitment had additional significance in 1947 when Australia was to press so forcefully for the conclusion of a settlement with Japan.

     There were other conclusions in the appreciation but it is important to note one other, that of paragraph 20(1) which said: [that the] presence of BCOF in Japan ensures that the British Commonwealth value as an economic and social factor in developments in the Far East is not overlooked or underrated’. That the economic motive should receive this prominence in Australian assessments may be a reflection of a growing Australian discontent with SCAP’s conduct of economic policies within Japan. It could also be seen as a belated realisation that the initial and sustained UK economic interest in Japan had been in marked contrast to Australia’s primary and obsessive interest in ensuring that Japan did not reappear as a military threat. Thus, for example, the UK interest in the expansion of the area occupied by the BCOF referred to the economic importance of Kobe as a major industrial and trading area.5

     The appreciation noted that although the economic aspect of the occupation had not been mentioned in the directive to the C-in-C, BCOF, ‘since the directive may be read by other nations’, ‘... it is none the less implicit as one of the reasons which induced the British Commonwealth Governments to participate in the occupation of Japan’.

     By mid-1947 the full effects of the withdrawals from the BCOF became obvious. Following the withdrawal of forces by the other participants, the arrangements for the control and administration of the BCOF were reviewed by the Council of Defence on 3 July 1947. This review led to the dissolution of JCOSA, with effect 31 December 1947, with responsibility then assigned to the Australian Government. This responsibility was to be exercised through the joint service machinery in the Defence Department with the UK and NZ having accredited representatives.6 The new arrangements were approved, retrospectively, by the Council of Defence on 28 April 1948. In Tokyo on 16 July 1947 a BCOF spokesman announced: ‘almost the entire burden of the British Commonwealth occupation role will fall upon the Australians after the departure of the Indian contingent and part of the New Zealand army component’.7

FURTHER WITHDRAWALS

   Despite these pressures upon Australia to maintain its military obligations to the BCOF and the promising signs of a break through in the arrangements for a peace settlement, the pressure for withdrawals continued. On 5 October 1947 there was a press report in London that the UK had approached Australia about the withdrawal of UK troops from Japan, subject to concurrence of the other Commonwealth Governments, the US Government, and General MacArthur.8 Although the announcement implied that this withdrawal involved only a residual British force, the actual numbers were considerable, and totalled about 4500 personnel. The effect of this British action was that with the departure of the UK troops, the only British Commonwealth troops remaining in Japan were about 11,000 Australians and 3000 New Zealanders. The British withdrawals were not expected to be completed until early 1948.

    The British withdrawals attracted attention in the Australian Parliament and the Government was asked if it intended to make good the losses to the BCOF. The Minister for Defence, J.J. Dedman, would not be drawn and limited himself to saying that the matter was still being examined by the Australian Government, although the indications were that Australia would neither send additional troops nor reduce the size of the Australian contingent.9 Nevertheless, the withdrawal of Australian troops seemed a probability, despite the Minister’s assurance to the contrary. In reply to a further question in Parliament in late October 1947, whether Australian forces would be withdrawn by June 1948, the Minister for the Army, Cyril Chambers, linked such a withdrawal to the signing of a peace treaty and, in answer to a supplementary question, admitted that it would be unfair to the families of Australian servicemen to proceed to Japan after December 1947 ‘because [they] may have to return [to Australia] in six or nine months’.10

     In January 1948 the Australian Government announced a reduction in the size of the RAAF force in the BCOF from three to two squadrons because it had been possible to replace the DC3 aircraft on the courier run to Australia with Qantas aircraft. Technically, however, the RAAF was unable to sustain the three-squadron commitment.

     The Defence Committee conducted a further assessment of the Australian contribution to the BCOF at its meeting on 22 April 1948, at which it considered the following figures:

    The Defence Committee noted that expected further reductions in the Australian figure by the end of 1948 would mean that the BCOF: ‘... will not be a useful contribution to any military situation which may arise in Japan’. The Committee further noted the Services’ viewpoint that: ‘... no useful contribution can be made to any military situation which may arise in the occupation of Japan by a force of less than a brigade group plus the necessary naval and air supporting forces and administrative personnel totalling approximately 7000’.11

REDUCTION IN THE AUSTRALIAN CONTRIBUTION

    Nevertheless, on 7 May 1948 the Australian Government put forward a proposal to the US Government ‘to reduce the Australian contingent of the British Commonwealth Occupation
Forces in Japan to one army battalion and one air force squadron with the necessary administrative units for their maintenance or an approximate overall strength of 2750’.12

     The US Government, in contrast to its reply to an earlier proposal to withdraw the NZ component, reacted very strongly to these proposed Australian reductions in the Australian contingent of the BCOF.13 The reply referred to a ‘token’ British Common wealth force ‘which would be inadequate for the occupation of the BCOF area’ and observed that ‘The proposed reduction would necessitate a redeployment of United States forces now in Japan’. However, as the US,

    Thus, rather than accepting the Australian proposal to reduce the Australian force, the US Government’s response called upon Australia to more than double the size of its army component in Japan. It also indicated clearly that an Australian reduction would leave the BCOF area inadequately garrisoned and at a time when the US was not in a position to compensate for the reduction from its own resources.

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

    In Adelaide on 21 May 1948, Cyril Chambers, the Minister for the Army, released a summary of reports submitted to him by a committee of enquiry set up to investigate allegations of black marketeering and immorality among the Australian component of the BCOF. According to Chambers, the summary exonerated the Australian component of the allegations, although it revealed that about 23 per cent of the force had VD.14 Quite apart from the occasional domestic outbreak of criticism of the Australian Government concerning the conduct of Australian troops in the BCOF, and hence this enquiry, questions of morality were seen as setting an example to the Japanese people as part of what had been heralded as a necessary ‘democratization’ of the Japanese people.

     The Minister for the Army had received two reports on the situation of the Australians serving with BCOF. The first ‘A study of some problems affecting the British Commonwealth Occupation in Japan in April-May 1948’ had been prepared by Major General C.E.M. Lloyd and Mr Massey Stanley and the second prepared by the Chaplains General: the Reverends T. McCarthy, A.H. Stewart and A. Brooke. These reports provide a valuable insight into the reality of the Australian situation some two years after the arrival of the bulk of Australian troops in Kure in February-April 1946.

     The Lloyd-Stanley report recalled and summarised the original deployment of Australians in the following terms: ‘The original Australian components of the British Commonwealth Force Japan were subjected in the beginning to much avoidable hardship. Few troops would have weathered the initial storm as well and perhaps none better. Quite certainly many would not have weathered it at all.’ The authors noted the impact the delays in the political process had had upon the military preparations of the time, particularly the decisions to concentrate the force in Morotai rather than bringing the participants home for leave and proper pre-embarkation familiarisation, re-equipment and training; the creation of new units without any common tradition or composition; and misleading information as to service conditions.

     Moreover, ‘the troops landed in Kure area in appalling conditions. The whole area was devastated by bombing, the weather was bitterly cold, and especially after tropical heat, the troops were not suitably clothed or equipped, and there was no heating or amenities of any kind’. ‘All this was quite unnecessary. The Australian component should have been taken initially to Australia for leave and quiet unhurried and adequate preparation for their task, and it was no unimportant task. This was Australia’s first essay at the provision of an overseas garrison force in peace time — a project of long range implications.’

     The report then noted:

    Substantiation of these positive observations was contained in the detail of a number of specific appendices to the report. Black market activities were divided into two categories: ‘the resale of goods — generally items of canteen issues — regularly in the possession of individuals’; and the ‘theft of stores, supplies and equipment for sale to the Japanese black market’. Lloyd and Stanley rejected the first category offence as being a black market, but agreed that there ‘was evidence of traffic by individuals using some or all of their canteen rations [usually to purchase souvenirs from Japanese shops]. However, the total canteen sales to individ uals is less than 1% of the total canteen turnover in Japan’. Figures were produced to demonstrate the conclusion that ‘no very large scale operation’ existed.

     With regard to the second offence — theft — Lloyd and Stanley concluded that ‘losses by theft of stores and supplies are in no way extraordinary’ and ‘there is no evidence of an organised trade as far as BCOF personnel are concerned’. There was evidence of ‘organised Japanese gangs specialising in the theft of bulk food stuffs, clothing etc.’ and ‘on a few occasions service personnel have been involved with these gangs in the theft of BCOF stores and supplies’. Attached to the report was a summary of the nine major black market offences involving the 17 Australians in an 18-month period who had been found guilty of theft of public property and subjected to harsh penalties.

     Both reports also found that the bulk of black market activity was actually undertaken by merchant seamen, including Australians, serving at Kure. Evidence was offered of the extraordinary profits to be easily made by individuals or organised gangs of seamen bringing in saccharin, sugar, currency, clothing and drugs and taking out cultured pearls, crockery, silk, medicines, drugs, linen and fishing lines. Lloyd and Stanley concluded that ‘allegations of widespread blackmarketing by troops of the British Common wealth Occupation Force are without foundation in fact’.

     The perennial issue of venereal disease was also examined. ‘The most serious military problem in Japan is the high incidence of venereal disease in the civil population, and their widespread abandonment of normal moral standards occasioned by post war economic and social conditions.’ So the Lloyd-Stanley report summarised the situation. The situation was further compounded by the variation in policy between SCAP and the BCOF on this problem. The US policy was a worldwide one which had resulted in the marked reduction in VD among US forces, including those in Japan. The C-in-C, BCOF, however, despite repeated attempts to obtain formal policy advice, had been instructed only to ensure that weekly returns be forwarded to the Australian Military Board, which, it was noted by Lloyd and Stanley, had not suggested any course of action, and the only reference on the JCOSA Outline Plan was to list VD as a disease endemic to Japan and to require medical officers and unit commanders to give frequent lectures on the control of preventable diseases. The Minister in his comment on the reports noted that he had directed with effect from 11 June 1948 ‘that troops contracting VD in the future will be automatically returned to Australia after treatment and cure’.

     Specific mention also was made in the Lloyd-Stanley report of ‘the vexed question of fraternisation’ where the ‘present posi tion is that these matters are left to the discretion of local commanders’.

     The report outlined at length the views of the C-in-C, BCOF, on this subject which were inter alia that the:

Lloyd and Stanley concluded that ‘(a) The [non-fraternisation] policy cannot be really enforced and it is regrettable that the directive was ever issued. (b) Any action either way now would incur criticism. (c) the future role of BCOF will automatically solve the problem in that conformity with existing US policy will be unavoidable.’

     The report sought also to redress what it described as ‘too little credit has been given at home to the positive achievements of the Australians serving in BCOF’. These achievements were summarised in part as ‘in addition to their share in the respon sible tasks of demilitarising Southern Honshu (including the biggest naval base and dockyard ever built) and of policing the Allied directives issued to the Japanese, the Australians engaged on guard duty in Tokyo have gained an international reputation’.

     Australians in the BCOF pointed out to Lloyd and Stanley that their US counterparts did much to promote ‘the American way of life’ by the positive publicity accorded US visitors, whereas Australian visitors were sent ‘to probe their [Australian] morals and behaviour’ and attracted publicity for Australians serving with BCOF as ‘representing a country which had no apparent interest in manifestations of post-war Japan except those which placed the Australian soldier in an unfavourable light’. Furthermore even though an objective of the force was ‘to illustrate ... [and] impress upon the Japanese people ... the democratic way and purpose of life’, there was concern in the BCOF that the voluntary work at that time being undertaken to improve the standard of nursing care in Japanese civilian hospitals would be seen negatively in Australia as an example of fraternisation.

     The Chaplains’ report also noted:

    The Chaplains were concerned about the low church attendances within the force but encouraged by the valuable initiative pioneered within the BCOF to establish practical moral leadership courses for all ranks. They noted that a special tour laid on to Kure brothel areas during their visit ‘failed to reveal the presence of one Australian soldier’ and that ‘throughout the course of their tour in Japan we did not encounter a drunken soldier, or a man behaving in an objectionable manner’. They praised the work being done to educate service personnel and their families, the high level of amenities and the standards of personal accommodation.

    Finally, much was made of the valuable work undertaken to improve morale through the special program of facilities for families of serving personnel. Lloyd and Stanley were convinced that the BCOF housing, for some 472 Australian families out of a force at that time of 8200 Australian personnel, was equal to that provided by the US for its families and in the case of the Rainbow Village at Nijimura, superior. Dependants’ housing included the provision of furniture and equipment, free servants and medical, dental and hospital services. Education was provided by BCOF education officers. Generous though these arrangements appeared to be by comparison with conditions in Australia, ambiguities in the promulgation of service conditions had led to the build-up of some grievances following a decision in 1947 to implement a scale of rental charges.

     Commenting upon the public version of the report issued by the Minister for the Army, The Age suggested that the Australian Government would be justified in accelerating the withdrawal of troops from Japan and leaving only a token force ‘for guard and ceremonial duties’.15 The Chambers’s announcement and The Age editorial were followed up by a strong presentation by the C-in-C, BCOF, Robertson, on the value of BCOF experience for Australia.16 Robertson pointed out that Australia had demonstrated clearly its capacity to assume a major defence role in British Commonwealth affairs in the Pacific and the various practical ramifications of this occupation experience would stand Australia in good stead. Although Robertson was clearly defending the Australian performance to that point, he also avoided any com ment on the future of the Australian contribution to the BCOF.

     The Australian Government’s policies with regard to the BCOF were advanced yet further when, within the context of supporting a proposed parliamentary visit to Japan, Chambers claimed the visit was necessary ‘in view of the fact that significant moves had been made in recent months to rebuild Japanese industries as a buffer against communism’ and ‘with the withdrawal of Britain, India and New Zealand and the gradual reduction of the Australian component of the BCOF to a token force’.17 He argued that these events greatly magnified Australia’s role in Pacific strategy.

ENHANCING AUSTRALIA'S STATUS

    The Australian Government was sensitive, however, to criticism of the contribution made by the BCOF and on 14 July 1948 the Minister for Defence, J.J. Dedman, issued a statement entitled ‘Review of the organization and accomplishments of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan’.18 Dedman claimed in this statement that Australia had enhanced its status by acting as the principal representative for several Commonwealth governments and that the establishment of the JCOSA represented an advance on any machinery ‘hitherto devised for the control of a joint commonwealth force’.

     There is evidence to support Dedman’s general claims and some of this evidence was mentioned in the text of his statement. Nevertheless, a number of the claims he made were open to question. For instance, his claim concerning ‘Australia’s willingness to carry responsibilities’ could be challenged on the grounds that Australia had not at any time increased its component of the BCOF to compensate for withdrawal by its Commonwealth partners. Similarly, his claim that this was ‘the first time that forces of the United Kingdom have been placed under the control of a Dominion government ...‘ is questionable given the presence in Japan of General Gairdner; the JCOSA arrangements; the overriding authority of the various governments and General MacArthur; and the separate arrangements applicable for the control of the naval element and the operational control of the army and air force elements.

     As Shedden was to later write concerning the JCOSA, ‘while this was a useful experiment, the Australian Government and its advisers did not consider this committee to be a suitable model for the future development of machinery for British Commonwealth co-operation’.19 Nevertheless, the lessons to be drawn from this experiment, as outlined in the preceding paragraph, were invaluable had the Australian Government determined to establish machinery for British Commonwealth cooperation in defence matters.

REVISED DIRECTIVE

     Following the disbandment of JCOSA, the Australian Government reviewed its directive, dated May 1946, to the C-in-C, BCOF. Under this revised directive, dated July 1948, the role and military purposes in effect remained unchanged and retained as part of the military role of BCOF ‘the demilitarization and disposal of Japanese installations and armaments’. This was despite the fact that the demilitarisation tasks in Japan had long been completed. Further, the recent serious rioting in Osaka led to an amendment to the Australian cablegram on 7 May 1948 informing the British, US and NZ Governments of Australia’s wish to reduce the strength of its own contingent in the BCOF.20

     Dr Evatt, in an address to a UNESCO Council meeting in Geneva on 30 July 1948, appealed for a peaceful and prosperous Japan to be encouraged to play a full part in the affairs of the Far East, albeit under the control of a peace treaty safeguarding against a resurgence of Japanese aggression. The Australian ‘hard line’ on Japan reappeared briefly when the C-in-C, BCOF, General Robertson, during a speech at Hiroshima, reminded the Japanese people that he believed the blame for the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima rested upon the Japanese.21

     On 27 August 1948 the seven-man Australian parliamentary mission to Japan led by Mr L.C. Haylen, MHR returned to Australia and praised MacArthur’s program for the ‘democratization’ of the Japanese.22 Following the return of the mission there was a resumption of interest in the Australian Parliament in matters concerning the domestic affairs of Japan. Haylen was particularly vocal with regard to what he saw as the way in which the Australian element of the BCOF had been ‘let down by the people of Australia’ and he singled out the press for its handling of material concerning the BCOF.23

     Haylen’s criticisms have little substance when it is remembered that Australian troops had been in Japan for over three years and this was the first parliamentary delegation to visit the BCOF. Apart from brief earlier ministerial visits by Chifley, Evatt and Chambers, the Australian Government had done little to encourage a close public interest in the BCOF. Haylen’s remarks concentrated heavily upon the conditions under which the Australian troops in Japan served rather than upon the purposes of their being there and it was left to Mr McEwen to attack Haylen, as leader of the delegation, for making no mention in his report to Parliament of any matter concerning a possible peace settlement.24

     At this time Australia’s diplomatic standing in Tokyo with SCAP HQ was strained. A record of the conversation between Mr Gascoyne, Head of the UK mission in Japan, and W.J. Sebald, reveals that Mr Patrick Shaw, the Australian diplomatic repre sentative on the ACCJ, was regarded by MacArthur as acting in concert with the Soviet member on the ACCJ in criticisms of MacArthur.25 In this same record Gascoyne confirmed that the British Foreign Office saw the problems of Europe and elsewhere as more pressing than those of Japan where events were proceeding smoothly. The Foreign Office hoped that a peace conference would be arranged as soon as possible and despite local antagonism in Tokyo, State Department policy towards Australia, as outlined on 18 August 1948, saw ‘Australian support for our Japan policy’ as ‘highly desirable’ and ‘every effort should be taken to prepare the ground through diplomatic channels before new measures are adopted which might be misunderstood in the Australian Government’.26

    Mr J. Francis, MHR, a delegation member, praised the part played by the Australian contingent of the BCOF in the demilitarisation of Japan, and saw two reasons for continuing the Australian presence. Firstly, he believed a withdrawal would be premature and that it would retard progress on the ‘democratization’ of Japan and secondly, if the Australian forces were ‘withdrawn too soon there is a danger of invasion of communism from Korea’.27 While Francis’s remarks are evidence of Opposition support for the idea of Japan as a bastion against Russian communism, he, in company with the Australian Govern ment, did not press for a reinforcement of the Australian contribution to the BCOF. He appeared to be content to rest his case upon the news that ‘fortunately in March next year the United States of America intends to augment the strength of its occupation forces’.28

    There was some support for continued emphasis upon the need for Australia to guard against a resurgent Japan. For example, Senator R.J. Murray believed there was ‘grave danger that if the occupation is not policed properly the military classes may rise again as in Germany’ and he sought ‘serious consideration to this menace, which is more dangerous than communism at this time’.29 While Murray repeated that the purpose of the Australian military presence in Japan was to secure a place at the peace settlement he also put forward another proposal: that in addition to the development of Manus Island as an Australian outpost the Australian Government should also develop an outpost in Japan.

     Although his proposal was merely a restatement of what had been a fact for over three years, if it is taken in conjunction with the longstanding concept of an island screen, he was suggesting a significant forward move of this screen, as the outer ring of defence for Australia. Murray went on to propose that Australia could charge the costs of maintaining and training ‘substantial fighting forces’ against reparations payments which Australia was entitled to demand from Japan.

     This theme of an Australian presence in Japan was echoed by Mr C.W. Davidson, MHR, who regarded Japan as of ‘greater importance to Australia than to any other nation’ but he was concerned that the whittling away of the strength of the BCOF and progressive reduction in strength of the Australian contribution to BCOF had seriously eroded the prestige of the British Commonwealth and of Australia in particular.30 Davidson argued for a peace settlement with Japan and he proposed the regular relief of the Australian component of the BCOF by, say, a brigade at a time. He also forecast a time when Australia might wish ‘to re-establish’ itself in Japan, but it is not clear from his remarks what he meant by ‘re-establish’. He, like Senator Murray, saw in Japan ‘a splendid training area for the troops of our regular army’.31

A LARGER CONTRIBUTION

    The Australian Government, during the budget debate of 1948 again defended its defence policies. The Defence Minister, J.J. Dedman, using the Prime Minister’s statement in 1946 that Australia had to make a larger contribution towards the defence of the British Commonwealth, quoted figures to support his argument. He noted that quite apart from the Australian contribution to the administration, command and supply of the BCOF, the Australian proportion of the order of battle of the BCOF had risen from 32 per cent to approximately 75 per cent. Dedman added that it was expected ‘in the near future the whole of that force will be of Australian composition’.32

     There are several aspects of Dedman’s argument that invite comment. The first is that the Australian Government’s spokesmen invariably claimed an increased defence responsibility by Australia on behalf of the British Commonwealth, whereas continued with drawalof the contingents of other Commonwealth countries from the BCOF confirmed an increasing isolation of Australia in the pursuit of its policies toward Japan. Even the New Zealanders, upon whom the Australian Government placed such reliance in terms of the 1944 Agreement and action since that time, decided to withdraw their contingent from the BCOF.

     Secondly, these strong Australian avowals of a greater Australian effort, were usually accompanied or followed by an announcement that actually Australia’s practical support for some particular policy in Japan was to be based on a reduction in military power. Dedman admitted, for example, that at that very time plans were under consideration by the Cabinet for the withdrawal of the Australian fighter wing based in Japan.33

     Thirdly, the Opposition continued to attack the Australian Government on the grounds that it was being dishonest with regard to the number of Australian troops being contributed to the BCOF. The Opposition attacked the Minister for Defence for having said that there were 11,000 Australian troops in the occupation force, whereas the figure had dropped to 6250 by 30 June 1948 and would be down to 2750 by 31 December 1948.34

     There was reason for concern by the Opposition as to the Australian Army’s capacity to maintain the strength of its contingent in the BCOF. Although the Australian Government publicly emphasised the importance of the role given to the RAN force committed to the BCOF, Shedden, in a minute to the Minister dated 14 September 1948, stated that ‘the main consideration in the Defence programme is the strength of the army and the capacity to build up the numbers required’. Shedden had shown a copy of the notes for the Minister to the VCGS, General Rowell, who had expressed ‘his complete agreement’. Shedden developed this comment as ‘the Army authorities consider the recruitment for the regular Army satisfactory and this view is based on a remark by the Chief of the General Staff [Sturdee] at the last meeting of the Defence Committee when we were discussing the manpower’.35 Nevertheless, the Australian Government had, in a note on 7 May 1948, and again on 2 September 1948, advised the US Government of its intention to reduce the Australian contingent in the BCOF 36 and had advanced ‘recruiting difficulties’ in support of its plans to reduce the Australian force.37

    The Australian Government continued to reduce its commitment and Chambers announced in Parliament on 8 October 1948 that no more Australian families would be sent to Japan because it was proposed to reduce the strength of the Australian contingent in the BCOF.38

    Because the Australian Government’s rundown of its contingent took place at a time when the US Government was attempting to strengthen Japan and the US military position in Japan, it is necessary to ask whether the Australian Government was with drawing its forces from Japan in order to avoid military obligations there of a kind very different to those it had accepted since 1946.

     The US Government maintained its strong stand against reductions in the size of the Australian force and went so far as to suggest that Australia take steps to overcome its recruiting difficulties or ‘to modify current plans for redevelopment of the regular forces in order to maintain Australia’s participation in the united security effort in the Pacific-Far Eastern area’.39 The US Government reaffirmed its earlier advice that ‘it cannot subscribe to this proposed further reduction of the BCOF in Japan’ and by way of further emphasis the US Government’s reply questioned the Australian Government’s contention that it had already given the required six months’ notice to withdraw forces. According to Shedden, the US ‘appears to have deliberately ignored’ the Aus tralian note of 7 May 1948.40

     On the 24 November 1948 the Australian diplomatic representative, in Washington, Harold Bullock, left a note at the State Department, in which the Australian Government formally notified the US Government that it was not practicable to maintain a force in Japan after 31 December 1948 greater than one battalion, one air force squadron, and necessary maintenance personnel, totalling 2750, and that this accorded with the formal notice of 7 May 1948.41 The C-in-C and staff of the BCOF would continue with rank commensurate with the responsibility and dignity of a BCOF mission.42 Formal acceptance by the US Government on this decision was dated 7 February 1949.

     The World War II postscript in Japan was coming to an end. US policies had changed; the Australian claim of participation in exchange for a place in the settlement was becoming less and less credible and the chance of a settlement more remote; and even the loose ends such as the war trials were being tied up. In Tokyo on 10 November 1948 the International Tribunal found General Tojo and other accused army officers guilty of conspiring ‘to wage aggressive wars’. On 25 November MacArthur upheld the sentences imposed and Tojo and six others were sentenced to death. On 23 December 1948 these sentences were carried out.43 As an echo of the harsh line originally taken by the Australian Government with regard to the Japanese Emperor’s role in the war, the President of the Tribunal, Sir William Webb, in a minority judgment, named Emperor Hirohito and said he should have been brought to trial. He added that the Emperor had been available for trial but had been granted immunity.

     On 15 November 1948 the final withdrawal of the UK Army and RAE components took place and NZ forces were withdrawn by the end of November 1948. The BCOF had become an entirely Australian force although by early 1949 the 65th and 66th Battalions and associated units had been withdrawn.44

     During 1949 there was a gradual decline in the overall strength of the Australian force in Japan so that by 1 February 1950 the figure had dropped to 2362. As a consequence of the change in status of US forces in Japan, withdrawal of the Australian force had been raised by the Australian Head of Mission in Japan and on 5 August 1949 he put a proposal to that end to Canberra. However, in the light of advice from Canberra on 18 August 1949 that the force would not be withdrawn until a Japanese peace treaty had been signed, the Head of Mission, on 26 August 1949, adjusted his view in favour of continued Australian participation in the occupation.45