An assessment of the events which followed from the Australian Government's decision to commit and maintain military forces as part of the Occupation of Japan leads to the identification of a number of significant features of Australian policy evident for much of the subsequent post World War II period.

i

GREAT AND POWERFUL FRIENDS

     In late 1941, Australia, already at war with the European Axis powers, had to adapt quickly to the new strategic circumstances and priorities caused by Japan's entry into the war. The sudden collapse of the European allied powers in Asia and the preoccupations of these powers with more pressing priorities in Europe and the Middle East isolated Australia from its traditional and, until then, great and powerful friend, the UK, and resulted in an immediate, yet restricted association with the US. The Australian Government committed the bulk of its military forces to the command of General MacArthur and it was not until 1945 that there was any significant adjustment to the policies adopted so absolutely in 1941-1942.

     As the war against the Axis powers turned in the favour of the Allies favour, the Australian Government sought to establish guidelines for policies applicable to the post war period. Australian resistance to the re-establishment of a British predominance in the strategic direction of Australian defence policies proceeded in parallel with attempts by the Australian Government to involve the UK in matters of direct benefit to Australia's strategic situation. Similarly Australia recognised the strategic predominance of its new great and powerful friend, the US, and sought vigorously to align US strategic interests to Australia's benefit.

     The Australian Government gave priority to the establishment of an independent position in the conduct of international affairs. Where possible this policy was to seek the mantle of leadership on behalf of the British Commonwealth concerning those matters seen by Australia to fall within its strategic interest. Early signs of this policy were evident in the forceful Australian response to the proposals put by the British Government for the offensive against the Japanese mainland, the re-occupation of Hong Kong, and the arrangements for the setting up of the BCOF. It was also seen in the strong line the Australian Government took on negotiations with the US Government over Manus and in the Australian response to the US Government's conduct of the occupation of Japan. The Australian Government of the day, despite the relative insignificance of the Australian voice, achieved, at least in the initial post war period, some recognition of this policy and made some progress in its implementation.

     Eventually these attempts by the Australian Government to pursue independent policies failed. Australia's powerful friends had priorities elsewhere and despite an occasional success in temporarily realigning, or at best coinciding an interest, the Australian Government lacked the influence to sustain the realignment. The Australian Government pressed its point of view, sometimes to its eventual disadvantage. On the one hand the Australian Government's insistence upon a reciprocity arrangement during the initial negotiations with the US over Manus contributed to the delay that eventually put beyond all doubt the US withdrawal from Manus and with it the central support of the Australian Government's island screen plan. Similarly, the Government's repeated espousals of confident and substantial policies were not supported in terms of the actual support necessary to give substance to these policies.

     Another aspect of Australian policies over this period was the emphasis placed upon the claim that Australia had earned, and continued to earn, the right to a say in the conduct of affairs, particularly in Asia and the Pacific. Australia had contributed significantly, in terms of its available resources, to the war against Japan and played a leading role in the British Commonwealth contribution in the occupation of Japan. Australian governments placed a great deal of importance upon the fact of this military contribution by Australia as the means by which Australia earned its place within the political councils of the day. The Australian Government did not rely solely upon this contribution and Evatt actively advocated the Australian view internationally.

     Nevertheless the credibility of the Australian position suffered primarily because of the obvious inability of the Government to give substance to its commitments.

     A feature of Australian policies in this period was that of loyal support for an ally. Australian support for the conduct of military operations by the US against Japan during World War II continued, in an amended form, in the arrangements made for the occupation of Japan. The Australian Government made available a sizeable force to the BCOF and accepted the political and military constraints imposed by the US Government on the activities of this force. The Australian Commander of the BCOF had access both to his own government through the JCOSA arrangements, and also to the SCAP, General MacArthur. Nevertheless his subordinate status was precisely circumscribed and repeated the earlier command arrangements put in place during the war, in the Middle East under the British and later in the SWPA.

     This was also the case politically. The purpose of the Australian commitment to the BCOF was to ensure a place and a voice in the councils that would consider the peace treaty with Japan. To this end the Australian Government persevered, despite a lack lustre performance by its British Commonwealth allies, in its contribution to JCOSA and BCOF as practical expression of support for allied (and Australian) purposes in Japan. Although there were many cases when the Australian political representative in Japan protested at the actions of MacArthur, it was also the case that the Australian Government maintained its support beyond that of the other contributors. On the occasion that the unity of the Australian commitment to the US purposes in Japan was thought to be at risk then the Australian Government acted quickly to reassure the US Government, for example, by the removal of MacMahon Ball by Evatt in 1947. This is not to deny that on other occasions the Australian Government asserted itself publicly and privately and, in the case of the preliminary peace treaty conference in Canberra in 1947, achieved some progress.

     Australian support for its allies was not unbounded and this is particularly evident in the changing attitudes towards the UK Government. The Australian reaction to the disastrous British defeats in Asia in 1941-2 and a developing independence in the conduct of Australian policies found expression in the rebuffs to a number of British proposals in 1945. Further, the Australian Government actively sought the mantle of leadership as the spokesman for the British Commonwealth in Asia and the Pacific and pushed Australia as the focus for UN or regional defence initiatives. These initiatives were not sustained because of the inconsistencies in Australian policies and the determination of the British Government to act strictly in pursuit of its own interests.

     Australian government policies towards its great and powerful friends rested on the presumption of a special relationship with these friends. This claim could be justified in terms of the military associations formed during the war, especially during the crucial days of 1941-2, when Australian forces were able to make a significant contribution to the war against the Japanese. As the British and Chinese forces gathered in strength in the later stages of the war so Australia's contribution diminished in significance to the point that attempts were made to accord the Australian representative subordinate status at the Surrender ceremony in Japan.

     Australia's confidence in these special relationships found expression in demands for a greater say in the conduct of affairs and aspirations of leadership. While it is true that the special relationship also incurred serious disadvantages in terms of Australian independence of action, the Australian Government was able to acquire a platform from which to put its point of view on matters affecting its interests. Australia's contribution to the war and to the BCOF made it possible for Evatt to seek the maximum advantage in access to, and claims upon, the US and UK governments.

     There were however acknowledged disadvantages of the special relationship. In the early days of the post war there was uncertainty as to whether the US Government would return to the policies of pre-war isolationism. The war had demonstrated Australian dependence upon US political and military support and a return to isolationism by the US, and with it a dismissal of a special relationship with Australia, would have placed Australia once again in a position of strategic vulnerability. Truman's rejection of this option carried with it other implications for Australia. As Admiral Nimitz was to observe, a special relationship with the US could involve Australia in matters not of its choice and possibly to its disadvantage. The US Government's interests were global and complex, and as was seen in the discussions over Manus these global interests took precedence over special or regional arrangements.

     A second disadvantage of the special relationship was that it was misleading. The Australian government repeatedly espoused policies based upon a claim to a special relationship but did little to give substance to the policy or the claim. Repeatedly, also both the US and UK governments acted selfishly and completely ignored Australian interests, neither was there any attempt to accord the Australian Government the status that could be allowed an ally with a special relationship.

     The third disadvantage of the special relationship was that it incurred or assumed obligations. The British and Indian Governments were prepared to give general and early support to the Australian initiative on JCOSA but to then withdraw this support at a time inconvenient to Australia and which imposed additional burdens upon Australia. The British Government on a number of occasions, noticeably over Hong Kong and Malaya, needed Australian support for its often repeated affirmation of support for British and British Commonwealth purposes. On a number of occasions in the earlier stages of the war and well into the post war period the Australian Government rejected or ignored opportunities and requests to provide assistance to a hard pressed British Government.

     The corollary to this point is that the Australian government also developed a more refined sense of understanding as to what courses of action were in the Australian national interest. Australian policies in support of BCOF and with regard to the plan to set up an island screen, and around it a regional defence agreement, were pursued vigorously and unashamedly by exploiting the special relationship. On the other hand the government avoided getting involved in commitments which it assessed as being contrary to the Australian national interest. It steadfastly avoided providing assistance for European Governments seeking to re-establish their colonial empires in Asia. In the case of support for the British position in Hong Kong in 1949 the Australian Government quite correctly placed the importance of its relations with the future government in China above that of the British presence in Hong Kong.

ii

AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT
TO AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY

     Traditionally the Australian Government had accepted assessments by the British Government on the perceived threat the imperial interests and on a number of occasions despatched significant military forces to Europe and the Middle East in support of these British assessments, and of its own assessments based in the main on British sources. Apart from isolated military actions in areas more immediate to Australia's interest, Asia, firmly in the hands of the European colonial powers, was not seen as being an area from which serious direct threats to Australian security were likely to emerge. During the 1930s there was an increasing public awareness in Australia of the growing military significance of Japan as a military power and Japanese actions, in Manchuria and China, indicated the likely progression of events in Asia. Despite some unpublished official misgivings in Australia as to the vulnerability of the imperial defence strategy in Asia, built around Singapore as a base, little was done in Australia to prepare for a direct threat to Australia. Singapore was espoused as impregnable, a fallacy premised on British naval power and subsequently proven false by Japanese air power and the Japanese Army.

     The speed, ferocity and the success of Japanese attacks on the colonial powers in Asia which commenced in December 1941, were followed by long and costly campaigns which greatly strengthened latent Australian perceptions of the so called 'Yellow Peril'. When the full impact of Japanese behaviour in Asia, and most particularly the treatment of civilian and military prisoners of war, became generally known, so an additional and powerful emotion was added to long standing Australian prejudices concerning Asia. Australian statecraft after 1945 was conducted within this highly charged emotional setting. Australian calls for retribution, reparations and revenge exceeded those of other nations whose nationals had also suffered at the hand of the Japanese.

     The humiliation of the colonial powers and the encouragement given to Asian nationalism by Japanese actions during the war set in motion developments that were to trouble the post was period in Asia. The resultant instability reinforced Australian concerns about being overwhelmed by the weight of numbers of people in Asia and assisted development of the point of view that Australia as an isolated European enclave under constant threat of being lost beneath the tide of Asian nationalism, unless bold defence policies were set in place. This view, put by politicians of differing political persuasion, was in part caused by the shortcomings in official Australian representation in Asia. The fledgling diplomatic service had yet to develop the confidence and expertise necessary to balance erratic and distracted contributions by Australian politicians and the difficulties of obtaining an accurate and objective assessment further compounded the subjectivity of the debate. The then Department of External Affairs, responsible to Evatt, and the Department of Defence responsible to a succession of Ministers but dominated by Shedden, pursued parallel, not complementary policies.

     This concern about being engulfed by Asia was a dominant factor in Australian defence, foreign and immigration policies. Evatt continued to see Japan as a menace to peace in Asia and recorded the prospect of a resurgent Japan as posing a singular threat to Australia. The major element in Australian defence policy during this period was encompassed in the commitment to BCOF and the significance of a peace treaty with Japan. Arthur Calwell, Minister for Immigration, was vocal in his opposition to Asians and the harshness of his views was specifically directed at the Japanese. However it was the leader of the Opposition, Menzies, who publicly linked this latent Australian fear of Asians with what he saw as a new development in Asia, the spread of communist ideology.

     Menzies portrayed Australia as likely to be 'hemmed in' by 'native communist republics'. Menzies remarks, made within the context of references to the emerging Republic of Indonesia, are important in that they were made at a time of flux in Australian attitudes to communist ideology. The Soviet Union had played a crucial role in the war in Europe, had had the status of ally, and communist ideology had been unhindered in its permeation of official and public attitudes in Australia. This combination of Australia's comparative isolation from the mainstream of more critical assessments of the Soviet Union and a necessary turn around required in Australian attitudes meant that alternative views, such as that put by Menzies, required time to take root in the political debate in Australia. Nevertheless it was this idea that became so important in the post war defence debate - The Yellow Peril became the Red Menace and the long heralded downward push of the Yellow Peril became the march of communism southward, eventually enshrined as the Domino Theory. Menzies remarks also fore-shadowed an ongoing and troubled relationship with Indonesia, which in the longer term, had a marked influence upon Australia's defence and foreign policies.

     The important of these changes in the nature of the possible threat to Australia was recognized by the Australian governments of the time. These governments sought to avoid any entanglement in the fundamental readjustments taking place in Asia. Australian forces were extracted as quickly as possible from those areas to be reoccupied by the colonial powers and the Australian Government turned down specific requests for assistance. These policies were continued into the post war and despite the obvious difficulties the British Government was having in Malaya and Hong Kong, the Australian Government avoided any commitment in support of British actions in these places.

    Similar policies were followed by way of Australian government responses to the developing international debate and assessments of the new significance of the Soviet Union. The US Government, quickly estranged from its war time ally, saw the Soviet Union as the driving force behind the instability in Asia and Europe. Australian attitudes were fuelled by US conduct towards the Soviet Union and this had immediate effect in Japan where the US Government was determined to restrict Soviet input to the conduct of the occupation. From time to time Australian officials were accused of siding with the Soviet position and these situations added to tensions in the relationships between the Australian and US Governments.

     Not surprisingly the Australian Opposition played up the nature of a threat to Australia in the many attacks made on the government's defence policies in the post war period. The Australian Government and the Australian people generally, were war weary and a combination of social and economic pressures restricted the priority given to defence matters. There is ample evidence that Labor governments over the period deliberately played down the possibility of war and of dangers to Australia's national interests. This conduct flew in the face of the international realities and reflected a return to another long standing attitude, that Australia's geographic isolation would greatly assist in its protection. Australian defence budgets reflected the economic restraints of the time rather than strategic considerations and continued uncertainties in Asia and the persistence of the opposition attacks pointed up the weaknesses evident in defence policies.

     As the intensity and scale of communist activity in Asia became more pronounced so the Australian view of Asia broadened. The prospect of a takeover by the Soviet Union of Japan and the unleashing of a combined Asian communist threat, was embellished by the realities of the obvious communist successes in China and the marked increase in communist incidents elsewhere in Asia. The Australian Government however continued in its insistence that the threat to Australia had been overdrawn. This view was most noticeable when Chifley refused to accept the assessment, put by the British Chiefs of Staff, in 1946, that the Soviet Union was the most significant threat to world peace. Chifley was not prepared to nominate any country as a threat and he persevered in this stand. On a number of occasions when the government was under attack for not assisting the British Government in responding to the troubles in Malaya, Chifley referred only to 'the preservation of law and order' in that country. On other occasions Evatt, who was quick to describe the Japanese as a threat, was subdued in his remarks concerning the Soviet Union.

     The debate in Australia over the prospect of a threat to Australia was complicated by the emotions generated by the intensity of the domestic debate in Australia on the subject of industrial unrest. The Communist party in Australia made no secret of its ties with the Soviet Union and publicly identified with it in opposition to the Australian Government's Defence and Foreign policies. The Communist Party was in the vanguard of the public opposition to the establishment of a rocket range in Central Australia and a leading Australian communist, Sharkey, was identified with meetings of communists in Asia, claimed later to be instrumental in the upsurge of communist successes in Asia.

     This domestic debate in Australia on the subject of communism had its most public expression in a series of industrial actions which culminated in the deployment of troops to break a miners strike in NSW. The issue had significant impact upon the unity of the Labor Party and directly affected the conduct of government business. The most damaging consequence of the debate however was its impact on the confidence of the US and UK Governments in the integrity and commitment of the Australian Government. This lack of confidence resulted in specific restrictions which had adverse effects upon Australian defence policy - ie. embargoes on the transfer of classified information and, at the diplomatic level, to the exclusion of Australia from negotiations on matters of defence importance to Australia.

     Finally, Australian attitudes to threats to Australian security, as expressed by Australian politicians and officials, were conditioned by the belief that Australia's great and powerful friends could be diverted away from those areas of specific defence importance to Australia. Central to allied strategy during World War II had been the decision taken by the US and UK Governments to give priority to resolution of the conflict in Europe. This strategy had had direct consequences for Australian security in that it lessened the importance accorded the war in the SWPA and restricted the level of practical support available to the allied commanders prosecuting the war against the Japanese.

     Following the cessation of hostilities and the immediate rundown in defence manpower and deployment there was initially uncertainty as to what military role the US would play in the post war period. The possibility of a return to isolationism by the US was finally dismissed by President Truman but his statement to this effect also marked a major readjustment of US Government defence perceptions and deployments. Similarly, the UK Government quickly became preoccupied with events in Europe and withdrew its forces from ares where it had had significant representation. These changes in policies by Australia's major defence allies accentuated Australia's sense of isolation and the memory of the recent war was a powerful reminder of Australia's vulnerability to threat if left to rely upon its own resources.

iii

FORWARD DEFENCE

     The post war period 1945-1953 is particularly significant in the evolution of Australian defence policy as a time when important initiatives were taken in what was to become known later as 'Forward Defence'.

     The concept of forward defence was one that placed the boundaries of Australian defence effort as far forward of the Australian mainland as was possible in order to create a number of barriers or hindrances to a potential enemy.

     Australian governments had from time to time despatched forces overseas, invariably seeing British and Australian interests as being synonymous in support of the interest of the British Government. It was not until the Australian mainland was directly threatened that territories within Australia's area of strategic interest took on particular meanings in a defence sense. The scale and reach of the Japanese offensives in Asia and the Pacific forced the Australian Government to consider deployment of Australian forces specifically in terms of Australia's immediate defence interests. This led to a substantial falling out with the British Government over the actual deployment of Australian forces, and the failure of the British and other colonial governments to protect their interest in Asia against the Japanese, led to a fundamental readjustment of Australian defence alignment, ie. from dependence upon the UK Government to dependence upon the US Government. The capture of British and other territories in Asia by Japan enabled the Japanese to pose a direct threat to Australia.

     The direction of the Japanese offensive, particularly in south east Asia, was such as to place the arc of islands to the immediate north of Australia in a new light. From the point of view of Japanese strategists this arc became the southern boundary of the area under military control of the Japanese and locations from which to threaten and harass the allies. From the point of view of the allied strategists the territories became important not only in the determination of the direction of the allied counter offensive but as essential stepping stones on the way to the final assault upon the Japanese mainland.

     From the point of view of those responsible for the formulation of Australian defence policies this northern arc of islands became a physical barrier around which Australian forces were to be deployed in a desperate attempt to stem the flow of the Japanese offensive. Despite gallant resistance by Australian forces in the NEI, at Rabaul and in Timor these deployments proved futile, although the Australian successes at Milne Bay and on the Kokoda trail highlighted the importance of these physical barriers as a means of purchasing time while other forces were gathered. The consequence of this Australian military involvement in these islands was a new awareness of the importance of these areas to Australian defence interest. The cost, in terms of Australian lives, also ensured a continuing public interest Australian governments had to recognise.

     This new awareness in Australia of the importance of these barriers to Australian defence interest led in its turn to other fundamental changes in the way the Australian Government viewed the areas to the north. There is some evidence that Australian politicians, most particularly the then Minister for External Affairs, Evatt, foresaw the day that Australian political interests in these areas would be developed beyond that previously confined to the colonial involvement by Australia in the Territory of New Guinea and the Trusteeship of Papua. Evatt was to persevere with these beliefs and MacArthur especially was to remain suspicious of Australian intentions to acquire interests in territories, previously occupied by colonial powers, later liberated from the Japanese. However by 1945 other views prevailed and the Australian Government sought to extricate Australian forces as quickly as possible from situations wherein they might become embroiled in complicated colonial readjustments. Nevertheless the legacy from the war time experience was one that put beyond all doubt the significance of these areas to Australia's defence. Australia's defence boundary had been moved to a major step northward.

     This new boundary was recognised in the Australian defence plans envisaged for the post war period. There was general agreement in the Australian parliament that the island chain to the north should be seen as part of Australia's perimeter defences and that Australian forces should be deployed, in peace time, to Australian bases to be established there. This change in policy, ie. the preparedness to move the defence boundary outwards, was significant but much more important was the preparedness, accepted by both government and opposition of the day, to station Australian defence forces out of Australia in times of peace. These forces were to be of a size and composition sufficient to provide adequate defence for this island screen and be additional to those required for the defence of the Australian and New Zealand mainlands. These plans rested upon the assumption that Australia, and New Zealand, could not undertake such a task unaided and must necessarily involve both British Commonwealth and other nations with interests in Asia and the Pacific.

     These proposals were not as novel as might first appear. Pre war arrangements for imperial defence in the Far East had been premised on a powerful British base at Singapore and a supporting British fleet. Australia had been included in these plans, fragile though they proved to be, and well before the Japanese attacks in December 1941, Australian forces had been deployed forward of the Australian mainland. Nevertheless, the pre war plans had not included deployment of Australian forces in peace time and had been prepared, as far as Australia was concerned, under imperial defence auspices only. The essential difference, as expressed in the post war proposals, was that this was an Australian initiative, taken in concert with New Zealand, and a direct consequence of the Australia-New Zealand agreement of 1944.

     The Australian Government clearly perceived the establishment of an alternative base (or bases) to Singapore although as was later revealed, the British Government also had plans for lines of defence, with the main line along the Asian mainland and a second line stretching from Indo China to Fiji. MacArthur was later to see the defence of US interests in similar terms. Australian plans were generally in accord with strategic proposals for the defence of this area under discussion at the time. Thus, in addition to seeking to mesh into these other proposals, and thus broaden the range of Australia's defence allies, the Australian Government had a clear idea of its own requirements and was prepared to implement its own defence plan. Manus Island, because of its location and the scale of US investment in military facilities in the later stages of the war, had obvious attractions although one alternative, and much more modest proposal, was to establish a base a Dreger Harbour on the north coast of New Guinea.

     The Australian plan to establish bases along the perimeter suffered early and abrupt modifications. Despite some initial Australian interest in Portuguese Timor it was soon obvious that the Australian Government sought to avoid any entanglement or involvement in territories at either end of the arc, ie. at the western end with the Dutch or Portuguese or at the eastern end, with the British; this left the centre part of the screen and obviously Manus Island.

     Australian defence policies as applied to Manus, had a number of features that characterised policies of this period and were to be important in later policies. Firstly, the Government had a plan, based on Australian perceptions of Australian interests. Secondly, the Government pursued this plan vigorously with the US Government in such a way as to seek to directly involve the US in the defence of Australian interest and territories. Australia sought to widen this US involvement to include other interests nations and to bring about a regional or collective security treaty, ie. Australia actively sought to make formal, and continue into the peace, a direct US military involvement in areas so recently proved to be of fundamental importance to Australia's defence interest. Thirdly, the Government espoused a bold plan which committed Australian forces to permanent obligations in peace time, forward of the Australian mainland. The plan also recognised the continued importance of naval power and the significance of air power, both of which should be exercised to best effect well forward of the Australian mainland.

     The island screen plan however was only part of Australian forward defence deployment. The other, and more important part, was the Australian commitment to the BCOF in Japan. Initially the Australian commitment to the BCOF was seen as Australia's contribution to ensuring that the most likely future threat to Australia's security, Japan, was rendered incapable. The swift demilitarisation of Japan, the continuing occupation, and the prospect of a formal peace treaty, were all seen as guarantees to this end. Gradually, and as these purposes were realized, so the Australian assessments of Japan's potential as a threat came into line with UK and US assessments. These assessments, based on an early preoccupation with the importance of the Soviet Union as a world power, carried with them the corollary that Japan was important, not only a potential ally but as a bastion for defence purposes in Asia and the Pacific. These assessments were subsequently widened to include a more general definition of a threat posed by communism, whether prosecuted by the Soviet Union or as developed in China.

     As with Manus, so with the BCOF, the size and composition of the Australian military commitment planned and in this case, implemented, was a very significant action by an Australian Government in times of peace. The Australian force of almost 11,000 in 1946, comprising elements of all three Australian services, was the largest committed overseas in the forty-five years following the end of World War II. The command and control arrangements for the BCOF was a valuable development in terms of Australian conduct of military activities in conjunction with its allies.

     By 1949 the Australian Government's enthusiasm for these forward defence initiatives had weakened and it clearly failed to match the boldness of these plans and the associated rhetoric with the military force required. The reasons for these failures have been outlined in this dissertation but there are two general observations that should be made. The first is that Manus Island remained, until independence was granted to Papua New Guinea, as an Australian naval and air facility. Secondly, it was from the Australian military presence in Japan that an Australian Government in June 1950 drew elements for prompt deployment in support of the UN military response in South Korea to military action by North Korea.

iv

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION

     Prior to 1941 Australian military forces despatched overseas had been placed under British commanders with agreed arrangements for Australian representation at appropriate, although always subordinate levels. Despite the gradual development of a preparedness in Australia to reorder this traditional approach this situation remained until Curtin's decision in December 1941, following the collapse of Australia's usual defence ally, the UK, to transfer the bulk of Australia's combatant forces to the US Government under General MacArthur's command.

     In the event this new arrangement had little effect upon either the direction or the execution of the war. However the experience stimulated a determination within the Australian Government to have a greater say in the conduct of affairs and to seek a widening and strengthening of support for Australian defence interests.

     One lesson learned by the Australian Government from the war was that an Australian military commitment to a common cause did not guarantee that the Australian voice, whether political or military, would be heard or even recognized, when important decisions were taken. A former Australian Prime Minister, Billy Hughes, speaking on behalf of 60,000 war dead established a worthwhile precedent. Australia had a legitimate claim to be heard and it was a proper course of action to pursue it. Nevertheless MacArthur conducted the war in the SWPA, and the US and UK Governments proceeded with the arrangements for the surrender and occupation of Japan, with little account given to the Australian point of view, no matter how forcefully this was put.

     Despite the farsightedness of the Australian Government with regard to what became known as JCOSA, and the potential for effective political and defence co-operation this organization offered, both the UK and US Governments effectively circumvented it and proceeded independently in much the same way as General MacArthur had circumvented General Blamey. Similarly, Australia made a substantial and effective early contribution to the BCOF and the associated political councils only to find that this input was of little consequence when important decisions were taken by MacArthur or the US Government.

     The Australian Government also sought a position of leadership on behalf of British Commonwealth defence interests in Asia and the Pacific. The Government put forward specific and imaginative proposals to enhance British Commonwealth interests. The Australian plan to create and garrison and island screen, and to involve the US Government in a reciprocal bases agreement of benefit to other British Commonwealth Governments, was complementary to its efforts to take a position of leadership in the BCOF. The Australian Government pursued these initiatives when the UK Government was constrained to withdraw from Asia and thus might have logically supported Australian efforts. This was not the case and the British Government often excluded the Australian Government or operated independently in pursuit of its own interests.

     The Australian Government, discouraged by the lack of progress on a peace treaty with Japan, also took the initiative that led to the Canberra Conference in 1947. This conference alone revealed important differences as to what notice would be given Australian leadership ambitions although it was sufficient to result in an amendment to US proposals on the same subject.

     The Australian Government sought, as a framework for its own defence policies, to sponsor or support a range of co-operative defence arrangements. In addition to the absolute support given to MacArthur during World War II and the significant numbers of Australian service personnel involved in other campaigns, Australia entered into a specific defence agreement with New Zealand in 1944. This agreement became in effect the foundation stone for Australia's later defence arrangements and defined the nature of what became known as Forward Defence. Within a year the Australian Government had developed a refinement of the Australian-New Zealand agreement known as the JCOSA Agreement and had included, in addition to New Zealand, the UK and India. The JCOSA was, at least in theory, a more sophisticated agreement and at its peak the JCOSA had the oversight of a force numbering some 37,000 service personnel in Japan.

     As well the Australian Government attempted to tie in its defence plans with the broad and regional defence agreements envisaged under UN auspices. This intention was built into Australian Government statements on defence and foreign policy and Evatt, especially, was vocal in his pursuit of this objective. With time it became apparent that the UN could not overcome readily the difficulties inherent in establishing such agreements and this delay led to the development of regional defence agreements outside UN auspices. It also became obvious that the Australian Government was reluctant to give substance to its widely publicised claims of support and when matters came to a head in Palestine in 1948, elected not to get involved or provide assistance.

     The Australian Opposition, remained unconvinced as to the likely effectiveness of UN sponsored defence arrangements, was openly critical of the UN and urged the Australian government to enter into more practical arrangements. Nevertheless the Australian Government saw the UN as a significant organization for the preservation of peace and Evatt's efforts in this regard were recognized by his election in 1948 as President of the UN General Assembly, 1948-9. One other measure of this Australian diplomatic support for the UN was the speed and ease with which a later Australian government was able to commit Australian forces to South Korea under UN auspices within seven months of the Labor Government losing office in December 1949.

     One feature of the Government's defence policies of this period was the confusion which existed over what became known as a Pacific Pact. Certainly the Government pursued actively and imaginatively proposals to build a regional defence agreement based on a community of British Commonwealth and other nations with defence interests in the Pacific. The Government also proposed schemes involving British Commonwealth forces or UN regional defence agreements. However there is also evidence that the Government deliberately merged these references to create the impression that it was active and within sight of a suitable defence agreement. Dedman went so far as to claim that details of a Pacific pact were almost complete and on 15 May 1949 Chifley announced that plans similar to those announced in Europe were proceeding in the Pacific whereas material available to Dedman, and presumably also to Chifley, confirmed that there were no official plans for a Pacific pact. There were however basic arrangements in preparation with the UK and NZ military liaison staffs but linked to what was to become known later as the ANZAM agreement.

     The Australian initiative with regard to a Pacific pact was pursued primarily by the Federal Opposition and proceeded in parallel with a number of proposals put by Asian statesmen. Arguably it was one of the most significant defence policy achievements of the government which succeeded the Labor Government in late 1949 was the conclusion, by 1951, of the ANZUS treaty.

v

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

      Curtin's call to the US for assistance in December 1941 was a watershed in the development of Australian defence policy. His placement of the bulk of Australia's combatant forces under MacArthur's command accorded with previous practice except that in this instance the military commander was American not British, and through him, to the joint command procedures agreed to by the US and UK Governments. The political control of Australian forces was thus widened beyond that usually accorded the British Government although in practice MacArthur, a comparatively junior US Commander, by-passed the protocols properly applicable to this situation, and dealt directly with the Australian Prime Minister, also Defence Minister, or with the Secretary of the Defence Department, FS Shedden.

     These arrangements followed the long established supremacy of civilian control in the conduct of Australia's defence policies, however the deliberate exclusion of senior Australian military commanders, acquiesced to by the Australian Prime Minister, imposed limitations detrimental to Australia's short and long term interests. In the short term the practice had political as well as military effects. Politically, it asserts the principle of ministerial responsibility but in so doing isolated the Defence Minister from a wider interaction of political and military input. This practice was to have particular ramifications for the conduct of post war policy. Also in the short term MacArthur, and the allied effort generally in the Pacific, failed to profit from the considerable experience gained by senior Australian commanders prior to the US entry into the war. Secondly, MacArthur went on to play down Australia's significant contribution to the war against the Japanese by assigning Australian forces secondary roles that were costly in lives and given little recognition subsequently. These practices were repeated in the post war period and were especially obvious in the status accorded Australia's senior military commanders by the Australian Government.

     In the longer term the wartime conduct of Australian defence policy set in place a pattern of oligarchic control. The direct relationship between policy and execution may have all been well suited to earlier desperate times but the inadequacies of the arrangement had become so entrenched by 1945 as to require an abrupt correction of course when Chifley became Prime Minister in July 1945. Chifley sought, at least initially, to be more assertive of Australia's control of its affairs. Unfortunately the separation of the portfolio of Defence Minister, from the Prime Ministership and the appointment of Beasley, as Defence Minister and Minister for Post War reconstruction coincided with the major distortions caused by the problems of demobilisation and post war reconstruction. The presence of two forceful characters, Evatt and Shedden, who were established in positions of authority hallowed by time and wartime experience, allowed in effect a continuation of the oligarchic practices developed during the war. The significance of Evatt and Shedden was magnified because in the post war readjustments defence policy was quickly submerged in the massive backlog of pressing domestic policy matters. Shedden also benefited in that Blamey was not treated well in the post war period, and became publicly critical of the government's defence policies, while the run down of the defence force encouraged a return to the traditional passivity by Australia's military leaders.

     The dominant influence upon Australia's post war defence policy was Evatt in so much that the far reaching decisions on defence policy were those that followed from foreign policy decisions, eg. support for the BCOF and support for the island screen including the base on Manus. With the essential direction of the defence budget dictated by economic rather than strategic considerations and with the defence force in a run down state, variations followed a requirement to provide a response to a foreign policy development. Equally important is the evidence available to confirm that often the government defence policies could not be implemented because funds had not been budgeted, for example, the decision to proceed independently on the use of the base at Manus. At other times even if the government had elected to pursue a course of action, eg. support the British in Hong Kong or Malaya, the defence material or manpower was simply not available, a condition caused by the government's restrictions on defence expenditure.

     Evatt's predominance was assisted by his isolation, both as an individual and from the wider infrastucture of the political process. His individuality and the harshness of his personality caused many practical difficulties in the conduct of Australian foreign policy. He held two demanding portfolios, as Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs, and the distractions of other obligations, for example his work on bank nationalization or at the UN, occurred at times when international events called for his full attention as Minister for External Affairs.

     Evatt was able to intrude, to a large extent, into other areas of policy, initially because of the declining effectiveness of Curtin and subsequently because of the preoccupations and comparative ineffectiveness of the post war Ministers for Defence. The longer Evatt remained as minister his ability to offend or create division grew, to the point that Dedman, especially, was very critical of his conduct of foreign policy and his behaviour over the Manus negotiations. This antagonism was reflected in the Departments of External Affairs and Defence although it is difficult to provide evidence of this.

     Evatt's performance however was neither unbridled nor unchecked. Chifley from July 1945 moved quickly into the vacuum caused by Curtin's death and became a steadying influence on the erratic behaviour of Evatt. Chifley, from the information available, appears as the man responsible for keeping Australia out of commitments likely to involve Australia in unacceptable obligations. Time and again he is revealed turning aside or avoiding requests such as assistance to the colonial powers in Asia.

     Nevertheless, Evatt, as Minister for External Affairs, quite properly had a major input to the development of policies which shaped Australia's defence obligations in Asia and the Pacific often apparently without reference to, and without the practical support of his colleagues, he put forward the government's view. Undoubtedly is own personality was a major contributing factor to this singleness of purpose and presentation but his cause was strengthened by the generally ineffectual performance of his parliamentary colleagues during Evatt's ascendancy. The Opposition was quick to capitalize upon the fact that the government relied so heavily, and often exclusively, upon the performance of Evatt.

     The war had forced an interest in matters of defence and foreign policy and the establishment of new organizations as the War Cabinet and the Advisory War Council. It has been argued that these separate mechanisms, when combined with a general war weariness, consolidated the likelihood, in the post war period, that these matters would remain the province and interest of a small group. It is difficult to locate much parliamentary support of any substance for Evatt although the Opposition managed a much broader contribution to the defence and foreign policies debates than the government. Repeatedly the Opposition called for the establishment of suitable parliamentary committees to concern themselves with defence and foreign policy matters and repeatedly the government avoided the issue, despite Chifley's early interest in a bipartisan approach to such matters.

     Similar remarks can be made concerning the influence of the Labor Party itself upon the conduct of policies. The party's formal platform came under review at agreed intervals and the parliamentary members of the party were required to work within the platform. The evidence from the official records of the party suggests by and large the party's formal organization left the conduct of defence and foreign policies to the Prime Minister and responsible ministers and it was not until late in the period that the federal executive even considered the establishment of a committee to provide a suitable discussion venue for such matters.

     There were outside the parliament and the party organization other influences upon the conduct of policy. There was to a surprising degree, given the experience of the war, an Australian preparedness to leave the carriage of international aspects of policy to the British or US Governments. Despite the many occasions when Evatt, particularly, vigorously pursued an Australian view in foreign places there were other occasions, ie. Chifley's visit to the US and the Bevin-Byrnes discussions over Manus Island, when Australia left the conduct of affairs, of particular interest to Australia, to others. There were also many occasions when Australia's great and powerful friends made decisions or embarked on policies of direct interest to Australia without consulting or even informing Australia.

     Within Australia itself there were restraints upon informed contributions to matters in hand at the time. One legacy of the war was a heightened public consciousness of defence matters and this ensured a vocal, although often emotional, response to matters associated with a possible threat to Australian security. Such attitudes can be readily identified in criticisms of the government by former war-time leaders but more particularly in the public attitudes which persisted with regard to Japan and which developed as a result of the debate on matters of domestic and international communism.

     One particular problem faced by individuals or organizations involved in these debates was the difficulty in ascertaining the facts of any given situation. Members of Parliament complained vigorously and often that the appropriate minister was absent from the parliament or that there were too few opportunities for debate on defence policy within the parliament. A comparison of the material available through a responsible newspaper reveals that much of the material made available in the parliament was not published in the press and that much of what was made available to the public through the press was not available through the parliament. Often The Age newspaper was the only voice expressing concern about the reluctance of the Australian Government to concern itself, in 1948-1949, with the changes taking place in Asia.

     The study of this period has provided further evidence of the ease with which a government, either consciously or unconsciously, can mislead the public. The most damning evidence of this can be seen by a comparison of the public with the official or private record. There were occasions when the government was able to deny it had been asked to assist, say, the British in Malaya or Hong Kong because it had previously and privately indicated that it would not welcome such requests. There were other occasions when the Government stated a position which was at variance with what it knew to be the actual state of affairs, for example, the government's response to proposals that it should provide troops for Hong Kong from the force in Japan, or the official pronouncements associated with the Manus dispute, or the purposes of the Shedden visit to the US. Indeed Dedman was later to claim that Evatt had actually misled the parliament over the true state of affairs with regard to Manus.

     Also revealing are the examples of the ways and means by which policies are originated and implemented. It is to be expected that key public servants like FS Shedden would be able, because of long-standing involvement, to influence the course of events and his contributions to the important policy positions be crucial. However, there were many times when the official input was either ignored or substantially amended, eg. the post war proposals for the development of the three services. Often the government was criticised because of the single handed way in which Evatt was said to conduct foreign policy but by way of redress, the parliamentary debate on the visit of a parliamentary delegation to the BCOF in 1947, confirms that the critics of the government could themselves be blind to the important issues at hand.

     The Australian Government in 1945 made a bold and promising beginning to the conduct of its defence policies. It was careful to avoid extraneous commitments and quite deliberately concentrated upon those issues likely to bring a return to the Australian interest. The governments of the time, sought under great difficulty, to develop policies for Australia's long term good and to establish a place in international councils thus ensuring a say in matters affecting Australia's best interest. These governments were unable to sustain the policies they espoused and although there were attempts to rescue the situation towards the end of the period under review Australia's defence preparedness and credibility seriously declined. Finally it can be shown conclusively that although the Australian Parliament should be quite properly the forum within which the government's policies are expounded and subject to review, in practice, at least during the period 1945-1949, the parliament was a poor reflector of the actual state of affairs.

     Similar comments apply to the range of defence policies envisaged for the post war. The island screen concept was an appropriate means by which Australia could defend itself and also involve a number of important allies in the defence of Australia. The Australian government's attempts to develop regional co-operation for defence purposes and its initial contribution to the occupation of Japan were bold initiatives and, if they had been sustained, would have been important and long term contributions to Australian defence.

      In defence of the Australian Government it can be argued that, despite the considerable odds, principally the size and preoccupations of the principal participants, the Government achieved no small measure of success in that it did act as catalyst for some movement forward in matters of direct bearing to Australia's national interest. It kept alive the matter of a peace settlement with Japan; it kept Australian forces forward of the Australian mainland; it kept Australia's claim to have a say in the ordering of regional and international events; and it set in place the foundation of Australia's defence policies: the ANZUS Treaty..

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