This said, it was during the subsequent debate that Evatt described the inadequacies of the political machinery of the occupation: 'although general policy had been agreed in 1945 it had not been issued [by November 1946] to General MacArthur; General MacArthur was bound by policy decisions issued infrequently by Washington; ... the Advisory Council could do no more than advise MacArthur'.5

     Evatt's admissions are particularly significant when it is realized that more than a year after the cessation of hostilities Australia had little or no influence on the conduct of the occupation of Japan although this had been a primary objective of Australia's post war defence policies for the post war period.

THE BRITISH WITHDRAWALS

     The first public sign that Australia's claim to a place at the peace table was in jeopardy because the BCOF itself was in jeopardy, was on 5 December 1946 when the Australian Government announced that 'agreement has been reached for the withdrawal of a brigade of UK troops from the BCOF in Japan'.6 The original British advice of intention to withdraw had been received on 12 November 1946, some six days after the Governor General's speech to the Australian Parliament, but also some three weeks before the Australian Government announced details of the British intention. The timing of the British announcement was accelerated when it became known that details of the British withdrawal were about to be released in the UK press.7

    The withdrawal of the British forces was to provide Robertson with 'my first serious clash with Gascoyne and Gairdner'. 7a Robertson had arranged an appointment to see MacArthur in order to raise with him the prospect of extending the BCOF area of operations to include Kobe, a long-time objective of the UK Government and one constantly pressed by Gascoyne. The day prior to his appointment Robertson had had occasion to see Gascoyne on another matter and was most disconcerted therefore, when, during his interview with MacArthur, MacArthur asked Robertson 'whether Australia was going to withdraw some troops too?' According to Robertson, when MacArthur 'suddenly realised to his astonishment that I did not know what he was talking about, ... I suspected quickly that UK must be up to something behind my back, and I let the matter drop'. 7b

    By the time Robertson had freed himself of immediate obligations a telegram had arrived from the Australian and UK Governments over the matter of British withdrawals and the news 'that General MacArthur had agreed'. The next morning Robertson confronted both Gascoyne and Gairdner with their duplicity over a matter which had placed Robertson 'in the embarrassing position of asking MacArthur for something which he knew and you knew was an impossibility'. Robertson further noted that 'As a result of that incident I never trusted Gascoyne or Gairdner since and every action of any importance on any dealings I have had with them has confirmed that view. They have worked constantly for UK's individual interests only, in direct opposition to any question of British Commonwealth cooperation.' 7c (Both Gascoyne and Gairdner were to be knighted for their work in Japan. Despite his belief in the Divine Right of Kings and that only Englishmen 'had the right to be made Governors of the Australian states or Governor-General, and that no Australians should hold those posts', Gairdner was appointed by the Australian State Government Governor of Western Australia and, on another occasion, Governor of Tasmania.) 7d

     The withdrawal of the UK brigade from the BCOF was discussed in the Australian Cabinet on 22 November 1946.8 Put simply, British commitments were in excess of the manpower available to meet them and in addition to reductions in its garrisons in Hong Kong, Malaya, the Middle East and Europe, the UK Government proposed to withdraw its brigade from the BCOF, reducing its manpower in Japan from 10,000 to 6,500.

     The announcement of a British military withdrawal drew attention again to Australia's lack of influence upon the occupation arrangements in Japan and threw into question the value of the Australian contribution to BCOF. It raised too the question as to whether the British Government ever intended to remain committed to an occupation force in Japan and whether it merely delayed the post war release of forces already in the Far East as temporary response to pressure by the Australian Government to foster a British Commonwealth force.

     That the British Government revealed this withdrawal only ten months after the announcement on 31 January 1946 that a British force was to be sent to Japan gives some credence to this supposition which is also strengthened by the fact that Indian forces were soon to be withdrawn also because of fundamental readjustments in India. It may well have been the case therefore that the British Government, with such a prospect in mind, readily consented to an arrangement which had the appearance, although not in fact the substance, of surrendering control to the Australian Government which willingly, or unwillingly, accepted this fiction.

     The withdrawal of the British brigade had other implications. The Australian Government, allowing for no increase in the size of the Australian contingent to the BCOF assumed, with that same force, the duties previously handled by a force twice the size. Thus, while the Australian Government claimed a greater responsibility for British Commonwealth defence it did nothing in reality to increase the Australian contribution to the force to meet that increased responsibility. Much the same sort of thing had happened in June 1945 when the Australian Government announced major reductions in the numbers of Australians then serving abroad.

     By its statement of intent to reduce military commitments abroad the UK Government also signalled the priority it gave to the occupation of Japan and to British Commonwealth defence obligations, a priority which ran contrary to those accorded by the Australian Government. Despite the isolation of Australia's position on these matters Evatt, in a statement to the House of Representatives, referred to 'the empire policy on foreign affairs' which he said 'has been consistently rejected in Canada and South Africa but in the case of Australia and New Zealand co-operation with the government of Great Britain is closer than that between other dominions and Great Britain'.9

     The British proposal and the Australian response mark a watershed in the development of the BCOF. The withdrawal of major elements of the available combatant force by the senior member of the British Commonwealth effected the integrity and status of the force as a whole. However, of particular interest is the manner by which the UK Government conducted the presentation of the proposal.10 This British proposal made it clear that the UK Government had no choice but to withdraw its brigade from the BCOF and the only point for discussion was the question of timing.11

     Secondly, the UK Government by-passed the command channels formalized in the JCOSA structure and dealt directly with the US Government and with General MacArthur. The UK Government had requested the Australian government's comments on the proposed British withdrawal before its Foreign Secretary raised the matter directly with the US Secretary of State during the UN session then in progress. Four days later, on 15 November 1946, the British Government informed the Australian Government that the Foreign Secretary had gone ahead and raised the matter with the Secretary of State.12 The Australian Government had not, by the time of receipt of this second communication, responded to any of the matters raised in the original UK cablegram.

     There were however, more rebuffs for the Australian Government. In its cablegram 363 of 15 November 1946 the UK Government also informed the Australian Government that as the matter had been (now) raised with the US Government it intended to instruct the UK representative at General MacArthur's HQ, General Gairdner, to let General MacArthur know of the UK intention on 'a purely informal and personal and preliminary basis'. Further, the UK Government announced that as MacArthur would in turn almost certainly raise the matter with the UK Chief of the Air Staff, who was due to leave the UK shortly on an overseas tour including Japan, the UK Government saw it as being of 'great assistance' if it could receive an 'indication of views' by 23 November 1946. The UK Government, determined to conduct any negotiations with the US government directly, concluded British cablegram 363 with the remark, 'in the meantime we are explaining to the United States authorities that we are still engaged in consultation with you ...'.

     Not unexpectedly the UK proposal created many difficulties for the Australian Government. In its reply, to both D1018 and 363, Chifley attempted to recover some of his Government's diminishing authority in Japan:

     In the event the Australian Cabinet agreed, on 26 November 1946, that no objection would be raised to the UK proposal, or to the conditions imposed by this proposal, and that the only matter for further negotiation would be the related financial arrangements. However, on Dedman's copy of the Cabinet decision there is a handwritten note, presumably by Dedman, which reads: 'it will be noted that decision contains no reference to what other nations may do'.18 In the submission to Cabinet Dedman had recommended agreement to the UK withdrawal, but on the understanding that the remaining countries continue their agreed obligations under the Agreement.

     The most obvious illustration of the UK reluctance to commit themselves fully to the BCOF concept can be noted in the arrangements made for the British Commonwealth naval forces operating in Japanese waters. Apart from a small naval port party which came under local USN operational control and BCOF administrative control, the bulk of the naval forces (known as naval force T), mainly RN but including RAN vessels, remained under the operational control of the C-in-C BPF, who was in turn responsible to the COMNAVJAP.

     There was some reluctance to challenge these arrangements. The JCOSA meeting, held on 13 February 1947, considered again the proposal put forward by the C-in-C BCOF, originally in September 1946, that naval force T be included in BCOF. It was noted in the minute that the 'committee was informed that it was not in accord with the highest policy of the Admiralty to allow naval elements to be under another service commander'.19 The Committee agreed to avoid a challenge to Admiralty policy although the C-in-C BCOF was given authority to discuss the matter with the C-in-C BPF.

     The matter was again considered by the JCOSA at its meeting on 27 March 1947 which took into account a letter from the Minister of the Army to the Minister of Defence which commented on the exclusion of British naval sea-going forces from BCOF.20 On this occasion the representative of the CNS(UK), advised the Committee 'that the proposal to include force T as the naval component of BCOF would conform with the principle of integration in that BCOF would be representative of all arms and services and it would strengthen the position of the C-in-C BCOF in relation to SCAP'. The Committee agreed that it 'would be desirable to include force T in the naval component of BCOF with the proviso that the composition and general naval administration of the force remains with the Admiralty for whom C-in-C BPF acts and the operational control of the force remains with COMNAVJAP'.

     Force T had had a period of separateness from the BCOF and the JCOSA decision of 27 March 1947 did little to change this arrangement although as was noted in the minutes 'It was felt that SCAP was under the impression that British naval units in Japanese waters were a part of BCOF'. In the light of the known Admiralty policies on operational control it is not surprising to find that the UK response to the JCOSA recommendation was to resist any change to the existing arrangements.21

A WORTHY REPRESENTATIVE

     By late 1946, the Australian Government was obliged, because of the British withdrawals, to reconsider its contribution to the occupation force in Japan. The Government made no increase in the size of the Australian contingent to compensate for the loss of the British brigade, nor did it reduce the size of the Australian contingent. By 27 December 1946, the Minister for the Army, Chambers, visiting Tokyo, denied knowledge of any plan to withdraw Australian troops from Japan. Just prior to this statement it was reported that the arrival of dependants of Australians serving with BCOF would be delayed although the Australian Government had announced on 6 December 1946 that plans for sending wives and families of Australians in the BCOF to Japan would proceed.22

     The Australian Government was questioned in Parliament as to the future of the BCOF. Senator CH Brand, a retired army officer, claimed in the Senate on 14 November 1946 that 'From all accounts there is great difficulty in keeping units up to strength. The novelty of serving in a foreign country, Japan, has worn off'.23 Another question on 22 November 1946, concerning those Australians serving in Japan and to be released on 31 January 1947, indicated that the Australian Government was having difficulty in meeting its service manpower obligation on a voluntary basis.24

     As noted elsewhere the objects of the BCOF stressed the importance of worthily representing the British Commonwealth in Japan. In its public statements the Australian Government emphasized the importance of these objects but in his reports to the Cabinet and to the military Board on his visit to BCOF, Chambers, was highly critical of the quality of the Australian force. Chambers had major criticisms to report concerning the conditions under which BCOF personnel lived and referred to the degree of black marketeering tolerated within the BCOF and the extent to which Japanese personnel were employed in support of BCOF.25

     Chambers also reported on the discussions he had held with MacArthur. During these discussions Chambers had attempted to broaden the involvement of the BCOF, specifically that the force should play some part in the military government of Japan and he was particularly concerned that routine garrison duties would be detrimental to the morale and character of the Australian troops in the occupation force. MacArthur remained of the view that the BCOF was solely a combat force and that 'the terms of the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement would be applied in their entirety by him', although there was subsequently a slight increase in the number of BCOF personnel involved in military government duties.26

     Also open to question was the progress being made by the occupation forces on the 'democratization' of the Japanese as means by which Japan could be conditioned against further military adventures.27 According to MacMahon Ball 'there has been no fundamental change in Japan's social structure or in the political outlook of her leaders'.28

     MacArthur however, took a very different view of the progress that had been made in this direction. On the first anniversary of the occupation, 2 September 1946, he claimed 'Japan is now underway to real democracy' and by January 1947 claimed 'major advances have ben made towards the development of a social system in Japan, designed along the most progressive and liberal lines'. He also said that a long occupation 'would only alienate the Japanese and endanger the work done in democratizing Japan'.29

     During his statement on international affairs made in the Australian Parliament on 19 February 1947, Evatt again stated that 'Australia has consistently demanded full participation at the highest level in the final settlement with Japan' as a political, objective of his Government.30 Then, within the context of an observation on the tendency, because of the expense and the drain on manpower, to withdraw forces from Japan, Evatt claimed 'It would be practically sowing the seeds of future aggression by Japan not to continue that control for a sufficiently long period'.

     Evatt's statements on this occasion suggest an increasing Australian concern at the growing isolation of the Australian position caused by a collapse in the unity of the BCOF, thus increasing its vulnerability, and by signs that the other British Commonwealth countries were losing interest in the continuance of the occupation, an attitude which suited the US Government. However in MacArthur's message to Congress he described the strength of US forces in Japan, as being at their lowest numerical level.31 Evatt, also determined to avoid any complacency in Australian attitudes towards Japan, reintroduced the 'fear of Japan' theme into his speeches.32

     Evatt's concern had been reinforced by a spate of Australian press comments in January 1947 speculating on a further British withdrawal of forces from Japan which highlighted differences in national reasons for participation in BCOF. These suggested that the primary purpose of British participation was to secure, eventually, commercial advantage and that this task could best be undertaken by diplomats and businessmen. Australian and NZ interests, which were more closely linked by geography with those of Japan, were seen to be much broader and the desire for future security much stronger.

     By 10 February 1947 the US Government had approved the withdrawal of the UK brigade of some 4000 men, and a total of 1924 Indian troops had been withdrawn or were expected to be withdrawn from Japan.33 In discussions between MacArthur and Major General Cawthorn, the Indian representative on JCOSA on 20 February 1947, MacArthur stressed the importance of keeping intact the present structure of BCOF and his concern with the psychological effect on the Japanese of any general reduction in the strength of the BCOF.34 On 25 March 1947 the Government of India made known formally its intention to withdraw all Indian troops by 15 September 1947, although the news of the Indian withdrawal had been carried on the ABC news of 6 March 1947.35

     No Australian or NZ units had been withdrawn although some RAAF personnel had not been replaced. But on 22 February 1947 the NZ Government advised the Australian Government formally of its intention to reduce the NZ force in BCOF of a brigade and a squadron of the RNZAF, totalling 4254 personnel, down to a battalion plus some administrative troops, in total 1200 army personnel.36

     That Evatt had cause to be concerned about British intentions was confirmed in a discussion between MacDermott, a UK Foreign Office official, and Drumright, an US Department of State official, on 19 March 1947. Drumright in his report of this discussion to the Department of State, said 'it appeared from the tenor of his (MacDermott's) remarks that the British Government may now have under consideration the withdrawal of further British contingents from Japan'. 37 MacDermott also speculated in his report on the likely recall of Indian troops from Japan. In due course proposals to this end were put forward formally by the UK Government and were accepted by the US Government on 21 May 1947.38

FULL PARTICIPATION

     Much more disturbing to Australia's interests in BCOF was the growing evidence that the US Government, as represented by MacArthur as SCAP, was ignoring any attempt by the Australian Government to influence the direction of affairs in Japan. Even in the period that led to the acceptance of an Australian diplomatic mission at SCAP, headed by MacMahon Ball with the title of minister, the first open breaches of allied commonality of purpose became evident.

     On 19 February 1947 it was announced by HQ SCAP that discussions on reparations would take place in Tokyo between representatives of SCAP and representatives of the Pacific nations to consider claims against Japan. Rumours also circulated at this time of a split between the US and the Australian representative but these were immediately denied in Canberra.

     Simultaneously it was reported in The Age of 19 February 1947 that complications had arisen in discussions in the FEC in Washington over the claim by the USSR to 'war booty' in Manchuria, and US claims to Japanese mandated islands. It was revealed that the US Government had instructed MacArthur to transfer from Japan, goods, as reparations payments to China, the Philippines, the Netherlands and the UK. The action was taken without the approval of all members of the FEC and it was seen to be the first time the US had taken independent action.

     The US Government's response was to justify this action as having been taken under that rule of the FEC agreement which entitled the US Government to issue interim directives on urgent matters on which the FEC had not yet established its policy. The US Government's action prompted an editorial in The Age of 8 April 1947 to find it disconcerting that 'the first considered division of Japanese reparations had been made without reference, much less approval, by Australia and New Zealand.'

     The second major economic matter illustrative of the powerlessness of the Australian Government concerned whaling. On 23 June 1947 there was a report in The Age that MacArthur was contemplating authorization of a second Japanese whaling expedition.

     The Australian Embassy, in Washington, had been instructed to inform the US State Department that the Australian Government strongly opposed any further Japanese whaling expeditions to the Antarctic and that the future of the Japanese whaling industry was a matter to be settled at the peace conference. The issue at stake was not a matter of an Australian veto on whaling in non Australian waters, rather an insistence by Australia that the economic sanctions imposed on Japan be enforced. Background material provided by Evatt to the Embassy, indicated that an earlier expedition had been of an emergency nature and at that time assurances had been given that no future expeditions would be undertaken except after consultation with the allied governments concerned.

     Nevertheless, HQ SCAP announced the authorization of a second Japanese whaling expedition. The ACCJ and interested nations were notified of the decision only a few hours before the press release at HQ, SCAP and were given no opportunity to discuss it. The next day both Evatt an the UK Government condemned the US Government action on whaling and an Age editorial of 26 June 1947 raised the question whether the wartime alliance had any meaning.39 Sebald reveals a postscript to these decisions on whaling, which described the long discussions between MacArthur in Tokyo and the Department of State in Washington over whaling in 1947. Sebald had raised the question why MacArthur had not gone ahead simply on his own authority. MacArthur had replied to Sebald that 'once the directive is received they can fight it out in the FEC while we go about our business'.40

     The third matter of contention was the decision to allow the Japanese to recolonize Anguar Island. On 27 June 1947 HQ SCAP announced that permission had been granted to the Japanese Government to recolonize Anguar Island from 1 July 1947 to work phosphate rock.41 The announcement came as a surprise to the Australian Government as the island, southernmost of the Palau Group, was only 300 miles north of Papua New Guinea, the closest of all Japanese territorial possessions to Australia an was generally regarded as an important strategic area of the south Pacific. A spokesman for MacArthur replied, rather spuriously, to criticisms in the Australian press by saying that operations at Anguar Island had been under way for over a year and, as the island had been captured by the Americans and was under US control, there could be no question as to the propriety of the actions of the US Government.

     These actions of the US Government provoked a rising tide of protests in Australia including criticism by the Leader of the Opposition, Menzies - 'Australia has an unquestionable right to an effective voice in the settlement of the policies to be pursued.42 The UK protest was described as the 'clearest statement by a British Foreign Office spokesman that Britain is dissatisfied with several aspects of US policy in Japan'. These criticisms in turn provoked a strong denial by a US spokesman on the whaling and Anguar Island decisions. He dismissed as a 'patently ridiculous charge' the various reports that the Australian and British Government had not been consulted. The US spokesman however went on to point out that as no new policy had resulted from discussions the US Government had had with its allies the US had been obliged to take administrative action.43

     A further comment by a British Commonwealth spokesman, obviously MacMahon Ball, in Tokyo, that he was 'completely astonished at the tone and content of the statement issued by the SCAP spokesman',44 left no doubt as to the strength of Australian feeling on these matters. The spokesman agreed that both whaling and Anguar Island matters had been discussed but the discussion had been far from complete. 'This latest Headquarter's statement is typical of the hot headed and inconsiderate filibusterings which characterized the meetings of the Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo since its inception'. Subsequent statements in July 1947 indicate that in Tokyo at least the British Commonwealth representatives had come together in a united protest.45

     On 12 July 1947 The Age reported an announcement made in Washington:

This announcement was hailed by HQ SCAP as ratifying all MacArthur's actions in Japan.

REVIEWING THE RELATIONSHIP

     Following upon the Washington announcement there were Australian attempts to tone down the protests over the US actions and on 15 July 1947 Chifley issued a strong denial that friction existed between the Australian Government and MacArthur. He described the purpose of the proposed visit to Japan by Evatt as being 'to obtain a proper understanding of the atmosphere in Japan'.46 Clearly Australian policies with regard to Japan, and Australia's relations with the US, were in need of major review. Evatt's visit to Japan was the catalyst that set this review in motion.

     Evatt repeated his earlier appeals for an early peace settlement with Japan in his statement on International Affairs made in the Parliament on 26 February 1947. This was supported by Menzies but neither the Opposition nor the Australian public was to know that Evatt had made some considerable progress on the prospect of a treaty and that there was a growing body of sympathy for this in US circles.

     Evatt's attempts to secure for Australia 'full and equal participation' in the drafting of a peace treaty with Japan had been recognized, confidentially, by the US Government in a telegram dated 13 December 1946. The US Secretary of State had instructed the Ambassador in Australia, Butler, to advise Evatt 'informally and confidentially that the United States hoped and desired that Australia would participate on a full and equal basis in the formulation of the peace treaty with Japan'.47 In his response Evatt sought 'to initiate an exchange of views between representatives of our two governments', on a treaty, and he made this offer 'as in a sense (Australia) being the representative of the British Commonwealth of Nations chiefly concerned in the treaty ...'.48

     Progress towards a peace treaty received a major impetus when MacArthur was reported on 7 March 1947 as being in favour of an early settlement.49 This report led the Australian minister in Washington, Stirling, to ascertain the State Department's position on this subject and from the record of conversation it appears that the US had not replied to Evatt's letter and it was claimed 'that the State Department had had no conversations with the United Kingdom Government or anyone else regarding the treaty with Japan'.50 There were grounds for concern by the Australian Government as to a possible bypassing of its leadership on this matter; the subject of discussions on 19 March 1947, between the Head of the Japan and Pacific Department of the British Foreign Office, MacDermott, and Drumright, First Secretary, US Embassy, London.

     Two external factors helped Australia to promote its call for the early finalization of a peace settlement with Japan. These were ex-President Hoover's advice to Congress51 that a peace treaty with Japan should be negotiated immediately and a statement by Bevin, UK Foreign Secretary, during a defence of government policies at a UK Labor Party conference, in which he said that the 'Japanese peace treaty would come into the realm of practical politics very soon'.52 Bevin also stated that all eleven countries involved in the war against Japan should form the peace conference. There were also reports that the US Government would demand an abandonment of the Big Four peace making system.53

     Against these positive factors have to be put the negative factors operating at this time. The first factor was the constant concern, carried over from the war years, that the allied priority of effort should be spent on resolving matters connected with Europe, before those connected with Asia and the Pacific. This attitude, that a peace treaty with Germany had to come first, was reported to be that of General Marshall, US Secretary of State. By way of support for this contention the State Department believed that affairs in Japan were progressing well by comparison with those in Germany.54

     The second factor, often noted by Australia, was the US preparedness to act outside the ambit of a peace settlement and take action unilaterally with Japan as it had done by decisions on reparations, whaling and Anguar Island. This method for doing business with Japan by the US became more pronounced as the delays in finalising a peace settlement continued. Australian concern that this piecemeal approach to Japan would undermine the validity of a peace settlement with Japan is reflected in a letter from Eggleston, dated 11 June 1947, to Evatt, which 'raised the question of whether the Far Eastern Commission was entitled to come to agreements on particular matters which would then eliminate the necessity of including them in the provisions of the peace treaty'.55

     The third factor of concern to Australia was that Australia would become isolated from the support which would enable it to present a united front to the US with regard to a settlement with Japan. There had been ample evidence that Australia's allies were prepared to proceed independently and Australia, by virtue of its geographic position,, regarded itself as being most vulnerable to a resurgence of Japanese militarism.

     The fourth factor and one which troubled the Australian Government probably more than any other, was that of the status that would be accorded to Australia in any peace settlements which followed from the recent World War and in which Australia had participated in a number of theatres. The Australian Government, it seemed, could never claim with certainty that the Big Four recognized Australia's status as a principal party in any peace settlement.56 This was still the situation almost two years after the cessation of hostilities and despite the assurances which Evatt had received from the US Government.

A PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE

     In late May 1947 the Australian Government urged that there should be some preliminary talks in Canberra on a Japanese peace treaty, not later than July 1947, between representatives of the British Commonwealth of Nations, preferably of ministerial rank, to lay down principles.57 Two difficulties arose - first, the UK Government's reluctance to send ministers because of the physical distance; second, an assumed lack of interest by the (US) Department of State in a Japanese treaty. As Chifley admitted on 31 May 1947 the 'outlook for a peace settlement was not very hopeful!'.58 Australia had persevered with its initiative although it was aware of the reluctance of Canada and South Africa to attend and the practical difficulties British ministers would have in attending.

     On 1 June 1947 the diplomatic correspondent of The Times, London, introduced further doubt by suggesting that an early conference was unlikely, primarily because the UK Government would prefer to wait for the results of the Four Power conference on Germany, which was to be held in November 1947, before entering other negotiations.59 He also offered the view that doubt existed among the allies as to whether the Japanese had changed their ways. By way of contrast, The Economist in a report on the Australian proposal, thought UK support should be offered in order to remove any suggestion that the British were indifferent to these distant matters but also 'to show appreciation of the generosity of these two dominions in sending parcels to the UK in recent months'.60 The Economist also noted that the recent debate in the House of Commons 'showed a lively opposition to the fading out from the Far East', whereas the US Political Advisor in Japan, Atcheson, in a memorandum to the Secretary of State, reported his impression 'that the British are leaving leadership in this matter to the Australians'.61

     Chifley made a further statement on 3 June 1947 to the effect that no formal proposals had been made to hold empire peace talks in Canberra in July 1947 but noting, that if such a conference was held in August 1947 instead, then the UK Government would be prepared to send some Ministers.62 Evatt called yet again for an early peace settlement and referred to the Australian initiative proposing a preliminary conference about which negotiations were still proceeding.63 On 26 June 1947 UK Secretary of State for the Dominions, Lord Addison, announced officially that the 'British Government welcomed the decision to hold a Commonwealth conference on the Japanese peace treaty in Canberra ...'.64


     Particularly significant for Australian leadership aspirations, with regard to the peace treaty, is a statement attributed subsequently to the UK delegation to the conference which:

     The strengthening of British support publicly for the Australian Government's initiative both with regard to American actions within Japan, and in connection with the proposed Canberra talks, prompted some US reaction. The official US position was put forward in a telegram from the Secretary of State to the American Ambassador to Australia in which the US indicated that 'we are not yet prepared to enter into bilateral discussions with other nations' but 'in the near future we will hope to be in a position to exchange views with the Australian Government in regard to a Japanese peace treaty and to discuss the matter with other interested governments'.66 There were also press reports that American officials feared that the Canberra conference would lead to a British Commonwealth controlling bloc, using a two thirds rule, when the peace conference was eventually held.67

     However on 17 July 1947 The Age reported a US proposal for a special preliminary peace conference on Japan to be held in Washington or San Francisco on 17 August 1949. There appeared to be some haste associated with the US proposal as the proposed dates clashed with the Australian conference and the proposed level of representative was to be only expert level, as the US Secretary of State was already committed to an inter-American conference in 1947. There was also a report that General MacArthur had not been informed prior to the Washington announcement.68 While the initial response among the British Commonwealth diplomatic community in Tokyo was to see the proposal as a US attempt to pre-empt the Canberra conference, US willingness to alter the date proposed threw this response into some doubt. There was even a suggestion that some senior American officials regarded the Canberra conference as an essential preliminary to a wide peace conference.69

     The Australian Ambassador to the US, Makin, had called on the US Under Secretary, Lovett, on 8 July 1947 to seek assurances that the US Government would take no action on the Japanese peace treaty until after the conclusion of the conference convened by the Australian Government in Canberra on 26 August 1947. Lovett stated that the matter was under 'active consideration' and although he assured Makin that 'no separate bilateral discussions would be carried on' Lovett also made it clear that the State Department was not prepared to wait until the end of August 1947 before taking any specific action.70 The US proposal for a conference on 19 August 1949 was handed to all representatives of the FEC, except the Soviet Union, on 11 July 1947.71

     The American position on the conference in Canberra remained unclear. On 18 July 1947 the State Department said it had made no decision to postpone its own conference and officials in Tokyo, both allied and US, claimed to be uninformed as to the Washington proposal. The New York Tribune observed that the State Department's move for an early start to a conference came as something of a surprise, given the Department's earlier determination to delay consideration of the Japanese settlement until after the resolution of the peace with Germany.72 It is possible that the United States was concerned about Soviet attempts to have the Japanese peace treaty handled by the Big Four and in order to pre-empt such a move, saw fit to expedite matters. This was Evatt's interpretation and he voiced strong opposition to the use of a veto or the formulation of the Japanese peace treaty by the Big Four, and he could see no reason why the negotiations for the peace settlement should be drawn out.73

     Details of the US proposal of 11 July 1947 to hold a conference on 19 August 1947 were included in a statement issued by the Department of State on 16 July 1947. The statement made clear the US Government's intention that 'other states at war with Japan should be given an opportunity to present their views ...'.74 The Soviet reply, 22 July 1947, to the US proposal, insisted that the matter be considered by the Big Four Powers and this proposal was subsequently rejected by the US Government in an aide-memoire of 12 August 1947.75

     Chifley had earlier made Australia's position clear and on 17 and 18 July 1947 stated that although Australia was willing to attend a conference convened by the US on the subject of a Pacific peace settlement, the dates proposed by the US Government did not suit the arrangements already in hand by the Australian Government.76 Two weeks later the US Under Secretary of State announced that the American proposal had been deferred because it would conflict with the Australian proposal.77

EVATT'S VISIT TO JAPAN

     Changes in Australian policy towards Japan had been developing for some time. Central to these changes were a number of incidents initiated at MacArthur's Headquarters during 1947 and which had provoked strong Australian protest - ie, the reparations, whaling and Anguar Island matters. US conduct on these matters contradicted Australian claims to adequate representation in the making of decisions associated with Japan but there was also a divergence of opinion developing between the Australian Government and its representative in Tokyo, MacMahon Ball. Matters were brought to a head by the visit of Evatt to Japan in early August 1947.

     Reports of a possible visit by Evatt to Japan were circulating in mid June 1947 and were linked to an expected hastening of a peace settlement.78 What was not generally known was US opposition to the visit by Evatt. The US Secretary of State had told the US Ambassador in Canberra that 'the Department does not feel that any useful purpose would be served by implementing the proposal that Evatt and you visit Japan.79 The prospect of the visit caused some concern and a spokesman for MacArthur's Headquarters went so far as to claim that Evatt's visit 'would be personal not political'.80 This statement was particularly surprising because of the unexpected announcement the day previously of the US decision to allow the Japanese to recolonise Anguar Island - a decision which had provoked a strong objection by the Australian representative in Tokyo. As well there were a number of political matters concerning Japan that required ministerial attention, for example, the statements by Japanese politicians on matters associated with Japan's security as well as the news of the withdrawal of troops from BCOF.

     There had been speculation that a 'major clash' would result from Evatt's visit to Japan as he was regarded by both the Americans and the Japanese as the exponent of a 'tough line' against Japan and as being sensitive to any suggestions that Australia should be relegated to a secondary position at the peace settlement.81 Attempts were made to tone down the likelihood of a clash and Chifley denied that any friction existed.82 Despite an apparent willingness by the US to soften its opposition to a preliminary conference in Canberra, MacMahon Ball, on the eve of Evatt's visit, made a sharp attack on the way the US was conducting the occupation.

     Upon Evatt's arrival in Japan on 1 August 1947 there were reports that MacMahon Ball would be replaced, ostensibly to enable him to attend the Canberra conference, and that a wider shake-up was envisaged.83 The expectations of a major clash between Evatt and MacArthur were not fulfilled and the explanations for this state of affairs vary widely. The statement by Chifley that no friction existed was supported by British diplomats in Tokyo who claimed that Evatt was influenced by two considerations. Firstly, it was important for Australia and the British Commonwealth as a whole that the US should be strong in the north Pacific. Secondly, the British Commonwealth depended so heavily upon the US that any disagreement over detail was unthinkable.84

     An alternative view did not come out into the open until the resignation, on 17 August 1947, of MacMahon Ball as British Commonwealth representative on the ACCJ and as Head of the Australian mission in Japan. In his explanation MacMahon Ball pointed out that he felt he could not carry on under Evatt. He claimed that Evatt, on his arrival in Japan, had congratulated him on the work he had been doing in the ACCJ but had later, following a long conference with MacArthur, become highly critical of him.85

     The historian Peter Edwards recorded that MacArthur had heard 'as early as May 1947 that Evatt was privately disavowing MacMahon Ball's criticisms and was seeking a personal invitation to Tokyo'.86 Atcheson describing his conversation with Evatt on 1 August 1947 reported that:

     Robertson took steps to heal the breach between Macmahon Ball and Acheson, both of whom were under great strain and suggested ways to avoid comments critical of Macmahon Ball appearing in the US forces newspaper The Stars and Stripes. 87d

     However, the wheels for Ball's removal were already in motion. During Evatt's visit, Robertson attended a function hosted by Acheson and heard that the news had been broadcast that Macmahon Ball had resigned an hour before and that he (Robertson) was to take his place on the Allied Council. 'That was the first that either Ball or I had heard of such a suggestion, and Ball was a dumfounded as I was.' 87e Robertson ws subsequently queried by MacArthur as to whether he would accept the position. Robertson was prepared to do so provided appropriate arrangements for a Deputy C-in-C were put in place. In the event the position was taken up by Patrick Shaw, a career diplomat.

     The day after MacMahon Ball's forced resignation, Chifley announced Cabinet's approval of the policies put forward by Evatt on the Japanese peace treaty. Chifley pressed for early resolution of the settlement lest there be further delays or encouragement to have matters dealt with on a piecemeal basis. Chifley's public endorsement of Evatt's policies was despite the existence of an Australian advisory committee on a peace treaty with Japan whose function it was to advise the minister and which had yet to report to the minister.88

     There are a number of observations that should be made with regard to this advisory committee. First, the committee was not set up until almost two years after the cessation of hostilities with Japan. Second, during this time the Government had repeatedly called for discussions on a peace settlement.

     Third, some doubt existed as to whether the Government, and especially the minister, intended that the committee should be an effective instrument for the purpose for which it was formed. The committee, although appointed on 8 July 1947 did not hold its first meeting until 12 August 1947, ie. after Evatt had returned from his visit to Japan. Although the committee held its initial series of meetings from 12 to 15 August 1947, ie. before the British Commonwealth conference commenced, the Cabinet approved Evatt's proposals on a Japanese peace settlement on 18 August 1947. These timings raised doubt as to whether the committee had sufficient time to contribute effectively to Evatt's proposals.89 The committee's formal report was not submitted until 1 October 1947.90

     Chifley, in his remarks on 18 August 1947, repeated Australia's claim to have Australia's war effort recognized as an entitlement to be a principal party in the peace settlement. Evatt in an elaboration of Australian policy on Japan, said it embraced two points - first, the encouragement of democracy in Japan, and second, to promote the security of the Pacific against Japanese resurgence by the destruction of Japan's industrial capacity to make war.91

     Despite the confidence expressed in Evatt by the Cabinet there were some severe criticisms of his conduct of affairs in Japan. The Age correspondent in Tokyo said that Evatt had failed to keep MacMahon Ball informed about changes in Australian policy on Japan and that Evatt, wishing to dominate the Canberra conference personally, had disallowed the attendance at that conference of any senior Australian official with recent knowledge of Japan.92 The correspondent also claimed that MacMahon Ball had refused to accept without question the views of HQ SCAP, as was expected by that HQ, and that Evatt had succumbed to these HQ views quite suddenly.

     Atcheson, described Evatt's visit to Japan 'as having been highly satisfactory' and he reported Evatt as saying 'that he has found the visit useful to himself politically'.93 However, as a US policy statement, dated 18 August 1947, noted - 'Although the Australian attitude became more friendly to our occupation policies following Dr Evatt's visit to Japan in July 1947 a suspicion of our intention remains'.94

     The US Embassy, in Canberra, reported on Evatt's visit on 22 August 1947 and noted 'Dr Evatt's apparently complete conversion to support of the policies of General MacArthur caused some eyebrow lifting in Australia' and that 'a few commentators implied that Dr Evatt was "taken in" by General MacArthur ...'.95

THE CANBERRA CONFERENCE

     Whatever the actual situation in Tokyo might have been it was announced in Washington on 22 August 1947 that the US Government had agreed to a conference on a peace treaty with Japan, to be held some time between 5 and 9 September 1947, that delegates to the conference should be at ministerial level and that delegates from eleven countries concerned should attend.96

     Consideration of a Japanese peace treaty invariably included reference to the occupation of Japan and arrangements for control of Japan after the peace settlement had been signed. According to Sir Frederick Eggleston, Chairman of Evatt's Advisory Committee, Australian views on the occupation were not in accord with those of its British Commonwealth allies.97 It was Eggleston's view that the allies should continue to exercise control over Japan, but there was difficulty in ascertaining Evatt's actual position with regard to the US occupation, or the length of allied occupation generally.

     Eggleston claimed that Evatt had expressed himself to be in favour of a long occupation although he believed that Evatt's attitude had been influenced by a view extant, but unfounded, that the US Government was not in favour of a long occupation of Japan.98 On the other hand Eggleston had been 'angered' by 'the reversal of opinion at the last moment by the Defence Department'. An early view in favour of a long occupation was upset by a report by General Robertson that MacArthur was in favour of an immediate evacuation.99

     Related to these matters of occupation and control were the uncertainties at the time about the future of Japan in the strategic struggle then developing between the USSR and the US. Eggleston had identified the problem as 'The most important strategic question involved in the peace treaty is as to the role which Japan will play in the balance of power in the Pacific'. Eggleston put forward historical evidence to substantiate his own view that Japan could not be trusted and claimed that she 'was exceedingly astute in calculating what course would be most to her advantage'.100 He referred to the:

To guard against this possibility it was the view of the advisory committee, and of Eggleston as its chairman, that continued control 'for some considerable period' was necessary.103 In his report of 1 October 1947, to the Minister, on the findings of the advisory committee, Eggleston indicated that this view still prevailed amongst the advisory committee.104

     The Conference which opened on 26 August 1947 and at which Evatt presided, confirmed the Australian position which was to have the final peace treaty with Japan signed by July 1948; to have Australian ministerial representation, and to have a two thirds majority voting arrangement at the peace conference. The conference also decided that the military contribution to the BCOF would be substantially reduced.

'TRAGIC DELAYS'

     Following the conclusion of the Canberra conference, there remained the question of the arrangements for the conference proposed by US Government. Initially it appeared that the US Government might attempt to slow down the impetus for such a conference by changing the dates because of Soviet charges that the US Government was attempting 'to run world affairs' and because of a Chinese inclination to favour a 'Big Four only' conference on Japan.105 However by 8 October 1947 the State Department was reported to be seeking ways and means to speed up the preparations for a conference, and during discussions between Truman and Evatt, Evatt again stressed Australia's wish to conclude a Japanese peace treaty as soon as possible.

     Evatt maintained the pressure on the US Government. During a conversation with the new US Secretary of State, Atcheson, on 28 October 1947, Evatt said he 'had had the impression that the United States was not as firm as it had been in the past on the understanding which he said had been conveyed to him by my predecessor, that Australia would have a position second to none in the making of the Japanese peace treaty'.106 Atcheson responded to these comments by reviewing the difficulties the US Government was encountering in its efforts to call a Japanese peace conference and he stressed particularly the complications which had been caused by the policies of the Soviet and Chinese Governments.

     On 4 February 1948 an editorial of The Age drew attention to the fact that at the time of the Canberra conference in August 1947 it had been expected that a series of other conferences would follow, leading to a definite peace treaty by June or July 1948. Possibly stung by this editorial, Evatt stated on 6 February 1948 that the Australian Government did not accept the present impasse in peace settlements - and he was obviously referring to both the Japanese and European settlements.107

     Apart from a brief reference in Evatt's statement in February 1949 on International Affairs, to the 'tragic delays in making peace treaties with Germany and Japan' the Australian Government appeared powerless to create a sense of urgency about these matters since the promising days evident in the Canberra conference held in August 1947.108 The Opposition kept up the pressure in Parliament by use of questions drawing attention to the lack of progress, despite the passage of time, and the Government, in response to these questions, could in its turn only repeat that 'we shall make every effort to ensure that Australia shall have a say in the framing of the peace treaty with Japan'.109

     The Australian Government also faced questions such as that put forward by Senator Tangney who, drawing attention to the fact that 'The advisory committee on the Japanese peace settlement had not met for over 15 months', called for 'a discussion of outstanding problems which are militating against an early and final settlement'.110 As late as September 1949 Evatt, in reply to a question, said the 'position ... (with regard to the) peace treaty ... remains substantially the same ... (the) present situation has continued since 1945. Even territorial matters have not yet been finally adjusted'.111

     Quite apart from the lack of Australian success with regard to the signing of a Japanese peace treaty, the US Government was pursuing courses of action within Japan which foreshadowed a return to normalcy in the conduct of Japanese domestic affairs. Following on the announcements in May 1949, concerning trade and reparations arrangements for Japan, MacArthur announced in late July 1949 a reduction in the US military supervision of Japanese affairs and the withdrawal of 42 US military government teams by the end of 1949.112

     Early in August 1949 there was an announcement of yet another Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic and in Washington on 19 August 1949 the State Department revealed, that in the absence of any positive policy by the FEC, it had instructed MacArthur to help Japan to re-establish direct diplomatic relations with other countries.113 During discussions between Bevin and Atcheson in August 1949, Bevin was informed that the US 'now thought it important to proceed as quickly as possible with negotiations in a settlement'.

     There were some compensations for the allies and at a press conference in Tokyo on 1 September 1949, the US Under Secretary for the Army, Voorhees, said the US Government was ready to consider a Japanese peace treaty and would not give in to Russian demands for a veto on peace treaty proposals. Voorhees also announced that there would be no change in US policies towards Japan or any reduction in the size of the US occupation force.114 The only Australian Parliamentary comment on the Voorhees announcement was that by CW Davidson MHR, that 'It would not be long before a peace treaty with Japan will be signed' but he went on to note 'the obvious desire of the US to finalize the treaty so that it may develop Japan into something of an ally'. He also noted 'There have already been suggestions that Japan may be permitted a certain degree of rearmament'.115

     Although the Australian Parliament had dissolved on 27 October 1949 for the general election the matter of a Japanese peace treaty was kept very much alive through other avenues. The Age, published on 5 November 1949 a report from Canberra by a 'very high authority', which stated that activity in London and Washington on the subject of the calling of a Japanese peace conference had quickened considerably in the past three months. The long delay in arriving at a settlement was laid at the door of the Soviet Union which had objected to the participation of smaller nations, such as Australia. But Australia, which had been supported by Washington and London, had been insistent that any country which played a major part in the defeat of Japan had to be given the opportunity to participate in the final settlement. It was expected that talks on the settlement would proceed, with Soviet participation, and would take place probably by the middle of 1950.116

     In Canberra, on 8 November 1949, it was announced that Australian diplomatic representatives in South East Asia and the Pacific, as well as UK and NZ representatives, would meet in Canberra to discuss a draft peace treaty with Japan.117 Despite the apparent Australian enthusiasm for a resumption of activity there were also signs of difficulties yet to be resolved. It became necessary for British Foreign Office officials in London to deny a press report of the existence of an Anglo-American draft peace treaty or that the Foreign Office was working on a draft treaty. There was a report that US Secretary of State, Atcheson, had yet to be convinced that it would be useful to conclude a treaty without the co-operation of the Soviet Union and of communist China.118 In Japan there was strong support by the opposition for a peace treaty that included as signatories, China and the Soviet Union, despite the desire of the Japanese Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, for the conclusion of a treaty at the earliest possible date.

     The Australian initiative was also supported by the US State Department and a spokesman in Washington said that the Canberra conference called by Evatt was a 'logical development' at this stage. He revealed that there had been no exchange of information on the subject of a peace treaty with Japan with the other members of the FEC 'who were fully aware the United States had been anxious to conclude a treaty for the past two years'.119 The delay in the settlement, he attributed to Soviet insistence that the treaty should be negotiated by the 'Big Four' of whom, the Soviet Union had entered the war against the Japanese only a few days before the cessation of hostilities. The US State Department was also alert to the possibility 'that Australia may try to obtain a US security guarantee in return for concurring generally in the substance of our proposals for a Japanese peace settlement'. 128

     The Australian position was again stated strongly in Canberra by Evatt on 10 November 1949 in terms of 'irrevocable opposition' to a negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty by the Council of Foreign Ministers, and by Evatt on 11 November 1949, who said 'the Australian Government is strongly opposed to any proceeding which would preclude Australia from being regarded as a principal party to all matters arising out of the war with Japan'.120

     On 11 November 1949 Evatt said the main problem discussed at the Canberra Conference on a peace treaty with Japan, on 10 November 1949, 'related to the desirability of expediting the consideration of a treaty in relation to Japan' and was preliminary to a conference which might be held in Ceylon early in 1950.121 The Canberra conference had made possible a review and further definition of British Commonwealth (ie. Australia, NZ and the UK) policy with regard to Japan. Evatt stressed that, as the discussions have been mainly on the official level 'no Government commitments of any kind have been entered into'.