The military role of the BCOF included the safeguarding of all allied installations and of all Japanese installations awaiting demilitarisation, as well as the disposal of Japanese armaments. This role was elaborated in FO No. 35 published by HQ Eighth US Army on 7 March 1946 as follows:

    Lieutenant General Robertson was later to comment privately on his interpretation of what was called ‘military government’ in Japan:

         Robertson was to comment further that this arrangement, whereby the US Government assumed the responsibility for and bore the costs of the restoration of the Japanese political and economic system, actually avoided throwing upon the British Commonwealth ‘a tremendous financial burden to restore any portion of the Japanese people’. He was generous in his praise of the contribution of the United States in this regard.

Showing the flag

     As elaborated elsewhere, Australia was to be vigorous in its diplomatic efforts to secure an appropriate status in the discussions concerning the peace with Japan. The military support for these efforts had its form in the Australian military contribution to the BCOF. A visible and continuing effort was made, therefore, throughout the occupation period, to undertake ‘showing the flag’ activities.

     There were two aspects of ‘showing the flag’. The first was as a demonstration of the superiority of allied military strength and therefore way of life. Second, the presence of foreign troops, in occupation and responsible for the security of symbolic Japanese institutions, struck at the very core of Japanese sovereignty. Thus lAnzac Day, commemorated in Japan for the first time in 1946, was the occasion of a major parade and fly-past in Kure at which LC BCOF, Lieutenant General J. Northcott, took the salute. Previous to that occasion, a ceremony was held on 12 April 1946 to break out the flags of the participating contingents from a signal tower overlooking Kure Harbour.

     The principal Australian (and BCOF) activity in ‘showing the flag’ was participation in ceremonial and security tasks in Tokyo, principally the guarding and conduct of parades at the Imperial Palace. The first such guard, shared with soldiers of the 1st US Cavalry Division, was mounted over the Imperial Palace on 8 May 1946.

     Bob Aird, a member of the 1st Armoured Car Squadron, recalled some of these duties:

Operational Responsibilities

    Lieutenant Colonel Colvin, Commanding Officer, 66th Battalion, summarised the completely new, numerous and complex opera tional tasks of military control and demilitarisation undertaken by units of 34 Brigade in the following terms:

    Colvin noted that for the ‘first 20 months of their occupational role they [units] were completely involved in operations with very little time spent in garrison duties. Training was confined to specialists in disposals and intelligence.’ Units of the BCOF had arrived in the country at differing standards of training although that of the 34 Brigade was assessed as high.4 For the first six months any attempts to undertake formal training pro grams were frustrated by the many demands of the operational roles, the variety of administrative demands and the lack of local training facilities. The immediacy of these demands and the distances between units also militated against any attempt to undertake training at unit or formation level until such times as the short-term obligations were met. Early plans for the conduct of an amphibious exercise with US forces was postponed indefinitely.

     By November 1946 an infantry school had been established at Matsuyama and by 1947 this had become the BCOF Central Army Training School. But during 1946 there had been a range of courses conducted elsewhere: 40 and 60 students were attend ing the HQ BCOF Staff Course at Eta Jima; 16 attended the Australian Staff College Pre-entry Course at Hiro; 196 attended the four-week Drill Training Cadres at Kaitaichi which were designed to raise the standard of drill within 34 Brigade; 145 attended cooking courses at Eta Jima; 130 attended hygiene courses at Eta Jima and others attended a range of signals, PT, refrigeration, fire fighting and infantry courses at a variety of locations.5

     According to the summary of training undertaken in this period, at least one company of the battalions of 34 Brigade was undertaking classification shooting at the former Japanese army range at Haramura and during October a sand model exercise was conducted for officers of the brigade on the defence of Kure in the event of a civil disturbance. The normal cycle of training and retraining at section and platoon level continued unabated. By August 1948 a wing of the Royal Military College had been established at Miyajima to ascertain suitability of candidates serving with the BCOF for a permanent commission.

     What then were the day-to-day activities of the Australian combat forces? The 65th Battalion was deployed to the eastern sector of Hiroshima Prefecture with the Battalion HQ located at Fukuyama, a former seaplane base on the Inland Sea. One company of the battalion, commanded by Captain Colin East, who was 24 at the time, was assigned the task of the military control (but not military government) of Onomichi, a city of 80,000 people also located on the Inland Sea, about 20 miles to the south-west of Fukuyama, and reputed to be a centre for black market activities and smuggling. East’s task was to ensure that security was maintained, law and order upheld and that any Japanese military stores or equipment located were destroyed.6

     East worked on a daily basis with the mayor and the chief of police, using them as his deputies. This arrangement worked successfully, and East recalled that both officials were ‘very courteous, very deferential, very obedient and I had nothing but praise for them. They did exactly what was wanted.’ All involved, however, were also aware that East had 120 fully armed soldiers, plus a detachment of military police and a number of field security NCOs at his immediate command.

     The usual pattern of activities was a vigorous program of foot and vehicle patrols carried out at irregular times throughout the city and the surrounding countryside. The purpose of these patrols was to make their presence felt by the locals but not to interfere in their day-to-day business. From time to time the company, in their slouch hats and with rifles at the slope and bayonets fixed, would march through the city as a reminder to the Japanese of the formal nature of the occupation.

     Later in his time in Japan, when East was serving with the 67th Battalion, located at Hiro Camp in Kure, he was ordered in October-November 1948 to take a company to Ube in Honshu to provide aid to the civil authority, which was confronted with rioting by the large Korean community there. An element of the disaffected Korean community had got beyond the capacities of the local police. Following his arrival, East arranged for the local police to arrest the ringleaders as his company fixed bayonets and marched through and around the town in a display of force over two days. When the situation calmed, the company returned to barracks at Hiro.

     Included in the original statement of the ‘Objects and Role of the BCOF’ were the intentions ‘to represent worthily the British Commonwealth ... ; to maintain and enhance British Commonwealth prestige ... ; and to illustrate to, and to impress on, the Japanese people, and as far as possible, the democratic way and purpose of life’. The task of actually implementing these ideals was placed squarely on the shoulders of those many soldiers whose daily activities brought them into direct contact with the local Japanese communities.

     How then to combine these disparate obligations as an occupying power? East and his company were governed formally by the non-fraternisation policy, which the BCOF enforced more stringently than did the US forces. Commenting on the contradiction, East was later to observe: ‘The whole idea of democracy which we were told had to be conveyed by demonstration and example of our way of life to the Japanese people was simply not possible to practise if we were forbidden to mix with the Japanese people outside — as simple as that’.

     US personnel had, from the early days of the occupation, fraternised with the Japanese, a situation in stark contrast with the absurd situation in which the Australians now found themselves. In effect the BCOF troops were breaking the non-fraternisation rules all the time. After all, the bulk of East’s company had been out of Australia and separated from their families for at least a year and had been in Japan for six or more months. There were no European women with whom to mix and there were plenty of Japanese women who were very attractive. The majority of Australians were ‘as fit as Mallee Bulls’, and could not be kept cooped up in their basic barracks in a foreign and fascinating land. Thus despite all the warnings and maybe because of them they naturally sought opportunities to meet, talk with and get involved with the local Japanese. East regarded his soldiers as ‘dammed [sic] good ambassadors because they were good, clean cut, well dressed’ and said that he ‘had very little trouble with the population or the Australians. The Japanese were seeing us as ordinary people, kind, natural and friendly.7

     Much was made of the dangers of contracting venereal disease and the shame of getting it. If an infected soldier was apprehended by the military police, he was charged with an offence and punished by confinement to barracks or a fine. This went on his record. East recalls a group of officers newly arrived from Australia breaking the rules within 48 hours of their arrival and found themselves on an aircraft back to Australia the next day. From time to time the level of VD infection amongst BCOF personnel was such as to attract unfavourable publicity in Australia and the military command system reacted accordingly.

     East admits that he was so concerned about the situation that as a preventative measure, he approached the local police chief and arrangements were made to establish a controlled brothel for the use of occupation personnel. On the occasion of the official opening, attended by East and his officers, the mayor and police chief, East received a message from a friend, the Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal in Kure, to the effect ‘Col, they know all about you down here, I suggest you drop it’. Those involved finished their meal then East cancelled the project.

     The Japanese in this immediate postwar situation were desperately short of basic necessities, particularly food and clothing. The major source of supply was the occupation force, the soldiers of which were permitted to supplement their wages by selling off for Japanese Yen surplus or acquired food, clothing and other items of equipment. These arrangements were mutually beneficial at the citizen — soldier level. There were situations, however, where Australians became involved in large-scale blackmarket activities, were caught and put to trial.

     There was a logical link between blackmarket activities and smuggling. During July 1946 East mounted a successful operation with the Japanese authorities that led to the disruption of a smuggling ring operating out of the port of Onomichi. Acting on information from a local informant that two vessels of about 80 tons loaded with contraband were due to sail shortly, East set in place a boarding party which opened fire across the bows of the departing vessels and obliged them to heave to. The subsequent search revealed a treasure-trove of gold bullion, US dollars, pearls, medical supplies, blankets and stores destined for resale in Formosa.

     Members of the Armoured Car Squadron, when not on ‘showing the flag’ activities, found themselves initially limited in the execution of their military role as mobile reconnaissance because the combat vehicles with which they were equipped were inappropriate for that task. The poor quality of the local transport network, including fragile bridges and densely populated countryside, meant severe limitations on the use of their vehicles. On 31 October 1946 two Staghound vehicles overturned on the road between Kure and Hiroshima resulting in the deaths of two occupants. Apart from occasional field firing exercises, the squadron’s operational responsibility included the port city of Onomichi, about which one observer said ‘the city of 80,000 souls is mainly slum and mainly insanitary’. Duties for the squadron were primarily directed at the suppression of black market activities, and the discovery and destruction of military equipment.

Knowing what was going on

    The conduits through which communication and therefore knowledge flowed between the occupation force and the occupied population were many and varied.

     The military nature of the occupation required a heavy emphasis upon the intelligence mechanisms of the force. Thus ‘the primary object of Intelligence in this theatre has been to acquire information necessary to ensure the security of the occupation forces and compliance by the Japanese with the orders and instructions of SCAP in the BCOF zone of responsibility’.8

     This object in turn made it necessary for the appropriate elements of the force to determine:

     Following the initial intelligence requirements associated with the lodgement, deployment and maintenance of the force, there was an intense period of patrolling and routine surveillance to fulfil the operational role of the force. The conduct of the Japanese elections in April 1946 required the deployment of special observer teams to ensure compliance with SCAP directives and provost, military government and counterintelligence units to monitor the activities of political, industrial and criminal organisations that mushroomed during this period. Of particular concern were the activities of foreign nationals, mainly Formosans and Koreans involved in smuggling and blackmarket schemes.

     Military government was to remain the responsibility of the US Army, which deployed military government units throughout the BCOF area. Nevertheless, manpower provision was made to allow 18 personnel from the BCOF to be trained and employed as liaison with the US military government units. The 36th Australian Field Security Section dealt in the main with the political aspects of the occupation, covering such matters as political rallies, riots and responses to the Land Reform Bill. A detachment of the Provost Special Investigation Branch, usually about 12 men with an attached linguist, was concerned with strictly criminal cases involving occupation personnel — such matters as murder, rape, assault, hit and run, or large-scale black market activities.

     The deployment of the force into a totally foreign and chaotic landscape was to place heavy demands upon the provost units of the BCOF. Following the initial preoccupation with matters of signposting, traffic control and general military policing obligations, the Australian provost units were soon caught up with much broader obligations of liaison with the US military and Japanese civil police and the other military police units of the BCOF. These duties soon concentrated on the criminal activities of occupier and occupied alike, especially those offences such as prostitution, assault, theft and the development of the black market in scarce commodities or the highly desirable and easily accessible essentials issued to the occupation forces.

     Obviously, the use of the Japanese and English languages was the most important means of communication for the occupation force and the population. During the war the Allied Translator Interpreter Section (ATIS) had been the primary source of lin guists available to the Australian Military Forces and as early as October 1945, Australian linguists, under Captain G.J. Moses, had commenced duties at the Yokohama Interrogation Centre under US command. Gradually this work was extended to support the war crimes trials and the name of the organisation changed to the Translator and Interpreter Service (TIS), which included a number of Australian personnel.

     The early plans for the Australian contribution to the BCOF placed a high premium on the provision of well-trained linguists, the requirement estimated as ‘one linguist to each 100 troops of the force’.10 There were at the time Australians who were Japanese linguists scattered throughout the area of recent operations and others in training at the RAAF Language School in Melbourne.

     The more experienced linguists were in demand satisf the many requirements arising from the early conduct of war crimes courts established at Darwin, Morotai, Wewak, Rabaul, Ambon and Singapore. Given the period during which members of the occu pation force were being assembled in Morotai, the opportunity was used to train interested personnel and those in specialist units in basic conversational Japanese. These efforts were further assisted in December 1945 by the issue of an English-Japanese phrase book. Suitable volunteers for the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) ensured that the unit assembled in Kure in February 1946 with a strength of 12 officers and 37 other ranks, at that stage all Australians, until the arrival of 11 British personnel in March.

     The earlier preparatory work in basic language training was to be of immediate benefit as personnel of those specialist units in close contact with large numbers of local Japanese set about their task of settling into their daily activities and adjusting to the realities of essential communication. Nevertheless, as late as June 1946, Northcott was representing his concern that although the force had been established in Japan for four months ‘it has not been possible to issue either a single guide or phrase book from BCOF sources’.

     The first unit task for CSDJC was the surveillance of the Japanese elections conducted on 10 April 1946. Sixty-four teams were deployed for the period prior to and following the election date to report on ‘the assurance of a free and untrammelled election’. So successful was the execution of this task that the unit was the recipient of congratulatory comments from MacArthur.

     Members of CSDIC were in constant demand throughout the area of occupation at the many points of daily contact with Japanese nationals, including, for example, the repatriation centres and the field security units. Typically, members of the unit were scattered throughout the BCOF area, engaged on interpreting or the translation work of newspaper and documentary articles on a range of matters from ‘underground activities’, ‘traffic accidents’, ‘illegal entry’ to ‘political organisations’. The interpreter was regarded as the ‘barometer’ by which the occupiers were enabled to read the ‘nationals’ real feelings’.11

Destruction of war stores

    The primary task for the occupying forces was the dismantling and destruction of the means by which the Japanese had waged war. The extent of this task was unknown initially and only following deployment of BCOF forces into the BCOF area was the magnitude and complexity of the task appreciated by the staff on HQ BCOF. The result was that the supervision of this task was directed by the Disposal of Enemy Equipment Section raised on HQ BCOF. Accordingly, a plan for the systematic searching of the occupied area was put in place, initially using information pro vided from Japanese sources and subsequently by way of careful checking for deliberate or accidental inaccuracies. This search was undertaken by patrols sent to locate all warlike stores and equipment and the number of identified locations ran into the many thousands.12

     The Disposal of Enemy Equipment Section comprised by June 1946 eight officers, including a US officer experienced in the disposal of poison gas, and was assisted by technical experts drawn from US forces until such time as Australians were sufficiently trained to take over these duties. A set of priorities was established as were procedures for destruction. The first priority was the destruction of ammunition, explosives and poison gas. Items for disposal were classified as ammunition and explosives; chemical warfare equipment and stores; weapons; submarines under 500 tons; precious metals and currency; narcotics and medical stores; signals, engineering and ordnance stores. Items were further
classified as being of interest for research or intelligence purposes; for destruction; for use by the occupation forces; for handing over to the Japanese authorities for civil use and for conversion to scrap.13

     Despite the destruction caused by US air raids, considerable quantities of Japanese stores had been concealed in numerous tunnels and caves and included explosives, ammunition and poison gas. HQ BCOF estimated, in July 1946, that 100,000 tons of explosives and 5000 tons of poisonous gas were stored in Hiroshima Prefecture alone. One dump, known as the Koyo Akizuki magazine on Eta Jima, where HQ BCOF was established, contained 70,000 tons.

     Recovery, transportation and destruction of these materials was highly dangerous work Much of the ammunition and explosives were dumped at sea, while at other times material was burned or dismantled on the spot. Wherever possible non-dangerous items were handed over to the Japanese Government for civil use. In this regard the 42 members of the 1st Australian Salvage Unit were deployed to about ten disposal sites throughout the BCOF area, arranging for the effective utilisation of large num bers of reuseable items such as drums and jute bags or the disposal by sale of suitable items to the Japanese authorities.

     Of particular note was Operation Lewisite, within the BCOF area, whereby some 19,658 tons of poisonous gas and material were destroyed by the 30 September 1946 at the site of the Japanese chemical warfare arsenal on Okunoshima, which had been established in 1925. The plant was located on three different sites containing nine different storage dumps. Included in the total storage of some 22,000 tons were 665 tons of mustard gas bombs, 58 tons of gas-filled shells and 15,000 tons of toxic smoke.14

     There were as well a variety of weapons located including 450 complete torpedoes in one dump, guns of 191/ inch calibre and many smaller calibres. Once located, the task became one for trained personnel, principally ordnance and engineers, who were assisted by locally recruited Japanese.

     The destruction of poison gas was supervised by specialist officers initially supervising Japanese labour. As this proved impractical, a Japanese contractor under BCOF supervision was engaged and disposal carried out in three stages. Liquid poison gas was pumped into tanks specially constructed on US supplied LSTs, which were also loaded with bombs and containers, then towed into deep water and sunk. Other stocks were loaded onto a former Japanese vessel for destruction at sea. A member of the 13th Australian Army Troops was later to recall that, as a demolitions expert, he was given the task of preparing a surplus ship of 10,000 tons located at Okunoshima ‘for a fail proof sink to the ocean bed’. He recalls inspecting the local poison gas facility and photographs stored in filing cabinets recording the effect of gasses on humans. The loading of the ship completed, it was towed out to sea and sunk.15

     The second method for destruction was burning or by a combination of burning, dismantling and dumping. Where dumping at sea was not possible, large quantities of gas were stored in caves, which were then sealed by concrete.

     Corporal Les Semken was one of the 22 members of the 10th Australian Bomb Disposal Platoon. Initially employed on basic carpentry tasks and using locally recruited Japanese, Semken was armed but this soon changed as did the day-to-day contact be tween the occupier and occupied. In his time in Japan he said that he ‘didn’t meet one family in Japan who had not lost some family member during the war. As well my daily contacts were with a people desperately short of food and the basic necessities.’16

     Semken and five others were sent to a bomb disposal school in Tokyo conducted by the US Army. There he was trained over a six-week period in the recognition and handling of Japanese ordnance. The risks involved in this work were vividly illustrated in the latter days of the course when an instructor was killed and a number of others seriously injured. The task, as put by a senior US officer, ‘was to draw the teeth of the Japanese War Machine’, estimated to be approximately 650,000 tons of explosive ordnance throughout Japan. This situation in part had been caused by the effectiveness of allied naval and air blockade in preventing the efficient supply of ordnance to Japanese forces overseas. As a consequence, a vast network of storage facilities in Japan was built or utilised.

     Deemed ‘qualified’, Semken and his colleagues in turn trained the other members of the 10th Australian Bomb Disposal Platoon, based in Kure. But its members were scattered through out southern Japan either operating independently or attached to local US or NZ units for local administration. While the tasks undertaken ranged in magnitude and degrees of difficulty, all were dangerous. The unit was given responsibility for the neutralisation of the explosive ordnance at Eta Jima, formerly the principal ordnance facility for the Japanese Navy.

     Semken describes the tunnels on Eta Jima as ‘huge things, like huge warehouses dug into the sides of the granite mountains, then completely lined with concrete and over that timber. The whole construction was undertaken without nails in order to avoid problems with friction; earthed; air conditioned and fitted with railway tracks.’ At the other end of the scale were tunnels built by the use of Korean labourers or POWs. These tunnels were unlined; usually damp and wet and because of the use of pitric acid as the main means of explosive content, highly dangerous, the acid becoming very unstable when exposed to moisture. Sometimes these storage facilities were based in the centre of a local village or town and usually a ‘principal person’, for example the mayor or police chief, would be the holder of the keys to these facilities and would on demand reveal the location.

     Contained in these tunnels were explosives and equipment ranging from the largest guns ever manufactured to torpedoes, mines, arms and explosives. The usual practice was to follow the first principle of bomb disposal ‘can you BTBIS?’ (blow the bastard in situ). Often this practice would raise the prospect of problems for the local community and on those occasions the disposal personnel involved, who had absolute authority, would enlist the assistance of the local police for crowd control. More complex were those times when the explosives had to be relocated before destruction, for example 500 lb bombs or the 2000 lb acoustic mines which contained a very sensitive fuse system and, because they were usually delivered by parachute, found in the most unexpected of locations.

     One of the major examples of relocation was the work of destruction on Okuna Shima, which was known as the ‘Burning Island’ and surrounded by a wide exclusion and safety zone. Usually the collected ordnance was loaded onto barges, towed to the island then unloaded and stacked for destruction by burning or detonation. The labouring work was undertaken by as many local Japanese as the demolitions officer required for the particular task at hand. Often the work was done by women who had been office girls and schoolteachers. They carried loads on back cradles and despite daily briefings about the danger of the work many were killed. Semken recalls when one of the Japanese assisting him undertake a major destruction task, dragged him to safety. Semken had fallen and sprained his ankle shortly after having set in train the ignition devices.

     A number of Australians were also to lose their lives in these operations. Corporal J.R. (Doc) Sewell (10th Australian Bomb Disposal Platoon) was to be awarded (posthumously) the George Medal in late 1947 for his courageous action on 22 October 1946. Sewell was in charge of disposal work at Onasamishima and in the words of the citation:

    The supporting documentation recommending Sewell for the George Medal was to wend its way slowly through the offi cial channels, being forwarded by the Australian Prime Minister to the King on the 19 August 1947. The award was officially gazetted in the Commonwealth Gazette on 20 November 1947.

     Acting Sergeant Sewell was killed almost a year after his courageous conduct at Onasamishima. On 15 October 1947, in company with Sapper A.P. Bramly, Sewell was delousing a Japanese marine mine containing 1100 pounds of high explosive at Mitsushima Beach, Shikoku. The mine exploded and Sewell and Bramly were killed instantly and another Australian, Private R.J. White, who was in the vicinity, was knocked unconscious for several hours. Also killed in the explosion were 72 Japanese civilians who were in the area at the time. In another irony of timing, Sewell’s mother, living in rural NSW, was to hear the news of her son’s death on the local radio news some hours before the official telegram advising her of his death reached her.

     Sapper H.E. Foley also served with the occupation forces and during that period he was presented with his George Medal in recognition of his courage in bomb disposal at Balikpapan on 2 July 1945.

     Apart from Japanese ordnance for destruction, members of the unit were often confronted by a range of unexploded US ordnance. Thousands of these items were found scattered throughout Japan lying in backyards, main streets and in the countryside. In each case careful attention to detail was required; sometimes the task was simply a matter of removing a fuse, other times it was a complex task. At all times it was fraught with danger due to the uncertainty as to the actual state of the detonator and the condition of the explosive.

Elections, military government and democratisation

    The most significant of the early tasks undertaken by the BCOF in Japan’s transition ‘from a feudalistic state to a democracy’ was to assist in the security of elections held on 10 April 1946 by the deployment of observer teams on polling day and by the presence of patrols in the preceding week. The purpose of these patrols was to ensure that elections were conducted democratically and that voters were free from intimidation. The Australians provided 42, including two female personnel, of the 51 observers deployed, all being identified by the wearing of white brassards containing the Japanese characters for ‘Election Observer’. The election saw the enfranchisement of Japanese women for the first time in Japanese history and a number of female candidates took their seats in the Japanese Diet.
Initially, the responsibility for military government and counter intelligence activities in occupied Japan was exclusively American and no such responsibilities were delegated to C-in-C, BCOF. Nevertheless, from June 1947 this policy was relaxed and groups of three Australians were allotted to each US military government team, in total 11 teams, operating in the BCOF area. These Australians were subordinate to the US team commander.18

     The process of democratisation as implemented by MacArthur is beyond the scope of this account. However, in terms of the Australian contribution, the main impact occurred through personal contact. An Australian member of BCOF, John Coffman, for example, seeks to place democratisation in context by refer ence to the impact the occupying forces had upon a society which to that time had been quarantined from the outside world. He argues that the Japanese were forced to accept the democratic reforms imposed by MacArthur. The locals were in a parlous condition bought about by the impact of the war, especially those who had been subjected to the atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima. Surprisingly, the accommodation to the new arrangements was almost universal and there were few accounts of actual violence against Australians or the animosity most expected.19

     One feature of this process of democratisation was the establishment, under powers delegated to the C-in-C BCOF on 11 March 1946, of provost courts. These courts, which sat in Japanese public buildings and were open to the public, heard cases usually of offences against BCOF personnel and property and those involving illegal immigrants. The courts had the power to impose prison terms of up to five years’ hard labour and/or impose substantial fines. In certain serious cases the matter would be referred to the Military Commission.

     The major point of contact between the force and the Japanese people was created when the BCOF became the employer of approximately 40,000 Japanese, which brought them into daily contact with the Australians and the other nationals in the force. For the most part the Japanese were employed on menial tasks such as domestic duties, labouring and cleaning, but this provision of employment, at a time of massive disruption to the Japanese economy, meant Japanese access to the basic necessities of food, clothing and shelter.

     One obvious aspect of this widespread contact was the opportunity to exploit those involved. There was a major imbalance in the composition of the local population caused by the loss of many young Japanese men and this, coupled with the ready availability of Australians and others who had both time on their hands and access to goods, meant that female companionship could be cheaply bought, even it was said, for a cake of soap. As well there was ample opportunity for Australians to supplement their meagre pay by purchasing and then selling goods obtained from the canteen stores.

Allied POW's and civilians

     The relief and evacuation of allied POWs and civilians held on the Japanese mainland had been implemented under what was known as Operation Blacklist The majority of those involved had been evacuated by the end of August 1945 using suitably trained personnel organised into teams, including Australian repre sentatives. In all the US Eighth Army recovered and evacuated 23,985 persons including 1455 Australians.20 These activities, and those concerned with establishing the fate of missing Australians were, in the main, completed before the arrival of the BCOF.

Demobilisation

    Similar progress was made by US authorities on the massive task of demobilisation and disarmament of Japan’s military forces located in the Japanese home islands. At the time of surrender they numbered about three and a half million personnel. All military forces in Japan had been demobilised by December 1945. The success of this process was due in large measure to the utilisation of the existing Japanese political and military organisa tion, and apart from minor incidents prior to the actual surrender, it proceeded without incident after the surrender.

Repatriation

    More complicated for US authorities was the major task of repatriating Japanese forces from overseas territories and foreign nationals, other than Allied personnel, to their respective home lands. Major factors complicated this process, not least being the fact that approximately six and half million Japanese service personnel and civilians were overseas and required ‘probably the largest movement of human beings ever attempted by sea’ to get them home.21

     There were within the BCOF area of responsibility three repatriation reception centres established at Senzaki, Ujina and Otake. The centres at Ujina and Otake were supervised by 34 Brigade, and that at Senzaki by New Zealand forces. By July 1946 these centres had processed more than 20,000 people leaving Japan and 467,000 returning to Japan. Although generally these centres were closed by October 1946 due to the small numbers of Japanese being repatriated at that time, the centre at Ujina was still processing returnees in March 1947.

John Coffman was a participant in the arrangements made for those returning Japanese who passed through the reception centre at Ujina.22 As Hiroshima had been the Southern Command HQ and Kure the principal port of departure, the effect on those returning was traumatic. Coffman offers the opinion that the Japanese Army initially regarded themselves as triumphant. The first repatriates were usually confident but as the full extent of the damage visited upon Hiroshima became evident and imagined for other cities, so also attitudes changed. Coffman also puts the view that the Japanese used the word ‘Shinchugon’ for the BCOF 'occupation forces', akin to meaning ‘a small patrol that travels into enemy territory’. On the other hand, the word ‘Senryogon’ which means ‘conquering army’ was used by the Japanese to describe the US occupation forces.

     The usual procedure for reception was that an Australian infantry company would meet a transport ship (or any one of the many forms of shipping pressed into service) into which had been packed 8000 troops returning from, for example, Rangoon. First down the gangplank would be about 30 soldiers carrying a white linen or cotton strap and a box containing cremated remains of fallen comrades for deposit eventually at the Yasakuni Shrine in Tokyo. All returnees were searched and all items of a military nature removed. Curiously, this often meant the removal of the very basic items such as blankets and mess tins they had been issued with by the British prior to leaving Rangoon. The next steps were a medical, which consisted of running past a couple of Japanese doctors, and then a thorough dousing with a DDT powder. Finally, they were questioned as to the location of their home, given a rail warrant to the nearest station and left to their own resources.

     Keith Boothroyd, a corporal with the 67th Infantry Battalion who spoke Japanese, assisted with a variation of this process.23 First the Japanese were ordered to remove all badges of rank, which were thrown into large drums. This removed all distinctions between them and reduced them in status to ordinary citizens again. Contrary to the Japanese tradition of ‘come home victori ous or don’t come home at all’ this passage through the Gaisenkan (Hall of Triumphant Return) was by men disarmed, sick, depressed with nothing to look forward to. The further humiliation of being subject to this situation was compounded by the next step in the process: being sprayed all over by Japanese women using delousing DDT sprays. This vigorous procedure was repeated as the soldiers were made to undress, except for their trousers, and DDT sprayed down their trouser legs.

Naval activities

     The principal initial task for the naval component of the BCOF was to conduct port operations to enable the transhipment of personnel and equipment from ships arriving at and departing from Kure. In effect Kure became the funnel through which poured the occupation force and the returning Japanese in extraordinary numbers and in the most varied of conditions.

     The Royal Navy Naval Port Party No. 2504, known as Force ‘C’ the advance party of which (HMS Glenearn) arrived at Kure on 1 February, took over port operations from US forces on 18 February.24 All US naval units had completed the minesweep ing of the widened shipping approaches to Kure by the end of February 1946. In addition to the handling of incoming ships, the naval port party had to survey and clear wreckage, arrange the disposal of 24 undamaged Japanese submarines, re-establish or replace handling facilities and service visiting ships. Between February and May 1946 the port party handled some 50 visiting merchant and 65 visiting warships. During the crucial period when the main body of the Australian contingent arrived (February-March 1946), the Australian Army 42nd Port Operations Company, using Japanese labour, averaged a daily discharge rate of 2000 tons. It has been estimated that in ‘the first six months F of BCOF operations a total of 348,693 measurement tons of cargo was discharged in the Kure docks’.25

     Due to the damage done to the docks area by allied air raids much of the cargo and personnel could not be unloaded directly F onto a wharf. This required a major transhipment program at a time when few BCOF or local craft were available. Although Australian movement control personnel were included in the advance parties, they were hard pressed to handle the tasks placed upon them. For example, the 58th Port Landing Craft Company, usually manned to handle up to 20 craft, was required to conduct operations utilising some 45 craft.

     Once stores were ashore there was an immediate requirement to have them either stored or moved forward. The transport sections and workshop of the 168th Australian General Transport Company were pressed into immediate service upon arrival and operated a 24-hour day until May 1946, moving 242,000 tons of stores and 456,000 personnel. A second unit, the 169th Australian General Transport Company, arrived in April and set up as a vehicle workshop to refurbish vehicles and support the many engineer tasks then in progress.

     The third part of this Australian transportation effort was the 21st Australian Ordnance Depot, which was responsible for the receipt and issue of stores to the snowballing arrivals of the main bodies of the various national contingents.26

     Force ‘C’ completed the bulk of its duties associated with the arrival of the BCOF and by 3 June 1946 reductions in the size of the port force were made and the ‘stone frigate’ HMS Commonwealth, was recommissioned with a strength of about 300. As the pace of the operational commitment eased and became one of routine maintenance to the BCOF, so the naval personnel ashore turned their attention to assisting the local Japanese authorities in the establishment of Kure as a major commercial establishment.

The British Commonwealth naval elements in Japan contributed to a program set up by the US, whereby up to six million people from distant parts of the former Japanese Empire were repatriated within 12 months of the conclusion of hostilities.

     Another major task for the navy was to conduct an inventory ‘Japanese naval vessels, in whatever condition, and put in place rangements for their disposal. This task, primarily the respon bility of the US Naval Commander for Japan, was of extraordinary magnitude and not completed until January 1949, by which time 415 vessels had been destroyed.

     Force ‘T’, the British Commonwealth Naval Component in Japan, was the naval presence afloat. By December 1947, following a succession of reductions in the British contribution to the BCOF, the last British warship was withdrawn and what then became known as the British Support Unit became entirely Australian, comprising HMA Ships Arunta and Warramunga. Also HMS Commonwealth, by then consisting of only 90 RN personnel, was reorganised as a small port directorate and sea transport office manned by RAN personnel.

Air activities

    The air elements of the BCOF were located at three sites. Given the combination of mountainous terrain and the devastation caused by allied bombing, there were few suitable locations. Iwakuni in Hiroshima Prefecture was selected, with a second airfield at Bofu 40 miles to the south-west and later, Miho near Matsue on the north coast of Honshu. Advance parties from the RAAF and RAF and the 5th Airfield Construction Squadron, RAAF had the major task of the preparation of airfields and supporting facilities at Iwakuni and Bofu before the arrival of the main body of aircraft of 81st Wing in early March following their 3100-mile ferry flight from Labuan.

     HQ 81st (Fighter) Wing, RAAF was based at Bofu. 76 Squadron arrived on 11 March, 77 Squadron on 6 March and 82 Squadron over the period 13-18 March 1946. Apart from the difficulties caused by the preoccupation with the rehabilitation or construction of such essential infrastructure, and the constant maintenance of this infrastructure as would allow the conduct of flying operations, there were two other matters that bedevilled the effective functioning of the air force elements as a whole. These were the high turnover of personnel due to repatriation and release, and secondly technical problems with the quality of aviation fuel. Large quantities of aviation fuel had been shipped in drums from India and Morotai, but upon inspection on arrival it was found to be contaminated. Consequently, flying operations were seriously restricted.27

     The principal task for the air elements of the BCOF was the conduct of surveillance flights in support of programs to reduce the number of Koreans illegally seeking to enter Japan and the incidence of smuggling.

    John Coffman, at the time a member of the Intelligence Section of the 67th Battalion, recalls that from 1947 to 1949 elements of BCOF were kept busy combating the large-scale smug gling being conducted by mainly Korean crime rings. These rings sought to smuggle into Japan those Koreans seeking to leave the troubled Koreas as well as items such as sugar, saccharin, footwear and drugs, which were in short supply in Japan. To combat this the Australians had several 300-ton Japanese torpedo boats manned by Japanese but with armed Australians on board to patrol the Tsushima Strait, between Japan and Korea.

     The RAAF would supply aircraft to act as spotters of the Korean vessels, which ranged in size from about 6000 tons to large fishing vessels, and would guide the BCOF interception craft. Often the Korean crews would resist interception and a gunfight would ensue, but eventually the vessels would be boarded and escorted back to a Japanese port for follow-up by the Japanese police.28

     The problem of illegal immigration was to plague the New Zealand Brigade especially as it was responsible for the supervision of the west coast of the island of Honshu where the BCOF and Japanese authorities were apprehending up to 150 Koreans a day and then becoming responsible for their security and repatriation.

     BCAIR squadrons were also required to contribute to ‘showing the flag’ activities in massed flights for visiting dignitaries and on special ceremonial occasions. As the technical problems of support for operations were overcome, routine fighter tactical training, tactical reconnaissance exercises with BCOF ground forces and ground defence training was resumed. The establishment of an armament practice camp at Miho enabled each squadron to spend a month there refining its skills. Squadron personnel also were required to participate in dismounted ceremonial activities and from late 1946 the conduct of technical trade training.29

SOME MATTERS OF JUSTICE

    There were in addition to those Australians serving with the BCOF, a number of other Australian service and civilian personnel on duty in Japan. These included, as at July 1946, Brigadier J.W. O’Brien, who held the appointment of Chief of the Scientific and Technical Division, Economic and Scientific Section, GHQ SCAP; Lieutenant Colonel Allan, also of that Section; Colonel Abbott and ten other members of the Australian Scientific Mission; personnel participating in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East; the Interna tional Prosecution Section; the UK, Canada and Australian Division Legal Section; personnel in the Australian Military History Section; and an Australian Army War Crimes unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel D.L.B. Goslett.

THE AUSTRALIAN SCIENTIFIC MISSION TO JAPAN

    The Australian Government, in an effort to seek reparations from its former enemies, authorised the despatch of two missions, one to Germany and the second to Japan.30 Each mission had two objectives: the first was to obtain plant and machinery to replace that used on war production in Australia; the second objective was to obtain access to scientific and technological developments that had arisen in the respective countries during the war. The mission to Germany was successful in achieving both objectives and added a third achievement in encouraging German scientists and technicians to emigrate and contribute to Australia’s postwar reconstruction.

     The Australian Scientific Mission to Japan was under the command of Brigadier J.W. O’Brien, and then later Colonel Abbott. The ten civilian members of the mission were granted the honorary rank of lieutenant colonel for the duration of their duties in Japan and initially the mission collected some ‘technological information of value’. However, eventually the mission was recalled as MacArthur refused to allow anything of value to be taken out of Japan, even refusing the direct intervention of Prime Minister Chifley, who sought landing permits for a small group of Australian industrialists to visit Japan.

    O’Brien and Allan were posted to HQ SCAP in what was assumed to be ‘a favoured position’, but in the event produced nothing of value. O’Brien’s standing was described in a private letter dated 15 July 1946, to him as ‘although you are for the time being an Australian officer paid from Army Votes, you are working on SCAP HQ in more or less a civilian governmental capacity and not as an Army officer from BCOF’.31

AUSTRALIAN INVOLVEMENT IN WAR CRIMES TRIALS IN JAPAN

    Following the Japanese Surrender, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered:

    On 19 January 1946 MacArthur established the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) on which 11 nations, including Australia, were represented. The President of this tribu nal was an Australian, Sir William Flood Webb. War criminals were divided into three classes. Major war criminals (Class A) were those charged ‘with planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war ... ‘ and Classes B and C were ‘actual perpetrators of war crimes, and those who abetted or permitted them ...'

     The trial of Class A War Criminals began at the Ichigaya Building in Tokyo on 3 May 1946 and of the 28 indicted, 25 were found guilty and sentenced on 12 November 1948. Two of the accused died during the course of the trial and a third was declared unfit to stand trial.

     Investigations into war crimes committed by the Japanese began in Australia in 1942. The first information received by the Australian military authorities regarding the commission of war crimes by Japanese forces against Australian forces and civilians was after the Japanese invasion of New Britain in January 1942. The information came from survivors who escaped to the mainland. Information of other atrocities committed by the Japanese on Ambon was also brought to Australia by those who had managed to escape.

     As a result of these reports action was taken to obtain statements from those who were able to give information regarding breaches by the Japanese of the rules of warfare. In June 1944 the Australian Government appointed a Commission of Inquiry into war crimes perpetrated by the Japanese against Australians. The Commission consisted of Mr Justice (later Sir William) Flood Webb, chairman, Mr Justice Mansefield and Mr Justice Kirby.

     Subsequently the Governor-General was empowered, inter alia, under the Australian War Crimes Act, (11 October 1945), to ‘convene military courts for the trial of persons charged with the commission of war crimes’; and to ‘appoint officers to constitute military courts ...‘. Responsibility for the arrest, custody and trial of those charged with, or suspected of, war crimes was devolved upon AHQ Melbourne. A number of military courts were author ised, including the 2nd Australian War Crimes Section, raised in Melbourne on 15 March 1946 to serve in Tokyo.

     Initially known as 2 AWCS (AFPAC), on 29 April 1946 the unit title was changed to 2 AWCS (SCAP) and along with a British and a Canadian unit, worked in close collaboration with SCAP’s Legal Section, commanded by the (US) Chief Legal Officer, Colonel A.C. Carpenter. The unit was located in the Meiji Building also known as the Far Eastern Air Forces Building. The first CO of 2 AWCS was Lieutenant Colonel D.L.B. Goslett, until 11 April 1950, when he was succeeded by Temporary Major S.M. England until 4 January 1953 when the unit was disbanded.

     The CO was directly responsible to the Australian Adjutant General at AHQ Melbourne, and although in the early days of the unit the BCOF provided drivers and escorts for Japanese POWs, the C-in-C, BCOF had no jurisdiction over the unit. During the period 1948-49 the staff of the unit comprised 27 personnel, being variously legal officers, interrogating officers/linguists, a translator and administrative and support staff.

     2 AWCS prepared cases and prosecuted war criminals for crimes against Australians assisted only by SCAP’s legal section in search and apprehension. From the time the unit was raised to the time it was disbanded on 4 January 1953, 779 war criminals were brought to trial under the Australian War Crimes Act (1945).33 These trials were conducted concurrently with, but apart from, the trial of the Class A War criminals.

     The military courts consisted of not less than a president and two members and a judge advocate appointed to assist the court on legal procedure. The accused were permitted Japanese defence counsel who were assisted by an Australian officer in matters of court procedure. Australian officers acted for the prosecution. Sentences were reviewed by a chief legal officer and then submitted with any petition to the Judge Advocate General, the highest legal authority in the Australian Military Forces. Finally details of all proceedings were submitted to the confirming authority.

     The first trial conducted by 2 AWCS was of the Japanese (Murakami and others) accused of atrocities against Australian and allied POWs at the Niihama Beshi Copper Mine at Naoetsu on Shikoku. Major D. Campbell acted as prosecutor and a US lawyer acted for the defence. Two Australian former POWs at the mine returned to Japan to give evidence in the trial over the period April to July 1946 and subsequently a number of the Japanese accused were found guilty by the Military Court and sentenced to death or long periods of imprisonment.

     Some 22,376 Australians became POWs of the Japanese and of these 8031 (35.9 per cent) died. Two hundred and ninety-six trials were conducted under the Australian War Crimes Act before Australian courts, including those sitting outside Japan. Nine hundred and twenty-four accused were brought to trial, of these 280 were acquitted, 148 were sentenced to death and 496 to periods of imprisonment.34 However,

     As the occupation came to a formal end, so there was a slackening of the earlier pressures to see that Justice was done. Of the 171 Japanese war criminals sentenced by Australian Military Courts and held in Sugamo Prison, Tokyo as at 1 January 1954, 67 had been released since the formal conclusion of the occupation on 28 April 1952. Of those remaining, the majority had been sentenced in early 1946 to periods of imprisonment of 15 years to life. (The last of the trials were conducted on Manus Island during May 1951 when 36 Japanese were acquitted and five were sentenced to death.) 36

     On 14 April 1955 the Australian Cabinet agreed:

    The implementation of the Cabinet decision led to enquiries as to the policy of the British Government. By August it had been ascertained that the British Government had reduced the period of life imprisonment and sentences of 20 years or more for Japanese war criminals to 15 years. Furthermore, all sentences would be subject to a remission for good conduct and that the effect of these arrangements would be that all remaining Japanese would be released by 1958. On the basis of this information and in the light of the Cabinet decision, the Australian Adjutant General on 8 September 1955 set in train the procedures for the release in small numbers and without publicity of 103 war criminals by the end of 1956.38

     A further review on 25 January 1956 by the Adjutant General recommended that on the basis of release on parole after serving two-thirds or 10 years of their sentences approximately a hundred war criminals be eligible for release in 1956.

     By 28 May 1956 all minor war criminals except for a number of Koreans and Formosans had been released on parole. Typically, Warrant Officer Keigo Kanamoto, found guilty of the ‘Murder of a number of Australian POWs near Laha Airfield on Ambon Island about 14 Feb 42’ by the Australian Court sitting at Manus Island, had been sentenced to imprisonment for life on 19 March 1951. His sentence was terminated on 21 June 1957. His co accused, also found guilty of the same offence, had been executed. A third co-accused had been found not guilty and released.39

     By July 1957 the last five prisoners still in prison who had been sentenced by Australian courts had been released.

MILITARY HISTORY

    Recording the work of the Australians in the BCOF officially was the task of the 1st Australian Military History Section located on HQ BCOF. This section of 12 was required to collect data for use by the Official Historian, to collect enemy equipment, documents and the like for inclusion in the Australian War Memorial collection and to record photographically important events in the history of the occupation.