The Australian contribution to the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in Japan formed a significant
expression of Australia’s defence policy from the end of the
war in August 1945 to the fall of the Chifley Government in December
1949.
Australia’s support for the BCOF
had a number of remarkable features. Firstly, the Australian Government
sought a position of leadership on behalf of the British Commonwealth,
and was prepared to give this leadership substance by the sustained
diplomatic campaign it mounted in support of its claim. This campaign
revealed a new awareness by the Australian Government of Australia’s
potential as a contributor to important international affairs and
demonstrated a preparedness to negotiate firmly with great and powerful
friends in support of Australia’s national interests.
The second factor was Australia’s
preparedness in times of peace to despatch a sizeable military force
and maintain it in a foreign country to achieve a national political
objective: in this case the right to be heard in the peace council
drawing up the terms of a peace treaty with Japan. Thirdly, Australian
predominance in the BCOF gave Australia the kind of military experience
it needed if it intended to become politically a mature and independent
nation intent on exercising international responsibilities. Australia’s
attempts, however, to give substance to an independent stance in defence
and foreign policy matters in the postwar period suffered early setbacks.
On 18 August 1945, three days after the capitulation
of Japan, the Australian Prime Minister, J.B. Chifley, announced in
Parliament an Australian offer to provide a composite Australian force
to participate in the occupation of Japan.1
Chifley emphasised the Australian Government’s desire to act
as a separate belligerent and for Australian forces to operate under
Australian command, subject only to the control of the Supreme Commander,
Allied Forces Japan.
The War Cabinet had met in Melbourne on 17
August 1945 to consider the recommendations of the Defence Committee
following its consideration of a Dominions Office cablegram (No. 290
of 13 August 1945) concerning tasks arising out of the capitulation
of the Japanese.2
Of particular interest were the British proposals with regard to the
reoccupation of Hong Kong and the occupation of Japan. Cablegram 290
superseded an earlier British proposal for an occupation force for
Japan and related matters.3
Instead, the British proposed that Australia provide a force of brigade
size for the re-establishment of a British garrison in Hong Kong,
until relieved by a British force, and another brigade, plus an air
force contingent, for a British Commonwealth force for the occupation
of Japan.
The Defence Committee considered the British
proposals on 17 August 1945 and recommended:
'a that an Australian naval task force (group
74.1) should proceed immediately to Hong Kong and remain there until
relieved about the end of August (by British units) and that units
of group 74.1 be subsequently employed in Japanese and Malayan waters;
and that an Australian force of about one brigade strength be transported
with all speed to Hong Kong for temporary garrison duties until relieved.'
4
The committee stressed that this force could
not accept any responsibility for feeding, clothing, hospitalisation
and civil administration of the population. It was also to be a condition
of acceptance that the commitment was of a temporary nature only and
was not to exceed one month. Separately the committee noted that,
as the force for Hong Kong was to be of a temporary nature only, this
action would not prejudice the organisation of a force for Japan.
The Defence Committee proposals were accompanied
by advice that the following forces could be made available without
delay for the occupation of Japan: one cruiser and one destroyer,
one brigade group, and three fighter squadrons.5
The War Cabinet considered these recommendations
and despatched on 17 August 1945 cablegram 286 to the Dominions Office
in London, which made clear the Australian Government’s determination
to contribute to a force for Japan ‘not as a subsidiary but
as a principal Pacific power which has for so long borne the heat
and burden of the struggle against Japan. We cannot but help feeling
that this has not had sufficient recognition in the armistice arrangements
... ‘ and separately, ‘We must insist, however, that this
contribution is being made by Australia as a separate belligerent
of Japan, and that our force will operate under an Australian Commander
who will be subject only to the supreme allied commander’.6
The size of the Australian military force
proposed also reinforced the Australian Government’s determination
to act independently and in support of Australia’s national
interests.
The War Cabinet overruled the Defence Committee’s
recommendations in support of the British proposals regarding Hong
Kong and gave absolute priority to the occupation force for Japan,
proposing that this consist of Task Force 74.1, two brigade groups
and the three squadrons of the RAAF. The War Cabinet doubled the size
of the army strength for Japan at the expense of urgent British requirements
in Hong Kong.
Secondly, the Cabinet reaffirmed its determination
not to become embroiled in any postwar readjustment of the colonial
relationship in the British colony of Hong Kong. It was prepared for
national reasons (the loss of the 8th Division, the recovery of Australian
prisoners of war) and for status reasons (connected with the surrender
of the Japanese) to make available a paratroop battalion for the reoccupation
of Singapore.
There is a suggestion here that the Australian
Government was also foreshadowing its claims to an important role
in the occupation of Japan. By 19 September 1945 the Australian proposal
for the army’s participation had been reduced to ‘the
initial organization ... [of] one brigade group and consideration
to be given later to a raising of a second brigade’.7
This revision of the size of the force so soon after the earlier proposals
raises the question as to whether the Government’s original
plan for two brigades was merely a device to avoid the commitment
of a force to Hong Kong, although an assessment of the personnel available
to man the brigades may have forced the reduction.
The British response to this cablegram reaffirmed
that there should be a single British Commonwealth force for Japan
in order to enhance British Commonwealth status and position in Japan.
The British conceded that the commander and the bulk of the HQs could
be provided by Australia, although they also insisted that the commander
would be jointly responsible to the Australian and the UK governments
and that units of the British Pacific fleet in Japanese waters would
remain under the operational control of the British Pacific fleet.
The Australian Government was unable to agree
to these British counterproposals and maintained its position on an
independent Australian force. Australia’s reply noted especially
that under the British proposals the force would not be fully representative
of the British Commonwealth, nor would it be a unified force under
one Commander-in-Chief.8
At this stage the Minister for External Affairs, H.V. Evatt, then
in London, intervened and sought a review of the Australian decision
contained in cablegram 286 on the grounds that it should be possible
to compromise slightly but at the same time ‘demonstrate Australian
leadership in Pacific affairs and Pacific settlement’.9
The Australian Government decided to compromise and its agreement
to participate was communicated to the British Government in cablegram
305 dated 21 September 1945).10
Having done so, the Australian Government
then had to negotiate with the US Government, which was particularly
sensitive to any suggestion of a challenge to, or interference with,
what it regarded as its sole prerogative to order affairs in Japan.
The principles of the US occupation policy had been outlined in the
‘US initial post-surrender policy towards Japan’ (SWNCC
150/41) of 6 September 1945,11
and the implementation was largely entrusted to MacArthur (as Supreme
Commander, Allied Powers, SCAP), who on the flight into Japan mapped
out with his Chief of Government Section, Major General Whitney, the
main objectives of the early occupation. These objectives, listed
under eleven headings, were elaborated in SCAP directives issued soon
after MacArthur’s arrival in Tokyo.12
The Big Four were separately considering the
arrangements envisaged for the political supervision of the post-surrender
arrangements in Japan. The US Chargé d’Affaires in Canberra,
Minter, reported on 6 October 1945 the agreement of the Big Four to
establish a Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEC) for the consideration
of political matters connected with the fulfilment by Japan of its
obligations under the instruments of surrender. Australian participation
in the proposed commission was sought and its acceptance was received
by Minter on 11 October 1945.13
Separately Australia pressed its case for
membership of an Allied Control Commission (ACCJ), to be set up in
Tokyo, the original proposal for which provided for the inclusion
of Australia and four other nations as members. Australia’s
participation finally came under challenge and Evatt, prompted by
a Washington press report of 26 October 1945 of new proposals, made
urgent representations to the US Secretary of State on the same day,
reiterating Australia’s claim to membership of the ACCJ.14
Australia’s concern to obtain membership
of both the FEC and the ACCJ in Tokyo was the subject of further representations
by Evatt in Washington to US Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson,
on 1 November 1945.15
Evatt ‘complained bitterly’ concerning aspects of the
revised draft of the terms of reference and especially about the ‘discriminating
treatment of powers involved’, specifically with regard to the
status of the Soviet Union.16
Acheson’s response, later accepted by Evatt, was to point out
the necessity of reaching an accommodation with the Soviet Union on
matters affecting the FEC.
Evatt, in the same conversation with Acheson,
stated ‘that the Australian view, which he thought had made
very considerable headway was that Australia should be the spokesman
for the British Commonwealth on Pacific matters’. He went on
to remark, within the context of Australian primacy, ‘that it
would be utterly incompatible with this result to have the United
Kingdom singled out as one of the Potsdam powers with special prerogatives
on the Far Eastern Commission or as one of the powers to be represented
on a Control or other Commission to be set up in Japan’. Acheson
also noted that ‘I also gathered the impression that Dr Evatt
attaches great importance to our acceptance of British Commonwealth
troops under Australian command in Japan’.17
Evatt had grounds for concern about British
intentions with regard both to its own position and to the Australian
claims to leadership. In a memorandum of 24 November 1945 to the US
Secretary of State, the British Ambassador, Halifax, stated that the
British Government had decided to increase substantially the size
and expertise of the British staff available to General Gairdner,
‘the Prime Minister’s personal representative with General
MacArthur’ .18
Similarly, there were grounds for concern
by the Australian Government as to the actions taken by MacArthur.
The Australian representative in Washington, Eggleston, complained
to the US Secretary of State on 27 November 1945 about a press report
on 24 November which indicated that MacArthur was taking action on
reparations matters without consulting other interested parties. Eggleston
requested ‘that there should be the fullest possible consultation,
through the Political Adviser of the Australian Military Mission,
Washington’.19
Australia also sought to maintain its initiative
that the Commander-in-Chief of the BCOF be an Australian officer.
The Australian Government formally sent the BCOF proposals, on behalf
of the governments of the UK, Australia, NZ and India, to the US Government
on 17 October 1945. On the same day MacArthur informed the Australian
mission in Tokyo that he was opposed to any idea of a British area
in Japan with the staff of the three services integrated under the
command of one officer. His plan was that the individual service components
of all nationalities would be directly responsible to US navy, army
and air force commanders. An interim reply to the Australian proposals
of 17 October 1945, received from the US Government on 24 November
1945, accepted in principle the participation of a British Commonwealth
force but indicated that the forces would be integrated operationally
into US forces.
The US response to the British Commonwealth
proposals ran contrary to the principles the British and Australian
governments had earlier sought to establish in pursuit of their own
national interests and had not been easily obtained. In his cablegram
of 8 December 1945 to Chifley, Evatt explained: ‘We feel you
should know that the above reply was obtained from the State Department
only after we and the Legation here had exerted great pressure in
order to expedite its delivery. The document was practically pushed
from desk to desk in the State and War Departments.20
The recently established Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Australia (JCOSA) considered the US reply on 11 December 1945.21
The JCOSA noted that the US proposals of 24 November 1945 showed little,
if any, advance on those put forward on 17 October 1945 and that the
wording of the proposals left plenty of scope for ambiguity. The JCOSA
identified three courses open to it:
'Course A. To stand firm on the original
conception of the Common wealth force and make it clear to the US
authorities that we are not prepared to provide the force unless it
is certain from the outset that the whole force including the air
component and naval forces ashore retains its identity as a Commonwealth
force under a Commonwealth C in C and staff.
Course B. To permit the Commonwealth Army and Air Forces
to be placed under American Army and Air Commanders respectively.
Course C. To accept the American proposals as they stand
and to give General Northcott authority to make the best arrangements
he can in direct negotiation with General MacArthur, striving to get
included in the arrangements the points raised in paragraph 4 of E65
(dated 8 December 1945). Alternatively we might in accepting the Washington
proposals demand that these safeguards are included before General
Northcott starts detailed discussions.'
The JCOSA recommended Course B as the one
which might be able to work but agreed also that Northcott should negotiate
the British Commonwealth viewpoint with MacArthur. The J proposals were
agreed by the War Cabinet on 18 December 1945 and machinery set in train
for the build-up of the BCOF.22
Lieutenant General J. Northcott, an Australian officer sent to Japan
to conduct the negotiations with General MacArthur, was to become the
BCOF’s first Commander-in-Chief.
Following negotiations between MacArthur and
Northcott an agreement on a memorandum was signed in Tokyo on 18 December
1945.23
Under the memorandum, operational control of the three service elements
included was assigned to appropriately senior US local commanders. The
Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth force, who remained responsible
for the administration of the force as a whole, was to have direct access
to the SCAP on policy matters, and operational control of the force
was to be vested in the Commanding General, Eighth US Army, who controlled
the whole area of Japan.
On 29 December 1945 the JCOSA responded to
a request from Chifley to draft a formal reply which accepted the general
principles put forward by the US Government and the memorandum negotiated
by MacArthur and Northcott.24
The Northcott report to JCOSA on 24 December 1945 stressed the wholehearted
welcome and cooperation offered by MacArthur and his staff. MacArthur
affirmed that the BCOF was urgently needed and that far from opposing
it he had always pressed for its early arrival.25
In parallel with these discussions on the BCOF, the Australian Government
had been heavily involved in activities designed to bolster claims to
recognition of its status as a ‘party principal’.26
Even after agreement had been reached with
MacArthur (but with a formal agreement not immediately forthcoming),
Australia’s British Commonwealth allies showed signs of restlessness.
The New Zealand Government, although prepared to persevere, admitted
to flagging enthusiasm and it questioned the prospects for any improvement
in British Commonwealth prestige. The British Government’s reluctance
to contribute to BCOF became more noticeable as time went by.27
Finally, there were complications with regard
to the composition of the Australian component of the BCOF. The Australian
Government’s willingness to commit troops to an occupation force
in Japan was hamstrung by delays in the formal acceptance by the US
Government of the Australian offer. The Australian Government had decided
to provide the bulk of the occupation forces from volunteers from within
the Australian forces already serving abroad. As a high proportion of
these volunteers were at that time located at Labuan and Morotai, as
was the 81st Wing of the RAAF, which had been earmarked as the RAAF
contingent to the BCOF, the Australian Government sought arrangements
that would enable these occupation personnel to move directly to the
BCOF in Japan.
The longer the delays in obtaining clearance
for these personnel to move, the more difficulties were posed for the
Australian Government — not merely difficulties with regard to
discontent among the volunteers but also those of a wider political
significance. These difficulties included the continued Australian presence
in territories from which the Australian Government sought the earliest
possible departure, and a continued denial of opportunity to the Australian
Government to supplement, with appropriate military involvement, its
claims to recognition in the arrangements for the peace settlement.
Australian units and personnel to comprise
the occupation force for Japan were raised and assembled from throughout
the South West Pacific Area and the Australian mainland. A total of
‘71 units were formed to become part of Australia’s contribution.
Originally all these Units were to be part of 34 Brigade but prior to
leaving for Japan the Australian contribution to Headquarters British
Commonwealth Base under Colonel, later Brigadier, A.G. Wilson was designated
as such.
HQ 34 Brigade opened at Morotai on 27 October
1945 under its first commander, Brigadier R.H. Nimmo. Its principal
combat units were the 65th, 66th and 67th Australian Infantry Battalions.
These units were composed of volunteers drawn respectively from the
7th Australian Division (Borneo), the 9th Australian Division (Borneo)
and the 3rd, 5th, 6th and 11th Australian Divisions located at Wewak,
Bougainville and New Britain. The other combat units of the brigade
were an armoured car squadron, a field battery of artillery and a field
squadron of engineers.
The 1st Australian Armoured Car Squadron, commanded
by Major C. Ives, was raised at Puckapunyal in January 1946 from volunteers
from the 2/5th, 2/6th and the Amphibious Regiments as well as from HQ
4 Armoured Brigade. Equipped principally with Staghound armoured cars,
the unit trained extensively until embarkation on the SS Pachaug
Victory at Sydney for onward movement to Kure and arrived there
on 12 April 1946.28
The artillery unit was raised at Balikpapan
and initially designated the 6th Independent Field Battery. The battery
comprised men drawn from the 7th Division and other units and was equipped
with eight 25 pounder field guns. The unit moved to Morotai on 7 November
1945 but many men took their discharge when they heard the rumour that
the 2nd Mountain Battery was the preferred unit for the BCOF. In the
event this was the case, although this unit, commanded by Major T.A.
Rodriguez, MC was later redesignated as A Battery, RAA (on 14 March
1946). The battery’s advance party and main body were to arrive
in Kure on the 12 and 23 February 1946 respectively.29
The principal engineer unit was the 28th Field
Squadron but also essential to the efficient functioning of the force
were the many other smaller units drawn from a range of sources. Thus
the 13th Australian Army Troops Company, RAE was raised in October 1945
and manned from personnel who had volunteered from the Bougainville
area. This unit embarked on HMAS Kanimbla on 10 November 1945, calling
at Lae and Madang before disembarking at Morotai on 17 November 1945.
The 343rd Light Aid Detachment was raised at Pandasari, Balikpapan on
12 October 1945 but members of the unit did not concentrate finally
at Morotai until 23 November. The 20th Field Ambulance was raised at
Morotai whereas the 6th Welding Platoon, RAE, raised at Bathurst, NSW,
in February 1946, with approximately 50 members, left Australia on 1
March 1946 and travelled to Kure where the unit disembarked on 13 March
1946.
Colin East, a rifle company commander with
the 2/9th Battalion, was at Morotai and given the opportunity to select
his own new company of 120 men of the 65th Battalion. Some 300 volunteers
applied and he was only given three or four days to interview and select
soldiers mature in behaviour and well recommended.30
Between the time troops became aware of the
prospect of service in an occupation force and the despatch of that
force, there were long periods of inactivity. For those who had volunteered
there was little to do prior to their concentration at Morotai and little
to do after it. Those at Lae for the three months from August to November
were able to sleep or swim more or less at will. Even at this stage
men began to question whether they had been ‘forgotten’
by the Australian Government and when finally located at Morotai, increasing
numbers sought release from their obligation and return to Australia.
Life at Morotai entailed nominal administrative
duties but little else to do but swim, walk on the beach or gather to
dispose of the accumulated beer ration of two bottles per man per week.
One group at Morotai dug a pit inside their tent, lined it with charcoal,
placed their beer ration in the pit and then covered it. This makeshift
refrigerator provided ice-cold beer. Generally, how ever, members of
the force had only their own company; medical officers routinely warned
against contact with local women for fear of disease, a warning reinforced
by the clear evidence of poor hygiene among the locals. The more enterprising
members took advantage of arrangements whereby Japanese prisoners were
used to teach them rudimentary Japanese.
The RAAF contribution to the BCOF was formed
into the 81st Wing, which comprised 76th, 77th and 82nd RAAF fighter
squadrons at the time located on Labuan Island. Originally the 3rd,
11th and 17th Squadrons, these squadrons were re-equipped with P51D
Mustang aircraft and supplemented by the addition of No. 5 Airfield
Construction Squadron and the 481st Maintenance Squadron. The latter
was to be replaced by the 381st (B) Squadron in May 1946.
Volunteers for the RAAF contribution located
at Labuan were issued with new uniforms and BCOF and ‘Australia’
shoulder flashes, and spent their time on the administrative preparations
for the despatch of units to Japan and training in ceremonial drill.
Prior to arrival at Morotai some troops had
been told that they would spend six weeks practising their ceremonial
drill before the force embarked forJapan. For some the ultimate irony
and ‘last straw’ was the introduction of weapon training
on the .303 rifle, their constant companion throughout the war.
For others the unit was fully occupied on the
maintenance of vehicles and equipment or the preparation of stores.
However, time passed slowly and by Christmas there was still no news
concerning the move to Japan; and consequently the morale of individuals
sagged.
As early as 12 December 1945, the (Sydney)
Sun carried an article entitled ‘Our Forgotten Airmen’.
This claimed that RAAF personnel in Labuan, part of the force assembled
for service in Japan, ‘were thoroughly browned off by Official
neglect and the general futility of tropical service ...‘. These
personnel were reported to ‘have held stop-work meetings to protest
against their casual treatment by the authorities in Australia. Discipline
is apparently suffering in an atmosphere of boredom and the neglect
of the authorities.’ Those involved, having volunteered for an
extra period of 18 months’ service, complained that they had ‘been
forgotten, had nothing to do, suffered from monotonous food, shortage
of comforts and amenities’ and had yet to be told whether or not
the force would actually go to Japan and if so when this would take
place. The Sun article called for some action by the appropriate
minister to rectify this situation. The frustration caused by the delay
was to boil over into a major incident at Morotai. This incident was
referred to colloquially as the ‘Jack Up’.
On 11 January 1946 members of the force conducted
a protest march and parade in order to draw attention to two major grievances
of concern to those personnel who had volunteered for service in Japan.
The troops at this point had had no official advice of their actual
embarkation date for Japan or of the commencement date of their service
with the force. These two issues had been of concern since December
particularly, and on 10 January the situation was so tense that a meeting
of representatives from all units of the assembled force was held to
discuss what could be done to resolve them. This meeting passed a resolution
that a ‘protest’ march be held the next day. News of the
meeting and the proposed course of action spread and some officers paraded
their units and specifically warned their troops against participation
in such a protest.
On the morning of 11 January 1946 troops accompanied
by their NCOs, paraded as usual at 7.30 to receive their daily issue
of atabrine. The troops then marched off in formed subunits, without
any orders being given, to the regimental parade ground. No orders were
given to ensure that no one could be identified as a leader and be then
subject to disciplinary action. At the regimental parade ground a stage
had been built and a public address system installed.
Administering command of 34 Brigade during
the absence of Brigadier Nimmo was Lieutenant Colonel Colvin, DSO, CO
66th Battalion, who was approached by a deputation led by Sergeant T.A.G.
Hungerford and invited to address the troops. Initially he refused to
do so, but when assured that the troops would not heckle or interrupt
him, he addressed the protest. He indicated that as a result of communications
between HQ 34 Brigade and Army Headquarters in Melbourne a signal had
been received nominating the commencement date for service in the force
as 1 January 1946. In their respective accounts Colvin31
and Hungerford32
agree that Colvin defused a most difficult situation. Hungerford records
that all units then dispersed in an orderly fashion, whereas Colvin
records that he obliged his own battalion to spend the remainder of
the afternoon undertaking battalion drill, an activity the participants
took in ‘good spirits’.
On 22 January 1946 the Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister for the Army, Frank Forde, MHR arrived at Morotai after
having flown there from Australia. Forde told the troops assembled for
the occasion of his visit that shipping having been diverted from the
other tasks, the Australian contribution to the occupation force, then
located on Morotai, would be moved to Japan within the next four to
six weeks.
Despite a willingness on the part of the Australian
Government to commit military forces to the occupation of Japan, there
was in January 1946 much uncertainty within the Australian Government
surrounding its proposal. It was not until 31 January 1946 that Chifley
announced details of the plan for a British Commonwealth force to participate
in the occupation of Japan.33
The details of the plan, published in The
Age on that day, were that the US Government had formally accepted:
-
'participation of a British Commonwealth force in the occupation;
-
that the Australian Government was to act on behalf of the British
Commonwealth Governments;
-
that Australia was to provide the Commander-in-Chief of the BCOF and
the bulk of the HQ’s;
-
details of the force structure;
-
that
General Northcott was to be responsible for the administration of
the British Commonwealth force and its maintenance in Japan with direct
access to General MacArthur on policy;
-
the establishment of the JCOSA, to be located
in Melbourne.'
The BCOF was responsible for demilitarisation tasks but not for
military government, which remained a responsibility of US agencies.
The order of battle of the BCOF included an Australian brigade group,
a New Zealand brigade group, a British brigade, a British/Indian brigade,
three Royal Air Force squadrons, three Royal Australian Air Force
squadrons, one Royal Indian Air Force squadron and one Royal New Zealand
Air Force squadron. Australia and the UK contributed to Naval Force
‘T’.34
Although the public announcement by Chifley
put to rest uncertainties over the delay on the Australian participation,
it did leave certain matters unexplained. The first concerned the
period of time that had elapsed since the Australian Government announced
on 18 August 1945, and had since repeated, its willingness to contribute
forces to an occupation force. After all, US troops had entered Japan
in August 1945. Why had there been a five-and-a-half months’
delay? Secondly, on whose initiative and authority had the tasks of
the BCOF been so circumscribed? Thirdly, was it true that many of
the demilitarisation tasks of an occupation force had been completed
before the BCOF arrived? There is some evidence which supports the
view that the major task of demilitarisation had been completed within
a few months and when the BCOF, and particularly the Indian contingent,
assumed their duties little was left to be done to accomplish their
objectives.35
Although the process of democratisation was
expected to be a long one, its implementation in some areas was both
rapid and effective. The process included the conduct of the trials
of war criminals, the removal of ‘pro-fascists’ in the
Japanese community, the disbandment of the secret police, the release
of political prisoners, the eradication of Shintoism, the drafting
of a new constitution and the granting of freedom of association to
the Japanese people.
Nevertheless, the Australian Government was
determined to make the BCOF concept become a reality and work. Australia
contributed the force commander and its force HQs; accepted the responsibility
for the administrative aspects of the force; provided a significant
percentage of Australian personnel; and played the leading role in
JCOSA. As both Chifley and Forde were to point out, the BCOF represented
a significant step forward in British Commonwealth cooperation in
international affairs.36
As well, a strong Australian line on British
Commonwealth participation in Japan accorded with Australia’s
other efforts to establish a proper status for itself and so participate
effectively in the determination of a peace settlement, particularly
in respect of Japan. Australia had had ample evidence by this time
that the major powers would attempt to relegate Australia to a status
of insignificance in such matters. But the BCOF represented, in a
concrete as well as a symbolic manner, Australia’s determination
not to be excluded.37
The Australian Government had not achieved
all its objectives. On 28 January 1946 there had been a report that
the Japanese Emperor, Hirohito, had not been listed by the US Government
as a war criminal.38
Hirohito had been the subject of earlier Australian representations
and it would be difficult to separate Australia’s policy objectives,
with regard to Japan, from the emotional responses evident in Australia
as the full scale of Japan’s treatment of Australian prisoners
of war became known in the second half of 1945. The revenge and reparations
factor weighed heavily in Australian policies at this time and a report
on 2 February 1946 indicated that the cost of maintenance of the Australian
contingent — about £11 million annually — was to
be paid by the Japanese as a first charge against assets seized from
Japan.39
On 14 February 1946 Evatt had again urged a firm policy on
Japan.40
Also at this time the Australian Government
had a wide range of defence-related matters awaiting resolution. There
were signs of considerable unrest with regard to the repatriation
of Australian personnel; there were conflicting reports as to the
US Government’s position with regard to island bases; there
was a UN Assembly meeting in progress but with little definite advancement
on the military aspects of the charter; there were the questions surrounding
an Australian bid for trusteeship status for New Guinea; there were
obvious complications in Australia’s relations with the Dutch
in the NEI; and there was the desire by the Australian Government
to withdraw its military forces from temporarily occupied foreign
territory as quickly as possible.
Despite the announcement of the despatch of
an Australian force to Japan and the preliminary work to this end
already in train, on 4 February 1946 the Minister for the Army, Francis
Forde, announced that the movement of the Australian component numbering
about 12,000 was expected to be completed with vehicles and equipment
by the end of April 1946, i.e., a further two months.41
There was also an Age report of 7 February 1946 in the form
of a reminder that the Australian and other forces in Japan ‘expected
to have purely military functions and will not undertake semi-government
duties’, —
a reappearance of the Australian Government’s earlier policies
carefully circumscribing its military involvement overseas.42
Having finally achieved the announcement of
the despatch of a force, the Government came under fire as to its
relevance. General Northcott repudiated reports ‘that the 35-40,000
British troops would be a token force’ and emphasised that they
were ‘definitely needed to help with the job of occupying Japan’.
He avoided any firm commitment as to the length of time the force
would remain in Japan, merely stating ‘that the occupation must
continue until the Japanese could stand on their own feet’.
Northcott’s statement should be compared to a report of 19 February
1946 by the FEC which claimed that a ‘five years comprehensive
occupation of Japan was essential, with thereafter technical occupation
by experts’ and a report of 1 March 1946 in which a New Zealand
minister envisaged the occupation lasting for a period of twenty years.43
Evatt highlighted the significance of Japan
and the BCOF commitment in his major speech on international affairs
to the House of Representatives on 13 March 1946.44
On this occasion he returned to his ‘Japan is a menace’
theme by stating that ‘the constant concern of the Australian
Government must be to ensure that Japan did not rise as an aggressor
a second time’, although the significance of his claim was not
questioned. There is no other reference to the potential threat of
Japan in the following debate by either Government or Opposition members
and even Opposition questions were limited to matters concerned with
barracks accommodation for the BCOF or complaints in The Age that
the Australian occupation troops were idle.45
Evatt made much of the role that Australia was
playing in the occupation. He drew attention to the appointments of
General Northcott, Mr William Macmahon Ball and Sir William Webb to
important positions within the occupation framework and to the fact
that an Australian represented the participating British Commonwealth
governments, including the UK itself.46
This was seen by Evatt as a development of great importance.
An entirely new concept of British Commonwealth relations was thought
to be emerging.
The total BCOF, although small by comparison to
the US occupation force, was a meaningful contribution proportionately
for Australia. The JCOSA machinery was a practical step forward in
the development of Australia’s higher defence machinery, not
merely for purposes of military consultation, but also in the concept
of political consultation on military matters. As well, the BCOF had
come into being and the fact of its presence was a reminder to the
US Government of the British Commonwealth contribution both to the
late war and to the ensuing peace. These matters represented for Australia
no mean achievement, at least in the immediate postwar period.
This admitted, the realities must also be
recognised. Having secured the senior military appointment for an
Australian officer, the Government announced three months later that
the commander-designate, General Northcott, was to be released to
become Governor of NSW. Far more important, however, were questions
as to the political significance of Australian and British Commonwealth
representation in the occupation. On 18 April 1946 The Age reported
‘that the Allied Council for Japan at its second meeting today
received a letter from General MacArthur refusing virtually all requests
made by the Council a fortnight ago’. On 20 April 1946 The Age
reported ‘that the clash between the Far Eastern Commission
and General MacArthur was serious’.
MacArthur was prepared to use the BCOF for
military ‘house keeping’ duties but he would not brook
any interference at the political level and in terms of influence
Australia did not really count. MacArthur’s attitude did much
to blunt the edge of the initiative taken by Australia with regard
to the BCOF.
The Age continued to carry reports
of the failure to reach understandings on political matters.47
MacArthur stated his position clearly in a statement to the
ACCJ: ‘As the functions of the Council will be advisory and
consultative, it will not divide the heavy administrative responsibility
of the Supreme Commander as the sole executive authority for the Allied
Powers in Japan’.48
MacArthur made no secret of his dislike for the ACCJ, which
he regarded as an unwarranted intrusion into the occupation and an
undesirable vehicle for Soviet propaganda.49
MacArthur regarded the FEC similarly.50
Within the general framework of discussions
on postwar security, there were attempts to use the BCOF to best effect
within the British Commonwealth itself. During the Prime Ministers’
Conference in London in April 1946 there was a report in The Age which
took up this point:
'Units of the three services from Australia, New
Zealand, Britain and India for the first time are being integrated
into a single readily expendable British Commonwealth force in the
biggest advance thus far made towards the formation of a world wide
peace preservation force . empire defence force being given a trial
run in Japan ... What may develop into the British Commonwealth contribution
towards forming a UN force.' 51
But in much the same way that the US Government
tolerated the allied political machinery associated with the occupation
forces and chose to ignore it on matters of substance, so also the
British Government conducted its business with regard to British Commonwealth
matters. When a matter of substance, e.g. the significance of the
Suez Canal within the Imperial defence system, came to a head the
British Commonwealth was informed, not consulted. It had been convenient
for the UK to concur with the arrangements made in 1946 to form the
BCOF.
Although these reservations concerning the
validity of the BCOF concept must have been obvious to the Australian
Government, Chifley’s statement of 19 June 1946 made clear that
Australia was actively seeking a bigger role in the Pacific and on
behalf of the British Commonwealth.52
By 11 July 1946 the Australian strength in Japan had reached 10,026,
although this was some 2000 men short of the expected total of 12,000
as had been indicated by Forde on 4 February 1946. Nevertheless, during
the debate on Chifley’s statement, little attention was paid
to the BCOF. Such questions as were put concerned the ‘housekeeping’
of the force rather than matters of substance. There was an air abroad
that suggested that the Australian Government had seen its duty done
and the Opposition sought satisfaction on issues other than the BCOF.
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