Although the Australian Government had finally to agree to the employment of the 7th Division in Borneo 30 certain conclusions follow from MacArthur's reply. The first is that the Australian Government, as a result of its earlier support for MacArthur and its acceptance of a primary role for Australian forces in the bypassed areas, had seriously curtailed its military options with regard to subsequent activities - particularly with regard to the continued offensive towards and against the Japanese home islands.

     Secondly, the Australian Government was not consulted with regard to the plans for subsequent military operations against the Japanese mainland and there were powerful hints in MacArthur's remarks of moves to divest MacArthur of the Australian element of his forces; to hand over the command of these forces to the British; and to confirm Australian forces to operations south of the Philippines.

      Despite the disclaimers by MacArthur with regard to forward planning it was later revealed in a British cablegram, dated 10 August 1945, that:

'At Potsdam it was agreed in principle that portions of south west Pacific areas should pass from United States to British Command as soon as possible; and
that proposals concerning future operations against Japan had been tabled at Potsdam. The proposals included a plan whereby one Australian division would form part of a corps of three Commonwealth divisions (one Australia, one Canadian, one United Kingdom) to be fought as an integral part of the US army with the US having the right to detach divisions in an emergency and with the whole corps to be completely equipped and organized as far as possible on American equipment.' 31

     This cablegram revealed that the British Government had not passed on to the Australian Government details of these fundamental decisions concerning the proposed deployment and command arrangements for Australian forces. The cablegram also left no doubt as to the British view that Australia should comply with these proposals, which the British had intended to discuss directly with the US.

      By July 1945 the Australian Government had appreciated more precisely the residual effects of MacArthur's island hopping campaigns and had a new awareness of the difficulties involved in subduing the Japanese in the bypassed areas. As the full realisation of this experience became generally known the Australian Government became anxious to shift some of the American resources, increasingly directed towards Japan, back to the task of either neutralising or subduing the Japanese in these bypassed areas. The Government told its Allies that it was unable to accept any further military commitments from its own resources and that two commitments, to the SWPA and a force for the offensive against Japan, were sufficient to strain existing resources.32

      The future role of Australian forces and reorganization of South West Pacific Area had been reviewed by the AWC on 19 July 1945.33 During this review the following reasons were advanced in support of a continued Australian association with the offensive against Japan:

(i) Australia had received considerable aid from the United States and it would probably be the desire of the Australian people that their forces should fight alongside the Americans to the end as a co-operative expression of their gratitude. It was also thought that such action would strengthen future Australian American relations and this would be of paramount importance from the aspect of security in the post war period.

(ii) It was the popular desire of the land forces to be associated with the forward offensive.

(iii) There had been criticism that the liquidation of bypassed areas was not by itself a worthy effort for Australian forces and from the aspect of prestige and participation in the peace settlement and control machinery it would be of great importance to Australia to be associated with the drive to defeat Japan.

     The review confirmed that the Opposition attacks on the Government for its conduct of the war had had some validity and it was admitted to the AWC that 'public opinion was disappointed that the Australian forces allotted for the Philippines campaign were not used' and 'that our military effort during the latter half of 1944 and the early part of 1945 was judged solely on the important, but nevertheless secondary roles allotted to the remainder of our forces. This has also been the cause of dissatisfaction among the forces'.34

      Another aspect of this reassessment was the Australian Government's response to British overtures.35 There is evidence of a growing Australian independence in the face of British moves to get back into the war in the Pacific. The arrival of the British fleet in the Pacific prompted speculation that the US was playing down the significance of this contribution and by mid 1945 the Australian Government was either unwilling, or unable, to entertain a British proposal that the RN force in the Pacific be supported from the Australian mainland.36

      Australia also opposed a British proposal that elements of the British Commonwealth, with interests in the Pacific, combine to form a British Commonwealth Force to participate in the invasion of Japan. This proposal envisaged that an Australian division would link up with a main British force, to be assembled in India, and that Australia and NZ would provide the bulk of the air support for this force. Implicit in this British proposal was the understanding that the Australian element would be subordinate to the British commander and that by this time Australia's operational subordination to the Supreme commander, SWPA, would have shifted from the Americans to the British.

      The Australian reply threw doubt on the practicality of the proposal, particularly to the timings suggested. Deployment of the force was not expected before April 1946, whereas it was understood that the American forces would begin the invasion of the main islands of Japan at a much earlier date. The Australian Government reaffirmed its determination to be associated with the main drive against Japan and to continue its association with MacArthur. This policy was supported by the Opposition members of the AWC at its meeting on 19 July 1945.38 The Australian offer of support for the US offensive against Japan had been repeated in a letter from Chifley, dated 27 July 1945, to MacArthur.39 In a separate telegram to the British Government the Australian Government confirmed that any change in the existing command arrangements for the prosecution of the war against Japan would provide for the continuation of the principle then in force, ie. a direct link between the Australian Government and the commander in chief, presumed to be am American, of the forces directed against Japan.40

      The same strong line was maintained by the Australian Government with regard to British proposals to set up a British Commonwealth command in the south west Pacific area. In response to a US Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal to hand over to the British the SWPA, less the Philippines and the Admiralty islands, Churchill had put forward a proposal to the Australian Government whereby the Australian Chiefs of Staff, to be responsible for the area east of the Celebes, would be linked with the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the British Chiefs of Staff.41

      This arrangement would have not only downgraded the significance of Australia's partnership with the Americans, developed during earlier campaigns, it would have meant a resumption of direct British control of Australia's operational forces. The Australian Government recognized the technical convenience of this proposal but rejected it, as it had rejected subordination under the British proposals for the British force to be assembled in India for the offensive against Japan.

      However, a review on 22 June 1945 and 3 July 1945 of the direct war effort, conducted by the Australian Defence committee, had formulated provisional assumptions that the future commitments for the Australian army would include 'A token force of approximately a mobile brigade group for operations in South East Asia Command'.42 The British Government reply to this offer conveyed the impression that it would be impossible to include an Australian army unit in these British operations due to the advanced stage of planning that had been reached.43 The Australian Government's delay in offering the force had led to its exclusion.

      Chifley, on 27 July 1945, reiterated the basic political objective of the Australian Government with regard to the post war period as to secure a place and a voice in the peace settlements. The Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945 made public on 27 July 1945, completely ignored this Australian claim.

      Australia's official response to the Potsdam Proclamation was contained in a telegram of 27 July 1945 to the British Government.44 This telegram strongly reaffirmed Australia's right to participate as a principal in all negotiations concerning the peace settlement and it specifically drew attention to Churchill's assurances during the British Commonwealth talks in London in April 1944, and subsequently, that this right would be observed by the British Government.45

      Evatt, in the course of a major public response on 30 July 1945, concerning the terms of the Proclamation issued by the Potsdam Conference, summed up the basic political aims of the Australian Government in the following words:

'Ever since 1941 is has been the declared and accepted policy of the Australian Government that in all matters relating to the peace settlement, both in Europe and in the Pacific, Australia being an active belligerent, possesses the right to the status of a party principal to every armistice and peace arrangement. The validity of this policy has been accorded widespread recognition and very recent assurances of its general acceptance were received from the UK Government.'

     Evatt went on to expand on the manner by which Australia received the news of the Potsdam Proclamation:

'Although that ultimatum declared certain terms or principles of the peace settlement with Japan, it was published without prior reference to, still less the concurrence of, the Australian Government. The ultimatum was of fundamental importance to Australia, yet our first knowledge, both of the terms and its publication, came from the press.' 46

     The Potsdam proclamation invalidated Australia's claims that it was entitled to special status, or that membership of various bodies, and representation in certain quarters, was of any actual significance when the major decisions were made. Australia had relied too heavily and too trustingly upon its special status by way of representation in the British War Cabinet; and the Pacific Council; upon the goodwill of the British and American Governments, to which it had deferred in the political and strategic direction of the war.

     Despite all this apparent access Australia was ignored, its Government was neither consulted nor given any official prior warning. However, even before hostilities ended, the Australian Government had had unmistakable evidence that in the distribution of power in the post war period by the Big Four, Australia's views would count for little. As Bruce, Australian High Commissioner in London, was to point out, the British Government, during the visit of Forde and Evatt to London in April 1945 had 'given undertakings with regard to information and consultation in connection with armistice terms, terms of surrender and military government and control commission policy for Japan'.47 Bruce described the contents of Dominion's office telegrams sent on 17 July 1945 as 'another and glaring example of our being faced with a fait accompli'.48

      The unexpected employment of the atom bomb and the abruptness with which hostilities with Japan were terminated, caught most governments, except those of the UK and US, by surprise and it allowed very little time for consideration and consultation with regard to arrangements for the Japanese surrender.

      The Australian Government, no doubt prompted by Bruce's cablegrams, had on 2 August 1945 repeated to the British Government that its first requirement with regard to the future of Japan was 'Full Australian participation as a principal in decisions on policy and in control arrangements'.49 The Australian Government's position on the future of Japan was also outlined in a memorandum delivered by the Australian minister in Washington, The Honourable Sir Frederic Eggleston, to the US Secretary of State on 13 August 1945.50 This memorandum emphasized the main arguments previously stated publicly with regard to 'Australian participation in allied consultations and decisions on the future of Japan' and it made specific reference to the responsibilities of the Japanese Emperor. Separately, the US charge d'affaires in Australia, Minter, reported to the Secretary of State that Evatt had 'expressed very strongly his feeling that Australia should participate in the official surrender announcement.51

      The British Government was also having trouble convincing the US Government of the need to consult with its allies concerning the conduct of arrangements for Japan. In a cablegram sent to the Australian Government, the UK Secretary of State for the Dominions, Lord Addison, had to admit that, with regard to the draft act of surrender for Japan, '... the United States Government appears to be going ahead on their own draft'.52 As Cadogan, UK Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had noted separately 'we must accept this, and if dominions complain we can say that we, too, were not consulted'.53 Nevertheless the British and the Australian Governments were in fundamental disagreement over policies towards Japan, particularly with regard to the position of the Japanese Emperor. The Australian policy was that the Emperor, as head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces, was to be given no immunity whereas the British view was that 'it would be a capital political error to indict him as a war criminal'.54

      The second major disagreement between Australia and its allies was over policy concerned with arrangements to receive the Japanese surrender. According to the details announced by Evatt on 24 August 1945 it was only as the result of the most strenuous efforts of the Australian Government that Australia's claims to representation at the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay were not ignored. He publicly refuted the claim made by Lord Addison, that the UK had taken the initiative in pressing for Australian representation at the surrender ceremony. Evatt outlined the facts as being 'on 12 August 1945 the United Kingdom proposed Australian service representatives should attend the surrender, but as attached to the UK service representative'.55 On 14 August 1945 the Australian Government nominated General Blamey as the direct representative of Australia. The Dominions Office replied on 17 August 1945 that the US Department of State had rejected Australia's nomination. The Australian Government then took the matter directly to the US acting minister in Canberra, and to MacArthur.

      There is evidence of either confusion or misrepresentation by both the Americans and the British in their decisions with regard to whether or not Australia should be represented separately at the surrender ceremony. A memorandum by the JCS, Washington, of 14 August 1945 on the subject: 'Instruments for the Surrender of Japan', included the following amendment to the original proposals:

'The provision for surrender of certain Japanese forces to the Commander in Chief of the Australian Imperial Forces has been deleted and the forces in that area included under Admiral Mountbatten's responsibility in view of the fact that the British Chiefs of Staff have just stated their willingness to assume responsibility for parts of the south west Pacific south of the Philippines immediately upon Japanese surrender.' 56

     Further evidence of the complexities of the negotiations can be seen in a cablegram, dated 18 August 1945 sent from Evatt to Blamey which stated:

'We received report through Dominions Office that State Department, Washington, objected to your representing Australia separately and independently at general surrender. However this report has been contradicted by the State Department who have informed me that they are taking immediate steps through the War Department Washington, to ask General MacArthur to meet Australia's wishes to the maximum extent possible. In the circumstances, it should be possible for you to sign the surrender document making it clear that you are doing so on behalf of Australia alone.' 57

     In his reply, dated 20 August 1945, Blamey indicated that MacArthur was very sympathetic to Australia's claim to sign the instrument of surrender and had recommended that Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Holland and France should also sign.58 On 21 August 1945 the State Department formally recommended to MacArthur that these representative separately sign the instrument of surrender.59

      This public reversal of a decision about Australia's status at the surrender ceremony created the impression that although the British Government had sought to place Australia at a disadvantage its action was disregarded by the Australian Government and not supported by the US Government. Lord Addison sought unsuccessfully to correct this impression.60 Nevertheless suspicions remained in Australia and, following Australia's exclusion from the Council of Foreign Ministers, The Age said:

'For years the US and Australia fought alone in the south west Pacific. In spite of all this - fully recognized in many speeches there was still a deplorable tendency now that the fighting was over to relegate Australia to a subordinate status, and either not to consult it at all or to consult it in a perfunctory way and not on a footing of equality.' 61

     The combination of events, ie. the Potsdam Proclamation, the arguments over the surrender arrangements in Japan and the early set backs over Australian representation on the Council of Foreign Ministers, lends considerable validity to the Federal Opposition's suspicions that the Australian Government, by accepting a secondary role for Australian troops in the latter stages of the war, had also committed itself to a secondary role politically during the negotiations connected with the surrender and subsequent conditions imposed on Japan. On the other hand, as Australia was not a Great Power it could also be argued that Australia could not reasonably expect equal status in such negotiations and it was therefore a matter for arbitrary decision by the Great Powers.

      Apart from those Australian forces required for the main offensive against, and the subsequent occupation of Japan, or to hold the bypassed areas, the Australian Government was faced with demands for forces to satisfy other requirements.

      The major statement on the deployment of Australia's forces following the cessation of hostilities was made by Chifley on 29 August 1945.62 Chifley reiterated Australia's political aim as 'status in regard to the peace settlement commensurate with our substantial contribution to victory', and outlined its military commitments as:

'participation in the occupation of Japan and Singapore ... occupation of key areas of enemy held territories, within the areas for which we accept responsibility in order to secure effective control and to enforce the surrender and disarmament of the Japanese armed forces in those areas ... The earliest release of our prisoners of war and internees.'

Australian policy had by August altered considerably since the Australia-New Zealand agreement of January 1944. At that time a telegram had been sent to the UK Government putting forward proposals whereby Australia, in the immediate post war period, 'wanted to have full responsibility for "policing" Portuguese Timor, Australian New Guinea and the Solomon Islands Protectorate and a "share" in the responsibility for "policing" the Netherlands Indies, particularly Java, Dutch New Guinea and also the New Hebrides'.63

      On 22 May 1945 the British High Commission in Canberra made further representations to those made in March 1945, to the Australian Government in order to secure Australian military action against the Japanese who could do harm to British interests on Shortland Island, Choiseul and the British Solomon Island Protectorate. The High Commissioner was informed that a separate military operation for these purposes was 'strategically unsound' and the Australian Government was not prepared to detail forces prematurely for these purposes.64

      Similarly there had been substantial turn around in Australian Government attitudes to the stationing of elements of the Royal Navy in Australia. The acting Prime Minister, Forde, in a New Year's message of 31st December 1944, in a reference to the transfer of a powerful British fleet to the Pacific, stated the preparedness of the Australian Government to make substantial outlays in support of this fleet. However by 28 June 1945, following a review of its policies to rebalance the allocation of manpower, the Australian Government reduced the strength of the services by 64,000 and the level of support available to the RN.65 Australia wanted power and status but at minimum cost. By this stage of the war Chifley was seeking to correct some of the drift in direction in policy and re-establish some Australian authority caused by the illness of Curtin over the last six months of his life.

      A similar policy was evident in the Australian Government's response to British requests for assistance in Hong Kong. In reply to a question in the House of Representatives on 12 September 1945, regarding a request from the British Government for assistance, Chifley noted that Australia had agreed to the provision of units and crews for minesweeping duties off Hong Kong for a two months period only. Chifley went on '... our resources were insufficient to also provide troops for the occupation of Hong Kong'.66 This Australian assistance was strictly limited as to nature and timing and was unlikely to involve Australian forces in any complications which may have arisen with regard to the local population.

      A similar situation arose in Singapore. The Australian Government allocated an Australian paratroop battalion to the task of the release and safety of Australian prisoners of war. The battalion was not to have any duties associated with British relations with the local population and apart from 'showing the flag' at the surrender ceremony was to be withdrawn as quickly as these obligations were fulfilled. It was later agreed that the force could remain until December 1945.

      The trend of the Australian Government's policies towards the Dutch is summarised in War Cabinet Minute 4293 dated 28 June 1945.67 On 21 September 1944 War Cabinet had agreed in principle to a Netherlands Government proposal to station approximately 30,000 Netherlands troops in Australia, subject to a further study as to the practical implications of accommodating such a force. Subsequently a report of the Defence committee on 27 March 1945 indicated that the Dutch proposal would absorb Australian 'manpower to the extent of several thousands' and the Defence Committee 'decided not to make any recommendations upon the question whether Netherlands East Indies forces should be based on and trained in Australia.68

      The War Cabinet had agreed on 30 August 1945 the division of responsibility between the South East Asia Command and the Australian Command for the purpose of carrying out the terms of the Japanese surrender. Australia accepted initial responsibility for Borneo and for certain Japanese occupied territories to the east, including Timor, and Australian forces were to be relieved as quickly as possible by British and Dutch forces in territories other than Papua and the Mandated Territories, for which Australia remained wholly responsible.69 The government made clear its determination not to get involved in matters which it saw as properly the responsibility of those governments having sovereign right in areas for which Australia assumed initial responsibility.

      There are a number of possible explanations for the Australian Government's reluctance to become involved. Firstly, the Government was already committed to a major reduction in the number of personnel serving in the armed forces and had made public statements to this effect.

      Secondly, the Government's policy of 'non involvement' was in accord with its history of circumscribed responsibility evident in a secondary role for Australian troops; its failure to press for a larger say in the war, its reluctance to contribute to a second front or widening of the war in the Pacific; the reductions it had made in manpower allotted for military purposes.

      However the cessation of hostilities also threw into sharp relief a new set of circumstances - those associated with various national independence movements. In response to a Parliamentary question on 27 September 1945, concerning the eventual involvement of Australian troops in Indo China where there had been local uprisings, Chifley replied, 'I am extremely reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of any nation or to make representation for such interference to be made'.70

      The Labor Government had avoided any comment on Opposition suggestions earlier in 1945 that Australian forces should be associated with the relief of the NEI and the restoration of Dutch authority there. Within Australia, there was considerable industrial unrest associated with the Dutch reoccupation of the NEI and this was mirrored in the Federal Parliament. On 21 October 1945 the correspondent of the New York Times in the Hague reported the Netherlands General Staff as 'more unhappy than angry' because Australia had refused to train and equip Netherlands divisions destined for the reoccupation of the NEI. The Leader of the Opposition, Menzies, had earlier questioned the Prime Minister concerning a proposal that about 30,000 Netherlands troops should be accommodated, trained and equipped in Western Australia. Chifley had replied that this was not possible in terms of Australia's physical capacity to accept the Netherlands' force.71 This reply invited a serious questioning of Chifley's actual motives given the situation whereby his government was committed to a major demobilization of its own forces and this demobilization released the facilities being used by those forces.

      On 1 October 1945 The Age reported that Australian troops had restored order in Pontianak after a few minor clashes. Such action appears to be within the guidelines on such matters set out in a statement by Minister for Defence, Beasley, to the House of Representatives on 7 September 1945: 'During the initial period of military administration, military responsibility for the restoration of the economic life in the reoccupied territories is broadly restricted to action to prevent disease and unrest ...'.72

      On 15 October 1945 the Minister for Defence directed that it should be emphasized that militarily as well as politically, it was undesirable that the Commonwealth should become involved in commitments for the protection of small contingents of the Australian forces or in the internal strife in NEI territory.73 However the Government was kept under pressure for its handling of the NEI situation and on 24 October 1945 Chifley received a telegram from trade union officials protesting the use of Australian troops and transport aircraft to suppress armed Indonesians at Merauke and which alleged 'Australian troops (were) being used to suppress a coloured people'. However an official report on this protest confirms that although Australian troops were deployed at Merauke they were not involved in 'suppression' activities.74

      Menzies had in earlier statements promoted the cause of the Dutch in the NEI, but on 19 November 1945, demanded a declaration by the Australian Government on its policy for the NEI. Menzies made his demand against the background of industrial unrest in Australia and an incident in NEI which involved the use of British troops. Menzies further commented concerning 'the deadly danger which should confront Australia if the next few years found us hemmed in on our northern sea frontiers by a series of native, communist republics'.75 This appears to be the first public reference by Menzies or his contemporaries which identified a further potential enemy in terms of a communist threat of a 'native' type and is in sharp contrast to the presumption in Government statements that the most likely threat to Australia would be from a revengeful Japan.

      The matter of the future employment of Australian forces in the NEI was reviewed by the War Cabinet on 18 December 1945. This review had been prompted by, among other matters, concerns expressed by the Chiefs of Staff committee that dissatisfaction and unrest in the occupied NEI Territories could cause complications for the Australian forces and possibly lead to a prolonged occupation by these forces. An attachment to the notes on the War Cabinet Agendum 551/1945 indicates that Evatt had proposed on 23 November 1945 the employment of an Australian force in the NEI, and under SEAC, to arrange and supervise the concentration and removal of all Japanese troops and allied prisoners of war and internees. Chifley's reply to this Evatt proposal made it clear 'that Cabinet would not agree to commitment of force which your proposal implies', and 'my view is the present is not the time for initiative by us'.76 Chifley indicated that the Cabinet would have difficulty accepting 'even proposal to leave Australians for extended period at Borneo'.

      The War Cabinet review of 18 December 1945 confirmed the existing policies not to accept any additional commitments for the use of Australian forces in the NEI, noting: 'Should the situation deteriorate the Chiefs of Staff were free to submit any recommendations they might wish to make ...' and 'It was the wish of the Government that Australian forces in the NEI should avoid as far as possible participation in internal strife'.77 Australian policies on attitude to be taken by Australian forces with regard to the unrest in NEI were plagued by a lack of resolution. Even as late as 28 July 1947 the Department of Defence was still waiting a response from the Minister for External Affairs on aspects of policy queried on 20 August 1946.78

      With regard to Portuguese Timor Evatt had continued his special interest, first expressed in 1943. In August 1945 he actively sought to prevent the despatch of Portuguese warships to Timor so that the surrender of Japanese forces should be made to Australian forces. Evatt also proposed to maintain an Australian force in Timor until such time 'as important priorities in relation to defence, trade and communications were ... accorded to Australia'.79 This proposal was opposed by both the UK and Portuguese Governments.

      War Cabinet agendum item 13/1946 which summarized the progress made on the handover of responsibility in NEI, drew attention to a hesitation to withdraw the Australian force from Timor which might be subject to 'any special action which the Government might desire to take', (para 4) and which was, on 19 January 1946, the subject of discussion with the Department of External Affairs. The only explanation to come to light of this remark is that contained in a US assessment of Dutch attitudes towards Australia: 'friction may develop, however, with the Australians whose "northern defence arc" embraces part of the Netherlands Indies and who are anxious to use Portuguese Timor and possibly the entire island of Timor as a military and political base'.80

      The matter was to surface again. Prior to a visit to Australia by the Governor of Portuguese Timor in June-July 1947 the Defence Committee reviewed Australian defence interests there. The Committee observed that the development of airfields, oil production and technical communications facilities by the Portuguese Government and a programme of visits by Australian military aircraft and naval ships was to be encouraged and would be advantageous to Australia's defence.81

      During his visit the Governor expressed his gratitude for the service provided by a visiting RAAF courier service and welcomed the recent visit by an Australian warship. He enthusiastically supported a continuation of such visits. There were however bureaucratic barriers within Australia to the development of these purposes and, for example, the record of discussions held with the Governor was not passed from the DEA to the Department of Defence until 25 August 1948, despite a number of requests for the information.82 Details of subsequent developments are not at present to hand.

      Prior to 1941 the direction and control of Australian defence policy harmonised with Imperial defence policy and it was therefore strongly influenced by the views of the Committee of Imperial Defence, London. The Japanese entry into the war severely damaged the strength of this relationship but Curtin's switch to the US on the terms he offered merely continued Australia's role as a subordinate power. It can be argued that Curtin's Government had little choice but to accept US assistance in the form of General MacArthur, however little was done by the Australian Government to profit from the new circumstances by conducting itself as the Government of a principal power. For much of the time the control of Australia's defence forces were delegated to a foreigner whose personal interests, and the interests of the Government he represented, took precedence over Australian interests. Worse, the Australian Government had no representation on the CCS (Combined Chiefs of Staff) which relegated to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff the task of conducting the war in the Pacific.

      The completeness of this transfer of control from the UK Government to the US Government held a further and serious disadvantage. The Australian point of contact with MacArthur, and through him for most purposes, to the JCS, was Curtin who, in addition to being Prime Minister, was also Minister for Defence. This concentration of authority and Curtin's freedom of action, in that neither Cabinet nor his Party played any significant part in the conduct of defence policy, merely further protected MacArthur from any wider Australian influence.

      Organizationally, Australia's defence interests were also poorly served. Australia's most senior military officer, General Blamey, had had an impressive war record in the first World War and more recently in the war against Germany and its allies in the Middle East. He, like Curtin, carried dual and extraordinary burdens of office and responsibility. Blamey's difficulties were further compounded by the sweeping powers accorded to MacArthur, as Supreme Commander SWPA, by the Australian Government in 1942 and by the entrenched influence of F.S. Shedden, the civilian head of the Department of Defence, Melbourne. Shedden remained in a unique position for many years, able to directly influence the formulation and execution of defence policy. As permanent head he was chairman of the Defence committee, which comprised the senior military officers and was also a member of the Council of Defence, which comprised ministers and the senior military officers. All executive action of the Council was taken through official channels.

      Australia was to pay a heavy penalty for its loss of control of the operational control of its defence forces. The same troops who inflicted the first land defeats upon the Japanese and thus impaired the latter's myth of invincibility, also contributed to the early victories necessary to help redeem MacArthur's tarnished fortunes after his departure from the Philippines. Nevertheless, Australian military efforts in the SWPA, were soon directed from 1942 into areas of savage and costly campaigns away from the principal line of advance on MacArthur's way back to ultimate victory. As the war continued so did Australia's isolation, in both the political and the military sense, become more pronounced. The heavy cost in Australian lives, seen by the Australian government as its claim upon a place in the councils to be established to arbitrate the peace, was finally to be of little account because these lives had been expended largely against subsidiary objectives.

      There were some lessons to be drawn from this bitter experience. The speed with which Japan entered the war, and the peculiar circumstances of the SWPA, precluded at least initially, a separate Australian command. If Blamey's appointment to command the land forces in SWPA had been given credibility, and if other senior Australian officers had been given positions of authority in MacArthur's command then, when the situation eased, these arrangements should have been reviewed and alternatives, designed to further Australian interests, developed. The results achieved in the 'mopping up' operations bore no relationship to the costs incurred, nor did they reflect well upon the conduct of Australian defence policy.

      By early 1945 and despite the influence MacArthur still exercised upon Australian defence policy, Curtin began the early moves to redress the situation. Curtin's loyalty to MacArthur was not to find expression in policies he enunciated for post war Australia which foreshadow an eventual return to the long established and special relationship with the United Kingdom. The decline in Curtin's health coincides with a period of review dictated by the changing circumstances of the war and moves to re-establish Australia's position in the offensive against the Japanese mainland and, as a consequence, a renewed claim to a political status in accord with its contribution politically, militarily and industrially to the war against Japan.

           However the Australian Government's claim contained obvious imperfections that limited the effectiveness of its argument. An earlier Australian Government had despatched a grossly inadequate force, part of the 8th Division, to eventually languish in Japanese prisoner of war camps and from 1943 the Australian Government sought to reduce the size of the Australian operational commitment. By 1945 the reductions in the size of the Australian force and the secondary nature of its employment had diminished, rather than enhanced, Australia's claim to a place and respect at the conference table based on the number of bayonets at its command.

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