The decision to deny recognition, made by the Prime Minister of the day, Mr J.B. Chifley, was based on the grounds that the BCOF area was not an operational area, on advice tendered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia (JCOSA) to this effect and contrary to that tendered by the Australian C-in-C BCOF LTGEN J. Northcott.

     This advice should have been challenged on the following grounds:-

     At a subsequent meeting of the JCOSA 3 on 2 August 1946 it was noted 'that the recommendations submitted by General Northcott (for services rendered in the planning and mounting of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan) were prepared prior to the promulgation of the above decisions'. The Committee also recommended that a list of all personnel recommended should be forwarded to all the governments concerned for their information. The C-in-C list included the name of 39 personnel of whom 21 were Australian and a list of 90 for Mentions in Despatches of whom 49 were Australian.

     The JCOSA was also aware that the C-in-C BCOF was forwarding 'recommendations for honours and awards to certain senior United States Officers'.

     The JCOSA decision that BCOF area was not 'operational' appears to have rested on the grounds that a departure from precedent (ie, other occupation forces) was not justified. Such grounds took no account of the unique circumstances applicable in Japan.

     These circumstances stemmed not only from the military means used to force the Japanese to capitulate, ie, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but also the exceptional arrangements made by the Australian Government to secure Australian participation in the military occupation of Japan.

     Japanese capitulation. A feature of the Japanese capitulation was that it rested upon the obligation placed on the Japanese people by the Emperor to abide by the surrender arrangements. At the time and during the initial period of the occupation when some 6 1/2 million Japanese military personnel were being demobilised, under the military control of some 125-135,000 US occupation troops and the 35,000 personnel comprising BCOF, there was considerable uncertainty as to whether the Japanese would actually adhere to the Emperor's call. This point was made again in early 1947 by the Minister for Defence in a letter to the Prime Minister - vis '... it is important to bear in mind that, when the Occupation Forces went to Japan, there was no guarantee that they might not be involved in military operations arising from civil disturbance and insurrection'. 4

     Secondly, and apart from the potential threat from Japanese nationals, the allotted Australian area of operations was Hiroshima Prefecture and BCOF personnel were therefore continually at risk, as a consequence of earlier military action ie, the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima; the implications of which were imperfectly understood and generally ignored. The very act of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in itself created an operational area the nature of which was unprecedented and the significance of which unrecognised.

     Australian participation in BCOF. Whatever the level and intensity of Australian government to government activity prior to the establishment of BCOF, the Australian Government finally delegated responsibility for the negotiation of Australian and British Commonwealth participation in the Occupation to LTGEN J. Northcott (C-in-C BCOF designate), who dealt directly with the US Government's representative in Japan, General MacArthur (Supreme Commander Allied Powers SCAP).

     The Australian Cabinet subsequently confirmed, on 18 December 1945, what became known as the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement as the basis for Australian participation in BCOF.

     Under this Agreement the role of BCOF was defined as:

     During the Government to Government negotiations preceding this Agreement the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr H.V. Evatt had accepted that BCOF would be under command the SCAP upon arrival disembarkation point in Japan. This principle was subsequently incorporated in the C-in-C BCOF's Directive.

     Having thereby handed over command of BCOF to SCAP, although retaining policy control of the national elements, the Government initially and subsequently, accorded with SCAP's operational deployment of the Force and concurred with SCAP's insistence that BCOF was purely a 'combat' force and would be used only in that role by him. Moreover the purpose of the Force was to ensure Japanese compliance, if necessary by the use of force, with the terms of the Surrender. To this end the principal Australian component, the 34th Infantry Brigade, was organised at War Establishment and equipped as a combat force.

     Indeed the Australian Government itself was to use this very argument when assessing the likely effects of withdrawal of British Forces from BCOF in November 1946. The Minister for Defence concurred in the Defence Committee's assessment that 'the four brigade groups of BCOF provide SCAP with the only operationally experienced formations in the occupation and that SCAP would strongly oppose the loss of his most efficient operational force'.5 The Minister noted 'Australia ... assumed a special responsibility in the occupation of Japan which is ... vital to her security'.

     It has not been possible to locate a contemporary official technical definition of an 'operational' and 'non operational' area. However it follows logically that an operational force occupying the homeland of a recently defeated enemy under such volatile conditions and equipped to its War Establishment and with the specific role of 'military control and demilitarisation...' could not be other than in an operational area.

     There are however a number of additional factors that bear upon these matters of technical distinctions.

     Firstly, Japan and Australia (and the other Allied Powers) were technically enemies and in a State of War until the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Japan came into effect in 1952. The Treaty was signed by the participants at San Francisco on 8 September 1951 and Chapter II, Article I, stated:

     Secondly, Australian forces were bound by The Defence Act 1903-1953 and the definitions included therein. Section 4 of the Act includes the same definitions of Time of War, War and War Service as used in The Defence Act 1903-1939. Most specifically Time of War: 'Means any time during which a state of war actually exists, and includes the time between the issue of a proclamation of the existence of war or of danger thereof and the issue of a proclamation declaring that the war or danger thereof, declared in the prior proclamation, no longer exists'.

     The apposite Proclamations in this case were those authorised by the Governor General as follows:

     Thirdly, under the Defence Act, War Service was defined as 'Means active service, any naval, military or air force service in time of war, and any naval, military or air force service between the issue of a proclamation declaring that by reason of the recent existence of a time of war it is necessary in the public interest that the military forces should be temporarily subject to the Army Act, and the issue of a proclamation declaring that such necessity no longer exists'.

     Thus, Australians serving with BCOF did so within the dates prescribed by Proclamation and in terms of the definition and it would appear would also qualify under either the phrase Active Service (separately defined) or any naval military or air force service 'between the issue of a proclamation declaring that by the recent existence of war ...', that proclamation being the 1939 proclamation in force until 15 May 1952.

     Fourthly, Active Service as defined The Defence Act (as amended 1939) Part 1 Section 4 'Has a meaning corresponding to that of the same words used in sub section (1) of section one hundred and eighty nine of the Army Act defining the expression 'Active Service'. Under these provisions and Defence Act 54A(1) 'Members of the Military Forces whether on War Service or not serving with Imperial Forces outside Australia [or on their way to or from such service] were deemed to be on war service and subject to the Army Act'. The extra territorial operation of this sub section was elaborated in para 4 to Australian Military Regulations and Orders and reinforced by the Defence Act Section 55. Moreover the Defence Act made specific reference to those serving with Imperial Forces, thereby embracing generally BCOF and most particularly the naval component whose technical status was ambiguous, vis a vis the authority of SCAP.

     Fifthly, the C-in-C BCOF, the JCOSA and the Defence Committee (Extended) concurred (in July 1946) in the interpretation that Australians serving with BCOF were 'on active service in an occupied country'. This interpretation was not challenged by the Australian ministers involved in consideration of such matters. Moreover, The Defence Act 1903-1948 was amended in Section 4 by the substitution No 71, 1949, S3 as follows:

Active Service - in relation to a person subject to military law, means the service rendered by that person:

     This amendment was assented to on 28 October 1949 and stated to commence on 1 January 1950.

     The reasons why this change was introduced have not come to light but for the reasons outlined above the amendment merely refined the Act in terms of what had been the case, with regard to 'active service'. Moreover precedent existed in terms of the Defence Act as amended in 1941 for legislation to apply retrospectively, vis - certain sections of the Act were deemed to have come into operation on 3 September 1939. Similarly the Defence Act (No 2) 1951 on 11 December 1951 included provision for a Section as 'deemed to have come into operation on 1 January 1950'.

     On the 1 January 1947 the C-in-C BCOF sought a review of the Australian Government's policy on Honours and Awards.6 He did so on the following grounds:

   The C-in-C BCOF noted he had raised this matter with the visiting Minister for the Army who had promised to take it up again with the Australian Cabinet. He referred to recommendations by his predecessor, submitted in June 1946, for services of an 'exceptionally valuable nature during the establishment of BCOF', services rendered before the Government had promulgated its ruling. The C-in-C specifically singled out the recommendation on Brigadier W.M. Anderson, 'who was a very early arrival in Japan and carried out preliminary negotiations with the American Army'. He also submitted recommendations mainly for Australians whose names had been submitted in the June 1946 list.

   The Minister for the Army, Mr Chambers, wrote to both the Prime Minister and the Ministry for Defence on his return, concerning a number of matters arising from his visit to BCOF.7 These included:

     Mr Chambers in his letter to the Minister for Defence further elaborated on the points made by AVM Bouchier who 'in considering his own recommendations for honours and awards, he was convinced that he, personally, should not be bound by this direction', as he felt that in fairness to all concerned his recommendations should be made in order of priority on the basis of services rendered.

    25. He stated that, in submitting his recommendations to the Commander-in-Chief, he had, therefore, kept this in mind and had placed an Australian - Wing Commander A.M. Harrison as No 1 on his list. This officer, he said, 'stood out a mile before all others' and 'no man on earth deserved something in the nature of an award than Harrison'. If Harrison could not be recommended by his Commander-in-Chief, or be considered by the Australian Government (which was to him unfortunate because BCOF was a composite force), and if Australians only were excluded from periodical awards while representations of all other Nations were included, the Australians would be placed in an invidious position as it would appear to their fellow officers, in the opinion of their Commanders, they were not entitled to recognition...'.

     27. (He) 'reiterated that BCOF was an Empire organisation and that he desired, as much as anything else, to give honour where honour was due...'

     The C-in-C's letter was considered by the Defence Committee on 27 February 1947 and the Committee' felt that the conditions were exceptional and not contemplated when the present policy was decided. Australian personnel are serving overseas outside Australian territory on military duties which, whilst not operational are nevertheless not normal peace time duties'. The Committee felt that the reasons advanced by the C-in-C should be forwarded to the Government in the event the Government decided to review the policy, similarly that RAN personnel serving in Naval Force 'T' should be treated as a special case.8

     The Prime Minister did not reply to the letter by the Minister for the Army, dated 15 January 1947, until 7 August 1947. In the meantime the C-in-C submitted to AHQ Melbourne on 16 July 9 further recommendations for Australian personnel wherein he repeated some of the recommendations made previously and added new ones. Moreover as an attachment to his letter to the Secretary, JCOSA (MS 1208, dated 19 July 1947), he appended a consolidated list wherein the largest percentage and the highest priorities were Australian. Yet again he pressed for a review. 'I request and most strongly urge that this invidious position may be altered to enable meritorious service by members of the Australian component to be recognised in common with other components ...' Yet again the Defence Committee recommended that this letter by taken into account in any review of present policy.10

     In addition, the C-in-C BCOF wrote on 26 June 1947 to the Minister for the Army noting that he had agreed to take up the matters of Honours and Awards and 'I had hoped to hear from you the result of your representations'. 11

     He noted that 'The matter has now been further complicated by the fact that the Royal Air Force have granted seven decorations in the recent Birthday Honours List; four included in the list I submitted and three in the list previously submitted by my predecessor'.

     'The AOC BCAIR ... when submitting these names, placed Australian names above them in order of merit'. the Australians have not received their decorations ... (whereas the seven British personnel had).

     'There is also a list, of which I have not yet the particulars, for the British Army ...'

     'In the same Birthday Honours List I noticed that the King has awarded, on a direct recommendation from New Zealand, a CBE to Brigadier Potter commanding the NZ Bde here and an OBE to Squadron Leader DeWillimott, who commands their Air Squadron here - DeWillimott was in our recommendations for an MID.

     Brigadier Potter has done good work here, but he was not an original Brigade Commander and did not arrive in Japan until July 1946, consequently he would have been considered by me for inclusion in the next list, but certainly after a number of Australians, who have been here much longer and who have done more pioneering work.

     The CB was also awarded to Brigadier Potter's predecessor, Brigadier Stewart, after he returned to New Zealand, so that New Zealand is apparently still pursuing the policy of rewarding her troops here irrespective of what the British Commonwealth Occupation Force may do.

     There is a grave feeling of inequality in a Force which is supposed to work to equal conditions, over this question of Honours and Awards and I feel that I would be lacking in my duty to my troops if I did not ask you to again approach the Cabinet with a request that in my recommendations for Honours and Awards for the Force I should be allowed to include Australians on the same basis as other nationals.

     I might say that ever since I have been in Japan, the US Forces, alongside whom we serve, have continued to award decorations and they are unable to understand why we do not do and give the rewards, which cost little but seem to mean so much to all members of the Services. Scarcely a week goes by without some of their personnel being publicly decorated in Japan and troops of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force wonder why their Commander-in-Chief does not treat them in the same way that the United States of America's Commander-in-Chief does his troops'.

     The C-in-C's letter to Secretary JCOSA was considered by the Defence Committee on 31 July and it recommended that 'it be taken into account together with the earlier submission ... in connection with any review of the present policy which may be made by the Australian Government'.12

     This time the Committee received a reply: '... the recommendation of the Defence Committee has been considered by the Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Defence who is unable to agree to any variation of the present policy ...'. This decision was repeated in a similar decision by the Minister for Defence concerning the award of British Honours and Awards to US personnel for services to BCOF.13

     However the most revealing document on this subject is that written on 7 August 1947, by the Prime Minister to the Minister for the Army by way of reply to his letter dated 15 January 1947.14 In this letter the Prime Minister made a number of points, vis:

     The Prime Minister noted that the JCOSA 'correctly recognises that honours and awards are matters of domestic National policy which it is the sole province of each of the participating Governments to determine. This is a conformity with the agreed basis of participation in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, under which each Government retains responsibility for the interior economy and administration of its own Forces.

     It is not, therefore, a ground for reconsideration of the Australian Government's policy on honours and awards that it is different from the policies adopted by the other Governments and should be varied for the sake of uniformity.

     The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia, having decided that the British Commonwealth Occupation Force area is non operational for the purpose of honours and awards, the position as I see it, is that the standards and practices that commonly govern the recognition of non-operational service, subject of course to the policies of the governments concerned, apply to the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in the same manner and to the same extent as they do in relation to any other non-operational service. Service with the British Commonwealth Occupation Force does not therefore fall into any special category for the purpose of honours and awards.

     The proposal now made for variation of the Government's policy in its application to Australian personnel in BCOF (including the RAN component of Naval Force 'T') would, if approved, involve discrimination by the Government in the recognition of non operational service performed by members of the Australian Forces. Those serving in Japan would be eligible for awards and those serving in Australia and its territories would not. I am unable to accept this principle. I feel that the policy adopted by the government should apply uniformly to all members of the Australian Forces, without differentiation as to classes of non operational service, and I regret that I am unable to agree to any variation of it'.

     The C-in-C BCOF was advised in a letter dated 21 August 1947 from the Minister for the Army 15 that the Government would 'adhere to the policy as originally defined'. This decision was made on the principle that 'the policy should apply uniformly to all members of the Australian Forces ...'.

     As a postscript, the Secretary for Defence informed the Defence Committee (Extended) 16 on 19 September 1947 that Australian policy:

     The Prime Minister, in the event, chose to overrule the weight of advice available to him and exercise the authority, reiterated by him, that the Australian Government reserved the right to decide policy concerning its nationals. He chose to base his case on advice, based on an arguable precedent, and then insisted that the Australian Government was not bound by precedent set by other governments.

     Further, he was made fully aware that Australians serving in BCOF were being discriminated against, by comparison with other occupation personnel, whether US or other British Commonwealth participants. Nevertheless he argued that no change in policy could be agreed on the principle that such a change would discriminate against other members of the Australian forces.

     Finally the Prime Minister who argued that policy was based on advice provided by an advisory body (ie, the JCOSA), overruled the advice put repeatedly and cogently by the C-in-C BCOF upon whom the Government had devolved the responsibility not only for negotiating the agreement under which the BCOF was to operate in Japan but who was subsequently required to make it work. He also chose to ignore the admission by JCOSA that the force 'was on active service in an occupied country' and the advice from the Minister for the Army that an anomalous situation should be corrected.

     Moreover, the Prime Minister and his Ministers repeatedly used the presence of Australian forces in Japan as the justification for a range of policy decisions made by the Labor Governments in office until December 1949. Typical is the statement made by the Minister for Defence, dated 14 July 1948, in a Review of the Organisation and Accomplishment of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. 18 In this he notes:

     No attempt was made, as a duty of care to recognise let alone act upon, the fact that Australian forces in Japan were operating in an area that had been directly contaminated by an atomic bomb. No effort appears to have been made in the short or the long term to recognise the argument put by the C-in-C that 'the Occupation of Japan is not a peacetime duty'.

     Yet again on 28 February 1948 the acting C-in-C BCOF forwarded a consolidated list of recommendations which included members of the RAAF.

     The final attempt in this sorry saga was made by the C-in-C on 2 January 1950, following the defeat of the Labor Government in December 1949. The C-in-C requested details of all citations submitted by both C-in-C 'in respect of which awards had not been made. This request was made 'In view of the possibility that the new government may alter the conditions of award of honours'. 17 Even this attempt failed in so much as the reply to the C-in-C's letter stated "I am directed to add ... that until notification is made to the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the policy to be followed in relation to honours and awards, it is necessary that the matter remain in abeyance'.

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