(Published by Allen & Unwin)
Discussed in Panorama, 13 March 1999

Alongside Gallipoli, the Kokoda Trail is arguably Australia’s most significant military engagement. Where the landings on the beach in Gallipoli in 1915 have become part of the national consciousness, and gave rise to the Anzac tradition, Kokoda is altogether something different.

Moreover, generations of school children have learnt of the sacrifices made at Gallipoli. To be aware of what occurred on that fateful April dawn is essential knowledge for understanding the tradition of mateship and nationhood. Appropriately, with each passing year the few remaining original Diggers are accorded national, iconic status.

Australia was not directly threatened by the events at Gallipoli. Our participation was as much an expression of our deference to Empire as it was to national pride. The same cannot be said for Kokoda.

David Horner is one of Australia’s leading military historians. He is a senior fellow in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. His estimation of the importance of Kokoda is unambiguous.

‘In relation to the direct security of the nation, no Australians have fought more important battles than those who struggled through the Papua’s Owen Stanley Range during and August and September 1942”.

Yet, to imagine Kokoda as a moment in Australia’s military history where a unified sense of purpose was evident is – according to military historian Bill Edgar – to misread the situation.
Central to this is the relationship of Brigadier Arnold Potts and General Thomas Blamey, the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Army.

From a number of perspectives, Potts is a distinctive Australian. A part-time soldier, he was a farmer from the remote territory of south Western Australia. He had served in the 1914-18 war and he began World War II as a major in the 2/16th Battalion. In the space of three years, he was commanding the 21st Brigade on the Kokoda Trail.

The feats of the 2/16th and the 21st Brigade are legendary in the annals of Australian war history. David Horner believes that the 21st Brigade under Potts contributed significantly to the repulse of the Japanese.

“It is generally realised that because of the bad weather that hung over the peaks…the Owen Stanley Range was a considerable barrier to aircraft as well as men on foot. If the Japanese had taken Port Moresby, their bombers could have attacked Northern Queensland at will.”

The Japanese advance was slowed by the efforts of Potts and his men. The men were proud of their achievements and were inspired by the leadership of Potts. A month after the battle of Kokoda, Potts was relieved of command by Blamey. It was not a decision well received by Potts or his men.

Until now, there has not been a sustained analysis of the circumstances surrounding Blamey’s actions concerning Potts. There may not be any absolute truth in history, only interpretations, yet research undertaken by Bill Edgar is sure to enliven the controversy around the relationship between Potts and Blamey.

Edgar is unequivocal. He believes that Blamey treated Potts shabbily. Edgar sees that there may be flaws in Blamey's character which contributed to his actions which even today are questionable.

“The Blamey factor in the Arnold Potts story proved difficult to ignore. The general was a contradiction. He was deified by Establishment and yet vilified by the ordinary men he commanded. There was an irrationality about some of his actions in 1942, which for me has never been satisfactorily explained.”

Edgar’s views on Potts and Blamey are part of a new biography: Warrior of Kokoda. A biography of Brigadier Arnold Potts. If anything, Edgar’s research has taken a very different tack from what has generally been the case with Blamey in particular and Potts as well. This is in the use of applying psychoanalytic techniques to figures in the past. Edgar says he anticipates this will be controversial. “I think Sir Basil Liddell Hart put it correctly when he said that military history should be a study of the psychological reactions of the commanders, with merely a background of events to throw their thoughts, impressions and decisions into clear relief. “I don't think Australian military history has gone down that path. You need to leave the possibilities open. David Horner, as editor of the military biography series, of which my book is part of, is the centre of a conservative establishment. The issue of the relieving of Potts has been going on since 1942, and the men of the 21st Brigade have belt that they have not had a voice."

While Edgar's motivation is laudable, Horner sees there are some difficulties with Edgar’s views.

"I would say that he has put forth a hypothesis rather than saying that events happened in the way they are supposed to have done."

Notwithstanding Horner's reservations, Edgar's conclusions about Blamey are likely to be controversial. He mounts a plausible case, Horner admits as much and yet, what Edgar may have done by revisiting the past, is to be accused of significantly eroding Blarney's reputation. Edgar says he is ready for this.

“I’ll take some flak over my criticism of Blamey. To keep Blamey as a figure to admire, we need our myths.

“When Blamey died in May 1951, however, it was with the official accolades of his nation, and with his treasured field marshal's baton. Is this particular field marshal's baton more a tribute to ruthlessness and a capacity for astute political manoeuvre than to any greatness in the field of military endeavour? Many ordinary Diggers, even now, think so."
The core of Edgar’s work is the responsibility of the historian to continue to re-examine the past with a view to striving to represent it more truthfully, if not differently. For Edgar the facts do speak for themselves that Potts and the men who fought alongside him have been marginalised by Australian army high command.

The obvious question is why did Blamey feel it was necessary to remove Potts from his command after his successes on the Kokoda Trail in August and September in 1942? Edgar is unequivocal.

General MacArthur had felt that the Australians were not performing well in New Guinea.
"The blokes who fought under Potts feel betrayed as MacArthur was working through Prime Minister Curtin to get at Blamey."

It is a point Horner has some sympathy for.

"BIamey was under pressure to have a success in New Guinea. MacArthur was saying that Australia had failed and by implication, Blamey had failed. MacArthur had Curtin's ear. It was MacArthur's view that Blamey should take command and so Blamey went to New Guinea. Curtin had to accept MacArthur's position as he was Commander- in-Chief "
Opinion is divided as to what kind of man Arnold Potts was. He was formidable as a leader of men yet given to questioning the sense of those above him. Edgar does not eulogise Potts, but he makes his position clear: "Potts was a man for all seasons. A great soldier, citizen and family man. He was quietly ebullient. He was physically tough, popular with his men and in his letters to his wife, he revealed a gentle and tender side of his complex personality."
The action Blamey took can be seen as the decision of a desperate man. By sacking Potts, he removed from his post one of the most well supported men by those he commanded without Edgar believes, wholly convincing arguments. Horner says that Potts may have been the price Blamey needed to pay.

"For Blamey to sack Potts, he would be seen as doing something. Many judges, and Edgar is one, think that Potts was doing a good Job. Yet, he had certain character traits which may have worked against him.

'He was not a highly trained soldier in terms of managing staff. He was good on the Kokoda Trail, but not good elsewhere. In Bougainville, for example, he went like a bull at a gate.”
Where Edgar's research into Potts has broader dimensions is how he regards the Australian military culture.

He feels that Potts fell foul of a system, which could not easily embrace him. It would still be unable to do so. Blamey represented this culture when Potts was fighting on the Kokoda Trail and Edgar believes Potts spoke his mind frankly, something which was not always welcome.

“Potts, aware of the machination that had been going on in high places, was nevertheless getting on with his own job, hopeful that the commanders and the politicians, were getting it right at last"

In some senses, Potts exhibited the characteristics of the Australian identity, which have come to be valued as national qualities. He was an unswerving supporter of his mates, he could make do in times of considerable adversity, and he backed his judgement. He was of a generation who effectively built rural Australia.

He was hard working, resolute and prepared to go the extra mile if the thought there was to be a chance of benefit for those who depended on him. Characteristics Edgar says, which brought him into conflict with the army.

“Potts was a maverick. He didn't like superiors. He'd ask awkward questions and he took delight in tearing down authority."

This is clearly evident in a letter in October 1942 from Potts to his wife. He reveals his disregard and agitation towards Blamey and at the same time, indicates that he believes he could do better than his so-called betters.

"TAB called yesterday. He is looking old and harassed. The political side butts in and he screams and interferes terrifically and the axe is held over any head that doesn't bow to superior wisdom. I'd love to have an hour of authority and ask who is running the bloody war and who is entitled to criticise."

“Potts was an independent, character who knew that ultimately he was going to go back to his farm. He was also a driven man. He liked to be in control."

In the rewriting of Australian history by the present generation there inevitably will be some controversy. What Edgar has achieved is to give an important and informed opinion of an inadequately understood and appreciated decision by Australia’s foremost military commander during the fighting on the Kokoda Trail. David Horner, who has written extensively on Blamey, although not agreeing with all that Edgar says, nonetheless concedes that Edgar has made a timely contribution to Australia's military and social history.

“There is an opinion that suggests Blamey could do no wrong. There is the Blamey memorial trust for example.

"I compare Blamey to Rupert Murdoch. He was running a big empire and he trampled on a few people in doing so."

Yet, it is not just Putts and Blamey who take centre stage in this sure to be controversial study. Prime Minister Curtin is questioned and General MacArthur is revealed as a man who Edgar believes had no qualms about blaming the Australians for any setbacks in order to preserve his reputation in Washington."

Blamey does not come out well from Edgar's sifting of the past. With the evidence Edgar provides, it is difficult to see how he could. Potts is a man much maligned and maybe willingly misunderstood by the ranks above him. He was abrasive and like the men he commanded, first and foremost a soldier.

In the mud and blood of the Kokoda Trail it was those men, well led, who effectively saved Australia. Something his superiors were loathe to recognise.