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Inspecting Weapons

There have been some post-Cold War achievements in arms reduction, notably to US and Russian nuclear stockpiles. Yet the threat of proliferation, especially among rogue states and terrorists, remains a significant security challenge.

The end of Soviet communism and the growth of globalisation created an environment in which the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons could flourish. WMD precursors, many of which are dual-use, are available on the world market, as is technical expertise. The increased flow of goods and information around the world, one of the results of globalisation, has made it easier to match WMD demand with potential suppliers. Biological and some chemical weapons can be manufactured largely with dual- use equipment and materials.

WMD are the ultimate asymmetric threat. WMD allow weak states prepared to defy international norms and non-state actors (like terrorist groups) to strike unilaterally. And these states are ambitious: North Korea, for example, which can already strike much of North Asia, is actively pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles and a developing nuclear weapon capability. Countries like Iraq and North Korea see WMD as a source of international leverage and domestic legitimacy. The prospect that Saddam Hussein might threaten to use WMD against his enemies in the region or supply WMD to terrorists reinforces the international community's efforts to ensure Iraq is disarmed. Since September 2001 the world community has become less tolerant of rogue states'WMD ambitions.

The strategic consequences of WMD proliferation are profound. If the international community's determination to combat proliferation were to wane and known rogue states were allowed such weapons programmes, others would try hard to emulate them.

Furthermore, it would be a strategic miscalculation to underestimate the resourcefulness, persistence or ambitions of dedicated terrorists. We know that they intend to inflict mass casualties and we know they are making every effort to acquire WMD weapons capability. In Afghanistan coalition forces found clear evidence that Al Qaida was actively pursuing biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

Operation Slipper in the Gulf

The international non-proliferation and export control frameworks remain an important first line of defence against WMD. But the frameworks are only credible and effective if they keep pace with international developments and are enforced. Australia is working hard internationally to ensure this happens but we recognise the aggressiveness of determined proliferators. Therefore we need a comprehensive response - a layered defence.

Diplomacy is at the forefront. Strengthening the various multi-lateral non-proliferation arrangements, intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation, financial and border controls is similarly important.

But diplomacy and international cooperation will not always succeed: the Australian Government may need to consider future requests to support coalition military operations to prevent the proliferation of WMD, including to rogue states or terrorists, where peaceful efforts have failed.

Collective responsibility for meeting such threats to peace and security has already emerged as a test for the international community in the twenty-first century. In deciding whether to participate in such coalitions, the Government will look to Australia's national security and the extent of our global interests at stake.

For Australia, prevention of WMD proliferation is a high priority for our intelligence agencies and a specific focus of their cooperation with our intelligence partners. A focus of our intelligence efforts in the region is to monitor trade in dual use technologies. The Australian Government is encouraging regional governments to strengthen their domestic and export control regimes and maintaining arrangements for monitoring trans- shipment points given the important role many countries in the region play in international trade.

In the worst case we need to be ready to respond to a WMD attack on Australian soil or against Australian interests. The domestic layer of defence is a shared responsibility between the States and the Commonwealth and includes police, customs and other agencies, but the ADF has particular knowledge and skills to contribute. The Incident Response Regiment has an important role in supplementing State and Territory capabilities to respond to a nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological incident.

The events of September 2001, North Korea's current brinkmanship, and concerns over Iraq's capabilities have reinforced the resolve of the US to push ahead with establishing an effective missile defence system. Given the prospect of the ADF operating more often with our allies and friends in regions under threat of WMD delivered by ballistic missiles, Australia supports the development of effective missile defences to protect deployed military units.

In relation to strategic missile defence, the US is looking to involve its allies and this will be an increasingly important priority in the twenty-first century. We are continuing our close dialogue with the US on missile defence, particularly given our close cooperation on Ballistic Missile Early Warning.