EXECUTIVE SERIES

ADDP 00.1

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1 is issued for use by the Australian Defence Force and is effective forthwith. This publication supersedes Australian Defence Force Joint Operational Command and Control, issued on 14 December 2001 as interim command and control doctrine.

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Air Chief Marshal
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Department of Defence
CANBERRA ACT 2600

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FOREWORD

1. Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDP) and Australian Defence Force Publications (ADFP) are authorised joint doctrine for the guidance of Australian Defence Force (ADF) operations. ADDP are pitched at the philosophical and high-application level, and ADFP at the application and procedural level. Policy is prescriptive as represented by Defence Instructions, and has legal standing. Doctrine is not policy and does not have legal standing, however it provides authoritative and proven guidance, which can be adapted to suit each unique situation.

2. In recent years it has become apparent that our existing doctrine does not clearly define the nature of command and control required for today’s ADF. The recent re-structuring of the ADF to conduct campaigns and operations using permanent joint command arrangements, together with an evolving Australian approach to warfare, have combined to force a re-appraisal of command, leadership and management in the ADF. This will need to take into account aspects of Western military science and culture, and the ongoing development of corporate and business management principles.

3. ADDP 00.1—*Command and Control* therefore aims to provide guidance to commanders, forces and elements of the ADF in command and control of operations in the 21st century. This publication is intended as a complete reference, containing both philosophical and functional aspects of command. Although maintaining an Australian perspective, it also acknowledges our international experience by capturing Allied doctrine distilled from the conflicts of the past century.

4. The importance of our leaders cannot be overstated, as they alone will orchestrate success. However, there is no single template for command and control. The actual approach taken by individual commanders will vary according to circumstances. The human component of a command system has primacy and no technology will ever replace it.

5. Broadly, the ADF’s approach to operations is consistent with the commonly accepted term ‘manoeuvre warfare’. Manoeuvre warfare is in turn underpinned by a command philosophy of ‘mission command’ (replacing ‘directive control’). Mission command decentralises authority, encouraging initiative and freedom of action for subordinate commanders. The onus is then on subordinate commanders to fully understand their superior’s intent and be able to work cohesively and flexibly to support that intent.
6. ADDP 00.1 supersedes the following publications, which are herewith cancelled:

- *ADF Joint Operational Command and Control, Provisional Edition.*
- *Australian Defence Force Provisional Doctrine—Theatre Command.*

7. Principal related publications are:

- *ADDP 3.0—Operations.*
RECENT HISTORY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

The Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) has command of the ADF. From 1 November 1985 to 31 January 1997, CDF exercised the operational element of full command directly from Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQADF) through the Assistant Chief, Operations, with Operations Division providing the necessary staff support. Operational level functions were split between Operations Division and the three environmental commanders.

In 1995, CDF initiated a fundamental review of ADF command arrangements to strengthen joint command effectiveness at the operational level. At that time it was accepted that the principal function of the ADF was to defend Australia, and that responses to other threats, although possible, were not likely. The paradigm of ‘structure for war, adapt for peace’ predominated.

On 31 January 1997, ADF command arrangements were formally restructured to provide for clear separation between the military strategic level and the operational level of command. CDF delegated command at the operational level to a permanent Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST), and the environmental commanders were designated as Component Commanders (CC) for operations. The CC retained responsibility to their respective Service Chief for raising, training and sustaining the force. These command and control (C2) arrangements were developed and implemented in a relatively stable strategic environment where the major threats were perceived as arising from conventional military forces. As it was also presumed that operations in Defence of Australia would be conducted in vulnerable northern areas of the continent, there was corresponding momentum to re-locate some C2 infrastructure further north.

The need for a review of C2 doctrine in the ADF was recognised, but for some time this did not occur, due in part to the ADF’s high operational tempo—surpassing that in any year since 1972. On 20 September 2000, the Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC) formalised two new standing command authorities—‘theatre command’ and ‘national command’—as integral elements of ADF C2. These concepts were published in the doctrine pamphlet, *ADF Operational Command and Control, Provisional Edition*.

In 2003, with experience of recent operations, CDF initiated two further reviews which identified key issues in the contemporary strategic environment affecting higher C2. This new environment, as characterised in *Defence 2000* and *Australia’s National Security, a Defence Update 2003*, is one where traditional military threats are compounded by asymmetric threats arising from terrorism and globalisation. These factors are driving development of revised warfighting concepts encompassing a continuum of
warfare from traditional warfighting to warlike operations, to military operations designed to influence and shape regional and world views.

Other key issues identified by the reviews included necessarily closer government interest in military operations with potentially high strategic consequences, and the effects of technology on C2 and information management. The reviews recommended a simpler and flatter command structure for operations, and a separate appointment with command responsibility for all ADF joint operational activity. Accordingly, on 16 March 2004, the Minister for Defence established Joint Operations Command (JOC), with CDF’s operational command of the ADF now executed through Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) in his capacity as Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS). CJOPS is formally responsible for—‘Command of operations in defence of Australia and its interests’.

In 2005 CDF initiated a review into the ‘ADF’s Higher C2 Arrangements’ (Wilson Review). This review examined the concepts of ‘command’ and ‘control’, and the broader national and Defence context of the ADF higher C2 arrangements. It re-affirmed Government intent through the re-appraisal of strategic guidance, made an assessment of likely future trends in warfare as they impacted on C2, and provided the basis for the definitions and principles that underpin the re-conceptualising of ADF higher C2. The review analysed and rationalised the existing JOC arrangements in light of the revised concept, and proposed a new organisational structure for HQJOC that will be subject to rigorous testing and development as part of the implementation plan. The review made a range of recommendations for consideration by the COSC, the majority of which were accepted. The single biggest change resulting from the review was the reorganisation of HQJOC and its transition from a fragmented component headquarters structure to a single integrated headquarters.

Following approval from the Minister for Defence the separation of the VCDF and CJOPS roles was initiated with effect 01 October 2007. This separation of the roles was a response to a ‘Defence Management Report’ initiative, which sought to strengthen the command and leadership over ADF operations while also ensuring that Government is provided with high quality and timely advice. The VCDF role will focus on Defence business at the strategic level, specifically on supporting the Government and CDF while CJOPS will focus on the conduct of joint operations. This change formalises and re-enforces VCDF’s role as the ADF’s joint capability manager. VCDF will integrate the forces generated by the Services and the joint logistic support organisation into a well prepared, sustainable joint force to meet current requirements. Additionally VCDF will coordinate the development of joint capabilities, such as command and control systems, and complement and shape the work of the Services, Capability Development Group and the Defence Materiel Organisation to provide current and future capabilities for
ADDP 00.1

the ADF. CJOPS will focus on command and control, through HQJOC, and will lead JOC and command operations on behalf of CDF. His responsibilities include planning, mounting, monitoring and controlling campaigns, operations, joint exercises and other activities as directed by CDF. Additionally, CJOPS will liaise with VCDF Group to ensure military options and operational plans are developed and executed in accordance with strategic guidance.
Proposals for amendment of ADDP 00.1 may be initiated in either of the following ways:

- By Minute to:

  Director Doctrine and Training  
  Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre  
  RAAF Base  
  WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314

- By directly entering comment into the Joint Doctrine Development Environment (JDDE) found on the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre (ADFWC) Defence Restricted Network (DRN) website located at http://intranet.defence.gov.au/VCDFweb/sites/adfwc/. Select JDDE on the ADFWC homepage and open either the ADDP or ADFP block as required. Open the relevant publication and utilise the ‘Add Comment’ function at the bottom of the summary page for each publication.

  Note: The second option is an addition to encourage feedback from the wider ADF, as well as encouraging use of the JDDE in general.

DOCTRINE PUBLICATION HIERARCHY

The hierarchy of ADDP and ADFP and the latest electronic version of all ADDP and ADFP are available on the JDDE found on the ADFWC DRN website located at: http://intranet.defence.gov.au/VCDFweb/sites/adfwc/.

This publication is current as at June 2009.

This publication will be periodically reviewed and amended. The latest version of this publication is available on the ADFWC DRN website http://intranet.defence.gov.au/VCDFweb/sites/adfwc/.
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CHAPTER 1
COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP

Executive summary

This chapter outlines the fundamentals of command and control (C2), leadership, and management in the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

- Command is a purely military concept which lies at the very heart of the military profession and is central to success in battle.

- C2 is the system empowering designated personnel to exercise lawful authority and direction over assigned forces.

- C2 arrangements for the ADF must be unambiguous, flexible and efficient to ensure mission success.

- Command is recognised as a warfighting enabler, and includes authority and responsibility for using available human and material resources, as well as responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline.

- Control is the authority exercised by a commander responsible for implementing orders or directives.

- Leadership skill is the foremost quality in the art of command and contributes strongly to success.

- There is no leadership template since individual leadership qualities vary considerably. Strategic level commanders are responsible for matching leadership qualities to the command task.

- Commanders should develop a personal command philosophy based on vision, values, leadership expectations and personal conviction.

- ADF commanders at all levels must rely on their judgment and apply as much as they have learnt as appropriate, departing from established formula when circumstances demand.
Introduction

1.1 All military operations\(^1\) conducted by the ADF are derived from strategic guidance (refer chapter 2—‘Command philosophy’). Commanders whose skills and experience best fit the task are selected and appointed to conduct operations at each level. These commanders are then assigned forces, which are properly equipped, maintained and trained for their roles, and which can be logistically sustained for the duration of the operation. Operations are then commanded and controlled by arrangements which, though formal and legally based, are unambiguous, flexible and efficient.

1.2 Command is a military concept, which lies at the very heart of the military profession and is central to success in battle. C2 is the system empowering designated personnel to exercise lawful authority and direction over assigned forces for the accomplishment of missions and tasks. Military commanders have the authority to commit military personnel to battle in potentially life threatening circumstances. They therefore have an onerous responsibility and will be held accountable for their actions, and inaction.

1.3 The use of agreed terminology and definitions is fundamental to any C2 system and the development of joint doctrine and procedures. The definitions in the following paragraphs have some agreement internationally, although not every potential ally will use the terms with exactly the same meaning.

Command

1.4 Command is defined as:

The authority that a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

\(^1\) In this context, ‘operations’ refers to campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises and other activities as directed by the Chief of the Defence Force.
Control

1.5 Control is defined as:

The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

Command and leadership

1.6 The Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 00.6—Leadership defines leadership as:

The process of influencing others in order to gain their willing consent in the ethical pursuit of missions.

1.7 From the definition of command at paragraph 1.4 it is obvious that the essence of command is the legal authority to order subordinates towards assigned tasks. Command requires structure, is applied down the organisation and requires compliance from subordinates. The definition places primacy on accomplishing the mission and does not include the word ‘leading’, nor does it mention that vital component of leadership, namely the influence of others.

1.8 The point to note regarding command, leadership and their interrelation is that a member of the military may be assigned a leadership position with the legitimate and related powers of command, and yet display little or no leadership behaviour. With command comes all the power and authority over subordinates that the leader needs to achieve tasks. Although not its intended purpose, command takes away the requirement to actively exercise persuasion and personal influence to get things done. In theory, a commander ignores leadership as a practice and relies solely on command to achieve military objectives. In reality this would be a foolish decision as the leadership provided by the commander is necessary to ensure subordinate commitment to purpose and the willingness to continually pursue military objectives, even when unobserved. Without leadership, the subordinate’s will to fight is neither seeded nor nourished and therefore quickly wilts, jeopardising the mission. The ‘line of credit’ provided by the power and authority of command is important, but leadership is also essential.

1.9 A more comprehensive treatment of leadership in the ADF is contained in to ADDP 00.6.
Personal command philosophy

1.10 Taking command is an extremely personal business. From the moment a commander takes command they will consciously or unconsciously begin to develop a practical command philosophy that will considerably influence both their personal life and work and, that of their subordinates. A new commander may choose to reveal this philosophy slowly through time and events, or may wish to establish a quick rapport by clearly defining their philosophy up front through verbal address and/or written guidance.

1.11 The purpose of a command philosophy is to declare what you expect of your command. A good command philosophy should:

- indicate those aspects of organisational activity most important to the commander;
- give insight into the commander’s leadership style so others in the command can synchronise their actions with those of the commander;
- be broad enough to provide reference points for ethical, personal leadership style, and managerial style preference issues; and
- provide a foundation of understanding by which the commander and their subordinates can build a relationship of respect, trust and mutual expectation.

1.12 It is important to note that a good command philosophy should not simply be a one-way list of expectations that the commander has of their subordinates. Rather, it should also be a statement of what the commander’s subordinates can expect of the commander—a two-way performance contract if you like. In addition, commanders must guard against command philosophies that simply spout motherhood statements, such as ‘embracing the ADF’s values’, without providing some firm direction as to what the commander personally believes that to mean. Most of all, a command philosophy that the commander does not personally believe in, or does not intend to live and work by, should not even exist. The damage that will be done to a commander’s trust and respect by such a situation cannot be understated.
The ADF aims to achieve good leadership and communication through:

- clear and well understood lines of authority in the interests of efficiency, clarity and accountability;
- strong emphasis on joint doctrine, joint training, joint planning and joint operations to ensure effective integration of its individual component capabilities;
- appropriate technical support throughout the ADF, especially by means of interoperable and integrated communications and information systems;
- encouraging a command culture of delegation of authority, and of flexibility and initiative in the exercise of command authority; and
- strong whole-of-career investment in leadership and professional skills training from the most junior ranks to the most senior.

1.13 In general, a command philosophy has the following four components:

- **Vision.** Every success is based on an initial concept. A commander’s vision provides the initial common focus for an organisation’s energy and allows priorities to be determined, setting the conditions for ultimate success.

- **Values.** Members in an organisation who share the same values will view tasks from a common perspective and act accordingly. A commander has the responsibility to draw together the common values within the subordinates, making them robust enough to withstand external pressures and influences.

- **Leadership expectations.** Subordinate leaders in an organisation have specific responsibilities and fundamental obligations, and these must be clearly articulated and understood by them and their subordinates. By clearly articulating and reinforcing expectations, galvanising all components with an overall purpose, a commander has the opportunity to create synergistic effects.
Personal convictions. A commander is expected to possess attributes such as integrity, humility, courage, fairness and diligence. A commander should also display social ease or ‘people skills’. Not only must a commander’s character be visible to subordinates, but they must understand the personal convictions of their commander to best be able to interpret and carry out their commander’s intent.

1.14 ADF commanders, at whatever level, have to rely on their judgment and apply what they have learnt as appropriate, and to be able to depart from the established formula when circumstances demand it. ADF joint doctrine encourages flexibility and the use of initiative at all levels of command.

1.15 At all levels, and particularly where a force is widely dispersed, the commander’s intent and projection of will and commitment to succeed, together with the effective management of resources, will be of paramount importance in exercising C2. Consequently, strategic level commanders must appoint operational level commanders whose leadership qualities best fit the command task.

1.16 The quote below is attributed to Joseph Conrad’s, ‘Command at Sea, the Prestige, Privilege and Burden of Command’2. While it focuses on sea command, the principles described apply equally to command in the land and air environments.

Only a seaman realises to what extent an entire ship reflects the personality and ability of one individual, her Commanding Officer. A ship at sea is a distant world in herself and in consideration of the protracted and distant operations of the fleet units the Navy must place great power, responsibility and trust in the hands of those leaders chosen for command.

In each ship there is one man who, in the hour of emergency or peril at sea, can turn to no other man. There is one who alone is ultimately responsible for the safe navigation, engineering performance, accurate gun firing and morale of his ship. He is the Commanding Officer, he is the ship.

2 Circa 1895.
This is the most difficult and demanding assignment in the Navy. There is not an instant during his tour of duty as Commanding Officer that he can escape the grasp of command responsibility. His privileges in view of his obligations are most ludicrously small; nevertheless command is the spur which has given the Navy its great leaders. It is a duty, which most richly deserves the highest, time-honoured title of the seafaring world—CAPTAIN.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—MATCHING COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP QUALITIES TO COMMAND TASKS, WORLD WAR I

Command has many facets, and there are many different types of commanders. Operational failures of the past can often be attributed to commanders whose characteristics and capabilities, perhaps ideal for one task, were ill-suited to another. Matching the right commander to the right task is perhaps the most important responsibility of senior command.

General John Monash. Arguably Australia’s greatest soldier, Monash took command of the Australian Imperial Force’s 4th Infantry Brigade after the outbreak of World War I, landing at Gallipoli on 26 April 1915. Despite encountering some criticism as a brigade commander at Gallipoli, Monash was promoted to Major General commanding the 3rd Division. The division’s first major battle, Messines, was hailed as a great success. Further success followed and in May 1918 Monash was promoted to Lieutenant General and given command of the Australian Corps. His first battle in this role, the all arms attack on Hamel, came to be considered the ‘perfect battle.’ Later Monash commanded up to nine divisions during the successful ‘Black Week’ attacks breaching the Hindenburg Line. Monash’s effectiveness increased with more senior command which allowed him to display his conceptual, organising and leadership skills. He was an innovative leader who earned high praise from many leading military and political figures. However, by the end of the war his force was exhausted and severely depleted. After the war Monash returned to business and became manager of Victoria’s State Electricity Commission, becoming a leading figure in Melbourne’s community.

Effect of technology

1.17 One effect of technology is the increased flow of information, both in volume from particular sources, and in scope from many newly connected sources. There are several aspects to this increased network visibility. The first is a raised expectation by commanders to be continually informed, thus tending to undermine the philosophy of mission command (refer chapter 2),
which relies on subordinate commanders having the flexibility to achieve desired effects in their own way. This natural tension, also the result of overlapping levels of command, is sometimes referred to as the ‘command dilemma’ and is covered in more detail in chapter 3—‘States of command’.

1.18 Another aspect is the advantages of being able to value add to a more streamlined passage of information, thus boosting shared situational awareness and self-synchronisation of activities. However, improved battlespace management requires headquarters (HQ) staff to perform control functions across a wider range of activities, leading to fewer, or more compact, intermediate HQ. This risks increased political and command intervention in tactical matters. Increased higher level involvement can and should be positive, but requires discipline to avoid micro-management.

1.19 A third effect of increased network visibility on command and leadership is compression of the decision making cycle. Key western powers are using computing resources to display a common operating picture, and using software-aided decision tools to develop possible courses of action. This technology is developing rapidly. In the future, simultaneous transmission of situation pictures to all levels of the command chain will offer commanders unparalleled visibility of the battlespace. The risk here though is that analysis of so much additional data becomes difficult.

1.20 These newly emerging capabilities may support a flatter structure for C2 in the ADF. Current ADF C2 arrangements will need to respond to technology by altering structure and not just processes, as in the past. The present structure, using a network centric approach and automated decision support tools, positions the ADF to meet the challenges of the next decade. However, reliance on sophisticated technologies creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities—for both the ADF and potential adversaries. Command, despite technological advances, remains a human activity.
CHAPTER 2

COMMAND PHILOSOPHY

Executive summary

This chapter is concerned with the philosophical aspects of command.

- As with the principles of war, certain fundamentals of command have proven themselves over time. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) recognises seven principles of command.

- In military operations, the ADF has interpreted the principle of delegation of command by evolving its own command philosophy, known as mission command.

- Mission command is ideally suited to the ADF because of its small size, wide range of tasks and often great distances for operations.

- Under mission command, in its simplest form, the superior directs WHAT is to be achieved but leaves the subordinate free to decide HOW assigned tasks will be achieved.

- Subordinates in turn are obliged to be fully aware of the superior commander's intent, and to continually monitor and assess developing situations, whilst maintaining excellent communication.

- Mission command has its own set of principles, pre-requisites, enablers and application concepts.

- Mission command reinforces the manoeuvrist approach to achieve desired operational effects in the modern operational environment.

- Mission command is a significant contributor to high tempo operations by facilitating simultaneous tactical activity.

2.1 There are two aspects to command and control (C2). The first is organisational, functional and legal, covering the structures and mechanisms empowering designated commanders to exercise specified lawful authority and direction over assigned forces for missions and tasks. This aspect will be covered in subsequent chapters. The second aspect of command, the
subject of this chapter, is the underlying philosophy within an organisation that determines the style in which command is effected.

PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND

2.2 As with the principles of war, certain fundamentals of command have proved themselves over time. The ADF recognises the following seven principles of command:

- unity of command,
- span of command,
- clarity,
- redundancy,
- delegation of command,
- control of significant resources, and
- obligation to subordinates.

Unity of command

2.3 The first and foremost principle of command is that there can only be one recognised command authority at any time. A subordinate can only have one superior. The command authority may change as tasks change, but the principle of unity of command, with one designated commander clearly responsible for each task, must be maintained. This is particularly important in multi-phased joint operations, such as airborne or amphibious operations, where lack of unity of command could create doubt as to who is in command of the operation at various phases.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—UNITY OF COMMAND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, FINSCHHAFFEN 1943

The land, air-landed and amphibious operations for the capture of Lae in 1943 were commanded by General Blamey, South West Pacific Area (SWPA) Land Force Commander and New Guinea Force Commander.

These were well conducted, even though the overall SWPA Commander, General Macarthur, refused to establish joint task forces (JTF) for such
operations. To support Blamey, Macarthur ensured that United States (US) commanded combined naval and air force support, although not under Blamey's operational control, generally cooperated effectively.

However, in the follow-up operation at Finschhafen, Macarthur's General Headquarters (GHQ), convinced that opposition was light, considered that a brigade amphibious landing was more than adequate. Blamey's assessment of the enemy determined that a two-brigade assault was required. Macarthur compromised, allowing a second brigade to follow-up if required, but did not inform his naval amphibious commander of this task.

Once the operation commenced it became apparent that the Japanese force was at divisional strength. In accordance with Macarthur's agreement, Blamey's New Guinea Force tasked the US amphibious commander, Admiral Barbey, to land the second brigade. Knowing nothing of the Macarthur-Blamey agreement, Barbey refused. A conference of the Australian Land, and US Naval and Air Headquarters failed to resolve the problem, so it was referred to both GHQ and Land Headquarters (HQ) in Brisbane. Macarthur belatedly ordered Barbey to act, averting a serious risk to the landed brigade.

This type of ad hoc C2 arrangement relies on the senior commander being present and aware of problems in sufficient time to recognise, pre-empt or rectify them. Lack of unity of command can be unacceptably risky, particularly where operations are conducted on several levels of command. The use of JTF with specified command authority obviates these problems.

Span of command

2.4 There is a limit to the number of subordinate units that can be commanded effectively. Experience indicates that an optimum span falls somewhere between three and six subordinate units and is dependant on a range of factors and no finite number can be prescribed. While all C2 arrangements must be sufficiently flexible to cope with additional subordinate elements, the commander must not be overloaded to the point where it is not possible to operate effectively. The formation of subordinate HQ should be ordered before a span of command becomes overloaded.

2.5 There is a range of degrees of authority (refer chapter 3—'States of command') from which to match mission and responsibility. An operational commander needs the units—combat power, combat support and combat service support—necessary to carry out the mission, with lesser degrees of control over units which provide temporary, spasmodic or external support.
No commander should be denied force elements vital to the plan, nor burdened with command responsibilities for peripheral units where cooperative support would suffice.

2.6 For operational formations and units, span of command depends on subordinate and technical command requirements, effective combat groupings and communications-net feasibility. There is usually no need for transient maritime and air force elements to be under the command of a deployed operational commander, with all their inherent complications. In East Timor in 1999 the span of command was already over-extended with contingents from 22 nations. A massive air and sea logistic link between Timor and Australia was also established, and to have placed this under command of the JTF would have overloaded the commander unnecessarily.

Clarity

2.7 The principle of clarity, though closely allied with unity of command, focuses on the military chain of command. This requires commanders at each level to respond to directions from higher HQ, and in turn issue directions to subordinates. Consequently, each HQ normally reports to only one superior HQ thereby following an unambiguous chain of command. All elements in the chain must be aware of their superior and subordinate HQ and the C2 relationships with other elements operating in the same theatre or area of operations.

Redundancy

2.8 Alternative commanders and HQ (as appropriate) must be nominated at all levels of command to provide redundancy. Procedures must be established and practised to allow command to be passed to the alternate commander in such a way that operations are not adversely affected. The purpose of this process is to ensure that ongoing operations and commitments are not disrupted during a transfer of authority.

2.9 Removal of a major HQ from the command chain can often result in difficulty providing suitable staff and communications for alternative HQ. Navy units, having a network of ships equipped with command centres and good communications, have an inherent redundancy. Air bases are similarly equipped, and generally are in continuous contact with aircraft. In the land environment, command redundancy has traditionally relied on segregating a reserve cadre of all ranks as ‘left out of battle’, so that key personnel can be replaced. As a backup at higher levels, the artillery HQ, having both planning staff and communications, is usually designated as the alternate HQ.
Delegation of command

2.10 Underlying the principle of delegation of command is centralised direction and decentralised execution. At all levels of command, subordinate commanders should be given necessary directions and resources to conduct the task without further interference. This principle is manifest at the highest level where the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) issues broad directives to Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) and the Service Chiefs with detailed planning and execution taking place at HQ Joint Operations Command, (HQJOC) and subordinate levels where appropriate.

2.11 For the smooth and robust delegation of command it is necessary for the commander’s vision to be clearly articulated and understood. Subordinate personnel, who due to their appointments, are likely to be appointed to an acting command position must familiarise themselves with all aspects of their commander’s responsibilities in anticipation of having to discharge these duties or to respond to contingencies where communication with the commander is lost or the commander is incapacitated for a period.

2.12 When delegating command authority, the commander must ensure that the delegation:

- is unambiguous;
- clearly defines the degree of authority and responsibilities transferred, including any related conditions and limitations;
- clearly specifies the point at which the authority becomes effective; and
- gives guidance to the action to be taken in the event of a contingency or opportunity—this guidance should specifically address those contingencies where the commander cannot be contacted or unable to return to duty for a period of time.

Control of significant resources

2.13 There are some forces or resources that require treatment as significant resources because of their wide utility but limited availability, or limited expert control cells. Examples include submarines, special forces and strategic strike aircraft. C2 of nominated significant resources is normally retained at the highest practicable level. Delegation of authority over such resources is rare and will invariably involve procedures for the rapid return of the authority if and when circumstances change.
2.14 Constant liaison between the strategic, operational and tactical level planning staffs is essential to ensure best use is made of scarce resources, together with the type and duration of C2 arrangements.

Obligation to subordinates

2.15 ADF commanders are obliged to consider the interests and well being of their subordinates and represent them in the chain of command. This includes responsibility for safety, health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel. Commanders are also obliged to exercise appropriate C2 over their subordinates.

2.16 Command obligation is a feature of Australian military culture, and is facilitated by the philosophy of mission command. The ADF national command system has an obligation to establish, without lavish or wasteful use of resources, support systems additional to the reigning host and coalition lead nations in-theatre standards, which meet the usual aspirations and legitimate needs of ADF personnel.

2.17 During World War II (WW II), General Blamey, like all successful commanders, had to balance strategic, operational and administrative responsibilities in his dual roles as Commander-in-Chief of both the Australian Military Forces, and Land Forces South West Pacific Area. This involved visiting the battlefield to understand operations, explain directives, and connect with his troops. After a settling in period with some unfortunate outcomes, Blamey managed, with the help of competent staff, to effectively apply the art of command.

Figure 2–1: Commander-in-Chief, General Blamey, and the General Officer Commanding 7th Australian Division Major-General Allen, engaging with subordinate units during the Kokoda campaign
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—OBLIGATION TO SUBORDINATES
PERSONNEL SUPPORT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
WORLD WAR I AND II

During WW I, HQ Australian Imperial Force (AIF) established a series of administrative, training, medical, convalescent and recreational facilities in the Middle East and UK. While the British Army was willing to provide such services, the Australian Government and HQAIF determined that Australian Services should provide for the needs of its National force. Accordingly, of the AIF force of over 300,000, 55,000 were engaged in administrative support in the UK, with a proportional administrative cadre in the Middle East.

Support in the UK in WW II was not as well organised. The agreement covering the Empire Air Training Scheme provided that Dominion output would serve in National squadrons. This never eventuated, with nominal Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) squadrons containing a mix of nationalities, and half of RAAF aircrew directly allotted to Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons. Responsibility for administrative support was affected by the British Government, and attempts to form a RAAF base were circumvented to avoid diminution of the Air Ministry’s ability to employ RAAF elements and individuals piecemeal within RAF wings and squadrons.

Concern about this lack of support resulted in the dispatch of Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams to London in 1941 to establish a RAAF counterpart of HQAIF.

This was to fulfil the Australian Government desire ‘that RAAF personnel shall be under the command of RAAF officers … to the fullest possible extent’, and that they be provided with adequate specifically-Australian amenities. Canada and New Zealand had established amenities, but it was not until establishment of Air Officer Commanding Overseas HQ RAAF in 1941 that 15,000 RAAF aircrew overseas began to receive the support and amenities appropriate and usual for Australian expeditionary forces.

While coalition lead forces are usually willing to support the forces of contributing partners, they do so in accordance with their own determinations. As an example, in Vietnam the US Military Assistance Command considered weekly mail service to be adequate, compared with the Australian target, eventually achieved by HQ Air Forces Vietnam and the Australian Postal Service, of daily deliveries. The US target of daily delivery of unmelted ice cream was not so highly regarded by Australian serviceman.
MISSION COMMAND

In a networked approach to the military art, ADF personnel will receive clear information regarding the commander’s intent and may be required to make decisions that have broad repercussions beyond their level. Mission command is essentially about professional trust between commanders and subordinates, and Network Centric Warfare has the effect of bringing the quality of this interaction into sharp and unrelenting focus.

General Peter Cosgrove, AC MC

2.18 The ADF has adopted a command philosophy known as ‘mission command’ that promotes flexibility by rewarding initiative, ingenuity, innovation, resourcefulness, and devolution of authority in achieving the commander’s intent. Understanding the strategic and operational context within the joint operational framework allows tactical commanders to react quickly and appropriately to demanding situations.

2.19 Mission command promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative, but is responsive to superior direction. Mission command reinforces the manoeuvrist approach and the achievement of the desired effect in the modern operational environment. Under mission command, in its simplest form, the superior commander directs WHAT is to be achieved but leaves the subordinate commander free to decide HOW to achieve assigned tasks.

2.20 Mission command can only succeed when subordinates are fully aware of the superior commander's intent, and continually monitor and assess developing situations, whilst maintaining excellent communication through their chain of command and with other supporting units/personnel.

1 The previously used term ‘directive control’ is synonymous but has been replaced by the internationally accepted term ‘mission command’.

2 Refer Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.0—Operations.
Commanders at all levels had to act more on their own; they were given greater latitude to work out their own plans to achieve what they knew was the Army Commander's intention. In time they developed to a marked degree the flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them to act swiftly to take advantage of sudden information of changing circumstances without reference to their superiors. This acting without orders, in anticipation of orders, or without waiting for approval, yet always within the overall intention, must become second nature and must go down to the smallest units.

Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, 1956

Prerequisites for success

2.21 Successful application of the philosophy of mission command depends on the following prerequisites:

- **Doctrine.** Mission command is most successful when supported by doctrine which provides guidance for intelligent application, not dogma for automatic response. Good doctrine is based on sound application of leadership and operational principles developed through continuing education and rigorous training.

- **Reliability.** Commanders rely on subordinates to provide accurate and timely information to achieve operational success. High demands are made on the leadership qualities of subordinates, on their initiative and on their sense of responsibility to carry out their assigned tasks.

- **Trust.** Mission command requires a high level of mutual trust at all levels of command which can only be achieved through intensive, realistic training. Subordinates are trusted by being allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions, and commanders should keep control to a minimum so as not to constrain their subordinates' freedom of action.

- **Understanding.** Commanders ensure that subordinates understand the commander's intentions, their own missions, and the strategic,

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operational and tactical context. Subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it is necessary. The alternative for commanders is to resort to ponderous, detailed orders which stifle initiative and slow down the tempo of operations.

- **Risk.** Gaining and holding the initiative is critical in a rapidly moving battle where hesitation, indecision and time-wasting by seeking confirmation from higher command may be riskier than a flawed but timely decision based on the best available information.

**HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—MISSION COMMAND IN THE NORTH WEST MOBILE FORCE**

Since being raised in 1981 as an integrated unit with a high proportion of Army Reservists and aboriginal cultures, the North West Mobile Force (NORFORCE) has conducted surveillance across the top end of Australia. A key to the success of NORFORCE has been its practice of blending the many Aboriginal cultures with the Army way of doing business.

With respect to mission command (or ‘directive control’ as it was then known), the author of the unit’s regimental history noted:

‘Directive control, as a form of leadership, is almost mandatory if the North West Mobile Force is to function effectively, so soldiers and officers at all rank levels operate with an independence and responsibility far greater than their equivalent in a more conventional unit. It follows then that their training must be of a different nature. NORFORCE soldiers are unconventional soldiers tasked with a real and important responsibility in a very hostile environment’.

**APPLICATION OF MISSION COMMAND**

2.22 Although philosophical in nature, mission command is not all theory. Its practical application in the ADF stresses five key concepts which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

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Learn through practice

2.23 Mission command requires practice during training for military operations in general, not just for a particular operation. Questioning should be encouraged to provide insight by engaging experience and creativity. Programmed knowledge relies on published sources (including doctrine). Together, these permit learning as a form of self-acquired wisdom, which promotes and increases capacity to embrace change. The philosophy of 'Q+P=L' is particularly effective.

2.24 In order to practice mission command, sufficient instruction and training should occur in a benign environment, in which honest mistakes are accepted and discussed, and in which unorthodox solutions are not rejected. An active learning philosophy also creates an atmosphere for individuals to make wider contributions.

2.25 A deeper understanding of what constitutes commander’s intent should be the subject of continual development. Progressive thinking should be used to translate a higher commander’s intent into lower-level objectives, and foster an outcome-driven approach. Mission command cannot function without the unifying purpose of commander’s intent.

Apply wisely

2.26 Mission command does not necessarily apply to all situations and to all personnel. Commanders have a right to be satisfied that subordinates not only understand their intentions but are also acting on them. This cannot always be achieved by remote direction. The use of orders groups, back-briefs before mission execution and face-to-face communication during the conduct of operations not only develops trust and mutual understanding of the plan, but also strengthens collective and individual confidence, purpose and resolve.

2.27 In particular, mission command may not be compatible with, or acceptable to, some of our potential coalition partners. Mission command should be applied with particular care in a multinational environment. Whilst over-direction will often cause offence, too little direction may cause little effect. Mission command has the status of a ‘general rule’, however, it should not preclude the very necessary element of active control.

Risk aversion

2.28 Increasingly, tight legislative and regulatory requirements together with resource constraints, compound to work against mission command. These constraints can breed conservatism and indecisiveness, potentially
creating a tendency towards risk aversion in a wider operational environment. Warfighting involves risk-taking. Therefore mission command should be used during peacetime, with appropriate risk management measures, to develop decisiveness, moral courage, initiative and daring which can be easily translated into a warfighting environment.

**Remain flexible and adaptable**

2.29 Mission command must remain dynamic and agile. It should be applied flexibly, reflecting the understanding that doctrine itself is not immutable, and should be adapted for a particular campaign, operation or situation. A commander’s style of command must also reflect the situation, including the capability and understanding of subordinate commanders. The characteristics of persuasion, compulsion, loyalty and leadership by example combine to create an individual command style, but the relative proportion of each must be tempered to suit the situation.

2.30 In exceptional circumstances, there will be fleeting opportunities where commanders may have to skip an echelon and reach down at least one level of command. Historical evidence provides many examples of this: Napoleon, Rommel and Patton all intervened at a decisive point and brought about startling tactical successes. Endorsement of such action by a commander should not be seen as an encouragement of micro-management; it is a technique that should be applied sparingly, based on higher strategic knowledge, to turn the tide in a wavering operation or to seize the initiative where none was previously seen to exist.

**Delegation**

2.31 The ADF’s mission command philosophy is realised in the commander’s confidence in delegating responsibility to subordinates, and the professional discharge of those responsibilities of command by subordinates. This is of particular importance in response to fleeting windows of opportunity during the conduct of operations, and contingencies where no specific direction has been given to the subordinate.

**Information management**

2.32 Recent advances in information technology can boost the effectiveness of mission command through expanded and more efficient networking. However, too much information can prove counter-productive, and care must be taken to guard against trying to collect all possible information to inform everyone about everything all the time. Conversely, without enough detail, staff cannot provide effective advice to the commander. The answer is in achieving an appropriate balance and
ensuring that sufficient useable information is collected and passed to the appropriate personnel.

MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

The manoeuvrist approach to warfare emphasises the shattering, or at least disruption, of the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than concentrating on destruction of the enemy’s materiel or the holding of enemy territory.

2.33 The manoeuvrist approach involves a commitment to manoeuvre in the execution of military actions rather than merely accepting attrition. It favours an indirect approach in order to achieve tactical objectives and desired effects. Using the manoeuvrist approach, the focus is on dislocating the adversary’s strengths and disrupting the adversary’s overall cohesion and will to fight at all levels, rather than concentrating on the physical destruction of the adversary or holding territory. Mission command therefore complements the manoeuvrist approach by promoting decentralised command, while remaining responsive to superior direction. Refer to ADDP 3.0 for a more detailed description of the manoeuvrist approach.

2.34 The manoeuvrist approach also emphasises the need for the ADF to take the initiative. To apply this approach successfully, commanders at all levels should focus on precisely applying decisive action, using surprise, shock action, simultaneity and superior operational tempo, against accurately identified critical vulnerabilities. By decentralising command, mission command promotes freedom and speed of action and initiative.

2.35 The manoeuvrist approach promotes high tempo. Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the adversary in tactical engagements, battles and major operations. The tempo of a force also indicates its ability to transition from one operation to another. High tempo at the operational level can be achieved by conducting simultaneous, rather than phased, tactical activity.
INTERFET [International Force East Timor] demonstrates that, while the concept of manoeuvre is not new for military practitioners, ‘information era manoeuvre’ is about the opponent’s mind. It is about manoeuvring around his mental hard-spots rather than geographic hard-spots. This is the essence of ‘manoeuvre warfare.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Blaxland

LESSONS LEARNED

2.36 Learning from the successes and mistakes of the past (your own and of others) to improve performance next time is an intuitive human activity. This form of learning is the basic motivation for evaluation. Operational evaluation (OE) is an integral element of the ADF’s capability and preparedness enhancement systems and processes, and is one of the key levers by which the ADF achieves a knowledge edge. OE is applicable to operations, sustainment and all activities that prepare the ADF to undertake operations. For example, the capturing of lessons may lead to improvements to C2 arrangements and changes to the way in which Service Chiefs prepare force elements (FE).

2.37 Specific responsibilities for conducting OE are contained in the Joint Operations Command Operational Preparedness Requirement (JOCOPR). The JOCOPR includes the requirements for FE to be prepared to perform a role and achieve an operational outcome that meets the requirements of various military response options. In this context, the focus for OE is not only on the ability of FE to conduct combat operations but also encompasses the ability of the force to be sustained, an aspect of capability that is often overlooked during collective training. Notwithstanding particular OE activities, commanders are expected to exercise their professional military judgement in relation to assessing the preparedness of FE under their command.

2.38 Commanders are required to conduct OE in accordance with the ADF’s evaluation system that requires all joint activities to be evaluated and

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reported via the Australian Defence Force Activity Analysis Database System (ADFAADS). ADF operational evaluation policy is contained in Defence Instruction (General) OPS 41–1—*Australian Defence Force Activity Analysis Database System*. The system addresses routine internal OE requirements, conducted by activity participants and OE teams established by the local commander. Additional requirements that involve external OE teams are directed by higher commanders as required.

**Responsibilities**

2.39 The Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) is responsible for OE policy and for issuing guidance to commanders on specific OE and lessons learned requirements. This guidance is normally provided in the JOCOPR.

2.40 Responsibilities for OE are specified for each phase in the OE model—identifying requirements, planning, conduct, and implementation, monitoring and reviewing. The officer initiating the requirement for OE will usually delegate responsibility for the other phases, but retain overall responsibility for all phases.

2.41 Operational Evaluation and the capturing of lessons learned is discussed in detail in ADDP 00.4—*Operational Evaluation*.
CHAPTER 3

STATES OF COMMAND

Executive summary

This chapter describes the agreed degrees of authority, established for simplicity and consistency, and assigned to commanders to enable them to carry out their responsibilities.

- ‘States of command’ describes the framework of degrees of authority which may exist between headquarters (HQ), joint task forces (JTF), force element groups (FEG), formations and units.

- There is no direct relationship between the states of command and the levels of command.

- There are two groups of command authority used in the Australian Defence Force (ADF): standing and operational.

- The three standing command authorities are—full command, theatre command and national command.

- The four operational command authorities are—operational command, tactical command, operational control and tactical control.

- Command authorities are supplemented by other administrative, support and coordination arrangements designed to ease the span of command of the operational commander.

- There are three administrative authorities—administrative control, local administration and technical control.

- There are two forms of operational or administrative support—direct support or in support of.

- There are two coordination authorities—coordinating authority and direct liaison authorised.
Defining the battlespace and establishing a clear command and control system should be regarded as the very essence of effective planning at the operational level of war. All other operational functions—including manoeuvre, fires, logistics, intelligence and force protection—rely on a clear demarcation by an operational headquarters of battlespace parameters and command and control organisation.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field¹

Introduction

3.1 To ensure that commanders at various levels have sufficient command and/or control of assigned forces to carry out their responsibilities, they are assigned specified degrees of authority. For simplicity and consistency, an agreed framework of degrees of authority has been established, known as ‘states of command’. These may exist between HQ, JTF, FEG, formations and units.

3.2 There is no direct relationship between the states of command and the levels of command. The states of command are concerned with assigning forces, missions and tasks, and the ability to delegate operational authority, whereas the levels of command are concerned with the strategic, operational and tactical levels within the command structure. Furthermore, various administrative authorities have been established to support the command of assigned forces.

3.3 The two groups of command authority in the ADF are standing and operational. Standing command authorities include full command, theatre command (TCOMD), and national command (NATCOMD). Operational command authorities may be further qualified by time, task and function and include operational command (OPCOMD), tactical command (TACOMD), operational control (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON).

STANDING COMMAND AUTHORITIES

Full command

3.4 Full command is defined as follows:

The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services.

3.5 Full command equates to ‘ownership’ of the force and conveys with it complete operational and administrative authority and responsibility. It covers every aspect of resource utilisation, administration and the planning and controlling of military forces. Full command exists only within a national force. No commander from another country can exercise full command over assigned ADF forces.

3.6 CDF exercises full command of the ADF by virtue of CDF’s appointment under section 9 of the Defence Act 1903. CDF’s full command includes, when directed by the Minister for Defence (MINDEF) and Cabinet on an occasion-by-occasion basis, the authority to conduct operations. This is the authority required by a commander before legally using force in pursuit of national objectives.

3.7 Service Chiefs exercise full command of their Service, under CDF, and, as such, exercise complete administrative authority and responsibility. Service Chiefs are responsible for raising, training and maintaining force elements (FE) ready for operations and advising CDF on the employment of FE. The full command held by each Service Chief includes all authority required to command, lead and manage the respective Service in preparation for participation in operations. Single Service commanders whose FE have been assigned to another commander for operations, exercises or other selected activities, continue to remain responsible for those residual command responsibilities not covered by the operational commander’s delegated authority and responsibilities.

3.8 In discharging their raise, train and sustain responsibilities, Service Chiefs should keep Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) informed of any activity or development that may have an operational impact on current forces assigned and/or subsequent rotations. For example, a change in training or administrative procedures or a significant capability management issue.

3.9 Regardless of any delegated authorities, CDF retains full command of the ADF at all times.
3.10 CDF delegates certain aspects of full command to CJOPS, as specified in CDF directives, to allow CJOPS to fulfil all duties. This delegated aspect of full command is termed TCOMD.

**Theatre command**

3.11 TCOMD is defined as follows:

The authority given by CDF to CJOPS to command assigned forces to prepare for and conduct operations (campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises, and other activities as directed).

3.12 TCOMD is the degree of authority given by CDF to CJOPS over assigned forces to prepare for and conduct operations when directed by the MINDEF and Cabinet. TCOMD is limited by function and assignment, and cannot be delegated or transferred. The CDF is the only authority who can direct Service Chiefs to assign forces to CJOPS under TCOMD.

3.13 TCOMD essentially provides the authority for CJOPS to exercise the operational component of full command. When forces are assigned to CJOPS under TCOMD, CJOPS determines the level of administrative responsibility necessary for the effective and efficient conduct of operations. The residual administrative responsibilities remain the responsibility of the Service Chiefs or capability manager. The division of these responsibilities, between CJOPS and Service Chiefs, is not definitive and will vary according to the nature and duration of the operation or exercise, forces assigned, location of the deployment and the rotation plan for personnel and equipment. These arrangements are agreed during the planning phase and detailed in campaign/operations orders and/or instructions.

3.14 TCOMD includes the authority to assign and task assigned forces as necessary to achieve campaign objectives and to attain the military strategic end state required by CDF. These objectives and the end state, including any limitations, will be ordered by CDF following Government direction and guidance.

3.15 Unless otherwise directed by CDF, TCOMD implies the authority for CJOPS to act as the Australian operational level military point of contact in relationships with other nations’ commands, Australian diplomatic missions, other Australian agencies, and agencies of countries in-theatre.
3.16 CJOPS exercises TCOMD through:

- national commanders, during combined operations or campaigns;
- designated JTF commanders; and/or
- any other commander conducting operations or activities for CJOPS.

3.17 CJOPS cannot delegate TCOMD to a subordinate commander. The degrees of authority and responsibilities under TCOMD are detailed in annex A.

National command

3.18 NATCOMD is defined as follows:

A command that is organised by, and functions under the authority of a specific nation.  

3.19 NATCOMD is a standing command authority conferred upon a national appointee to safeguard Australian national interests in combined or coalition operations. NATCOMD does not in itself include any operational command authorities. Operational command authorities must be specified if a commander is to exercise both NATCOMD and a command authority such as OPCOMD.

3.20 In most circumstances NATCOMD would be conferred upon the senior Australian operational commander in the joint force area of operations (JFAO). CJOPS is the conduit of NATCOMD functions between CDF and the deployed Australian national commander of deployed forces assigned to CJOPS unless otherwise specified.

2 Sourced from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and adopted for use by the ADF in the interests of interoperability.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—NATIONAL COMMAND OF AUSTRALIAN FORCES DEPLOYED OVERSEAS

During the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa (1899–1902), Colonial and later Australian forces were placed entirely at the disposal of the British command. That experience, together with federation, developed an Australian determination to maintain the national identity of forces deployed overseas.

In World War I (WW I), the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) was assigned under operational command of the Imperial General Staff but was administered by the AIF commander. The latter reported to the national Government and was directed to keep the force intact, uniquely Australian, and committed strategically in accordance with national direction. This set a precedent for WW II and subsequent deployments in Korea and South East Asia. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was not so fortunate, as it had been agreed at the 1911 Imperial Conference that a declaration of war placed ‘the Naval Board and the naval services of the Commonwealth directly under the control of the Admiralty. The sea-going fleet would then become a squadron of the Imperial Navy, taking orders either direct from London or from the British officer under whom they were placed. The Naval Board would be placed in the position . . . of a naval commander-in-chief at a British port, and would take orders direct from the Admiralty, informing the Commonwealth Government of those orders’.

In WW II, the RAN was again placed under command of Royal Navy, as well as US Navy commanders. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) dispatched large numbers of aircrew to the UK, Middle East and Burma and, although there were RAAF squadrons, many individuals were absorbed into Royal Air Force units. An attempt at forming a RAAF HQ in the UK, as the AIF had, was ineffective. In the South West Pacific Area however, HQ RAAF Command maintained RAAF forces as an Australian entity.

With the increasing commitment of the ADF to United Nations and Coalition operations from the 1990s, and the increasing emphasis on joint command and control (C2), it has now become standard to establish a National HQ responsible for forces of the three Services. For the commitment to Iraq, MINDEF Senator Robert Hill stated, ‘the commander of Australian troops is Australian. Australian commanders command Australian troops and a coalition of the willing led by the United States of America (USA) would in effect be managed by the USA. So in terms of the management of the total coalition, that would be USA leadership with Australia in the loop. But decisions relating to commitment of our forces, targeting by our forces, their rules of engagement are all Australian decisions’. 
3.21 NATCOMD provides for the oversight of assigned national forces and includes:

- liaison with the combined force commander and the Australian chain of command over changes to operational authority;

- the employment of Australian forces outside the degree of operational authority specified by CJOPS; and

- maintenance of access by deployed Australian forces to their military representatives on national matters involving the employment, administration and conditions of service peculiar to Australian forces.

**OPERATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES**

3.22 Operational command authorities empower a commander to employ the operational capability of forces to achieve missions. The delegated authority may be command itself, or degrees of command or C2 with certain qualifications. A summary of what a commander is authorised to do with assigned forces is listed in the tables for ADF states of command at annex B. Equivalent operational authorities used in combined and coalition operations are discussed in chapter 6—’Command in coalition and combined operations’.

3.23 The operational command authority granted to a commander in joint operations must be stated with clarity and precision. The joint force commander and subordinate commanders of assigned forces must understand precisely the C2 arrangements for the campaign or operation.

3.24 The degree of authority delegated should be sufficient to allow a commander to direct and deploy assigned forces to complete tasks without reference to a higher authority. The delegation should be balanced with the commander’s level of responsibility. A commander should not be assigned more forces than required or given excessive authority over forces, as capabilities may be wasted that could be better used elsewhere.

3.25 Levels of authority and responsibility may be directed by:

- common usage;

- specified in detailed subordinate doctrine, alliance agreements, memorandums of agreement and memorandums of understanding; or
• promulgated on a case by case basis in documents such as directives and operational orders (OPORD).

3.26 Transfer of authority. Operational authority can be delegated or transferred by commanders within the definition of each authority. The transfer of authority over designated forces between nations or between commanders must:

• be unambiguous,

• clearly define the degree of authority, and

• clearly specify the point at which the authority becomes effective.

3.27 Forces are transferred using the terms ‘assign’ when passing from one commander to another, and ‘attach’ when joining a unit or formation. The level of authority to be exercised on transfer, including responsibility for administration and logistics, must be specified as part of the operational authority and is not determined by the use of these terms. The process of transferring force elements equally applies to exercises as well as operations. Using the same process for exercises and operations provides a consistent approach and ensures clarity of the states of command of all force elements involved.

3.28 The assignment and reassignment of FE must be a recognised phase of an operation and designed to balance the needs and timing imperatives of the single Services and CJOPS. Whilst the importance of a smooth handover/hand back of FE is covered in doctrine the detail of the actual activity will vary by operation and FE and be included in OPORD, directives and procedures. Australian Defence Force Publication 3.0.3—Mounting Operations provides further guidance on the handover/hand back of forces.

Operational command

3.29 OPCOMD is defined as follows:

The authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to re-assign forces and to retain or delegate OPCON, TACOMD and/or TACON as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics.

3.30 OPCOMD represents the highest degree of operational authority which can be assigned to a commander by CJOPS, and is usually retained
for the duration of the campaign or operation. It provides the authority to task an asset over the range of its capabilities without further approval being sought.

3.31 OPCOMD of ADF forces would not normally be assigned to a non-ADF commander.

3.32 Only one commander should exercise OPCOMD of assigned forces. OPCOMD gives the authority to task the asset in detail over the range of its capabilities. A commander assigned OPCOMD of forces may:

- specify missions and tasks as deemed appropriate;
- reassign forces;
- allocate separate employment of components of assigned units; and
- delegate TACOMD, OPCON, or TACON to a subordinate commander.

3.33 While the definition advises that OPCOMD does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistic support, commanders holding OPCOMD clearly require and invariably hold a level of authority and a level of responsibility for both administration and logistic support, and other aspects of operational importance. Levels of authority and responsibility vary according to environment, Service, country and circumstances.

3.34 A commander assigned forces by CJOPS under OPCOMD cannot delegate OPCOMD to a subordinate ADF commander unless specified (refer annex B). Lower levels of command may be delegated to subordinate commanders to meet operational objectives.

**Tactical command**

3.35 TACOMD is defined as follows:

The authority delegated to a commander to specify missions and tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission specified by higher authority.

3.36 A commander assigned TACOMD of forces may:

- specify missions and tasks provided they accord with the mission given by higher authority,
3.37 TACOMD is normally the highest operational authority that can be assigned to a non-ADF commander over ADF assets in combined and/or coalition operations.

3.38 TACOMD allows a commander freedom to task forces to achieve an assigned mission, and to group and regroup forces as required within his assigned force structure. TACOMD is commonly used below OPCOMD in ADF single-Service environments.

Operational control

3.39 OPCON is defined as follows:

The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; deploy units concerned and retain or delegate TACON of those units. It does not include authority to allocate separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

3.40 A commander assigned OPCON of forces may:

- direct assigned or attached forces, limited by function, time or location; and

- delegate OPCON or TACON to a subordinate commander (see annex B).

Tactical control

3.41 TACON is defined as follows:

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

3.42 TACON covers the local direction of a force or asset in such a way that it assists in the accomplishment of missions or tasks. A commander delegated TACON may:
• direct forces and assets in manoeuvres to accomplish assigned missions or tasks, and

• delegate TACON to another commander.

3.43 Normally, TACON would not be a pre-designated operational authority assigned at the operational level. Rather, it is intended as short-term authority to be delegated by a local tactical commander for the immediate conduct of tactical activity.

3.44 A commander assigned TACON of forces or units cannot reassign missions or tasks.

Delegations

3.45 CJOPS, as the Theatre Commander, may delegate NATCOMD and/or an operational authority of assigned forces (OPCOMD, TACOMD, OPCON, TACON) to subordinate commanders, as appropriate.

3.46 Once forces are assigned to CJOPS by the Service Chiefs (force assignment) at the direction of CDF, TCOMD enables CJOPS to re-assign these forces or elements to JTF commanders or other subordinate operational commanders, under an operational command authority in order to conduct operations. Only one commander will exercise OPCOMD of any particular force or element. A commander assigned forces by CJOPS under OPCOMD cannot further delegate OPCOMD, unless specified. Lower levels of operational authority may be delegated to subordinate commanders to meet operational objectives (refer annex B).

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY

3.47 Service Chiefs retain overall administrative authority for their respective Service and this authority is exercised through the chain of command. In the case of forces assigned under TCOMD the respective Service Chief will exercise their responsibilities through CJOPS and the operational chain of command. Therefore, the assignment of forces under TCOMD includes the administrative authority for assigned forces, unless otherwise specified.

3.48 TCOMD also authorises CJOPS to coordinate with subordinate commanders and to approve any joint aspects of administration (including recommending honours and awards for campaigns and operations) and support necessary to the conduct of assigned missions and tasks within theatre. TCOMD provides CJOPS with the authority to maintain discipline as a function of command including, for example, appointment of Commanding
Officers for discipline and convening of court-martials on matters of a joint nature.

3.49 During operations and campaigns, TCOMD includes the authority to assign priorities and issue directives to Chief of Joint Logistics (CJLOG) for logistic support within the theatre, to meet the operational requirements and scheme of manoeuvre. TCOMD also includes the authority to assign priorities to other Defence supporting organisations for the support of campaigns and operations through Service Chiefs and Group Heads. TCOMD provides CJOPS with the administrative authority to use the resources of all forces assigned as necessary to accomplish the assigned missions and tasks.

3.50 When assigning forces under OPCOMD and TACOMD, the level of administrative support must be clearly specified if not already inherently understood. Furthermore, the tasking of assigned force elements may preclude the use of established procedures for the provision of support. In either case, a force element may be assigned, in addition to its operational assignment, under the administrative authority of an appropriate HQ or unit for the provision of administrative support.

3.51 The administrative authorities used by the ADF are administrative control, local administration and technical control.

**Administrative control**

3.52 Administrative control is defined as follows:

Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

3.53 For example, a RAAF lodger unit at an air base may be assigned under administrative control of the local Combat Support Unit.

**Local administration**

3.54 Local administration is defined below:

Administration controlled by a local commander and related specifically to the troops in their area or to the operation in their area.

3.55 Local administration involves:
discipline;

provision of services and administration, such as quartering and accommodation, water, light, power, care and wellbeing of personnel including rationing, hygiene and sanitation, fire protection, maintenance of barracks and camps, and supervision of stores accounting and internal checking;

allocation of ranges, training area and recreation facilities;

local movement of personnel and materiel;

local road traffic control and movement;

security, including preventative measures against vandalism and theft;

the supervision and maintenance of safety;

relations with local civilian authorities and population;

allocation of any local pool of labour and unit transport; and

allocation of local duties.

3.56 For example, an infantry battalion located at a RAAF base for rest and training may be assigned under the air base commander for local administration.

Technical control

3.57 Technical control is defined as follows:

The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces.

3.58 Technical control is applied as follows:

Technical control is exercised by capability managers, or by designated authorities through the capability manager.

For forces assigned to operations, technical control is exercised through CJOPS, where it directly effects operations only.
• Technical control advice may not be modified but may be rejected in part or in total by a commander in consideration of operational factors.

3.59 Technical control may be used where necessary to designate the specialised and professional operating procedures essential to the appropriate management and operation of forces. In an operational setting, technical control generally constitutes advice of a single-Service nature on technical operating and maintenance matters. Technical control is normally a responsibility retained within each Service and is not usually delegated. However, in joint operations a division of responsibility for technical maintenance may be specified in directives assigning forces and assets.

3.60 Technical control supports the principle of centralised control and decentralised execution. The centralised control system allows for the necessary degree of guidance and control required for the integration and operation of assigned forces and capabilities.

3.61 Examples of technical control are as follows:

- the Chief of Air Force is responsible for aviation safety management, and as the ADF airworthiness authority, is responsible for airworthiness management (operational and technical) of all ADF fixed wing aircraft, rotary wing aircraft and unmanned aerial systems;

- the detachment commander of a deployed FE of shore-based maritime rotary wing (RW) aircraft may have technical control of maritime RW aircraft; and

- a senior communications officer in a JFAO may have technical control of all communications assets for the maintenance of the area communications system.

SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS

3.62 A commander may be provided operational or administrative support by FE that are not under their operational or administrative authority. The two support arrangements used within the ADF are direct support (DS), and in support of (ISO).

3 Defence Instruction (General) Operations 02-2—ADF Airworthiness Management
Direct support

3.63 DS is defined below:

The support provided by a unit or formation not attached to or under command of the supported unit or formation commander, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation.

3.64 A unit in DS cannot be tasked to provide the same resource under DS to more than one formation. While tasked in DS, the unit is not attached to or under command of the supported unit but remains under command of its parent formation. The support may be withdrawn only with the agreement of the supported force or direction from a superior authority. Planning and tasking remains with the supporting force’s parent command. The support provided would usually include the provision of advice, liaison and communications.

3.65 Examples of DS are as follows:

- RW gunships from an aviation regiment may be in DS of a brigade for a specific task, such as a river crossing;

- a maritime FE of landing craft heavy (LCH) may be tasked in DS of a battalion for intra-theatre sea movement;

- a maritime patrol aircraft may be tasked in DS of a maritime task group for anti-surface warfare or anti-submarine warfare operations; and

- a Defence enabling executive may be directed by CDF to provide assets/resources in DS of CJOPS, for example Defence Support Group.

In support of

3.66 ISO is defined as follows:

Assisting another formation, unit or organisation while remaining under original control.

3.67 ISO is the lowest level of control and does not confer on the supported HQ any responsibility or authority for administration or movement of the supporting unit. The commander of the supporting force assigns
priority to the support given in accordance with their own judgment or advice given by the supported force.

3.68 Examples of ISO are as follows:

- a Naval surface combatant may be assigned ISO a brigade for naval gunfire support during an assault; and

- a Regional Force Surveillance Unit may be assigned ISO Commander Northern Command for surveillance support.

COORDINATION AND LIAISON

3.69 The two coordination authorities used within the ADF are coordinating authority, and direct liaison authorised.

Coordinating authority

3.70 Coordinating authority is defined below:

The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, the commander should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event essential agreement cannot be obtained the matter will be referred to the appropriate authority.

3.71 When designated as a coordinating authority, a commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement.

Direct liaison authorised

3.72 Direct liaison authorised (DIRLAUTH) is that authority granted by a commander to a subordinate to consult directly or to coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.

Annexes:
A. Theatre Command
B. Tables for Australian Defence Force States of Command
## THEATRE COMMAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Degree of responsibilities</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>Theatre Command (TCOMD) is exercised through:</td>
<td>TCOMD constitutes the operational component of full command. CDF has delegated this responsibility to Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS). TCOMD provides the authority to exercise that responsibility. The residual functions of full command remain the responsibility of the Service Chiefs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Chief of Joint Operations,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• designated joint task force commanders,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• national commanders, during combined operations, or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• any other commander conducting operations or activities for the theatre commander.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Theatre Commander may delegate operational command (OPCOMD),</td>
<td>OPCOMD cannot be further delegated unless specified. Lower levels of command authority may be delegated to meet operational objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>operational control (OPCON), tactical command (TACOMD), tactical control (TACON), and/or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>national command of assigned forces to subordinate commanders, as appropriate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Degree of responsibilities</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCOMD includes the authority to assign and task allocated forces to achieve campaign objectives and the military strategic end-state required by CDF.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unless otherwise directed by CDF, TCOMD implies the authority for CJOPS to act as the Australian (AS) operational level military point of contact in relationships with other nations’ commands, Defence, AS diplomatic missions, other AS agencies, and agencies of countries in-theatre.</td>
<td>As a result of the strategic responsibilities assigned to Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) by the United States National Command Authority, a defined relationship exists between CDF, CJOPS and CINCPAC. CDF deals with CINCPAC at the strategic level, while CJOPS deals with CINCPAC at the operational level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Theatre Commander has the authority to determine those operational level matters, in relation to the exercise of TCOMD, in which subordinate commanders must communicate with external agencies through CJOPS, unless DIRLAUTH is approved.</td>
<td>Australian Defence Headquarters will manage political/military relationships with other nations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Degree of responsibilities</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational preparedness</td>
<td>TCOMD includes the authority to ensure that joint forces are prepared for campaigns and operations, as required by CDF and the operational preparedness directive (OPD). CJOPS’s primary management tool for achieving OPD preparedness requirements is the Program of Major Scheduled Activities (PMSA).</td>
<td>TCOMD is limited to that responsibility for preparedness devolved to CJOPS by CDF and the Chiefs of Service Committee in the OPD and PMSA and by CDF in his directives to CJOPS. The raising of single-Service force element groups to designated levels of capability, including operational level of capability (OLOC), is the responsibility of the appropriate Service Chief. The task of raising forces to OLOC may, of necessity, extend beyond the time of force assignment, at which time the assigned forces must be responsive to CJOPS for specific operations-related battle procedure. Thus, the preparations for an operation and the raising to OLOC of assigned forces may occur in parallel. Once forces are at OLOC, they would be available to participate fully in final preparations, such as mission rehearsals, under CJOPS direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Degree of responsibilities</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCOMD</td>
<td>TCOMD includes responsibility for the command and management of those joint and combined exercises approved by CDF in the PMSA.</td>
<td>CJOPS is designated as the Manager PMSA, coordinated through the PMSA Coordination Group. CJOPS, in consultation with the Service Chiefs, will develop the PMSA for CDF approval to ensure an exercise regime that meets both Theatre joint and combined exercise and single-Service objectives. CJOPS will appoint an officer conducting the exercise (OCE) appropriate to each activity for which he is OSE. These appointments, plus specific exercise management guidance, eg for politically sensitive exercises, will be promulgated in an annual CJOPS Exercises and Activities Directive. Full details of the management of the PMSA are listed in the ADFAAMS User Guide.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Authority | Degree of responsibilities | Remarks
--- | --- | ---
Administration | During operations and campaigns, TCOMD includes the authority to assign priorities and issue directives to Commander Joint Logistics, for logistic support, to meet the theatre commander’s operational requirements and scheme of manoeuvre. When the support of other Enabling Executives outside Joint Logistics Command is required, CDF may assign them to CJOPS under support arrangements. |  
TCOMD provides CJOPS with the administrative authority to use the resources of all forces assigned as necessary to accomplish the specified missions and tasks. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Degree of responsibilities</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCOMD authorises a theatre commander to coordinate with subordinate commanders to recommend honours and awards for forces deployed under TCOMD.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCOMD provides CJOPS with the authority to maintain discipline as a function of command including appointment of commanding officers for discipline and convening of courts-martial on matters of a joint nature.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrangements for financial support to operations and exercises under TCOMD will generally be parallel to command and control arrangements.</td>
<td>CJOPS will determine financial support arrangements with regard to output management and accountability aspects. Financial provisions for major exercises are included in FYDP planning.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLES FOR AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE STATES OF COMMAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australian Defence Force States of Command</th>
<th>Standing Command Authorities</th>
<th>Operational Authorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FULL COMD</td>
<td>TCOMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specify missions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specify tasks</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct forces for specified mission/task</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deploy units</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassign forces</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocate separate employment of units</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin responsibility</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**

1. To accord with the mission given by higher authority.
### DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

**Australian Defence Force States of Command**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ability to delegate authority</th>
<th>FULL COMD</th>
<th>TCOMD</th>
<th>NATCOMD</th>
<th>OPCOMD</th>
<th>TACOMD</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>TACON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FULL COMMAND</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCOMD</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATCOMD</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCOMD</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (unless specified)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACOMD</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**

2. These standing authorities cannot be delegated when operating within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation alliance. For coalition and combined operations, commanders must confirm the appropriate delegations with each national chain of command.
CHAPTER 4
NATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

Executive summary

- This chapter provides a functional overview of the national command hierarchy for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) based on the levels of command.

- Command and control (C2) doctrine in the ADF is applied on three recognised levels of command, namely strategic, operational and tactical.

- The matching of command authorities to each of the levels is not straightforward due to their overlapping responsibilities.

- Command at the national strategic level is the exclusive province of Government.

- Command at the military strategic level is concerned with the art and science of coordinating the application of military power.

- Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) commands the ADF ('full command'), and is the principal military adviser to the Minister for Defence (MINDEF).

- Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) exercises command of operations of assigned forces on behalf of CDF.

- Command at the operational level is concerned with planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to support strategic objectives.

- Command at the tactical level is responsible for the planning and conduct of military tasks and actions, usually through joint task forces (JTF), although a JTF may be formed at the operational level.
Levels of command

4.1 C2 doctrine in the ADF is applied on three recognised levels of command, namely strategic, operational and tactical. These levels of command provide a framework for C2 of operations, and analysis of politico-military activity, before, during and after the conduct of military operations. An understanding of the levels of command—and of their limitations—is vital to a commander’s grasp of the application of military force. Force may be applied in different ways at different levels in pursuit of strategic objectives. For example, it may be applied offensively at one level, whilst being defensive at another, both being consistent with the military strategic end state.

4.2 Strategic level. The strategic level of command is concerned with the art and science of employing national power in a synchronised fashion to secure national objectives. The strategic level of command includes:

- National strategic. The national strategic level refers to the broad political dimension of national activities, both domestically and internationally, and is the exclusive province of government. Mobilisation of national military and non-military resources occurs at this level. National strategic planners define political objectives and provide the overall direction for military strategic planners.

- Military strategic. The military strategic level of command refers to the planning and direction of military operations and activities to meet national strategic objectives within a whole of government approach. The CDF is responsible for setting the military strategic end state, objectives, desired effects, critical coordination activities and the broad approach to be taken.

1 Defence Act 1903, Section 8: Powers of Minister in relation to Defence Force.
- **Operational level.** The operational level of command is the primary responsibility of CJOPS. This level of command plan, synchronise and conduct campaigns and operations to achieve strategic objectives. The operational level provides direction and resources to force elements (FE) taking military action, thus acting as the interface between the strategic and tactical levels of command. The focus of command at this level is on forming joint forces, deploying them into areas of operations, monitoring and controlling operations and sustaining them logistically.

- **Tactical level.** The tactical level of command plans and conducts military tasks and actions to achieve operational objectives. Tactical military action integrates and applies lethal and non-lethal force to bring about desired effects. Joint operations at this level are normally conducted by one or more JTF, each comprising an appropriate mix of capabilities. Most FE conduct operations at the tactical level.

![Figure 4–1: The Australian Federal Government identifies the national strategic objectives which guide Australia’s military strategy](image)

4.3 The matching of command authorities to each of the levels of command is not straightforward due to the overlap of responsibilities between levels. Figure 4–2 shows the general relationship of command to the three levels, which closely correlates with the ‘ends’, ‘ways’ and ‘means’ of achieving national objectives. The implications of overlapping command levels are discussed later in this chapter.

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2 *Refer* to Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.0—*Operations* (chapter 1—‘Philosophy of Joint Operations’).
4.4 The levels of command reflect the distribution of responsibilities for planning and directing resources for campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises and other activities as directed by CDF. Although the levels of command were developed with warfighting in mind, they apply to all ADF operations and activities.

4.5 When applying military power in pursuit of national security objectives, appropriate control of that power is essential to ensure military activity is consistent with Government policy. The ADF command structure must therefore:

- satisfy the government’s appropriate and growing interest in tactical activities with potentially strategic level implications,
- provide for lawful delegation of authority,
- facilitate the efficient and effective employment of capabilities and resources,
- allow commanders at all levels to achieve their mission through initiative and the application of operational art and design,
be adaptable to any military activity or operation the ADF may be required to execute,

take into account the potential effects of technology, and

inspire confidence in members of the ADF and the wider community.

CDF commands the ADF. Service Chiefs exercise full command of their respective single-Services for all aspects except operations. CDF’s command includes, when directed by MINDEF and Cabinet, authority to directly conduct operations. In practice though, in almost all cases, CJOPS will exercise command of operations on behalf of CDF.

COMMAND AT THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC LEVEL

The Australian Government

Australian sovereignty is based on a self-governing federation of Australian States, incorporating a constitutional monarchy and liberal-democratic structures and processes. Australia’s system of government is a product both of its history and its national values. Within this federal political system, national defence is the constitutional responsibility of the Commonwealth Government. All Defence activities are governed by the cardinal principle of control of the ADF by the civil authority. The ADF, and Defence, are accountable to the Government, and the Government in turn, through the Parliament, is accountable to the people of Australia.

Consequently, command at the national strategic level is the exclusive province of Government, whether acting independently or in concert with other governments. The latter will usually be effected through a multinational organisation (such as the United Nations), an alliance established by treaty (such as the Australian, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Treaty) or an ad hoc coalition (such as that formed in Iraq in 2003).

Legal and constitutional basis. The Defence Act 1903 includes provisions that set out the broad legislative framework dealing with the command and administration of the ADF and its 3 arms; the Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force. In setting the broad parameters on these matters, the Defence Act:

- provides that MINDEF has the general control and administration of the ADF (section 8);

- vests the command of the ADF with the CDF, subject to MINDEF’s power of general control and administration (section 9);
• provides that the Chief of Navy (CN), Chief of Army (CA) and the Chief of Air Force (CAF), under the CDF, command their respective arms of the ADF, subject to MINDEF’s power of general control and administration (section 9);

• vests the administration of the ADF jointly with the CDF and Secretary of Defence (SECDEF) except with respect to:
  – matters falling within the command of the ADF or the command of an arm of the ADF; or
  – any other matter specified by MINDEF (section 9A); and

• provides that the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) shall, under the CDF, be responsible for such part of the administration of the ADF in respect of which the CDF has responsibility, whether alone or jointly with the SECDEF, as the CDF specifies in writing, and shall have such other functions as CDF determines in writing (section 9AA).

4.10 The above provisions are consistent with the general constitutional responsibility and authority of Ministers for the administration of their portfolios. They ensure that any exercise of command and administration responsibilities in the ADF, as well as the administration of the Department, are subject to ministerial control. They also emphasise the primacy of civilian authority over the ADF.

4.11 In addition, the SECDEF is, with the exception of the Defence Materiel Organisation, responsible for the Department and ADF under the Financial Management and Accountability (FMA) Act 1997 and its associated regulations and Chief Executive Instructions. All ADF members are allocated to the Department of Defence under regulation 4 of the FMA Regulations and are required to comply with the requirements of the Financial Management and Accountability legislation. As a result, the SECDEF is responsible for advising MINDEF on matters relating to the stewardship of Defence resources, as well as policy and departmental issues.

4.12 Section 68 of the Constitution provides that the Governor-General has ‘command in chief’ of the ADF, this function of the Governor-General has always been recognised as titular in nature and lacking any substantive powers of command or direction. In addition, any powers in Defence legislation that vest specific powers with the Governor-General (e.g. powers of appointment of the chiefs) which are not exercised by a delegate must be exercised under ministerial advice.
4.13 Parliament and the executive. The constitutional authority for setting strategic and defence policy lies unequivocally with the Parliament and the Executive. In practical terms, this power is exercised by:

- the Cabinet;
- the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC), usually comprising the Prime Minister (Chairman), the Deputy Prime Minister, MINDEF, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Treasurer and the Attorney-General; and
- MINDEF, noting that MINDEF is subject to decisions of the Cabinet and of the NSC.

4.14 Cabinet and NSC mechanisms ensure that decisions to deploy the ADF on operations reflect a whole of government approach.

4.15 National Security Committee of Cabinet. In Australia, command at the national strategic level is executed through the NSC. This committee directs national strategy and provides coherence to overall national, alliance or coalition policy, including military and non-military aspects. National strategic command responsibilities are to:

- determine the political objectives to be achieved and monitor progress towards their achievement;
- stipulate and monitor limitations and conditions to be imposed on the military, including circumstances in which military activity should cease (the end state); and
- make available required resources, including direction of the national industrial base.

Defence

4.16 Defence is an institution subordinate to the authority vested in the Government by the Australian people. This subordination of Defence to the Government, and the Government to the people, is fundamental to Australia’s political culture. Commanders and their subordinates at all levels serve the Government and the people.

4.17 Command can only achieve legitimacy when it is exercised in the context of acting in response to a lawful direction from the Government. Defence, and the ADF in particular, will lose the confidence of the Government and the people if it fails to act legitimately when force is used on behalf of the Government.
4.18 The Government provides strategic guidance to Defence in the form of White Papers. Defence conducts its business under the guidance of the ‘diarchy’. Under the *Defence Act 1903*, the CDF and SECDEF jointly administer the ADF, except with respect to matters relating to command of the ADF and any other matters prescribed by MINDEF. CDF and SECDEF are to exercise their authority subject to, and in accordance with, direction from MINDEF.

4.19 Defence governance framework. Essential elements of the Defence governance framework are:

- A joint ministerial directive to the CDF and SECDEF is issued by MINDEF. This directive unambiguously establishes MINDEF as the 'customer' for, and 'owner' of, outputs delivered by CDF and SECDEF.

- The directive provides detailed ministerial direction to both officers on how MINDEF expects them to conduct their business in delivering Defence outcomes to Government. It details the respective roles, responsibilities and accountabilities of CDF and SECDEF, ministerial expectations, and pragmatic implementation changes. Further detail on the CDF/SECDEF ‘diarchy’ is contained in the next paragraph.

- The Directive is carefully structured to allow it to be 'cascaded' to Service Chiefs and Group Heads in the form of Charter letters. This clearly establishes the chain of accountability from MINDEF, through CDF and SECDEF, to Service Chiefs and Group Heads.

- Both the directive and the charters specify key accountabilities and results, but not the means of achievement. This reflects the underlying philosophy of the Defence governance framework to allow Defence leaders to pursue innovation, but with clear accountability.
The diarchy

The diarchy is a collegiate, cooperative and adaptive governance arrangement, subject to directions issued by the Minister for Defence, which in practice has the flexibility to satisfy changing needs and to meet challenges as they emerge in delivering those Defence outcomes for Government.

Secretary of the Department of Defence ³

4.20 The term ‘diarchy’, while it derives much from section 9A of the Defence Act, in fact has no specific legislative basis. Rather, it has become a commonly used term to describe the relationship between CDF and SECDEF, both under MINDEF. The manner in which it operates is further set out and clarified in directions given to CDF and SECDEF by MINDEF.

4.21 The diarchy is a governance structure unique in the Commonwealth public service. It reflects the amalgamation of what were previously discrete entities into the one Defence organisation. The diarchy reflects the individual responsibilities and accountabilities of CDF and SECDEF, and also their joint responsibilities and accountabilities, in ensuring that the Defence organisation delivers to Government the outcomes that go to meeting the goal of defending Australia and its interests. Since the 1970s, the diarchy has been a flexible and successful mechanism through which Defence has delivered results to Government.

4.22 Within this diarchy, under section 8 of the Defence Act of 1903, CDF commands the Defence Force. CDF is the principal military advisor to MINDEF. Under section 9A of the Defence Act, the CDF and SECDEF jointly administer the Defence Force.

4.23 The SECDEF is the principal civilian adviser to MINDEF and carries out the functions of a departmental head. In that context, SECDEF exercises the statutory responsibilities under section 57 of the Public Service Act 1999 and the responsibilities under section 44 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997, in relation to the efficient, effective and ethical use of resources. MINDEF would look to SECDEF for primary advice on departmental issues and on the proper use of resources in Defence.

³ Secretary’s Statement to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Defence Sub Committee), Review of the Defence Annual Report 2001–02, 27 February 2003.
Support from other agencies

4.24 Other Defence, and non-Defence, agencies may support ADF commanders at all levels in accordance with a whole of government approach. This support should be coordinated at the highest practicable level. Government legislation, conventions, departmental instructions, contracts and memorandums of understanding control these supporting agencies which are all external to the ADF command chain. In the case of agencies with legislative obligations, command will be affected through the relevant Government Minister responsible for that agency. In the case of contractual obligations, command will be affected through the relevant Defence Group.

COMMAND AT THE MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVEL

4.25 At the military strategic level CDF and SECDEF develop and implement plans and programs to give military substance and effect to guidance from the Government. In multinational or alliance operations, national authorities together determine the level and type of military contribution.

4.26 Command at the military strategic level is exercised by CDF supported by the VCDF, CJOPS and the Service Chiefs. CDF commands the ADF under direction of MINDEF, and is the principal military adviser to MINDEF. This role arises directly from section 9(2) of the *Defence Act*, whereby the Governor-General may appoint an ADF officer to be CDF.

4.27 In this regard, MINDEF would look to the CDF for primary advice on matters that relate to military activity, including operations. The CDF and SECDEF also have joint responsibilities and accountabilities in respect of the administration of the ADF. In this regard, MINDEF would look to either or both, CDF and/or SECDEF, for advice.
Section 9: Command of Defence Force and arms of Defence Force

(1) The Governor-General may appoint an officer of an arm of the Defence Force to be Chief of the Defence Force and:

(a) may appoint an officer of the Navy to be Chief of Navy;

(b) may appoint an officer of the Army to be Chief of Army; and

(c) may appoint an officer of the Air Force to be Chief of Air Force.

(2) Subject to section 8, the Chief of the Defence Force shall command the Defence Force, and the service chief of an arm of the Defence Force shall, under the Chief of the Defence Force, command the arm of the Defence Force of which he is service chief.

(3) It is a function of the Chief of the Defence Force to advise the Minister, in such manner as the Minister directs, on matters relating to the command by the Chief of the Defence Force, and it is a function of the service chief of an arm of the Defence Force to advise the Minister, in such manner as the Minister directs, on matters relating to the command by the service chief of the arm of the Defence Force of which he is the service chief.

Defence Act 1903

Chief of the Defence Force

4.28 Command of the ADF is held by CDF. CDF provides the military advice needed by Government to assist in determining national strategic objectives and deciding realistic military strategic objectives. The mechanisms by which Defence provides advice to Government are detailed in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) D—Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine and ADDP 5.0—Joint Planning (Provisional).

4 CDF exercises ‘full command’ of the ADF, refer chapter 3—‘States of command’.
4.29 CDF is also the principal military adviser to MINDEF. CDF is responsible to MINDEF for:

- arrangements for the exercise of C2 within the ADF;
- planning and conduct of military operations;
- preparedness of the ADF including its organisation, manning, training and logistic support;
- raising of forces and units; and
- maintenance of standards of health, welfare, morale and discipline.

4.30 Taking into account the views of the Service Chiefs, CDF is also responsible for the provision of military advice to MINDEF on relevant issues, which include:

- strategy;
- the implications of strategic developments;
- aspects of ADF capabilities necessary to meet approved Defence policy objectives;
- aspects of ADF development, including the size of the ADF and the balance within it, and supporting infrastructure; and
- aspects of the disposition of components of the ADF.

4.31 In commanding the ADF at the military strategic level, CDF is responsible for:

- assessing national military strategies available to achieve strategic objectives in the light of political, humanitarian and economic constraints to the application of military force;
- identifying military strategic objectives and assessing their feasibility;
- identifying the desired military strategic end state;
- considering political, financial or legal constraints on the use of military force, with particular regard to alliance or coalition partners;
- directing forces and resources to be assigned;
• approving the operational-level commander’s objectives and concept of operations (CONOPS), and monitoring the execution of the campaign; and

• establishing the military strategic command organisation specific to the campaign.

Figure 4–3: The Chief of Defence Force, Vice Chief of Defence Force, Service Chiefs, Chief of Joint Operations and Chief of Capability Development

Service Chiefs

4.32 Command of each of the ADF Services is exercised by the Chief of that Service, as expressed in section 9 of the Defence Act. The Service Chiefs are CDF’s principal military advisers on Defence policy, military strategy and the employment of their Service’s forces. They are also responsible for advising the Minister on matters relating to the command of their Service.

4.33 Success in joint operations derives from the warfighting capabilities of the single-Services prepared for adaptive employment. The principle is to draw together a multi-purpose force from a pool of single-Service units and mould them into a task-orientated grouping appropriate to the needs of a specific operation. Such an approach confers economy of effort whilst exploiting the inherent stability of single-Service structures. To accomplish this, the single-Services must be sufficiently responsive to meet the short
time-scales of an emerging crisis. Establishing the balance between the organisational stability required for developing single-Service professional expertise and the responsiveness so vital to effective joint operations is central to the roles of the Service Chiefs.

4.34 The Service Chiefs are responsible to CDF and obligated to their Service for:

- arrangements for the exercise of C2 within their Service;
- advice to CDF on single-Service aspects of planning and conduct of military operations;
- the preparedness of their Service elements, including their organisation, manning, training and logistic support;
- the assignment of prepared forces to operations, joint exercises and activities as directed;
- raising of single-Service forces and units as directed;
- maintenance of standards of health, welfare, morale and discipline; and
- delegating command within their respective Services to subordinates, who exercise command by virtue of their rank or assignment.

Chief of Joint Operations

4.35 CJOPS is CDF’s principal adviser at the operational level. In addition, as a member of the Strategic Command Group (SCG), together with the three single Service Chiefs, CJOPS is a principal adviser to CDF at the strategic level for matters relating to operations. Although CDF retains the right to command operations when required, in practice CJOPS will exercise command, theatre command\(^5\) (TCOMD), of assigned forces for operations, joint exercises and activities on behalf of CDF.

4.36 CJOPS is responsible to CDF, and obligated to his subordinate organisations, for:

- deriving from the military strategic end state the necessary operational level planning guidance for the Deputy Chief of Joint

\(^5\) Theatre command is defined in chapter 3.
Operations (DCJOPS), in order for DCJOPS to develop operational objectives which will constitute success;

- the mounting and conduct of designated operations, joint exercises and activities;

- considering any political, financial or legal limitations on the use of military force, with particular regard to alliance or coalition partners;

- allocating forces and resources and appointing commanders who will exercise degrees of operational authority over their commands;

- joint preparedness in accordance with the Operational Preparedness Directive;

- approving the operational level commander’s operational objectives and CONOPS and where necessary adjusting resources, and monitoring the execution of the campaign;

- establishing the operational level C2 organisation specific to the campaign or operation; and

- command of assigned agencies and units.

**Strategic committees and groups**

4.37 The key committees and command groups that support CDF in exercising command obligations are:

4.38 **Defence Committee.** The Defence Committee (DC) is the pre-eminent committee supporting the SECDEF and CDF in meeting their obligations under the Ministerial Directive. The DC derives its authority from the SECDEF and the CDF, and their commitment for the Committee to deliberate on strategic issues that require collective consideration in relation to achievement of the Ministerial Directive. The Defence Committee’s role is to make the decisions that assist in achieving the results specified in the Ministerial Directive to the SECDEF and CDF. The DC comprises SECDEF (Chairman); CDF, VCDF, Chief Executive Officer Defence Material Organisation, CN, CA, CAF, Chief Capability Development Group (CCDG), Deputy Secretary (DEPSEC) Strategy, Coordination & Governance (SCG), DEPSEC Intelligence, Security and International Policy (IS&IP), DEPSEC Defence Support Group, DEPSEC People Strategies and Policy, Chief Information Officer, Chief Finance Officer and the Chief Defence Scientist. The Ministerial Directive requires the SECDEF and CDF to deliver:
• successful conduct of military operations, the CDF retaining sole command authority;

• provision of capability to enable our Defence forces to defend Australia and its national interests;

• timely and responsive advice;

• appropriate stewardship of people and of financial and other resources, including operating within budgeted financial constraints; and

• appropriate evaluation and reporting documents, including an annual Defence Management and Finance Plan, the Defence Capability Plan, and periodic Strategic Reviews and White Paper reports.

4.39 Chiefs of Service Committee. The role of the Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC) is to provide military advice to the CDF to assist in the discharge his responsibilities with command of the ADF and as principal military adviser to the Government, as outlined in the Ministerial Directive. COSC advises CDF on the approval of strategic-level military strategies and plans, including the assignment of forces and supporting assets to CJOPS as operational commander. The COSC permanent members comprise CDF (Chairman), SECDEF, the Service Chiefs and VCDF. Permanently invited members are CJOPS, CCDG and DEPSEC SCG. CDF may augment COSC by inviting additional Deputy Secretaries and other appropriate officers for discussion of matters affecting their functional areas of responsibility.

4.40 Strategic Command Group. The Strategic Command Group (SCG) is another key advisory body providing CDF with situational awareness on intelligence, policy and operational issues and advice on military options. In doing so, the SCG performs the following roles:

• Provide advice to the CDF in relation to ADF operations, in support of CDF as the principal military adviser to the Government, and in exercising full command of the ADF.

• Provide situational awareness of ADF operations for CDF and a secure forum for CDF to issue direction and intent.

• Coordinating the Defence strategic management response to a critical incident involving, but not limited to:

  – death or multiple major injuries of ADF personnel on operations, training accidents or other incidents as determined by CDF;
– capture of ADF personnel on operations;

– terrorist or suspected terrorist incidents which might require an ADF response; and

– emergencies (including national disasters) and accidents involving the loss of or significant damage to military platforms.

4.41 The diverse roles of the SCG dictate that format and attendance will be adjusted to suit the needs of the CDF on a case by case basis. There are three broad types of SCG:

- **SCG Principals (SCG-P).** The SCG-P advises CDF on strategic issues and assists in the formulation of strategic military guidance to the ADF and advice to Government. Attendance at this SCG is limited to the appropriate senior officers of the Department and the ADF. The permanent members comprise: the CDF (Chairman); VCDF; SECDEF; Service Chiefs; DEPSEC SCG and DEPSEC IS&IP.

- **SCG Operations (SCG-O).** The SCG-O provides CDF with situational awareness of ADF operational matters, including emerging threats, policy matters, public affairs and force availability. Attendance at this SCG will normally include a larger number of Departmental, ADF officers and selected staff which will allow a clear understanding of intent and rapid execution of direction. The permanent members comprise: the CDF (Chairman); VCDF; SECDEF; Service Chiefs; DEPSEC SCG and DEPSEC IS&IP.

- **SCG Contingency (SCG-C).** The SCG-C provides CDF with situational awareness of any critical incident that requires the provision of strategic direction to the ADF or advice to Government. Personnel attendance at the SCG-C will normally be similar to the SCG-O but will be determined on a case by case basis.

**COMMAND AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL**

4.42 The operational level of command is the primary responsibility of CJOPS. However, the distinction between command at the military strategic and operational levels of conflict is rarely clear cut.
The strategic level of war has to do with overall direction of the war effort, and with the overarching political objective of the conflict. ... The operational level of war has to do with the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations to achieve strategic-level objectives. ... The operational level of war is the link between the strategic and tactical levels of war.

ADDP–D—Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine

4.43 The operational level commander provides direction and resources to the force elements taking military action. The focus of command at this level is on forming the joint force, deploying the force into the area of operations, sustaining the force, allocating resources and providing guidance to best achieve strategic objectives and effects. The operational level commander links military strategic objectives with all tactical activity in the theatre, and directs military resources to achieve the end state.

Chief of Joint Operations

4.44 CJOPS, through DCJOPS, conducts operational planning using elements of ‘operational art’ and ‘operational design’. CDF has assigned CJOPS command over Joint Operations Command (JOC), direct command units and assigned forces. JOC was formally established as a joint command by the CDF, pursuant to section 9 of the Defence Act 1903 and Regulation 4 of the Defence Force Regulations, on 10 August 2004.6

4.45 Depending on the nature and scale of the operation, and within the constraints of any amplifying directive released by CDF, CJOPS will command the operation directly. CJOPS will exercise TCOMD over assigned assets. CJOPS will design a campaign or operational plan, command assigned forces, direct major operations of any campaign and be responsible for:

- recommending the CONOPS for CDF approval;
- determining the operational objectives necessary to support the achievement of the military strategic objectives which in turn support the achievement of the military strategic end state;

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• recommending to CDF the resources required to achieve the operational objectives;

• allocating assigned resources as necessary to subordinate commanders to achieve their tactical missions;

• determining in what sequence operational objectives should be achieved;

• setting priorities for the provision of combat and logistic support to sustain tactical battles;

• directing the activities of those formations, ships, aircraft and other units or assets not delegated to subordinate commanders, especially those earmarked as operational level reserves; and

• keeping CDF informed of actions, problems and future plans and maintaining awareness of considerations affecting CDF’s intentions.

4.46 Within the framework of the CDF’s military strategic guidance, CJOPS and the staff of Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) should focus on analysing the centre of gravity for both the ADF and the adversary. CJOPS will then decide the actions that will be decisive in protecting the ADF’s centre of gravity, defeating an adversary’s centre of gravity and the shaping operations required to achieve the required end-state.

4.47 Joint power of command. To permit CJOPS and subordinate commanders to lawfully exercise command over personnel of the various Services, CDF directs that, when a member or part of the Navy, Army or Air Force is posted or attached for duty or assigned to a JOC direct command unit or an assigned force, then those members or parts are considered to be acting together. An instrument issued by CDF gives authority to any officer, warrant officer or non-commissioned officer acting in the joint arena in this fashion to exercise powers of command in accordance with Part II of the Defence Force Regulations.

Deputy Chief of Joint Operations

4.48 DCJOPS, as HQJOC Chief of Staff (COS) is responsible for coordinating and directing the HQ staff, through the HQJOC Branch Heads,
to plan, control and coordinate all aspects relating to campaigns, operations and specified joint and combined exercises.

4.49 Planning at the operational level utilises elements of both operational art and operational design:

**Operational art.** The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of campaigns, operations and battles.

**Operational design.** Operational design is the way in which CJOPS expresses a vision on how the operation may unfold and how the desired effects will be synchronised.

4.50 CJOPS and the COS utilise operational art to translate military strategic guidance into operational and ultimately tactical action. For further detail on planning for joint operations refer to ADDP 5.0.

**Commander Joint Logistics**

4.51 CJLOG has strategic-level responsibility to VCDF and the Service Chiefs for the provision of logistic advice, logistic staff support and logistics. The Joint Logistics Command (JLC) is responsible for planning for the provision of National Support Base materiel support to ADF operations and exercises. JLC develops tactical level guidance to its business units taken from HQJOC operational level guidance to provide sustainment of operational forces.

4.52 CJLOG is tasked to provide direct support to CJOPS for the delivery of logistics support for operations. In this capacity, CJLOG has operational responsibilities to CJOPS and other operational commanders for the provision of:

- logistic support to designated campaigns, operations, exercises and other activities;

- logistic advice; and

- the coordination of support to operations by the enabling groups.

**Commander Border Protection Command**

4.53 Border Protection Command (BPC) is a multi-agency organisation consisting of ADF, Australian Customs Service (ACS), Australian Fisheries Management Authority and Australian Quarantine Inspection Service
personnel. BPC is the Australian Government lead organisation with respect to offshore security and undertakes planning, preparedness, prevention, response and recovery-related maritime security activities, including responses to terrorism threats or incidents originating from Australia’s maritime domain.

4.54 An ADF two star officer, agreed between the CDF and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the ACS, commands the BPC. The Commander BPC (CBPC) commands and manages BPC under a joint CDF and CEO ACS Directive. In the Defence context, CBPC is responsible to CDF through CJOPS. In the Customs context, CBPC is responsible to the CEO ACS.

4.55 CBPC is responsible to the CEO ACS for the planning and execution of the Civil Maritime Surveillance Program and for the coordination of any surface response in support of this program. CBPC, as commander JTF639, is responsible to CJOPS for the conduct of surveillance and coordination of maritime response in the Australian exclusive economic zone and adjacent areas, and to prepare for, support and/or command directed offshore maritime, joint and specified operations to defend Australia and its interests. In this regard, CBPC is responsible for the operational level command and planning of designated ADF operations, joint exercises and other activities in support of the provision of military offshore patrol, prevention, interdiction and response capabilities pertaining to the protection of offshore facilities and shipping. Additionally, CBPC is responsible to the CEO ACS for the planning and execution of the Civil Maritime Surveillance Program and for the coordination of response in support of this program.

COMMAND AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

4.56 At the tactical level forces meet the adversary, placing different pressures and command responsibilities on the tactical commander than those experienced by strategic and operational level commanders. Tactical military action integrates and applies fighting power to achieve decisive and enabling effects in accordance with operational objectives. Most ADF force elements conduct operations at the tactical level.
Operational level of war has to do with the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations to achieve strategic-level objectives. . . . Tactical level of war has to do with the planning and conduct of battles and engagements that are subsets of a military campaign.

4.57 A Commander Joint Task Force (Comd JTF) is designated by CDF or CJOPS for a specified campaign, operation or activity, and is responsible for the conduct of operations as directed. JTF subordinate commanders, who may command force element groups, formations and units, are appointed by their respective Service Chiefs. These subordinate commanders are responsible for commanding their units in accordance with joint and single-Service doctrine whilst achieving a Comd JTF’s joint objectives.

EXAMPLES OF COMMAND AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

Figure 4–4: HMAS KANIMBLA in the Persian Gulf 2002. As well as providing boarding parties and replenishment for maritime intercept operations, HMAS KANIMBLA was the C2 platform for the Maritime Component of the Australian National Force.
Figure 4–5: Headquarters Sector West at Suai in East Timor 1999. Commanded by HQ International Force at Dili, HQ Sector West was set up by Army’s 3rd Brigade in the Suai Courthouse. This HQ was responsible for the AO west of Dili on the border with Indonesian West Timor.

4.58 C2 at the tactical level, including Comd JTF responsibilities, is detailed in annex A.

OVERLAPPING LEVELS OF COMMAND

4.59 The levels of command were developed with warfighting in mind, although they can apply to military activities across the spectrum of operations. Planning at the strategic, operational and tactical levels is very closely linked and interdependent. There is never any clear line between the levels. They invariably overlap and distinctions between them will rarely be precise. In some operations, and during the management of complex situations, action taken at the lowest tactical level may need to be especially responsive to strategic decision making. The need for this responsiveness is due to the current operating environment where an increasing number of military actions are capable of generating both desirable and undesirable strategic effects and outcomes. In these situations control mechanisms must be established enabling tactical elements to be especially responsive to strategic decision making. For example, the contact between Australian and Indonesian forces on the East Timor tactical control line during Operation STABILISE could have had ramifications for the national strategic relationship between the two nations, a relationship that was already under some considerable tension.
4.60 As a result of this and similar incidents, Defence should be equipped to rapidly pass accurate information and advice from the tactical to the strategic level. There are two primary reasons for this. The first enables political and military leaders at the strategic level to remain confident that subordinate commanders understand strategic objectives and the effects the Government requires from military action. This confidence is a pre-requisite for effective delegation of authority through mission command.

4.61 The second reason for streamlined information passage between all levels of command is political and cultural, in aiming to keep the government informed of events before the media. However, this is not always possible. The ability of technologically-capable ‘embedded journalists’ to provide almost instantaneous battlefield detail to their news services using portable satellite equipment was clearly demonstrated in the Iraq campaign of 2003. While the exact facts and detail of an incident may initially be unclear, the fact that something has occurred must be passed to the strategic level from the tactical level at a speed comparable to that achieved by the media.

The tradition that the military will provide measured advice to the strategic level only when the picture is clear has gone from normal operations and will not return.

Clarke Review, 2003

4.62 While CJOPS is still the main provider of information upwards to the strategic level, the traditional military channelling of information progressively upwards through myriad of layers of intermediate HQ is becoming increasingly complex. A network centric approach, facilitated by modern technology, enables information to be rapidly passed to the strategic level in parallel with intermediate HQ who may offer comment when necessary.

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A network centric approach to warfare involves passing information between different parts of the ADF in a rapid and seamless way. Achieving an efficient degree of connectivity offers the Australian military a future in which our personnel can detect, identify and engage targets, using a broad range of sensors and weapons. More importantly however, relevant, accurate and protected information will allow ADF personnel to collaborate and to achieve a level of synchronisation superior to that of any adversary.

General Peter Cosgrove, AC MC

Command dilemma

4.63 While the overlap of levels of command may be inevitable and unavoidable, it has the potential to undermine the C2 structure and the philosophy of mission command. This is the so-called ‘command dilemma’.

4.64 The command dilemma can be managed if the overlap is anticipated and considered during planning. The two interconnected challenges are:

- the risk of senior commanders 'micro-managing' operations at lower levels; and

- too heavy a reliance on communications, which has the effect of undermining the longer-term ability, or indeed willingness, of subordinates to take the initiative.

4.65 The best response to these challenges is to strike a balance, allowing the initiative to be taken by subordinates but with superior commanders providing guidance and support when appropriate. Given the immediate impact that some tactical decisions can have on strategic outcomes, achieving the right balance is not always easy. Nevertheless, a balanced C2 approach is a fundamentally important skill for commanders to develop. The key to this is mutual trust and confidence amongst commanders, one of the pre-requisites of mission command.

Annex:
A. Joint Task Force Command and Control

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JOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. The composition of a joint task force (JTF) is largely determined by the mission and situation and is outlined in the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) order establishing the force. This order also details the broad command and control (C2) arrangements for the operation and assigned force elements (FE).

2. A JTF is established when a mission requires two or more Services operating together on a significant scale and requiring close integration of effort. A JTF could also be required to coordinate joint force activities within a subordinate area such as local defence. A JTF may also be required to effectively liaise and coordinate the activities of one or more Services in conjunction with a government agency or non-government organisation. The JTF is dissolved once the mission and end state have been achieved.

3. JTF have a functional or task focus, which their compositions will reflect, from small and specialised, to large, perhaps comprising a significant portion of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The choice for force composition and command arrangements depends on the nature of the activity. CDF and Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) can command the JTF either:
   a. directly (through Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC)); or
   b. through a Commander JTF (Comd JTF).

4. JTF may have subordinate structures such as single Service tactical organisations (Brigades or Naval Task Groups), or joint forces assembled into environmental or functional components, or perhaps one or more subordinate JTF. A mixture of these structures can also be used. Major JTF Commanders will plan and conduct assigned operations and phases of campaigns, often supported by other component commanders. Minor JTF Commanders will be assigned staff and forces commensurate with the assigned task, operation or activity.

Responsibilities of the Commander Joint Task Force

5. The authority establishing a JTF appoints the Comd JTF and assigns the mission and forces. Comd JTF is responsible for making recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of assigned forces to achieve assigned missions.
6. The responsibilities of a Comd JTF include:

   a. exercising C2 over assigned and attached forces;

   b. developing a detailed plan for approval by the establishing authority;

   c. requesting rules of engagement (ROE) needed to accomplish the assigned mission;

   d. notifying the establishing authority when prepared to assume responsibility for the assigned joint force area of operations or area of responsibility;

   e. ensuring that cross-Service support is provided and that the JTF operates as an effective, mutually supporting team;

   f. using assigned forces to best perform the mission;

   g. providing guidance to subordinate forces for the planning and conduct of combat operations;

   h. monitoring the operational situation and keeping the superior commander informed;

   i. coordinating with other forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, as appropriate;

   j. establishing, if necessary, a coordinating procedure for specific functions or activities among assigned, attached, and supporting forces;

   k. establishing the succession of command within the JTF; and

   l. apportioning to subordinate commanders, as necessary, those tasks needed to accomplish the plan.

7. The responsibilities of a JTF component commander include:

   a. as authorised by Comd JTF, exercising C2 of assigned and attached forces and control over supporting forces;
b. as directed by Comd JTF, coordinating with commanders of other JTF components to ensure the effective and efficient conduct of operations;

c. the planning and conduct of operations in accordance with Comd JTF guidance and detailed plans;

d. monitoring the operational situation and, as required, passing information to the Comd JTF;

e. ensuring administrative and logistic support for the force, as required by Service regulations or by Comd JTF; and

f. providing liaison personnel to Comd JTF, other component commanders, and supporting commanders as necessary or as directed by Comd JTF.
CHAPTER 5
METHODS OF COMMAND

Executive summary

This chapter describes the process of command of Australian Defence Force (ADF) joint operations, including headquarters (HQ) staff structures and the common joint staff system.

- The ADF recognises two methods for command and control (C2) of joint operations: the direct method and the component method.

- The direct method is useful for operations of limited scale and intensity, when HQ staff can manage the greater span of command.

- For operations of greater scale and intensity, when the span of command may become cumbersome, the component method of command may be better suited.

- With the component method, the force is divided into components, each with its own component commander (CC) who issues orders consistent with the broad direction of the joint commander.

- CC are usually, though not always, co-located with the Commander Joint Task Force (Comd JTF).

- Components may be grouped along single-Service lines, or comprise functional groupings of formations, units, sub-units or elements from more than one Service under appropriate states of command.

- The ADF employs both integrated and component joint staff structures for joint operations.

- Selection of the most appropriate C2 method, including joint staff structure, should be guided by the principles of command and the operational environment.

- The Comd JTF may achieve tactical coordination of components by designating them as either ‘supported’ or ‘supporting’ CC.
The art of command requires refinement of a number of professional and personal attributes, including mental discipline, operational experience, a clear sense of professional judgment and a rigorous approach to the use of time.

General Peter Cosgrove, AC MC

5.1 The ADF recognises two methods for C2 of joint operations: the direct method and the component method.

**Direct method**

5.2 A Comd JTF may exercise command authority directly over assigned forces. This method is normally used when the knowledge and capacity of the commander and staff are such that they can employ the capabilities of assigned forces effectively, and when the scale and intensity of the operation is limited.

5.3 However, when using the direct method of command the HQ must be appropriately staffed and equipped for the greater span of command. The direct method of command is shown in figure 5–1.

![Figure 5–1: The direct method of command](image-url)
Component method

5.4 When the scale and intensity of the operation increase significantly, the span of command may become too great for effective use of the direct method of command. An alternative is to divide the force into components, each with its own commander who issues orders consistent with the broad direction of the Comd JTF. This is known as the component method of command.

5.5 Component commanders are usually, though not always, collocated with the Comd JTF. They will require staff support and command facilities, large or small, collocated or separate, depending on the operation. An example of the component method of command would be assignment of maritime assets under the operational command (OPCOMD) of a Comd JTF, with the maritime assets commanded by the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). The component method of command is shown in figure 5–2.

![Component method of command diagram](image)

**Figure 5–2: The component method of command**

5.6 Components may be grouped essentially along single-Service lines, or they may comprise functional groupings of formations, units, sub-units or elements from more than one single Service under appropriate states of command (*refer chapter 4—‘National command structure’*). An example of
the latter is assignment of tactical fighter aircraft under tactical control (TACON) of an MCC for maritime air defence.

**Joint staff structures**

5.7 The ADF employs two types of joint staff structure for joint operations: the integrated and the component. They should not be confused with the methods of command, but can be used by either. Salient features of each are as follows:

- **Integrated.** Staff expertise from the three Services and specialist capabilities such as special operations and logistics are integrated within functional branches of the HQ. HQJOC is an example of an integrated headquarters.

- **Component.** Single-Service, Special Operations and logistics staff may be grouped in separate components with each component having its own component commander subordinate to the Comd JTF. The component staff system allows the Comd JTF to draw on single-Service, environmental or functional expertise to plan and conduct operations.

5.8 **Common joint staff system.** Both the integrated and component staff structures normally use the common joint staff system (CJSS) adapted from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) joint (J) staff system. The CJSS is described in annex A.

**Headquarters Joint Operations Command**

5.9 The current command arrangement within Joint Operations Command (JOC), at the operational level, is an example of the direct method of command with a single integrated HQJOC and subordinate units being under the direct command of the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS).
Selection of command and control arrangements

5.10 Selection of the most appropriate C2 method, including joint staff structure, should be guided by the principles of command and the operational environment. Additional factors are:

- the nature of the mission,
- the size and composition of the force,
- the need to maintain flexibility,
- the political and geographic considerations, and
- communications.

5.11 Smaller, less complex JTF can often be commanded without the need to create components. A JTF HQ staff directly controlling a force element group on behalf of Comd JTF permits efficiencies in time and personnel. For example: HQ Northern Command for Operation RESOLUTE and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 635 for Operation ANODE.

5.12 For larger operations, such as the Australian commitment to operations in the Middle East in 2003/04, the size of the JTF and the complexity of the task may dictate the establishment of components. In this case, however, ADF elements committed to coalition operations in the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan were placed under operational control of the lead coalition nation. A national HQ was also established to carry out national command functions determined by the Australian government (refer chapter 6—‘Command in combined and coalition operations’ for more detail).
Supported and supporting component commanders

5.13 One way for a Comd JTF to achieve coordination across a variety of operational tasks is by assigning subordinate commanders as either supported or supporting commanders and designating the main effort in each phase of an operation.

5.14 Supported commander. Supported commanders have primary responsibility for all aspects of an assigned task and are allocated resource priority. Supported commanders must indicate to supporting commanders their support missions/requirements and associated coordinating instructions.

5.15 Supporting commander. Supporting commanders provide forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander as required. They must advise the supported commander on the availability and most appropriate employment of their assets. Supporting commanders are responsible to complete the mission/tasks allocated to them by the supported commander.
5.16 The assignment of supported and supporting commanders is dynamic and will change according to the needs of the situation. In a complex operation with multiple lines of operation, a supported commander on one line of operation may simultaneously be a supporting commander to another commander on a concurrent line of operation. For example, in the lodgement phase of an amphibious operation the JFMCC may be designated the supported commander for the amphibious line of operation, which in this case is also designated the main effort. Concurrently the joint force air component commander may be designated the supported commander for the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance line of operation. Due to the multiple capabilities inherent to many ADF force elements, both commanders may also be designated as supporting commanders for the others’ line of operation. However, the main effort remains paramount regardless of supported and supporting arrangements.

Annex:
A. The Common Joint Staff System
COMMON JOINT STAFF SYSTEM

1. Advances in technology have contributed to the evolution of effective staff systems and this evolutionary process will continue. Technology will also affect the selection of the staff model, while experience and familiarity remain key factors in determining effective staff processes. The key to successfully employing the components of a joint force to achieve assigned tasks lies in establishing effective staff structures, with clear divisions of responsibilities, in all headquarters (HQ). The Common Joint Staff System (CJSS) is outlined below.

Common Joint Staff System

2. The CJSS has been adapted from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) joint (J) staff system. The CJSS supports the commander in achieving the mission and end-state. The staff responsibilities include developing policy, preparing and coordinating plans, and monitoring operations. In the CJSS, personnel drawn from the single Services are grouped together into functional divisions. Advantages of the CJSS are:
   a. common functional staff structures at all levels of command;
   b. clear divisions of staff responsibilities along functional lines;
   c. simplified correspondence distribution;
   d. provides flexibility in inter-HQ command and control (C2); and
   e. compatibility with allies and potential coalition partners.

3. Common Joint Staff System Naming Protocols. The CJSS protocols are common throughout and are environmentally based. Letter designators are used followed by three numerals, where the letter identifies a ‘joint’ or ‘component’ HQ position and the numerals identify the branch and the function within the branch. For example, J322 is interpreted as follows:
   a. ‘J’ Joint
   b. J(3) Branch
   c. J3(2) Function within the branch
d. J32(2) Second desk

4. Other protocols used are:
   a. JO(X) Command function; and
   b. / Indicates a combined branch, as in J1/4.

5. **Letter designators.** As indicated in paragraph 3, the letter designator indicates a joint or component headquarters position. These are:
   a. J Joint;
   b. N Naval;
   c. G Ground; (at Divisional level and above)
   d. S Ground; (at Brigade level and below)
   e. A Air; and
   f. SO Special Operations.

6. **Numeral designators.** Up to three numerals will follow the single letter designator. The first number indicates the branch, the second number relates to the function within the branch and the third is sequential. For example:

   J332 would be;
   
   Joint Operations 3 3 2
   Current Operations
   (Second Desk)
   
   and G351 would be.
   
   G 3 5 1
   Army Operations Plans Cell
   First Desk

**Component**

7. The size of the HQ will dictate the number of numerals used. Smaller HQ will have no need for the third numeral and need only use two. Additionally, multiple letter designators may be used to further describe staff positions if deemed necessary. These are to be in upper case, follow the last
numeral and should be no less than two and no more than four letters. For example: G351 ARTY, J453 TPT.

8. **Headquarter identifier.** To avoid confusion in correspondence between HQ staff, an HQ identifier suffix is to be used. For example: J01 JOC; J35 JOC; J50 NORCOM and J3 JTFXXX.

**Common staff designations**

9. The CJSS allocates numbers to designate the branch or cell which will be preceded by a letter designator indicating a joint or component position as described in paragraph 5. The staff designator numbering system is as follows:

   a. **0—Command group.** This staff area includes personal and executive staff who are responsible directly to the commander. The command group is further sub-divided as follows:

   (1) 00 – Commander.
   (2) 001+ – Commander's personal staff.
   (3) 01 – Chief of staff (COS).
   (4) 011+ – COS personal staff.
   (5) 02 – Deputy commander.
   (6) 03 – Assistant commander.
   (7) 04 – Head of co-ordination.
   (8) 05 – Senior resource adviser.
   (9) 06 – Senior legal adviser.
   (10) 07 – Senior health adviser.
   (11) 08 – Senior chaplain.

   b. **J1—Personnel.** J1 staff manage personnel, develop personnel policies, and administer military and civilian personnel and prisoners of war within an area of operations (AO). Responsibilities encompass policies for the sustainment...
of manpower for a JTF and of the personnel that constitute the force. This involves manpower accounting including casualty reporting, prisoner of war management, management of the welfare, discipline, and honours and awards. For enhanced synergy, the J1 staff are usually located near the J4 staff.

c. **J2—Intelligence.** The J2 staff coordinate the commander’s intelligence requirements within the AO and assess the location, activities, intentions and capabilities of the adversary. Comd JTF J2 staff are directed and tasked by the Comd JTF, ensuring that their effort is tuned to the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). In answering these CCIR, the J2 staff integrate information and intelligence from national and Allied sources and agencies, with that from their own organic resources and from other partners within the joint force area of operations (JFAO).

d. **J3—Operations.** J3 staff are responsible for matters relating to ongoing operations. They assist the commander to organise, train for, execute and monitor operations. Within the HQ the J3 staff manage the information flow and disseminate the commander’s orders. The J3 branch is the focal point of the HQJTF. It is the lead staff branch and is responsible for the production and issue of directives and orders and the co-ordination of liaison and operational reporting. The J3 branch is organized into functional specialist branches and/or cells appropriate to the operation at hand, which may include:

1. **J33—Current operations cell.** The current operations cell monitors the immediate situation. This is usually taken to be the last, and the next, 24 hours, though might extend up to the end of the present phase of activity, out to about 96 hours ahead. It also compiles routine reports and returns and manages incidents. In some HQJTF a J3 co-ordination cell is established within the current operations cell to act as the COS’s personal staff branch to enhance the co-ordination and synchronisation of operations.

2. **J3/5—Current plans cell.** The J3/5 Cell bridges the gap between J3 and J5 and is primarily responsible for converting the operational plans and contingency plans produced by J5 into operations orders for release to a JTF CC. It is usual to try and divide the responsibility
between J3, J3/5 and J5 in a logical way, usually in blocks of time from the present. For example: J3 manages current operations up to 96 hours; J3/5, 96 hours out to seven days; and J5, seven days and beyond.

(3) **Operations support cell.** There are a number of operational support activities that require planning, coordination and management by J3 staff. The core of operations support is aimed at coordinating information operations, targeting (including joint fires), Defence public information and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). The cell could also focus on force protection issues specific to the mission. Other specialist J3 capabilities, such as environmental specialists or engineers may also form up under the cell, and in time may grow to become semi-autonomous organisations reporting directly to the COS.

(4) **Specialist J3 capabilities.** Some force elements, usually highly specialist in nature, provide cross-component capabilities that are not generally delegated to the JTF CCs. Referred to collectively as Force Troops, they may include:

(a) **Special operations liaison.** Coordination of operational level special operations (SO) functions under a specialist J3 cell to coordinate the conduct of SO tasks across environments.

(b) **Joint force engineers.** Coordination of operational level engineer functions under a specialist J3 cell, outside the normal J1 to 9 structure, ensures a pan-JFAO view, particularly in being able to re-balance engineer resources across components, and for wider benefit to other government departments (OGD) and non-government organisations (NGO). Engineer infrastructure experts would probably be collocated with J4.

(c) **Joint helicopter force.** Similar in purpose to joint engineer capabilities, a joint helicopter force apportions the allocation of scarce battlefield
helicopters in accordance with the Comd JTF’s priorities.

(d) **Other scarce capabilities.** Comd JTF may decide to group and accommodate other capabilities, usually scarce, which are not subordinate to components but that interface at the operational level.

e. **J4—Logistics.** J4 staff coordinate all logistic advice, formulate logistic plans and monitor their execution. The J4 is the principal adviser across the broadest definition of logistics, which includes movements. The J4 branch sets priorities for the overall logistic effort and movements within the JFAO, and acts as the direct interface with the JTF logistics component if one is deployed. The J4 branch also sets the logistic and medical and health service support policy and ensuring this is met throughout the operation. The J4 branch is usually large in size and could contain within it J1/4 Coordination, J1, J4 Supply, J4 Equipment Support and J4 Medical.

f. **J5—Policy and Plans.** J5 staff focus on factors which might have an impact on future operations but for which the commander has little direct control. The staff prepare for future operations by establishing close cooperation with agencies, including NGO, through relevant policy or plans. Their responsibilities can include the development of international agreements at the strategic level, national civil-military agreements at the theatre level and local CIMIC at the tactical level if not dealt with by a J3 operations support cell. The J5 branch is responsible, primarily for developing the Comd JTF campaign plan, producing the campaign plan, the ongoing review of the operational-level estimate, and planning for future operations through the development of operational plans. The J5 branch also co-ordinates these planning efforts within the HQJTF, with both higher and subordinate formations as well as with civil authorities. The J5 division is also responsible for developing contingency plans, especially branches and sequels for the current campaign phase and works particularly closely with the current plans cell (J3/5).

g. **J6—Communications and information systems.** J6 staff coordinate communications, electronic and other information
systems requirements. This includes the development and management of the information architecture\(^1\). The J6 Branch ensures adequate communications and information systems (CIS) support is provided for the operation. J6 is responsible for enabling the information exchange requirement across the JTF, for planning and controlling JFAO CIS architectures, including integration at both the strategic and tactical levels.

h. **J7—Doctrine and training.** J7 staff develops doctrine and validate procedures. They are responsible for coordinating training to meet readiness requirements and combined and joint interoperability standards. The J7 branch acts as the doctrine focus, organises operational level joint, individual and collective training and validates standards across the JTF. For joint exercises or the lead in to operations, J7 conducts special-to-JFAO and/or in-theatre training to assist the Comd JTF in the preparation of the HQ and force, and will manage the after-action review and evaluation process. On operations, J7 collates identified joint lessons and evaluation and post-operational reports, and contributes to joint doctrine development in association with the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre.

i. **J8—Force structure and development.** J8 staff are responsible for force structure development, conducting net assessment and analysis of force manpower, plans, budgetary programs and strategic capability proposals, including mobilisation. The scale and complexity of the operation will determine whether a separate J8 branch (Finance) is required. J8 staff act as the focus for setting up contracts, and for budgetary oversight of all financial activity, even though some budgetary aspects may be delegated\(^2\).

j. **J9—CIMIC.** In coalition operations the J9 function may be allocated to the CIMIC function if the size and scope of the

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\(^1\) The management of information within a headquarters is the responsibility of all branches and should be coordinated by the J3 Branch.

\(^2\) J8 in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) organisations is titled Resources and Finance.
CIMIC requires a dedicated branch or cell. The J9 is responsible for coordinating activities between the joint force, local government, civil population, international organisations, NGO, and other agencies of the countries where the JTF is deployed, employed and supported.

10. The principal advantage of the J staff system is that it provides organisational consistency among ADF HQ whilst enhancing interoperability. Smaller HQ may have a requirement to amalgamate some J functions, such as J1 and J4 (J1/4) or J3 and J5 (J3/5). Single Service liaison representation within a component staff is identified by the designators N, G, A or SO for Navy, Army, Air Force and Special Operations respectively. For example G3 would represent an Army operations staff in a component HQ while J3 would represent operations staff in a joint HQ.

11. The CJSS is presented diagrammatically in figure 5A–1 and in tabular form in table 5A–2 below, and.

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Figure 5A–1: Common Joint Staff system—diagrammatic example

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\(^3\) NATO identify CIMIC as the J9 function rather than as a J3 function.
### Table 5A–2: Common joint staff system—tabular example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Branch</th>
<th>Joint Staff</th>
<th>Component Staff</th>
<th>Brigade or Battalion Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>J00</td>
<td>N/G/A/SO 00</td>
<td>S00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander's Personal Staff</td>
<td>J001</td>
<td>N/G/A/SO 00</td>
<td>S00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>J01</td>
<td>N/G/A/SO 01</td>
<td>S01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist Staff</td>
<td>J00</td>
<td>N/G/A/SO 0</td>
<td>S0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel (PERS)</td>
<td>J1 – PERS</td>
<td>N/G/A/SO 1– PERS</td>
<td>S1 – PERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence (INT)</td>
<td>J2 – INT</td>
<td>N/G/A/SO 2– INT</td>
<td>S2 – INT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations (OPS)</td>
<td>J3 – OPS</td>
<td>N/G/A/SO 3– OPS</td>
<td>S3 – OPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics (LOG)</td>
<td>J4 – LOG</td>
<td>N/G/A/SO 4– LOG</td>
<td>S4 – LOG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans</td>
<td>J5 – Plans</td>
<td>N/G/A/SO 5– Plans</td>
<td>S5 – Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and Information Systems (CIS)</td>
<td>J6 CIS</td>
<td>N/G/A/SO 6– CIS</td>
<td>S6 – CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine and Training</td>
<td>J7 – Doctrine and Training</td>
<td>N/G/A/SO 7– Doctrine and Training</td>
<td>S7 – Doctrine and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)</td>
<td>J9 – CIMIC</td>
<td>N/G/A/SO 9– CIMIC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Staffs and agencies

12. Staffs differ fundamentally from agencies. The staff in any organisation exists to support the commander and has no executive authority. An agency is a functional component organisation with its own commander and staff.
CHAPTER 6

COMMAND IN COMBINED AND COALITION OPERATIONS

Executive summary

This chapter focuses on command and control (C2) of Australian Defence Force (ADF) joint task forces (JTF) in combined or coalition operations in a multinational environment.

- There may be subtle differences in states of command used by allies and/or coalition partners.

- Before operations are undertaken governments must agree on the command arrangements at the national, military strategic and operational levels.

- When necessary and appropriate, the Australian Government will authorise the assignment and employment of Australian forces under international commanders.

- No international commander can exercise full command over Australian forces that are assigned to a combined or coalition force. The Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) retains full command.

- Contributing nations will appoint a national contingent commander to represent national interests at the operational level. The designated ADF officer is Commander Australian Contingent (COMASC).

- The force commander (FC) may have to call upon a suite of leadership skills, including personal example and strength of character, to build coalition morale affected by inevitable stresses.

Introduction

6.1 Increasingly, the ADF is tasked to conduct joint operations, within an Australian whole of government approach, in a multinational environment to meet national strategic objectives, both military and non-military. Most of these operations in the multinational environment will be conducted within a framework of formal agreements. These are termed combined when conducted with an ally or allies, or coalition when conducted with nations that
are not all allies, but are unified by a common mission such as the conflict in Iraq. Combined and coalition operations require a clear understanding of both national C2 arrangements and the combined or coalition C2 arrangements. Coalition operations are currently the most common form of ADF operation. Combined operations are rare as most operations tend to involve more than Australia’s allies\(^1\).

The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands represented a new model of regional intervention using the full assets of diplomatic, economic, police and military assets in a coordinated, whole-of-government approach. The command arrangement was unconventional and accepted risk—but it proved appropriate. It was important that the response was not unilateral in Australia’s part but rather a multilateral Pacific effort to help a neighbour in need—and five nations committed military forces.

**Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen, 2003**\(^2\)

**Definitions**

**Combined**: An operation conducted by forces of two or more allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

**Coalition**: An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations, which are not all allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

6.2 Some operations in the multinational environment will be conducted in an informal and largely uncoordinated manner, with independent national and international agencies unified only by their rapid response to a sudden and urgent need such as a large scale environmental and/or humanitarian crisis. These informal international responses to crises are referred to as multinational operations, a recent example of which is the response to the

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\(^1\) United States, New Zealand, United Kingdom and Canada.

Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004\(^3\). These multinational operations are conducted under national command arrangements, however significant command interaction and liaison with other government departments, host nations and international and non-government organisations is required.

6.3 Operations involving force contributions from foreign nations will be influenced by differences in politics, strategic outlook, language, religion, culture, national customs, equipment and systems, doctrine and practices. For United Nations (UN) missions, the military component is provided by several troop contributing countries (TCC). In coalition operations, the term more commonly used is troop contributing nations (TCN).

**Foreign nation states of command**

6.4 Many of Australia’s potential military partners adhere to or refer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) model and its definitions for command, which have subtle differences to Australian terminology. Significantly, the NATO acronym for operational command (OPCOMD) is OPCOM, and the NATO acronym for tactical command (TACOMD) is TACOM.

6.5 Further complicating combined/coalition operations, the operational authorities which define command relationships (empowering a commander to properly employ the operational capability of forces to achieve missions) vary in term and/or definition between nations.

6.6 To aid interoperability, the operational authorities used by the UN are listed in annex A. The equivalent United States (US) and NATO states of OPCOMD and operational authorities are detailed in annex B, and a geographic depiction of the US combatant commands is in annex C.

6.7 The British Armed Forces and Canadian Forces utilise NATO states of command and operational authorities. The New Zealand Defence Force utilises the same states of command and operational authorities as the ADF, with the exception of theatre command (TCOMD).

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\(^3\) Operation SUMATRA ASSIST was an ADF joint operation in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. The international response was characterised by nations, multinational and other agencies rapidly reacting to a major disaster in an independent, fragmented and largely uncoordinated manner with the common goal of providing humanitarian relief.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—THE DEPTH AND BREADTH OF AUSTRALIAN OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

Korea, 1950–55: United Nations Command Korea comprised a combined force drawn from 17 nations, to which Australia contributed a carrier force, fighter squadron, two infantry battalions and logistic support elements.

Figure 6–1: Korea—forward positions of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR)—GOC 1st Commonwealth Division (UK), Commanding-General 8th Army (US), Commander 28th Commonwealth Brigade (Australia), and CO 1 RAR

South Vietnam, 1966–72: The Free World Forces coalition, comprising the United States, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand) operated under US command. Australia contributed a peak of 7670 personnel, comprising a national headquarters, Task Force, Logistic Support Group, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) strike and transport squadrons, RAN destroyers, helicopter flight and clearance divers plus an Army Training Team.
Figure 6–2: The Chief of the General Staff, LTGEN Daly confers with Commander Australian Forces Vietnam, Commander 1st Australian Task Force and the Commanding Officer 3 RAR

Figure 6–3: An observation post in a fire support base observes Canberra aircraft of 2 Squadron, RAAF, bombing enemy positions in the Long Hai hills

Command arrangements

6.8 Before operations are undertaken Governments must agree on the command arrangements at the national, military strategic and operational levels. The types of command arrangements which might be required are:
• **National command authority.** The National Command Authority is comprised of the national leaders of the defence forces involved in the operations, such as the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand and the President of the United States, or their representatives.

• **Strategic coordination committee.** The Strategic Coordination Committee consists of the senior military representatives, such as the Australian CDF, the New Zealand CDF and the United States (US) Commander Pacific Command.

• **Combined (or coalition) force commander.** A Combined (or Coalition) Force Commander (CFC) and Deputy Combined Force Commander must be mutually agreed and appointed to ensure unity of command. Staff representation on the Combined Force Headquarters should also be agreed. The combined/coalition force commander will exercise operational authority over assigned forces agreed by the appropriate national chain of command. Changes to operational authority must be approved by the national chain of command. The combined or coalition force may be designated as combined/coalition joint task force (CJTF).

• **Chief of Joint Operations.** Unless otherwise directed by CDF, TCOMD implies the authority for the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) to act as the Australian operational level military point of contact in relationships with other nations' commands, Defence, Australian diplomatic missions, other Australian agencies and agencies of countries in theatre for the conduct of operations.

• **National commander.** The senior officer from each combined or coalition partner will normally be designated as the national commander for the purposes of exercising National Command (NATCOMD) over national units and personnel. The national commander will maintain access to their military representatives on purely national matters involving the employment and conditions of service of their national forces. The national commander has no operational authority over deployed ADF forces unless separately assigned by CJOPS.

6.9 Full command (the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates) exists only within a national force, and is retained by CDF at all times. No international commander can exercise full command over ADF forces that are assigned to a combined or coalition force. Full command equates to 'ownership' and conveys with it complete operational and administrative authority and responsibility.
6.10 TCOMD, which is an authority unique to Australia, is retained by CJOPS and is not delegated. OPCOMD and operational control (OPCON) can be delegated to the CFC by CJOPS. TACOMD and TACON can be delegated to commanders at the tactical level.

6.11 Interpretation of the degree of authority implied by each state of command in a combined or coalition system differs markedly between nations and Services and, like any aspect of doctrine, is subject to flexible interpretation by the key personalities in the chain of command at the time. It is important for both superior and subordinate commanders to be absolutely clear about any restrictions on the use of allocated force elements (FE), and to be pragmatic about what needs to be achieved to realise the commander’s intent.

6.12 When Australian FE are working under US command, further constitutional complications arise because of the direct strategic links that US combatant commanders have with their National Command Authority. It is important that Australia identifies early in the operation where influence and additional coordination should be applied in order to match responsiveness in decision making.

Operational authorities

6.13 When necessary and appropriate, the Australian Government will authorise the assignment and employment of Australian forces under foreign commanders. The respective commanders are the:

- CFC, the strategic level commander in a multinational force (MNF) or combined/coalition operation;
- component commander (CC) in a combined/coalition operation; or
- FC, the operational level commander in a UN mission.

6.14 The commander will exercise the operational authority over assigned forces that have been agreed by the appropriate national chain of command. Changes to the operational authority can only occur with the approval of the national chain of command.

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4 The US National Command Authority comprises the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense.
6.15 Warfighting is the foundation for military support operations, and the same principles should be used for peace operations. The adage 'train for war, adapt for peace (operations)' applies equally. To date, Australia has been lead nation (LN) for a number of operations, and has provided several senior officers to command appointments on UN or UN-sanctioned missions.

6.16 The composition and C2 of the military component of a peace operation depends on the type of operation and intensity of the conflict. Force members must understand the mission and the mandate, accepting that, whilst it is a key player, a military solution will not be the measure of success for a mission.

6.17 In his 1994 review of UN peacekeeping operations, commenting on C2, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) noted that the UN does not exercise full command of member states’ armed forces, but that the command exercised was akin to ‘OPCOMD’. This is not widely supported by member states, which are more likely to place their armed forces under the OPCON of the UN.

6.18 Within MNF or UN operations, command is made complex by having separate chains of command (refer annex D for the UN chain of command). This usually takes the form of the OPCON of the force itself, and national command, normally vested in the COMASC. It is important to gain an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of these respective commands, prior to deploying if possible.

6.19 In the field, it is essential that effective command relationships be implemented among the TCC and the UN. In the transition to peace operations, whether it be under MNF or UN auspices, it is important to recognise the following C2 aspects:

- The role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) as the head of a UN mission, as opposed to military or national leadership. Appointments below the SRSG are generally considered equal in status, except when the mission is structured along functional pillars such as peacekeeping, governance and

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5 Refer Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.8—Peace Operations.

6 MNF command authorities are defined in the Multinational Interoperability Council—Coalition Building Guide.
The SRSG has a direct relationship to the UN SG and staff, and component commanders/heads work for the SRSG with links to respective offices or departments in UN New York or UN Geneva.

- The head of mission (HOM) represents the UNSG, leads political engagement and speaks on behalf of the UN within the mission area.

- The roles of the FC and Chief Military Observer (CMO) in exercising leadership and command over ADF personnel serving as a United Nations Military Observer. Depending on the nature of the mission, the CMO may be an independent appointment or may serve under the OPCON of the FC.

- The role of the FC in exercising leadership and command over ADF personnel serving as a UN Military Liaison Officer.

- In UN operations, the Director of Administration or Chief Administrative Officer wields considerable power and influence, particularly with logistics procurement, sustainment, movement and communications. Robust links are therefore necessary between the UN Peacekeeping Force Headquarters and the civil administration, particularly regarding the interpretation of integrated mission logistics and contingent owned equipment.

- The role of the civil authority and cooperation with civilian police (CIVPOL) forces and the UN CIVPOL. Given the internal security responsibility of CIVPOL and the responsibilities of the military component, good working relationships with members of this organisation at the operational and tactical levels are essential.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—AUSTRALIAN COMMITMENTS TO PEACE OPERATIONS

Cambodia, 1992–93: The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) comprised components for human rights, electoral, military, civil administration, civil police, repatriation and rehabilitation. The military component of UNTAC totalled 15,000 personnel, drawn from 15 countries: the ADF provided a contingent of 1215 personnel, comprising a Force Communications Unit, a helicopter squadron and a Movement Control Unit.

Figure 6–4: The UNTAC Force Commander, LTGEN John Sanderson (Australia), with his deputy, MAJGEN Tamlichia Ali (Indonesia) and headquarters staff

Figure 6–5: Aviation tasks included collection of ballot boxes for elections organised by UNTAC
NATIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

Commander Australian Contingent

6.20 Each TCN contributing to a combined/coalition operation, or TCC contributing to a UN operation, should appoint a national contingent commander to represent national interests at the operational level.

6.21 In general, an ADF officer so appointed will be designated COMASC. The roles of a COMASC include:

- representing national concerns to the CFC/FC;
- keeping Australian authorities informed; and
- coordinating and fostering international component relations in support of the commander’s mission.

6.22 Specific tasks for a COMASC could include:

- exercise command as directed by CDF and/or CJOPS, keeping them informed of the situation in-theatre, with particular emphasis on developments which may affect national political objectives or require changes in rules of engagement (ROE), the concept for operations or the commitment of additional national resources;
- advise the CFC/FC on specific capabilities of Australian forces and any constraints limiting their employment;
- facilitate liaison support to the staff of the CFC/FC;
- ensure, through the Australian chain of command, that administrative and logistic support is available for Australian forces to achieve and sustain their operational readiness;
- harmonise the Australian communications and information systems (CIS) with other components of the force;
- facilitate the integration of Australian intelligence architecture into the force while ensuring the integrity of national security;
- coordinate and cooperate with other national commanders to ensure unity of effort as directed by the CFC/FC;
when required, recommend to CDF and/or CJOPS changes to the national C2 arrangements under which Australian forces are assigned or attached to the force; and

implement Australian information operations with due regard to any instructions issued by the CFC/FC.

6.23 The distinction between representing Australian national concerns and exercising command over Australian FE should be clearly articulated, and may change during the life of an operation. The COMASC may not be assigned a command authority for deployed FE, as deployed FE may be under the command of another Australian Commander or under the direct command of CDF or CJOPS. Alternatively the deployed commander of an Australian joint task force (JTF) may be identified as the National Commander/COMASC.

6.24 Directives to the national commander and to FE and units should contain provision for foreseeable changing circumstances, or will require quick amendment as unforeseeable contingencies arise. This will avoid the potential for confusion, which can arise from the absence of clear written directives or from the need to reinterpret extant directives.

**HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—SOMALIA 1992–93**

During the deployment of the Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) in 1992–93, Headquarters Australian Force Somalia (HQ AFS) was under OPCOMD of HQ UNITAF (in effect HQ 1st US Marine Expeditionary Force). The role of HQ AFS initially comprised national oversight, administrative support, and liaison with HQ UNITAF. HMAS TOBRUK was in support of the force but remained under command of Maritime Commander Australia. The 1st Battalion Group was under command of HQ AFS, but was assigned under OPCOMD of the 10th US Mountain Division. After the division’s departure, the 1st Battalion Group was left with responsibility for the Baidoa Humanitarian Relief Sector but without an operational commander, so the Australian national commander assumed this function.

In such circumstances where Australia is not the LN, the initial command arrangements for HMAS TOBRUK and the 1st Battalion Group were not unusual, however changing circumstances may require the national commander to assume command of operational units.
National limitations

6.25 The governments of TCC/TCN will always maintain their administrative channel of communications with their contingents, commanders and personnel on operational matters. They must not, however, issue any instructions to their military personnel contrary to UN policies and the implementation of its mandated tasks.

6.26 On occasion, the separate chains of command in coalition, MNF or UN operations will present conflicting information and/or tasks to a commander. The force may request a particular mission or task be conducted which may fall outside national guidance or tasking. Accordingly, permission to conduct the task may be refused by the Australian commander exercising national command. Strategies to assist in dealing with such situations include:

- ensuring that the CFC/FC, HOM, CMO or other operational commanders understand any particular limitations that apply to Australian elements under their control before such situations arise;

- appreciating that neighbouring units supplied by other TCC/TCN may have different powers or limitations than Australian elements, and making the effort to understand theirs as much as it would be expected for them to understand any Australian national limitations; and

- actively implementing measures such as briefings and coordination conferences, within operations security considerations, to minimise cross-cultural or inter-agency misunderstandings.

6.27 While none of these measures may necessarily prevent ill-feeling when a task is refused, reinforcing the ground rules at the outset should enhance mutual respect and may help to minimise long-term damage. Once deployed, it is normal practice that, if any planning will impact on national contingents, the CFC/FC will initially consult with the commander of that national contingent.

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7 Department of Peacekeeping Operations Command and Control of Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (17 Oct 2001); also refer to earlier discussion in chapter 3 regarding ADF national command and theatre command.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—NATIONAL COMMAND IN THE MIDDLE EAST AREA OF OPERATIONS, 2003

In early 2003, ADF personnel were pre-deployed to the Middle East to support international efforts to disarm Iraq, remove Saddam Hussein and offer a better future for the Iraqi people. Operation BASTILLE was the initial pre-deployment of forces, acclimatisation and in-theatre training. Operation FALCONER covered combat operations to disarm Iraq, and Operation CATALYST was the stabilisation and recovery effort. Operation SLIPPER, the ADF support to the coalition against terrorism, continued.

During these operations, Australia retained C2 of ADF force elements at all times, while still working effectively within the coalition. CDF retained full command of all Australian forces; Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) in Sydney maintained TCOMD/OPCOMD of forces assigned to operations in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO). The Commander Australian National HQ-MEAO exercised NATCOMD of ADF forces deployed under Operations BASTILLE and SLIPPER.

To ensure effective overall strategic direction of Australia’s efforts in Iraq, the Strategic Command Group met frequently, supported by video links with COMAST and the NATCOMD HQ in the MEAO. CDF and SECDEF then invariably went to Parliament House to brief the National Security Committee and to receive additional guidance from the Prime Minister and MINDEF.

Australian forces then operated under the OPCON of coalition CC. This arrangement allowed CC to assign specific tasks to ADF forces while they remained under their Australian commanding officers at unit level. Although ADF FE worked toward the overall coalition plan, there were processes in place to ensure that Australian forces were always employed in accordance with Australian Government policies.

RAAF and special forces officers were placed in the Coalition Air Operations Centre to ensure that targets assigned to ADF units were appropriate and lawful. Australian commanders had ADF legal officers to advise them on the laws of armed conflict during the process of allocating targets.

Occasionally, Australia was allocated targets on the US-developed strike lists, but they were always assessed according to Australia’s own legal obligations. Several target categories were subject to Australian Ministerial approval before they could be engaged. Australian pilots could, and on occasion did, abort missions to avoid the risk of unintended casualties if their target could not be clearly identified from the air.

These arrangements permitted smooth, effective integration of ADF elements within the coalition, and were testimony to the routine high levels of interoperability with our friends and allies. Improvements in communications and web technology greatly assisted high-level decision making.
OPERATIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

6.28 Major considerations for C2 architecture, both external to and within a combined or coalition task force, are:

- **The problem.** The scale, nature, range and likely duration of the operation or mission, including the number and status of other concurrent operations.

- **Influence.** Where and how best to influence both allies and key decision makers at home.

- **Command.** Where and how best to exercise command of the JTF or Australia’s contribution, reflecting Australian command philosophy.

- **Communications.** The capacity and suitability of available CIS infrastructure, which should enable, not hamper the exercise of command.

Campaign arrangements

6.29 CJOPS may have to conduct a campaign, coordinating several operations, and use a combination of the types of command arrangements outlined above. This will especially be the case where Australia is the LN.

6.30 The term ‘lead nation’ (LN) is equivalent to the NATO term ‘framework nation’. In general, the framework nation provides the framework of the HQ and the principal command staff to the CFC/FC. However, Australian doctrine uses the term LN as it suggests greater emphasis on will, capability, competence and influence. Circumstances in which Australia might lead a coalition are detailed in chapter 3 of ADDP 00.3—Coalition Operations. The Australian-led International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) operation in East Timor is an example of a LN command structure.

6.31 In campaigns where Australia is the LN, the majority of forces will most likely be drawn from the ADF. Ideally there would be sufficient assets to allocate to each JTF or CC to conduct all necessary operations. However, the scarceness of critical capabilities in the ADF, and of trained staff to employ them, works against this outcome. Critical operations in each phase demand command focus and priority allocation of combat forces, combat support, resources and logistics support. This ‘orchestration’ permits available combat power to be manoeuvred decisively on lines of operation.
6.32 In combined/coalition operations where Australia is not the LN, it is important that national issues are quickly identified and resolved by the national and operational chains of command working closely together.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE—LEAD NATION

Australia’s experience in the South West Pacific in World War II developed a command and support structure sufficiently mature for Australia to be LN of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. Australia then assumed the Commonwealth lead-position in the Australia New Zealand and United Kingdom (ANZUK) Division in Thailand (South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) Plan 4) and ANZUK Force in Singapore (Five Power Defence Arrangements). Post-World War II, Australia has established a very creditable record in peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian operations, contributing to nearly fifty such operations.

Post-Vietnam, ADF contributions to overseas missions were essentially on a niche basis within coalitions led by other nations. More recently, however, reflecting an increasingly active engagement in its region, Australia has been LN for a number of operations including:

- **Operation LAGOON.** South Pacific Peacekeeping Force in Bougainville 1993, the first Australian-led joint and combined peace operation.


- **Operation TREK.** International Peace Monitoring Team in the Solomon Islands, 2000–02.

- **Operation ANODE.** Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, since 2003.

Common to these commitments was Australia’s national strategic political willingness and capability. Significantly, both the international and Australian community expected that Australia would lead these coalitions. The INTERFET experience in particular highlighted that Australia is expected to demonstrate leadership within its area of natural responsibility. This carries with it a requirement to maintain the necessary military and civil infrastructure inherent in assuming LN status when appropriate.
Command attributes

6.33 The commander of a joint, combined or coalition force must understand the capabilities and weaknesses, not only of ADF forces under command, but of assigned forces from other nations. This calls for political awareness, together with patience, tact and mutual understanding based on knowledge of other nations’ languages, history and culture. The posting of high calibre commanders and staff officers to combined/coalition or multinational headquarters in peacetime sows the seeds of this understanding. This extends to attachés, exchange officers and liaison officers.

6.34 Elements from other nations embedded in each component are responsive to their national chain of command, which can cause friction. The commander should strive to overcome this friction by welding all national contingents together into a strong and coordinated team. At the same time, the commander must balance the burden and risk-sharing in order to ensure that no one nation either sustains disproportionate casualties, or receives disproportionate credit, both of which may weaken the cohesion of the alliance or coalition.

6.35 Conflicting national pressures and/or exploitation by the opponent will inevitably strain force unity. The commander will have to call upon a suite of leadership skills, including personal example and strength of character, to rebuild the morale of the force and confidence of the alliance or coalition. If the commander can stress that although political problems may exist, the real task of the commander and allied subordinates is to produce a military solution to a military problem, then cooperation will be put on a sound basis without offending national sensitivities.

6.36 Commanders should be able to rely upon strong political support and the assistance of superiors. The operational level commander should take every opportunity to discuss military problems with Ministers, Chiefs of Staff and senior officers from contributing nations who visit the area of operations.

Annexes:
A. United Nations operational authorities
B. United States states of command and operational authorities
C. United States combatant commands
D. The United Nations chain of command
1. Through the 1990s, the United Nations (UN) was confronted with many systems and procedural difficulties directly related to how it exercised command and control (C2) of military forces placed at its disposal for the prosecution of a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). These were largely resolved as a result of various reviews, and the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) issued formal guidance in 2001 regarding C2 of military components in UN peacekeeping operations.1

2. Command relationships within the UN are determined by operational authorities, which empower a force commander (FC) or Chief Military Observer (CMO) to properly employ the operational capability of assigned forces to achieve the designated mission. In common with most defence forces, the UN uses a framework of operational authority for simplicity and consistency.

3. The UN command authorities are defined below.

a. **United Nations operational authority.** The authority transferred by the member states to the United Nations to use the operational capabilities of their national military contingents, units, formed police units and/or military and police personnel to undertake mandated missions and tasks. Operational authority over such forces and personnel is vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the UN Security Council (UNSC). ‘United Nations Operational Authority’ involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of:

   (1) a specific mandate of the UNSC;

   (2) an agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification; and

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(3) a specific geographic area (the mission area as a whole).

The UN Operational Authority does not include responsibility for certain personnel matters of individual members of military contingents and Formed Police Units, such as pay, allowances, and promotions. These functions remain a national responsibility. In regard to disciplinary matters, while the discipline of military personnel remains the responsibility of the troop-contributing countries the UN may take administrative steps for misconduct, including repatriation of military contingent members and staff officers. With respect to the Experts on Mission, including UN police officers and military observers, the UN would take administrative actions and disciplinary measures in accordance with the UN Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers.

b. **Command.** The authority granted to a Military Commander in a UN Peacekeeping Operation to direct forces assigned so that the Commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign Tactical Command or Control of those units/personnel. Operational Control (OPCON) includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub units of a contingent, as required by operational necessities, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the Contingent Commander and as approved by the United Nations Headquarters.

c. **United Nations operational control.** OPCON is the authority granted to a Military Commander in a United Nations peacekeeping operation to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign Tactical Command or Control of those units/personnel. OPCON includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub units of a contingent, as required by operational necessities, within the mission area

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2 The ADF definition of OPCON is given in chapter 3—‘States of command’.
of responsibility, in consultation with the Contingent Commander and as approved by the UN Headquarters (HQ).

d. **United Nations tactical command.** The authority delegated to a military or police commander in a UN Peacekeeping operation to assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

e. **United Nations tactical control**\(^3\). Tactical control (TACON) is the detailed and local direction and control of movement or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish mission or tasks assigned. As required by operational necessities, the Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police Component (HOPC) may delegate TACON of the forces assigned to the UN peacekeeping operation to his subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.

f. **Administrative control.** The authority over subordinate or other organizations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Administrative Control is a national responsibility given to the National Contingent Commander (NCC) in peacekeeping operations.

g. **Tasking Authority.** The authority vested in specified senior appointments (Head of Military Component (HOMC), Head of Police Component (HOPC) or Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) of UN peacekeeping operations to assign tasks to enabling units. Tasking authority includes the authority to deploy, redeploy and employ all or part of an enabling unit to achieve the mission’s mandate. Enabling units comprise aviation, engineering, logistics, medical, signals, transport and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units. Tasking authority over military or police personnel/units, when exercised by civilians is applicable for their routine, day to day employment and does not include tactical control of military/police resources exercised purely in pursuance of military or police operations.

\(^3\) The ADF definition of TACON is given in chapter 3.
h. **Technical reporting.** Technical reporting is an information and technical advisory communication link not relating to the C2 of operations or to national administrative control. This link does not circumvent the primary reporting line and command/supervisory relationships, through which formal direction and tasking is issued.

i. **Transfer of authority.** The transfer of authority between national contingents and military personnel to the UN-designated commander must be completed immediately before these forces come under control of the UN. This process may take place when personnel arrive in the mission area, or it may be transferred immediately prior to deployment from home locations. The exact timing for this transfer will be decided during the negotiations between the UN and national authorities. Contributing Member States negotiate with UN HQ the specific date and location that the UN will assume ‘UN Operational Authority’ over their uniformed personnel and units. The Operational Authority over Military and Police ‘Experts on Mission’, which includes Military Observers and Individual police officers/advisers, is considered to be automatically transferred to the UN when a contributed ‘Expert on Mission’ reports to the designated UN authority for his/her duties in the operational area of responsibility. The operational authority is reverted back to the respective national authorities on completion of assignment with the UN, or at the time of repatriation.
### UNITED STATES AND NATO STATES OF COMMAND

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>US Combatant Command(^1)</th>
<th>US OPCON(^2)</th>
<th>NATO OPCOM(^3)</th>
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<th>NATO TACOM(^4)</th>
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\(^1\) US Combatant Command is broadly equivalent to the command authority held by Chief of Joint Operations under Theatre Command.

\(^2\) Operational Control (OPCON)

\(^3\) NATO Operational Command (OPCOM) (Australia OPCOMD)

\(^4\) Tactical Command (Australia TACOMD)
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\(^1\) Tactical Control
\(^6\) NATO OPCOM authority only allows commanders to delegate OPCON with prior approval.
THE UNITED NATIONS CHAIN OF COMMAND

1. This annex defines and describes the United Nations peacekeeping chain of command and authorities. Command and control exists at three separate but overlapping levels:
   
a. strategic level,

b. operational level, and

c. tactical level.

Figure 6D–1: Levels of authority, command and control in UN peace operations
Strategic level

2. The management of a peace operation at United Nations Headquarters level is at the strategic level of authority and command and control. The chain of command is as follows:

a. **United Nations Security Council (UNSC).** The UNSC is responsible for the overall political direction of the peacekeeping operation. It provides the legal authority, high-level strategic direction and political guidance for all UN peacekeeping operations, and it vests the operational authority for directing these operations in the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The UNSC authorises the mandate of the mission through a UNSC Resolution.

b. **Secretary-General.** The Secretary-General is responsible for the executive direction and control of the mission. Member States transfer ‘Operational Authority’ over their military forces and personnel to the UN. This authority is vested in the Secretary-General, who exercises it on behalf of the UNSC.

c. **Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (USG DPKO).** The USG DPKO has been delegated responsibility from the Secretary-General for the administration of, and provision of executive direction for, all UN peacekeeping operations\(^\text{1}\). Specifically, the USG DPKO:

   (1) directs and controls UN peacekeeping operations;

   (2) formulates policies and develops operational guidelines based on Security Council resolutions (mission mandates);

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\(^{1}\) There are two USG accountable to the Secretary General for the conduct of Peace Operations which include military elements; the USG DPKO and the USG for the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). USG DPA has responsibility for Special Political Missions, some of which include military elements. Some UN Missions for which USG DPA is responsible are managed by USG DPKO.
(3) prepares reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on each peacekeeping operation with appropriate observations and recommendations;

(4) advises the Secretary-General on all matters relating to the planning, establishment and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations;

(5) acts as a focal point between the Secretariat and Member States seeking information on all matters related to United Nations peacekeeping missions; and

(6) is responsible and accountable to the Secretary-General for ensuring that the requirements of the United Nations security management system are met within DPKO-led field missions.

3. In addition to the above-mentioned responsibilities, it is important to be aware of additional UN System responsibilities for financial authority and for the safety and security of UN staff, which lie outside of the authority of USG DPKO but which affect UN peacekeeping operations. These are:

a. **The Under Secretary-General for Management (USG DM).** The USG DM is delegated financial authority and responsibility from the Secretary-General for all financial matters relating to UN peacekeeping operations.

b. **The Under Secretary-General for Safety and Security (USG DSS)** is directly accountable and responsible to the Secretary-General for the executive direction and control of the United Nations security management system and for the overall safety and security of United Nations civilian personnel and their recognized dependents at both headquarters locations and in the field.

c. **The Under Secretary General for Field Support (USG DFS)** is responsible for all activities of the Department of Field support. On behalf of the Secretary General, the Under Secretary General directs all support for the peace operations by providing necessary strategic direction to guide the work programme of DFS. Under direction of the USG DFS, the Department of Field Support is responsible for delivering dedicated support to the field operations, including on personnel, finance, procurement, logistical, communications,
information technology and other administrative and general management issues.

4. The military adviser (MILAD). The MILAD is the senior uniformed person in UN headquarters, New York. The MILAD is established as a line position heading the Office of Military Affairs within DPKO, however is accountable directly to both the USG for DPKO and the USG for DPA for management of military elements deployed on peace operations under their respective authorities.

5. Contributing Member States. Member states that provide military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations retain full and exclusive strategic level command and control of their personnel and equipment. Contributing Member States may assign these personnel and assets to serve under the authority of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and under the operational control of the Head of Military Component (HOMC) of a United Nations peacekeeping operation for specified periods and purposes as agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations Headquarters. Member States may withdraw their military and police personnel and the operational control of those personnel from the United Nations through formal communication with United Nations Headquarters.

Operational level

6. The field-based management of a peacekeeping operation at the Mission Headquarters is considered to be the operational level. The following senior officials hold operational level authority, command and control responsibilities at the Mission Headquarters level:

   a. Head of Mission (HOM);
   b. Head of Military Component (HOMC);
   c. Head of Police Component (HOPC);
   d. Deputy Special Representative(s) of the Secretary-General (DSRSG); and
   e. Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS).

7. In addition, there are several joint, integration and coordination structures that support mission-wide coherence at the operational level.
These are not command and control structures but they support integration of effort across the peacekeeping operation under the authority of the Head of Mission.

**Head of Mission**

8. The Head of Mission (HOM) of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation is generally a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The HOM reports to the Secretary-General through the USG DPKO. The HOM is the senior UN Representative and has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations in the mission area. The HOM represents the Secretary-General, leads UN political engagement and speaks on behalf of the United Nations within the mission area. The HOM leads and directs the heads of all mission components and ensures unity of effort and coherence among all UN entities in the mission area, in accordance with the UN Integrated Strategic Framework for the mission.

9. The HOM provides political guidance for mandate implementation and sets mission-wide operational direction including decisions on resource allocation in case of competing priorities. The HOM delegates the operational and technical aspects of mandate implementation to the heads of all components of the mission. The HOM provides direction to those components through the component heads.

**Head of Military Component**

10. In multidimensional peacekeeping operations the Head of Military Component (HOMC) is generally designated as the Force Commander. If the military component comprises Military Observers only, a Chief Military Observer (CMO) or Chief of Staff (COS) will be appointed as the HOMC. The CMO reports directly to the HOM and exercises Operational Control over all Military Observers.

11. The HOMC establishes the military operational chain of command in the field and may establish subordinate Sector Commands, as appropriate. In doing so, the HOMC places military units under the Tactical Control of military commanders in the operational chain of command.

12. The HOMC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Military Adviser in UN Headquarters. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPKO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.
Head of Police Component

13. The Head of Police Component (HOPC) reports to the HOM, exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the police component of the mission. This includes all UN Police Officers (including all members of Formed Police Units) and relevant civilian staff serving in the Police Component. The HOPC, in consultation with DPKO, shall establish the police chain of command in the mission. The HOPC shall also establish appropriate succession arrangements within the police component to ensure effective command and control in his/her absence.

14. The HOPC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Police Adviser at UN Headquarters. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPKO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.

Deputy (ies) Special Representative of the Secretary General

15. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations generally have at least one Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) to support the HOM in executing the substantive civilian functions of the mission. Deputy SRSG report to the HOM and they exercise managerial authority over those mission components that have been assigned to them. When a DSRSG is designated as the Deputy HOM, he/she shall support the SRSG through the performance of any specifically delegated HOM responsibilities and shall officiate as HOM in the absence of the SRSG.

16. In integrated missions, the Resident Coordinator (and Humanitarian Coordinator, as appropriate) of the UN Country Team may be appointed as Deputy SRSG to co-ordinate the mission’s activities with UN agencies, funds, programs and other development and humanitarian entities operating in the mission area.

Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support

17. The Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) reports to the HOM and is accountable to the HOM for the efficient and effective provision of administrative and logistical support to all mission components. DMS/CMS advises the HOM on the rules and regulations relating to the commitment of UN financial resources to ensure the provision of efficient and effective administrative and logistical support to all mission components. The DMS/CMS has sole UN authority in the field to commit UN financial resources for any purpose, including any contractual arrangements for the use of local resources. The DMS/CMS is responsible
for the strict observance of, and compliance with, UN technical and administrative regulations related to the administration of the mission and logistics management.
GLOSSARY


The ADG is the source for the terms, definitions, abbreviations and acronyms used within this publication, unless stated otherwise. The following legend is used to identify new and allied terms:

NATO        Allied Administrative Publication–6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, (AAP–6)


TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

administrative control
Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

coalition force
A force composed of military elements of nations which have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose.

coalition operations
Operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

combined operations
Operations conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

command and control
The process and means for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces.
command
The authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

control
The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

coordinating authority
The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.

direct support
1. The support provided by a unit not attached to or under the command of the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation. Related term: in support of.
2. In maritime usage, operations related to the protection of a specific force by other units, normally under the tactical control of that force. Related term: associated support.
3. In land operations, a primary tactical task given to an artillery unit to provide fire requested by a supported unit other than an artillery unit, without specifying the command relationship. Related term: general support reinforcing.
full command
The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. Note: the term 'command', as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command or operational control.

in support of
Term designating the support provided to another unit, formation or organisation while remaining under the initial command.

lead nation
The lead nation is that nation with the will and capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organisational framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical sub-functions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels. (MIC)

local administration
Local administration is administration controlled by a local commander and related specifically to the troops in his area or to the operation in his area.

mission command
Mission command is a philosophy for command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given clear direction by a superior of his intentions. The result required, the task, the resources and any constraints are clearly enunciated, however subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result.

multinational operations
Operations involving other countries with a common objective but where there is no formal command or interrelationship. These operations are characterised by the sharing of unclassified
information and coordinated use of resources to achieve economy of effort.

**national command**
A command that is organised by, and functions under the authority of, a specific nation. (NATO\(^1\))

**non-operational activity**
Any authorised Defence activity other than operations.

**operation**
A designated military activity using lethal and/or non-lethal ways and means to achieve directed outcomes in accordance with national legal obligations and constraints.

**operational art**
The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions. It requires a commander to:
(a) identify the military conditions or end-state that constitute the strategic objective;
(b) decide the operational objectives that must be achieved to reach the desired end state;
(c) order a sequence of actions that lead to fulfilment of the operational objectives; and
(d) apply the military resources allocated to sustain the desired sequence of actions.

**operational command**
The authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational control, tactical command and/or control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration.

**operational control**
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; deploy units

\(^1\) Partial NATO definition.
concerned and retain or delegate tactical control of those units. It
does not include authority to allocate separate employment of
components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include
administrative or logistic control.

raise, train and sustain
The generation, preparation, and maintenance of Defence capability
by designated Capability Managers at the level of capability specified
in preparedness directives. Notes:
1. Service Chiefs raise, train and sustain (RTS) through the
   exercise of full command.
2. Before and after assigning forces to operations, RTS
   encompasses Service Chief requirements to:
   a. Generate force elements (capability) in accordance with
      force structure priorities.
   b. Train and sustain force elements at specified
      preparedness levels.
   c. Reconstitute forces returning from operations.
3. Once forces are assigned, RTS encompasses:
   a. Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) requirements to:
      (1) Generate joint forces capability in accordance
          with force structure priorities.
      (2) Sustain joint forces through the provision of
          appropriately prepared force elements.
      (3) Provide support to assigned forces.
      (4) Be the coordination authority for technical
          control of assigned forces and the arbiter of
          disputes between operational and technical
          control priorities.
   b. Service Chiefs and Capability Managers requirements
      to:
      (1) Sustain forces through the provision of
          appropriately prepared personnel and
          equipment.
      (2) Provide support to assigned forces that is
          beyond the capability of operational
          headquarters.
      (3) Exercise their technical control authority for
          assigned forces, through CJOPS, as the
          coordinating authority.
      (4) Provide technical control advice to CJOPS for
          assigned forces, including priority notification of
          any impact on operations.
reach
The ability to generate required effects, for the appropriate period of time, at considerable distance from the National support base.

reachback
A force element’s ability to access military and non-military support from the most appropriate source outside its designated area of operations.

tactical command
The authority delegated to a commander to specify tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission specified by higher authority.

tactical control
The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

technical control
The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces.
Notes:
1. Technical control is exercised by capability managers, or by designated authorities through the capability manager.
2. For forces assigned to operations, technical control is exercised through CJOPS, where it directly effects operations only.
3. Technical control advice may not be modified but may be rejected in part or in total by a commander in consideration of operational factors.

theatre command
The authority given by the Chief of the Defence Force to the Chief of Joint Operations to command assigned forces to prepare for and conduct operations (campaigns, operations, combined and joint exercises, and other activities as directed).
**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Australian Customs Service</td>
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<td>ADDP</td>
<td>Australian Defence Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<td>ADFP</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force Publication</td>
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<td>ADFWC</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre</td>
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<td>AFS</td>
<td>Australian Forces Somalia</td>
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<td>AFV</td>
<td>Australian Forces Vietnam</td>
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<td>AIB</td>
<td>Allied Intelligence Bureau</td>
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<td>AIF</td>
<td>Australian Imperial Force</td>
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<td>AMF</td>
<td>Australian Military Forces</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
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<td>AUS</td>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>ASNCE</td>
<td>Australian National Command Element</td>
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<td>BPC</td>
<td>Border Protection Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>command, control and communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Chief of Army</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Chief of Air Force</td>
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<td>CBPC</td>
<td>Commander Border Protection Command</td>
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<td>CC</td>
<td>Component Commander</td>
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<td>CCDG</td>
<td>Chief Capability Development Group</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined/Coalition Force Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander-In-Chief Pacific</td>
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<td>CIOP</td>
<td>commonly informed operating picture</td>
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<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>civilian police</td>
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<td>CJLOG</td>
<td>Commander, Joint Logistics</td>
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<td>CJOPS</td>
<td>Chief of Joint Operations</td>
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<td>CJSS</td>
<td>common joint staff system</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>Chief Military Observer</td>
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<td>CN</td>
<td>Chief of Navy</td>
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<td>COMASC</td>
<td>Commander Australian Contingent</td>
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<td>COMAUSFLT</td>
<td>Commander Australian Fleet</td>
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<td>Comd JTF</td>
<td>Commander Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
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<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>COSC</td>
<td>Chiefs of Service Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCJOPS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Joint Operations</td>
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<td>DEPSEC IS&amp;IP</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary Intelligence, Security and International Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPSEC SCG</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary Strategy, Coordination &amp; Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLOC</td>
<td>directed level of capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMO</td>
<td>Defence Materiel Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>direct support</td>
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<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>force element</td>
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<td>FEG</td>
<td>force element group</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMA</td>
<td>Financial Management and Accountability</td>
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<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
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<td>HOM</td>
<td>head of mission</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQJOC</td>
<td>Headquarters Joint Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISD</td>
<td>Inter-Allied Services Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>in support of</td>
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<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>joint</td>
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<tr>
<td>JC</td>
<td>joint commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>joint force air component commander</td>
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<td>JFAO</td>
<td>joint force area of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHC</td>
<td>Joint Health Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFLCC</td>
<td>joint force land component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFMCC</td>
<td>joint force maritime component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLC</td>
<td>Joint Logistics Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOICAUST</td>
<td>Joint Operations Intelligence Centre, Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCAUST</td>
<td>Land Commander Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHQ</td>
<td>Land Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>lines of communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOGC</td>
<td>Logistics Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOGSUPT</td>
<td>logistics support</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEAO</td>
<td>Middle East Area of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILAD</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINDEF</td>
<td>Minister for Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>multinational force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>memorandum/memoranda of agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum/memoranda of understanding</td>
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<td>NATCOMD</td>
<td>national command</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NORCOM</td>
<td>Northern Command</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORFORCE</td>
<td>North West Mobile Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Committee of Cabinet</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCE</td>
<td>officer conducting the exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLOC</td>
<td>operational level of capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCOMD</td>
<td>operational command</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPD</td>
<td>operational preparedness directive</td>
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<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operational order</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSE</td>
<td>officer scheduling the exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMG</td>
<td>peace monitoring group</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMSA</td>
<td>program of major scheduled activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>POTUS</td>
<td>President of the United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAN</td>
<td>Royal Australian Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>Royal Australian Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Strategic Command Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary for Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>special operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCAUST</td>
<td>Special Operations Commander Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWPA</td>
<td>South West Pacific Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACOMD</td>
<td>tactical command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>troop contributing country</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>troop contributing nation [NATO]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCOMD</td>
<td>theatre command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMO</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCDF</td>
<td>Vice Chief of the Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW</td>
<td>World War</td>
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