

Part One: The US–China Relationship

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Analysts see the relationship between the world's most powerful nation, the United States of America (USA), and its most populous country, the People's Republic of China (PRC),¹ not only as the most crucial factor for future developments in Asia, but also in worldwide international relations.

This paper looks at the evolution of this relationship during the past 30 years, discusses the important issues that have shaped it, and attempts to give an outlook on its development in the next decade.

The Sino–American relationship after 1949

During the second half of the 20th century the US and China shared a relationship that underwent drastic changes and had to survive many crises. The initial phase of Sino–American relations following the foundation of the PRC in 1949 was significantly affected by the Truman Doctrine and America's fear of the Domino Theory.² China's 1950 alliance with the USSR reinforced the US perception of monolithic communism—a misperception as it turned out because there were always significant tensions between Moscow and Beijing. However, American worries about a communist expansion in the Asia–Pacific led to a policy of containment. The 1950–1953 Korean War, where the two countries avoided a major military confrontation only by a slim margin, was a consequence of this situation. During this phase the US and China did not maintain official relations, mainly because the US recognised Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) regime on Taiwan as the legitimate government of China.

With China's estrangement from the USSR beginning in the early 1960s, the strategic setting changed dramatically: the two communist states not only terminated their partnership but became rivals, challenging each other across their common border.³ The Sino–Soviet split alleviated America's fears of a combined effort of communist expansion in Asia while at the same time it created a Chinese requirement to balance Soviet power. Thus, the ground was paved for a new era in Sino–American relations. Following the convergence initiated by President Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger in 1971–72, the two countries developed a strategic partnership aimed at containing perceived Soviet expansionism that lasted, despite some difficulties, until the late 1980s.

The first signs of erosion of this de facto alignment showed in 1987, when Chinese arms sales to countries in the Middle East, particularly Iran, led to a disagreement between the two countries.⁴ A huge shift, however, was caused by the June 4th 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. America reacted to this event by temporarily breaking off all high-level contacts with China and by imposing limited economic and military sanctions. Almost at the same time, the end of the Cold War, symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall, terminated the need for a strategic partnership against the USSR. As a consequence of these events, military cooperation, hitherto the strongest element of the bond, came to a halt; the relationship turned cool.

It took the two countries almost a decade to re-establish a 'normal' relationship. Adding to the Taiwan problem, Human Rights (HR) related questions began to influence American policy towards the PRC. During the early years of President Bill Clinton's administration, these questions even became a dominating driver in the relationship.⁵ Due to public opinion in the US and a strong China-critical

faction in Congress, China's attempts at resuming more favourable ties with America made only slow progress. Hurdles such as further Chinese arms sales to Middle East countries, President Clinton's ill-fated policy on China's Most Favoured Nation status (MFN)⁶ and, most significantly, the crisis over Taiwan in 1996⁷ delayed the development. China's economic transformation into a fast growing market, instigated by Deng Xiaoping's reforms beginning in 1978, acted as a catalyst for a better rapport between the two states. The increasing economic ties during the second half of the 1990s, such as a lively trade and growing US Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China, alleviated some of the political and strategic problems between the two countries in that period. But there were also major setbacks in Sino–American relations after 1995. They included Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the US in 1995; the Taiwan crises in 1996; the release of the 1999 Cox Report alleging Chinese espionage of US nuclear secrets; and the accidental US bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade in 1999.⁸ The Taiwan crises in 1996, involving PLA military exercises opposite Taiwan, launching of Chinese missiles towards Taiwan into the sea and the deployment of two US aircraft carriers into the waters off Taiwan, were a particular nasty incidents. Its positive effect, however, was a sobering of Washington and Beijing they both realised the potential consequences of a downward spiral in relations. This, once more, led to a convergence in their relationship, documented by the two Clinton–Jiang summits in 1997 and 1998. Thus, at the end of Clinton's second term, the US–China relationship was basically back on track, despite lasting ideological differences and unsolved problems such as Human Rights, weapons proliferation and Taiwan.

With the inauguration of George W. Bush in January 2001, America's China policy arguably took the most notable rebalancing since Nixon's visit to China in 1972.⁹ During the presidential campaign Bush had criticised Clinton's 'strategic partnership' policy as too accommodating and attaching too much importance to the US–China relationship. Short of calling China a 'threat',¹⁰ he characterised it as a 'strategic competitor'. Once in office, he translated this rhetoric into practice by adopting a much tougher approach towards the PRC than his predecessor. Almost immediately, Washington terminated the strategic dialogue between the two countries;¹¹ an official meeting of President Bush with the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, in the White House in May 2001 signalled a strong position on issues of HR; and most importantly, the President approved the largest arms-sale to Taiwan in a decade¹² and made several strong statements in regard to US policy towards Taiwan's defence.¹³ The PRC's downgrading in Bush's foreign policy became evident by the dispatch of comparably low-ranking US officials to China in the first half of 2001.¹⁴

Had it not been for a muted, de-escalating response to the policy of the newly arrived administration by Beijing,¹⁵ the EP-3 incident of April 1st 2001, in which an American surveillance-aircraft collided with a Chinese fighter aircraft,¹⁶ could have provoked much graver consequences. As it was, the situation was resolved within 11 days with the release of the American crew. However, as a result of the incident the relationship became even more strained.¹⁷

The horrific attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon proved to be pivotal events for the Sino–American relationship. Although none of the contentious problems between the two countries have been solved, since then the Bush administration has re-evaluated its China policy. Following 9-11, America's pre-occupation with the 'War on Terror' and Beijing's generally supportive attitude has diverted US attention away from strategic rivalry with the PRC.¹⁸ Furthermore, the PRC's relatively soft policy on Taiwan and its efforts in the revived crisis over North Korea's nuclear program have led to a re-engagement between the US and China. The improvement in bilateral ties since 9-11 is exemplified by softened US rhetoric, several good-spirited summits,

a resuscitation of military exchanges and, most recently, a notable shift of US policy regarding Taiwan.¹⁹

In summary, the US–Chinese relationship over the past 30 years has been embossed by periodic fluctuations: phases of good cooperation alternated with periods of disengagement, even confrontation. There are fundamental differences between the two countries that, in conjunction with sometimes real, sometimes only perceived adverse policies, have built an atmosphere of suspicion in their relationship. Despite the almost constant, occasionally frantic struggle by both sides to build a solid, survivable partnership, this lingering distrust has not disappeared. As Denny Roy puts it, ‘an aura of tragedy surrounds the US–China relationship’.²⁰

Strategic, military and intelligence cooperation

Strategic considerations were the nucleus of Sino–US rapprochement in the early 1970s.²¹ In developing a working partnership both countries saw an opportunity to counter the Soviet threat which both perceived as the main security challenge at the time. Additionally, the US hoped to make use of China’s ties with Vietnam to end the Vietnam War honourably.²² After 1994, the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program provided a field for common engagement.

During the 1980s, the US and the PRC increasingly intensified their intelligence and military connections. Initially, US–Chinese intelligence cooperation was limited to the US providing China with information on Soviet military activities. But soon, this support developed into real collaboration, until, ‘under the Carter administration, the intelligence agencies and bureaucracies of the two countries began working side by side.’²³ Regular visits of high-level intelligence officials including several directors of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to China and the joint operation of a signals intelligence (SIGINT) station in western China illustrate the depth of those ties.

Parallel to collaboration in the field of intelligence, military cooperation intensified in the 1980s: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and US forces regularly exchanged visits of high-ranking military leaders and a Defence Minister and Secretaries. The US provided the PLA with a much needed technology boost. Secretly-handled transfers of weapons and equipment through America’s Western allies developed into a trade in ‘non-lethal weapons’ and culminated in some official arms and technology sales in the mid 1980s; this enabled the PRC to modernise its obsolete defence equipment and to build a more advanced defence industry.²⁴

Although the effect of US–Chinese interaction on Soviet strategies cannot be analysed within the scope of this paper, it is safe to assume that the Sino–US strategic partnership towards the USSR, particularly during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, achieved its limited aims.²⁵ In contrast, US hopes of Chinese assistance in bringing the Vietnam War to an honourable end were not fulfilled. The PRC was either unwilling or unable to coerce Vietnam into a solution that would have accommodated the US.²⁶

With the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, the alignment between China and the US lost its strategic glue. The lack of a rationale for their partnership in combination with America’s outrage about the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989 turned their relationship sour and had dire consequences for their military cooperation: all military contacts were frozen and American arms sales to China stopped. Although informal contacts commenced again in the early 1990s, official bilateral military relations and a strategic dialogue could only resume in October 1993, following a policy review by the Clinton administration.²⁷ Realising the weight of the PLA in Chinese policy, the Pentagon pushed

for a reversal of the confrontational course.²⁸ Furthermore, the beginning of the crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons program restored in some ways a common strategic interest and provided an opportunity for cooperation. Thus, despite the setbacks in the overall relationship mentioned above, in the second half of the 1990s Sino–US military relations improved again, as indicated by 'an upsurge of regular exchange visits between the top defence and military leaderships of the two countries'.²⁹ Notwithstanding this improvement and some rhetoric such as the mutual assurance of the 1997 Clinton–Jiang summit 'to build toward a constructive strategic partnership',³⁰ strategic and military cooperation between China and the US did not regain the intensity and depth it lost with the end of the Cold War.

Matters deteriorated again under the early Bush administration: military contacts were laid on ice³¹ and after the EP-3 incident in April 2001, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld ordered a complete review of bilateral military exchanges.³² The *Quadrennial Defense Review* of September 2001, reflecting mostly pre-9-11 thinking, implicitly portrayed China as a threat.³³ Despite US military preponderance,³⁴ the increased modernisation of the PLA after the Kosovo War in 1999 raised concerns among US officials.³⁵

Strategic relations were further overshadowed by America's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2001 and Bush's decision to develop a National Missile Defense system (NMD).³⁶ However, with the thawing of the overall Sino–American relations following 9-11, military exchanges have intensified once again.³⁷ Cooperation in the field of intelligence has been revived and China is once more acting as mediator between North Korea and the US in the ongoing crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear program.

But diverging interests continue to characterise the US–Chinese strategic relationship: China as an emerging regional power sees the danger of encirclement and containment by America and its allies. This view has been reinforced by the US expansion in Central Asia in conjunction with the war in Afghanistan in 2002, and the increased US cooperation with Russia and India in the anti-terror struggle.³⁸ Beijing also has great difficulties with American unilateralism and pre-emptive notions as laid down in the so-called Bush Doctrine.³⁹ Further, it strongly opposes a unipolar world under US hegemony.

Washington, on the other side, has not completely overcome its suspicion of the emergence of a China threat.⁴⁰ The Bush administration's assessment with its prevailing realist thinking has come to the conclusion that China, with its growing economic potential, will inevitably challenge America's pre-eminence in the future. Fears that China will use its newly acquired economic power for expansion are enhanced by recent statements of Chinese leaders about the need for a new political and economic world order and the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation'.⁴¹

Weapons proliferation and espionage

Since the mid 1980s, the issue of arms sales by the PRC has increasingly become a tripwire in Sino–US relations. Before 1987, Chinese arms sales to Third World countries, although amounting to a considerable scale, did not get much of Washington's attention. This changed when the US became progressively more concerned about both the nature of the weapons sold and the recipients: China's deals with countries of the Middle East, particularly Iran, involved medium or long-range missiles such as the Silkworm missile and the CSS-2.⁴² Over the years, China has continued to trade a wide range of weapons almost indiscriminately around the world for a number of reasons. Firstly, the arms sales have provided a welcome source of profit to both the PLA and the Chinese defence industry.

Secondly, China has used arms deals to gain political advantage: a 1986 missile transaction to Saudi Arabia can be linked to Riyadh's recognition of the PRC.⁴³

America's reaction to Chinese weapons proliferation and technology transfers has provoked a third motive: the PRC has learned how to use arms sales as a tool in shaping US–China relations. Depending on circumstances, the US, which perceives this matter as a serious security threat, has responded in various ways to China's proliferation: it has reminded China of the destabilising consequences of certain deals; it has threatened the PRC with a deterioration of mutual relations; it has even imposed sanctions; and lastly, the US has tried to negotiate China out of some deals by offering rewards in other areas.⁴⁴ In exploitation of the latter, China developed remarkable skills in employing its arms deals as a bargaining tool in US–Chinese negotiations, particularly over Taiwan.⁴⁵ Moreover, it tried to use them to 'punish' the US for what it considered unfavourable behaviour.⁴⁶

Another contentious matter in this respect is the alleged espionage of US technology by China. Amongst other things, the 1999 Cox Report accused China of having stolen 'design information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons'⁴⁷ and claims that this kind of espionage has been ongoing over several decades. Although the Cox report is a much-disputed document,⁴⁸ its release exacerbated already existing displeasure among the American public towards China.

In the recent past, another facet has been added to the controversy over Chinese weapons proliferation: while continuing to remind the Chinese Government of its promises given to President Clinton in November 2000,⁴⁹ the Bush administration has started to target Chinese companies not complying with the US non-proliferation policy.⁵⁰ In parallel to these sanctions it also has repeatedly requested a better implementation and enforcement of laws relating to non-proliferation by the PRC leadership.⁵¹

For the US, weapons proliferation, particularly transfer of nuclear technology, and espionage are matters of grave concern; consequently, and notwithstanding the positive aspects of China's proliferation policy,⁵² China's overall record in this regard has significantly contributed to suspicion and irritation in US–Sino relations.

Economic interdependence

While in the initial phase of US–China rapprochement in the 1970s economic ties were clearly subordinate to strategic cooperation,⁵³ this changed over the years. In the 1990s, economic relations actually constituted the major field of interaction between the two countries.⁵⁴ This progress was sparked firstly by far-reaching reforms towards a more market-oriented system in China implemented by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and secondly, by the US granting the PRC MFN status under Carter in 1979. Since then, China has developed into one of the world's fastest growing economies,⁵⁵ with the US being a 'major contributor to China's rise in economic power'.⁵⁶

The economic relations between the two states has led to a degree of mutual interdependence. The PRC is reliant on America as an export market for its goods⁵⁷ and as a source of FDI and technological modernisation;⁵⁸ at the same time, the US business community is attracted by China's potentially huge market and cheap labour force. The importance of an agreeable economic relationship with China was reflected in the Clinton administration's dropping of all linkages between China's MFN status and Human Rights issues in 1994: the US Government had come under tremendous pressure from the American business community to unconditionally grant China MFN status. So by that time, the US obviously had realised the importance of the China market and abstained from revoking China's trade benefits for fear of potential consequences to America's economy.⁵⁹

An important step for Sino–US economic relations was China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001; after prolonged negotiations the two nations had finally reached consent on the conditions of China’s entry in 1999. In exchange for a guaranteed access to the American market China had to agree to more than 600 commitments⁶⁰ which, if met, will have extensive social and political implications for the PRC.⁶¹ President Bush, who, in the economic field, had for once continued Clinton’s policy towards China,⁶² welcomed the entry; in line with the American business community he expected a wide range of US business sectors to benefit from it. Moreover, Washington saw China’s WTO accession as a further step for its integration into the international community and again, a catalyst for ‘fundamental reform’.⁶³

Human Rights

America’s policy towards China in regard to Human Rights questions has been riddled with inconsistencies: during the 1970s and 80s, Human Rights issues were virtually not a topic in Sino–US relations.⁶⁴ During the Cold War, US administrations did not criticise allies for their domestic policies. Even Carter, who came into office with a special Human Rights agenda, applied double standards by treating China differently from other countries with a poor Human Rights record, for example, the USSR.⁶⁵ Since 1989 however, despite an arguably improved Chinese Human Rights behaviour,⁶⁶ these questions have been a bone of contention between the two countries.

The change was brought about by the 1989 events at Tiananmen Square, when the Chinese Government ended weeks of political unrest with a brutal crackdown on protesters in Beijing and other cities. The event, in part broadcast on international television, caused uproar in the US and had far-reaching consequences for the US–China relationship. Ever since, US policy towards China has been complicated by public sensitivities about Chinese Human Rights conduct⁶⁷ and the possibility of partisan exploitation of the issue.⁶⁸

With the advent of President George W. Bush’s robust China policy, Human Rights issues have acquired even more prominence. Right from the beginning of his term in office, Bush used every occasion to criticise the PRC for its Human Rights behaviour; the US’s attempt in 2001 to get a UN resolution condemning China’s Human Rights practice underscores his tough position in that matter.⁶⁹ Despite the improvements in Sino–US relations in the wake of 9-11, the administration stood firm in regard to Human Rights questions.⁷⁰ When China attempted to link the war on terror with its domestic struggle against separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang, the US Government rejected any such connection.⁷¹ Furthermore, until recently it did not accept the war on terrorism as an excuse for any kind of Human Rights abuse.⁷² However, during the latest meeting between Presidents Hu and Bush in Evian on 1 June 2003, Human Rights issues were not a topic.⁷³ Whether this is an indication of another shift in US policy remains to be seen.

Since 1989, America has strongly advocated Human Rights vis á vis the PRC; however, in some instances other issues continue to be placed higher on its agenda. Whenever Human Rights questions seriously threaten American business, economic prerogatives seem to override the US role of a Human Rights advocate. In these cases rhetoric and strong public announcements, often assisted by symbolic concessions of the PRC, substitute for progress in Human Rights but help enlist public support.⁷⁴

Considering these inconsistencies it is not surprising that China does not believe in the genuineness of America’s Human Rights policy; nor does it share the Western view of a universal standard of Human Rights.⁷⁵ Rather, the Chinese leaders consider US pressure in Human Rights-related issues as a bargaining ploy in other matters, or worse, as a means used to pursue regime change in China.⁷⁶

Therefore, they have usually reacted to US demands by taking an uncompromising stance, making no substantial concessions and agreeing to small items (like releasing a few well-known dissidents) only reluctantly. In countering US Human Rights policy, China has even accused the US of violating Human Rights itself.⁷⁷

Taiwan

The Taiwan problem will be analysed in more depth in the second part of this paper; hence a very brief mention of the issue will suffice at this time.

Arguably, the Taiwan issue has been the most complex and potentially most dangerous problem in Sino–US relations and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future. China's quest for unity, Taiwan's democratisation and growing striving for independence and America's complicated role in the issue have created a critical, occasionally explosive situation in the Taiwan Straits. In the past, the problem has triggered several severe crises between China and the US, thus constituting one more obstacle to a friendly relationship.

Future outlook

China's goals of taking its 'rightful place among nations'⁷⁸ and the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation' leave room for speculation as to what exactly its long-term intentions are. However, its short- to mid-term objectives seem quite obvious: China will continue to pursue economic growth and technological build-up;⁷⁹ further, it will strive to maintain internal and external stability. These objectives are intertwined. Each depends on the other. The PRC will also persist in modernising its military forces.

China cannot accomplish these goals unless it maintains a benign relationship with the US. Its economic growth depends on trade with America. With the exception of any substantial concessions regarding Taiwan it will therefore go to great lengths to accommodate the US by becoming an even better international citizen. This includes great efforts in meeting the WTO commitments, an active role in stabilising the East Asian region (particularly with respect to North Korea) and a patient stance towards the Taiwan problem. The PRC will, however, not shy away from a conflict with the US if it sees either its unity or the integrity of its regime endangered. This may well lead to further difficulties between the two countries over Human Rights issues (which by themselves will not trigger a severe confrontation if the US refrains from interventions à la Kosovo in Tibet or Xinjiang) or, again, Taiwan.

The US, which intends to reinforce its dominant role in the Asia–Pacific Region (APR),⁸⁰ observes the evolution of China and its emergence as a powerful nation in that region with keen eyes. In countering China's development into a formidable rival in the APR, America faces a quandary: increased economic exchange with China is in its own best interest, but will foster the undesirable effect of China's emergence as a pre-eminent regional power. Domestic pressure in the US against measures that disadvantage American business in China will be insurmountable for the government. It is therefore safe to predict that Sino–American economic relations will intensify in the years to come.

Since a benign-behaving China does not justify any openly offensive or even aggressive action to restrict its development, the US will probably continue its path of 'geo-political encirclement and soft containment'.⁸¹ Potential partners in that approach include long-standing US allies such as Japan and

South Korea, but also India and Russia.⁸² Again, the contradiction between the economic and strategic US strategy should be noted.

Unless unilateral activities by Taipei provoke another severe crisis, the US–Chinese relationship during the upcoming ten years will not develop into a hostile one; both sides stand to lose too much from that. Then again, due to ideological differences and the suspicions built up over the years, chances are slim that the relation will grow to be a warm, cordial friendship.

Endnotes

1. Throughout this paper the terms PRC and China will be used interchangeably.
2. Under the Truman Doctrine the US was committed to oppose the spread of communism on a global scale. The related Domino Theory sees the danger of countries in the Third World sequentially falling to communism analogous to a row of dominos. See Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, London: Penguin Books, 1998, p. 134 and p. 545.
3. In 1969, the two countries even clashed militarily along their joint border. Bruce Kennedy, *Chinese-Soviet Border Clashes*. CNN, [Internet, viewed 27-06-2003; available from www.cnn.com].
4. James Mann, *About Face*, New York, USA: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1999, p. 167.
5. In the 1992 election campaign, Clinton had vowed for a tougher stance on ‘dictators’ in the world, a policy aimed particularly at China. David M. Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams*, Berkeley, USA: University of California Press, 2001, p. 33.
6. Mann, *About Face*, op. cit., Chapter 16.
7. Problems related to the Taiwan question will be discussed in more depth in the second part of the paper.
8. Jing-Dong Yuan, ‘Sino–U.S. Military Relations since Tiananmen: Restoration, Progress, and Pitfalls’, *Parameters* Spring 2003, pp. 54–55.
9. Robert Sutter, ‘The Bush Administration and US China Policy Debate – Reasons for Optimism’, *Issues & Studies* Vol. 38, No. 2, 2002, p. 2.
10. Susan Moran, ‘Military Professionalism on Rise in Asia?’, *United Press International*, 13-08-2001.
11. Lanxin Xiang, ‘Washington’s Misguided China Policy’, *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2001, p. 10.
12. The US\$4 billion sale included 4 destroyers, 12 maritime patrol aircraft and a promise to facilitate the acquisition of 4 diesel electric submarines. Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘11 September and the Future of Sino–American Relations’, *Survival* Vol. 44, No. 1, 2002, p. 39.
13. On national television on 25 April 2001 Bush pledged to do ‘whatever it takes’ to defend Taiwan. Sutter, ‘The Bush Administration and US China Policy Debate – Reasons for Optimism’, op. cit., p. 4.
14. Seiichiro Takagi, ‘The Impact of September 11 on China’s Key Foreign Relationships’, *Japan Review of International Affairs* Vol. 16, No. 1, 2002, p. 12.
15. *ibid.*, p. 10.
16. The Chinese pilot was killed in this incident; the US aircraft made an emergency landing on a Chinese airbase on Hainan Island.
17. Sutter, ‘The Bush Administration and US China Policy Debate – Reasons for Optimism’, op. cit., p. 25.
18. Jonathan D Pollack, ‘Assessing Alternative U.S.–Chinese Strategic Futures: Some Preliminary Hypothesis’, *KNDU Review* Vol. 7, No. 2, 2002, p. 16.
19. On 01 June 2003, President Bush confirmed for the first time that the US would not support Taiwan independence. See *President Bush’s Meeting with Chinese President 01 June 2003 - Press Briefing*. The White House, [Internet, viewed 18-06-2003; available from www.whitehouse.gov].
20. Denny Roy, ‘Rising China and U.S. Interests: Inevitable vs. Contingent Hazards’, *Orbis* Vol. 47, No. 1, 2003, p. 137.
21. Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992, p. 4.
22. Mann, *About Face*, op. cit., pp. 14–16.
23. *ibid.*, p. 98.
24. *ibid.*, pp. 74 and 139ff.
25. For a more detailed discussion on this issue see Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, op. cit., pp. 162ff.
26. Mann, *About Face*, op. cit., p. 34.

27. Yuan, 'Sino-U.S. Military Relations since Tiananmen: Restoration, Progress, and Pitfalls', p. 52.
28. Mann, *About Face*, op. cit., p. 288.
29. Yuan, 'Sino-U.S. Military Relations since Tiananmen: Restoration, Progress, and Pitfalls', op. cit., p. 53.
30. *China–US Joint Statement*. China Online, 1997 [Internet, viewed 28-05-2003; available from www.chineseculture.about.com].
31. E.g., the Annual Defence Consultation Talks in 2001 were cancelled.
32. Yuan, 'Sino-U.S. Military Relations since Tiananmen: Restoration, Progress, and Pitfalls', op. cit., p. 55.
33. The review hints at China as 'a military competitor with a formidable resource base', *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington: US Department of Defense, 30 September 2001.
34. The DoD sees China's military 20 years out of date. See David Shambaugh, 'Sino–American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors', *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2000, p. 104. China is aware of this: the wars in Iraq 1991 and 2003, Kosovo 1999 and Afghanistan 2002 have highlighted the immense US advantage. See Friedberg, '11 September and the Future of Sino–American Relations': p. 43.
35. The President himself 'drew attention to China's heightened emphasis on military modernisation', Pollack, 'Assessing Alternative U.S.–Chinese Strategic Futures: Some Preliminary Hypothesis', p. 12.
36. The PRC is convinced that this system is mainly aimed at China's nuclear arsenal. See Roy, 'Rising China and U.S. Interests: Inevitable vs. Contingent Hazards', p. 135.
37. Yuan, 'Sino-U.S. Military Relations since Tiananmen: Restoration, Progress, and Pitfalls', op. cit., p. 56.
38. See Friedberg, '11 September and the Future of Sino–American Relations', p. 40ff.
39. See *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House, 17 September 2002. This document is widely recognised as the basis of the Bush Doctrine.
40. For a comprehensive discussion of the 'China threat theory' see Herbert Yee and Ian Storey (eds), *The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality*, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002.
41. Zemin Jiang, 'Build a Well-off Society in an All-Route Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics', Beijing: 16th CPC Congress, 2002, pp. 22 and 26.
42. Mann, *About Face*, op. cit., pp. 167–68.
43. Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams*, op. cit., p. 85.
44. Mann, *About Face*, op. cit., p. 167ff.
45. Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams*, op. cit., p. 85.
46. China's passing of modern M-11 missiles to Pakistan in 1992 may well have been a reaction to America's F-16 sale to Taiwan earlier that year. See Mann, *About Face*, op. cit., p. 271.
47. 'Report of the Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the PRC', (Washington: US Congress), Vol 1, Overview.
48. Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams*, op. cit., p. 84.
49. Among other assurances, 'China had promised to suspend further transfers of missile technology to Iran and Pakistan'. Friedberg, '11 September and the Future of Sino–American Relations', p. 37.
50. In July 2002, the US Government imposed sanctions against nine Chinese entities. *Press Statement by Richard Boucher 24 July 2002*. US Department of State, [Internet, viewed 19-06-2003; available from www.usinfo.state.gov].
51. Richard N Haas, *Remarks to the National Committee on US–China Relations*. US Department of State, 2002 [Internet, viewed 18-06-2003; available from www.usinfo.state.gov].
52. In the past, China has played an active part in restraining North Korea's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. It is also signatory to most major arms control regimes. For a full list see Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams*, op. cit., p. 83.
53. E.g., in the Shanghai Communique trade relations were mentioned only briefly, specific goals were not outlined. *Joint*

- Communique of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China*, US Department of State, 1972 [Internet, viewed 26-03-2003; available from www.usinfo.state.gov].
54. Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams*, op. cit., p. 112.
55. According to China's central statistics office, its average GDP growth from 1996 to 2001 was 8.3%. See 'China becomes World's Sixth Biggest Economy', *People's Daily*, 2002 [Internet, viewed 02-06-2003; available from www.taiwansecurity.org]. However, official Chinese economic statistics are questionable. Joshua Kurlantzick, *Is China's Economic Boom a Myth?* TNR Online, 2002 [Internet, viewed 02-06-2003; available from www.tnr.com].
56. 'Report of the Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the PRC', (Washington: US Congress), Chapter 2.
57. China's trade with the US has resulted in a US trade deficit increasing from \$6 billion in 1989 to \$87 billion in 2000. *ibid.*, Chapter 2.
58. *ibid.*, Chapter 2.
59. See Mann, *About Face*, op. cit., Chapter 16.
60. William B Abnett, 'China and Compliance with WTO Commitments: The First Six Month', Seattle, USA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, November 2002, p. 6.
61. See Joseph Fewsmith, 'The Political and Social Implications of China's Accession to the WTO' *The China Quarterly* No. 167, 2001, pp. 589ff. The author predicts negative results, such as higher unemployment, even social unrest, and positive outcomes, such as a more efficient economy and political reforms.
62. Bush realised the importance of the US–Chinese economic ties for American business. He also regarded normal trade relations with China as 'good for the force of change'. Consequently, he supported the renewal of China's Normal Trade Relations (formerly MFN) by Congress in June 2001. See Colin L Powell, 'The Promise of China Trade' *The Washington Post*, 01-06-2001.
63. Robert B Zoellick, *US Trade Representative Outlines Implications of WTO Accession for China, Taiwan*. 2002 [Internet, viewed 18-06-2003; available from www.usinfo.state.gov].
64. Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, op. cit., p. 198.
65. Mann, *About Face*, op. cit., pp. 100ff.
66. Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams*, op. cit., p. 133.
67. Contentious subjects include China's handling of secessionist movement in Tibet and Xinjiang, its one child policy leading to abortions and its treatment of dissidents and religious minorities.
68. America's policy towards Chinese HR abuse has been an important issue in every presidential election campaign since Tiananmen Square.
69. *US Introduces UN Resolution on China's Human Rights Practices*. US Department of State, 18 April 2001 [Internet, viewed 18-06-2003; available from www.usinfo.state.gov].
70. Takagi, 'The Impact of September 11 on China's Key Foreign Relationships', p. 13.
71. Friedberg, '11 September and the Future of Sino–American Relations', p. 37.
72. *US Assistant Secretary of State Lorne W. Craner says Government can't ignore Human Rights in War on Terrorism*.
73. *President Bush's Meeting with Chinese President 01 June 2003–Press Briefing*. The White House, [Internet, viewed 18-06-2003; available from www.whitehouse.gov].
74. Again, Clinton's handling of China's MFN status can be taken as an example. See Mann, *About Face*, op. cit., p. 309.
75. Robert M Hathaway, 'Promoting Human Rights in China: Practical Steps for U.S. Policymakers' *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002, p. 8.
76. Long-lasting apprehension in Beijing about the US promoting a regime change, nurtured by numerous comments of US officials ever since 1972, was magnified when the US lead the intervention in Kosovo 1999 on humanitarian grounds.
77. *China Hits Back on Human Rights*, Taiwan Security Research, 2003 [Internet, viewed 15-05-2003; available from www.taiwansecurity.org].

78. Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams*, op. cit., p. 69.
79. 'China has defined economic and technological modernisation as its primary goal.' *ibid.*, p. 26.
80. See *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (The White House, 17 September 2002).
81. Friedberg, '11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations', p. 40.
82. China is aware of that policy and obviously tries to counter it: in a recent visit of India's Premier Atal Behari Vajpayee to Beijing the two countries declared their intention to cooperate in the pursuit of a multi-polar world order. See Johnny Erling, 'China und Indien entdecken ueberraschend ihr neue Freundschaft', *Die Welt*, 23-06-2003.