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Night moves
Letters to the Editor

Cadet Corps

Dear Sir,

The argument to establish a “resuscitated and reinvigorated” Australian Cadet Corps (ACC) as advanced by Captain Jonathan Huston in the July/August 1991 issue of the ADFJ cannot go unchallenged.

Captain Huston proposes “a strategic plan to renew the ACC”, one of his principal aims apparently being “to harvest a crop” of enlistees to RMC and ADFA.

Part of that strategic plan is to “fully support all cadet units” and “re-establish the ACC along predominantly school lines”, presumably to increase the number of cadets. Captain Huston does not indicate whether the additional costs involved should come from within the existing Defence Force budget or whether extra contributions would be required from Australian taxpayers.

A counter argument is to disband the ACC entirely. This is a view which I have held and articulated publicly well before the Corps was initially abandoned in 1975, an action which Captain Huston seemingly emotionally called “a cheap expedient at enormous cost to Army credibility and military community relations”. Suffice it to say that many at the time thought otherwise.

In considering whether there should be a Cadet Corps, we should ask ourselves why adolescents should be urged to wear a military uniform and be tutored in combat related activities. It has not been unusual for Australians to criticise other countries which use their very young in battle. Such criticism is well deserved, but there is a fine line between that practice and having a military presence in our schools.

Those secondary students who have not been cadets may not have, as Captain Huston states, “a solid understanding of rank, barracks routine, discipline, basic field-craft and military organisation”. But if they have a well rounded education and are otherwise suitable to enter RMC or ADFA, should this matter? If it does, perhaps it says something about the early stages of training at those institutions.

There are many factors which influence a career choice. But figures quoted by Captain Huston clearly attest that the choice of a military career does not depend on prior experience as a cadet. It is not correct to regard former cadets as, to use Captain Huston’s words, the “catchment area” for RMC and ADFA. The catchment area is the final year school population.

Despite high levels of unemployment among school leavers, those who are highly capable are eagerly sought after by employers and post-secondary institutions. It is in this market in peace time that service recruiting has to compete. If it cannot, it must take steps to make a service career appear to be and actually be more attractive. Propping up and expanding a Cadet Corps is not an acceptable answer.

Senator Mal Colston

Editor’s Note: Senator Colston, a member of the inactive Army Reserve, was a school cadet for four years. He is at present Deputy President of the Senate. Originally a teacher, he was medically unfit for National Service due to injuries sustained in a road accident, but later joined the CMF (AA Psych Corps) as a Private. He subsequently remained in the CMF/Army Reserve for 15 years. He served for a short period on CMF full time duty in what was then New Guinea and later was OC21 Psych Unit for three years. He holds degrees in Arts and Education and has a Ph.D. in Educational Psychology.

Armour in Low-Level Operations

Dear Sir,

My reason for writing is the article “The Use of Armour in Low-Level Operations” (ADFJ 89). Whilst I strongly agree with CAPT Phillips’ contention on the role, or even the necessity of armour, in all levels of conflict; several points require critical review.

The “disadvantages” of armour not being able to hold ground, and the tendency of mounted infantry
not to dismount unless forced to, beg the following retort. The destruction of the enemy rather than the capture of ground must be the foremost aim in low-level conflict on one's own soil, and secondly why would one dismount other than when essential? Combat craft (rather than tactics) in mechanised ops is a different ball game to that of CRW. Without decrying the emphasis of skills of our Infantry soldier, foot patrolling is but one of the many skills today's soldier requires. Hence armour (including mechanised infantry) may be regarded not just as a supporting arm to the ODF (or any force for that matter) but as a fighting arm well suited to the operations in our north.

My largest contention however was the comparison of Armour, CAIRS and Artillery in a paragraph that seemed to contradict an earlier assertion that armour need operate as part of a balanced team (or is a balanced team Armour and Infantry only?). My contention is threefold:

a. Captain Phillips is misinformed if he believes a force must "withdraw" to facilitate the use of Artillery. If one is, in open country, within the 600m required to prompt Danger Close procedures then one is also well within small arms and anti-armoured weapons range provoking all elements to take evasive action. Even then withdrawal is only one of three options available to the local commander to allow indirect fire (see your local Forward Observer or Battery Commander). Notably most engagements in the Gulf were initiated at around 3,000m (Utilising Challenger and M1A1).

b. Armour is not a "suppressive" weapon. One vehicle (the extreme ventured in this article) without mutual support is hardly in a position to provide continuous fire support, nor is this the best use of the weapon (a tank is not just a self propelled gun). The primary role of the tank gun and tank ammunition is defeat of armour (or at worst a point target). An examination of the ballistic properties of APDS shows that it represents considerable danger not only to tanks but also to dismounted friendly Infantry (sabot) and to surrounding areas (ricochet). Even if HESH and HE predominated the terminal ballistics hardly represent less danger to surrounds, but provide significantly less area coverage (due to velocity and angle of impact) than Artillery which can vary charge with range to reduce ricochet, thereby containing (given adjustment or the use of laser) risk to inherent zone of the guns. .50 cal suffers similar disadvantages in terms of ricochet.

c. It was obviously not within Captain Phillips' aim to ponder who fixes the enemy in location whilst armour manoeuvres to bring its firepower to bear; or who suppresses enemy AT resources (perhaps he doesn't have any?) whilst armour and mounted infantry close on the objective. I can only venture that perhaps the "Soviets", and the "South Africans" (or even Australia in Vietnam) included Indirect Fire support also as part of their balanced team.

Having had close contact with both 1AR and 5/7 RAR as a forward observer, I am a disciple to the role of armour in all phases and levels of war. We must, however, assume that the enemy when he comes is professional and armed with the latest lightweight weapon systems including anti-armour assets. I only hope that our preparation, with all the good intent Captain Phillips can muster regarding armour for its advantages, is not undermined by lack of due regard to the need for artillery as well.

D.J. Moore
Captain
Royal School of Artillery
Larkhill United Kingdom

Adventurous Training

Dear Sir,

The three articles regarding adventurous training published in the Journal (No. 90 Sep/Oct 91) each presented some thought provoking and valid points. While I would challenge Army's doctrine attempting to separate adventurous training from sport (Cannot war be considered the ultimate sport and one of the most effective adventurous training situations?), two other points are worthy of additional consideration.

Formal adventurous training is as valid for old as for younger members. For young members life itself, and particularly the challenges of early Service involvement, is an adventure and can be used as such for personal development purposes. For older, more experienced, sedentary members with routine jobs and lifestyles the challenge to exercise, maintain and even develop the qualities which differentiate military people from civilians is far greater. It is important that older, more senior members take an active role in adventurous training, not only for their own and their unit's benefit, but for the example they set as role models to their juniors.

With common aims and objectives and limited resources the three Services could achieve the
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

5

greatest efficiency by adopting a joint approach to adventurous training. By any standards, the amount of resources given to such training and, in the main, the level of expertise presently in the Services is small and fragmented. Consolidating what there is and building on the environmental strengths of each Service — in much the same way as the British forces do — would lead to more universal training, improved standards and consequently a higher quality of Service member. The time is right for such an approach.

M.J. Linsley
Commander, RAN

Air Power

Dear Sir,

I am writing to contribute to the debate about air power and its application. Having read the articles on the RAAF Air Power Manual, AAP 1000, published over the past year in the ADFJ, I decided to read AAP 1000 for myself. I found the Air Power Manual, in all, a well balanced presentation of Air Power and Australia. In fact, as strategy is ever evolving and seeking crystallisation, perhaps the RAN, and to a lesser extent Army, could benefit from the same experience. I would like to point out, however, one section which I found was not in tune with the symphony of history.

In the section dealing with Political Responsiveness, paragraph 2.36 states: 'Thus air power has displaced sea power as the immediate response or display of national power.' This sentence is unequivocal in its assertion that sea power is no longer preferred as a demonstration of national will. This assertion is not only unsubstantiated, but also appears to be drawn from selected instances. There certainly exists one clear example of air power achieving a political objective: the US air raid against Libya in 1986. However, I found it difficult to find other clear examples supporting AAP 1000's statement.

When I read the assertion that air power is the preferred political option, I immediately thought of my own experiences off Fiji in May 1987, when Australian and New Zealand warships were used as insurance against hostile acts on our nationals. This had to be done again later that year.

There are many more examples of sea power fulfilling the classic role of gunboat diplomacy in the last twenty years. However, this is not to say that air power has no political application; it does. The Libyan raid was instrumental in halting that country's terrorist activities. Air power has, amongst others, the advantages of speed and quick concentration, valuable assets when immediate reaction is necessary. Nevertheless, these very assets may work against the national effort. The passage of a warship to its station allows valuable time for diplomatic negotiation — and most importantly — an escape route for an aggressor.

In 1975, RAN warships were on station as a diplomatic tool during the East Timor crisis. Following the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the RAN began rotating a destroyer through the North West Indian Ocean, not only to maintain a presence, but to also demonstrate affiliation with Western efforts to oppose the invasion. Again, Australian warships were conducting operations to achieve political aims in response to the crises in Fiji in 1987, Vanuatu in 1988, and Bougainville in 1989/90. And of course, there was Kuwait, and the on-going DAMASK commitment. These examples of sea power supporting the political aim concern only the RAN; there are many more from overseas, such as the United States Navy's experiences off Lebanon in the early 1980s, and the multinational Naval operations in the Arabian Gulf during the Tanker War later in the decade. From these examples, it can be seen that sea power is still the most preferred method of supporting diplomatic initiatives. This is simply because a warship offers the endurance and independence aircraft lack, something recognised in AAP 1000. Because sea power offers these advantages, it will almost invariably be used as an adjunct to diplomacy in expressing national will. To have a statement asserting otherwise in an important document such as AAP 1000, is not in keeping with its intended use as a reliable and thorough treatise on air power. When speaking about the international fleets in the Mediterranean, the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat summed up sea power's diplomatic strength thus: 'Fleets are no more than floating borders: nothing can stand against them, or curb their activity.'

Paul Garai
Sub Lieutenant RAN

Adventurous Training — Doctrine and Conduct

Dear Sir,

Regarding the two articles on adventurous training (ADFJ 90) one by CAPT M. Reilly, the other by MAJ G. Smith — I feel it is appropriate for me to offer comment on some of the issues raised.
CAPT Reilly suggests that greater emphasis needs to be placed on evaluating the results of adventurous training activities. Surely this should be considered post-activity “SOP” for any training activity. This point highlights the critical issue underlying most topical discussion of adventurous training in the Army generally — that there is not training in the Army then adventurous training — adventurous training is an integral facet of training — and should not be compartmentalised and treated as a special or unique category of training.

Due acceptance of this key rationale would go a long way towards resolving many of the perceived problems or difficulties associated with the planning conduct and evaluation of adventurous training. There is no requirement to provide specialised training at RMC or other officer training establishments on these matters. Cadets are given formal training in the planning conduct and evaluation of training activities (including the essential requirement to adequately plan and forecast for all necessary resources appropriate to the particular activity) and this is sufficient for all activities. As a luxury or added bonus, since early 1990 the OC of AATC has addressed the graduating class of RMC — covering adventurous training policy, doctrine, risk management, planning, administration, and military leadership. So from a grooming of future “platoon commanders” for adventurous training perspective the field is already well and truly covered.

The raising of unit or area libraries is a good idea and in fact has occurred. Care however needs to be taken that junior leaders do not see these information sources as an easy option for activity planning — merely changing the dates and participants’ names from earlier exercise instructions. A significant element of the value accruing from the planning and conduct of any activity is the effort and research required. These libraries should be used as no more than a source of suggestions and ideas.

Regarding MAJ Smiths’ article — it is important to remember that the main charter of AATC is to train unit adventurous training leaders (UATL) not “instructors”. Most students are first exposed to climbing, ski-touring or rafting/kayaking whilst at the Centre — to emerge only two weeks later as “an instructor” would be a tall order indeed! This is the major reason why the formation and active involvement of local area adventurous training clubs is so crucial — they alone can facilitate the maintenance of skills, competence and standards at a safe and proficient level. They maintain an on-going interest and repository of enthusiasm among like-minded individuals towards adventurous training and form a valuable “pool” of leaders from which area units can draw to support their activities.

The distinction drawn between “instructor planned” or “unit planned” adventurous training thus becomes a little blurred — a unit can plan conduct and evaluate its activity utilising the services of a neighbouring unit’s leader — and the activity would still be regarded as “unit planned”. This concept of running adventurous training activities from within a unit’s own resources (notwithstanding the “loan” of a skilled UATL) is stressed by AATC. No doctrinal changes are therefore considered necessary in furtherance of this objective.

Panelling of Australian soldiers on NZ AATC courses was a pre-Aust AATC measure. It should no longer be regarded as an option for any member other than certain staff of AATC Bonegilla.

I agree that adventurous training should not be regarded or treated as voluntary. I have never been “invited” to attend a unit range practice, field exercise or parade! The required degree of danger, risk, adventure and excitement can be pitched at a level sufficient to test the members thus compelled to partake — obviously a squadron of counter-terrorist troopers from SASR will need more stressful objectives than a group drawn from a Log Bn Camp-Earmark section. The important criteria regardless of the composition of the participating group is to first set the aims and objectives — then select activities which best meet the aim — not vice-versa which is so often the case.

Likewise, it is agreed that costs should not normally be attributed to the soldier (I have never paid, other than by taxation, for rounds fired at the range). Thorough pre-activity planning and forecasting can help prevent the last-minute cost attribution back onto the participants. It is accepted however that many overseas adventurous training expeditions, particularly to places such as the Himalayas (where mountain booking fees and a host of other costs not levied in Australia apply) will invariably involve a members’ contribution. Most would concede that in these circumstances such a contribution is fair and reasonable; levies are charged for compulsory mess dinners, I’ve forgotten how many unit “T” shirts I’ve had to buy over the years for compulsory unit PT and esprit de unit!

In summary then, whilst it is pleasing to note the general upsurge in the conduct of (and ADFJ articles on) adventurous training — there is no requirement at this stage to review current doctrine or practices.

L.R. Phillips
Captain
**No Recognition**

Dear Sir,

In response to Mr Michael P. Prowse, President of Vietnam Logistic Support Veterans Association. Letter dated May, June 1991 No. 88 ADFJ.

I am one of many ex-Naval personnel who served during the Vietnam Conflict whom received no recognition of service during the conflict.

We served on the Jeparet and the Boonaroo which carried war supplies from Sydney to Vungtai and Cam Ran Bay, going ashore and tasting Vietnamese hospitality.

We were ordered to serve on these ships because the Merant Seamans Union would not man the ships.

We served the Australian Government to the best of our ability and we still have not been granted full recognition of our active service.

Even after nineteen years.

Laurence J. Lord

*One of few still to return from a lost conflict*

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**Australian Military Medicine Association**

Dear Sir,

The Australian Military Medicine Association has recently been established. For anyone interested in any aspect of Military Medicine, this should be welcome news, as there has not been such an association in the past. Membership is open to all health professionals, uniformed and civilian, and others with significant standing in some aspect of military medicine. Aims of the association are to establish communication between members, to promote the study of, and research into, military medicine. A newsletter will be the forerunner of a journal; there are regional groups, and special interest groups, to cover aspects such as nursing, radiography, underwater medicine, human factors and so on, and there will be an annual conference.

For more information and an application form, write to:

SDRldr Marcus Skinner
Secretary, AMMA Base Medical Flight
RAAF Amberley Qld 4306

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The Infantryman — An Endangered Species

By Lieutenant M.D. Collins, RA Inf.

Introduction

Retaining the good soldier has become one of the most important aims of commanders at all levels in recent times. The increase in the number of personnel leaving the Defence Force has caused a great deal of concern in all units. In 1989, 100 soldiers were discharged from 2/4 RAR for a variety of reasons. By the end of May 1990, 62 soldiers had been discharged.

To an infantry battalion of 700 men this represents a substantial portion of experienced soldiers. Almost 90% of those discharged had served a minimum of three years. It is quite likely that the 1990 discharge figure will be greater than 100. In addition to the 62 soldiers already discharged this year, a further 30 soldiers have tendered their discharge applications. Clearly the current situation is unacceptable, especially for a unit designed to go to war at short notice.

Efforts to retain the soldier have consisted mainly of counselling at sub-unit and unit level. In many cases the reasons why soldiers are electing discharge are not formally addressed until the member marches into the discharge unit and answers a discharge questionnaire. A great deal of information is available concerning numbers and statistics, but little information has come from the statistics themselves.

To understand the retention problem it is necessary to ask the soldiers the reasons why they are electing discharge. This service paper is based on the personal interviews with those members of 2/4 RAR who have been discharged this year. It represents the majority of personal views and backgrounds of soldiers who were past the counselling stage and ready for the transition into civilian life.

The decision for a soldier to choose discharge after his minimum engagement, or the decision of the Army to discharge him prior to the end of his current engagement, depends on two factors; the individual's disposition prior to enlistment (pre-enlistment history) and his experiences after enlistment (post-enlistment environment). Both factors, in combination, directly contribute to the retention problem that 2/4 RAR is facing today.

Pre-enlistment History

Pre-enlistment history influences the type of individual we are recruiting. For some soldiers all efforts to retain them are doomed from the start. They have not joined the Army with a view to making it their chosen career, the reasons for this are varied. The individual's personal circumstances and needs prior to enlistment may force him to consider the Army as a short term form of employment. The Army offers a secure job with a guaranteed fortnightly wage and it's not very hard to get into (just read the recruiting advertisements in the paper). It may not be what the individual wants at the time but it will do until something better comes along. Soldiers in this category can offer very few reasons as to why they joined in the first place and have little in the way of aims or aspirations within the Army. If we recruit this kind of individual then there is a good chance the Army will have problems retaining him.

Recruiting

The Raw Product. It is a common observation amongst many of the more senior soldiers and NCOs electing discharge that the new soldier in the Battalion is younger and less mature. He is perceived as being non-career orientated, having poor powers of information retention, lacking in commonsense and initiative, being more of an individual rather than a team member and expecting the Army to solve all his problems for him. This observation could be dismissed as simply the older soldier putting down the new reinforcement or perhaps forgetting what he was like when he first joined the unit. Looking at these comments within the Battalion environment does bring out some interesting points though.

Advertising. To get the maximum return of service from a soldier we need to recruit career minded individuals. Preference should be given to those who have some knowledge of the Army and
some aim or ambition that they wish to fulfil within the Army. These prospective candidates can be won by effective recruiting. Recruiting needs to be more informative and more personalised to let potential recruits know what the Army has to offer and what they might want to do within it. People must have a good idea of what they want to do before they enlist.

**Education.** Of all the new soldiers who marched into 2/4 RAR in 1989 less than 15% had year 12 education. It has been stated at higher levels that ‘today’s soldier is more intelligent and expects to have reasonable solutions to his problems’ (Brigade Commander’s conference 19 October 1989). It is quite likely that today’s soldier has spent longer at school than soldiers did 10 years ago. It must also be remembered that school is compulsory up until year 10, regardless of how well the student is doing. In a technologically advanced society such as Australia, most employers expect prospective employees to have a high level of education, year 12 is a distinct advantage. In comparison with Australian society, where there is an increasing tendency for students to go on and complete year 12, many of our soldier’s education standards are not particularly high.

**Discipline.** In 1989, 11 soldiers were discharged from 2/4 RAR because their retention was ‘not in the Army’s interests’. For the same period 18 soldiers were placed on formal warnings and 33 received in-house warnings. The civilian offences that these soldiers committed included: driving under the influence of alcohol, wilful damage, assault and drug offences. Of the total Personnel Incident Reports for 1989, 80% involved soldiers who had been in the Army for less than three years. This situation obviously compounds the retention problem, here exists a situation where the Army clearly does not want these soldiers and actively seeks their discharge.

**Age and Maturity.** The average age of all new soldiers to 2/4 RAR in 1989 was 20 years old. The age of today’s soldier is not in question, his maturity and intellect is. The large percentage of new soldiers who get involved in civilian offences generally do not display mature or sound intelligence. If the individual is not the ideal material for an Army career to start with then it is most likely that he will be difficult to retain even if all the post-enlistment concerns of the soldier are solved. In many cases he will either seek his discharge voluntarily due to his own non-commitment, or the Army will seek his discharge because he develops into a discipline liability. The Army should not enlist this kind of individual in the first place if they will only add to the retention problem in the future. The Army needs intelligent, career minded, mature people to start with. Quality should not be sacrificed for quantity.

**Post-enlistment Environment**

The post-enlistment environment is the influence the Army has on the individual once enlisted. If the Army has recruited the soldier who is only after the short term employment or who is not generally the ideal soldier in regards to a long term career, then he is not likely to be very responsive to his post-enlistment environment. If he has already made his mind up to spend only four years in the Army or has no ambitions or goals then it would require a great deal of effort by the Army to keep him and convince him that the Army is a good career. Alternatively, if the Army displays little effort to retain the soldier or the post-enlistment environment is adverse then the soldier will see all the more reason to get out at the end of his engagement period. In extreme cases the soldier will actively pursue an early discharge.

**Training**

The most common complaint that soldiers have concerning training is that it lacks forethought and detailed planning. Training lacks realism, variety, is unimaginative and in most cases is the same old information presented in the same old way. There are often disruptions, cancellations and shortening of training time at the last minute. Many live fire practices are over safety conscious to the point of being unrealistic. This problem needs to be addressed at platoon and section commander level. Maximum time must be given to platoons from within battalion command for training. In any case, there will always be situations where time is short. Platoon staff need to have well planned, imaginative training on hand with the minimal amount of external support that can be conducted at short notice when required. For example: an ‘Exercise Trained Soldier’ activity when waiting between details during a range practice. This does not mean that we discard training programmes, these are essential to effective training.

**Exercises.** In the past, time has been wasted whilst on exercise. Soldiers become bored and disillusioned when they spend a large part of the exercise doing
An exercise trained soldier.
nothing. Time spent in the field is seen by many as being short enough as it is without wasting what little time we get. Financial constraints will generally restrict the amount of time spent on exercise, therefore time must be used more effectively. Exercises need to be planned and coordinated better so that soldiers are not sitting around doing nothing. They should be more intense and generate more activity so that the soldiers can achieve greater learning value. Shorter more frequent exercises, of 10 day duration, should be looked at in preference to less frequent longer exercises. There is always the requirement to conduct longer exercises, but these should not be designed to exercise the higher command elements at the expense of section and platoon training. These aims can be achieved concurrently.

**Boredom.** One of the most difficult tasks of all commanders is how to effectively keep their soldiers occupied. This is just as relevant in barracks as in the field. Many soldiers complain of boredom in their second year in the Battalion. In several cases, if the soldier had experienced the same interest as in his first year in the unit then he would have remained in the Army. Soldiers expressed boredom with such things as unimaginative repetitive training. Two areas of concern included weapon and physical training. Boredom can only be overcome by effective planning by commanders at all levels. An innovative and exciting training program should not leave soldiers the opportunity to become bored.

**Resources.** Ammunition, rations and transport are valuable commodities which are essential for effective training. They are highly sought after and as a consequence can become scarce. The lack of resources to conduct training is counter productive to training and morale. Many weapons that soldiers carry on exercise have rarely been live fired by the individual. Exercises are postponed or changed due to the lack of combat rations or helicopter air hours. Alternative resource planning for exercises is essential, a little imagination and planning can overcome a shortage of combat rations, for example. Scarce resources must not be wasted, they need to be carefully pooled and evenly distributed so that everyone gets a chance to use them. Every effort needs to be made to obtain ammunition for effective training. The use of ammunition and pyrotechnics for activities of a non-military nature (for example; open days and public demonstrations) should be questioned. A priority between training and public relations needs to be made. In these days of Defence cut backs the Army cannot afford to support both as it has in the past.

**Leadership and Man Management**

**Senior Officers.** A soldier’s perception of his senior commanders is by no means the main reason he elects discharge, but it does effect the morale of the individual and the group and can have a multiplier effect within the unit. Aside from the issues that senior officers directly influence (for example; training and exercises), one area of concern is micromanagement. On many occasions disruptions to platoon training are caused by demands at company and battalion headquarter level. The intentions of platoon commanders and even section commanders are bypassed on some occasions from higher. The chain of command is not used correctly and section commanders (and platoon commanders for that matter) feel that they are not really in command. The section commander needs to be given the room to make his own decisions, use his own initiative and earn the satisfaction of leading his section.

**Junior Officers.** In most cases soldiers feel that while their platoon commanders are generally well trained they lack the depth of experience to lead effectively. There have been many cases of poor man management on the part of junior officers. Administrative, welfare and career concerns of individuals have not been properly addressed. Many are considered poor counsellors, are viewed as unapproachable and are seen to have a ‘know it all’ attitude. Many soldiers have little confidence in some platoon commanders and see them as in the Army for their own career. Several soldiers stated that their main reason for electing discharge was a direct result of the way they had been managed by their platoon commander. Most had not been counselled on a regular basis in the form of platoon commander’s interviews. A great deal of leadership training can not be taught in a training environment. Officer education needs to continue at unit level. Group discussion and tutorials on a range of matters from welfare to promotion needs to be conducted on a regular basis. Trained counsellors, Army welfare organisations and experienced senior non-commissioned officers (the RSM, for example) need to pass on their experience and knowledge to junior officers.

**Junior Non-Commissioned Soldiers.** Soldiers generally consider that Lance Corporals and Corporals are promoted too early and in some cases beyond the individual’s ability. A soldier is promoted on the basis of his attendance at promotional
courses more so than his ability to lead. In many cases the individual’s leadership technique is still developing in its early stages. Many soldiers see the willingness of new non-commissioned officers to charge first rather than use other methods as an indication of this underdeveloped leadership ability. This situation is a direct consequence of the increase in discharges in the previous years. It is obvious that the Army needs Corporals and it is an unavoidable fact that soldiers are promoted earlier than would have been the case ten years ago. Correct identification of leadership potential, continual on the job training and counselling from senior non-commissioned officers is one way to keep check of this situation.

**Promotion.** The promotion of junior soldiers over more senior members can have a damaging effect on the morale of the more senior soldier. In some cases soldiers have been panelled and even attended promotional courses when they have already expressed their intention to take discharge. The promotion of soldiers is an important issue, failure to advance in rank is a common reason for discharge. In many cases soldiers are not counselled adequately and come to expect to be panelled for a subject course simply on the pretence that they are one of the senior soldiers in the platoon. Effective counselling by the platoon commander, by keeping the soldier informed of his performance, and the correct identification of leadership potential can help avoid this problem in most cases.

**Postings.** Officers and senior non-commissioned officers are generally posted every two to three years. Many soldiers have served in 2/4 RAR for several years. In many cases soldiers look forward to a change in scenery. The option of posting to another locality after a qualifying period in the Battalion should be offered to those soldiers who want it. This may not improve retention in 2/4 RAR but it may retain the soldier in the Army.

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**Non-Military Pursuits**

**Duties.** Rarely do soldiers join the Army with the ambition of scrubbing pots and pans in the Other Ranks Mess three times a week every five weeks. With a full strength company not always available during a duties week, soldiers are finding that they are performing more and more duties each time. The use of civilian labour on a full time permanent basis in the three messes would greatly reduce this problem. Currently 26 soldiers are employed after hours in a duty role. This number could also be reduced if ideas such as a brigade guard (supplied on a unit rotational basis) and a centralised after hours battalion duty room, for example, were designed and implemented.

**Public Relations and External Support.** Support to community organisations, welfare groups, schools and the like is controlled at both brigade and battalion level. The majority of soldiers see this as an interruption to training and a waste of resources, especially when such pursuits are a regular occurrence. In light of decreases in Defence spending; shortages of ammunition and air hours, for example, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify supporting such public relation exercises at the expense of operational training.

**Attitude to Sport.** Reactions to sport in the Army are generally divided. The soldier’s response depends greatly on whether he plays sport at a competitive level or not. It is considered by the majority that too much emphasis is placed on winning at sport, especially at the inter unit level. The idea of sport as a break from military training has been lost, the emphasis is now on training for sport for the sole aim of winning in inter unit competition. Competitions of a military nature need to be re-introduced and emphasised at battalion level. Sport needs to be put back into perspective as a relaxation and recreational pursuit preferably at platoon and company level to promote teamwork at that level.

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**Government and Defence Attitude to the Infantry Corps**

**Self Image.** Media attention highlighting Government policy on Defence, including cut backs, delays in weapon procurement and the increased emphasis on the Army Reserve at the expense of the Regular Army, gives the soldier the impression that the Regular Army is an organisation that the Government can do without. When conflicts develop within Australia’s area of direct military interest and the Operational Deployment Force is put on stand by three times and never used this reaffirms the soldier’s beliefs. A positive, useful image of the Operational Deployment Force, especially, needs to be generated by the Government. A realistic job orientated role needs to be developed, for example; the Engineer contingent to Namibia has provided those soldiers with a positive self image.

**Money.** There is a general feeling that the average Infantryman’s wage does not accurately reflect the number of hours and extra days worked. If the Government is unwilling or unable to review
Defence wages then there needs to be some other form of incentive to compensate for the long hours and extra days worked. One solution is to decrease the amount of after hours work, this has already been discussed in respect to duties and public relations. New and improved conditions of service including a more beneficial superannuation fund and interest free (or low interest) loans are just two examples of a step in the right direction.

The Infantry Corps as a Career. The Department of Defence does little to promote the Infantry Corps as a career. Recruiting tends to advertise the more technical and mechanical careers to the potential soldier. The most common complaint heard about the Corps, from the soldier within it, is that he has no qualifications for further employment once he leaves it. Clearly the Infantry Corps needs to be promoted as a professional career within itself. Effective advertising aimed at the recruiting level needs to present the infantryman as a technically proficient tradesman in the area of modern warfare. Once at unit level soldiers should be given the opportunity to specialise and cross train in a variety of new revised courses in addition to existing specialist courses within the unit. New courses could include compact two week courses on combat survival, battlefield first aid and mine warfare, to name a few. In addition, the opportunity for regular sub-unit sized exchange exercises with Australia’s allies would present the Corps as an exciting, challenging and professional career.

Conclusion

The retention problem in 2/4 RAR is a direct consequence of the soldier’s history prior to enlistment and his experiences once enlisted. No single factor or group of factors is directly responsible for a soldier electing discharge or the Army actively seeking his discharge. A combination of many factors, along with some exceptions (not considered in this article), are responsible for the retention problem.

The new soldier entering the Battalion has an average age of 20 years old. He is generally not as well educated as many of his civilian peers who continued on to year 12 level. In many cases he has joined the Army for the short term as a means of earning a wage and has no real goal or ambition in the Army. Many of his peers have had problems with Army discipline and a few are on administrative warnings of some description. This outline fits the kind of soldier the Army does not want. In the majority of cases recruiting has not selected the ideal raw material for a career in the Army and a great deal of effort is required on the Army’s behalf to retain him.

The new soldier who is career orientated, motivated and reasonably intelligent finds reason to request discharge when the environment at unit and higher level is adverse. Lack of effective training and poor exercises compounded with the problems of boredom and a lack of resources leads to poor morale and a disillusioned attitude to Army life. Poor leaders and a lack of opportunity for postings and promotion also affect his decision to ‘soldier on’.

In an environment where more emphasis is placed on non-military pursuits and in a climate where Government opinion appears to be against a full time Army, the soldier finds it very easy to become disenchanted with the whole situation and seek employment elsewhere.

If the Army fails to retain the experienced Infantryman then it is at a disadvantage before the ‘war’ even begins. It is the Infantryman who is expected to do the majority of the fighting and it is the Infantry units which are the largest manpower orientated formations in the Army. A decrease in their integral experience will lead to a decrease in their effectiveness and therefore a decrease in the Army’s overall effectiveness.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made:

a. The Army review the recruiting standards for general entry and adopt a more selective policy aimed at a higher quality individual than presently accepted.

b. The emphasis at battalion level be directed towards effective operational training at all levels, making the best use of all available resources.

c. Development of leadership qualities continues at battalion level in the form of informal counselling and group discussion tutorials for commanders at all levels.

d. Time and Defence resources be used for military pursuits only.

e. The Department of Defence inject a positive public image into the Infantry Corps by the promotion of the Corps as an essential and professional organisation.
International Legal Order: A Reality or Merely a Regulative Idea?

By Wing Commander Peter May, RAAF, (Ret.).

"When we look at international politics — with its ecological crises, its increasing disparities between rich and poor; with mountains of dead, killed intentionally in war or in famines and epidemics by neglect; with its obscene economies and economic practices, what reply do we give to the question as to whether the international legal order is a reality or only a regulative idea?"

Introduction

It is not difficult to find evidence of failure in mankind's attempts at institutionalising world order. Is this surprising, or to be expected? Should the idealists among us be disappointed or should the realists explain that this is the natural order of things and we are merely observing the true nature of collective human behaviour?

Whereas the quest for territory, the instinct for species survival and the urge for dominating behaviour in individuals are accepted as the natural way of the "Wild Kingdom", we tend to reject these same characteristics when manifest in human society. In response to a need for security for life and property, and predictability in social conduct, we have developed and codified a multitude of laws and regulations which operate at the domestic level. The regulation of domestic order is an evolutionary phenomena which has not developed consistently across national boundaries, nevertheless in most societies there is a high level of compliance with the body of norms which regulate the "Legal Order". It could be claimed that International Law is also evolutionary and that it has not yet evolved to the same degree of compliance as domestic law, and that the "Realists" see where we are coming from, and the "Idealists" are focussed on the future. This article outlines some traditional theories and policies that provide background to the current practice of international relations and looks at some contemporary events for evidence that there is a basis for "World Order" in the transformation of international relations through the continuing evolution of international law. The article suggests that there is reason to be optimistic that international order will become more apparent through the progressive development of International Law.

Theories of International Order

The traditional Western view of international law evolved in an Eurocentric world where the rules were made to suit the European monarchs and to foster European imperialism. Western oriented concepts served to maintain the status quo and to protect the interests of the richest and most powerful states. Whereas this view of international law as a process of maintaining "World Order" may be desirable for states that are satisfied with the existing order, it may be seen as self-serving, inequitable and even oppressive to other states that consider the Western orientation contains political, ideological and economic principles which are hostile to their own. The Soviet view seems to accept international law as a body of rules governing diplomatic and economic relations (the positivist view) but to colour it with the Marxist contention that all law is an instrument of class oppression and that the law of nations undertakes to promote class exploitation in the international system. The Chinese view is further alienated from the prevailing Western orientated practices of international law having suffered the consequences of Western Treaty Law during the "Century of Humiliation" and having been subjected to the imperialisation of its territory and commerce by Western power superiority. Third world nations share China's perception of having been victimised by the Western international order. To newly independent nations the notion of sovereignty, in the face of disparate power, is an abstraction. In place of colonialism the economically less developed states find that international law does not protect them from economic imperialism by stronger nations.

The contemporary international system is more diverse in outlook than that conceived by the Eurocentric world. Multiculturalism and the decline of Western domination has led to a breakdown of many of the traditionally held principles. There is no longer a fundamental distinction between law on
Economic Theories of World Order

The growth of international trade since the Industrial Revolution has led to the ever-increasing interdependence of national economies. It would seem that, in an integrated world economy, economic issues are integral to world order. Modern economic theories of imperialism stem from Post-Industrial Revolution studies of capitalism. The Marxist theories of dialectic materialism, for example, owe much to Hobson's critique of the capitalist system. Hobson saw capitalist profiteering as a major factor in the causation of international war. He argued that capitalism provides the drive for expansion and need for foreign markets and resources. The narrow view of capitalism and class struggle argues that the capitalist class will invariably resort to war to combat threats to its economic interests. Critics of the theory of economic imperialism reject its ideological biases and point to the long history of precapitalist imperialism and the part played by powerful leaders exercising personal ambitions for conquest and acquisition.

Modern liberals such as Adam Smith and J. S. Mills considered that free trade would guarantee peace. They thought that international specialisation in an international economy would create a system where nations were so interdependent that it would not be in their best interest to resort to war. It was thought that growth and prosperity would divert public attention from military ventures and their potentially disrupting effects.

Realism vs Idealism

Realism, as a theory of international behaviour, emphasises the nation-state as the principle actor and assumes there is no essential harmony of interests among nations. The theory generalises from the lessons of history and maintains that self-interest is a controlling factor in international relations and that conflicting national interests are the fundamental causes of war. Much of the Realists argument is a reaction to perceived shortcomings of utopianism. In contrast Idealism accepts the notion of international order based on norms of behaviour and the law of organisations.

Realism argues that power is the dominating factor in international relations and theorists analyse the elements of a nation's power to assess its capability to act at the international level. A nation's military strength and other factors such as its economy, geography, population, technology and the "national will" are all considered to be elements of "Power". In the absence of a common government in the international system, Power becomes a major determinant of behaviour. Realist writers usually define politics as "The struggle for power" and maintain that international politics is not a function of ethics and at the international level, without an authoritative institution capable of regulating behaviour, it is the "Balance of Power" which determines international relations. The notion of a balance of power, as a means of maintaining international order, operates in the absence of a central regulating authority and is seen as a systematic power distribution among sovereign states which tends to avert war. The balance of power is seen as a possible approach to world peace and the concept has included arrangements such as the complex alliances of the 18th Century through to the bipolar "balance of terror" of the Cold War years.

Collective Security

It is clear that the balance of power system has not prevented war, and in the absence of a central authoritative world government, some nations have adopted systems of collective security. These arrangements usually involve treaties that provide for mutual support to counter aggression from within the system and requires all member states to participate in sanctions against the aggressor. Collective security implies a partial waiver of national sovereignty as it forbids its members to resort to force to settle disputes and it requires them to apply sanctions against another member state that does resort to force.

The League of Nations was an attempt to implement collective security at a time when the traditional balance of power system had resulted in the great powers becoming locked into two competing alliance blocs and a grossly devastating war which wrought havoc in Europe. The founders of the League sought to rule out any alliances and to
establish a collective arrangement whereby an aggressor would automatically be confronted by the combined sanctions of all the other members. This principle was embodied in Article 16 of the League's Covenant which also stressed economic sanctions as an alternative to the use of force. The idealist principles underpinning the League were not able to withstand the reality of a conservative Europe and an isolationist United States and the League failed to prevent Japan from occupying Manchuria in the early 1930s and was ineffective in settling a dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1935. The League failed again when the limited sanctions it applied against Italy did not stop that country using modern weapons to conquer and occupy Ethiopia.

An attempt at achieving collective security following World War II saw the formation of the United Nations. Until very recently the UN has seemed no more successful than The League of Nations. In the past, when it was set in the Cold War environment, with liberal use of the veto in the Security Council, and with Third World issues dominating the General Assembly, the UN has proved ineffective at its main task of maintaining peace and security.6

Regional Collective Security

Whereas both theory and practice suggest that collective security will not work on the global level, Idealists argue that there is reason to believe it could be successful if limited geographically because a regional arrangement may avoid the Great Power rivalry and ideological struggles, and because regional nations may have more in common and perhaps a better understanding of local disputes. Furthermore, regional nations are likely to have a real interest in avoiding an escalation of problems. It could also be argued that the major powers could value such an arrangement as a means of avoiding becoming involved in local disputes. The optimistic view that regionalism could provide international peace has not been borne out in practice. Regional organisations such as the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Arab League have proved ineffectual in settling internal disputes and outside intervention has often been called on to resolve conflict and restore sovereignty. The OAU was unable to deal with its internal disagreements and failed to settle the numerous disputes that occurred throughout Africa in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The OAS has not averted war in Central America and the apparent success of the Arab League in protecting Kuwait against Iraq in 1963 has been overshadowed by recent events which see Kuwait occupied by Iraq and the outside world once again involved. It is difficult to accept that regional organisations are more likely to provide peace and international order through collective security arrangements than was the League of Nations in a global context.7

The Arms Race

Most nations look first to their own power for security believing that "If you want peace, prepare for war!". Defence spending is part of every nation's budget and in economic terms it usually represents a significant "opportunity cost" in other things foregone. Equity and compassion at both the domestic and international level are often overlooked when rival states accelerate their arms acquisition in competition. The competition between the USA and the USSR during the Cold War led to inordinate expenditures on armaments and the development of grossly excessive weapons which redefined the notion of a "Balance of Power" to be more accurately known as the "Balance of Terror". This hideous scramble for superior weaponry became known as "The Arms Race".

The Nature of International Law

Whereas domestic society may find order in the institutionalisation of rules and the establishment of legal systems for making, adjudicating and enforcing laws, the international system generally lacks these attributes. The analogy between domestic law, with its rules and institutions, and international law is held firmly by Positivists who argue that a system of rules (norms) specify rights and obligations governing the external behaviour of states, and that the states become subject to these rules only by voluntary consent. A contrasting theory is argued by Neorealists who see policy and values, not rules, as the centre of legal order. They see international relations in constant change and regulatory law a process of decision making and subject to policy determination. Thus international law, in the neorealist view, is a subjective process of authoritative decision making as expressed through foreign policy declarations and by state practice. Although not regulated and
enforced by a central legislating and compelling body, as is domestic law, international law is seen to exist, and to have achieved general compliance, through a process involving both the Positivist and Realist theories.

The Gulf Crisis —
A Test for International Law

How can these theories of international order be reconciled with recent events in the Middle East? The widely held view of Saddam Hussein's actions, a view which prompted a swift military reaction from the USA and others and a unanimous condemnation from the UN, is that of a military dictator invading and annexing a small neighbouring sovereign state. The actions are seen clearly as a blatant disregard for the basic tenet of international law, and the reaction as a move to restore civilised world order. It could be argued that the response would not have been as quick nor as severe had it not been for the critical issue of Middle East oil. Is the confrontation about oil and self interest or about world order and international law? Countries outside the region may be more concerned about the security of their own oil supply and happy to accept that their interests are coincident with the provisions of international law.

Saddam Hussein appears to have strong local support and seems to be regarded as a hero to some of the region's Arab population. His actions may be perceived by his supporters to be those of a charismatic leader seeking to redress a grievance and to reunite Arab people and lands that were divided under colonial rule. As a spokesman for Iraq put it “Iraq did not invade Kuwait; it merely justly reunited it with Iraq.” They may not be kindly disposed to the rich feudal monarchy that was deposed in Kuwait, nor that under threat in neighbouring Saudi Arabia. They may not want a return to the days when fabulous oil wealth was used to enrich ruling families rather than support the Arab nations in general.

If “law,” and “order” go hand in hand, and if international law like domestic laws, seeks to provide stability through predictability, and peace through the regulation of behaviour by the consistent application of rules, then some other events which suggest that the law does not operate impartially may be questioned. Iraqi supporters may well ask why the UN did not act when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. They may also suggest double standards and ask where were the champions of justice and international law when Grenada and Panama were invaded, or point to the unpredictable reaction of the US and its allies over Kashmir, Afghanistan or Lebanon.

The balance of power in the Middle East is in a state of flux. The regional balance, always precarious, has become further unstable because of the Iraqi move and because of the easing of tension between the USSR and the US. For eight years the world has witnessed the Iraq-Iran war and both the Soviet and Western nations supplied the arms that fuelled the conflict and were happy to see the return of their money as Middle East oil revenue was spent on military equipment. The power balance between moderate and revolutionary Arab States is changing as a result of the build up of arms in the Western oriented States in reaction to the Iraqi aggression. The US, for example, has supplied Saudi Arabia with modern tanks, missiles and aircraft, and provided Egypt and other moderates with economic assistance. Hussein's sudden move into Kuwait made him arguably the strongest leader in the Arab World and the most potent force in the global oil market, however, faced with the strength of world opposition, and the choice of war or backing down, he may not maintain his position long. Iraq must become weaker from the economic and financial blockade and the cost of keeping a million of its population under arms. Israel's position vis a vis its Arab neighbours is threatened, even the build up of defensive strength in the moderate Arab States places weapons in the region that could conceivably be brought to bear against Israel. Israel, already a nuclear power, may see an increase in its nuclear arsenal as an appropriate way of addressing any perceived disadvantage in the new power balance and thus increase the pace of the regional arms race.

The USSR and US rapprochement has a significant bearing on events in the gulf. In the past many regional conflicts occurred against a background of the cold war where Superpower stalemate prevented a united response. The balancing effect of the two opposing Superpowers has gone as they now join in condemnation of Iraq. Ironically the situation in the Middle East may have a counter effect on the Superpower detente in that the Soviet leadership may feel threatened by the continuing presence of US forces so close to their southern borders and become more reluctant to relax their guard against the US.

Conclusion

The Realist's retrospective view of the world shows us that the global political system has brought
us wars and conflict; the global economic system has resulted in enormous inequalities between and within nations; and the global industrial system has created ecological disasters and currently threatens the environment on a global scale. The Idealists offer hope of better things to come through the rule of law.

It was self interest, the Realists would claim, that spurred a quick UN reaction when Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened to dominate the world's oil supply and, furthermore, without the element of "self interest" we should not expect this new sense of UN determination to be a consistent guardian of the rule of international law in future. On the other hand, Idealists may envisage a new age of positivism and, in the absence of East-West tensions, a more effective role for the UN in shaping a new world order.

Regardless of the outcome of the immediate crisis in the Gulf the UN has proved capable of overcoming divisions and acting with alacrity. Granted that future issues may not be so clear-cut, and even with an East-West detente the UN will undoubtedly face other challenges to its unity, however, it viewed as an evolutionary process the achievement of international order through the rule of law has moved incrementally towards reality.

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Since his retirement from the RAAF in 1988 Wing Commander May has expressed his interest in international affairs by undertaking a Graduate Diploma Course in International Law at the Australian National University. Wing Commander May's Air Force career included tours of duty in Maritime and Transport squadrons and staff appointments at both Operational and Support Command. He is a graduate of the US Armed Forces Staff College (Class 69) and has completed a Graduate Diploma in Administration at Canberra University. Wing Commander May has previously contributed to the Australian Defence Force Journal.

KEN LLEWELYN

FLIGHT INTO THE AGES
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Ireland and the Roots of Insurgency

By Andrew Selth, Department of Defence.

Introduction

In examining the long drawn-out 'Troubles' in Ireland, most scholars have traced the present terrorist campaign in Ulster to the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin and the so-called War of Independence which followed a few years later. In recent years greater attention has been given to the military dimensions of the Irish nationalist struggle, but relatively few observers have looked beyond developments in Ireland this century for the antecedents of the Irish Republican Army's strategy and tactics. Such a survey can reveal that, while there are many direct links, the war of 1918-1921 marked a significant change in the approach taken by Irish nationalists who, in many respects, anticipated the strategy and tactics later used by other insurgent groups in unconventional campaigns elsewhere.

Guerrilla Warfare in Ireland

Guerrilla warfare was not new to Ireland when introduced as national policy by the extremist Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) in 1917. Traditional warfare had long emphasised guerrilla-style engagements. In their early clashes with invaders, the lightly armed and more mobile Gaels, utilising the terrain to advantage, favoured ambush and surprise, avoiding where possible the shock of more heavily armed troops. While they were not able to inflict any decisive defeat on their enemies, the Gaels were able in this manner to wear down their resistance and turn the advantage of their material strength against them.

As outside contacts grew, however, and Irish leaders fell under the influence of foreign schools, so they began in increasing measure to adopt the more conventional military practices of the day. This process began as early as 1318, when heavily armed Gaels, influenced by Norman techniques, won a fixed battle at Dysert O'Dea. This trend continued with the emigration to Ireland of gall oglach (literally, 'foreign warriors'), mainly from Scotland, to act as mercenaries in the armies of Irish lords. These galloglas favoured pitched battles such as that at Knockdoe in 1504, where they were able to use their broad bladed axes to great advantage.

Although Queen Elizabeth I's Irish Wars saw a number of fixed battles, traditional guerrilla-style fighting continued to play a major part in the Irish resistance. Marauding bands of 'tories' and 'rapparees' roamed the hills, a problem for the English which grew after the later confiscations and massacres of Oliver Cromwell and his men. In his History of England, for example, the 19th century scholar Thomas Babington Macaulay described the situation in 1691 in terms which are familiar today:

The English complained that it was no easy matter to catch a rapparee. Sometimes, when he saw danger approaching, he lay down in the long grass of the bog; and then it was as difficult to catch him as to find a hare sitting. Sometimes he sprang into a stream, and lay there like an otter, with only his mouth and nostrils above the water. Nay, a whole gang of banditti would, in the twinkling of an eye, transform itself into a gang of harmless labourers. Every man took his gun to pieces, hid the lock in his clothes, stuck a cork in the muzzle, stopped the touch hole with a quill, and threw the weapon into the next pond. Nothing was to be seen but a train of poor rustics who had not so much as a cudgel among them, and whose humble look and crouching walk seemed to show that their spirit was thoroughly broken to slavery.

Skirmishers and groups such as these remained a feature of Irish campaigns for some time, their importance waxing and waning with the fortunes of more conventional Irish formations. Living off the land or making secret sallies at night from their peasant holdings, these irregular forces fulfilled an important function for the Irish nationalist cause, raiding enemy bases and wearing down the English forces.

As more Irish leaders were schooled in warfare on the Continent, however, and leant towards more formal military practices, so the trend to fixed battles and conventional strategies continued.
Guerrilla-style tactics became more and more an adjunct to the regular effort. By the time of the Great Rebellion of 1798, irregular tactics had been almost completely superceded by regular campaigns. Under the influence of their French allies, the Irish commanders attempted to pit their untrained, poorly armed forces against the better armed and more highly disciplined British troops by frontal assault and pitched battle. Michael Collins, the major architect of the Irish victory of 1918-1921, was to observe 124 years later:

"in the 98 we went out into the open and made damned fools of ourselves." By casting their military efforts in the mould of current conventional practices the Irish repeatedly challenged the British strength and so fore-doomed their efforts to failure.

The same lack of strategic acumen underlay Irish rebel efforts in the period leading up to the Easter Rising in 1916. The most important and potentially dangerous secret political society of 19th century Ireland was the Irish Republican Brotherhood. Founded in Dublin in 1858, shortly after the establishment of the Fenian Brotherhood in the United States, the IRB affirmed unconditionally that it was prepared to use any kind of violence in order to gain its objective of an Irish Republic independent of Britain. The leaders of the IRB still adhered, however, to the essentially European tradition of armed insurrection, in which the masses would rise up under the leadership of a small band of dedicated revolutionaries. It was this thinking which lay behind the IRB's support for the abortive Fenian Rising of 1867, and the equally unsuccessful Rising in Dublin during Easter Week.

Similar theories were expounded by the Socialist labour leader James Connolly. In a series of articles published in the Workers Republic between May and July 1915, he analysed insurrections in various cities since 1830. He concluded that the Russian experience of 1905 succeeded in establishing the fact that even under modern conditions the professional soldier is, in a city, badly handicapped in a fight against really determined civilian revolutionists. Noting that Ireland was not well suited to rural guerrilla warfare, he argued that:

"a city is a huge maze of passes or glens formed by streets and lanes. Every difficulty that exists for the operation of regular troops in mountains is multiplied a hundredfold in a city." Connolly still thought in terms of barricades and fortified positions. Indeed, he was largely responsible for the choice of buildings to be occupied and defended during Easter Week and, according to rebel leader Padraic Pearse, was 'the guiding brain' of the subsequent battle against the British.

It is perhaps just as well that the Easter Rising in Dublin was essentially a political protest for, as a military one, it was doomed to failure from the start. The outmoded and unimaginative military thinking behind the Rising can be seen in the tactics of the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army. Both were private militias which 'appeared quite openly, wore uniforms, held parades and actively recruited new members'. They were organised along conventional military lines and, indeed, were often drilled and commanded by men who had seen service with the British Army. Moreover, they observed the rules or traditions of conventional warfare. During the Rising, they engaged the vastly superior British forces in a static firefight (which they were bound to lose) rather than using the hit-and-run guerrilla tactics more suited to their limited capabilities.

As Charles Townshend has pointed out, after the Paris Commune of 1871 'the increasing sophistication of military technology made contests between regular armies and popular forces more unequal than ever before'. The day of the street barricade was effectively over, and fortifications like Countess Constance Markievicz's trenches on Saint Stephen's Green were a military nonsense. When Padraic Pearse and his fellow nationalists barricaded themselves into their Dublin strongholds, and with small arms attempted to defend these positions against British artillery, they were indeed keeping faith with the past, as Pearse told his court martial was their aim.

Yet in the 1916 Rising, and the prominence of men like Pearse, Connolly and a few years later Michael Collins, a development can be discerned in Irish military thinking, from the blind acceptance of past military practices to a more carefully considered rejection of them. At one end of the spectrum was Pearse, a romantic idealist who had elevated the fight for Irish independence to the level of a religious crusade. His military thought dwelt in the past and in glorious but hopeless conventional battles. For his part, Connolly had determined:

"to fight the way I want... Not the way the enemy wants! It'll be a new way, one the soldiers haven't been trained to deal with." Even with this approach, however, he drew on historical examples of street fighting for theories which were 'only superficially more viable'.

Michael Collins, on the other hand, favoured 'a wholesome and necessary departure from the ideas and methods which had been upheld for a genera-
the continued fight for Irish independence would have been extinguished by the abortive Rising of Easter 1916 convinced him and a number of other Irish leaders that it was futile to oppose the British forces on their own terms. As Collins was to observe after the Rising, ‘personal bravery alone is of hardly any more use than its opposite’.16 His empirical response to the ‘glorious madness’ of Easter Week was that the continued fight for Irish independence would have to be carried out by ‘organised and bold guerrilla warfare’.17 By this, Collins did not just mean ambushes and raids in the countryside, but also the extra dimension of terrorism in the streets. By selective assassination he hoped to eliminate or neutralise individuals considered dangerous to the rebel cause and enforce at least passive support from the Irish population.

**Irish Terrorism**

Again, such tactics were not new to Ireland. Terrorism had been a feature of Irish resistance to British rule for a long time. Secret terrorist societies, both Protestant and Catholic, had long been active on agrarian and related social and economic issues. Nationalist Catholic organisations like the Whiteboys, Thrashers, Ribbonmen and others in the 18th and 19th centuries used terrorist methods to enforce resistance to what they considered coercive laws and practices, and to ‘punish’ those seen as agents of British oppression. Although Ireland was to become riddled with such secret societies, their activities were usually unpolitical, or politically very crude. As Robert Kee has noted:

> Even when, as happened from time to time, attempts were made to enlist [their activities] for political purposes it tended to remain most stubbornly what it has always been: the simplest form of war that the poor can wage against the rich or those who play the rich man’s game.18

There were a few secret societies with avowed political and nationalist aims, like the United Irishmen, which was banned in 1794. Yet they were not really terrorist organisations and failed to win significant support outside the main cities.

Perhaps the first really ‘political’ terrorist group in Ireland prior to 1917 was a renegade branch of the IRB calling itself the Irish Invincibles. This group, which was formed in 1881, modelled itself on Russian terrorist organisations of the same period and “openly declared a policy of assassination against British officers in London and Dublin”.19 Before being suppressed, the Invincibles succeeded in killing the Catholic Permanent Secretary of Ireland, Lord Frederick Cavendish and a companion, Thomas Burke, as they were walking in Dublin’s Phoenix Park one day in May 1882. Like all their terrorist predecessors, however, the Invincibles were amateurish and ill-organised. More significantly, their poor security arrangements and the excellent British system of spies and informers in Ireland usually rendered such groups ineffective soon after their formation.20

Around the same time, three British cities suffered a series of bomb attacks from two United States-based Fenian organisations, Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa’s ‘Skirmishers’ and Clan na Gael. Using the recently invented dynamite, these groups conducted a series of attacks in Liverpool, Glasgow and London between 1880 and 1887. In contrast to the declared aims of the Invincibles and contemporary Russian terrorists, the two Irish-American groups eschewed a policy of assassination for the bombing of symbolic targets like railway tunnels and public buildings (such as the Houses of Parliament and Tower of London). Neither group realistically expected their explosions to produce a spontaneous uprising in Ireland, but they did believe that their campaign might force the British Government to withdraw from Ireland and permit the development of a free and independent nation.21 Like earlier rebel groups, however, they were mistaken.

The idea of a campaign of successive and continuous terrorist attacks such as that envisaged by the Invincibles and Irish-American radicals was mooted again by some Irish extremists prior to 1916, but rejected. They were dissuaded by the ultimate failure of the Invincibles, the American Fenians and organisations such as Narodnaya Volya (‘Peoples’ Will’), the Russian terrorist group responsible for the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881. Irish nationalist leaders like John MacBride and Arthur Lynch, who had fought with the Boers against the British — but had returned to Ireland before the guerrilla phase began — had little faith in the feasibility of the idea.22 Others, like Pearse, focussed instead on the political and public impact of a more open and formal challenge to British authority.

Later Irish nationalists like Collins, however, recognised the threat posed by British agents and sympathisers in Ireland and successfully persuaded the rebel leadership that a terrorist campaign, if carefully managed, would be essential to the success of the next Irish effort. As Collins later explained:

> England could always reinforce her army. She
could replace every soldier that she lost. But there were others indispensable for her purposes which were not so easily replaced. To paralyse the British machine it was necessary to strike at individuals. Without her spies England was helpless. It was a characteristically ruthless, but in one sense realistic, response to a critical problem. The old Fenian John O'Leary had once said that 'there are things a man must not do to save a nation' but, as William Butler Yeats wrote in his poem September 1913, romantic Ireland was dead and gone, with O'Leary in his grave.

Collins was a military amateur, but he was well read, and had obviously studied the lessons of Irish history. He also revealed a knowledge of several earlier guerrilla campaigns, including those of the guerilleros of the Spanish Peninsula War (1808-1813), the Boers, and the German General Paul von Lettow Vorbeck, whose native schutztruppen successfully managed to elude and harass the British in East Africa for the duration of the First World War. Some of Collins' colleagues were also to reveal such knowledge, but it was he who first recognised the crucial importance of Intelligence, and of linking the Irish military effort with a concerted political campaign, both in Ireland and abroad. He saw that 'it was never possible for [the Irish] to be militarily strong, but [they] could be strong enough to make England uncomfortable, and strong enough to make England too uncomfortable' to remain in Ireland.

Between 1918 and 1921, the Irish Volunteers carried out guerrilla raids and ambushes in the countryside, made terrorist attacks in the cities and towns, and then melted back into the population, to the frustration of the security forces hunting them. There were no 'gallant allies in Europe' as had promised to help the rebels of 1798, the Fenians of 1867 or the insurgents of Easter Week. Nor were there any 'active sanctuaries' nearby in which the Irish rebels could rest and regroup. Yet some 3,000 insurgents were able to keep a security force of 50,000 at bay for four bitter years. The nationalist movement established parallel hierarchies in both the political and military fields, challenging and ultimately usurping the legitimacy of the British administration. Skilful propaganda, greatly enhanced by the strong British reaction to Irish tactics, created great concern abroad (particularly in the United States) and caused considerable diplomatic pressure to bear on the beleaguered British Government. Finally, in December 1921, the British agreed to withdraw from all but six counties of Ireland, thus granting the Irish their most significant victory since Strongbow and his Anglo-Norman knights landed in 1169.

**Conclusion**

The achievements of the Irish Volunteers during the 1918-1921 period have since been romanticised and greatly exaggerated, not least by their successors, the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Indeed, it has been claimed that the Irish independence struggle of 1918-1921 pioneered many aspects of modern guerrilla warfare and acted as the prototype for many of the 'wars of national liberation' which have occurred elsewhere this century. Michael Collins himself has been held up as a 'politic-military genius' and 'a guerrilla chieftain of Mao-like stature' who was to anticipate by decades many guerrilla leaders whose names are now better known. As Charles Townshend in particular has shown, the Irish nationalist campaign was by no means the scientific, well disciplined and tightly coordinated effort that has often been suggested. Guerrilla warfare was initially forced upon the rebels, and both strategy and tactics evolved as time progressed. Despite Collins' best efforts, many Volunteer formations outside Dublin remained stubbornly independent and until 1921 a number were relatively ineffectual. The popular support often claimed was slow to emerge and in some areas was never achieved. Nevertheless, as Townshend concedes, the Irish campaign was 'a remarkable pioneering endeavour'. Both as a symbol and practical example of a successful nationalist struggle against a superior power, the Irish independence war served as an inspiration and guide to other radical nationalist groups wishing to change their governments or to end colonial rule. In many respects, it marked the difference between traditional and modern guerrilla warfare.

**NOTES**

1. This article is drawn from a longer paper prepared for the Australian Joint Services Staff College Association. An earlier version was published in RUSI (Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies) 128:1 (March 1983), pp. 44-47.
4. For example, Owen Roe O'Neill, who defeated the English at the Battle of Benburb in 1648, had served Spain in the
Netherlands. Captain-General St Ruth, commanding Irish forces at Aughrim in 1691, had been trained in the formal French school. The successful marriage of both conventional and unconventional techniques was vividly demonstrated in the strategy of Hugh O’Neill at the Battle of Yellow Ford in 1598. He used skirmishers to weaken the English columns before sending in his regulars to deliver the coup de grace. See C. Falls, ‘Battle of Yellow Ford’, in G. A. Hayes-McCoy (ed), The Irish at War (Mercier, Cork, 1964), pp.55-66.


9. Quoted from ‘Manifesto’ in Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook, Easter 1916 (Weekly Irish Times, Dublin, 1917), p.50. Although the Irish Volunteers were quite distinct from the nationalist political party known as Sinn Fein in 1916, the two were erroneously but irretrievably linked by the British at the time. Fiction has now become fact, however, with Sinn Fein the overt political arm of the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland.

10. Peter Alter, ‘Traditions of Violence in the Irish National Movement’, in W. J. Mommensen and G. Hirschfeld (eds), Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe (Macmillan, London, 1982), p.146. The Irish Volunteers were a more radical offshoot of the Irish National Volunteers, which were formed in 1914 in answer to the creation of the Protestant Ulster Volunteer Force in the north. The Irish Citizen Army was formed in 1913; at the height of serious labour unrest, in order to defend Dublin workers against police excesses.


20. The Dublin Metropolitan Police were well informed about the Invincibles and their aims. They were prevented from making arrests, however, by the lack of concrete evidence and by scepticism on the part of the local authorities, not least Cavendish himself.


25. Unfortunately, there is no record of Collins’ ever having studied the writings of the Young Ireland publicist James Fintan Lalor, whose descriptions in 1847 and 1848 of what he called ‘moral insurrection’ were directly prophetic of the Sinn Fein programme in the twentieth century. See Charles Townsend, Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance Since 1848 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983), pp.31-32.


27. In 1796 a French invasion fleet was prevented from landing in Ireland by a strong ‘Protestant wind’. The Fenians of 1867 were expecting aid from a large force of American Fenians who had promised to sail to Ireland and help establish an Irish Republic. The insurgents of Easter Week had been promised German aid.


32. Not counting the works of IRA propagandists and sympathisers, this view has been put forward most consistently by Tom Bowden. See, for example, The Breakdown of Public Security, pp.51-140.

Devolution within Defence: Defence Regional Support Review

By Major B. J. Agnew, RAAC.

Introduction

Devolution has been a “key thrust of the reform agenda” by changing administrative procedures and practices to give managers more incentives to manage and greater awareness of resource costs (Keating and Holmes, pp 173-176). This has led to attempts to address the imbalance between authority and responsibility whilst acknowledging that gaining greater authority is linked to enhancing accountability. Devolution within the public sector comprises two tiers, first, that between central and line departments, and, second, within departments. This case study focuses on intra-departmental devolution.

Faced with mounting budgetary and external pressure, the Department of Defence has embraced devolution as a management tool to accelerate the introduction of the various reform agenda. Defence has been slow to introduce Program Management and Budgeting (PMB) as part of the government’s Financial Management and Improvement Program (FMIP) due to its resistance to change and unique characteristics (Bradford, 1990). The concept of devolution provides the necessary means to ensure adherence to these management philosophies. Coupled with this is the need to achieve savings and devolution presents an option that had not been previously fully explored. Hence the reform rhetoric has been too tempting to ignore. Devolution has become crucial in itself and as a mechanism for facilitating other agenda, such as civilianisation and commercialisation.

In accordance with FMIP proposals, Defence has seen three intra-departmental devolution initiatives. These include:

a. Structural Review of Higher Australian Defence Force (ADF) Arrangements (Sanderson Review), which affected higher structure;
b. Various structural reviews which saw the formation of the Defence Housing Authority, Australian Defence Industries and Aerospace Technologies of Australia; and

c. Defence Regional Support Review (DRSR), impacting on regional/State level administrative support. This is the subject area of this case study.

Concept of Devolution

Devolution involves the distribution of power and authority. This is not necessarily the same as decentralisation of administration, which may not be accompanied by distribution of power (PMB Manual 1990). In a specific sense, devolution can be defined as “the transfer to line managers of specific authority over the use of resources and the setting of priorities, and their subsequent accountability for performance including the management of resources (Department of Defence, 1990, p.xv). The effect of devolution should be to make the users of resources more accountable for the outcomes they obtain.

The term decentralisation is frequently transposed with that of devolution (as in Metcalfe and Richards, 1987, p.77). Noting this, Perrow (1977) quoted in Metcalfe and Richards, states “the bureaucratic paradox is that efficient organisations centralise in order to decentralise” (Metcalfe and Richards, 1987, p.79). So tight unified control and autonomy on the one hand, and management initiatives on the other, do not have to be viewed as control opposites. Solutions must be found to ensure that the kinds of controls and management processes instituted assure overall direction at the same time as effective delegation. The key to this dilemma is the combining of the three Perrow control orders. These involve:

a. 1st order — rules and regulations;
b. 2nd order — standardisation and specialisation; and

c. 3rd order — design, sustain and modify the organisation.

“Administrative decentralisation” (or devolution in this case) is best achieved by a deliberate shift from reliance on first order controls to second order controls. Hence devolution is dependent on clarification of decision-making criteria, definition of responsibilities and demarcation of roles” (Metcalfe and Richards, 1987, p.89). What is required is
positive guidance to decision-makers at lower levels which will reduce the need for the negative error correcting of the first order controls (Metcalfe and Richards, 1987, p.92). As Coombs explains, "delegation and devolution, if they are to be effective, will depend on an adequate flow downwards of information from top management about objectives, priorities and the principles on which individual decisions should be made" (quoted in Hawke, 1989, p.5). For example, the proposed Army Plan goes some of the way by determining goals and objectives. The challenge in the public sector is to provide the incentive for operational management to accept such devolution.

### Regional Support

The Department of Defence has many unique features which sets it apart from other mega-departments. These impact on its concept of regional support and on the debate over devolving administrative support functions to achieve efficient and effective operations. These unique features include:

- a. the executive diarchy of Secretary and Chief of Defence Force;
- b. that it is not a single organisation in structure, ethos, management practices or conditions of employment;
- c. it is geographically diverse but interdependent;
- d. it is part military and part civilian (Atkinson, 1990, p.34); and
- e. often trades efficiency and effectiveness for operational considerations.

The current conduct of ADF and Defence Regional Support is characterised by the individual Services, the Regional Offices and other Defence organisations (such as Defence Scientific and Technical Organisation) following their own well-developed, but individual procedures. In 1989 a Review Team, comprising an Assistant Secretary and Brigadier, was tasked to “make recommendations to ensure the most effective and economical procedures and organisational arrangements for the support within the regions of ADF and Defence” (DRSR, 1989, I.03).

The team recommended “optimum devolution of administrative support functions and associated delegations to the lowest responsible level of implementation” (DRSR, Executive Summary 4). To achieve this, significant organisational restructuring was required. Defence Centres (DC) would incorporate existing Regional Office functions and the Headquarters Military Districts, the headquarters of the Naval Officers Commanding of each region, and involve RAAF administrative heads in the RASC. By way of example, devolving Army's Military District tasks would result in one third of the tasks (in number) being devolved to units, one third to Base Administrative Support Centres (BASC) and of the remaining one third, half are retained (at DC) and the rest are referred to superior headquarters (Army Office or the Functional Commands).

Further study was conducted on the effect of these recommendations on Victoria and Tasmania. This study confirmed the need for:

- a. extensive devolution of authority,
- b. removal of intermediate levels of supervision and reporting,
- c. integration and rationalisation of existing duplicated administrative support structures, and
d. increased use of civilians and commercial contracting in place of Service staff (DRSR-V/T, 1990, p.2).

The developmental stage continues with implementation to occur in 1991 and 1992.

### Analysis

As implementation is yet to occur and this attempt at devolution is also accompanied by other significant restructurings and changes within the Department, analysis can only be tentative. The long term effects of DRSR can easily be subsumed within wider initiatives but perhaps what is more likely is some modification in the face of budgetary constraints. Despite this turbulent beginning in terms of the overall changes within Defence and the debate over its introduction, the project retains high level management support. DRSR is seen by some as the first plank of current restructurings and reviews. Its significance to the conduct of administrative support and therefore forming the foundation of Defence operations, is well understood at the senior levels.

### Efficiency and Effectiveness

Examining the DRSR claim of “improving efficiency while maintaining effectiveness” (DRSR Media Information Package May 1991) is somewhat problematic. On the surface, devolving authority over resources to the lowest practical level assumes that this level best knows what to use these new
found resources on. The assumption is that the Department's objectives are clearly stated, agreed and adhered to at all levels.

Accordingly, Perrow's paradox must be applied if efficiency is to be achieved. A clear central framework is yet to be espoused within which devolution is to function. As has been noted, Defence has only recently applied the principles of PMB and associated corporate management techniques. For instance, the Army is yet to see its first Army Plan which will hopefully provide clear objectives linked to allocated resources and the framework for subordinate levels to operate within.

Maintaining effectiveness in this period of change may prove more difficult than anticipated. Lower management levels will have an increased burden of responsibility and tasks to perform which could be part of the improvement in incentives that is seen to accompany devolution, thereby enhancing effectiveness. But under DRSR, responsibilities have been transferred to officers of lower rank and experience level without any change in the selection or training of these individuals. Unless the previous system was grossly inefficient, as has been suggested, some loss of effectiveness could be expected, hopefully only in the transition phase.

The efficiency and effectiveness tradeoff is best illustrated by the current Military District Headquarters. These Headquarters achieve economies of scale with central management, hence efficiency but not necessarily effectiveness. However with devolution greater effectiveness will be achieved with a loss of some efficiency at the lower level.

Control and Accountability

As has been noted, accountability forms an essential part of devolution, but apart from recognising this, DRSR seems to overlook this aspect. The basic philosophy of DRSR seems to embrace the need to combine all three of Perrow's control orders. Traditional concurrence, rules and regulations are to be overthrown by "clear accountability" (DRSR Media Information Package, 1990). However, a standard specialised system of regional administrative support is being established by DRSR in concept only. Single Service autonomy is to remain embodied in the BASCs. This appears inescapable, given the nature of the three Services within Defence. However, the integration of the RASC points to similar reforms in areas outside DRSR study. Also there is no doubt that further third order controls will be necessary as DRSR is implemented. These changes will perhaps be ongoing throughout the next ten years as further change is implemented.

Clear accountability assumes clear lines of responsibility and control with line managers being responsible to one manager within a single program. DRSR has yet to achieve this as it appears that at this stage DC could be answerable to up to eight program managers and BASCs to four sub-program managers. Options to improve this are hampered by single Service rivalry and it appears that multiple lines of responsibility will remain for at least the short term.

Organisational Design

Wisely, DRSR has adopted a bottom-up approach to developing organisational design aspects. This has led to some frustrations as the "right" answer has not always been presented. But this approach will assist the ultimate implementation and ensure a comprehensive coverage of all requirements. As the new regional structures evolve from devolved practices, little impact has occurred on central structures or procedures. Therefore the central framework remains largely unchanged, resulting from perhaps an ingrained resistance to change and perhaps an intention not to devolve as much as could be achieved. There has been no consideration of involving the regional managers in policy development as well as policy implementation as has occurred elsewhere (Aucoin, 1985, p.157).

Other influences such as including the concept of risk management, Management Information Systems (MIS) and training of managers are still to permeate through the various levels of the Department as a result of devolution. Whilst the installation of new MIS computers will dictate the pace of DRSR changes regionally, full cognisance of central management requirements and implications are yet to be determined. The level of understanding and skill of the managers who are about to receive new or additional authority and functions is inappropriate to the challenges they face (DoF, 1989, p.iv).

Savings to Defence

The savings generated by DRSR to the Defence Portfolio are not inconsiderable (Ferguson, May 1991) and as has been suggested, are underpinning the determination to pursue this initiative. For example, DRSR in Victoria could realise manpower reductions of 750 and facilities rationalisations both totalling up to $50m pa. Therefore it is conceivable that nationally DRSR could yield up to $100m pa to Defence.
Conclusion

Devolution within Defence has been embraced resulting, as has occurred on some other departments, in the removal of a layer within its structure. Some regrowth is inevitable and if the spread of geographic responsibility of the DC is any indication, has already begun. Any subsequent evaluation of the introduction of this system of devolved regional administrative within Defence may be difficult as other systemic changes occur. Despite its unique and perhaps complex features, the introduction of devolution in Defence seems to reflect many of the difficulties experienced by other departments attempting a similar exercise. Tensions exist between the centralising influences of the managerial paradigm and the stated intentions of devolution. DRSR, as an example of Public Sector devolution, seems to suffer common ailments.

Notwithstanding this, DRSR will inevitably result in implications for the wider framework in which it operates. The DRSR model of devolution as applied to regional administration could be transposed to central administration, consequently the maintenance of large Single Service Offices (Navy, Army and Air Force) with the other Departmental divisions could be reviewed. The growth of joint Headquarters of the Australian Defence Force is already overshadowing the Single Service Offices. Whilst unification has been rejected, further integration is inevitable. Furthermore, a review of the executive diarchy within Defence could be a possible outcome. Such are the far-reaching implications of introducing devolution to regional administration within Defence.

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The Significance of Socialisation and Cohesion in Contemporary Society — Military Transitions

By Dr Richard Cardinali, Assistant Dean, Central Connecticut State University.

Abstract

At the conclusion of twenty years of military service, the author has observed that a common social background assists members of military organisations to develop a cohesive unit. Similari­ties in previous social experiences such as social class, regional origin and age appears to contribute toward solidification of the primary group. This article examines the factors which contribute to the development of socialisation and cohesion in an organisation. One vehicle to assist the reader is the discussion of the Werhmacht model and its impact on the issue.

Overview

At the conclusion of twenty years of military service the author has observed that in many cases a common social background assists civilians entering the military to develop intimate inter­personal relations. For example, similarities in previous social experiences such as social class, regional origin or age appears to contribute toward solidification of the primary group. Conversely, the author noted that heterogenous ethnic and national origins within a unit tend to inhabit formation of primary group relations. This is heightened when like any other novice entering a new social institution, the member's behaviour during the important initiation period is characterised by a great deal of insecurity.

The insecurity could be caused by the person's ignorance of military rules and regulations, the military way of life, its norms and sanctions and perhaps most important, the social environment they recently left. Consequently, when a person enters this new environment, their insecurity in the new system is heightened. Additionally during the initial entry period, the leaders they seek to please appear to deliberately follow schemes that reinforce insecurity for the new members. For example, the military instructors abstain from giving comprehensive explanations for their orders instead expect the new person to follow orders without explanation. The environment becomes more threatening when the new arrivals are threatened by harsh sanctions for even marginal deviation of rules.

Some writers suggest that in trying to establish the primary group, one of the difficulties is that military organisations are now receiving volunteers who have developed a loss of esteem for its institutions, schools, church, police and government. Based on this premise the implications of these people entering appear clear. Military organisations are attempting to motivate people who have a somewhat reduced capacity to be motivated and are passively apathetic toward our political, social and economic institutions and most important they bring this apathy into military organisations.

One important area that further contributes to the socialisation and cohesion needs of the person entering a military organisation is self-esteem.

Although elusive and not readily quantifiable the need for self-worth is paramount in the transition process. Each individual requires respect for themselves and the work they accomplish within the primary group. Carefully aligned to this respect is leadership and how it is perceived to assess the group accomplish its mission. Finally, satisfaction from unit membership becomes the solidifying factor for group socialisation. Basically this feeling extends toward the extend that the accomplishment of the mission is something that each individual can be proud of and if extended, can produce dividends in terms of continued interest in the accomplishment of group rather than individual goals.

Introduction

When specifically addressing socialisation and cohesion in military organisations, the work of Wakenhut provides an excellent undergirthing. In his study of socialisation in military organisations
Wakenhut states that if one assumes that during the fifteen months of military service (German), draftees are actually exposed to a series of socialisation processes, then it follows that these influences, with reference to the goals of an organisation like the military could be investigated. The primary organisational goal of the military, as specified by the Constitution, is defence of the nation from aggression by another nation. This organisational goal according to Wakenhut, determines military training requirements, in the manpower sense; he asserts, it constitutes a specific environment for the draftee. It is particularly characterised through the association with weapons, living on a military installation and wearing a uniform. He also declares that socialisation cannot be viewed only as a transmittal of military abilities and skills, but also as a general perspective of education of the draftee that he receives while on active duty.

Wakenhut also provides another interesting explanation of the socialisation process. He states that in the German model, for a eighteen year old adolescent, the role of being a member of society develops on a concrete basis. He comes of age, attains the actual right to vote, and is confronted with the responsibility of every male citizen to serve in the military. This change in orientation from a family to a more general social reference system upon entering the military is a implicit prerequisite. This is because of the change in social orientation and because of the specific environment of the draftee, educational interventions of the Bunderwehr fall into an individual receptive to influence and guidance. Additionally, in this model there is a large compulsory participation requirement in the education program to which the draftee is exposed. The expectation that in the armed forces a socialisation process, more precisely, a political socialisation process has indeed taken place has some plausibility.

Janowitz

Morris Janowitz's study on the Army as a social group analyses the relative influence of primary and secondary group situations on the high degree of stability of the German Army in World War II. Historically, the author points out as he established the differences between a conscripted and a volunteer army, volunteer armies such as the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War were effected by the degree of orientation toward major political goals. Conversely, in a society that employs conscription as a means of raising forces, values involved in political and social systems do not have much impact on the determination of the soldier to fight to the best of his ability and hold out as long as possible. Therefore unlike his American counterpart, the German soldier is a member of a squad or section which maintains its structural integrity and which coincides roughly with the social unit which satisfies many of his primary needs.

In essence, primary group cohesion can be viewed as a dependable variable effected by both social values and in time of war, combat experiences. It is also argued that societal values were important determinants of combat effectiveness and that these values could have directly effected combat effectiveness without necessarily first influencing group solidarity. For example, societal values can provide the motivation which directs soldiers toward the military's goals and the development of combat skills. In contrast, and perhaps most important in our discussion is the fact that while the American soldier usually looks at war as an unpleasant necessity, the Second World War German, because of a more Spartan orientation, could see it as a service group solidarity that stems from survival needs and reaction to stress.

There is strong evidence that military effectiveness resulted from societal values prevalent in the Nazi state, but the most obvious cause of primary group cohesion, especially in the early part of the war, was the German early successes on the battlefield. In fact if the military goals are accepted by the group then it would follow that such solidarity would facilitate mission accomplishment. It was only at the conclusion of the war in Germany that cohesion among units broke down. In part this was caused by the infusion of diverse groups of individuals (rear line troops) into fighting units. Once this happened, the cohesiveness, that is the ability of the unit to sustain mission effectiveness despite combat stress failed.

Contributing Factors

The reasons for these failures is that the development of military cohesiveness is complicated by a number of factors. First is the initial relatively low level of willingness to invest in the units because unit assignment is not the choice of the individual (making German support troops infantry men). Second is the low level of organisational maturity of new accessions into a unit, together with their relative immaturity. The leader of a small military
unit is therefore required to develop the commitment and dedication of group members to a far greater extent of a group where membership is voluntarily elected and initially desired (special forces teams). Military cohesiveness then results from shared positive experiences of a challenging nature where group members are inter-dependent in the accomplishment of assigned tasks that permit attainment of respected unit goals.

Socialisation

Socialisation is when an individual learns the behaviour appropriate to their position in a group. This is learned through interaction with others who hold normative beliefs about what his/her role should be and who rewards or punishes for correct or incorrect actions. Ineflicacious socialisation refers to the process which fails to produce outcomes which are in the best interest of the organisation.

This discussion centres on the problem that arises when new member’s socialisation into an organisation is carried on without reference to his other role requirements outside the organisation. Since an individual usually has difficulty with all demands placed upon his various memberships, role strain is likely to develop. In this situation the individual’s response may be an attempt to manipulate the situation to some acceptable level of strain or to set limits upon the degree to which he will allow the organisation to penetrate his life space. Both of these responses influence the outcomes of the socialisation process. Hence, success of the process depends in part upon the sensitivity exhibited by the organisation to the new member’s other obligation. If the organisation is extremely insensitive, the new member is likely to assume peripheral role behaviours calculated to minimise role strain and thus may force the individual to adopt an external location on the response continuum.

Additionally, once a loss of idealism in the organisation by individuals occurs there may develop a cynicism toward the organisation’s proclaimed objectives. When a new member learns that the organisation’s goals which he first encountered (and which are communicated to the outside environment) cannot justify his activities within the organisation, he loses interest in the group. This realisation is likely to be disturbing to a recruit. To compensate, the individual adopts peripheral behaviour — such as rejecting organisational values.
Socialisation and the Primary Group

A number of studies which focus directly on the individual and his socialisation were conducted (see references). These studies attribute the success of transition of a person from civilian life to military life to several factors. These are:
1. the amount of contact that the new person has with family and civilian friends
2. the extent to which his unit is a unified group
3. the extent to which he participates as a unit leader
4. whether the person receives an orientation designed to teach specific techniques of adjustment to the military.

The results of the study confirmed the hypothesis that (for single men) training far from home with limited contact with family and friends increases the likelihood of a successful transition to military life. In fact, contrary to expectations, it was found that membership in a unit composed of men with similar intelligence and background was associated with a decreased likelihood of a successful transition to the military life.

Inhibitors of Military Cohesiveness

To this juncture a general explanation of some of the factors which effect the socialisation process and group cohesiveness have been reviewed. This section will review several factors which inhibit military cohesiveness understanding. These could make unit membership more effective as a vehicle for satisfying self-esteem needs, resulting to give members confidence in the unit, leadership, and its ability to accomplish missions. Factors detracting from military cohesiveness are those which have opposite impact, such as turbulence, a perception of disorder and a disorganisation within the unit, individual competition for prominence, and a negative leadership climate. Figure 1 lists those factors positively influencing cohesiveness, Figure 2 lists those factors negatively influencing cohesiveness.

Conclusion

Throughout this article socialisation has been viewed in terms of an interactive process largely in terms of the individual and organisation. The literature on socialisation does reflect that little is known about the characteristics of swift socialisation on the individual or organisational forces which facilitate such occurrences. It appears to this writer that in looking at transactions, the understanding of individual social make-up is absent. Little is said about the ethnic sub-culture(s) which thrive in urban centres. One would ask if a greater understanding of the environmental make-up of the individual would assist in the socialisation process? Conversely this philosophy improperly instituted could emphasise the current problem of trying to satisfy all special interest groups in a unit. It is apparent that in recent years relationships between groups have sometimes been explained through analysis of individuals who have endured unusual degrees of frustration of extensive authoritarian treatment in their life histories. Therefore, there is good reason to believe that some people growing up in unfortunate life circumstances may become (are) more intense in their prejudices and hostilities.

When the linkages between military units and the social order are examined, the research reports that wider societal values in individuals are a result of personal experiences. Further, it appears that the values and attitudes that the individual acquires in the wider social arena are functions of his basic need requirements. Accordingly, the same "need profile" which motivates a person in civilian life is expected to motivate him in military life. In essence, there is no requirement to develop purely military values and attitudes; civilian mechanisms of motivation are simply transposed into the military environment. What finally seems to happen, is that a primary linkage with the larger social order is established in the process of motivation, namely dovetailing self-interests of the organisation in an entrepreneurial or occupational fashion. The motivational process is the same in civilian life as in military life.

Wakenhut's conception of the group in military life suggests there is no need for a socialisation mechanism to create new values, destroy old ones, or establish and transmit values and goals which are deemed specifically appropriate to military service. In short, this final contrasting view states that the motivational process and values appropriate to civilian life are deemed equally appropriate in the military environment. There is, on the surface, little in the military experience per se that requires re-socialisation of the individual.

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Figure 1
Factors Positively Influencing Cohesiveness

Personal Need Satisfactions

Physical
Security and Economic
Affiliation
  Peer friendship
  Feeling of belonging
Self-esteem
  Achievement through work
  Pride in accomplishment and unit
  Education
  Environment structured to enhance performance
  Direction, purpose and meaningfulness in assigned tasks
  Skill development

Group Characteristics

Team Work
Mutual Trust
  Group member similarity on value and goals
  Level of training on mission-relevant skills
  Shared successful experience on challenging or high risk mission relevant tasks
  Confidence in other group members and the group as a whole
  Sense of common goals and desire for high performance
  Distinctiveness
  Shared norms on self-discipline
  Shared norms on military courtesy
  Perception of common goals or common energy outside group
  Interdependence in goal attachment/mission accomplishment

Climate
Stability in organisation (low turbulence)
Consistency of organisational goals and policies
Organisational emphasis on development/improvement
“Freedom to fail” attitude
  Belief in the importance of the human resources of the organisation
  Belief in the personal worth and dignity of the individual
  Willingness to accept rational risk
  Consistency in policy, plans, and operations

Organisational Process
Appropriate leadership styles/behaviour at all levels
Effective communications, upward, downward, and laterally
Capacity to acquire and use information
Capacity to make effective decisions
Capacity to develop and implement medium and long-range plans
Capacity to anticipate change and minimise short-term disruption in plans or operations

Technology
Equipment that fosters soldier confidence in his ability to succeed mission accomplishment
Tactical operational capability that fosters soldier confidence in the unit’s ability to succeed in mission accomplishment
Figure 2

Factors Negatively Influencing Cohesiveness

Personnel Management System
- Personnel turbulence
- Personnel shortages
- Leader shortages (lower ranks than authorised)
- MOS mismatch
- Tour length
- Quality distribution policy
- MOS reclassification policy
- EPMS fostered enlisted “ticket punching”
- SD requirements

Resources Constraints
- Economic constraints (limiting training)
- Resources shortages (POL, spare parts)
- De-civilisation of installation support

Climate
- Over commitment of units (excessive “can do” attitude)
- Mandated programs (undermine chain of command, pull leaders from mission relevant positions)
- Overcontrol (checklists, reposts, over centralisation)
- Fear of failure (“zero defects”, no room for failure)
- Competition for individual advancement overriding concern for unit effectiveness

Quality of Life
- Erosion of benefits (e.g., medical care for dependents)
- Housing
- Ability to support dependents

(References continued)


Military Intelligence at Gallipoli — ‘A Leap in the Dark?’

By Captain M.J. Davies, Aust Int.

Introduction

Not many historians or commentators would consider the landings at Gallipoli in 1915 a triumph of military intelligence. Just prior to the landing a British journalist accompanying the allied forces, E. Ashmead Bartlett, described the coming operation as:

‘...a leap in the dark, lacking information on the following vital questions: What number of Turkish troops are available for the defence of the Peninsula; have they had the necessary time to prepare all vulnerable points against a surprise attack... have both coasts — European and Asiatic — been fortified...?’

Surprisingly however, this information and considerably more was known and was used to plan the campaign.

Intelligence support to the Gallipoli campaign did not have a promising start. General Sir Ian Hamilton received his initial orders as Commander of the Mediterranean Expedition Force (MEF) from the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, on 12 March 1915. He commented in his diary after this meeting that, ‘The Dardanelles and the Bosphorous might well be in the moon for all the military information I have got to go on’.

Basic Intelligence

For a campaign of the scope of the Gallipoli landings, basic intelligence on a wide variety of subjects such as, terrain, enemy fortifications and general enemy dispositions would have been required. All Hamilton’s Chief of Staff, Major General Braithwaite, was able to obtain from the Intelligence Branch at the War Office was an ‘out of date’ textbook on the Turkish Army, two travel/guidebooks and pre-war Admiralty report.

The ‘out of date’ textbook on the Turkish Army was actually a General Staff War Office publication called the Handbook of the Turkish Army. Even by today’s standards the Handbook is a detailed and well organised source of basic intelligence. It would have provided comprehensive background detail on the Turkish Army, including the organisation of its fighting arms, a glossary of Turkish military terms as well as basic detail on Ottoman Empire defences, including the Dardanelles. Such basic information is unlikely to have been significantly ‘out of date’. There is no doubt that the handbook was extensively used by British staffs during the planning of the campaign. An intelligence report released by the 29th Division on 1 April 1915 quotes as a source the Handbook of the Turkish Army 1915. Information from this handbook was also available to the ANZAC Divisions prior to the landing.

Of the guidebooks nothing is known. The ‘out of date’ Admiralty report is likely to have been similar to a 1908 series of maps of the Peninsula. These maps showed fortifications and defensive positions in the Dardanelles built during the Crimean War and as such were clearly ‘out of date’.

The Missing Reports

One mysterious aspect of the pre-campaign intelligence preparation is why two key appreciations on the Turkish positions at Gallipoli were never given to Hamilton. The first appreciation consisted of a series of reports prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Cuncliffe-Owen, the British Military Attache to Constantinople in the Spring of 1914. These reports provided a comprehensive survey of Turkish preparations in the Dardanelles prior to the war. The reports contained detail on new armaments being deployed in the area, minefield locations and gun sites. These reports were submitted to the War Office but were not given to Hamilton to use in planning his campaign. Cuncliffe-Owen’s experience, despite participating at Gallipoli as the Commander of ANZAC artillery was never called upon.

The second appreciation came this time from the French Military Attache to Constantinople, Colonel
Maucorps. Maucorps had spent five years as the Military Attache prior to the outbreak of the war. He provided a very detailed appreciation of the Turkish situation at Gallipoli to Lieutenant General Sir John Maxwell (Commanding in Chief in Egypt). The appreciation identified the locations and capabilities of existing defences, the strength of the garrison and even an assessment of the Turkish Commander at that time, Djevad Pasha. This appreciation was telegraphed to Lord Kitchener on 26 February 1915. However, it was never given to Hamilton.8

Just why these two reports were never passed to Hamilton is not known. Some polite speculation on Lord Kitchener’s methods was raised by the Special Commission into the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia in 1917. It commented, with deference to ‘the illustrious dead’, that Kitchener often maintained an unworkable level of secrecy with ‘respect to all matters connected to military operations’. Such secrecy often meant that Kitchener would not reveal the full extent of information to his subordinates or even to members of the War Council.9

A great deal of basic intelligence was actually available on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Intelligence is useless, however if it is not passed or disseminated to those who needed it. Hamilton, in the initial planning stages of the campaign needed such information but did not receive it. He therefore started the campaign at a significant disadvantage. A disadvantage that would have to have been met by current intelligence.

Of the development of current intelligence to support planning the same two questions can now be asked. Was there current intelligence available on immediate, tactical aspects of the area’s terrain and enemy? If so, was such intelligence made available to those who needed it? Hamilton had at his disposal three potential sources to provide information and intelligence on the area. The first was visual reconnaissance of potential landing sites on the eastern side of the Peninsula was made as early as 23 February by Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood (the ANZAC Commander). As a result of this, Birdwood telegraphed Kitchener saying that a large military operation would be necessary given the ‘formidable character’ of the area’s defences.10 On 18 March, Hamilton accompanied by his staff made an additional reconnaissance of the coast on board HMS Phaeton.11 This reconnaissance confirmed both Birdwood’s report as well as reports made by Admiral Sir John Robeck (Commander of the Mediterranean Fleet). Hamilton wrote to Kitchener after this reconnaissance noting that, ‘Gallipoli, looks a much tougher nut to crack than it did over the map in your office.’12

Throughout the remainder of the preparations for the campaign, information on Turkish entrenchments, obstacles and general defences was provided by Royal Navy vessels on an almost daily basis.13 Whilst it could be argued that such reconnaissance may have compromised the security of the operation, Hamilton assessed that the Turks were already fully aware of the allied intentions to land at Gallipoli.14 Such reconnaissance therefore would provide valuable intelligence without necessarily compromising the security of key aspects of the operation, such as, the specific times and locations for the landings.

The amount of detail provided by these visual ship-bound reconnaissance would have given Hamilton’s planning staff only a very limited view of their objective. An additional dimension and a second source of information was provided through the use of air reconnaissance.
Air reconnaissance, as a tool of intelligence was very much in its infancy in 1915. The air assets available to the allied forces prior to the landing consisted of land based aircraft belonging to No. 3 Squadron, Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), seaplanes from the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal and 'Drachen' type observation balloons deployed from the balloon ship, HMS Manica. None of these aircraft were designed specifically for air reconnaissance and their aircrews were not trained for the task. Again, the hand of Kitchener is evident here. Prior to the campaign General Braithwaite asked Lord Kitchener for 'a contingent of up-to-date aeroplanes, pilots and observers'. As Hamilton notes in his diary, 'K (Kitchener) turned on him (Braithwaite) with flashing spectacles and rent him with the words, 'Not a one!'

Even within these limitations, some of the aircraft were still able to provide a steady flow of information about Gallipoli. As early as 18 March Major Villers-Stuart, GSO III, to Birdwood, was able to fly over Turkish trenches on the Gallipoli Peninsula. C.E.W. Bean, the Australian Official Historian of World War I, noted that 'new trenches and gun positions on the Peninsula were most carefully noted daily by British Airmen.' Air photography of the area was also being taken by these aircraft. The procedure, while very rudimentary, provided an immediate reference to Hamilton and his staff on current Turkish positions, deployments and defences.

The third source of information available to Hamilton came from human intelligence sources such as spies and refugees. Bean points to the availability of information from such sources. He writes that 'spies' had been used to provide intelligence on Turkish positions on the Peninsula. He also writes that visitors to the Peninsula had been used in the preparation of maps of the landing sites. Further, reports issued by the 29th Division cite refugees being used as a source of information on terrain aspects of the area.

There seems little doubt therefore that there was current intelligence available from these sources. How well was it used though? John Laffin in his book — *British Butcherers and Bunglers* claims that 'no military or naval intelligence appreciation was ever made' to support the planning of the campaign. However, a review of existing primary sources at the Australian War Memorial (AWM) does not support
this claim. Two sets of documents at the AWM clearly point to the fact that the available intelligence was made accessible and that it was used as a basis of planning.\textsuperscript{24}

The first of these documents is the War Diary of Intelligence, 29th Division. Extracts from this diary between 1 April and 24 April show a build-up of intelligence on the current situation at Gallipoli. The diary reflects reports being received by the 29th Division from General Headquarters of the MEF on locations of Turkish troops, both strategically within the Ottoman Empire and tactically on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Attachments to the diary provide detailed reports on issues of terrain and layout of defences.\textsuperscript{25}

This information in turn, is reflected in a second set of documents, those detailing the pre-campaign planning of the 1st Australian Division. The messages and signals contained in these documents reflect the information shown in the 29th Division Intelligence Diary. A constant flow of intelligence and information to and from higher and subordinate formations is indicated. Included among these messages and signals there are a number of hand annotated traces of Turkish positions in the vicinity of the landing site. These traces are dated and signed by a Major T.A. Blarney GSO III (later Field Sir Thomas Marshall Blamey) on 20 April.\textsuperscript{26}

Further proof that current intelligence was being disseminated throughout the force can be seen in a series of 1:40 000 maps of the landing sites held by the War Memorial. Two of these maps, belonging to Colonels Monash (Commander 4th Brigade) and McLaurin (Commander 1st Brigade) are annotated as ‘Turkish positions and emplacements as identified by air reconnaissance between 15-20 April’.\textsuperscript{27}

In answer to the questions of whether current intelligence support was both available and accessible, the answer is a resounding ‘yes’. Yes, there was a sufficient degree of intelligence available on immediate, tactical aspects of Gallipoli’s terrain and on the Turks. Yes, this information was passed in an accurate and timely fashion to those who needed it. Both the Australian and British Official Historians of the campaign agree that the degree of intelligence support given to the immediate planning of the campaign was generally accurate.\textsuperscript{28}

**Australian Intelligence Corps**

The final question for consideration is what role did the intelligence staff of the various ANZAC headquarters play in the development of intelligence support to the campaign? In some ways, Australia should have been more fortunate than her allies at Gallipoli, as a dedicated intelligence corps had been formed in 1906. The Australian Intelligence Corps (AIC) was formed as an integral part of the Australian General Staff. The AIC was responsible for mapping, collection of terrain intelligence, collection of foreign intelligence and in intelligence related training.\textsuperscript{29} By early 1914 AIC Intelligence Officers could be found on many Brigade and Divisional Headquarters.\textsuperscript{30}

Despite much training and preparations in the years before World War I the AIC did not serve at Gallipoli. In what must be one of the greatest ironies of the Australian military history, the AIC was disbanded due to administrative and financial limitations 20 days before the outbreak of war.\textsuperscript{31}

Even if the AIC as a corps did not serve at Gallipoli it was well represented. Three ex-officers of the AIC held key positions during the planning of the campaign. The first of these officers was Major General Sir William Bridges, Commander of the 1st Australian Division. Bridges is considered to be one of the two men instrumental in the founding of the AIC. During the years 1906 to 1910 Bridges acted as ‘Chief of Intelligence’ to the Australian General Staff. From this position he enthusiastically led the push for the creation of the AIC. After its founding he remained actively involved at all levels of the Corp’s training and activities. Bridge’s view of the importance of intelligence in these years was clear. He saw that the most vital function of the AIC would be the collection of intelligence in war. To achieve this he saw the need for intelligence officers to serve as staff officers to Division and Brigade Headquarters.\textsuperscript{32}

The other officer closely involved in the founding of the corps was Colonel James McCay. Colonel McCay served as the first Director of Intelligence from 1906 to 1912. During the landings at Gallipoli, McCay commanded the 2nd Brigade.\textsuperscript{33}

McCay’s successor as the Director of Intelligence was Colonel John Monash. Monash’s appointment was however, shortlived, as the position was disestablished in December 1912. Prior to this, Monash commanded the Victorian detachment of the AIC from 1908 to 1912. During that time he quickly established the AIC in Victoria as the hardest working and most efficient AIC detachment.\textsuperscript{34} Monash understood the importance of intelligence and the need for it to be analysed and distributed accurately and quickly. He lamented on more than one occasion that commanders at all levels failed to
utilise their intelligence officers properly.\textsuperscript{35} The input that these officers had on the use of intelligence support at Gallipoli is difficult to judge. There is little available primary or secondary source material which detail their views. It seems most unlikely, given their backgrounds that they would not have a very clear understanding of the benefits of accurate and timely intelligence in these circumstances. Perhaps some guide to their input can be found in the activities of the non-AIC intelligence staff at Gallipoli.

The actual co-ordination of intelligence matters in the planning of Gallipoli was in the hands of General Staff Officers. The General Staff appointment, GSO III, was responsible for intelligence. As previously indicated one of the most famous incumbents of these positions was Blamey. Major T.A. Blamey was not an AIC officer but acted as GSO III to Bridges during the Gallipoli campaign. During that period his involvement with intelligence is evident by the number of intelligence reports, memorandums and other material that he raised and distributed throughout the 1st Australian Division.\textsuperscript{36}

While the AIC had no direct role at Gallipoli, the ANZAC intelligence process appeared to work well. The efforts of Blamey and others in co-ordinating the collection and dissemination of intelligence was efficient and effective. The task of these officers could only have been helped by having ex-AIC officers such as Bridges, Monash and McCay as their superiors.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Conclusion}
\end{center}

A critical review of the role of military intelligence at Gallipoli such as this, could easily identify large gaps in the intelligence that should have been known prior to the landing. With the benefit of hindsight, other sources of information and other questions of intelligence that should have been asked could be found. It must always be remembered however, that an enemy rarely affords his attacker such a clear view of his intentions as he gives the historian.

Two points on the role of intelligence are now clear. While there was considerable basic intelligence available on Gallipoli, it was not provided to Hamilton for the planning of his campaign. Hamilton’s intelligence process therefore did initially
step off in the dark. As preparations for the campaign progressed, intelligence staff at all levels, including the ANZAC elements, were quickly able to collect and process a healthy level of current intelligence. In all, Bartlett’s ‘leap in the dark’ was nothing more than a piece of journalistic license. On the contrary, military intelligence lent valuable support to the planning of the Gallipoli campaign. If anything, it shone a clear light into this so-called darkness.

NOTES
3. R.R. James, Gallipoli, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London 1965, p53. James’ list of basic intelligence sources is based on comments made by General Sir Aspinal Oglander who was a member of Hamilton’s staff and later the official British military historian for the Gallipoli Campaign.
4. 29 Div Dardanelles, Intelligence Report dated 1 April 1915 in GS, Intelligence, AQ and Bdes (2), in Australian War Memorial (AWM) 45, item 3.20 (Hereinafter cited as 29 Div Dardanelles).
5. General Staff War Office, Handbook of the Turkish Army, Fifth Edition, 1912. A copy of this handbook is currently held by the Heritage Library at the infantry Centre, Singleton. The Librarian, Mr David Richardson, believes that the Handbook forms part of a set received by the ‘School of Musketry’ Randwick in January 1914. It seems a fair assumption that Australian Forces mobilising from Sydney in late 1914 would have had access to this material.
6. Gallipoli Map Series, AWM.
7. James, op cit, pp53-54.
14. E. Ashmead Bartlett, op cit, p44.
17. The General Staff Officer Grade III (GSO III) was a staff officer responsible, among other things, for intelligence matters.
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32. Pedersen, op cit, p23.
33. Coulthard-Clark, op cit, p49.
34. Pedersen, op cit, p22.
35. ibid, p31.
36. 1st Aust Div op cit. See particularly the unrefereed memorandum from HQ 1st Aust Div on 15 April, signed by Blamey. Also the hand annotated traces of Turkish positions signed by Blamey on 20 April.

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In April 1990, a group of World War I veterans made the historic pilgrimage back to Gallipoli to take part in the events marking the 75th Anniversary of the landings at Anzac Cove.

The Australian Defence Force Journal was there to capture the atmosphere of this emotional event and has produced the book 'The Spirit of ANZAC'. This unique publication is a collection of excellent paintings by Defence artist Jeff Isaacs with the narrative prepared by Michael Tracey.

The Spirit of ANZAC is available from the Australian War Memorial bookshop.
Disaster Relief in the South Pacific Region: 
A Proposal to Form an Australian Relief Team

By Major D.H. Cato, RAAMC.

Introduction

The Australian Army, in conjunction with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), has in the past been called upon to assist in times of natural disaster both on the Australian continent and as part of international aid programmes.

Engineering support is currently available and engineer units participated in disaster relief after the recent Newcastle, NSW, earthquake. However with the removal of the 1st Preventive Medicine Company from the Australian Army there is no longer any unit readily able to be deployed to offer medical disaster relief. It is therefore proposed that a special disaster team with medical and engineering capabilities should be formed.

This article analyses the problem and recommends the formation of a team to be able to be readily deployed at the request of the government of the stricken nation. The team would also be available for Australian use in the advent of continental natural disaster.

Natural Disasters

The Pan American Health Organisation publication *A Guide to Emergency Health Management After Natural Disaster* (p3) lists four types of natural disaster:

a. Earthquakes;

b. High Winds (without Flooding);

c. Tidal Waves/Flash Flood; and

d. Floods.

The cyclone combines these disasters so that all except the earthquake can be present.

During the summer months very intense depressions form over the oceans and these develop into storms known, depending on geographic location, as cyclones, tropical cyclones, hurricanes and typhoons (Gaskell, p16).

Due to the Coriolis effect these maritime depressions become true cyclones when they encounter land and are characterised by very strong winds and heavy rain. They can last up to seven days before the influence diminishes to normal weather. The winds typically cause heavy sea conditions which result in wave damage and local flooding.

The above reference quotes deaths as few for high winds and floods but earthquakes and flash floods as causing many (Gaskell, p3). The authors quote the case of Cyclone Tracey which destroyed Darwin in 1974 as only causing the comparatively light casualty figures of 51 deaths and 145 hospital admissions (p7).

The Darwin situation can not be regarded as typical since this was a mainland city of modern construction and certainly recent historical accounts are indicative of far more devastation with such events as the Swatow typhoon, which occurred in August of 1922, accounting for 50,000 lives (Miller, p122). The death potential is enormous as the experience of the New South Wales town of Lismore showed when in 1953 the fracture of sewer pipes resulted in water contamination and in excess of 200 persons contracted dysentery (Holthouse, p128). In more recent times another World Health Organisation (WHO) publication quotes the East Pakistan cyclone of November 1970 as accounting for “hundreds of thousands of human lives...” (Assar, p15).

Disasters can be divided into phases and Skeet (p3) uses five phases:

a. warning;

b. impact;

c. rescue;

d. relief; and

e. rehabilitation.

It is the middle two, rescue and relief where urgent intervention is required.

Cyclones

Cyclones are the most common of the natural occurring disasters so far as the Pacific Region is concerned (as compared to flood and drought for
Cyclones are intense meteorologic depressions which, the Coriolis effect causes them to become major storms with wind speeds between 100-400km/hr and rain falls typically of 30mm/hr which, over the average time of maximum intensity of 36hr, will give an inundation of greater than 1 metre (Holthouse, p129).

With modern satellite tracking, and the now well established meteorological services, these storms can be predicted as to time of impact, place of maximum probable damage and likely strength.

**Proposal**

The South Pacific Region both politically and geographically is the area in which Australia should be concerned with regard to relief and aid and disaster relief should be a high priority.

In order to do this it is proposed that the Australian Army, with support from the RAAF and the RAN should form a ready reaction team that can be deployed in the rescue or relief phases in response to a government request by the inflicted nation.

The team must be air portable and should be able to be deployed within 48 hours and have medical and engineering capabilities.

Whilst deployment within 48 hours is the ideal it must be appreciated that this may not always be possible due to a number of factors:

a. other commitments, that is personnel are on other tasks;

b. lack of landing area or conditions that preclude the use of aircraft at that time;

c. special equipments required; or

d. political considerations.

The above factors may in fact mean that deployment may be nearer to five days rather than the ideal two days.

It should be noted that the RAAF has had considerable experience in the support of the civil authorities in cyclone relief (Holthouse, p132).

**Tasks**

The Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO), referred to above, lists six health problems associated with all disasters (p4):

a. **Social Reactions**: This includes breakdown of administrative control, rumours and exodus of population from the stricken area;

b. **Communicable Diseases**: PAHO considers outbreaks of communicable disease (p5) to be unusual but could possibly result in enteric diseases from contaminated drinking water and later outbreaks of vector borne diseases (the Lismore experience supports this although the use of unusual is questionable);

c. **Population Displacement**: This is primarily a problem in continental disasters since conditions in island situations could well prevent any exodus;

d. **Climatic Exposure**: PAHO considers this to be a low risk provided that the population is dry (but this is unlikely in a cyclone);

e. **Food and Nutrition**: This constitutes both an immediate and on going problem because of the destruction of food stocks, animals and crops; and

f. **Mental Health**: Experience has shown that there will be anxiety about relatives and friends and this can become an acute public health problem but of short duration.

It is considered that b., communicable diseases is the area in which the Australian effort should be focused since the expertise of the Army in this aspect is well established and all necessary equipment and techniques are in place in the normal training of the ADF Preventive Medicine Company. The remaining aspects, not to be dismissed, are more easily controlled by civil planning and stock piling.

Whilst not specifically mentioned by the PAHO, a high priority to the provision of drinking water is given by Assar (p36) and this is also the opinion of Skeet (p216) who, without acknowledgement, repeats verbatim the statement of Assar. Provision of drinking water, closely allied to disease prevention, should be included when considering food and nutrition as an immediate need and this too is an area in which the Australian Army has considerable expertise and is well equipped.

Water requirements are listed by Assar (p37) as daily requirements in litres per person per day as:

a. field hospitals and first aid stations — 40 to 60 litres;

b. mass feeding centres — 20 to 30 litres;

c. temporary shelters and camps — 15 to 20 litres.

These requirements are immediate post disaster and will rise to 100 litres per person a day as normality returns. Since hygiene and water usage
are related, as Assar points out (p37), restrictions should not be made unless there is an initial shortage and these restrictions must be lifted as soon as possible.

With the provision of a safe water supply must also go the provision of a sanitary system to control possible enteric disease outbreaks and to prevent contamination of water supplies. Standard field type arrangements are suitable for this purpose where again considerable expertise is available from the Australian Army.

In the Pacific Region there is ever present the problem of vector borne diseases, particularly malaria and arboviruses such as dengue and the parasitic diseases associated with contaminated water.

Parasitic disease problems can largely be overcome by the installation of suitably disinfected potable water supply and sanitary facilities but control of mosquitoes may be of considerable difficulty immediately following heavy rain occurring during the peak breeding season.

Following any major disaster first aid and minor treatment facilities will be required including the resuscitation of the injured for evacuation to a level 3 medical or surgical facility.

**Implementation**

It is proposed that a special team based on the Preventive Medicine Company and supported by Field and Construction Engineers and Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and an adviser from the Malaria Research Unit be formed and available for assistance as required.

The team must be fully air portable and be able to be moved by C130E aircraft of the RAAF. This means that their deployment cannot be before landing facilities are available. Recent advances in the formation of an air drop Field Ambulance may be able to be applied to the support team and this could shorten the deployment time. Additional heavy machinery support can later be moved by sea if the task is in any way prolonged.

Townsville would be the preferred location for the team however the lack of a Preventive Medicine Company north of Brisbane may require that Richmond be the lift off point.

It is estimated that training could be restricted to one annual exercise which should be held in September or October before the cyclone season and that Australian mainland cyclones should be covered by the team as a civil aid and training exercise.

**Conclusion**

The Australian Government does not at present have any unit able to be quickly deployed in the advent of a natural disaster.

Past experience has shown that the military forces are best equipped to deal with the immediate effects of natural disaster whether these occur on the Australian continent or in the Pacific Region.

The nucleus of such a ready deployment force exists and by the use of shadow posting could be readily available for cyclone relief at very low cost.

**Recommendations**

It is recommended that:

a. a ready reaction team be formed and trained in disaster relief as an adjunct to existing units;

b. postings to the team be on a rotational basis and as shadow postings;

c. whilst the team should be based on the Preventive Medicine Company the Team Commander should be an RAAMC officer of LTCOL rank and have some training in epidemiology;

d. whilst operational control should be as high as possible, the commander on the ground must be given a broad discretionary responsibility so that, within his delegation and role and probably in the absence of reliable communications, he can react quickly to the situation.

The Role and Characteristics of a unit or team able to carry out such a task is shown below.

**ORGANISATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN DISASTER RELIEF TEAM (Aust DRT)**

**Situation**

The South Pacific region is prone to cyclones and these occur mainly in the months December, January and February. They are tropical and the closer to the equator they occur the stronger they tend to be.

These storms are very intense depressions which, due to the Coriolis effect, become severe storms...
The immediate aftermath requires the greatest support.

when they encounter land masses. Depending on the geographic area these storms are known as cyclones, typhoons or hurricanes. The cyclones occurring in the South Pacific region are of the maritime variety.

Whilst modern meteorology, aided by satellite surveillance, can accurately track and predict cyclones it is the immediate aftermath that requires the greatest support.

The Pan American Health Organisation divides natural disasters into four major types — earthquakes, high winds without flooding, tidal waves/flash floods and floods. Cyclones usually combine floods with high winds.

Expected health problems include social reactions, communicable disease, population displacement, climatic exposure, food and nutrition and mental health. As part of nutrition is to be included the provision of a safe water supply.

Aims and Objectives

_Aim_ — To provide a ready reaction team able to be deployed following a natural disaster in the South Pacific Region and continental Australia at the request of the government of the stricken area.

**Objectives** — To provide a team that is:

a. able to be deployed within 2 days of any natural occurring disaster;

b. administratively self supporting over a period of 21 days and able to operate with support for up to 80 days;

c. made up of medical and engineering elements;

d. fully air portable.

**Characteristics**

The Australian Disaster Relief Team (Aust DRT) can support a population of 10,000 and is able to:

a. provide second line medical support with a holding policy of 72 hours;

b. operate a water treatment plant with an output of 500,000 litres of potable water per day;

c. supply its own power generation to a limit of 500kVA;

d. provide limited sterilisation facilities for dressings and instruments;

e. provide limited laboratory facilities for the quality control of water supplies, bacteriology, biochemistry and haematology;
The teams are required in the immediate period following the disaster.

f. be able to operate without resupply for a period of 7 days.

The team will not be able to move unassisted and will have only sufficient organic vehicular support to move engineering equipment for water purification plant and three x ¾ tonne GS vehicles fitted with stretcher frames.

The outline organisation of the team is shown at Appendix A.

It is envisaged that the team would not be a separate unit but would comprise an amalgam of units based upon the Preventive Medicine Company (Pvnt Med Coy) and supported by a Treatment Section from the Field Ambulance (Fd Amb Sect) and a section of Field Engineers (Fd Eng Sect). The team will have no surgical facility and any request for surgical assistance would need to be provided separately and attached to a hospital.

b. provide a casualty clearance facility in the immediate post disaster period;

c. conduct health surveillance and rapidly identify any outbreak or potential outbreak of disease;

d. conduct vaccination programmes as dictated by circumstance;

e. provide a treatment facility for minor sickness and injury;

f. carry out mosquito and parasitic control measures; and

g. construct and maintain sanitary facilities as required.

Execution

The team will require an equipment pool which is to be dedicated to the task and kept at readiness.

All staff tables are to be maintained along with a personnel table.

All personnel allotted to the team are to be medically fit to FE standard and to have all inoculations at current level.

Team members should undertake field exercises annually between September and October to ensure
that all equipment and techniques are fully operational. The exercise should include air movement.

It is anticipated that any request for assistance will occur at the latest within seven days of the disaster following an assessment of the damage and that the lead time for deployment will be between 2 and 5 days. In some circumstances, with sufficient warnings, it may be desirable to deploy before the onset of the storm.

Leave for key members is to be of short duration only during the cyclone prevalence period.

**Movement**

Movement will be in 3 phases:

a. an Advance Party to establish the camp and commence immediate first aid treatment in the local area;
b. a Main Body to follow within 48 hrs; and
c. installation of Heavy Equipment and extension supplies.

The Advance Party is to establish the camp area and commence the casualty clearance role.

The Advance Party will be provided with 24 hrs supply of packed water and is to be locally sufficient within 48 hrs.

The Main Body will establish the water point to full capability within a period of 72 hrs and commence extend medical support and disease surveillance.

Heavy equipment is to include water bladders and stave tanks, heavy power generation equipment, fogging equipment and sterilisers.

Vaccines will be supplied on request as the situation dictates but initial pharmaceutical supplies must include antimalarials (selected on advice of the Director of the Malarial Research Unit), broad spectrum antibiotics and gammaglobulins.

The commander of the team will be RAAMC with an officer of the Pvnt Med Coy acting as Operations Officer.

**Administration**

The Team is to be administratively self contained and will use local purchase where possible or resupply from base where shortfalls occur.

The Team Commander will be responsible for local liaison and is to work with any diplomatic representatives, local authorities and any other international organisation as the situation dictates.

Army Head Quarters (AHQ) is to be kept fully informed by the quickest available means of progress, other requests for assistance and supplies.

No additional requests for assistance outside the role of the Team are to be accepted without prior approval from AHQ.

**REFERENCES**


Return to Greece

*Return to Greece* is an *Australian Defence Force Journal* production highlighting the 50th Anniversary of the Australian Defence Force’s participation in the Allied struggle of the Greek Campaign of World War II.

In 1941, Greece fought for survival against the might of Germany. The Greeks, aided by Australian, New Zealand and British forces fought to ward off the invasion of their homeland. *Return to Greece* tells of these battles and of the Allied evacuation.

*Return to Greece* revisits the sites of the battlefields through a selection of 50 water colours and drawings. The book takes the reader on a journey with the veterans of the Greek Campaign through the country where they fought valiantly with their Greek comrades in defence of democracy. It illustrates the pride and professionalism of today’s Australian Defence Force personnel as they pay tribute to the memory of those who fought with such bravery and self sacrifice in the cause of freedom in the dark days of 1941.

This book will rekindle memories for those who took part in the campaign of 1941 and also for those who participated in the return pilgrimage in 1991.

*Return to Greece* is illustrated by Defence artist, Jeff Isaacs with text by Michael Tracey.

*Return to Greece* is available from the *Australian Defence Force Journal* at a cost of $20.00.
The RAAF Needs A Regiment

By Sgt S. J. Brasher, RAAF.

For want of a nail the shoe was lost,
for want of the shoe the horse was lost,
for want of the horse the rider was lost,
for want of the rider the battle was lost,
for want of the battle the kingdom was lost,
and all for the want of a nail.

Introduction

The RAAF is responsible for the air defence of Australia, its territories, and lines of communication. To meet this task the RAAF employs a fleet of Surveillance, Strike, Fighter, and Transport aircraft.

Of these types the FA-18A, for example, is a nimble performer in the air combat arena. But like its stable mates is highly vulnerable on the ground. For this reason the RAAF is also responsible for the ground defence of its aircraft, equipment, assets, and personnel.

Background

In peacetime the security of RAAF installations is maintained by civilian peacekeeping, the RAAF Police (RAAFPOL), and RAAF Police Dog Handlers (POLDOGH).

During conflict the role of the RAAF POL and POLDOGH would be basically unchanged except that their rules of engagement would be changed to suit the situation. Also, all other personnel on the Air Base would be armed to provide close protection to their own work areas. Unfortunately these personnel lack the training, organisation, and military spirit to deal with a determined ground assault. This is through no fault of their own, but is a reflection on current air force policy toward ground defence and military skills training.

In time of conflict the defence of RAAF assets is the responsibility of the Airfield Defence Guard (ADG) mustering and the Ground Defence Officer (GDEFO) category.

Aim

The aim of this article is to describe the history and present situation of RAAF ground defence and to discuss changes to improve the situation in the future.

World War Two

In the early days of World War Two the RAF suffered serious losses of aircraft on the ground in Europe and Crete.

As a result, the RAF formed the Royal Air Force Regiment (RAF REGT.) and the RAAF introduced the mustering of Air Force Guard. These RAAF members were to be trained as infantry to defend RAAF airfields. However, no training was carried out and the personnel were transferred to other musterings.

The bombing of Darwin in 1942 demonstrated not only the deplorable lack of passive and active ground defence training for RAAF personnel but also highlighted the dubious policy of recruiting and promoting airmen based on technical skill alone with little or no emphasis on leadership qualities or military skills. A situation that in many ways still exists today. As a result of the debacle of RAAF Darwin it was determined that all aspects of ground defence training were essential to the self preservation of RAAF personnel and the protection of RAAF assets. This eventually resulted in the formation of No 1 and No 2 Airfield Defence Squadrons which were at the time referred to collectively as the "RAAF Infantry Regiment".

No 2 Airfield Defence Squadron (2ADS) went on to face the Japanese not just in a defensive role, but also as an assault force in such places as Morotai, Brunei, Tarakan, and Balikpapan. At the same time, the RAF REGT had evolved and once the Allies went on the offensive in Europe elements of the regiment had the role of racing forward to capture and hold German airfields for use by Allied tactical fighters.

At the end of the war, despite the severe lessons of Darwin, the RAAF wasted little time ridding itself
of the RAAF Infantry Regiment. 2ADS was disbanded in October 1945 with 1ADS following a month later. Ground defence was banished with only a small cadre of GDEFOs and Aerodrome Defence Instructors (ADI) remaining.

Vietnam

To meet its ground defence obligations in South Vietnam the RAAF amalgamated the ADI and Drill Instructor musterings to form the ADG mustering. Many members of the mustering were employed as instructors at various bases and units while others were formed into ADG Flights and attached to flying squadrons serving in SE Asia. One of the flights served with No 9 Squadron at Vung Tau while another was at Phan Rang with No 2 Squadron. These Flights were a component of the flying squadrons they defended and were not recognised as independent combat units as such. At this time there were a total of eight ADG flights plus the training cadre which taught drill, and active and passive ground defence. Some of these flights had a strength of sixty members, but they still lacked a formal overall command structure to oversee their correct employment and training, the flights being under control of the CO of the base they resided on.

In 1972, with the withdrawal from South Vietnam the ADG flights were reduced to four in number with the strength declining steadily as time (and defence cuts) wore on. By 1983, the flights were down to basically platoon strength of thirty-five men each when No 2 Airfield Defence Squadron 2 (2AFDS) was reformed. In 1985, due to manpower cuts No 4 Rifle Flight (4RFLT) was dis-established.

Today

Today, 2AFDS still fields three rifle flights and a support flight but due to further manpower cuts the rifle flights have dropped the original platoon-section type organisation. Two of the rifle flights now operate half section strength reconnaissance patrols with the other flight specialising in the quick reaction/counter penetration role. The squadron currently appears on the ORBAT as part of the Tactical Transport Group (TTG) which supports the ODF through the Tactical Air Support Force (TASF). The squadron has good mobility but lacks the firepower and protection to deal with anything more serious than a small scale raid. The squadron has no large calibre HE weapons, no indirect fire weapons, and no air defence capability. However, what 2AFDS lacks in resources it makes up for with innovation and improvisation. The squadron has developed a concept of operations that has been proven in numerous exercises in Australia and overseas. Exercise Kangaroo 89 proved the value of the tactics developed by 2AFDS, K89 also displayed that the pre-1940's attitude is alive and well in the rest of the RAAF. Many of the personnel from the fighter squadron at RAAF Curtin displayed a serious lack of willingness to be involved in the ground war. Some of the technical personnel preferred to fly kites when they should have been assisting the development of the local defences. When the enemy conducted his reconnaissance it was obvious the area held by 2AFDS would be a hard target, while the domestic area would be easy pickings. After the ensuing raid, the Hornets on the ground were untouched, but many of the pilots would have been killed in their lightly defended accommodation.

Treated Too Lightly

Obviously the RAAF has for a long time treated too lightly its responsibilities to ground defence. This needs to be addressed if the Air Force hopes to keep aircraft flying should a conflict occur. Without adequate ground defence aircraft and aircrew will not get the opportunity to meet the enemy in air combat, they will be lost where they are most vulnerable. As Darwin in 1942 demonstrated this is a matter too serious to be left to the last minute.

As Darwin and K89 showed there is no place for uniformed civilians in battle. The air force needs to rid itself of the “tech skills first” mentality and initiate a training regime that will provide personnel with some “tactical commonsense”. Highly trained pilots and technicians are of no value if they get themselves killed during the first enemy probe, or even worse, turn and run at the threat of “hot lead and cold steel”.

The RAAF Regiment

After decades of being shunned and ignored the time has come to do something positive about the ground defence situation. The first step is to organise the ground defence cadre into a cohesive formation,
the RAAF REGIMENT (RAAFREGT). To simplify mustering titles the old ADG and GDEFO could be dropped in favour of RAAF Regiment Airman and Officer respectively (RAAFREGT.A. and RAAFREGT.O.). For one thing this would make it easier for ADGs to explain their role (many people think that because the “G” stands for “Guard” ADGs belong at the main gate checking ID cards). Obviously on AFDS on its own can’t defend an entire base, let alone all the RAAF bases. For the Air Force to meet its obligations it must raise more airfield defence squadrons. I suggest that each of the RAAF’s five operational groups have one or two AFDSs. At least one of these should be at full strength and manned by regular personnel for support of ODF operations at short notice. The remainder could be manned by reservists in a similar fashion to the Army Reserve. These reserve squadrons could be located on bases where there is a civilian population large enough to sustain recruiting close by. These squadrons could train on their home bases and at the same time develop the passive defence measures of those bases. For example, the Strike Reconnaissance Group (SRG) could be allocated a reserve squadron raised from the Brisbane and district population. In the course of their training the squadron’s personnel would construct and maintain the necessary passive defences, i.e. fences, bunkers, etc. to help defend the SRG from raids and infiltration.

Firepower

The Regiment needs to acquire the firepower to neutralise or destroy an enemy using stand off weapons, both direct and indirect fire. For example, an enemy sniper using a 12.7mm or 14.5mm Anti-Materiel Weapon could put a number of aircraft out of action very quickly. Even if the sniper’s firing point could be located (difficult to say the least) by the time a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) could be deployed the damage would be done. I would suggest a mortar bomb has a much faster time on target than a Land Rover. To provide more flexibility in response (especially when the pilots get tired of dodging mortar bombs in flight) I also suggest 84mm Recoilless Rifles.

History has shown that Air Bases attract Special Forces raids like bees to honey, they also attract air attacks. From a ground defence aspect the AFDS works with the Army’s VAP Battalion to provide “defence in depth”. It must achieve defence in depth
from an air defence aspect in conjunction with the Army’s 16 Air Defence Regiment. To achieve this the RAAF REGT needs a Low-Level Air Defence (LLAD) weapon. This could be a missile system like RBS-70 or Stinger, or a gun system could be used, thus providing the ability to engage ground targets also. I propose each squadron of the RAAF REGT raise a LLAD section within its support flight to be equipped with three or four fire units of which ever is the preferred weapon. While on this topic I would like to ask one question: If the RAAF lost the Blackhaws because they were deemed to be a component of the land battle, then should not the RAAF operate the Rapier SAMs since they are an air battle weapon?

**Protection**

The AFDS achieves protection by digging in and building up defensive positions, the reconnaissance patrols (RECON PTL) use stealth and concealment to avoid direct confrontation with the enemy. The QRF, who’s role is to engage and destroy the enemy has very little protection. When a RECON PTL detects the enemy it directs the QRF, which is mounted in soft skinned vehicles, to the enemy’s vicinity. This could lead to disaster were the QRF be engaged while still mounted. To correct this danger I suggest the RAAF acquire a number of LAV-25 APCs for use by the RAAF REGT QRFs. Because they are wheeled vehicles there is no damage to runways etc and they are self deployable within Australia.

**Tactical Training**

It would not be possible, nor should it be necessary, for the RAAF REGT to protect every member of the RAAF. There is no excuse for able bodied service personnel not to be able to defend themselves and their workplace. The Regiment can provide the early warning of attack and counter it, but if a few raiders should slip through they should be quickly disposed of by the first RAAF members who encounter them. For this reason the RAAF must address the present weakness in ground

defence and military skills training for RAAF members. The present syllabus is of a very low standard with most members rarely getting past the “intro to the rifle and putting on cam cream” stage. The training never progresses to the point where a technician corporal could take a section of troops and counter an enemy attack. This is partly because, outside the ADG mustering, RAAF NCOs are not required to be leaders. They may be managers at times, but not leaders in the true military sense. I suggest the RAAF introduce a syllabus that produces basic riflemen from initial trainees (including officer cadets) and requires all members, regardless of mustering, to pass a military leadership course for promotion. The course should contain training in tactics, drill, and service knowledge appropriate to the level of promotion sought. For example, any member seeking promotion to corporal would be trained to take a section sized (eight to ten men) body of troops for drill and lead them in a tactical environment. This would lead to promotion being awarded on leadership and not just technical expertise. This type of training is required right from the initial stage because, as it has been found, it is difficult to train older members in these skills after they have had no military training in ten or more years service.

**Conclusion**

Some of the proposals I have made will incur some expense to implement, others will be minimal in cost. Either way, they are cheap compared to the cost of a flight line full of destroyed combat aircraft. No matter what, we must make a start and the forming of the RAAF Regiment should be that start. It will send a signal to the rest of the RAAF and the other services that we are serious about what we do and how we do it. The apathy that led to the disaster at RAAF Darwin cannot be allowed to continue. This nation has made a large investment in its defence through the purchase of highly capable combat aircraft. To ignore the need to protect that investment where it is most vulnerable could be considered as negligent. As Australia pays its insurance by financing the ADF, so must the Air Force pay its insurance by financing the RAAF Regiment; because for want of a nail . . .

Sergeant S.J. Brasher joined the RAAF in 1981 and after training was posted to No 1 ADG Flight, after specialist training he was posted to Support Flight 2 A FDS as a Scout Dog Handler. Career highlights include the Recon Soldiers Course at Field Force Battle School, member of the first Australian military team in the Nijmegan Endurance March in Holland, a three month attachment to A COY 8/9 RAR in Malaysia, and inclusion in the 36 SQN team for Airlift Rodeo 89 in the U.S.A. He was posted to the Defence Force Academy in January 1990 where he is presently on the staff of the Field Training Wing.
SOME THINGS NEVER CHANGE IN SINGAPORE, FORTUNATELY ...

At The Mandarin Singapore we have kept our traditions of opulence and hospitality very much alive. Treasured and preserved in the splendour of our courtly interiors and in the glowing warmth of our smiles. It’s a simple philosophy from which we have wisely never departed. Because you wouldn’t expect anything less from a Singapore Mandarin International hotel.
The Evolution of Service Strategic Intelligence 1901-1941

By Lieutenant Commander Wayne Gobert, RANC.

Prior to 1901 the only intelligence activities conducted in Australia were undertaken by the Royal Navy Squadron based at Sydney. Moreover, in these pre-wireless days, intelligence merely consisted of maintaining shore observation stations. In 1901, the Commonwealth assumed responsibility for defence, but intelligence in both services was badly neglected, reflecting the treatment that intelligence received in the UK. Throughout the Boer War intelligence was considered to be a part-time pursuit, and commanders rarely consulted, or believed in, their Intelligence staffs, and chose to rely on "instinct". In 1904 The British Esher Report, cognisant of the problems of the war, proposed a new system of administration of the armed services, recommending the creation of service boards. Under this restructuring the First Members became responsible for intelligence matters. The Esher Report was received in Australia with indecision by the government.

Finally, after a lengthy delay, on 2 Dec 1907, Lt Col J.W. McCay, VD, became the first Chief of Army Intelligence, and the Army Intelligence Corps was raised. The First Naval Member Rear Admiral Creswell, became responsible for Naval Intelligence.

Creswell initiated close liaison between Customs and the RAN, and by 1911 he had established a network of coastwatchers around Australia, their major role was to monitor German merchant shipping. However, the weight of responsibility upon the First Naval member was overwhelming, combining almost all functions except personnel, finance and engineering. In 1912, a former Royal Navy officer, Commander Walter Thring, was appointed as assistant to the First Naval Member, and given responsibility for intelligence.

Creswell granted Thring considerable leeway in intelligence and war plans. Thring envisaged a two way flow of intelligence between the RAN and RN, the RN did not. The RN considered the Australian role to be reporting only, what the Admiralty considered Australia required, they would provide without prompting. This one way attitude was typified by the British reply to a Australian request for information during the Russo-Japanese War: "requests for information were firmly rejected on the grounds that they had never been supplied to Colonial Officers".

However, Thring urged Creswell to seek greater Australian participation in intelligence matters. In spite of Admiralty opposition, Creswell arranged for an ongoing exchange of intelligence from the RN's China Squadron, Customs, and Australian business interests in the Pacific. The Commonwealth Militia concentrated upon development of the Australian Intelligence Corps (AIC), and although tactically oriented, this body produced many outstanding officers.

In 1913, Thring and Brigadier Gordon, the Chief of the Australian General Staff, embarked on the first independent Australian strategic survey of Australia. On 9 July 1913 Thring delivered his Report on The Naval Defence of Australia. Its three central propositions were that: Japan was Australia's major enemy, the RN could not be relied upon to supply a Fleet for Australia's defence, and that present defence policy, the Henderson Report was inadequate. The report warned that: "The squadron (RN) stationed in Australian waters has always been a holiday squadron . . . There is now a possibility that an enemy can strike a deadly blow before help can come . . . Geographically, the position of Australia with respect to Asia and the Pacific may be compared to that of England to the North of Europe . . . the danger of a descent by the Japanese, in their own good time, is a very real danger, almost amounting to a certainty, unless adequate steps are taken for defence against it . . . British ships . . . in the case of a European war would be largely occupied with matters other than the defence of Australia".

This was the first major Australian defence document to predict that Australia would have to provide its own defence, unaided. It urged defence of the islands immediately to the north, and northern Australia itself. It was conceded that the RAN couldn't meet a Japanese main fleet on the High Seas, but it was postulated that light forces, supported by cruisers raiding behind Japanese lines of communications, and the mining of Torres Strait, would provide a serious deterrent. The final line of defence would be a large regionally based militia.
World War One

When war commenced in 1914, the RAN had an independent, well-informed, regionally oriented intelligence service. The Army had the cadre of an intelligence corps in place, that while predominantly tactical, was as been previously mentioned, the font of many brilliant Australian military men, including Monash, Lavarack, and Wynter.

In 1914, The War Room activated in Lonsdale Street, Melbourne. Captain Thring became Director of War Plans. The Intelligence staff consisted of: Captain A. W. Jose (later official war historian), one Lieutenant Commander, and two Lieutenants. The RAN intelligence service had three basic tasks: informing the Naval board on regional matters, passing information to the UK, and counter-intelligence. Mobilisation of the Army Intelligence Corps proceeded at a pace aligned to the raising of units for the 1st AIF. The first wartime Director of Military Intelligence was Major E.H. Piesse. He was appointed in 1915.

Signals Intelligence

Upon the outbreak of war RAN intelligence had activated a wireless interception cell at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne. There is no evidence of an Army equivalent, and it is assumed that the Australian Army was in of a similar mind to the British, which had steadfastly refused to accept signals intelligence. In contrast the RN was Marconi's primary sponsor. A civilian instructor from the RAN College, Geelong, Frederick William Wheatley, was appointed to oversee wireless interception. Wheatley was a graduate of Oxford and Flinders Universities and was fluent in German.

On 11 August 1914, the RAN placed the defences of Port Phillip on what appeared to be a peacetime footing, hoping that a German merchant ship may enter the port and be seized. Late on the afternoon of the 11th, the Black German Line Hobart, entered Port Phillip and came to anchor off Observatory Point. Immediately Captain Richardson RAN, the District Naval Officer and Sub-Lieutenant Veale RANR, rowed to the ship with civilian clothes covering their uniforms. Upon boarding Capt Richardson produced a pistol and declared the ship to be a prize of war. Twenty RANR sailors boarded Hobart and she proceeded to Port Melbourne. That evening Richardson hid himself in the Master's cabin. He anticipated that the Master would attempt to destroy his hidden code book that evening. Richardson followed the German to a secret compartment in an inner cabin, and obtained the code book at gunpoint. The documents captured included: Instructions to Shipping as To Their Conduct In A Naval War, The Secret Appendix and the Handelsverkehrsbuch (HVB) Code.

The code book was immediately forwarded to the wireless room at Navy Office. At that time the German Navy were using 3 codes, the HVB, SKM, and VB, The HVB was used for supply communications, zeppelins, small ships, and merchant ships. The ‘Verkehrsbuch’ (VB), was used by warships overseas and embassies. “Signalbuch der Kaiserlichen Marine” (SKM), was used by major units. Significantly the RAN had also captured the first wartime key to HVB, thus allowing cryptographers to follow changes in the HVB code. The HVB reached London in October 1914, and was immediately utilised by ROOM 40, the Australian wireless room's counterpart.

Simultaneously the RAN Wireless Service had begun plotting the location of the German Pacific Squadron through radio direction finding (RDF). They were unlocated after they left Nagasaki on 23 June, and the only vessels in the Pacific capable of matching them were the battleships of the Japanese fleet and HMAS Australia. With trade accelerated, the invasion of German New Guinea imminent and troop transports being readied to proceed to Europe, locating them was vital. From the first day of war the RAN Wireless Service had begun intercepting transmissions from Scharnhorst, Nurnberg, Geier, and Planet. The wireless room's direction finding (DF) experts placed the squadron in the vicinity of the Marianas/ Caroline Islands, and an intercepted transmission read: “From Yap to Scharnhorst — You must proceed to the Marianne Islands [sic]. However, this vital intelligence was ignored on the grounds of “instinct”, and the search for the Germans centred on the Rabaul area. The German squadron was in fact in the Marianas, and escaped eastwards towards Cape Horn, with the exception of Emden which was detached to raid independently.

Meanwhile Wheatley continued his cryptographic attack on the HVB code. The British Naval Attache in Montevideo had also been intercepting signal traffic from the squadron, but was unable to decrypt it. In late October the Admiralty advised him to cable transcripts to the RAN intelligence organisation. Wheatley claimed that after a long day,
inspired by the 1914 Melbourne Cup, he broke the HVB code at 1800 on November 3 1914. Wheatley immediately signalled the squadron’s itinerary through the Straits of Magellan to the Admiralty. On 8 December the squadron was intercepted and destroyed in the Battle of The Falkland Islands by HM Ships Invincible and Inflexible. On 6 Jan 1915 HMMS Australia sunk the supply ship Elmore Wohrmann off Brazil based upon intercepted positions.

The breaking of HVB was to compromise German positions for several months to come, for although the code was a merchant code, it was used by warships and U-Boats to arrange re-supply. The Admiralty requested 200 copies of the code which the RAN duly produced, despatching 100 to the Admiralty, 50 to the America and West Indies Station, and retained 50 for the RAN and China Stations. James Goldrick’s notes that: “In terms of naval operations in home (ie: UK) waters HVB was the most significant capture . . . a mass of seemingly routine and unimportant messages disclosed information of great value . . . it was often the HVB signals which gave warning of the sorties of the Hoch See Flotte”.

For the remainder of the war the RAN SIGINT unit continued operations, but the area became quieter, as the war’s focus shifted. However, the RAN continued to advise the Admiralty and support decryption operations. The Army had no strategic SIGNINT capability.

RAN intelligence also carried out censorship and control of all wireless telegraphy into Australia, and internal surveillance and security, in concert with the Counter Espionage Bureau and Army. The Army were responsible for mail censorship, and a Chief Censor was supported by State censors.

There is little evidence of clandestine radio activity in Australia during WW1. The only documented case was a rumour that a German Mission station at Beagle Bay possessed an illegal transmitter. However, this claim was later dismissed. The lack of underground wireless activity was possibly the result of: the lack of activity in the region, the weakness of the period’s transmitters, and Germany’s inability to influence the region to any large degree.

In 1915 counter-intelligence was entrusted to The Counter-Espionage Bureau (CEB), headed by George Steward, Secretary to The Governor-General, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson. Steward’s Deputy was Major H.E. Jones, in each state a ‘Commonwealth Traffic Officer’ headed local operations. The CEB was closely linked to M15, and worked uncomfortably within the triumvirate of: The Governor-General, Prime Minister, and Steward.

In mid 1916 friction between the RAN and the CEB came to a head over the suspected sabotage of the new cruiser HMMS Brisbane. It was alleged that the International Workers Of The World (IWW or ‘Wobblies’), had penetrated the Union movement, and were delaying the ship’s completion. The ship eventually sailed for the Mediterranean (on 12 Dec 1916), but in the process a police agent was shot, the IWW premises raided and closed, IWW members arrested, and clandestine reports received from ‘secret service agents’. The RAN were never officially informed of any of these activities, and Creswell was furious over this lack of liaison.

In late 1916 Creswell, unhappy with Steward and what he described as the CEB’s “inefficiency”, created his own counter-intelligence service. This unit was headed by a reserve law lecturer, J.G. Latham. Latham would later serve as: Attorney-General, Leader of The Nationalist Party, External Affairs/Industry Minister, Deputy PM, Chief Justice of The High Court, and Australia’s first Ambassador to Japan (1940-41).

LCDR Latham approached his task enthusiastically, and by 1917 his political intelligence unit had expanded operations to most states. His operatives pursued Communists, and IWW members, but there were few productive leads, and frankly, few genuine security risks.

In July 1917, SS Cumberland was sunk off Gabo Island after an explosion. The IWW and Communists were immediately suspected of planting a delayed action explosive in the hold. The CEB conducted its own investigation and determined that the ship was sunk by a rogue Australian mine. The RAN vehemently denied this. On 11 September the RAN announced that the ship had probably been sunk by a mine from the German raider Wolf.

The other major focus of Latham’s interest were the Japanese. The political intelligence unit maintained surveillance operations against Japanese Consular and Military Personnel in Sydney, and on Thursday Island. The Japanese Naval Attache in Sydney was shadowed, and the sale of charts to Japanese closely controlled.

On Anzac Day 1918, LCDR Latham sailed onboard SS Niagra as chief adviser to Navy Minister Joseph Cook and Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes for The Versailles Conference. In London he attempted to widen Australia’s access to Admiralty and Foreign Office intelligence. Due to Latham’s absence, and as the war wound down, the counter-intelligence unit slowly disappeared.
During World War One strategic intelligence was almost entirely undertaken by the Navy. The Army Intelligence Corp served almost exclusively as a subordinate adjunct of the British Army as an element of the 1st AIF.\textsuperscript{29} However, the Army counter-intelligence service was active. There was no RAAF intelligence service as the RAAF was not yet created.\textsuperscript{30} The RAN intelligence service effectively carried out its reporting, signals intelligence, and counter-intelligence roles throughout WW1. Furthermore, the Australian SIGINT unit was directly responsible for contributing to the destruction of more enemy shipping than the RAN surface fleet.

In 1918 intelligence was designated a permanent branch of the naval war staff. At the close of WW1, it seemed that naval intelligence, unlike Army intelligence, had a future. Admiral Jellicoe was commissioned to conduct a serious survey of Australia’s naval requirements, and the boom in radio communications had clearly indicated that signals intelligence would play a vital role in future conflicts. The performance of Australian naval intelligence in WW1 was summed up by the following letter from Lord Fisher to Admiral Creswell, when he observed that: “... the excellence of your Intelligence Service has been our admiration [sic] during the war”.\textsuperscript{31}

**Between The Wars**

The appointment of a dedicated Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) was one of several recommendations contained in the Jellicoe Report, and on 14 January 1922, an experienced intelligence officer, Lt Col F.H. Griffiths (Royal Marines), was loaned to the RAN as its first permanent, peacetime Director of Naval Intelligence. Griffith’s appointment was funded by the RN, and he was tasked with establishing an intelligence organisation similar to the RN’s. A civilian assistant, W.H. Brooksbank, was allocated to Griffiths, a Naval Intelligence Division (NID) established, and a District Intelligence Officer appointed to Sydney. Outside Sydney, intelligence became the responsibility of the District Naval Officers (DNOs).

In 1919 Captain Clare, the DNO in Fremantle submitted a paper outlining modification of the coastwatcher organisation to enhance its intelligence capacity.\textsuperscript{32} On 14 January 1922, the Chief of Naval Staff convened the initial (and only) inter-service Coastwatching Committee, this meeting formalised the coastwatching arrangements proposed by Clare. Unfortunately the sound foundations of 1919 were soon drastically eroded by two factors. The first was the general international trend towards disarmament and “peace through legislation”. The second factor was the retirement of the strong, perceptive officers who had guided the RAN through WW1. Thring’s health had broken down in 1919 and he retired to the UK in 1920, never to return to Australia.\textsuperscript{33} Jose became a writer and contributed to The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, The Times Literary Supplement, and The Australian Encyclopedia.\textsuperscript{34} John Latham entered politics to begin a distinguished career. In early 1923, Lt Col Griffiths returned to the UK, and was not replaced.

The leadership of the RAN was entrusted to a succession of seconded British Chiefs of Staff who believed that intelligence could be dealt with by a part-time assistant DNI, responsible to the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. The SIGINT establishment was disbanded, and the counter intelligence function had already been discontinued on 23 May 1919, and absorbed by the Investigation Branch (IB) of the Attorney-General’s Department.\textsuperscript{35} In January 1921, the designation ‘intelligence’ was deleted from all naval correspondence. Army intelligence had met a similar fate. The regular Army was reduced to a mere inspectorate of 1,000 permanent soldiers, and clearly the bulk of the army, being part-time militia, could not provide any type of strategic intelligence service.\textsuperscript{36} On 14 June 1919, the position of Director of Military Intelligence was abolished, and intelligence merged into The Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence. Officers with a bent for intelligence remained in state commands, and one Major and two Captains administered the Intelligence Section at Army Headquarters, but these activities could contribute little to strategic intelligence. As Coulthard-Clark observes:

The Intelligence function ... did not slip from existence during the inter-war period ... [but] there was indisputably no longer an Intelligence Corps.

Consideration would not even be given to establishing an RAAF intelligence service until August 1939! The inevitable result of this organisation, was that between the wars, strategic intelligence became an almost exclusively naval activity.

The RAN intelligence service devoted itself primarily, to providing intelligence as a sub agency of the UK’s international network. In 1923 Naval intelligence policy was noted as:

This Division [ie: intelligence] of the Naval Staff forms the centre of one of the areas of the
Admiralty world-wide intelligence organisation, and, therefore enjoys the mutual exchange of information provided in that organisation... Admiralty Intelligence Instructions are in force throughout the Australia Station.

The RAN maintained the coastwatcher service, and RAN vessels were despatched on intelligence collection tasks at the request of the RN. The cruisers were used to gather intelligence on visits throughout the Pacific. Particular emphasis was placed upon the Japanese Mandated Territories in Micronesia. The reporting network in major ports was re-organised and Reserve Naval Intelligence Divisions (NIDs) established in major capitals on RN lines.

Little else was undertaken by the RAN. Japanese language training was continued at a reduced rate, with a trickle of naval and army officers, and one civilian, being posted to the British Embassy in Tokyo as language students. The Australian Naval Board had arranged these postings. An ad hoc personnel loan was arranged, with Paymaster Lieutenant Nave joining HMS Kent for cryptographic duties. Nave was actively engaged in Traffic Analysis (TA) of Japanese naval communications and the deciphering of low level naval codes. Nave claims to have much success against the Japanese, and he was warmly commended by the Admiral Commanding the China Station. He undertook these activities in China, Japan, and the Mandates.

Yet essentially these were all informal, passive activities, that involved almost no independent analysis, and the records strongly indicate that RAN intelligence service, while well aware of the growing menace of Japan, merely responded to British direction. Moreover, the RN, regardless of the glowing rhetoric of a global intelligence organisation, maintained its position of refusing to share significant intelligence with Australia. Nave's fate typified the problems confronting naval intelligence, on 29 August 1930 Nave left the RAN to join the RN. His cryptographic expertise was not replaced.

However, in 1934 Australian intelligence reached a watershed. The Lyon's government, aware of deficiencies in intelligence being received from the British began to independently collect intelligence in Asia. Australia began to receive a frightening picture of a militarising, totalitarian, expansionist Japan. In 1936 a large scale re-armament programme was commenced, with munitions factories being established, and new equipment ordered. The Trade Commissioner to Japan, E.E. Longfield-Lloyd, forwarded Japanese maps depicting Australia as part of a Japanese Empire, and Japanese expansion southwards, became a serious point of consideration in defence and foreign policy circles. In the same year Lieutenant Commander R.B.M. Long assumed responsibility for intelligence. Army intelligence remained as a subordinate element of the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence. However, the officers responsible for military intelligence retained an interest in strategic matters, although they were clearly hampered by having no troops.

The RAN reporting network was further upgraded in 1938, and immediately began to yield results. By late 1938 over 34 clandestine Japanese landings, surveys and espionage missions had been detected on Australian shores. These ranged from mysterious tide marks and trig stations, to the detention of Japanese trawlers. One “sampan” has an extensive radio and personal weapons outfit, and a military crew. It had been charting all of northern Australia’s coastal radio and customs stations. Japanese merchant vessels paid particular attention to Stockton Beach, off Newcastle, photographing its approaches, making unexpected deviations from track towards the beach with sounding equipment apparent, sending uncleared landing parties ashore, and visiting the Stockton environs for “banyans”. Stockton was considered by Australian Army planners to be the primary invasion point on the east coast. In 1937 Australia’s hardening attitude towards Japan was typified by an incident off Darwin, when the patrol vessel Larakia, expended over 1,000 .303 “warning” shots into, and over, eleven Japanese “fishing boats”, violating territorial seas.

Counter-intelligence (CI) was revived, as a primarily Army and IB responsibility. Some Naval agents were also recruited and counter-intelligence links were re-established with the UK and New Zealand. RAN operatives were active in monitoring and surveilling Japanese and German agents. Some of the cases dealt with included: Count Felix Von Luckner and Vice Admiral Hiroshi Ono, a “crewman” on a Japanese lugger visiting Darwin. Naval CI operatives worked closely with their Army and civil counterparts and by 1941 they would have almost completely suppressed any potential Axis “fifth column”. This was a particularly significant achievement, as the Japanese espionage service, although not sophisticated, was large and pervasive.

Intelligence sources and activities began to broaden, and by 1938 Army and Navy personnel were loaned to the RN intelligence unit FECB (Far East Combined Bureau) in Hong Kong. FECB...
consisted of two sections: a general intelligence unit, and a SIGINT section. The British had divided the world into zones of SIGINT responsibility, with the RN taking Asia, the RAF Europe, and the Army the Middle East. FECB was extremely effective, and was largely responsible for much of the success against the Japanese in the years leading up to war in the Pacific, and were credited with deciphering the Japanese Consular code (J-series) and the naval JN code series.\(^{57}\) Commander Long was closely involved with FECB operations, and by 1940 he had arranged for QANTAS, KLM, and KLIM (the NEI subsidiary of KLM) pilots to report all sightings to FECB, these pilots regularly visited the FECB operations centre for briefings and familiarisation.\(^{58}\) In 1939, FECB was withdrawn from Hong Kong to Singapore in view of Hong Kong's exposed position.\(^{59}\)

Commander Eric Nave returned to the RAN and was tasked with establishing an Australian cryptographic organisation. Attempts were also made to exchange intelligence with the Dutch Navy, and a Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer was appointed to the Netherlands East Indies.\(^{60}\) The Dutch connection was particularly important, as the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) had become an area of confrontation and potential conflict.\(^{61}\) Commander E.A. Feldt RAN (a classmate of Long's from the initial RANC class of 1913). In late 1939, Lieutenant Commander Feldt was posted to Port Moresby to reinforce and reorganise the coastwatcher chain. AWA 3B teleradio tranceivers were acquired, and a coastwatching manual and codes produced for the service. Civilian coastwatchers were advised that they were no longer expected to carry out their duties (due to the danger of their civilian status), but the majority remained in place. RAN and RAAF officers were posted to key northern areas in New Guinea, the Solomons, and the New Hebrides, to coordinate local coastwatchers. By mid-1940 a chain of coastwatchers were reporting all movements on 'frequency X'.\(^{62}\)

A joint service Wireless censorship service was also commenced under RAN direction, and became the responsibility of Lieutenant Commander George Gill.

The censorship section fought a long battle with the Post Master General's Department, the ABC, and the Commonwealth Publicity Censor, to limit transmission of information that could be of value to the enemy. These organisations were firmly opposed to censorship, despite evidence to indicate that Axis agents in Australia were signalling the sailings of troop ships.\(^{63}\) They considered their monitoring system to be infallible, a "dare" with LCDR Gill demonstrating the ease with which codes could be disguised, and passed, in simple transmissions. The Army accepted responsibility for mail censorship, and implemented a comprehensive system.\(^{64}\) The Navy were also involved in censorship of shipping company records.\(^{65}\)

By mid-1940, SIGINT collection stations had been established at HMAS Coonawarra, near Darwin, HMAS Harman in Canberra, and RAAF Darwin.\(^{66}\) The Navy SIGINT chain was commanded by Commander Newman, another classmate of Long and Feldt's.\(^{67}\) An independent Director of Military Intelligence was appointed in late 1940 and a tactical SIGINT unit raised for service with the AIF.\(^{68}\) The RAAF finally established a Directorate of Air Force Intelligence in August 1941, but they had been quick to commence intelligence operations in spite of official procrastination. They were a major participant in the coastwatcher network, and by late 1941, they had established a chain of covert High Frequency Direction Finding (HF/DF) in the neutral Dutch East Indies. These RAAF personnel were given £20 to dress as civilians, and manned these stations in civilian dress until 8 December 1941.\(^{69}\) The NEI RAAF chain was highly significant and included online teletype and teleprinter services. They were linked with RAAF Darwin and the Dutch Medium Frequency MF/DF stations in the Halmaheras.\(^{70}\) The Dutch stations were aimed at Japanese submarine and fleet tactical communications in the Japanese Mandates.\(^{71}\) These stations, in concert with the Australian DF net would have
given a very complete coverage of the Japanese Navy. The significance of DF operations in these pre-satellite days cannot be overemphasised, as it was the major means of localising the location of enemy forces.

The extent of SIGINT cooperation was so complete that an Australian COIC was secretly established at Ambon in the neutral NEI, personnel here also dressed in civilian clothes. The RAAF effort in the NEI was headed by a Group Captain at Bandung, a very senior rank for the period. In late 1941, and perhaps not coincidentally, the Australian Defence Committee met with US delegates to discuss the sharing of radio intelligence with the US Asiatic Fleet (USAF). The Australian stations would have been vital links in accurately direction finding the Japanese Consulate-General in Sydney and Melbourne. The SIB was working closely with the USN, FECB, and Dutch SI units. Signals intelligence was also being received from the External Affairs officer in London, outlining Japanese manoeuvrings over Macao and East Timor. The Army also established a field wireless interception unit subordinated to the 3rd Militia Division.

Commander Nave had established a photographic unit in a secret location at the Monterrey Building in Melbourne. This unit was one of the nation’s first true joint units, as Nave gathered all of the Japanese linguists he could find, regardless of service. Nave’s unit was designated the Special Intelligence Bureau (SIB), and also incorporated a team from the University of Sydney under Professors T.G. Room and A.D. Trendall. By September 1940 the SIB was successfully decyphering the Japanese J-19 consular and diplomatic traffic to, and from, the Japanese Consulate-Generals in Sydney and Melbourne. The SIB was working closely with the USN, FECB, and Dutch SI units. Signals intelligence was also being received from the External Affairs officer in London, outlining Japanese manoeuvrings over Macao and East Timor. The Army also established a field wireless interception unit subordinated to the 3rd Militia Division.

Commander Long also began to place naval officers and secret agents into espionage positions in South East Asia. A full time Naval Intelligence officer, Paymaster Lieutenant Whittaker was inserted into Portuguese Timor in 1940, under the cover of a “Department of Civil Aviation clerk”. His superior, David Ross, a former naval aviator, was also under secret orders to gather secret intelligence. Within three months they had: discovered a secret Japanese airfield, reported Japanese submarine activity, compiled lists of friendly and unfriendly civilians, and gained access to all Japanese Consular traffic through bribery. They established an evening schedule with the RAAF station at Darwin for secret reporting. A Dutch journalist, Johann Stuimers, another of DNI’s agents, was also active on Timor, his exploits included secretly boarding and photographing a Japanese tender in Dili, the Zaiho Maru, a vessel which was preparing to arm disidents in Timor, and use its “civilian crew”, to capture Dili. Long was also cooperating with Sir William Stevenson, of ‘Man Called Intrepid’ fame, in placing and paying British Security Coordination (BSC) operatives in Asia.

By mid 1941, there were clear indications that Japan may threaten Australia. In June 1941 the coastwatcher service began to cache stores and “go bush”. In late 1941, the Australian Trade Commissioner to Japan signalled that “the coming months will bring disaster”, the Army liaison officer to FECB Major Tebutt, also warned of dire problems in Singapore. In September 1941 the SIB decyphered a Japanese consular signal instructing their Consul-General to find another neutral nation to represent Italian interests, and on 4 December 1941, the SIB also decyphered a Japanese signal ordering their diplomatic and consular staffs in Australia to destroy all their codes and cyphers.

Three days later, Australia was propelled into its first regional war. The COIC’s were still not properly established, being delayed by Department of War Co-ordination opposition to such “unnecessary demands” as £11,000 and 1 x Map Wall Australia, 1 x 15′ x 15′ green carpet, and 1 x telephone black. The coming months would demonstrate that while intelligence is a vital first line of defence warning, it is meaningless, unless supported by fighting assets.

NOTES
1. MP 1587 No. 107, Distribution of Intelligence on The Australia Station 1894.
3. Wilkins, Naval Intelligence, p.1.
5. Ibid, pp.66-90.
8. Early projections boasted that 1908 Australia could support a Militia in excess of 100,000.
10. Ibid, letter Pearce to Watt 26 June 1918.
11. Ibid, Naval Intelligence Instructions October 1915.
18. Ibid, p.75.
19. *loc.cit.*
20. Goldrick, *The King’s Ships Were At Sea*, p.177.
22. The title Commonwealth Traffic Officer was used as a front for CEB officers.
27. *AWM 50.8-5, ‘Sale Of Charts To Japanese’.
29. The RAAF would not be created until 1921 upon the merger of the Naval and Army air services.
32. Pending entry Australian Dictionary of Biography, from correspondence with R. Lamont University of New England.
33. Jose continued a loose association with the RAN Reserve, but did not seriously rejoin the debate on intelligence.
34. After WWI counter-intelligence was rationalised and formalised as a section of the Attorney-General’s Department.
35. For a description of this schism within the Army see: Horner, *Staff Corps vs Militia*.
37. MP 1587/1 185 A1, Australian Naval Policy, Appendix VIII.
40. Interview with Straczeck.
42. *loc.cit.*
43. *loc.cit.*
44. *loc.cit.*
47. Gobert, *op.cit.*.
48. *ibid.*
50. See: correspondence between Col Coombes and McCarthy (Sec Dept of Commerce), A 601/1, 402/17/30, *Implications of Japanese Expansion Southwards*.
51. Between the wars the regular Army did not have a single platoon. Horner, *Crisis of Command*, p.5.
52. AWM 51, Items 157-158, *Strategic Concentrations Plans*.
53. *loc.cit.*
54. See: Sydney Morning Herald 2,5,6 April 1937; Melbourne Sun 6 April 1937; and Canberra Times 7 April 1937.
60. AWM 124, Box 3, *Posting of Commander Kennedy as RAN Liaison Officer to Batavia, and Eldridge, A History of the RAN College*, p.362.
63. For a complete description of the early coastwatcher days see: Feldt, *The Coastwatchers*.
64. Military Intelligence 1943, *Keeping Information From The Enemy, and Laughlin, Boots and All*, pp.69-74.
65. *loc.cit.*
66. MP 1185/8/M8, *Military Censorship*, “Letter from Secretary of the Military Board to The Secretary Naval Board dated 8 Sep 1939.
70. RAAF Historian, *The RAAF In NEI Stations*, NEI AOB's 1941-42, No.49.
71. *loc.cit.*
72. *loc.cit.*
73. *loc.cit.*
74. CRS A 2031, 156/102/ 3/11/41, Minutes of The Defence Committee, *Radio Location USAF to Provide Long Range Warning*.
76. A 981/1, *Item Timor (Portuguese)* 22, Part 5 — Telegrams from External Affairs Officer to External Affairs Canberra.
77. *loc.cit.*
79. *ibid.*, *Ross to DG Civil Aviation 28 April 1941*.
80. *loc.cit.*
81. *loc.cit.*
82. A 981, Portuguese Timor 5A, *Naval Intelligence to External Affairs NID 455/11B of 19 December 1941*.
84. AA A601, *Item Trade Commissioner Annual Reports from Japan, 161/16/18, Trade Commissioner Japan to Secretary of Commerce 18 October 1941*.
85. A 981/1, *Item Far East 16B, Letter Tebbut to Bowden 13 December 1941*.
87. MP 1185 1937/2/160, *Item Command and Control of Intelligence, Letter Director of COIC to Dept of War Coordination 11 March 1941*.

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