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A combined exercise
Letters to the Editor

The Law of Armed Conflict

Dear Sir,

As a postscript to my article entitled “The Law of Armed Conflict” published in the Journal in January/February 1991, the Geneva Conventions Amendment Bill 1990 passed through both Houses of Parliament in February 1991. The purpose of the Bill was to allow ratification of Protocol I.

On 25 June 1991, the Foreign Affairs Minister, Senator Evans, and the Attorney-General, Mr Duffy announced that Australia had ratified the two Additional Protocols and that they would come into effect in six months (pursuant to Article 95 of Protocol I and Article 23 of Protocol II).

P.M. Boyd
Lieutenant Colonel

Teeth to Tail

Dear Sir,

The term “teeth to tail” has an alliterative attraction but can be misleading if taken only at face value. It implies that any element of the ADF whose raison d‘etre is not solely concerned with direct engagement with an enemy is, by definition, useless.

The term tends to create an unhelpful mindset when one is considering how best to apply combat power on a maritime, land or aerial battlefield. Combat power is not a function only of the numbers of fighting ships, infantry battalions or combat aircraft — teeth, if you like — which Australia possesses.

Teeth, of themselves, do not hurt. Teeth are merely inanimate objects with a potential to hurt. Biting is an action which does hurt. And combat power is all about action, not inanimate objects.

We want our fighting ships, battalions and aircraft to be available for action more often and more effectively than our enemy’s. This means that we must structure our support mechanisms — civilians and uniformed — so that our teeth can bite frequently and, if at all possible, indefinitely.

Proper support mechanisms, uniformed or civilian, form a necessary backbone rather than a useless tail. And this backbone extends from the battlefield back through lines of communication to the national production base.

If our deliberations on what is backbone and what is tail were based on considerations of combat power rather than mere tallies of fighting ships and battalions and aircraft then the task would be clearer.

Perhaps “bite to backbone” is a better term than “teeth to tail.” It is even alliterative.

Let us cut off any useless tail by all means. But let us not sever the backbone while so doing.

W.L. Fowles
Colonel

Hot Air

Regarding the Australian Defence Force Journal (No. 89 Jul/Aug 1991) with cover art showing ‘A hot air balloon of the Royal Australian Air Force’, it is appropriate to ask my friend Sqn Ldr Roger Reading to remedy the deficiency in the Air Power Manual and his article ‘RAAF Air Power Doctrine’ by commenting in future ADFJs on the strategic basis and force structure implications of RAAF ballooning.

Could we next have an article on the operating characteristics of the balloon(s), with particular reference to the stealth features of the colour scheme?

It is also interesting to see that the RAAF has embraced recent civilianisation initiatives to the extent of having its aircraft on the civil register rather than using a service designation (see cover photo).

There is much food for thought in that edition of ADFJ. (I ate up every word of the culinary correspondent, Gordon Pound!)

P.R. Ellis
Lieutenant Commander, RAN

A Slight Misunderstanding

Dear Sir,

I read with interest the article written by Major Cullens under the heading “A Slight Misunder-
standing — Politicians, Commanders and Greece, 1941.” It seemed to me that he did not deal adequately with the Australian political events and the nature of the Australian Government's role in decision-making about the campaign. May I suggest that, alongside his article, students might also read the fuller account of events given by me in the Civil Series of the Official History of Australia in the War of 1939-45. See The Government and the People. Vol 1, Chapter 8, pages 332-341.

Rt Hon. Sir Paul Hasluck

Air Power Doctrine

Dear Sir,

I read with interest the comments of Group Captain Kavanagh in the July/August issue of Australian Defence Force Journal in response to my observations of the RAAF Manual of Air Power Doctrine in the March April publication.

Indeed lest my view be misunderstood, let me congratulate him and his colleagues on the work they have done in presenting a strategic level doctrine for the RAAF.

However, my concern and those of other armchair strategists like me is the reality of the serious situation to which, due to Federal Government policies, we find the state of our Army, Navy and Air Force and their declining operational capabilities.

To my mind having a strategic doctrine is worthless if you don't have the resources to back it up.

The RAAF is virtually a seven operational squadron force excluding the transport and helicopter units, and the strategic doctrine for a Battle Order of this size must surely be different to an Air Force of larger proportions.

My comment on the Reserves was not intended to be exclusive but simply a reminder that the present policy of the ADF as I understand it is to "come as you are", which in strategic terms for any worthwhile threat would be quite ridiculous.

In my opinion therefore it is highly important to relate strategic doctrines to the realities of the Order of Battle, or to use an analogy, its all very well for the Pope to pray, but its not going to solve the world's population problems.

Peter Firkins

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Deakin University
Adventurous Training — Are We Obtaining the Best Value?

By Captain M.D. Reilly, RAA

'The more uneventful and dull life is, the more we become bored, frustrated and restless ...'"  

Introduction

The Army has long recognised the benefits of adventure training, particularly in peacetime. The question we must ask ourselves now is 'Are we obtaining the maximum benefit from our training? Do we make the most of each adventure training opportunity or do we simply conduct the activity, pack our bags and go back to work?'

Adventure training is an extremely valuable form of training, particularly for junior commanders. If properly planned and conducted it is able to develop the personal qualities of individuals required in combat. It is able to improve teamwork and communication and develop problem solving and decision making techniques. It has the potential to improve retention by offering soldiers and officers the challenges that they joined the Army to experience.

We must examine the results of our adventure training to ensure that we are actually achieving our aim. We need to look at the attempts that are made to relate the adventure training activity back to the soldier’s actual job. What training do we give our junior commanders, those we expect to conduct the majority of our training, in the processing of experiences or the transference of adventure training activities. How do we assess the success or failure of the training activity?

The Australian Army is doing more now than ever before in the area of adventurous training. The formation of the Army Adventurous Training School at Bonegilla is an indication of the commitment of the Army to the long term value of this form of training. Training of this nature is not simply meant to be a holiday away from work under another name.

Why Adventure Training?

The major reasons given by Lieutenant Colonel Letts as to why the Australian Army conducts adventure training are:

a. provide more challenge, excitement and adventure in a peacetime Army largely confined to Australia;

b. develop the individual qualities required in war by accustoming soldiers to fear, danger, hardship and endurance;

c. develop personal qualities of leadership, initiative, resourcefulness, trust and teamwork;

and
d. familiarise soldiers with the peoples and terrain of the remote areas of Australia, particularly in the north of the continent, and with the ADF areas of interest particularly Malaysia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand.

Adventure training should be aligned to the normal level of activity for a soldier. If he jumps out of airplanes or helicopters as a part of his normal day’s work, his ‘excitement level’ is probably higher than someone who sits behind a desk or works in a kitchen all day. In an infantry battalion the excitement level should be very high. Soldiers are keen to do the type of adventure training activities presented and after the experience most have enjoyed it. In a survey conducted in 1986, 63% of soldiers surveyed said that they had had the opportunity for adventurous training. Of those that were given the opportunity, 78% indicated that they welcomed opportunities to overcome a challenge or extend themselves.

Adventure training is generally supported in most units, but it is often not encouraged to the extent that it could be. It needs to be planned as a major unit activity with training resources forecast well in advance. This is particularly the case for scarce resources such as air or naval support. All too often platoon commanders are required to conceive, plan and co-ordinate an activity which is expected to meet all the challenging and exciting criteria of adventure training without the necessary resources being allocated. Due to the inexperience of platoon
commanders, activities often fail to get off the
ground or have to be watered down because of
the lack of resources. To ensure that the adventure
training exercise is well thought out and that the
objectives are relevant and realistic, platoon
commanders should receive training in the
planning, conduct and debriefing of these type
of activities at officer training establishments or
on their ROBC.
To assist platoon commanders, adventure
training packages containing ideas, objectives,
instructions, maps and after action reports,
should be held within the unit to form a library.
This library could include packages from other
units within the area or possibly the Division.
The aim of the library would be to provide
platoon commanders with a starting point for
their own adventure training activity.

**Adventure Training Objectives**

Each adventure training activity must begin
with a set of objectives listed by the commander
of the group. They should reflect, as in any other
activity, what the commander of the group, not
necessarily the commander of the expedition/ activity, wishes to achieve through the conduct
of the exercise. This person in the battalion would
usually be the company commander. They should
be made clear to every member before the exercise and examined during and after to ensure that
they have been met.

The following are suggested objectives for
adventure training:
- a. physical and mental challenges for individuals;
- b. develop individual qualities;
- c. develop leadership, organisational and plan-
  ning skills;
- d. become familiar with remote areas of
  Australia;
- e. team building;
- f. decision making/problem solving;
- g. mission/task orientation;
- h. creative thinking; and
- i. development of analytical skills.

These objectives are broad and must be
developed further by the commanders supervising
the adventure training activity. They should be
developed first and then an activity or expedition
designed to ensure it achieves them. Our current
training generally concentrates only upon the
activity. These objectives also assist in the
transference of experiences from the activity back
to the soldier's job.

The major problem with assessing the value
of adventure training activities is that we are
attempting to quantify subjective results. What
is a stressful activity for one soldier is hardly
a challenge for another. Adventure training
should be aimed at presenting perceived high risk
activities, coupled with physical hardships, that
involve elements of uncertainty. This allows the
soldier to face the natural anxiety of confronting
the unknown. Most adventure training does
attempt to develop the qualities stated earlier and
often involves tired soldiers facing the unknown,
but rarely, if ever, do we attempt to 'process'
an individuals experience.

**Processing**

The term ‘processing’ refers to the attempts
made to think or talk through the activities or
experiences. This is done in an effort to learn
how individuals react in certain situations or why
they make certain decisions. It is a way of ensuring
that every individual has learnt something during
the activity. Current adventure training makes
no attempt to assess or even explore, an
individuals reactions to certain situations. We
may, in our normal training, conduct a debrief
on a particular activity, but in adventure training
activities this is not the case. Quite rightly, the
debrief after a platoon attack is more concerned
with the mechanics of the attack, rather than how
anyone felt. We are very interested in the platoon
commander and his tactical ability. We question
him as to why he attacked from a certain direction
or in a certain formation. The same type of
questions, in the appropriate way, should
accompany our adventure training experiences.
They should also be directed at the entire group,
not necessarily just the commanders. The
questions should be directed at individuals so that
all levels of the activity are covered, from the
individual viewpoint to the ‘big picture’.

In the past ten years, management training
industries in the US and UK and more recently
in Australia, have recognised the benefits of
adventure training or adventure learning.
Management trainers in these countries have
realised that without the processing of the
experience, its maximum benefit is usually lost. It is not simply enough to undertake a strenuous or stressful activity in isolation, you should have each individual examine why it is stressful to him. To learn from the experience, soldiers must analyse why they reacted a certain way, given a particular situation. What was the impact of stress, fear and apprehension on their decision making process. Occasionally people learn during the actual activity, but, it is usually in discussions at the end of the day that most realisations occur. This does not have to be a 'warm feeling' type of 'group therapy'. It should be conducted in a normal military debriefing situation. Those conducting the debriefing must be aware of the potential problems that may arise.

The danger with this type of debriefing is that often raw emotions and hidden fears are exposed. These are exactly the type of emotions and fears, usually to a lesser degree, that will surface in a combat situation. Psychological safety of individuals during these debriefings is a problem as our junior commanders are not trained, nor often experienced enough, to conduct this type of open discussion. This training on dealing with psychological stresses should be addressed before encouraging our junior leaders to conduct such debriefings. The common bond shared after a particularly strenuous or stressful activity is strong and allows for a more open exposure of attitudes and feelings. Soldiers are aware of the strength of the bond that may develop in these types of environments from the time they finish their initial basic training. The ability to control and facilitate these debriefings is something that should be covered in junior officer and non-commissioned officer training. The true value of adventure training activities can be extracted if soldiers are able to process their experiences in a controlled and guided way. Much can be learnt in these situations if the discussions lead to positive action not scorn and ridicule.

### Outward Bound

"Outward Bound, the personal and management training organisation, conducts courses that use adventure training techniques. They consider that the management of situations in the field to be a powerful and immediate equivalent to coping in the work situation. In the Army we are accustomed to working in the bush rather than spending all our time behind a desk. The experiences learnt from the field should stand us in good stead for all other work situations. Both situations involve people in unpredictable events, complicated by limited time and resources. A major part of their learning techniques involve the opportunity to identify personal strengths and weaknesses and to find strategies for overcoming weaknesses and building on strengths. There is a need to identify personal strengths and weaknesses and as much as possible those of the people in our section. Adventure training is the ideal medium to conduct training..."
which highlights these strengths and weaknesses. It can be conducted in an environment that is different from work and therefore less threatening, particularly to commanders.

**Conclusion**

Adventure training certainly has its place in the Australian Army, particularly during peacetime. It is a way of providing soldiers with the challenge, thrill and excitement that the majority of them joined the Army for. The training in its present form however could be improved by the use of formal debriefing techniques to maximise the impact of the experiences and through the training of those conducting the activities. The processing of the insights and reactions in a skilled and sensitive manner will enhance the soldier's personal development and improve his, and therefore the unit's, operational capability. The transference of the adventure training experiences will ensure that adventure training is effective and efficient training and not just a 'swan'. The writing of objectives will focus the activity in the mind of the commander and for those actually doing the activity. Objectives will assist in the development of the aim, the planning and the conduct of the adventure training. In short, further training of junior leaders will make certain that we do obtain the best value from adventure training and benefit our operational effectiveness in the long run.

**NOTES**

7. Gall, op cit, p.56.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Captain M.D. Reilly graduated from RMC, Duntroon in 1984. He spent three years in 8/9 RAR and two years as the TDO at HQ Third Training Group. He is currently posted to 2/4 RAR.
Army Adventurous Training: For the Benefit of Those Who Need it Least

By Major G. Smith, RA Inf.

Introduction

Current Army doctrine states that the aim of adventurous training is to develop individual and group qualities which are required in battle. Other statements in the doctrine concerning the 'characteristics' of adventurous training include the following:

- It is a group activity which should complement field and barrack training providing an interesting and less rigid atmosphere in which important individual and group qualities may be developed.
- Adventure is experienced when participants attain the capacity to overcome difficult or unexpected situations.
- An ideal adventurous training group comprises a cross section of ranks with different skills.
- Notwithstanding the fact that many sports conform to adventurous characteristics no activity which is properly classified as competitive sport should be conducted as adventurous training.

I have divided adventurous training into two broad categories:

- Instructor Planned Adventurous Training (IPAT). This is adventurous training where qualified Army instructors bring together personnel from different subunits, units, formations and also from civilian sources to form groups to participate in specialist adventure activities. While current doctrine states that an ideal adventurous training group comprises a cross section of ranks with different skills I am suggesting that these groups are mostly not representative of the groups of soldiers that are posted together in normal training, and that can expect to be together in battle.

- Unit Planned Adventurous Training (UPAT). This is adventurous training initiated by unit commanders and designed to give adventurous training to sections or subsections (or the smallest working groups) within a unit. Army instructors are involved in planning UPAT and are employed in the preparation, training and conduct of the activities.

Advantages and Disadvantages

The aim of this article is to suggest that adventurous training doctrine should set out the advantages and disadvantages of IPAT and UPAT and that it should place more emphasis on UPAT.

In July 1989, the Australian Army established the Army Adventurous Training Centre (AATC) at Bonegilla. The AATC has been tasked to train unit instructors and expedition leaders, so that unit commanders will be able to sponsor adventurous training activities using trained personnel from their own units.

1 Commando Company and the Parachute Training School have been authorised to train unit personnel in scuba diving and free fall parachuting respectively, with a similar aim to that of the AATC. Other initiatives to increase the scope of adventurous training in the Army include the attendance of Australian soldiers at NZ, AATC Courses, increased support to adventurous training associations, the establishment of Army Adventurous Training Clubs, and Bridges Company (a course designed specifically for selected RMC cadets).

However, while such positive initiatives have been taken it could still be argued that the official approach to the implementation of adventurous training remains ad hoc, and that adventurous training is mainly for the benefit of those in the Army who need it least.

It is my opinion, that there is a significant problem in maintaining high morale among our personnel during collective training. A cause of this problem is that sections (or groupings) rarely remain constant for periods that allow high levels of cohesion and esprit to be formed. The word 'groupings' refers to combinations of personnel who would be expected to work together in war.
the Orderly Room staff of a Divisional Headquarters, led by the Chief Clerk. There are many possible combinations but the overriding factor should be whether or not the personnel doing adventurous training are the same personnel who will be working face to face with each other in war.

**Affect on Morale**

Another detrimental affect on morale during collective training comes from the ever increasing demand placed on commanders (and particularly junior commanders) to be absent from their commands. Many of these other demands relate to participation in activities for which the returns, in terms of improvement to our fighting capability, can be (and are being) questioned. For example is time spent playing *all* approved Army sport contributing to our fighting capability? Does sword drill still significantly contribute to our fighting capability?

It is not being suggested that personnel who do not strive to participate in IPAT begrudge the experience to those who do. However, it has been my experience that many resent having to do the work of those who seem to often get authorised and lengthy absences. Also the group seems to particularly resent the loss of cohesion and *esprit* caused when the group leader is the person most often absent.

It is interesting to note that some sections of private industry have been spending considerable funds on adventurous training using civilian adventurous training organisations. In the industry programmes people who work with each other are placed on courses by senior management, and given little if any option in regard to attendance, despite a sometimes appalling lack of natural aptitude and fitness. It is also interesting to note in these programmes, how the leaders (management) attending are expected to demonstrate leadership qualities regardless of technical knowledge or aptitude.

Under the doctrine in place, selected personnel grasp the opportunity to eventually achieve qualifications as an instructor in a particular adventurous training field. These personnel are then encouraged to canvas in units and areas and to select personnel for adventurous training activities and or courses. Due to the recent initiatives, there will be far more opportunities for personnel to participate provided time is made *available*. Of course it is still understood that places on the ‘best’ activities will be most actively sought by soldiers with good aptitude, a strong desire to participate, perhaps the money required to meet what can be substantial additional costs and most importantly the ability (and in some circumstances the gall) to use their Army time in addition to their own time to meet the commitment and its prerequisites. Not surprisingly the people who become most involved in IPAT often already have experience, they generally do not have pressing homelife commitments and they have few money problems.

**Good at Sports**

Also not surprisingly the same people who tend to juggle a reasonable commitment to IPAT tend to be good at sports. Army doctrine concerning sport provides further regular and approved absences to attend training and competition. I would suggest that Army doctrine should look closely at the sports which are currently approved and involve selection competitions, inter-area competitions and interservice competitions. It is the same soldiers who are not predisposed to IPAT activities and who are generally not good sportspeople who remain ‘in camp’, and often during periods of major sporting competition pick up the duty commitments of their more athletic colleagues. I contend that the current initiatives in adventurous training are doing little to redress this situation and are in fact contributing to a further imbalance between those who get to do what are seen as ‘reward’ activities in units and those who remain behind to do the guards, duties, maintenance, and preparation for training.

In 1987, Dr Kevin Smith wrote an article (DFJ No.67) about a survey which was conducted to determine regular Army soldiers ‘attitudes towards adventurous training’. The article quotes some ‘quite typical’ comments made by soldiers regarding their access to ‘challenge’ in their training. Some of these comments are as follows:

- ‘I’m getting pissed off with duties and no one really cares about the men.’
Men are getting out because of cancelled training plans and because what we do is neither lively or challenging.

Some platoons are always supporting the battalion and we rarely get a chance to do something different.

I feel like a council worker rather than being a digger.

The important question is, will such attitudes still be representative of a large proportion of soldiers after the AATC initiatives have been in place for some years? If the assertion (that adventurous training doctrine does little to ensure that soldiers at all levels of aptitude, enthusiasm, wealth and relative influence in their groups, receive equitable consideration for adventurous training opportunities) is still perceived to be true, then I suspect similar responses by significant numbers of disgruntled soldiers will be forthcoming.

It is not the aim of this article to disparage IPAT. Certainly, the Army will always need to foster IPAT. IPAT activities provide the required 'adventure', they still develop leadership, planning and organising skills and they are successful in familiarizing personnel with the peoples and terrain of remote areas of Australia and with the countries in the ADF's area of interest.

However, IPAT splits the normal working group and is seen as a method of favouring individuals, while in contrast UPAT can provide considerable advantages, provided it is conducted properly.

Too often, UPAT is conducted in a manner that can adversely affect morale. Many a unit commander may have chosen to work his unit hard for a certain period, perhaps building up to major activity, and then after the activity he has looked for some novel and interesting training as a reward. In these circumstances a lot of 'adventurous training' has actually been conducted as 'recreational training'; when a just allocation of stand down would probably have been far more beneficial to unit morale.

Guidelines for adventurous training given in the current doctrine indicate that adventurous training should not be confused with recreational training. Some further guidelines concerning UPAT are suggested:

- It should not be voluntary. Personnel who are vehemently opposed to participating in specific aspects of the training could be taken out of their normal work group and concentrated into groups who could then be given very basic levels of challenge in their problem area, or different challenges.
- The criteria to be 'adventurous' is met through careful planning that necessitates as wide an input from all in the group as possible. Some of the group will be a hindrance to the others in many situations but they all will be required to achieve their individual part in the group achievement of final objectives.
- No one is required to contribute to the cost of military training.
- The military training is properly recognised in regard to allowances and pay (particularly for the ARs).

Training Clubs

The establishment of the Army Adventurous Training Clubs should become particularly significant to unit commanders who seek to sponsor adventurous training as they will provide some form of co-ordinated access to instructor support in the area, equipment pools, and advice. Currently, doctrine does not appear to formally direct how the Clubs should support UPAT. Certainly unit commanders need to retain the prerogative to schedule and sponsor adventurous training activities. However, it is unlikely that instructors within units will be able to meet unit requirements for UPAT, particularly where time periods allocated to adventurous training are provided to whole subunits.

Specific levels of annual tasking for instructors may need to be controlled by a higher body. There is little doubt most instructors will favour activities that present themselves with greater challenges (IPAT activities), in preference to the more mundane instructing tasks (UPAT activities). Doctrine should ensure that UPAT is increased and that the Army trained instructors provide the best possible return from their training, which should be to develop the individual and group qualities that are required.
in battle, within the same groups that will be employed in battle. And it is these groups of people in the Army who need every available opportunity to get to know each others strengths and weaknesses of character and constitution, and in so doing they will enhance their ability to fight as a team.

In summary, this article recognises the importance of adventurous training and has divided it into two basic forms, IPAT and UPAT. The article has attempted to present an argument that adventurous training doctrine should recognise such a division. It does not suggest the demise of IPAT, only that emphasis should be placed on the advantages to be gained by increasing unit esprit through UPAT. The argument for this has been based on a perceived inequality in the access provided to soldiers, across the Army, to participate in adventurous training. It has suggested that the limitation to many in this regard is not based on the availability of IPAT (provided with the assistance of Army Adventurous Training Clubs), but on the availability of work time, unit organisation and funding. And it should be recognised that the people who need adventurous training most will generally do least to arrange their participation. (Certainly this appears to be recognised by some sections of private industry).

Doctrine that emphasises and promotes UPAT can change the perception (or the illusion) of inequality associated with adventurous training and in so doing can improve the Army's ability to fight, and strengthen morale.

MAJ Smith graduated from OCS Portsea and served with 8/9RAR. He has been a Water Operations Tp Cmd with SASR, served with 3 RAR, and has been the OC 1 Cdo Coy. As the OC 1 Cdo Coy he was the CI of the Water Operations Wing of 1 Cdo Regt, which is the organisation responsible for training Army shallow water divers from all corps. During MAJ Smith's appointment as CI, the Wing was tasked to conduct training to 'train the trainers', who would then conduct shallow water diving as adventurous training for the Army.

MAJ Smith was posted to HQ 3 Div where he was involved with writing and conducting Bde level TEWTs and CPXs based on low-level operations contingencies. He is currently working for LHQ on various tasks in Melbourne.

International Conference
MARITIME CHANGE: ISSUES FOR ASIA
21-22 November, 1991
Resort Hotel, Brighton Beach
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A major international conference is being jointly hosted by Vice Admiral Ian McDougall, Chief of Naval Staff, RAN and by Ken Harris, Managing Director of ADI, Australia's largest defence manufacturer.

The Conference will be an important gathering of senior civilian and uniformed people with interests in Asian maritime affairs. Key participants will include senior naval officers from nearly every Asian country, eminent businessmen and academics from throughout the region.

Major issues to be discussed will include:
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* Maritime arms control in the Asia-Pacific region
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An International Conference jointly sponsored by Australian Defence Industries Ltd and the Royal Australian Navy.
The Realm of Uncertainty:
Directive Control and the Modern Battlefield

By Major J.A.S. Cullens, RA Inf.

Directive control is a term used to describe a decentralized approach to command and control. It has been developed with a view to saving time on the battlefield, exploiting advantages offered by improvements in the mobility of forces and, perhaps most importantly, avoiding the use of detailed plans which attempt to predict the unpredictable. The objectives of time saving, exploiting mobility and achieving flexibility are critical to success in combat.

Australian Army Training
Information Letter Number 1/88
‘Directive Control’

‘War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.’

Carl Maria von Clausewitz

‘He is resourceful and imaginative, and the best results will be obtained by encouraging him to use his initiative.’

The Australian Soldier

At 1415 hours on Saturday, 6th October 1973, the first wave of 8000 Egyptian Infantry conducted an assault crossing of the Suez Canal. The immediate aim of the assault force was to establish a bridgehead to a depth of two miles on the east bank of the Canal. This task was to be complete by last light on the first day of the operation and the Egyptians hoped that the position gained would be sufficient to withstand the shock of the armour-heavy Israeli counter-attacks long enough for it to be reinforced during the following days. The initial phase of the operation was based on the Egyptian intention to establish a foothold on the east bank of the Canal ‘in order to break the political impasse and enable the next phase to be a political one.’

The Egyptians during the detailed planning for the operation, could hardly have envisaged the effect this bold manoeuvre would have on the Israeli command structure.

The initial Egyptian moves achieved their intended surprise and the commander of the Israeli Southern Front, Major General Gonen, had little more than a single, mediocre quality brigade to hold the widely dispersed Bar Lev fortifications on the east bank of the Canal. Israeli planning was based on the premise that they would always have sufficient warning of an Egyptian attack to allow for the reinforcement of the fortifications by Infantry and tank reserves. In this case sufficient warning was received and in accordance with operational planning the Armoured Division (Sinai), should have been dispatched forward by Gonen in an attempt to restore the situation. However, due to the uncertainty on the part of Gonen as to the location of the main Egyptian effort, the order was critically delayed. This failure in the environment of chaos of modern combat was to be but the first of several mistakes made at the critical opening phases of Yom Kippur War; failures that were to prompt van Creveld to create the phrase ‘reverse operational control’ when examining the Israeli disasters of the first four days of the conflict. He further defined reverse operational control as a form of control where ‘it was the man who knew the least who made the crucial decisions.’ Operational control had been gradually developed by the Israelis since the guerrilla operations of 1948. The concept allowed maximum freedom of action to be undertaken by subordinate commanders within the confines of the superior commanders’ intent. It did however include the proviso that the superior headquarters could interfere at any time in order to make major changes to the original directives.

On the Israeli side, the opening phases of the War were to be characterized by problems, modus operandi and decisions which were essentially anathema to the concept of directive control. This situation was to develop within the command structures of an army which through the campaigns of 1956 and 1967 had proved to be the modern master of this concept. With the blessing of ‘the silly certainty of hindsight,’ some military historians have been able to dissect some of the reasons for the Israeli failures in the first
The Retention of Suppleness

...the need to retain suppleness by the development of directive control, (Auftragstaktik)\(^\text{10}\)

‘You are to rise up from ambush and take the city.’ Joshua 8:7

History is replete with examples of directive control but credit for its modern application lies with the Prussians. Early examples of the style of command can be traced as far back as 1806 when campaign tactics stressed that the commander in chief should outline only his broad concept to his divisional commanders allowing them the flexibility in deciding how the task was to be done. Great stress was placed on the realization that the commander could not possibly be everywhere.\(^\text{11}\) The Prussians, however, may have learned from Napoleon, who in 1796 had laid down parameters when he instructed his political masters:

‘The government must have entire confidence in its general; allow him great latitude, and only provide him with the aim he should attain.’\(^\text{12}\)

In composing this statement Napoleon had in essence described some of the key elements of what is now referred to as directive control. By stressing the aspect of confidence he implied the importance of the element of trust that must exist between subordinates and superiors. The ‘great latitude’ alluded to the concept of freedom of action and use of initiative at all levels. The ‘aim’ may be described as the all-encompassing intent which would bestow on his armies a unity of purpose.
Field Marshal, Count Helmuth von Moltke was appointed Prussian Chief of the General Staff in 1857. A profound disciple of what he termed as the 'business' of war, Moltke was to act as a catalyst for major changes in the concept of command in the Prussian Army. He appreciated that armies were increasing in size, that the methods of deploying and fighting these military forces were becoming more complex and that the speed with which events were taking place on the battlefield was also increasing. He saw the solution to these changes as being decentralization of command. However, of even more significance was the realization that:

'. . . because no plan of operation can with any certainty look beyond the initial clash of major forces, once it has occurred, it is incumbent on subordinate commanders to act on their initiative, but in accordance with a common doctrine.'\(^{13}\)

He further stressed the requirement for directives in place of detailed orders and believed that although confusion would arise it would be more than adequately compensated for by the speed of decisive action on the part of the battlefield commanders. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, Moltke ensured that his concepts were employed. His initial intentions included the resolve to attack the enemy wherever he was found and to leave the details of the plans 'to the decision of the hour.'\(^{14}\) History recorded his success.

The concept of directive control was, during the First World War, to be swallowed by the stinking, clinging mud of Flanders. With the emergence of the doctrine of mechanized warfare and particularly its adoption by the fledgling new German Army in the early 1930s, directive control was to emerge as the key command concept employed by the Wermacht during the Second World War. The memoirs of the defeated German generals are filled with references to the concept. Eric von Manstein in his book *Lost Victories* details but one:

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'It has, at all times, been the special strength of the German military leadership to rely on the willingness of the leaders of all levels to assume responsibility, as well as on their self-reliance and initiative, and to promote these wherever possible.'\(^{15}\)
The Blitzkrieg concept dramatically illustrated that this philosophy worked. The modern Bundeswehr training publications further detail the concept by highlighting the requirement to 'take immediate action in accordance with the superior commander's thinking in the absence of a set task.' The German 'Auftrag' was originally translated as 'mission' and 'Auftragstaktik' as 'mission-type control'. This is unsatisfactory. Simpkin stresses the problems that exist with this attempted translation of the concept from German. In line with his thinking the term 'directive control' will be used as the translation for 'Auftragstaktik' as opposed to the American interpretation of 'mission-type' control.*

Directive control is essentially a style of thought combined with a distinct offensive modus operandi. As with any concept, there must be readily identifiable critical elements. The problem with directive control is that there appears to be little common agreement as to the critical elements. Simpkin stresses the role of communication with particular emphasis on the passage of information upwards and downwards in the various levels of command. He remains the most ardent advocate of the part played by mutual trust in the concept and argues at great length about the critical determinant being the superior commander's intention. The American point of view however may be characterised by Nelsen who suggests that speed is the first imperative of the concept. He further argues the importance of the German methodology in issuing orders (what is to be done but not how to do it) and the requirement for independent decision making. An Australian point of view is offered by Bergman who lists the underlying principles of the concept as being maximum freedom of action in achieving the mission; predictability of response by subordinates and uniform perception at all levels of command. With this plethora of conflicting opinion an assessment should be undertaken of the modern German view. Major General Storbeck (a divisional commander in the Bundeswehr) claims that the characteristics of directive control do not have an order of priority but that 'they can be compared more with a chain in which every link contributes equally to the strength.'

He emphasises, the independence of the execution of a mission; the importance of mutual trust; risk taking; mental flexibility and the passage of information. After an examination of such diverse points of view it is possible to narrow an analysis of the characteristics of directive control into the areas of mutual trust, speed of decisive action, initiative and unity of purpose. These characteristics can be discussed in the light of Australian experiences.

Mutual Trust

The essence of mutual trust is a level of familiarity between individuals within an organization. Superiors should know their subordinates and understand their capabilities. Subordinates need to develop faith in the ability of their superiors to take the best course of action in any given operational situation. This process is reinforced by the understanding that individuals at both ends of the military spectrum are products of a training system that places great emphasis on demanding, realistic training but reinforces individuality through the delegation of responsibility. Commanders at all levels are therefore expected to take risks and make decisions in the absence of detailed orders from a superior commander. The existence of mutual trust will ensure that in the chaos of the battlefield individuals will take a course of action. If mutual trust does not exist in the command relationship between a superior and a subordinate and particularly if the superior lacks confidence in the subordinate's ability then the subordinate must be replaced.

Mutual trust is further developed by the length of time that individuals spend together. At the basic level it develops into the term 'mateship'. In a command relationship, it is predicated on the subordinates appreciating how a superior operates, whilst on the other hand, the superior also appreciates how his subordinates are likely to react in any given situation. This aspect is of particular importance in the U.S. Army because of the short term nature of appointments and the resulting turbulence, particularly amongst officers. In the concept of directive control mutual trust assumes that each individual will do his duty which may include additional responsibility by taking a particular course of action. Operational doctrine in the Australian Army now formally recognizes the importance of the concept. The commander:
 must embrace all philosophy of directive control and display complete confidence in his subordinate leaders, grant them discretion in carrying out their tasks and expect them to seize opportunities as they occur rather than wait for consultation . . . He must also instil confidence in his people that the course of action he has chosen is indeed the right one.25

Comments made by General Monash on his troops in 1915 show that mutual trust has long been a characteristic of Australian military operations:

'. . . no one could wish to command a finer and more earnest, more worthy and well behaved body of men.'26

Leaders must appreciate that their effectiveness resides in the trust and confidence soldiers have in them.27

**Speed of Decisive Action**

The modern battlefield, even more so than battlefields of past history, will be an environment of chaos. Despite the quantum leap of modern technology the capabilities of men rather than weapons will in the future, as in the past, control.28 Australia's next war is likely to display somewhat differing characteristics to its previous conflicts. The conflict is likely to be short, probably intensive, tightly politically controlled and it will incorporate highly sophisticated technology. The future battlefield commander may have the opportunity to win or lose a major engagement or perhaps even the war in a matter of a few hours.29 More than ever the future commander will be faced with Clausewitzian dilemmas of the realm of chance. During the conduct of dispersed operations opportunity will present itself to commanders at all levels. The decision to take a course of action, as emphasised by directive control, must be taken quickly or the opportunity will be lost. The decision will require to be made in an environment of uncertainty and conflicting information but it must be made with a sense of professional judgement, duty and responsibility. During the great tank battles in southern Russia in 1943 the Germans were able to display their ability to make major decisions with great speed when they were able to rapidly redirect Panzer divisions in the assault to face an emerging Russian threat. In the Australian context speed of decisive action was inculcated in commanders and troops in Vietnam:

'The cultivation in training of an instinctive offensive reaction in an emergency must be emphasized.'30

The decision made in the environment of chaos must be tempered with a balanced risk assessment. The penalties for a late decision or even a delayed decision in an attempt to obtain further guidance from a superior commander may result in disaster. In the final assessment the leader must be able to assess the situation rapidly and 'make a prompt, sound decision.'31

**Initiative**

Initiative is a virtue that is eagerly sought and painstakingly developed in the training institutions of most of the armies of the world. In essence it is acting without the prompting of others and it is a highly regarded and critical element of leadership. In the context of the German development of directive control initiative held pride of place as can be seen in this extract of Field Service Regulations (1911) which required:

'... every officer, under all conditions, to exercise initiative to the maximum extent, without fear of the consequence. Commanding officers must encourage and require this.'32

The Regulations further detailed the importance of developing initiative during long periods of peace when independent action in training could be discouraged. It was believed that it was the duty of commanders to make every effort to develop this virtue. The Germans alluded to the disasters incurred by the Russians at the hands of the Japanese in the 1905 War and believed that one of the major causes of defeat was because the Russians followed orders to the smallest detail and exercised little initiative in making the most of fleeting opportunities. Australian leadership
doctrine has always strongly emphasised initiative:

'In the absence of orders, you should take the initiative and pursue the action you believe your superior would direct if he were present.'

It further stresses the requirement for leaders to be prepared to exploit any opportunity on the battlefield with boldness and energy. The doctrine also highlights that a major training requirement remains the production of skilled, driving and aggressive commanders capable of exercising initiative. Again Australian military history is blessed with examples. Serle, commenting on the initial performance of the Australian Imperial Force at Gallipoli remarks that the detailed actions of the troops, 'imbued with their instructions to press on, and out of control of their commanders, are largely unknown.' It is reasonable to assume that considerable initiative was employed at both the leader and digger level to achieve their objectives on that first day.

In allocating the mission the superior commander must conduct an appreciation which should result in an understanding of circumstances in which the mission will be carried out; an idea of the resources required to achieve that mission, and any additional directions or restrictions that may be required. The subordinate then may operate with a degree of latitude 'consistent with his level of command, and within which he discharges the command function vested in him.' At unit level there may be little latitude allowed, however, further conflict may well involve greatly dispersed operations in which case the subordinated commander will encounter a higher degree of freedom of action.

At the commencement of planning for a future operation, the commander will normally prepare a concept of operations. The commander's intention flows from this concept and it is a clear statement of this intent that is fundamental to the application of directive control. The intent is essentially the 'master plan' and it needs to be stated in such a manner that all subordinate commanders, when faced with situations of chance and uncertainty, are able to act in a fashion expected by the commander. After receipt of instructions or orders it is a standard operating procedure that requires subordinates to discuss their concept of operations with their superior. Prior to the operations, there is then created a unity of purpose throughout the formation. During the execution of the mission it becomes the responsibility of the subordinate commander to keep his superior informed as to what he is doing. Senior commanders however must take care that they do not unduly interfere with the missions of units two levels down the chain of command. Australians have been found wanting in this area. A situation such as this occurred at Bardia North Africa in January 1941 when the 6th Division in its operation order for the attack, allocated some tasks down to specific sub-unit level. The intention in this particular case was stated in place of the mission!

It is evident from this analysis of the concept of directive control that the fundamental aspects of this style of command are already incorporated into Australian leadership and C2 doctrine. The

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**Unity of Purpose**

Fundamental to an understanding of the unity of purpose in the concept of directive control is an examination of the mission and the intent of the superior commander. Current Bundeswehr doctrine states that:

'The commander (in his orders) clearly lays down the mission, direction and framework of action for his subordinates.'

The doctrine further details that the subordinate commander has considerable freedom of action and judgement in how the mission will be executed. Australian doctrine on the other hand is somewhat less precise depending on which reference is consulted:

'While it is necessary to tell men what to do it may not be necessary to tell them how to do it.'

It does however clarify in more recent publications this rather vague statement:

'At higher levels, the immediate subordinate is given extensive latitude, within the frame-
problem lies in that while the principles exist they are not being fully exploited. Further training and changes are required in order that the Australian Army may benefit from this style of command and control in its preparation for future conflict. Only by incorporating such changes can the retention of suppleness in C2 be assured. We may then be in a position to issue orders in the style practised by Joshua.

FIT FOR WAR

'The CO’s aim is a clear one — to produce a battalion trained in such a way that it is, in every respect, fit for war.'

Although this comment implies the state of training required at unit level it may also be applied to formations. Future conflict is likely to be characterized by its brevity and intensity. In the Australian context, we may expect this style of warfare is a mid-level conflict but it would be unlikely to occur in a low-level scenario (low-intensity conflict). Current doctrine also highlights other characteristics of future conflict. It is most likely that there will be tight political control over military operations at all levels, whether they be on mainland Australia, on offshore territories or in Australia’s area of direct military interest. Commanders will be faced with justifying their every action to a well-informed public.

With the development of technology there will be changes in the way the battle is fought and the application of this technology may well give one side a marked advantage. Both sides will have the ability to rapidly acquire and engage critical targets such as headquarters and supply dumps. Both sides will also have the ability to disrupt, monitor, or jam communications. The requirement for dispersed operations in order to reduce vulnerability at formation level or to undertake tasks over large geographical areas will mean that units will be susceptible to frequent communications disruption. Dispersion will also require a high degree of leadership from junior commanders. A major danger is that with more capable communications equipment there will be an
increasing temptation for commanders to centralize control by using the technology to directly influence action at the lowest levels. This is particularly the case with regard to the introduction of Mobile Subscriber Equipment in the U.S. Army. The tempo of operations is also likely to be intense with the problem of fatigue being a critical aspect in the decision-making ability of commanders. The U.S. Army stresses this particularly effectively in training at the National Training Center. This situation will be seriously compounded by the commander being faced with data saturation and the subsequent inability to identify the key elements of information. Perhaps the staffs of all modern armies, and the commanders themselves, are guilty of this. The endless quest for certainty in the chaos is bound to continue. John Ruskin, the noted essayist, in 1866 was able to describe quite simply what he perceived as being the nature of modern war:

'Scientific War'—chemical and mechanic war, — worse even than the savage's poisoned arrow.

Changing Times

It would appear that in the doctrinal sense the Australian Army has been able to identify the nature of the problems of future conflict. The release of recent doctrine has shown that there exists an understanding of a requirement for directive control. But how far has implementation progressed and where lie the pitfalls?

In the area of training, the philosophy seems to be well entrenched. In early 1988, aspects of directive control were raised by the General Officer Commanding Training Command in an address to the Command and Staff College. Emphasis was placed on the application of directive control for the dispersed operations likely to be conducted by the Australian Army in the future. The need to exploit the chaos of the battlefield was stressed and the old adage of the importance of the individual's initiative highlighted. The presentation outlined what was perceived as being the key elements of directive control and included the requirement for confidence in leaders, the need to know the commanders plan, the seizure of opportunities, the delegation of authority, the development of mutual trust and the acceptance by commanders of honest mistakes by their subordinates. This is fine in theory but what of the practical application?

The concept is certainly practised at the lowest levels in the Australian Army. It is standard practice at platoon level or equivalent for the commander to explain his intent to his section commanders in respect of what he wants done. He will always include any restrictions that there might be on the task and allocate the resources available. The job invariably is done and history has often proved that much more has been achieved besides. This concept also appears to work at unit level. In peace the first failings appear at formation level where there is often a reluctance on the part of commanders in both Australian and U.S. Armies to allow the subordinates to get the jobs done without further command supervision or indeed intervention. This may in part be related to an unfounded belief that combat experience is a prerequisite for successful modern command. If this is the case then thinking is at odds with the belief of a recent Chief of Defense Force Staff who believed that recent combat experience (Vietnam) may in fact be a disadvantage in coping with the demands of modern conflict. More likely however is the reluctance on the part of the commander to accept honest mistakes made by their subordinates for fear of damaging their image. The absence of mutual trust may well be another reason.

Although field exercises, undertaken in a realistic setting, are generally believed to be the most effective way of training for war during peacetime, they also create further problems. In our current modus operandi these exercises can be closely controlled allowing little opportunity for commanders at unit level and above to be realistically tested. Little scope is allowed for the development of initiative and decisions are rarely made under conditions of extreme stress. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that although teamwork and cohesion is often superb at unit level, because of the infrequency of exercising, it is lacking at formation level. The commander rarely has the opportunity to issue operation instructions as espoused by new doctrine because the formation simply does not spend enough time working together. The exercises are also too short for a formation to develop a unity of purpose or indeed an identity.
as a cohesive combat organization. The U.S. Army has been able to resolve these problems in part with the development of the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center. However even at the National Training Center there are many artificial constraints placed on commanders. One of the major problems is that the commander is often forced to fight battles of attrition in lieu of battles of manoeuvre because of the geographical constraints of the training areas. During Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 directive control was implemented in some U.S. units because of the dispersed nature of some of the operations. On the other hand, the concept of directive control worked in the Wermacht experience because of the amount of time formations spent together. It was only late in Operation Barbarossa that the concept started to disintegrate due to the total dislocation of the command structure.

When there is an opportunity during field operations for a formation commander to practice forward command it invariably does not occur because of the perceived need to be at his over-sized headquarters from which the main event can be carefully orchestrated. Simpkin refers to these headquarters as "the kind of circus that traipses around in the wake of American and British formation commanders." In the U.S. Army's field headquarters structure this problem is further complicated by the permanent existence of three command posts at Divisional level. Each CP (Main, Tactical and Rear) is specifically intended to fight or support a particular part of the highly structured Airland Battle. In practice, the existence of certainly two of the CP's (Main and Tactical) just further confuses the C2 procedures. Although Airland Battle doctrine is most precise in dividing the battle field into deep, close and rear battles one must question as to whether each CP can so adroitly define these parameters in the chaos of combat! And what of the location of the commander? Perhaps we have forgotten the lessons of history which reveal the extent to which the appearance at the front of the commander can influence the decision. These problems can only partly be solved by the use of wargaming and simulation. There must be a fundamental change in our thinking if we are to ensure that the Army (Australian and U.S.) is not only fit for war but sufficiently fit to win. Directive control encapsulates flexible thinking and in order to be successful we must adjust accordingly.

Responsibility of the Commander

A firm believer in decentralization, he (Major General Fraser) commanded with a fairly loose reign and trusted his subordinates — an admirable trait, but one in which he faced the prospect of being let down if a subordinate failed. At times there is a fine line between allowing subordinates to make decisions which are rightly the responsibility of the commander.47

Directive control has often been referred to as an excuse for incompetence because its institution may be seen as an abrogation of responsibility. If we are to be serious about its implementation this belief must be proved as being a fallacy. As is noted by Horner, there is always a fine line when allocating degrees of responsibility. The commander's intent should make it clear to the subordinate as to the extent of his responsibility. There may be times however in the 'fog of war' where the subordinate is forced to make decisions which exceed this degree. In an army whose command system is predicated on mutual trust the matter would probably go no further. Even if a mistake was made there should be little fear of recrimination. Herein lies the major challenge to the introduction of the concept of directive control into the Australian Army and probably the U.S. Army. There must be a change in attitude by senior commanders. They need to adopt a leadership style which practices corporate and national interest in lieu of self interest. Decision making must be delegated because the junior raw command material exists and it is more than capable of taking on the responsibility. The Australian Chief of the Defence Force recently recognized the need publicly when he stated:

'It's a deliberate action we've taken to push responsibility further down the chain. That's very good in a number of ways. It makes them really manage it, makes them really lead, and it increases their responsibility. If they muck it up, they get a kick in the pants.'48

The will exists. The example must be made at the top for only then will it percolate throughout the organization. The situation
recently cited by a retired Australian officer who remarked that the current resignation problem was a result of an enforced lack of responsibility and accountability at middle-management level (Major/Lieutenant Colonel) cannot continue. Delegated responsibility should become the norm at all command levels. Mistakes will be made but it must be recognized that it is the proven method of training commanders. Subordinates will be forced to use their initiative when faced with challenges and the development of mutual trust will occur rapidly if commanders are permitted to spend time working together. This mutual trust will then subsequently filter through the ranks and it will be reinforced by communication upwards and downwards. Talent and ability, once recognized, should be cultivated by senior commanders through the process of mentorship. In this manner the experience, so hard to accumulate in peacetime, will be passed on.

Whilst the successful implementation of directive control requires a change in current thinking and practice, changes in other areas are also required. Simpkin again argues for a reduced headquarters size stating that they need to be 'small, simple and supple'. He further points out that the Germans were able to employ directive control most effectively when a small headquarters worked closely with a commander who used the technique of forward command. Certainly in an army the size of Australia's this is a critical point. The current operational headquarters are too big. This is also the case with Corps and Division level headquarters in the U.S. Army. Although we may not reduce the size to the extent of the Wermacht, who often did not even relieve duty officers, there is scope for change. The Australian Army Review Committee (1988) was tasked with examining the reduction in size of various headquarters. In conjunction with this there is also a requirement to reduce the content of our Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). They should only contain the bare minimum of information to allow the unit or formation to function properly. Currently they tend to be the total masters of procedure and not the servants, the role for which they are designed.

The preparation for the continuous combat expected in modern war must be dynamic. It remains not only a question of physical conditioning but also of mental toughening. This can be developed in commanders by selective stress training in field exercises and in wargaming and battle simulation. By undertaking this type of training we should be able to develop the mental flexibility required by directive control. The U.S. Army has a sound approach to this requirement in the Battle Command Training Program.

The study of battle through the examples of history has always been a requirement for aspiring commanders. Whilst it is true that the study of military history is used 'for acquiring the theoretical foundations of military science, and for gaining an understanding of human performance in conflict situations', there are drawbacks. The main problem is that a commander may attempt to apply the lesson of history to his real tactical problems. This practice is fraught with danger. The knowledge gained from history must be tempered with practical experience. As both Armies continue to lose their combat experience there is a requirement to turn more to the lessons of history. Only then will commanders become familiar with the problems of war and in particular with the actions of the successful exponents of directive control. At this present time insufficient attention is paid by training institutions to the study of the art of command and with it the application of the techniques of directive control.

Conclusion

The concept of directive control is certainly not new to the Australian military experience. The framework for the style already exists in army doctrine and training. The major hurdle to its successful practise lies in the attitude of commanders at the more senior levels. Recent statements by the Australian Chief of the Defence Force have revealed that the will to implement this style of command also exists.

The recent article by the U.S. Chief of Staff of the Army in Military Review (April 1990) highlights the need to develop subordinates through decentralization, the encouragement of innovation and the willingness to accept mistakes. These are all elements of directive control. Future conflicts in which Australia may be involved will probably be of a short and intense nature. There will be little time when the trouble starts, to prepare commanders for dispersed operations.
exposed to all of the problems of modern war. The problems experienced by the Israelis with 'reverse operational control' are unlikely to occur in the Australian Army with the reintroduction of directive control. Historical experience suggests that Australian troops should perform well given their legacy of training and discipline in combat developed over nine wars since 1885 in the Sudan. The preparation of commanders however must start now. The current problems of centralized control, stifling of initiative, unwillingness to take risks and an apparent lack of mutual trust must be overcome if we are to be successful in the future. With the rising cost of field exercises other methods of both physically and mentally preparing commanders for war require to be developed. The U.S. Army is heading in the right direction in this regard. Australia must continue in future conflicts, as in the past, to rely on the initiative and rapid decision making ability of her commanders at all levels. The 1990s will be the age of the tactical and strategic innovator rather than of an expert performer of tactical drill.\textsuperscript{52} Both armies should take heed of this statement. The answers to the command and control challenges raised by the modern battlefield lie in the successful implementation of the concept of directive control. The changes need to be made in peacetime. Only when this occurs will the army be fit for war. Slim was correct when he wrote that:

\begin{quotation}
\textquoteleft The use of new weapons and technical devices can quickly be taught; to develop hardihood, initiative, mutual confidence, and stark leadership takes longer\textquoteleft \textsuperscript{53}
\end{quotation}

Adherence to these aspects of directive control is the path to the future. Only then can success be assured in the realm of uncertainty.

\section*{NOTES}

7. Loc cit.
17. Loc cit.
32. Freytag-Loringhoven H. opcit, p.150.
34. Manual of Land Warfare One 1.1 opcit, p.6-3.
35. Ibid, p.6-4.
37. Bergmann P. opcit, p.6-5.
40. Loc cit.
41. Long G. To Benghazi, Australian War Memorial, Canberra 1952, p.312.
42. Ibid, p.312. The 6th Division's Operation Order Intention was: '6 Aust. Div will attack and capture the Central and Southern sectors of the BARDIA defences on 3 Jan.'
46. RODC Study two, opcit, p.13-2.
50. Simpkin R. opcit, p.239.

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COL G. Hellyer, ‘German Tactics’, (translated from German documents January 1986).

Long Tan Medallion — Twenty-Fifth Anniversary
A sterling silver medallion commemorating Australian troops’ most famous action during the Vietnam conflict was released at the Australian War Memorial on Sunday 18 August 1991.

Late in the afternoon of 18 August 1966, soldiers from D Company, 6th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment fired their first shots in what would become known as the Battle of Long Tan.

Now, a quarter of a century later, the Australian War Memorial and the Royal Australian Mint have combined efforts in a project to commemorate the battle.

Major Jamie Cullens is currently posted as a G-3 Operations’ Officer, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, California. He is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon and the Australian Army Command and Staff College. He has served in various command and staff postings in Infantry in Australia as well as in Kashmir and Papua New Guinea.
Return to Greece

*Return to Greece* is an *Australian Defence Force Journal* production highlighting the 50th Anniversary of the Australian Defence Force's participation in the Allied struggle of the Greek Campaign of World War II.

In 1941, Greece fought for survival against the might of Germany. The Greeks, aided by Australian, New Zealand and British forces fought to ward off the invasion of their homeland. *Return to Greece* tells of these battles and of the Allied evacuation.

*Return to Greece* revisits the sites of the battlefields through a selection of 50 water colours and drawings. The book takes the reader on a journey with the veterans of the Greek Campaign through the country where they fought valiantly with their Greek comrades in defence of democracy. It illustrates the pride and professionalism of today's Australian Defence Force personnel as they pay tribute to the memory of those who fought with such bravery and self sacrifice in the cause of freedom in the dark days of 1941.

This book will rekindle memories for those who took part in the campaign of 1941 and also for those who participated in the return pilgrimage in 1991.

*Return to Greece* is illustrated by Defence artist, Jeff Isaacs with text by Michael Tracey.

*Return to Greece* is available from the *Australian Defence Force Journal* at a cost of $20.00.
The murder of seven Palestinians at Rishon Le-Ziyon (Southern Israel) by an Israeli civilian on 20 May 1990 sparked off violence in the Israeli occupied territories almost unprecedented in the history of the Intifada. The full brunt of the Intifada saw the highest number of casualties ever recorded in one day, since it began two and a half years ago. As a unique form of struggle, the Intifada has evolved inside the Israeli occupied territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This struggle is not as discernable in considering the more conventional, guerrilla, and terrorist struggles commonly associated with low-intensity conflict. Universally, it has become well known, and is characterized by limited violence and passive resistance. The aim of this article is to examine the nature and tactics of the Intifada, and to consider its future. For the purpose of this discussion the Intifada will be defined as civil unrest.

Before examining the nature of the Intifada, several assumptions must be made concerning the national interests of: initially, the Shamir/Peres Coalition Government, and most recently the Shamir nationalist-religious government of Israel, and the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising representing the Palestinians.

The national interest of the State of Israel is its own survival and perpetuation. The State recognizes its right to exist in the “Jewish Homeland” west of the Jordan River, including the territories of Samaria and Judea (the West Bank), and the Gaza Strip. Despite being a theocracy, Israel is struggling to become a Western democracy. It shares many of the same values that Western democracies represent; including free enterprise, self determination, and freedom of speech.

Security is Paramount

Surrounded by the Arab States of the Middle East, security is paramount to Israel’s survival. The numerous wars characterizing the Arab-Israeli conflict are evidence of the precarious position that Israel finds itself in. As history has shown, the most important and dominant instrument for maintaining Israeli’s national interest has been, and still is, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).

The IDF has successfully provided solutions of short term duration in support of the political, economic, diplomatic and intelligence components of Israel’s national interests. The pervasiveness of the IDF’s presence, and utilization around the national boundaries, extends a feeling of safety within Israeli society. Thus, the security of Israel, to include maintaining occupation forces inside the Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is regarded as a necessary condition to perpetuate its existence.

The Palestinian perspective of perpetuating nationalism through the creation of an independent Palestinian state is diverse. Their national interest is extremely undermined by factionalism, which does not extend a unified focus of effort. Each faction represents a variety of views on how to attain the Palestinian state and what it should look like.

Some Palestinian factions, for example, believe that peaceful coexistence with Israel in the form of bipartite sovereign states is possible, while others are prepared to take a more extremist approach towards statehood through armed conflict with Israel. It appears that, up until now, the most effective measures towards achieving Palestinian national interests have been informational, seeking world support through the media; and economic, boycotts aimed directly at damaging Israeli’s economy.

The Intifada is a manifestation of twenty years of Palestinian frustration attributed to the loss of the West Bank, from Jordan, and the Gaza Strip, from Egypt, following the Israeli victory of the Six Day War in 1967. Prior to the Intifada (officially beginning in December 1987), anti-Israeli activities conducted by the PLO underground group, al-Fatah, were suppressed by the Israeli paramilitary. This was followed by the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip initiating mass demonstrations inspired by the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. (Since then, ideological disputes between the Unified Leadership, representing the mainstream PLO factions, and Hamas have grown sharper). These demonstra-
tions have more recently been addressed as "strikes".

The aims of the Intifada are twofold. Firstly, it serves to demonstrate to Israel and the world that Palestinian quest for statehood is no longer faceless in the complex arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Secondly, it will have long term impact as an economic revolt against Israel's economy. The term Intifada means, more explicitly, to "breakaway". In this context the Intifada is a form of solidarity or a movement for identity, not unlike the situation that transpired in Poland in the early 1980s. This quest for identity shows that the Palestinians have tired of being treated as second class citizens, ruled by the Israelis, and that their civil unrest is an effort to disconnect themselves politically, economically, socially, and psychologically from the State of Israel.

**Internal Recognition**

Direction and guidance of the Intifada is provided by the PLO's Unified National Leadership of the Uprising. To achieve international recognition, the Palestinians needed the Intifada to be endorsed by the Chairman of the PLO, Mr Yasser Arafat. Thus, the Intifada surfaced in a way that managed to rekindle Arafat's standing in the Arab and world communities. Through the Unified Leadership, the activities of the Palestinians are coordinated in the form of a community effort that is intended to counter the daily routine dictated by the Israeli Civil Administration.

This community effort, which generally revolves around economic boycotts and "General Strikes", has created an uneasy situation for Israel. The military, in particular, are powerless to prevent these revolts. The merits of the forty two day Palestinian tax refusal in Beit Sahur remains to be seen in the long term. Its immediate effect was its success to inspire, as well as coerce, Palestinian tax collectors throughout the occupied territories to quit their positions and force the Civil Administration to employ new tax collectors.

The increased use of wagon carts, drawn by donkeys, replacing cars has had a direct impact on the amount of gasoline and petroleum products expected to be consumed by the Palestinian population. Idle automobiles equate to no VAT. Limited new housing construction, coupled with several families living under the same roof, fails to increase the number of lodgings to be taxed. Refusal by Palestinian merchants to purchase Israeli products for sale in the occupied territories is detrimental to Israeli's economy. Fishing boats that remain idle on Gaza's beaches has forced the Civil Administration to procure a more expansive workforce. Overall, the absence of a dependable cheap labour force, a refusal to push Israeli products, and an unreliable consumer populace supports the Intifada's intent as an economic revolt.

As a Palestinian centre of gravity, the community effort is disarming to the Israelis because the tactic of civil disobedience, as a component of civil unrest, has caught the Israelis unprepared to offer a solution, albeit military, to the problem. Foremost, Israel is trying to maintain the image of a Western democratic country in the eyes of the United States and democratic Third World countries. It cannot afford to unleash the type of total military response that President Assad of Syria used against the 1982 Moslem Brotherhood uprising in Hama. The United States, in particular, would be hard pressed to justify the US$3 billion provided in foreign aid to Israel each year, and convince the world of its advocacy for human rights. Thus, potentially, the Intifada serves to disarm Israel's government and foreign policy as well.

The necessity to establish a Palestinian infrastructure, complete with political, economic, and social institutions is foremost. The disarming effect of the Intifada may lead to the achievement of these objectives. Further diffusion of civil unrest, as a true Palestinian effort within the occupied territories, may compel Israel to realize that continued military occupation will severely test the political will of the State. It is therefore conceivable that the peace-for-territory accords may progress. If Israel remains steadfast in its present position, the occupation will continue to strain the US-Israeli relationship concerning Palestinian human rights, while attracting favourable world opinion towards the Palestinian cause. The emergence of Egypt as a player in the peace-for-territory accord supports this.

From Israel's perspective, the Intifada is a major threat to its security. Although civil unrest denotes limited violence, the Israelis view the use of stones, tyre burning, petrol bombs, bus attacks, and isolated stabbings by the more militant
Palestinians, as being the general behaviour of all Palestinians. Furthermore, Israel regards this pattern of behaviour in consonance with the 1964 Palestine Covenant calling for the eradication of the Jewish State through armed conflict. In response to this security threat, Israel's objective is to retain control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through occupation forces.

Control of the momentum of the Intifada continues to centre around Israel's intelligence agencies, in particular the Shin Beth (Israeli Secret Police). Timely and accurate intelligence has successfully enabled the IDF to contain, and prevent, activities of unrest from escalating. The infiltration of the Unified Leadership by the Shin Beth, and cooperation of Palestinian collaborators, serve as principle sources in this effort. Spontaneous incidents, on a local level, are suppressed by patrols and reaction forces.

The control measures employed by the Israelis against the Intifada are varied and effective. The simplest measure has been the issuing partially of identification cards to the Palestinians. The identification card has been an attempt to fragment the community effort by controlling the movement of Palestinians inside, and to and from, the occupied territories. This has limited the Palestinians ability to participate in strikes, confrontations, and the opportunity to seek profitable employment.

Economic and educational stagnation has had a direct impact on the political growth of the Palestinians. More than 50 percent of the Palestinian population are living in poverty, with unemployment estimated at higher than 30 percent. Limited educational development is a function of the relatively small agricultural, commercial and service based markets employing Palestinians. Universities have remained dormant because the more technical and specialized fields do not have a market in the Palestinian community to satisfy. By closing schools, the Israelis have denied formal education to the youth of Palestinians, potentially adding another generation of Palestinians unable to determine their own destiny.

That aside, the first two and half years of the Intifada has demonstrated the resolve and commitment of the Palestinians to endure social and economic hardship. The Israelis have failed to seize any opportunity to win the "hearts and minds" of the Palestinians. Instead, it appears that the Israelis are determined to break the political will and fighting spirit of the Palestinians by continuing on a course of military occupation of the territories.

The deportation or jailing of Intifada leaders has been directed more towards the proponents of civil unrest, than against the advocates of Palestinian armed conflict. While the IDF would most likely prefer to counter Palestinian violence, such as ambushes and bombings, vice, stone throwing, tyre burning and verbal abuse, Israeli commanders have recently enforced stringent rules of engagement and interrogation restraints among its units. This is clearly in response to adverse world opinion denouncing the IDF's earlier use of excessive force. Amnesty International, in its 1990 Annual Report, expressed deep concern over the repressive measures adopted by the Israeli authorities against the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The report stated that Israeli authorities had arrested approximately 25,000 Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, since the start of the Intifada. The report added that about 4,000 Palestinians served different terms under administrative detention without trial.

Deep rifts have begun to emerge in Palestinian society. The apparent lack of progress toward achieving Palestinian goals, and the continuing pressure of maintaining the Intifada in the face of tough and unrelenting Israeli measures, has manifested itself in the form of Palestinian intra group violence and the killing of collaborators. The escalation of killing alleged Israeli collaborators and anti-Islamic fundamentalists, by youths acting without any central control, serves to add more credence to the Israeli opinion that Palestinians are not urbane enough to exercise self determination and govern themselves. These acts of violence have been exacerbated by the successful infiltration of the Shin Beth into the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising.

The international political 'foot-dragging' concerning a Palestinian/Israeli dialogue has been ongoing for a number of years. Even after the denunciation of terrorism, and recognition of the State of Israel in 1988 by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, neither side have been able to arrive at an accord concerning the peace initiative. Fearful of being displaced, the PLO has prevented local Palestinian leaders from using the political advantage of their direct dialogue with Israel. This has been further compounded by the involvement of the United States in its application of diplomatic pressures towards Israel, while
appeasing the American Jewish lobby, and Egypt's emergence as a mediator.

The US suspension of dialogue with the PLO in June 1990, because of the PLO leadership's failure to denounce the attempted seaborne attack near two Israeli beaches on 30 May 1990 by members of the Palestine Liberation Front, has again thwarted any hope of a peace settlement in the foreseeable future. Diplomatic uncertainty and political discord have very effectively provided longevity to the Israeli occupation of the territories.

The tactics of the Palestinians during the first two and a half years have required a degree of imagination, patience and resolve. The impact usually captured by the media was that of children and youths throwing stones at the IDF as a form of limited violence. This served not only to disarm the Israeli authorities but also effectively drew upon the international community's sympathy in its view of the Israeli "Goliath" and the Palestinian "David". It portrayed the average Palestinian not as a "terrorist", but as an oppressed citizen subjected to the disparity of rules of another state.

It nows appears that the symbolic act of stone throwing and tyre burning has run its course, and on a wider scale to continue the same non-cooperative tactics of civil unrest may serve only to stagnate the momentum of the Intifada. It will also allow the Israeli Government to control the peace initiative time-table while simultaneously providing the IDF time to experiment on how to militarily deal with civil unrest. What remains to be seen is the direction that the Intifada will now take.

The first possible course for the Intifada would be to endorse a disciplined, quiet transition towards tactics of non-violence such as hunger strikes, peaceful nationalistic demonstrations and goodwill gestures toward the occupation forces of Israel. This could produce a number of favourable results.

The move towards Palestinian self-reliance, in the form of economic, political and social infrastructures, will allow the authority of the Palestinians, for now the Unified Leadership, to galvanize its position as a recognized governing body. Furthermore, it will serve to disarm the IDF to the point of suppressing the use of small arms. The international acceptance of such tactics may jeopardize US/Israeli relations concerning the occupation of the territories from a human rights perspective. A return to a more unified and cohesive Palestinian community effort may also gather economic, and much needed moral, support from the surrounding Arab States.

Alternatively, armed conflict as a result of either a successful or failed peace initiative is a possible course. The struggle for control of the Intifada between Hamas and the established Unified National Leadership, may precipitate the use of tactics of armed violence against both the IDF and fellow Palestinians.

An escalation of armed conflict would prove detrimental to the Palestinian intent of sustaining world sympathy and support towards the Intifada. It would also widen the rift between the PLO's National Council and Shamir's Nationalist Government. If the Intifada were to escalate to armed violence, it is conceivable that the Palestinian community will fragment and end in a similar situation existing in Lebanon today.

While the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising is responsible for the planning and implementation of some of the tactics of the Intifada, the PLO's greatest effort is required to make the Unified Leadership just that — a unified, cohesive, solely Palestinian authority within the occupied territories. It possesses some semblance of a government by virtue of its demonstrated ability to create and disseminate instructions to Palestinians, and generally achieve the cooperation of the community in support of those instructions.

The Unified Leadership has carefully avoided the apathy and resistance of the older Palestinian generation and directed its energies towards the receptive and spirited younger generation. By hardening the national will of the young "stone throwers" to a long term commitment, the Unified Leadership has undoubtedly provided the Intifada longevity. As stated by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, "Palestinians of the Israeli occupied territories are prepared to endure 500 years, if necessary, in order to attain the goal of an independent Palestinian state". Will there be any stones left to throw?

Major Keefe graduated from OCS Portsea in 1981 and was allotted to RAAC. He has served with 2 CAV Regt and I Armed Regt. He was posted to UNTSO in March 1990 where he served as a UN Military Observer in the Gaza Strip.
The Future of the Australian Defence Industry

By Captain D.A. Biglands, RAEME

Introduction

In 1976 the Government produced the White Paper on Australian Defence, a five year plan for the future development of the Australian Defence Force. The implementation of the plan was delayed due to its dependency on Government funding. It received its first major allocation of funds in 1979, however its forecasted expenditure proved inadequate due to inflation. This resulted in a progressive slipping of the five year plan.

After a bumpy start the White Paper is now the basis for the development and management of Australia's defence. It defines the Australian Defence Policy for the 1980s and onwards as "to conceive, plan, organize and execute joint military operations with overall political direction leading back to the Australian Government"; in plain words this essentially means that Australia be prepared to react independently should the need to do so arise.

To this end, the White Paper included a Defence Industry Policy with the aim "to ensure that the Defence Force can be supported and maintained in Australia, utilizing for the provision of equipment and materiel, a combination of local industry, selective stockholding and reliable overseas sources of supply".

The Defence Industry — Today

The Australian Defence Industry is the equipment and materiel support for the Australian Defence Force. This support is achieved by compliance with current Government policy which comprises a combination of:

a. Local Industry Support;
b. Reliable Overseas Sources of Supply; and
c. Selective Stockholding.

Since the implementation of the White Paper Australia has seen many developments in line with the Defence Industry Policy. The more relevant large scale applications of the local industry clause includes:

a. The Frigate and Submarine contracts,
b. The manufacture under licence of the STEYR self-loading rifle,
c. Army vehicle assembly in Australia,
d. Aircraft and Helicopter assembly under licence in Australia.
e. Australian designed and manufactured Camouflage Clothing.

It is apparent that recent large scale expenditures have incorporated local industry involvement. This is not by chance but is a direct result of two Government policies introduced to support the Defence Industry Policy. These two policies are:

a. The AMC (Australian Manufacture Content); and
b. The AIP (Australian Industry Participation).

AMC — Australian Manufacture Content

The AMC is simply the preference for Australian Manufacture Content in any major equipment purchase. It has resulted in firms such as Mercedes and Landrover (JRA) establishing assembly plants within Australia primarily or solely to support a major equipment purchase.

AIP — Australian Industry Participation

The Government’s AIP Policy basically requires a company, bidding for a major Government programme, to show the value of Australian industry participation it would achieve in fulfilling the contract. This could be in the form of AMC in the actual programme; or in the form of undertaking unrelated work within Australia utilizing the same or similar technology. This technology would be an equivalent benefit to the Government.

The benefits of Local Industry Support can be summed up as the capability to manufacture and maintain military equipment within Australia. This is in line with the self-reliant defensive Australia. This capability can never be too great...
There is a need to develop technology and train personnel as it is this capability that will be the basis for expansion in time of war.

The benefits are two fold, not only does it provide the basis for expansion, it introduces and maintains state of the art technology in the country. The long range benefits of large scale Local Industry Support is the ability to produce not only Australian needs but sufficient quantities of a high standard for export. Thus making this element of the Defence Industry a profit based organisation. This, of course, would require Government support in Labour, Treasurer and Trade controls and subsidies; similiar to Government involvement in the wool and sheep export markets.

Disadvantages of Local Industry Support

The disadvantages of Local Industry Support are more relevant if the support is minimal. That is inadequate expertise of equipment components due to simple assembly only and not large scale manufacture. In some cases, the technology required may be too specialized and may not exist at this time in Australia. This would result in the need to develop the technology and train personnel. In some instances, the time delay this would cause before starting production is unsuitable. As a result, Overseas Suppliers may be the only option.

Reliable Overseas Sources of Supply

Reliable Overseas Sources could be regrouped to allies as these sources must be accessible during time of conflict, and must be politically stable to ensure that they can maintain supply support. This criteria reduces the overseas suppliers to two groups. The first is America the second is Commonwealth Countries — primarily Britain.

America

Since 1951 and the signing of the ANZUS alliance, America has been an ally to Australia.
The loss of technical expertise is a dangerous path to tread

This alliance has been supported in the past by Australia providing troops to fight in American conflicts. Vietnam is an obvious example.

An alliance lasting almost 40 years and still being relevant is rare to say the least. The ANZUS alliance has been revamped to reflect current defence needs for both countries. America has large scale installations in Australia supporting its defence requirements and Australia has once again supported America in conflict, I refer to the Persian Gulf conflict involving Iraq and Kuwait. This support is not necessarily mutually assured; meaning that in the event that Australia was in conflict America may not send troops in.

This possibility is no cause for alarm with respect to the Australian Defence Industry as long as supply support is maintained. This is likely.

Traditional ties with the Commonwealth have secured Britain and other stable Commonwealth Countries as reliable overseas suppliers. The more obvious examples are Britain’s JRA Landrovers and Germany’s Leopard Tanks and Mercedes Unimog Trucks. The emphasis here must be on stable countries.

Germany, although not a Commonwealth Country, incorporates a large British contingency which enhances its stability and reliability as a supplier.

### The Benefits of Reliable Overseas Supply Sources

The benefits of Reliable Overseas Supply Sources can be grouped into one simple phrase, “timely economic high technology”. The use of Overseas Suppliers enables the Australian Defence Industry to procure advanced technology at a reduced expense compared to developing it in Australia. It enables the Defence Force to procure and maintain state of the art technology.

### The Disadvantages of Reliable Overseas Supply Sources

The disadvantages of Reliable Overseas Supply Sources are:

a. The time delay for delivery due to distance.
b. The loss of the capability to maintain high technical equipment within Australia.
**Time Delay for Delivery.** The time delay for delivery for parts or equipment is not a critical issue in peacetime but in time of conflict this could be a major shortcoming of overseas supply. This could lead to the need to stockpile expensive equipment to overcome the effect of delays. In an era of high technical developments this could lead to committing a large portion of funds to holding equipment which may become obsolete before it is required for use.

**The Loss of the Technology.** The loss of the technological expertise is a dangerous path to tread. It is offset by the quality of products manufactured today which outperform and outlast their predecessors, take the television for example. Television repairs are becoming a thing of the past, yet they last just as long. In technical terms the Mean Time Between failure of high technical items has improved dramatically and items procured today may never break down during their useful life. The inability to understand or maintain high-tech equipment quickly places the user in a compromising position should the political situation change and supply from an overseas source simply stop. Once again this option may lead to stockpiling of items to offset any immediate problems.

**Selective Stockholding**

Selective Stockholding would be based on usage and a predetermined supply lead times. For overseas supplied equipment this would result in holding greater quantities to compensate for the delay time for delivery. As opposed to lower levels for products produced within Australia.

Holding Stock commits funds to cover the unknown arisings due to supply problems. These funds could have been better utilized in times of economic constraints.

**The Defence Industry — The Future**

The Defence Industry supports the Australian Defence Force. As such its future is dependent on trends and changes in the configuration of the defence force. To provide a better understanding of the future of the defence industry we must first consider the future of the Australian Defence Force.

**The Australian Defence Force - The Future.** The future of the Defence Force in Australia is quite predictable. It has evolved into a high-tech state of the art defence force. It is dependent on technically advanced equipment to provide greater mobility and range. It can only be considered as a dynamic body and as such will undergo continual change and redevelopment. It’s development must match or surpass that of its immediate area of threat. As such the support required from the Defence Industry must be dynamic and keep pace with the development of the Defence Force.

**The Dynamic Defence Industry.** To be dynamic the defence industry must have a strong base to grow from. This base is being constructed now under current Local Industry Support Policy incorporating AMC (Australian Manufacture Content) and AIP (Australian Industry Participation). The only shortfall in this area is the lack of technical expertise due to overseas supplied equipment.

**Reliable Overseas Supply Sources.** Reliable overseas supply sources can only be counted on if the political climate is maintained. This may be to the detriment of Australia. The strength in a Defence Force is in its ability to take the initiative and this is reduced if other countries politics must be observed. In addition, since supplies are coming from overseas they are susceptible to disruption in time of conflict. Britain would not have withstood six years of bombardment in World War II if they did not produce the majority of their equipment from in country sources. The major disadvantage to overseas supply sources is the need to stockpile equipment to compensate for the lead time for delivery and any foreseeable shortages.

**Selective Stockholding.** Selective Stockholding is a fact of life for any defence force industry. It is essential to have immediate access to a predetermined quantity of equipment to cover contingencies. However, the quantity necessary to support overseas supplied items is far greater than that for local industry supported items. The end result in monetary terms is a large degree of funds tied up in stock because:

a. Australia does not have the technology to produce the item, or
b. Australia can not afford the time or funds required to develop the expertise needed to produce the item.
In reality, Australia is not importing equipment from overseas supply sources but is importing technology. The cost is far greater than the procurement cost because it also includes the cost of stockpiling adequate stores to support contingency planning. The cost for buying and storing equipment could be offset by accepting a delay in production of the item and developing the technology in Australia. The cost for developing the technology would be offset by reducing the storage required and, if the quality is high, the equipment could be sold on the world market. In addition, it would increase Local Industry Support. The only criteria for this is to plan ahead.

**Conclusion**

Research into the Australian Defence Industry has highlighted the benefits of the Local Industry Support policy which has been enhanced by the Australian Manufacture Content (AMC) and the Australian Industry Participation (AIP) policies. This has provided a secure base for expansion and maintained the technology within the Nation involved in supporting the Defence Industry.

However, the Reliable Overseas Supply Source could be considered to be a risk. It leaves unknowns for ongoing supply in times of conflict and generates the need to commit funds to large stockholding of items. The less the Overseas Supply Source is used the more independent the Defence Industry. However any reduction must be carefully offset by introduction and development of equivalent technology within Australia.

Selective Stockholding appears to be an offshoot of the Overseas Supply Source rather than a stand alone system. It provides flexibility to Local Industry Support. However, it is also tied up with providing adequate support to overseas supplied items. The costs involved in supporting this option would be better used in developing the necessary technology within Australia.

**Recommendations**

It is recommended that:

a. Local Industry Support be increased.

b. Reliable Overseas Supply Sources be critically analysed with the aim of completely removing the sources and replacing them with an Australian supplier. The removal of the overseas supply sources be instigated in conjunction with the introduction of its relevant replacement on a one for one basis, taking into account the time needed to introduce the new technology.

c. Develop the new technology to a high level of quality and export excess to the world market.

d. Selective Stockholdings be reduced in conjunction with the removal of overseas supply sources; and the released funds be redirected into research and development of the relevant technology in Australian Local Industry Support.

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The Development of Leadership Theory

By Captain M.J. Barry, ARA

What makes a good leader?
What makes a leader good?

Introduction

For centuries people have recognised that some persons are good leaders while others are not. History has brought to the fore many great leaders, Moses, Washington, Gandhi and Churchill are notable amongst a small but highly distinguished group of people that have earned themselves a permanent place in our history. Many definitions have been advanced in an attempt to define leadership. The Australia Army defines it as, “the art of consistently influencing and directing men in tasks in such ways as to obtain their willing obedience, confidence, respect and loyal cooperation in the manner desired by the leader,” while Peters and Waterman quote political scientist James MacGregor Burns who says that leadership builds on man's need for meaning and is inseparable from the followers' needs and goals, it thus raises people to higher levels of motivation and morality. One of the most comprehensive definitions, and the one that will be adopted for this article, is that put forward by Jago,

"Leadership is both a process and a property. The process of leadership is the use of noncoercive influence to direct and coordinate the activities of the members of an organised group toward the accomplishment of group objectives. As a property, leadership is the set of qualities or characteristics attributed to those who are perceived to successfully employ such influence." 7

The art of influencing people is the very essence of leadership and researchers first sought to establish those characteristics and behaviours that distinguish leaders from followers, and 'good' leaders from mere 'average' ones. Initially, it was thought that leaders were 'born' rather than 'made', but by the 1930s it was realised that leadership ability could be developed. This led researchers to begin examining the character and personality of great leaders in the hope that a list of traits, or characteristics, would emerge that could be used as a standard against which a persons' leadership ability or potential could be measured. Although this approach was highly regarded for some time it soon became apparent that leaders could be found that did not comply with these characteristics and the search for the answer moved on to behavioural factors. This area of research focussed on the specific types of leader behaviour which, it was felt, would determine the effectiveness of the group. Again, many researchers found that many leaders simply did not behave in the standard way postulated in the research. Whilst unsuccessful, the research did result in the Ohio State experiments which identified the 'consideration' and 'structuring dimensions' as two of the major types of leadership behaviour seen by subordinates.

The 'trait' and 'behavioural' approaches are grouped under the general heading 'Universalist' leadership theories because they postulate that there is 'one best method' of leadership and that a specific set of traits or behaviour could be identified and emulated that would meet all situations. These approaches proved to be too simplistic and failed to take into account many factors such as the environment, the task and the nature of the subordinates. A new theory was developed which said that it was not what a leader was, or how he behaves, that determines his effectiveness but rather the situation that he is in that will determine what he is and how he will behave. McGregor says that leadership is not a property of the individual, but a complex relationship among four variables; the leaders characteristics, the needs, attitudes and characteristics of the followers, the characteristics of the organisation and the social, economic and political situation. The Situational, or Contingency, theories are widely accepted and comprise a number of approaches; of these, Fiedler's situational-trait approach, the Path-Goal and decision tree theories and functional leadership will be examined. This article will discuss these theories and outline the authors view that there
is no single, comprehensive, leadership theory but that effective leadership is developed from the leaders own personality and is influenced by his reaction to the situation and the needs of the group, the individuals within the group and the needs of the task that is being undertaken.

**Universalist Leadership Approaches**

Dating from ancient Greek times the most widely accepted theory of leadership assumed that great leaders were born to their greatness. Later termed the ‘Great Man’ approach, this view concluded that leaders were destined for positions of influence from birth and throughout history certain men and women with special qualities have at times risen to positions of prominence through their own innate abilities. Sir Francis Galton, argued that leadership qualities were based on heredity and numerous examples of this approach could be cited with the ‘obvious’ leadership qualities of the various ruling nobility and Royal families ample evidence of the accuracy of the theory. While certainly true that some people are ‘born’ leaders, it bodes ill for the Army and society in general, if there is no choice except to wait for these people to emerge. This approach has been criticised as it ignores the influence of the environment on the developing leader. A child born into the British Royal Family, or the American Kennedy family, for example, would be influenced by the many powerful people he or she comes into contact with and may adopt the strong leadership characteristics of these people. These criticisms led researchers in the early 1930s to believe that if the characteristics of these ‘natural’ leaders could be identified and emulated then it would be possible to train people to become leaders by adopting these traits.

**Leadership Trait Approaches**

The first systematic approach taken in an effort to understand leadership was the attempt to identify the set of personal characteristics, or leadership traits, of successful leaders. Such people were thought to possess certain endowed traits that enabled them to be successful leaders in any situation. In their search for these traits researchers took two approaches; they attempted to compare the traits of leaders with those of non-leaders; and they attempted to compare the traits of effective leaders with those of ineffective ones. This early research found some consistencies in that successful leaders tended to be taller than followers, they tended to rate higher on IQ tests and tended to show higher levels of initiative, energy and ambition. Ralph Stodgill conducted an intensive review of this research in 1948 and found a positive correlation for these traits but other research found less correlation. Bird, in 1940, found that only five percent of ‘discovered leadership traits’ were common in four or more investigations while Gibb in 1954 concluded that the ‘numerous studies of the personalities of leaders have failed to find any consistent pattern of traits which characterise leaders.’ The first major criticisms of the trait approach stem from the difficulty of both defining and measuring a specific trait. Many ‘essential’ leadership traits began to appear and some researchers applied different labels to what was essentially the same trait or conversely the same label to different traits. While it is easy to measure a person’s height, and relatively simple to compare intelligence, it is substantially more difficult to measure a person’s level of initiative or energy and it very quickly became apparent that not all leaders displayed the same traits and that some successful leaders would not be successful in a different situation. Stodgill wrote, “The characteristics, considered singly, hold little diagnostic or predictive significance.” In summary, the trait approach ignores the personalities and needs of the subordinates, it ignores the nature of the task, and the nature of the studies makes it impossible to generalise findings from one situation to another. The trait approach should not be discarded entirely however, as it is essential that a leader be able to understand his own strong and weak points so that he may capitalise on his strong points and endeavour to develop his weak. Certain traits, while not a guarantee of success as a leader if present, will certainly inhibit the possibility of success if absent. Army leadership doctrine lists integrity, loyalty, moral courage, responsibility, initiative and decisiveness amongst its list of desirable leadership qualities and says that, “If demonstrated in daily activities these distinguishing
personality traits help the leader to earn the respect, confidence, willing obedience and loyal co-operation of his men.”

**Behavioural Leadership Approaches**

Rather than look for trait characteristics of effective leaders, behavioural theories have concentrated on what the leader does and how he behaves in performing the leadership function. Whereas most trait studies sought to separate leaders from non-leaders, and effective leaders from ineffective ones, behavioural studies attempted to determine how various kinds of specific behaviours affect the performance and satisfaction of followers. Studies identified four different leadership styles that warrant discussion. Leaders are said to be either ‘production-centered’ or ‘employee-centered’; they adopt an ‘initiating structure’ or ‘consideration’ approach; they are ‘close’ or ‘general’ leaders; and they adopt either an ‘authoritarian’ or participative-democratic’ style of leadership.

Studies conducted at the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center by Likert in the 1950s were developed to determine what types of foreman behaviour led to high productivity and employee satisfaction. Two dimensions of leader behaviour were identified by which a leader was said to be either ‘employee centered’ or ‘production centered’; it was initially thought that these styles were at either end of a continuum, but research showed that the two dimensions were not contradictory and that a leader could be high on both at the same time.

The Ohio State University studies conducted by Stodgill also sought to identify different types of leader behaviour and developed the notion of ‘consideration’ (employee orientated) or ‘initiating structure’ (task-orientated) leadership. Researchers however, found that subordinate ratings of leader effectiveness did not depend on the particular style of the leader but on the situation in which the style was used.

Other studies at Michigan found that leaders could be classified as either ‘close’ or ‘general’ and that the level of supervision used by a supervisor would range from ‘close’ at one end of a continuum, through ‘general’ to ‘laissez faire’, or ‘free-reign’, at the other. This would effect the level of productivity and satisfaction of an employee depending, once again, on other factors such as the situation, the employee needs and the task requirements.

A number of writers distinguish between authoritarian and democratic, or participative, leadership styles in which an autocratic leader will wield a high degree of authority over the group and make most decisions while a democratic leader will delegate authority where possible and allow subordinates a high degree of latitude in making their own decisions. Studies into the effects of an autocratic style of leadership versus a democratic style have proved inconclusive with a study by Lewin, Lippitt and White in 1940 finding that it was impossible to accurately assess the effects of the two styles in terms of productivity. Other studies found that while job satisfaction increased under a democratic style of leadership, its relationship to productivity remained unchanged.

The Australian Army summarises leader behaviour by saying that a leader should adopt, “... a style of leadership appropriate to that particular situation.”

On the whole, it appears as if these various ‘pairs’ of leadership style have much in common and can be broadly grouped into a ‘people’ and a ‘task’ orientation, but it is clear that no particular style is exclusive of the others and in fact a degree of each is possible. Stodgill said that none of the studies into leader behaviour demonstrated that a change in leader behaviour was related to change in productivity, group cohesiveness or satisfaction. Numerous other studies into leader behaviour have been conducted, but as it became apparent that leader effectiveness was dependant upon the leaders ability to adapt his style to meet a changing situation, leadership research began to concentrate on the effects of the situation on leadership success.

**Contingency Leadership Approaches**

Researchers began to try to identify the factors in the situation that influenced the effectiveness of particular leadership styles. Tannenbaum and Schmidt concluded that, “effective leadership depends on the leader, his followers, the situation,
and the relationship between them." and how the work situation affects a leader will depend upon his perception of that situation and various other factors such as his personality, experiences and expectations. Rather than concentrating on those factors that can influence leader behaviour, the contingency approaches to leadership attempt to identify which factors are most important under given circumstances, and to predict the leadership style that will be most effective under those circumstances. Researchers then attempted to identify methods by which a leader could learn to alter his leadership style to suit the needs of the situation.

**Fiedler's Contingency Model**

F.E. Fiedler argued that group performance or effectiveness is dependent upon the personality and leadership style of the leader, and the degree to which the situation gives the leader control and influence. The leader's personality is identified by a measure which reflects his primary goals in the leadership situation, the relationship-motivated person receives self-esteem from good interpersonal relationships with group members and accomplishes the task through these good relations, while the task-motivated leader obtains satisfaction and self-esteem from the more tangible evidence of his competence and focuses primarily on completion of the task before devoting time to cementing relationships with his subordinates. He identifies a leader's primary motivation by measuring his Least Preferred Co-Worker (LPC) score which is obtained by asking a leader to describe the worker they least enjoyed working with and scoring their feelings along a bipolar scale. The sum of the resulting scores becomes the LPC score which reflects a relatively stable personality attribute.

The other major variable of this model is the situational favourableness, or the amount of situational control that the leader enjoys. This is measured by assessing the degree to which the leader is or feels accepted and supported by group members, how clear-cut and structured the task is and how much 'position power' the leader enjoys. Several empirical studies support a weighting of these factors which gives greater importance to leader-member relations and a lesser weighting to position power. The leadership style adopted will depend upon the strength of the leader's position and the structure of the task being undertaken. A study of US infantry squad leaders demonstrated that the positive effects of experience and training contribute greatly to the leaders sense of confidence and situational control. The junior leaders were evaluated shortly after being assigned new squads in a newly formed infantry division and again five months later; the study found that the level of situational control had improved significantly after the leaders had gained experience and had had an opportunity to get to know their men.

Fiedler's theory indicates that group performance can be improved by either changing the leaders motivational structure or by modifying the situation, but has been criticised by studies which do not support the LPC score and indications that the scale itself is flawed, resulting in different scores on different days for the same person. It is doubtful that the theory, by itself, can consistently predict leader effectiveness and other situational factors, such as the leader's character, are omitted by the theory, and should be considered.

**House's Path-Goal Theory**

House drew some of his ideas from the Expectancy-Valence Theory and the earlier work of Vroom (1959) and Evans (1968, 1970), who had concentrated on the 'Initiating Structure' and 'Consideration' styles identified in the Ohio State studies. He argued that at least four types of leader behaviour must be recognised, and that these styles can be practised by the same manager at varying times and in varying situations. He said that a leader will choose from directive leadership, supportive leadership, achievement-oriented leadership and participative leadership depending upon the situation.

His theory suggests that effective leadership clarifies the paths through which subordinates can achieve both work related and personal goals, and the particular style selected will determine whether or not they feel satisfaction with their work, whether they can identify a link between effort and performance goals and whether or not
these goals will in fact lead to the satisfaction of their needs.

It should be remembered that Fiedler demonstrated that managers often have difficulty in changing their leadership style, and in fact their perception of the situation can vary considerably to that of their subordinates, so even if they are able to change their style they may select an inappropriate one. When leaders can, however, help subordinates to work along paths that achieve both the unit’s objectives and their own personal goals, then conflict is reduced and satisfaction and productivity increased.

**Vroom and Yetton’s Normative Theory**

One of the most sophisticated theories developed, Vroom and Yetton’s Normative Theory focuses on the amount of participation that leaders should allow their subordinates in decisions relating to their jobs. The model is aimed at how to get decisions made and implemented, rather than how to improve productivity or subordinate satisfaction. Through the use of a Decision Process Flowchart the leader will analyse the problem to be resolved and then select an appropriate decision style out of a series of five, ranging from Autocratic I, in which he makes the decision himself without consulting his subordinates, to Group Consensus II, in which he meets with the subordinates as a group to discuss the problem and allows the group to make the decision. In order to use the flowchart the leader asks himself seven questions about the problem; the first three questions concern the problem itself and relate to the amount of information available, the importance of the solution and the structure of the problem, while the remaining four questions relate to subordinate acceptance of any decision made. Research by Vroom and Jago appears to validate the theory and indicates that a manager who selects a style from the ‘feasible set’ will rate higher as a leader with both superiors and subordinates. Although too complex and cumbersome for everyday use, it does provide a framework for solving future problems and aids in the development of a disciplined approach to the decision making process and a reminder to the leader of the options available for decision making.

**Functional Leadership and Directive Control**

The functional approach to leadership does not introduce a new style or method of leadership, but instead provides a rational explanation of what has always happened in effective leadership. The Australian Army has taught functional leadership to its junior leaders for a number of years and is now expanding upon this doctrine by adopting a policy of ‘Directive Control’, a doctrine based on the German ‘Auftragstaktik’, which is loosely translated as ‘Mission Oriented Tactics’. The ‘functional’ leadership theory says that the functions required of a leader in any given situation will be determined by the needs arising from within the group, the needs of individuals within the group and the needs of the task that the group is to undertake. It is the responsibility of the leader to correctly identify the needs that have to be met, recognise which needs warrant priority of attention and adopt an appropriate leadership style; ‘Authorisation’, ‘Democratic’ or ‘Free Reign’ in order to satisfy the most urgent needs first. In order to achieve this, the leader must first know his own strengths and weaknesses so that he may capitalise on his strong characteristics and develop his weak, he must know the strengths, weaknesses and needs of his subordinates and he must have an intimate understanding of the situation and the tasks at hand. The leader will then place a priority on the satisfaction of these needs because there will be times when the needs of the task outweigh those of the group and the individual, while at other times attention can be given to satisfying these needs first and he will adopt an appropriate leadership style in order to satisfy these needs. While it may appear that he may sacrifice some needs in order to satisfy others, this does not have to be the case, as an effective leader will attempt to structure a task so that group and individual needs are met while also meeting task needs.

Directive Control is similar to ‘Management by Objectives’ in which a subordinate is given set goals to achieve, but differs in that he is given maximum latitude in carrying out his tasks. Field Marshal von Manstein wrote,

“It has always been a particular strength of the German military leadership that it relied
on, and encouraged leaders at all levels to accept responsibility, act independently and to use their initiative.”

The staggering successes of the German Wermacht early in WWII were largely the result of intensive training in this doctrine, and their later failures were due to a disregard of this proven formula by the German High Command. Modern Bundeswehr doctrine emphasises this principle and states that, “the commander will lay down the Mission, direction and framework of action for his subordinates . . . (who) have freedom of action and judgement in how they execute their mission.”

In order for this form of leadership to succeed, the leader must give his subordinates clear goals and he must thrust them to work toward those goals. He must be prepared to accept mistakes from his subordinates, secure in the knowledge that it is only by innovative action and the taking of calculated risks, that his subordinates will be able to realise their own potential and that maximum performance will be achieved. This concept is tried and proven and offers an opportunity for leaders to obtain high levels of performance from capable subordinates. Application of ‘Auftragtaktik’ in any organisation needs to be actively fostered at all levels from the top down, it cannot be forced onto people but can be achieved through senior managements’ willingness to apply its principles themselves and to allow their subordinates the opportunity to learn and develop from within their own abilities.

**Conclusion**

In summary, it can be stated that no one theory or style of leadership is suitable for all situations because the personalities and needs of the people involved are as different as the demands of the task and the external factors influencing their interpersonal relationships and behaviour. Effective leadership is constructed from the aspects of each theory appropriate to a particular situation and is built upon the personality and character of the leader. The most famous of world leaders were very much a product of the environment that they were placed in, imagine Hitler as an Australian today, at ‘best’ he would be a militant union leader, but the German political and economic environment of the 1920s and ‘30s gave him the platform from which he could strive for world domination in an effort to rebuild Germany and avenge her treatment at Versailles. The following illustrations demonstrate a number of situations in which different styles of leadership are appropriate and acceptable:

a. In a high stress situation such as combat an authoritative leadership style with leadership characteristics such as decisiveness, judgement, courage and initiative being dominant would be most appropriate. The situation precludes adequate time for participative decision making and the subordinates need to be able to rely on the leader for strength, motivation and control.

b. At the other extreme, in a social recreational situation, the leadership style adopted needs to be informal with the emphasis being on participation in decision making and freedom of action by subordinates. Leader characteristics in this environment would include friendliness, openness, communication and trust, as the leader allows the subordinates a high degree of ‘free reign’.

c. Similarly, in a counselling situation, the emphasis would be on a participative leadership style with integrity, loyalty, honesty and openness being dominant characteristics.

Leadership theory has undergone substantial development and refinement from its early ‘Great Man’ approach to the present day. Research has proved that there is no definitive list of leadership qualities and that there is no ‘one best style’ of leadership that can be applied to all situations. Successful leadership is achieved when the leader is aware of his own capabilities, when he understands the needs and abilities of his subordinates, both as a group and as individuals, when he understands the requirements of the task, and when he is able to adapt his own style of leadership so that the needs of each are met. He needs to be able to structure the task so that his subordinates are able to use their own initiative and resources in effecting its completion so that their own needs are met as they meet those of the task.
Effective leadership is not an 'art' or a 'science' but a deliberate application of strong character traits and an appropriate style of interpersonal behaviour into a situation so that the needs of both the people and the task are met. The effective leader must be able to recognise that a situation requires a particular leadership style, be able to identify that style and be able to alter his own behaviour and adopt the appropriate leadership for that particular situation.

NOTES
27. Fiedler, op cit. pp.276-379.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
Child Care Services in the Australian Defence Force

By Lieutenant J.A. Wittwer, RAN

Changing attitudes and opportunities in industry have meant that there has been a significant increase in the number of women in the workforce. Between 1981 and 1986, two thirds of the increase in the Australian workforce participants were women, half of whom were married. In 1986, 40% of women in 'couple families' with a child aged less than five years were in the workforce.

Child care in NSW is currently satisfying only 47% of the public demand and waiting lists of up to two years are not uncommon in many of the State's 1600 community-based centres caring for 125,000 children. Many private centres operating under similar guidelines are available, again for limited numbers; however, despite years of union lobbying and strong affirmative action and maternity leave legislation, there is currently few private work-based child care centres in Australia.

The increased participation of women in the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and the rising number of single parents remaining in, and joining the Defence Force has generated a requirement for child care services to be available exclusively to ADF personnel and employees of Department of Defence. Community-based centres, subsided by Federal and State Governments do not recognise the itinerant lifestyle of Service personnel and subsequently will not guarantee places in their centres for Defence families. In view of this, the necessity for a facility purely for Service personnel within a Service environment has to be recognised.

One of the major reasons behind the concept of work-based child care, aside from assisting single parents and the increasing prevalence of two income families, is that there is the need for the return of Servicewomen to duty following pregnancy and the lack of full-time child care facilities. Generally the ADF are losing female serving members, many with years of training and experience, following pregnancy, and in order to sustain productivity within the Services, we need to reduce turnover. If we can attract Servicewomen to return to duty, we can avoid additional recruitment costs, training costs and the costs in the loss of expertise and experience.

Our aim in reducing turnover is to attract Servicewomen to return from Maternity Leave sooner, rendering these individuals immediately productive upon their return. Therefore, in order to retain both female and male staff, we should demonstrate we are progressing the development of Service Personnel policies, express a genuine interest in the welfare of serving members and ensure all serving members can benefit from the provision of child care services.

A long day care centre in a military base would aid the ADF by reducing the number of Servicewomen leaving the Service due to the lack of appropriate child care, reducing the period of Leave Without Pay (LWOP) in association with Maternity Leave — this will occur as Servicewomen have the opportunity to return to work knowing their babies are being professionally cared for, reducing the resettling process of newly posted personnel and their needs for child care can be pre-arranged prior to arrival in the new locality, and increasing the conditions of service for members, thus a further enticement to remain in the ADF.

Some attempt, in recent years, has been made to significantly address the needs of Service families, and in particular, the child care needs of both single and two-parent families in the defence environment. It is important to note that many Defence families live in a very close Service environment in “Married Patches” ashore or
onboard a Defence establishment. A policy was formalised within the Cross Report, that proposed (Recommendation 17):

'The Minister for Defence, Science and Personnel to:
• develop a policy that recognises the special child care needs of service personnel and their spouses;
• implement a programme to meet those needs within the next three years; and
• in the interim, grant immediate subsidies to existing ADF child care facilities consistent with the 'user pays' principle'.

The Minister has taken action on the objectives embodied in this recommendation within the broader context of a Family Support Policy, and the broad objectives of such a policy are to encourage self-help among Service families, improve access to community facilities, maximise the benefits of presently available facilities and resources by limited funding of programmes which benefit a majority of Service families and support projects that are working towards building a sense of community amongst Defence Force families.

The Family Support Policy also embodies the increasing awareness of the contribution that the families of Service members make in support of their spouses' chosen career. The policy recognises the desire of Service families to help themselves to the maximum extent possible and to determine community needs in their local area. The Family Support Funding Programme is designed to support projects undertaken at the local level that will benefit the majority of Service families and assists in providing finance to establish much needed services, such as child care.

Under this initiative, employers provide a child care facility and the Commonwealth makes a contribution towards fee relief for parents using the service. In addition to fee relief, the Commonwealth would also provide resource staff to advise and assist employees during the establishment of new centres.

At this stage, all Commonwealth, State and Local Government bodies, including the ADF, are excluded from receiving Commonwealth assistance in the form of fee relief through the Industry Initiative. However, as part of the National Child Care Programme, the Commonwealth will increase fee relief rates substantially and extend eligibility for fee relief to commercial and public sector child care centres from 1 January 1991. This was announced as part of the child care package presented by the Prime Minister in his 1990 Election statement. New guidelines in relation to the changes to child care policy and information on how employees can benefit will become available from Department of Community Services and Health.

The benefits of employer only supported centres include total control over the centre's management and funding, all places are exclusively reserved for employees, and the centre is not dependant on the Government funding. Without employer supported child care, parents may find their planned return to work is not possible because of the lack of community child care facilities, particularly for children under the age of three. In contrast, if work-based child care is available, parents will not have to worry about child care arrangements, or having to take time off work when arrangements fall through. Personnel are more productive with the knowledge that their children are close by, being cared for in a quality environment, and helps alleviate the stress of combining work with raising a family.

Certainly, Service personnel are no exception. The availability of child care also means that Servicewomen, who might otherwise have to discharge from the Service because of difficulties with child care arrangements, are able to continue working and pursue their career. In mid-year 1989, the Commanding Officer,1 HMAS NIRIMBA, addressed the apparent need to provide child care for parents on the base, and generally within the Defence Force community. His major concern was the loss of highly skilled, trained, and in most cases, experienced personnel, following pregnancy and Maternity Leave, and single parents left to care for their children.

### Employer Supported Child Care

Employer supported child care is emerging as one of the major human resources issues for industry in Australia, and the changing face of the Australian economy, work force and family has highlighted child care as a vital link between productivity and work force needs of management and the child care needs of employees.

The Industry Initiative introduced in mid 1988 was designed to encourage industry to invest in the provision of child care for their employees.
The environment should be appropriate to the needs of the children following separation and divorce. He saw the necessity and the resources available to establish a facility within HMAS NIRIMBA. The Little Pelicans Child Care Centre Inc, a fully licensed and staffed centre, was established and operating 12 months from its inception.

To evaluate the needs and objective assessment crucial to the long-term integrity and success of establishing a work-based child care centre, a survey should be distributed to a sample population of the base. The results of this survey will indicate the type of care required and necessary facilities. A survey conducted in HMAS NIRIMBA reflected that Service members found it extremely difficult to obtain suitable child care in community-based centres which offer hours to suit and quality care. These personnel generally rely on family or paid “baby sitters” on a full-time basis to care for their child. The survey results indicated the need for long day care for the 0-5 year age group.

In determining the prerequisites for planning a child care centre on a Defence establishment, consideration should be given to:

- suitability of site (building and surrounding grounds);
- NSW Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) Children’s Services regulations for licensing;
- access and by whom;
- cost to operate and parent fees; and
- safety and educational facilities.

**Location and Suitability of Proposed Site**

The suitability of a proposed site for a child care centre is of paramount importance, and a building with existing facilities such as power and telephone lines, and adjacent to a Car-park, could be identified as a suitable site for a proposed centre. Australian Construction Services (ACS) should then be invited to assess the building and determine cost estimates to renovate the building. Estimates provided for the building identified as an appropriate site for HMAS NIRIMBA’s centre, to include floor coverings, wall and ceiling linings, ceiling insulation, hydraulics, sewerage, painting, electrics, carpentry and ceramic tiling, totalled $52,000.00.
Following initial discussions with the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), a member of the Property and Services Branch will visit the base on invitation and view the proposed site and child care centre architectural brief, which should be drafted in consultation with FACS requirements. (The FACS Building Project Supervisors are responsible for receiving and assessing plans in accordance with the requirements of the Act and FACS regulations, site inspections, overseeing construction and ensuring buildings are of a suitable standard, advising on building layouts and environs in respect of the regulations construction materials and safety standards for children and providing technical advice to Children's Services Advisers). The FACS officer can then advise on the capability of the centre, i.e., number of children and age group.

Much of the refurbishment of the building can be initially undertaken by base trades personnel, including the wall and ceiling insulation and lining, wiring of electrics and framework for each room. In HMAS NIRMBA, ACS were then employed to complete the building to the required standard. Additionally, NIRMBA's gardeners volunteered to landscape the playground, to include a paved area and built-in sand-pit.

**Department of Family and Community Services — Licensing Regulations**

FACS were consulted from the outset, as the regulations governing child care in NSW define the minimum acceptable standards as a guideline, and licensing, as such, of a child care service, aims to ensure that the physical, social, emotional, intellectual and cultural environment is appropriate to the needs of the children requiring care. FACS have a statutory responsibility for the licensing and oversight of children's services for children aged from birth to 12 years of age. The Department's aim is to foster quality care and the regulations for children's Services are designed to achieve this and meet the needs of both the parents and children. To this end, FACS encourage maximum use of the specialist support and advisory services offered by their department.

FACS have seven regions throughout NSW and within each region there is a Children’s Services team comprising a Community Pro-gramme Adviser, Funding and Licensing personnel, and Children's Services Advisers located at local community Welfare Centres. There are four main facets to the services provided within the region — licensing, funding, planning and community development, and Advisory Service.

Under the provisions of the new Regulations for Child Care Services to accompany the Children's (Care and Protection) Act 1987, wherever one or more children under school age who are unrelated to the carer are minded outside their own home, a license is required. These licences are issued by FACS. Before a license can be granted for a Child Care Centre, certain requirements must be met regarding the physical aspects of the building and its environs and to the staffing, equipment and programmes.

The licensing function of the Department involve ensuring the premises meet Departmental Regulations Local Government Ordinance (for development and zoning as applicable) and Board of Fire Commissioners (however, on Commonwealth property, these aspects are not relevant, and fire protection for the building should be in accordance with Service requirements for any building. Naturally, Council approval is not required for the construction of or refurbishment to a building on Commonwealth property); employment of adequate, suitable and trained staff; verification of license applications and issue of licence, adequate and suitable equipment and furnishings etc., which meet FACS requirements; ensuring the provision of appropriate programmes in accordance with the children's ages and maintenance of health, physical and emotional environments.

The regulations for centre-based child care services establish the minimum standards which services may operate in order to retain a licence. What is important is FACS licensing protects the interests of the children and as these regulations are the minimum standards and of nil cost to procure a licence, licensing should be the foremost factor in establishing such a service.

**Management Body**

The Management Committee has an important role in maintaining a level of operation which ensures that the service meets all regulatory requirements. The responsibilities, delegations,
CHILD CARE SERVICES IN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

An incorporated, licensed centre allows for the employment of qualified staff

and accountabilities of the Management Body of a child care centre should be clearly defined to include finances, policy, staffing, premises and equipment, legalities and accountability requirements. Centre management should represent the interests of the employers, parent users, unions and centre staff.

The management body should develop a constitution, Rules of Association (for Incorporation), practices and processes and these should include the name of organisation — which should reflect the purpose of the service and the place with which it is associated, the office address, the goals and specific objectives — to reflect what the organisation hopes to achieve, powers of organisation, eligibility, composition, elections to management body, duties, powers and proceedings of management body, annual, general and extraordinary meetings, alterations to the constitution, and books, records, accounts, documents and security of the organisation.

The Management Committee has a responsibility to develop personnel policies which clearly define employment conditions for staff, and which outline the organisational structure, staff responsibilities and policies of the centre. Policies will be regulated to some extent by laws and regulations as industrial acts and awards, FACS regulations, Department of Community Services and Health requirements and Department of Health regulations. Parents should be made aware of the centre's policies and a parent information booklet will inform parents of these policies.

Incorporation of the Association through the NSW Corporate Affairs Commission is a necessity to provide members of an association with limited liability. Incorporation is the process of legislation through which an organisation is recognised under the law as having an identity and legal status separate from its individual members. This enables the organisation to act in all financial and legal matters as an organisation. An Incorporated organisation may enter into contractual arrangements with businesses, employees, etc, in its own name instead of having to use the names of management committee members. Additionally, Incorporation protects the individual members from being personally and separately liable for any debts incurred by the organisation.

Incorporation provides members of the organisation with limited liability — members are not responsible for all debts incurred or actions
taken against the organisation; perpetual succession — the organisation's existence is not terminated or affected by changes in membership; and title to all assets vested in the company — it may sue and be sued in its own name.

The Associations Incorporation Act has been designed specifically so that community groups including child care centres can Incorporate cheaply and quickly as an association. The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) can advise if problems are encountered, and the organisation is required to take out insurance cover as required by the Associations Incorporation Act ($5 million public liability). The Committee must also appoint a 'Public Officer' to whom all correspondence will be forwarded, and is usually the person who carried out Incorporation. (A Defence Legal Officer is a good suggestion!). The Public Officer must be a resident of NSW, and may be a member of the committee, an employee or interested outsider. Additionally, changes to the Rules of Association must be passed by special resolution, and the ACT requires that accounts be prepared and presented at an annual general meeting.

Rules and Objects of Association are modelled on the rules provided by the CAC but can include additions as appropriate. In the case of a Defence child care centre, the Rules can include membership to the Association and use of the centre to be only available to serving members of the ADF and civilian employees of Department of Defence and their families. Additionally, the Rules of Association stipulate that the positions of President and Treasurer must be filled by uniformed personnel. In this way, bases can ensure exclusive rights to the centre are supervised by Service personnel.

### Staffing the Centre

An incorporated, licensed centre allows for the employment of qualified staff — either a Mothercraft Nurse (employed under the NSW Nurses Association) or a Certificate of Child Care Studies/Child Care Certificate (CCCS/CCC) (employed under the Miscellaneous Workers Union). The Children (Care and Protection) Act 1987 provides the new requirements for staffing in child care centres and with FACS licensing must be strictly adhered to. The supervisor is responsible for the planning and implementing of the daily programme for the care and education of the children.

The assistance of the local FACS Children's Services Adviser can be sought for the advertising, interviewing and selection of staff. In the case of a new centre the Director should be appointed at least 3-4 weeks before the centre is due to open, allowing for the establishment of all administrative procedures, production of programmes and visit by the Adviser for licensing. Additionally, suitable applicants should be provided with a separate 'job description' formulated by the Management Body, establishing conditions of employment.

The conditions of the Award under which the employee is employed should be included, as new staff may come from employment under a different union. The appropriate union, in our case the MWU, can be contacted and a representative made available to discuss all aspects of employment of staff.

### Insurance

There are stringent regulations applied to all aspects of child care services to reduce the possibility of an accident or injury to the children being cared for. If the service is incorporated and an accident occurs, the Committee and members will not personally be held liable for the negligence of an employee. Insurance is important even for Incorporated services so that if a liability for damages is found, the service, through an insurance claim, will be able to pay the damages awarded by the courts to a child. It is essential for the following insurance policies to be taken out by the controller of a child care centre:

- **Public liability** (under FACS guide-lines and CAC Incorporation regulations $5 million is required). Public liability insurance covers the legal liability to pay compensation to a person/s who sustain injury as a result of an act of negligence while on the premises described in the policy of the insured. Public liability insurance covers accidental injury where the provider can be found to have been negligent.

- **Worker’s compensation.** Worker’s compensation is compulsory. Employers are required by law in accordance with the “Worker’s Compensation Act” and common law to insure their
There has been a significant increase in the number of women in the workforce.

liability to employees. Cover is on employees while working on the premises and/or carrying out normal duties for and on behalf of the employer, and while on normal transit to and from the workplace. Premiums are usually classified according to the classification of work and cover such aspects as medical and hospital expenses and salaries for the time the person is off work through injury.

FACS also advise the following policies are also desirable — building and/or contents (fire, theft, accidental loss or damage); professional liability (against actions being taken by parents, or against staff negligence); money, on premises and in transit; and fidelity guarantee, against embezzlement by staff.

Under current Commonwealth guidelines, Federal and State Government will not subsidise child care in the private sector that is not available to the general community. Additionally, currently there is no Federal Government policy or guidelines on child care for Service personnel, so at this stage responsibility for providing such services rests with the individual bases. Establishing a Defence Force Child Care Centre as a community-based centre to attract subsidised funding and fee relief would negate the effect of providing child care specifically to meet the needs of service personnel. Therefore, all funding for the centre needs to be met by the centre and is derived from parent fees, donations and fundraising.

**Funding**

As a result of the Cross Report, the inaugural round of Family Support Funding Programme grants, Federal Government grants to assist Defence groups under the auspices of the Australian Defence Families Information and Liaison Service (ADFILS) was made in FY 1989/90. $20 000 is made available to each major operational area each year, and applications processed through the Local Military Commander. The Family Support Funding Programme grants can be used to purchase equipment, furniture and other necessary facilities for the establishment of a child care centre.
As a general rule, groups seeking funding need to demonstrate that one or more of the program objectives are being met by demonstrating that the organisation has a substantial, active and involved membership of the organisation, involving users in the management of the organisation, participation in fundraising, showing an innovative use of available resources, and charging fees for service commensurate where appropriate, with general community charges.

Due to limited funding, the operational budget needs close examination to ensure all costs can be absorbed by the centre alone. The level of expenditure naturally has an effect on the fees to be charged for the centre’s services and currently subsidies and fee relief are not available. Between 70% and 85% of child care costs are staff related and the costs associated with employing staff include primary contact staff, leave loading, superannuation, workers compensation, long service leave, increment allowance, relief staff, and salary increase allowance. Other costs that need to be included in the budget are children’s consumables, other consumable equipment, kitchen cleaning, medical and office supplies, nappy expenses, laundry expenses, other equipment, insurance, financial services, and subscription and publicity.

Some costs that could be met within Service resources include maintenance of building and grounds, cleaning, food and drink, power and heating and postage and telephone.

A well-planned budget is the objective basis needed for setting fees, discussing fees with parents and applying for funds and donations. It should be noted that while anticipated income can be estimated, based on the number of children expected to attend the centre, the actual income will be dependant on whether or not there is a full complement of children in the centre, the number of uncollected fees (if any) and staff wage increases.

In private centre’s, parent contributions generally provide the centre’s income, and the level of contribution required is related to funding costs. Costs for child care in private and community-based centres may vary between approximately $14.00 and $30.00 per child per day, and are determined as the minimum fee to cover the centres operating costs.

The issue of rental of Commonwealth property can be dealt with under the auspices of DI(N) ADMIN 22-1 — Provision of Non-Commonwealth Funded Facilities and Hire and Control of Facilities in Defence Establishments, whereby the Commanding Officer can waive recovery costs associated with rental charges when property is used by ADF personnel, civilian employees of Department of Defence and their families.

In the case of the Little Pelicans Child Care Centre, the Committee was required, following an original assessment by the Australian Property Group (APG), in consultation with the Australian Valuation Office to advise the current market rental value of the building for rental purposes, to make representation to HMAS NIRIMBA’s Local Member. The matter was addressed by the Minister for Defence, Science and Personnel, who consequently advised that rental charges “could be treated sympathetically under existing policy Guidelines which allow the Commanding Officer of an establishment to waive the recovery of non-capital costs for a welfare amenity organisation where the users are dependants of members of the ADF or employees of the Department of Defence”.

**Conclusion**

The RAN and ADF will continue to lose vital members of its organisation due to the lack of positions available in long day care centres in the local community. Many personnel are taking full maternity leave and LWOP entitlements because they are unable to have their children cared for in the Government system. Positions are few and waiting lists long.

As a consequence of MATL and LWOP, the ADF is inconvenienced as these periods often cannot be covered by remaining personnel. By providing long day care members would be retained in the ADF as member’s children can be cared for professionally whilst at work, postings would become less traumatic as members could pre-book their children into the centre in advance of their posting date and members would have the convenience of a centre on their base. Additionally, it would provide the Department of Defence with the retention of highly trained, skilled and experienced personnel, an increase in productivity and work performance and improved morale, and a quicker return to the working environment following pregnancy.
There is a need for child care facilities for Defence families

Providing a child care facility within a Service environment would cater to the continuity of child care, provide bonding through an increased involvement with child/ren, during travelling time and within work environment, and provide and opportunity for Defence families to attain a balanced lifestyle. There is a need for child care facilities for Service personnel and the resources can be made available for any Defence establishment to attain this goal.

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Lieutenant Wittwer is a General List officer who joined the RAN in 1981 as a Supply Officer. Her service has included two postings to the Royal Australian Naval College and HMAS ALBATROSS, and two years in the Directorate of Naval Training and Education. She is currently employed as Training Development Co-ordinator for the Marine Engineering and Craft Schools, HMAS NIRIMBA. LEUT Wittwer was responsible for the establishment of the Little Pelicans Child Care Centre in HMAS NIRIMBA.
This message is for every member of the ADF and their families, and is about a campaign called Heart Health 2000 being run by the National Heart Foundation.

In the ADF we have agreed to incorporate the main thrust of Heart Health 2000 into our ongoing health and fitness programs, and I thoroughly commend it to every Serviceman and Servicewoman.

Cardiovascular disease is the biggest single killer in Australia with 55,000 Australians dying annually. Heart Health is the Foundation's latest weapon in its continuing campaign against the disease. The campaign is designed to achieve key goals such as supporting advances in research, community heart health education (including recognising heart attack symptoms and basic first aid measures), preventive programs and rehabilitation of heart attack victims. It will supplement our existing programs which cover cardiovascular preventive measures, including fitness testing, weight surveillance standards, 'No Smoking' work areas, the use of QUIT programs, periodic medical examinations (including cholesterol testing), health promotion and health education programs.

To do this the Heart Foundation needs money. I thoroughly commend their appeal for funds to all ADF members. They would appreciate contributions (which are tax deductible) and suggest you consider a regular donation equivalent to 'a can of coke' or 'a litre of petrol' or 'four cigarettes' per day.

Details on heart disease and the National Heart Foundation are available at all ADF Health Facilities.
When Mountains Shoot Back . . . The Ruapehu Tragedy

By Lieutenant Commander Alan Hinge, RAN

'The purpose of training in peace is to prepare the Army for war. One element of war that is difficult to expose soldiers to in peace is the element of danger. Danger can be both exciting and frightening and it is something that every soldier must be trained to face. The purpose of adventurous training is to involve all ranks in outdoor activities which are challenging and contain an element of danger.' (Preface to New Zealand Army Adventure Training Centre Handbook dated 23 June 1987).

Introduction

New Zealand is a beautiful country. In fact one could go so far as to say it is almost as beautiful as Australia (but not quite), so while on ANZAC exchange in late 1990, I saw a bit of the country. In October, I spent a night at the Army Training Centre at Waiouru and made an early start for Auckland the following morning. On loading up the car my attention was arrested by the sight of Mt Ruapehu, towering majestically above the horizon, its slopes still covered in deep white snow made iridescent by the first rays of morning sunlight. It was a time of twilight and the stars had not yet given up their places as the mountain stood in stark contrast against a growing brilliant blue haze. It then suddenly struck me that it was on this same magnificent mountain that six servicemen had died only two months before.

Good Judgement

I wanted to find out more about the Ruapehu tragedy for two reasons. First, I spent a number of years fairly heavily involved in Adventure Training and I knew that one of the best ways to learn how to survive is by using good judgement. But good judgement is borne of experience and experience is derived from mistakes, that is, bad judgements. To gain experience we can either make the mistakes ourselves or learn from those made by others. Learning from others is invariably cheaper.

My second reason was more personal. At the tender age of sixteen I took on a mountain and almost lost. It was not a big mountain but it was very cold in August 1972. A friend and I had done the right thing by reaching the summit early and setting up camp, above the snowline, by 1530. We then took a walk which was planned to take twenty minutes or so. It took much longer and we returned in the dark, in bad weather. We couldn't find our camp but managed to get to a hut before things got too serious. From that time I took mountains and their weather very seriously indeed.

What follows are some of the details I found out about the Ruapehu tragedy. You may be interested in them.

Prologue to Disaster

On 9 August 1990, a group of eleven students and two instructors from Waiouru went to Mount Ruapehu to train in and practice Winter Mountain Craft as part of the New Zealand Army Adventurous Training Centre’s (AATC) Winter Basic Course.

The night of 9 August was spent in Dome Shelter, a pre-constructed shelter near the summit of the mountain. On 10 August, in clear fine weather, the group moved some 300 metres from the dome shelter and practiced the construction of snow caves and a snow dome. These are shelters constructed out of the snow to provide protection from the elements.

The group spent the night of 10 August in the snow shelters but next morning the weather had dramatically deteriorated, so they remained in the snow shelters with the intention of waiting out the storm. At approximately 11.00am, an
improvement in the weather was noticed and a decision was made to leave the snow shelters and head to the Dome Shelter (See Figure).

Once out of the shelter of the snow dome and caves, the group experienced the full force of the storm. Snow fall was extremely heavy, being driven by very high winds. The group decided not to continue in those conditions and made their way back to the area of the snow shelters, however, they were able to locate only one snow cave and the snow dome. Because of difficulties in keeping the snow dome entrance clear of snow, the group in that location joined the others in the cave, which resulted in all thirteen members of the group sheltering there. The snow fall was so heavy that the group had to maintain a continual shift clearing the entranceway throughout the night to maintain air circulation and avoid being sealed inside the cave.

By about 7.00 on the morning of Sunday 12, the roof of the cave had distorted and cracks had appeared in the walls. As there was about three metres of snow on the roof of the cave, a fear that the cave was likely to collapse and bury the occupants alive began to grow. At about 10.00am a further break in the weather was perceived and this, coupled with the rapid build up of snow, and the concern that the cave would collapse, led to a decision to again head for the Dome Shelter.

Ambushed by the Elements

The group prepared themselves to venture out again. However, upon leaving the snow cave the thirteen once again experienced the full force of the storm. Visibility was reduced to a few metres and winds of approximately 70-80 knots were experienced. On the way to the Dome Shelter the group moved into the flat col between Paretetaitonga and the Dome which was at that time probably the most exposed position on the mountain, and where the conditions proved to be much worse than had been anticipated.

Personnel were actually lifted off the ground by the wind and further progress became almost impossible. The group stopped and attempted to seek some protection from the elements by using their packs as wind shields and by digging trenches as emergency shelters.

After remaining in this location for between two to three hours it became clear that the weather had not improved and a second move was made to seek better shelter in the lee of the ridge.

It was while attempting this move that the first hypothermic cases became apparent. The group was immediately stopped to provide care to those in difficulty whilst the rest of the group attempted to construct a snow dome.

Construction of a snow dome proved impossible due to the strength of the wind, which destroyed each attempt at constructing a shelter. The group then tried to dig a trench in which to shelter in that location. Although a shallow trench was dug, the existence of a layer of ice under the surface prevented the trench from being completed.

At this stage two members of the group were hypothermic, one was suffering from frostbite and a number of others were close to exhaustion. An instructor and a student then left the group to seek help. Those remaining attempted to complete the snow trench and then to get into sleeping bags and plastic "survival bags" to await rescue.

In some cases sleeping bags were ripped away from students by the wind and lost. The Court of Inquiry which followed the tragedy identified high standards of personal behaviour on the part of those personnel still physically able to provide assistance to their comrades in the face of extreme conditions.

During the course of the night and next morning the following trainees died:

Private Brett William Barker, RNZIR
Able Rating Jeffrey Royden Boult, RNZN
Private Stuart Keith McAlpine, RNZIR
Private Mark James Madigan, RNZIR
Private Jason Ross Menhinet, RNZIR
Private David Edward Whawhai Stewart, RNZIR

The instructor and student seeking help made contact with staff members of Ruapehu Alpine Lights and the Duty Ranger at approximately 5.30 on the morning of 13 August. By 7.15 am, search teams had departed from Whakapapa by snowcat and by foot. The surviving members of the course were rescued at about 2.00pm on Monday 13 August 1990 by which time the six servicemen were dead.
August 9
11 students and 2 instructors arrive on mountain and spend night in Dome Shelter. Next day move to construct practice shelters.

August 10
Weather fine and clear
Prepare two snow caves, one snow dome. Spend night there.

August 11
Weather deteriorates. Try to leave but forced back to remaining two shelters for the night.

August 12 and 13
Second attempt to reach the Dome Shelter. Strength of wind forces them to stop. Attempt to dig trench. Instructor and student go to seek help. During night and next morning 6 die of the remaining 11.

Rescued at 2 pm, August 13. The six bodies recovered by helicopter on August 16.
Aftermath

The survivors were treated in the Dome Shelter and then moved off the mountain in snow cats. The rescue was greatly hindered by the continuing atrocious weather. The bodies of those who died were recovered by helicopter on the morning of 16 August.

The Court of Enquiry

The Court of Enquiry reported that the principal cause of the tragedy was that the level of skill and experience possessed by both instructors from the Army Adventurous Training Centre was inadequate to deal with the extreme weather conditions encountered. This led to a series of decisions being made which were seen to have been wrong. In particular, the Court identified the decision to leave the shelter of the snow cave in order to strike out for the dome shelter as an error of judgement.

The Court found that the personal clothing and equipment used on the course was adequate. The Court also identified some items of personal clothing and equipment where better items were available than those currently in use, for example, gloves and civilian survival/bivvy bags.

The Court criticised the absence of a radio with the group and recommended that radios capable of operating on the mountain be obtained before any further training took place. It was considered that radios would have led to a faster reaction time by rescuers, however, given the times factors involved, in this case, the question of whether radios would have made any difference to the outcome remains a matter of conjecture.

Although not directly attributable to the actual events which occurred, the Court also reported that the written Standard Operating Procedures at the Army Adventurous Training Centre were inadequate in content.

The Court also heard evidence from a Japanese climber, Mr George Iwama, who survived the storm for five days in two snow caves. Mr Iwama said to be a very resourceful character who had had 10 years mountaineering experience. When Iwama moved out of his first snow cave he found himself on the lee side of a ridge which protected him to some degree from the 80 knot winds which battered the thirteen-strong Army party when it emerged from its cave and, unlike the Army party, Iwama had been able to dig a second cave successfully.

Comments criticising the level of experience and leadership effectiveness in the group were made at the Enquiry by Mr Chris Knol. He was the specialist adviser for the Army on mountaineering during the Court of Inquiry, and is a former field officer of the New Zealand Mountain Safety Council. He said that, while never having been on Ruapehu during the arctic, white-out conditions encountered by the AATC group, the situation would have ended very differently if the instructors had been more experienced in leading groups.

He stated that mountaineering skills are one thing, but leading a group of inexperienced people in a tough situation requires a much broader range of expertise and he claimed that one of the reasons that George Iwama survived the same blizzard was that he had no-one else to worry about.

Knol also said, the ratio of instructors to students of 2:11 was too low and when courses restart after the review into the Army Adventurous Training Centre there should be a ratio of 1:4 put in place. But he added that the ratio is unimportant if there is not the depth of knowledge to deal with all the situations that can be thrown at people training in the mountains.

Knol believed that mistakes compounded during the crisis and the leader had to make very important, tough decisions. He cited the failure of the group to rope themselves together as one such error. At one point the chief instructor was blown back 10 metres by the wind during the initial attempt to reach the Dome Shelter. Knol believed that, given experienced leadership, the group should have reached the shelter.

Asked what he would have done if he had been caught in the open he said he would do what he did in an earlier situation: Put on all his clothes, jam extra gear under his clothes to create dead air space (for unsulation), get into his pack, pull the plastic survival bag over his head and let the snow cover him up.

The Court's principal recommendations were as follows:
1. That the Army Adventurous Training Centre cease conducting courses until a training review is completed. A training review should be initiated as soon as possible and should consider all matters related to:
   (a) staff selection and training, and
   (b) operating procedures.
2. That the Senior Medical Officer at Waiouru be made responsible for maintaining current expertise in the treatment of Hypothermic and related cold weather injuries.

3. That the programmed purchase of communications equipment for the Army Adventurous Training Centre proceed immediately.

The Review of Training

The review of training at the Army Adventurous Training Centre, Army Training Group, Waiouru, was completed in October 1990. The review team was required to look into such issues as: policies; operating procedures and regulations at the centre; qualifications and possible psychological testing for instructors; student selection procedures; emergency procedures and what the centre’s weather forecasting requirements should be.

A comprehensive report, classified RESTRICTED, is available from the New Zealand Defence Force.

Conclusions

Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Perhaps, deep down, most of us think we are smarter than the next bloke and disasters ‘can’t happen to us’. But they can happen and sometimes they do. The group that went up to Ruapehu in August 1990 were much like most of us: pretty capable, pretty fit and pretty confident. However, they were ‘ambushed’ by extraordinary, arctic-like elements in a natural killing ground on an exposed col between Paretetaitonga Ridge and their objective, the dome shelter.

Like me, some readers may have said to themselves ‘... But for the grace of God that could have happened to me’. We are in no position to condemn actions taken or not taken on Ruapehu under those conditions, but we can learn from the circumstances. To develop the judgement to make the right decisions in tough situations we need the experience of demanding situations and this is where the Catch 22 comes in: To gain experience of risk we make mistakes which themselves are basically the results of bad judgements. The penalties for mistakes in some situations can be tragic.

Many of us over the years have sought experience and challenge in situations which sometimes end in us being bone tired (sometimes to the point of near collapse), under a lot of pressure to reach a rendezvous under bad conditions, with members of our group losing their confidence, composure and the ability to contribute.

I call the syndrome ‘OVERWHELM’ and we must be alert to the onset and consequences of this type of group condition. To best prepare for the onset of OVERWHELM in a group the best thing we can do is learn the lessons of events such as the Ruapehu tragedy and apply them. And always remember, the mountains, deserts, seas and jungles in which we seek challenges are not always neutral . . . sometimes they shoot back.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

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T. Donoghue, ‘Ruapehu: The Court Findings’, New Zealand Herald (Auckland) October 13, 1990, p.20. The author is grateful to the New Zealand Herald for kind permission to use a Herald Graphic by Mr Richard Dale in this article.

Lieutenant Commander, Alan Hinge graduated from the Australian National University in 1977 and joined the RAN in 1979. He served at the Weapons Electrical Engineering School HMAS Nirimba and took up the post of training Officer HMAS Waterhen late last year.
Book Reviews

BATTLE FOR STALINGRAD The 1943 Soviet General Staff Study Edited by Louis Totundo Permagon — Brassey’s, 1989

Reviewed by LTCOL R.E. Bradford

The Soviet victory at Stalingrad over the invading German forces in late 1942 and early 1943 was the watershed in the conflict on the Russian front. From that point forward the Russians having learnt valuable lessons during the Stalingrad battles gradually but inexorably pushed the Germans back to the German homeland. Staff studies such as this one, and others such as the one on the battle for Moscow were instrumental in the development of tactics which were used in the remainder of the war against the Germans on the Russian front. My expectations therefore were high in relation to this work but unfortunately were not met by the content.

As the war against the Germans developed in 1942, the Soviet General Staff realised that there was an urgent need to assess combat experiences and formalise the lessons learnt from them. They established a special section with Operations Division to collect and disseminate the practical lessons learned by the Soviets on operational service against the Germans. The material was primarily aimed at senior officers and command personnel and was designed as an informational tool as well as an instructional publication. This was study No 6 and was prepared and issued in 1943.

The book suffers however from being overly concerned with descriptions of the various battles and conflicts undertaken in the Stalingrad area. Descriptions abound of actions by Fronts, Armies, Corps, Divisions etc. and are difficult to follow in their entirety. Lack of maps exacerbate the readers problems. Maps that have been included are of poor size and include an overabundance of details on formations; Map 4 for example has references to 370 towns or formations on it, all on the space of one page.

The work of the editor and the chapter conclusion however save the work and give it some academic credibility. In both areas concise and varied comments are offered and in most cases logical conclusion have been drawn from the text. In particular comments on cavalry, engineering and air force actions are of interest, and provide value for money.

I would not however recommend this book to anyone other than the purist or to those who are particularly interested in the Russian Front of World War II. The study obviously achieved its aim in 1943, but over the years has lost its impact and usefulness.

A SOLDIER RETURNS A Long Tan Veteran Discovers the Other Side of Vietnam by Terry Burstall, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1990.

Reviewed by LTCOL R.E. Bradford

Twenty years is a long time to ponder the vagaries of war. Being such an unpopular conflict (at least more so than most), the Vietnam War has once again come into focus with a plethora of film, television and printed matter being produced, concentrating mainly on the effects of the war on the combatants. This is another book on this general theme, albeit with a slightly different angle.

Since he served in Vietnam in 1966, Burstall has undergone a series of changes in his personal circumstances, ranging from his initial manual labouring jobs in the building trade, to being a plantation manager in Papua New Guinea, and culminating in his completion of secondary education, finally obtaining a tertiary qualification.

Over this extended period of time he had doubts as to Australia’s role and actions in the Vietnam War. His tertiary studies presented to him an opportunity to put these doubts formally into print. In many ways this book is a sequel to his first A Soldiers Story, an account of a soldiers war in Vietnam.

The first thing that hit me about this work is the strong emotions that abound throughout. In conducting his research, Burstall was able to return to Vietnam, and probably as a result of his compassion expressed towards the Vietnamese veterans (Viet Cong mainly) was able to meet many of his former opponents, and conduct interviews with them. The stories he obtained from them are fascinating and provide an aspect
of the war that will never be found in any official histories. Interestingly few of the soldiers hold any animosity towards Australia or Australians, but simply expressed bewilderment as to why Australia became involved in the conflict, a feeling not too unknown to many in this country. It is however the stories of the civilians, many of them Viet Cong supporters which reveal a side of the conflict not previously widely published. The leveling of townships and hamlets, and the forcible removal and resettlement of people away from their sole source of income are most poignantly related. Stories of death and maiming of civilians caused by ambushes and artillery harrassing fire are disturbing but need to be told. Burstall relates them in a most compassionable manner and easy flowing style, and in doing so reveals a great deal about himself and his concerns about the conflict. He also highlights the obvious concerns and mixed emotions about the conflict felt by many ex-servicemen.

In his criticism of the Australian Army in Vietnam, Burstall unfortunately does not present a balanced view of our involvement. He avoids the political motivation of our involvement concentrating on the actions of the Army in the early days of the involvement. Issues of note he covers includes the evacuation of townships located within 4000 yards of the Nui Dat base, the lack of resettlement support provided to civilians evacuated, the lack of re-imbursement provided to Nui Dat landowners and the killing of seemingly innocent civilians. In all of these matters he lays the blame solely at the feet of the Australian Army, avoiding criticism of those who placed the force in this situation insufficiently trained and prepared for civil affairs action. He also avoids mentioning the policies and involvement of the South Vietnam Government and United States forces, which would have also helped evolve Australian policy and actions. The one sided nature of the book is further exacerbated by the lack of criticism of Viet Cong methods of harrassment and intimidation of innocent civilians and their associated terror tactics. Inclusion of accounts of their actions, which he could have obtained as part of his research and interviews would have added a deal of credibility to the work, and would have provided the necessary balance to it, and even accentuate his criticism of Australian methods.

That criticism aside, I thoroughly enjoyed the book. Burstall's compassionate coverage conveys the fear, bewilderment and uncertainties of civilians caught up in conflicts regardless of their political or ideological affiliations. He has highlighted the many emotional problems faced by ex-servicemen again of both sides after their war is over. I don't believe Burstall satisfactorily answers his own question of 'why', possibly because the question becomes clouded by other issues. His close affinity with Vietnam and his own emotional state probably added to the lack of definite answer. He has however at least portrayed the unfortunate side of war that everyone needs to be made aware of, and in that way has added further knowledge on the dimension of disenchantment with war.


Reviewed by Mike Fogarty, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Dr Hudson is Editor of Historical Documents, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. A former journalist, he was Associate Professor of History, University of New South Wales, before taking up his current appointment in 1976. Arguably, he is the country's foremost historian of diplomacy. This book continues the excellent tradition of intellectual enquiry and sustained scholarship he has established in earlier works too numerous to mention here. The author received a bicentennial award for his highly acclaimed biography of Lord Casey. This latest book continues with the themes developed in earlier studies, namely, our reluctant search for independence and the evolutionary march of our own foreign policy.

In 1956, the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company which controlled the revenue from the Suez Canal, was nationalised by President Nasser of Egypt. While Britain and France prepared to protect their interests in this vital shipping link, Israel seized this opportunity to launch her own attack against Egypt on 29 October. An ultimatum was sent by Britain and France ordering Egypt and Israel to cease fire and withdraw their troops, and demanding the right to occupy Port Said. Egypt rejected this and sank blockships in the canal. On 5 November, after an aerial bombardment British and French paratroopers landed on Port Said followed by a seaborne landing the next day.
World opinion soon forced Britain, France and Israel to agree to a ceasefire and a United Nations Emergency Force was sent in to supervise the truce and restore order. On 7 March the Suez Canal was re-opened, but Britain’s influence in the Middle-East was greatly diminished.

Dr Hudson explains why the Suez affair still deserves our attention, as a classic foreign policy study — particularly when remembering that the five countries supporting intervention included Australia and New Zealand. Why did we get involved in this controversial decision? Our Prime Minister of the time assumed the role of an “honest broker”. Australia was also a member of the UN Security Council. Menzies was sent to appease Nasser who was unmoven — Nasser held on to the canal and to power. Eden was not so fortunate. The author reminds us that “... Australia was deceived at every level.”

However, British-Australian relations survived relatively intact no doubt due to the close personal relations between the respective political figures. Elsewhere, Anglo-American relations for a time were severely strained and Anglo-French ties more so by the outcome. Clearly, the author tells us that the events did not serve our interests either.

Casey and the Department of External Affairs exercised caution yet Menzies’ traditional views, despite his idealism, proved short-sighted as the title *Blind Loyalty* suggests. Hindsight is always a good friend yet he was not there when needed in 1956. Another Commonwealth partner, Canada chose not to back what then appeared to be a disastrous course of action. The author unwittingly gets it very right when the last two words of the introduction assume the imperative, namely, “... be Australian.”

The author correctly addresses our real insecurities of the time — our psychological dependency on the greater powers. The book properly analyses these processes as unnecessary baggage carried over from the late nineteenth century. While the treatment is certainly the audit of a major foreign policy decision, the author wisely avoids calling in the fraud squad.

Moreover, the methodological approach is sound. Here the author introduces standard research patterns to show his command of the detail. For example, he examines press reporting on the event. He tables voting results among the states of the United Nations. He also comments on political soundings of the issue through a survey of various gallup polls. It appears a majority of Australians supported our involve-

ment and position. From this he draws well-stated conclusions. Dr Hudson reminds us that there was not yet a national press and foreign affairs did not receive the heavy and daily attention we now take for granted.

This book is short yet comprehensive. The material is arranged in eight chapters allowing for a manageable development of the themes. The level of decision-making in Canberra is assessed and some hawks and doves are identified although the author does not perch them together in a coconut shy.

Young departmental officers in the form of Sir Nicholas Parkinson and Dr Alan Renouf had their role to play in the policy process showing the leadership which came to be recognised later. Although Menzies did not follow Casey’s advice on this occasion we also have to recognise the particular mind-set of the period when imperial ties were more evident than today. Again, Menzies was paramount in cabinet and the author explores the tensions between Menzies and Casey in their political relationship. Sir Arthur Tange recognised the looming disaster and continually urged restraint. Indeed, he emerges from the episode as a very impressive figure and his presence as Secretary reminds us that his account of the events would add to the literature also.

In many ways, Menzies shared some affinity with the Sphinx — perhaps the true story rests with them. The poor Sphinx has witnessed much perfidy in the sands over 5,000 years and this riddle added to the legend. Was Menzies an agent or dupe in his mediating role? The author asks whether Menzies knew more than he let on.

What was the legacy of Suez? As a military operation, “Musketeer” was comprised in that the political will was surrendered so close to the final military objective. To be sure, this arabesque had chronic effects in the region and other world capitals. Pressure from the United States forced a backdown. “Nothing had been gained by the invaders: the canal remained in Egyptian hands, Nasser was not dislodged ... much had been lost.” It was left to the United Nations peace-keeping force to restore some sense of order. The invasion force returned to their depots casting long shadows in the desert — shadows which loomed over cabinet rooms in Europe to eclipse some of the protagonists in this affair.

Eden was a political casualty of Suez — resigning early in the new year. Harold Wilson was reported to have said that Mr Eden had a very expensive education: Eton and Suez. The
last of the Anglo-French forces withdrew from Egyptian territory by 22 December 1956. The Suez Canal was finally cleared for shipping on 8 April 1957. The effects reached Fleet Street too — including the newspaper *The Observer*. Polite talk acknowledges that *The Observer* represents an alternative to conservative thinking. Elsewhere it was recorded that this paper felt that its position on Suez was their finest hour, despite an almost catastrophic loss of circulation which took a decade to recover. While *Blind Loyalty* is a serious political critique in some ways it owes allegiance to the traditions of the French detective novel. There is a credible plot, many suspicious characters, clues to behaviour, deceit, betrayal, vanity and some very unconvincing alibis among the perpetrators — and mystery for sure. All the better as it is non-fiction too. Furthermore this book is as intelligent offering which will rank among the accepted texts.

It was not a happy experience being an Australian in Egypt during those difficult times. There were many diplomatic repercussions and Colonel Nasser’s Government severed relations with Australia and Sir Roden Cutler and his staff were expelled and our diplomats were not to return until 1960.

Dr Hudson is alive to the sentimental and nostalgic yearnings in our political psyche and how they are manifested in greater dependency realtionships. The author modestly suggests that the nature of our society (in its relationship with its founding state) awaits an adequate historian. While his sincerity is apparent a disclaimer is not necessary as his book addresses this point most competently and its psychological and political costs. The questions posed provide their very answer. He makes his point and quite well too.

Dr Hudson properly avoids censorious judgements and takes an objective, rational view of the issues. He describes the milieu, the attitudes of the era, and gives explanations as to why the politicians acted as they did — allowing their actions to be judged for what they were. Truly, they were creatures of their time as the last chapter suggests. Also, he does not pass judgement upon the policies of the British Government during those troubled years. For him, it is enough to recognise the peculiar political and civic cultures at the time which prevailed — in both countries.

In all, *Blind Loyalty* is a most welcome and sensible contribution to Australia’s thin shelf of diplomatic history. The book is well-reasoned, literate and enjoyable. While it will find traditional acceptance in its given market, the book both invites and deserves a wider readership. Seventy-five years after Anzac we are now beginning to take some responsibility for our history. As we lurch towards the next millennium now might be a good time to remember the lessons learnt at Suez which we should also not forget. This fine book shows us how.


Reviewed by Major S. A. McPhee.

Many books have been written about the Second World War and of the brutal treatment of prisoners of war by the Japanese. None that I have read have been set out as this book has: as a published set of diary entries covering the day-to-day activities of prisoner of war camps in Java, Singapore and Thailand. The author, Sir Edward Dunlop, CBE, OBE, KSJ, MS, FRCS, FRACS, FACS, D.Sc. would be well known to most Australians for his work as a surgeon and for his community service in Australia and South East Asia.

The introduction briefly covers the author’s childhood, his first exposure to the Army as a cadet and CMF trainee and his successful qualification as a doctor. After being commissioned as a Captain RAAMC the author undertook post-graduate medical training in the UK and was there for the formal declaration of war against Germany. He served with the 2nd AIF in the Middle East and Crete before embarking for Java with 2/2 Australian Casualty Clearing Station (CCS). Unfortunately, Singapore fell to the Japanese as the author’s ship arrived off Sumatra and Java was soon to follow. The author served as a Lieutenant Colonel with 1 Allied General Hospital, Java, until the unit was captured by the advancing Japanese on 8 March 1942. After a period of about five weeks, during which the hospital was allowed to continue to function, the Japanese ordered its dismantling and the movement of all personnel to Bandoeng and the first of many prisoner of war camps.

From Bandoeng a large number of prisoners of war were first moved to Singapore and then to Thailand and the infamous Burma-Thailand Railway, which was then in its early stages of construction. The author describes in some detail
the differences between the transit camps, contrasting the initial disorganisation and openness of the Java camps with the regimentality of the Singaporean camp and the absolute squalor and inadequacy of resources at the railway camps. As the senior medical officer, Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop was required to establish hospital and hygiene facilities, including operating theatres, at several of the railway camps. These had to be built from local jungle timber and equipped with surgical apparatus manufactured from locally scrounged or improvised equipment. Discarded petrol cans, lamp parts, eating utensils and cut bamboo were used to make sterilising units, drip bottles, scalpels and other vital medical stores. The ferocious pace forced on the railway construction troops by the Japanese, combined with their poor diet and unsanitary living conditions, led to most becoming ill (and many dying) from tropical ulcers, cholera, dysentery, malaria and similar ailments.

From "front line" railway camps at Konyu and Hintok Mountain, Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop moved to “echelon” hospital facilities at Tarsau, Chunkai and then Nakom Patom. While the facilities and resources may have improved, the more serious nature of the casualties there made the task no less difficult.

Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop was at Nakom Patom camp on 16 August 1945 when the Japanese advised the prisoners of war of the signing of the armistice. He remained in Thailand until October 1945, assisting in the setting up of an evacuation program for former prisoners of war. He took his diaries back with him to Australia and returned to civilian life. He refrained from publishing the diaries for over forty years, fearing that their appearance in print may add to the suffering, controversy and hatred of the Japanese which existed in Australian society after the war. The diaries were finally published in 1986.

The diaries contain an incredible amount of statistical information on numbers of patients, types of ailments, camp financial arrangements, food rationing and medical supply arrangements for all prisoner of war camps in which the author was interned. In addition, they give an amazing insight into the Japanese Army’s attitude to, and treatment of, the prisoners of war and the prisoners' methods to counter this attitude and treatment.

The one underlying thread found throughout the book is the author’s determination that, despite being prisoners of a nation which denied the most fundamental human rights under the Geneva Convention, discipline and soldierly outlook must be maintained. Great emphasis is placed on the setting up of camp command and administrative procedures in order to maintain military law, health and fair access to food and clothing at the highest possible levels. This insistence on the establishment of such procedures was one of the primary reasons for the author’s success in trying conditions but also resulted in him being criticised by other prisoners for his apparent inflexibility and aloofness. With hindsight, it appears that such criticism was unfairly levelled at the author by prisoners whose schemes to look after themselves at the expense of others were foiled by these procedures.

The mere presence of the diaries indicates the degree to which the author was prepared to expose himself to risk. The Japanese did not allow the keeping of such records and searches were regularly conducted in order to find and confiscate these, and other, forbidden items. Nevertheless, the author carried the diaries with him throughout his period of capture and subsequent release.

E.E. (Weary) Dunlop’s book is essential reading for those investigating the plight of prisoners of the Japanese. The 381 pages of text are supported by 138 plates which comprise photographs, hand drawn maps, sketches by fellow prisoners of war and portraits of the author and camp life. The diary format initially takes some getting used to but adds considerably to the clarity of the total picture created.


This book, sixteen years in the making, won the Pulitzer Prize for non-fiction in 1988. The book has received critical acclaim and it may well prove to be one of the seminal works on the Vietnam War. All histories are essentially political and this one is no different. Despite its unequal treatment of the themes, it is still a book worth reading.

The author graduated from Harvard in 1958, in middle-eastern studies, and was rescued from the prospect of a career as an arabis in the State Department by enlisting in the U.S. Army serving
in Korea and Japan from 1959-62. On his discharge he landed a job as the Bureau Chief of UPI in Saigon at a time when the big stories were breaking. He later became a New York Times correspondent there in 1965. Thus he became a witness and participant in the dramatic events unfolding in Indo-China at the critical stage of its history.

Sheehan retained a keen enthusiasm for things military — which several years in the ranks had failed to dampen. Indeed, he was one of the few reporters to accompany South Vietnamese troops in the field where he gained some sympathy for their plight. He was therefore well-qualified to write on his book’s subject — Lieutenant-Colonel John Paul Vann, USA, a military adviser to the 7th Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, stationed in the Mekong Delta at My Tho, from 1962-63.

This is not Sheehan’s first book. He had earlier written The Arnhette Affair in 1972 on the alleged misbehaviour of a U.S. Navy officer who was relieved from his command of the destroyer USS Vance after an incident off the coast of Vietnam. From this earlier work, he no doubt developed the necessary forensic skills to dissect Colonel Vann and account for his life and times in the service of his country, as a soldier and civilian — in Vietnam and beyond.

John Vann, after resigning from the army in 1963, later returned to Vietnam in 1965 in a civilian capacity, as an officer with the U.S. Agency for International Development at Hau Nghai, west of Saigon. In 1971 he was appointed Director of the Second Regional Assistance Group in Military Region 2, an area which took in the Central Highlands, able to exercise both civilian and military powers, holding a major-general’s rank and with a full military staff. Vann did not live to see the outcome of the war, he died with others in a helicopter crash near Kontum on 9 June 1972, after the Easter Offensive in which he played a significant part.

On 16 June 1972, Neil Sheehan attended what could loosely be described as a state funeral at Arlington Cemetery. Many of the senior establishment figures came to pay their last respects to Vann. Sheehan noted that the gathering attracted a curious combination of Vann’s detractors and admirers. Despite falling foul of service and bureaucratic politics, Vann's last parade drew a respectable cross-section of the major personalities actively involved in U.S. political and military life and in many ways the top decision-makers during the Vietnam conflict.

This occasion touched Sheehan and it provided the catalyst to determine “... who was this man Vann?” Others who attended were equally curious. Holbrooke’s review in The New Republic (Front Man) of 24 October 1988 offers an interesting personal account too. Richard Holbrooke, a contemporary of Vann, found himself immediately behind William Rogers, the Secretary of State, and Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense. As the pall-bearers filed in, Rogers, whose presence in the chapel was evidently owed to the advice of his staff, leaned over to Laird and whispered “... who was this guy, anyway?”

Vann was a complex character as the author reflects in his book. As a tip, if you accept this biographical analysis of Vann as a metaphor for the U.S. involvement in Indo-China then you will not be far wrong — as this is what Sheehan intended. For the same reasons it is perhaps flawed for the implicit bias on such an assumption.

In short, Vann criticized the war and supposedly resigned in protest. However, we are informed that Vann had already planned to leave the Army after his Vietnam assignment. He befriended young reporters and gave them an insight into what he regarded as the real conduct of the war — or how it should be. Sheehan later concluded that he and the others were manipulated and lied to by Vann who had his own reasons for coming down against the U.S. command if only to establish his credentials or revive a flagging military career.

Certainly Vann was forthright and demonstrably courageous as he was both reckless and indifferent with himself and others. Sheehan attempts to reconcile Vann’s professional integrity against his psychological turmoil. This book is also a geopolitical study of the strategic interests at hand in its focus on selected events and forces in the war as much as they shaped the contours and relief in Vann’s own moral topography. The author argues that his subject later believed in victory and, in the end, became consumed in his efforts to achieve it.

Sheehan brings admirable qualities to this study in his role as scholar, journalist and historian — and maybe novelist too. Being Irish, he has probably kissed the Blarney Stone as some of his assessments indicate. However, to describe Vann as the reification of the American presence in Vietnam is a bit unfair. Vann’s suffering did
not end on his death as the Left and Right still argue over his reputation and legacy. As Patrick Morgan has said in Quadrant (September, 1987) about ideological claims against the family unit, "... (one) already over-burdened, cannot bear the extra load of these public functions." Like the hapless hunter, Vann ended up being captured by the game.

Possibly, the most unfavourable review the author received was from the National Review. Here, Peter Brimelow ('Out of Control') in the 10 March 1989 edition took the author to terms. It would be unfair to repeat the criticisms here but one of the milder admonitions is that "... the boat people are never mentioned." To balance this, one should turn to Le Ly Hayslip's When Heaven and Earth Changed Places which provides one woman's account of life in the wartime South.

In many ways, A Bright Shining Lie describes the political education of the author and his subject. Each had their own calvary, yet they arrived at it by a different route and at another time. Again, the clear danger in the review of this kind is to determine whether you are reviewing Sheehan, Vann or "the book". However, it is only through an assessment of all these aspects that one can come to terms with the validity of the argument Sheehan attempts to force. Like the pages of Felix Kroll's untamed thoughts, some conclusions just fly out the window.

In its essence, this book evokes strong attitudes from both sides of the debate — appearing in black and white and offering little grey in between. It might be reduced to some crude analogies. One commentator, Daniel Lennon, in an argument stripped of euphemisms, "... accepts that the Army has different functions than civilian institutions (to routinely kill and die being one)." Again, and if pressed, most service chaplains could probably find a space in their hearts to acknowledge Jeff Danziger's counter-argument that killing never really solved anything. That issues were so simple — the reality lying somewhere between the two extremes.

For John Vann, Sheehan would have us believe that he lost his moral compass around page 745 of the book. The ideological seam running through the Vietnam debate produces its own magnetic variation, a drift which affects Sheehan's own compass much earlier in the work. In retrospect, the author owes a greater debt to Barbara Tuchman and David Halberstam than he realizes — despite their listing in the sources. These authors greatly influenced his methodological approach showing the type of vehicle such a compelling study demands. Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 and The Best and the Brightest respectively, demonstrate that the degree of coherence and discipline that Lie might have attained.

Much is made of Vann's shenanigans (private and official) reminding us that "... in the midst of wars the laws are silent." Still, Lie is an achievement and it deserves to be read for whatever it has to say — whichever way you accept the telling of it. More rigour would have arrested the massive and drifting blizzard of unrelated detail. Proper editing would instil the necessary structural balance that this polemic might acquire. Despite all this, it remains an important work — as its many awards have indicated.

Recommended.