Defence Force Journal
Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.

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ISSN 0314-1039
Published for the Department of Defence by the Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1990
B90/21809 Cat. No. 90 180 27
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Printed in Australia by Better Printing Service
1 Foster Street, Queanbeyan, NSW
Letters to the Editor

Wrigley Report on Defence

Dear Sir,
While the Wrigley Report on Defence makes interesting reading and has some recommendations worthy of adoption eg. the reintroduction of School Cadets. I think it would be most unwise to place any more of our defence responsibilities in the hands of even a greatly expanded Reserve Force at present. The regular forces should not be reduced at a time when the world is still very unstable, witness the Iraq/Kuwait crisis. Perhaps though the activities and roles of each of the regular forces could be expanded to cover other areas of activity eg. increased coastal patrol and include much greater Reserves participation.

However, Mr. Wrigley's Report has one glaring omission or rather he presumes an Australia and Australians who are united and loyal to this nation. In fact I believe quite a considerable portion of Australia's population have little or no loyalty to Australia and could in time of emergency be active agents of potential enemies.

Our nation is divided and multi-culturalism is divisive. Our education systems do not promote allegiance and loyalty to Australia nor teach our nation's history.

How could we rely on military reservists drawn from such a population?

We confer citizenship easily even casually. Amongst our population we harbour people belonging to ethnic groups who have lived for hundreds of years in other nations without ever coming to terms with or adjusting to their host nation. What evidence is there that such people will ever fit in and meld with mainstream Australia let alone help defend Australia and be loyal citizens.

We have an influx of economic refugees who demonstrate their loyalties lie with the highest bidder. Some such peoples and there are many here may constitute the soft underbelly of Australia's defence and a definite security risk.

If we are to have an effective defence system based largely on citizen reserves then we must first have a cohesive loyal and united Australian population.

I have grave doubts that we have such a population at present.

Until we are a united Australia it behoves our Regular Defence Forces and Intelligence Organisations to be on full alert, a role the Reserves cannot undertake.

Mr. Wrigley is wrong to think the equipping, morale and well being of Regular Armed Forces personnel is not important. These factors including good promotion prospects are matters of paramount national importance.

Bruce Turner
Librarian and Historian
Naval Reserve Cadets

The Final Six

Dear Sir,
For the sake of historical accuracy I would like to correct your statement on page 34 of Defence Force Journal No 82. The final six aircraft in the New Tactical Fighter competition were the Tornado, the F15, the Mirage 2000, the Northrop F18L, the F16 and the F/A-18. The Tornado and the F15 were dropped from the competition in 1978, and the Mirage 2000 and Northrop F18L were dropped from the competition in 1979.

R.M. Stanier
Acting Director
Tactical Fighter Project Office

Directive Control

Dear Sir,
It is now over two years since I wrote the article on Directive Control which you published in your last edition of the Defence Force Journal. Since writing the article I have been fortunate enough to command a Squadron at the 1st Armoured Regiment. (As such I am an officer of the RAAC, the other combat manoeuvre arm, not the RA Inf as was indicated at the time of printing).
Please allow me to comment on a couple of issues which are raised in the article.

I have attempted to employ Directive Control as a command philosophy during my time as a sub-unit commander, not always with success. In training commanders I have found that developing the "uniformity of operational thought" is extremely difficult particularly when the posting cycle takes well over half of the subordinate commanders each twelve months. There is no doubt that before Directive Control will work there needs to be a learning period where subordinates come to understand what commanders of each level require of them, and how they think. This must be achieved within a climate where harsh resource constraints limit opportunities to test the philosophy.

Possibly the best way to train junior commanders, and I refer to tank crew commanders from the rank of Corporal upward, is to conduct TEWTs where they all work through a problem to understand how their leaders at each level think, and what they expect. This technique appears to have been satisfactory. Despite high rotation among commanders this technique was successful on Exercise K89 where the Tank Troops were dispersed over a 200 km area on occasions. This "common understanding" is an essential component of Directive Control and needs to be mastered as we prepare for the isolation and dispersion which characterised northern deployment.

Resource constraints within units are currently very restrictive and we are fast approaching the point where we conduct insufficient sub-unit and virtually no unit-level training. Exercising at formation level, ahead of establishing the building blocks at individual and lower collective training levels, is counter-productive and not consistent with the philosophy of Directive Control. Consideration of an extended command cycle and an equally extended training cycle; say three years and two years respectively, may alleviate this dilemma and allow the time necessary to prepare for, and benefit from, higher level exercises. At this stage I believe that we are still moving too quickly through command appointments and we are guilty of walking before we can crawl or exercise. Are we really as good at the basics as we think we are?

My experience with service in a relatively high-tech integrated unit is that Reservists in a separate sub-unit have little opportunity to develop within the framework of Directive Control. Integration into authorised establishment positions is equally unworkable. However, the use of Reservists for roundout within sub-units, where they can establish an understanding, and gain value from their resource intensive individual training appears to be the better option. Employed in this manner they are keen to return to the unit to train, are welcomed by the ARA soldiers, and they retain much more of their skills because they are working closely with soldiers who are able to teach them and help them to fit in.

Finally, discussions regarding the introduction of Directive Control will be re-kindled with the impending release of the MLW Pamphlet on Command. We should understand that our "old" system is so similar to Directive Control that the transition is not difficult. If we as commanders allow our subordinates to get on with the job, and to take advantage of those "infrequently presented" opportunities then we are half way there. If we are the type of commander who was "miffed" about LT Felix having his sleeves rolled up when he spoke to the General; or if we had the last brief we received re-typed to incorporate the one or two word amendment that we wanted, then we will probably never learn to cope with the philosophy.

In the best traditions of Australian soldiers our very junior commanders do not have any difficulty coming to grips with the concept: they enjoy the responsibility and usually strive to demonstrate what a good job they can do of it!

Michael O'Brien
Major

Editors's Note

Major Michael O'Brien graduated from the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1977. He completed a number of Regimental and Instructional postings at the 1st Armoured Regiment, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment and Armoured Centre. He completed the Long Armour Course at Bovington, UK in 1982. He was posted as an instructor at the Royal Military College in
1986 and completed Staff College in 1988. Major O'Brien is currently posted as Officer Commanding B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment.

The Article won the Peter Stuckey Mitchell Essay Award for 1988.

The Medium Power Airforce

Dear Sir,

I have read Lieutenant Bailey’s article “The Medium Power Airforce – What Need To Exist?” in the Defence Force Journal July/August 1990. I do not profess to be an expert in matters of military doctrine, and this letter is not intended to be part of an in depth consideration of Bailey’s concept that the RAAF should be disbanded. Rather, it is to demonstrate the fundamental invalidity of arguments used in the article.

At this stage I won’t dispute Bailey’s only definition of a “war winner”, which I found in “The ...ARA...has the clearest war winning role – indeed the seminal one – for it is the only service that is capable of siezing and holding enemy territory”, even though it begs the question of whether the simple defence of your own territory, by a comprehensive defeat of a force which is attempting to invade that territory, constitutes the winning of a war.

On just the first page, Bailey puts forward an invalid argument, and subsequently uses this invalid contention as a basis throughout the rest of the article. In an apparent attempt to convince the reader, in just a few lines, Bailey:

a. contends that “Unlike armies, they are not able to win a war alone, but navies have a unique ability to prevent a maritime power from losing (a war);

b. notes that “Naval strength combined with embarked Army forces can win a war”; and

c. for the rest of the article, writes as though it is accepted that the Army and the Navy are “the two war winning services”.

While the use of the word “unique” can be condoned because there can indeed be maritime operations which are unique to bodies which perform maritime operations, Bailey would have us believe that this unique capability excludes any other Service from having the capability to prevent the loss of a war.

Don’t we all agree that the Battle Of Britain did, at the time, prevent a war being lost?

As far as “Naval strength combined with embarked Army forces can win a war” is concerned, Air Force strength combined with embarked Army forces can win a war. This must be recognised as indisputable once you consider the prospect of a war fought between two land locked countries, both using only army and air forces.

Next, under the heading “Sicily 1943 – The Failures of Airpower” Bailey applauds the success of the Desert Air Force, and contends that the success was due to cooperation with the land force. He then contrasts this with the failure of allied airpower in the invasion of Sicily, after noting that the Allied Commander In Chief “gave little policy guidance” to the airforce commander. Later, the point is made that “the Axis forces had good air support from their airforces despite Allied aerial superiority”. Bailey does not state whether those Axis airforces were or were not part of discrete airforces, but apparently intends that point to add weight to the argument that a discrete airforce is an impediment. Despite the obvious conclusion to be drawn from Bailey’s own text, that the success of airpower depended upon which General gave the best guidance on the land forces’ requirements, in a quantum leap Bailey would have us believe that the failure in the Sicilian campaign was due to giving the allied airforce commander “maximum independence”.

In discussion of “The Problem of Narrow Specialisation” the article contends that “This problem would not arise if the military expertise of these narrow specialists could be broadened. The only way to do this is simply to abandon the idea of maintaining an independent service with no inherent war winning function (ie. the RAAF)”. If this is so, why stop at the disbandment of the RAAF? If narrow specialisation is a bad thing, let’s get rid of all specialisation in the Defence Force, and have each group, no matter how small, fully independent. If Bailey does not believe that patrol boats should be totally self-sufficient, and the dockyards closed, then the argument becomes one of degree, and is not a clear cut “yes or no” type of argument. Bailey has not argued where the cut should be made, and pointing out a perceived problem of narrow
specialisation does not automatically lead to acceptance that the only solution is to abandon the idea of maintaining the group accused of narrow specialisation.

In addressing joint warfare, Bailey raises the question of why there is a CDF, then answers with "He is the one who maintains the big picture at the national level and allocates assets to the Maritime or Land Commanders." Have we already dispensed with the Air Commander, who I understood used to have assets and tasks allocated to him by CDF? So much of the article bemoaned the inability of air power to be deployed in the fashion that the land or maritime forces want. Now the article makes all that irrelevant, by pointing out that we now have a CDF. Surely CDF will direct air operations to the best effect so far as the big picture is concerned.

The Issue of Base Vulnerability. Where to begin? The thrust of the article is to disband the RAAF, and allocate its assets to the Navy and Army. The issue of Air Force base vulnerability was probably included under the misconception that it would strengthen the article's overall argument that the RAAF should be disband. But if we disband the RAAF, and allocate the aircraft to the Navy and the Army, where are they going to fly them from? Nowhere in the article does Bailey come up with some revolutionary method of operating land based aircraft without an airfield, and the reference to the aircraft being "controlled by the people they were purchased to support, the Navy and Army" is totally nullified, as far as Army control is concerned, by not solving the previously described "insurmountable" problem of the vulnerability of an onshore air base.

With regard to the proposal that some of the aircraft should be controlled by the Navy, Bailey says "Aircraft embarked on ships are much more difficult to destroy as their platforms are mobile and always operate on the defense in depth principle. This contrasts strongly with the pathetic vulnerability of fixed airbases." I can't help recalling one of the better reported incidents of the Falklands War. When the HMS Sheffield was deployed to the war zone it was thought to be immune from being sunk in the circumstances it was expected to encounter. Once again errors of judgement, coupled with inadequate intelligence, proved the expectations wrong. Although Bailey assures us that fixed air bases are pathetically vulnerable in contrast with an aircraft carrier, I have yet to hear of a fixed air base which has been rendered as irreparably inoperable as a sunken aircraft carrier.

I will not attempt to argue that fixed air bases are not, to some degree, vulnerable. The experience that the Navy had at Nowra makes any such argument futile.

In the article we are then led through a cost effectiveness analysis of the RAAF, using as a basis the ratio between the combat aircraft and personnel. Bailey admits that, with reference to the figures quoted, "Table 1 is a very crude measure ... for each airforce mentioned obviously has differing aircraft types, different services contracted out to civilian organisations and a host of other variables not taken into account". Notwithstanding this admission that the figures quoted are pretty well useless, in the conclusion to the article Bailey states "The only real question which remains relates to cost effectiveness and military effectiveness. However, while other nations seem to have attained a good ratio of manpower to combat aircraft, Australia has not (Table 1 refers)." That part of the conclusion is, by the author's own efforts, quite invalid.

The rest of the conclusion relies on the supposition that the Navy and the Army are war winning services, and that the Air Force is not. Nowhere in the article is there justification for the change from "ability to prevent a maritime power from losing (a war)" to "war winning". To accept this change without justification, one would need to be prepared to accept the logic of "a cow has 4 legs; a dog does not have 5 legs; therefore, a dog is a cow". Indeed, since the Navy has not been properly demonstrated to be a war winning service, Bailey's "arguments" for disbandment have equal application to the Navy and Air Force - an interesting situation. Quite simply, the whole conclusion has no valid basis in the earlier text.

In my work section, comprehensive papers covering matters of some importance are not prepared solely by staff of ASO 4 or lower level. While some staff at that level may have developed to the stage where they can validly make a point on a complex subject, that is not the norm. It is apparent from the basic de-
iciencies in Lieutenant Bailey’s article that the same applies in the Defence Force, or at least in parts of it.

The standard of Lieutenant Bailey’s article brought me to the question of the purpose of The Defence Force Journal. Is it to be a publication which contains valid information and reasoned comment; or simply a vehicle to stimulate discussion; or a combination of both? If it is your desire to produce a journal which can be relied upon to contain only quality material which is informative, then Bailey’s article should not have been allowed to slip through your editorial net. If it is intended to stimulate light discussion, I am available, if you wish, to write an article similar to Lieutenant Bailey’s which will “prove” that the Defence Force should be subsumed by the Public Service, with traditional public servants making the real decisions, and uniformed personnel employed solely for the more menial tasks. My mind is already racing. The BIG “big picture at the national level” – including civilian educational, industrial and communication capabilities; impact on societal splinter groups etc. I look forward to your response.

Richard Fisher
Department of Defence

Dear Sir,

You published the article ‘The Medium Power Air Force – What Need to Exist’ by Lieutenant M L Bailey RAN in Defence Force Journal Issue 83, July/August 1990. Your policy of seeking articles from junior Service officers is excellent and you must be congratulated as well for refraining from any form of censorship when publishing their work. This is in stark contrast to American methods which were attacked so amusingly by LtCol G. Murphy Donovan USAF in his article ‘Strategic Literary’ in Airpower Journal, Winter 1988.

Lieutenant Bailey’s article is provocative. That is as it should be. It is good to see accepted values challenged because most beliefs must be reviewed regularly to ensure they are still valid. If they are no longer relevant then they should be discarded for fear that they might become useless dogma that inhibits professionalism. The sad thing is that Lieutenant Bailey’s provocation is not soundly based on fact and he has hurt not only his own argument but also some other, more valuable, parts of our profession.

His sources are poorly chosen. Scholarship demands primary sources; secondary sources produce third-rate articles. For example, the Senator Gravel Edition of The Pentagon Papers would have been more credible than Gabriel Kolko’s work, because often Kolko’s quotes are partial and come from other sources too. The table on page 56 is sourced from an outdated document (Pacific Defence Reporter Annual 1989) when 1990 sources, (preferably more than one for cross checking), are available. Moreover, the data in the table are wrong both for and against Bailey’s argument. The numbers associated with Brazil, South Africa, Australia and Sweden are incorrect.

His reference material is minimal. The cited works appear to have been chosen to support a predetermined argument. Intellectual honesty demands that both sides of a case be discussed thoroughly otherwise the paper is merely a polemic which has little value except to amuse some and annoy others.

These lapses do not help Defence Force Journal in its drive to be a professional product, nor do they help stem the increasing criticisms (see Graco, ‘Towards an Effective Officer Corps’ in DFJ. Issue 79, November/December 1989) that academic study has little value for officers in the Australian Defence Force. You published Lieutenant Bailey’s academic achievements at the end of his article and I regret that his work did little to enhance the standing of the institutions from which he graduated. I hope that future contributors realise their responsibilities when they put pen to paper. When they do so they should remember Bernard Baruch’s caution that ‘Every man has a right to his opinion, but no man has a right to be wrong in his facts.’

Ian MacFarling
WGCDR
HQADF

Dear Sir,

No 83. July/August 1990. I feel obliged to take the author to task. If I had read the article in any less reputable journal I would have treated it with the disdain it deserves or perhaps savoured some wry mirth from its ramblings. That you have chosen to publish the article indicates *Defence Force Journal* gives some credence to its contents; therefore I am compelled to respond.

Much of Lieutenant Bailey’s article challenges an earlier paper of mine published in *Defence Force Journal*, No 76, May/June 1989. That paper was written with the express purpose of stimulating rational and serious debate within the defence community on the application of air power for the best defence of Australia. Not only am I disappointed, I am also alarmed - in eight pages of sweeping statements, generalisations, selective quoting from history, use of absolutes, invalid premises and non sequitur argument, the author has effectively advocated the disbandment of the RAAF. Whatever happened to logical, disciplined and controlled writing and the principles of academic rigor?

To refute properly the eight pages would take sixty four; I will address only some of the fundamental premises.

Because the ARA is the only Service capable of holding enemy territory, according to Lieutenant Bailey it has the clearest war winning role for Australia. Nowhere does he argue the validity of holding enemy ground. Perhaps in Australia there is no need - I don’t see it as a strategic option in Dibb or the *White Paper*.

With nothing but vague statistical references to aircraft losses and, at a stroke of the pen, the author concludes, “airpower in Vietnam was a failure”. He mentions neither the severe, crippling limitations placed on air power during those times nor that in December 1972, when independent, strategic air power was unleashed in Operation “Linebacker II”, the North Vietnamese were brought to their knees in just eleven days.

Lieutenant Bailey, I believe it can be argued that non-nuclear, medium power air forces have “independent, strategic” and “unique war winning” functions. The Battle of Britain, the Berlin Airlift, the air power campaign in Korea after July 1951 to attain a favourable armistice, the Beka’s Valley campaign, the Israeli Air Force raid on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, the Libya Raid – to name just a few – all attest to that. Let me enlighten you that independent strategic functions are much more than massed bomber raids on German ball-bearing factories – an erroneous assumption you make continually throughout your paper.

I am dumbfounded at such preposterous statements as “…the RAAF has come to the realisation that it has no justification for its existence”. Wherever did this come from? Or that, “the command of airpower in Vietnam was a mass of confusion as the USAF attempted to gain control of everything that flew.” Any Australian Vietnam veteran will identify 16 Australian Task Force helicopters that didn’t fit that bill. Beware of absolutes!

I am only up to page two of the article, and I could go on, just as the fallacious argument goes on. For example, the author blames the fall of Singapore in WWII on the RAF. The Japanese Army might have something to say about that. Also, he attributes the Argentinian failure in the Falklands to faulty joint operations. Didn’t weapon effectiveness and tactics count for anything in the defeat? These over-simplifications are the essence of the whole paper.

I can only conclude that the author exhibits a poor understanding of air power, a questionable interpretation of history, but most damningly for the RAN, ADFA and the *Defence Force Journal*, a woeful appreciation of logical argument. I do not believe Lieutenant Bailey’s article contributes anything constructive to the defence debate on the use of air power for this nation - on the contrary. If I may offer some advice through the words of the immortal scholar Samuel Johnson:

> “My dear friend, clear your mind of cant... You may talk in this manner; it is a mode of talking in society: but don’t think foolishly.”

B.L. Kavanagh
Group Captain
Dear Sir,

Warfare in the 20th Century has been increasingly characterised by two seemingly disparate phenomena - on the one hand, a trend towards single service specialisation, and, on the other hand, increasing emphasis upon joint operations. The former trend reflects the influence of technological developments in weaponry, while the latter trend underscores the interactive, interdependent, and complementary nature of sea, land and air power.

For the ADF, the concept of co-operation is the basis for joint warfare and much has been done to embody this principle at all levels within the Services as the means of achieving the effective synergy of the three forms of combat power. There is still some way to go in this regard though, as lingering inter-service acrimony of the type expressed by Lieutenant M.L. Bailey, RAN in his article “The Medium Power Air Force - What Need to Exist?” (DFJ Jul/Aug 90) attests to.

I have no doubt that other readers will write to you and cite the lapses of scholarly conduct evident in Lieutenant Bailey’s article, but my concern is the wider issue of the extent to which air power is misunderstood by professional military officers and others involved in the Australian defence debate. I suspect that Lieutenant Bailey’s article represents the very tip of the iceberg.

The task of grasping the essence of air power and its application to an Australian context is not an easy one and then there is the further difficulty of the paucity of published conceptual thinking on the subject. As a step in the right direction to overcome this problem the RAAF has documented, from this publication, The Air Power Manual (AAP 1000) to your readers as a comprehensive philosophical foundation to underpin dialogue on the use of air power in the defence of Australia.

Brent Espeland
Group Captain
Air Force Office

Dear Sir,

I have just read the article “The Medium Power Airforce — What Need to Exist?” written by Lieutenant M.L. Bailey and published in the July/August issue of the Defence Force Journal. In your short biographical note you state that Lieutenant Bailey holds a BA in Military History from the Defence Force Academy. I wonder if this could be put right. Firstly, the Australian Defence Force Academy does not award a degree. The degree awarding institution is the University of New South Wales. This University has established a University College at the Australian Defence Force Academy. Secondly, the University of New South Wales through its University College does not offer a BA in Military History. It offers a Bachelor of Arts.

Possibly you will want to put this right in a future issue otherwise you readers could be misled in an important way.

John McCarthy
Associate Professor

Dear Editor

Lt M.L. Bailey’s controversial article “The Medium Power Airforce — What Need to Exist?” (DFJ Jul/Aug 90), will no doubt bring a rash of correspondence from supporters for his line of argument, and perhaps from the advocates of an independent airforce. However my main concern is that Lt Bailey has based his arguments on a very selective reading of military history, misinformation and data of dubious value. This does not do the Defence Force Journal justice. While I do not aim to write an article in rebuttal. I do believe there is a need to redress some inaccuracies and bring balance to the debate.

Firstly, the RAAF was not established to provide a ‘war winning’ capability in its own right. Notwithstanding the advocates of Mitchell and Douhet I doubt there would be many who would argue it has such a capability. Winning wars is not brought about by selective or indeed overall military supremacy. Rather it is a hybrid capacity, a creation of political will and resolve, national morale, economic and industrial power as much as outright force of arms. “Winning war” is the process that forges these elements into a dominant capability to exert control over one’s enemies. Maritime, land and air power important as they are, are simply elements of such a process.

As far as the origins and independence of the RAAF are concerned, the RAAF was not a plot borne of ambition to deny the RAN and Army their air components. Indeed it was naval and
army officers who oversaw the birth of the fledgling RAAF. (In this sense the RAAF was the first joint service organisation in the ADF.) Major General Legge, the Chief of General Staff in 1918, was the principal proponent of an Australian Air Force. However, the Government of the day was faced with two competing and costly air corps proposals, one each from the RAN and Army. Recognising the flexibility of air power and the potential for economy, in January, 1919 the Defence Council decided that a joint air service was the way ahead. Subsequently in February, 1921, the Air Council agreed to the establishment of the RAAF. The arguments which led to this were essentially about economy of effort. They are arguments as valid today as they were in 1919. They were not the arguments of enthusiastic, inexperienced theorists, nor followers of the latest fashion in British military organisation. Rather the decision was by men, including many senior Naval and Army officers who knew exactly what they wanted, and whose experience and expertise had been forged in one of the most gruelling wars of modern history.

Lt Bailey makes much of the “failures of air power” (including many of strategic significance), from which lessons can be drawn. Examples include: the Battle of Britain, the North Atlantic U-Boat campaign, the Nazi invasion of Crete, the Berlin Airlift, and the successes of the World War II strategic and tactical bombing campaigns. Closer to home, (and of continued relevance to Australia’s defence), examples are: the Battle of the Bismark Sea, and the Battle of Milne Bay (notable for the successful application of close air support). Lt Bailey derides the USAF’s efforts in Vietnam (while notably excluding comment on the relative performance of the USN’s carrier air groups). However, there were notable air power successes in Vietnam, for example Linebacker II which brought the Vietnamese back to the negotiating table, and other successes particularly in the tactical application of air power. However, enough has been said, the point is that we ignore these lessons at our peril. In the ADF we need to learn the way of success in the application of air power, rather than dwell on failures.

On the issue of relative efficiency, Lt Bailey quotes aircraft to manpower ratios allegedly published in the Pacific Defence Reporter, to support an assertion of the RAAF’s inefficiency. His claim is that the RAAF is not providing “bang for bucks”. I have one problem with this, his claim of 85 combat aircraft for the RAAF does not add up. There are in fact over 200 operational aircraft in Air Command, of which 150 are combat types and the remainder transports. Training Command, which has been included in Lt Bailey’s manpower total, operates close to 100 training aircraft. Also relevant is that the RAAF carries out much of its aircraft maintenance “in house”. Unless such factors are considered and adjusted for, comparisons such as that in Lt Bailey’s table are quite meaningless.

Finally, on the point of manpower transfers associated with the transfer of the rotary wing component to Army, this niggling question can be readily put to rest. Manpower was transferred to Army, and additionally a significant number of RAAF personnel have been seconded to the Army since 1989 to ensure as smooth as possible introduction of the Blackhawk to Army service.

I trust this helps set the record straight.

J.H. Graham
Wing Commander

Medium Power Airforce: The Author Replies

Dear Sir

I would like to make a brief reply to those who have submitted letters concerning my recent article in the Defence Force Journal (DFJ). The article in question was written in October 1989, and I was quite surprised (and pleased) to find that it had been published in the DFJ. I believe that a policy of permitting the open airing of opinion to be laudable, and I deplore the attacks on your Journal made as the result of my article. I, and I alone should be the object of any such attacks.

I wrote the article as an exercise for my own benefit, in order to get myself back into study routines prior to my posting to the Master of Defence Studies programme this year. As a result I freely admit it would be of much higher academic standard had I written it now.

That is not the point. The article was written as a reply to Group Captain Kavanagh’s article “One a Penny, Two a Penny” which put forward what I believe to be an outdated viewpoint. This
The central point I attempted to make was that the main function of the medium power airforce is the support of the other two services. This point has certainly eluded Mr R. Fisher who asserts that my aim was only to advocate the disbanding of the RAAF. In my opinion this would only be necessary if that service was unwilling to adapt to the doctrine of Joint Warfare, and I am looking forward to reading AAP 1000 on that point.

The RAAF has consistently reacted strongly to any hint of challenge to its independence, and rightly so, but the institution itself is immature and possesses a fixation with the technology of its function. This was explained to me by a RAAF officer of my acquaintance, but there is nothing new about this problem either. The RN was “similarly afflicted” prior to the First World War — see lectures of Sir J. Corbett between 1911 and 1913 to prove the point. This technological fixation cost the RN dearly in that war and I believe that these are serious issues that should be addressed.

I raised the issue of base vulnerability as an example of lack of balanced argument, and I would suggest to Mr R. Fisher that the airfields seized by the North Koreans in June to July 1950 were at least as lost as a sunken carrier. They were used by the enemy and had to be retaken by the UN land forces. Airfields are able to be seized and used against the previous owner. Similarly I would suggest that a study of US Pacific Operations from “Cartwheel” to “Iceberg”, or a study of the US submarine offensive against Japan might answer the question of the existence of a maritime war winning function, and ours is a maritime state.

Wing Commander MacFarling takes me to task for the scholastic quality of the article, and quite frankly most of his observations are valid. The article was not written as a polemic, however, and discussing both sides of the case would demand a much longer article. It was intended as a limited reply to another work and had one main point to make. I would also note here that this is a criticism that could be made of many articles in many journals.

I am tempted to requote Group Captain Kavanagh’s final lines over the issues of Linebacker II and the helicopter support to 1ATF. An examination of the wording of the peace proposals before and after Linebacker II reveals only minor changes. There exist good grounds for questioning whether the Christmas bombings had any real impact on the political settlement at all.

The issue of RAAF helicopter support for 1ATF is more revealing. Brigadier Mackay insisted on their delivery with armoured seats and door machine guns. The aircraft were delivered without them, and Brigadier Mackay grounded the helicopters until Canberra agreed to his terms on the issue of their employment. The RAAF also apparently insisted that peacetime Air Board regulations be applied to their use. I was informed of these incidents by a retired Army officer who was there at the time, but this is mentioned in Horner’s *Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War* as well. After that incident was resolved there were a few other minor problems, but the RAAF helicopters gave excellent support.

My reply is brief as I note that the major point I attempted to make has not been challenged, although whether this is due to agreement or to it not having been detected I cannot say. If any of these gentlemen would like to continue this discussion with me, I would be delighted to accommodate them. I can be contacted through the Advanced Students Squadron at the Defence Force Academy.

Mark Bailey
Lieutenant, RAN
The Defence Force and the Community: The Wrigley Review

By Alan K. Wrigley, Special Advisor to the Minister for Defence

This year Australians will spend nearly $9 billion on their defence force. Two thirds of this will be spent on people — either directly on their salaries and benefits or indirectly on their activities — and the other third on new equipment and facilities.

The Review proposes major changes to the way the defence force uses people: changes that would make it far more effective in its basic role of defending Australia. When the Minister for Defence, Senator Ray, publicly launched the Review report he said that it would dominate the defence debate for the next two or three years. It would therefore be useful for members of the ADF to get a good first-hand understanding of the basic ideas underlying the Review and the proposals it makes. This article sets out to help provide such an understanding.

Background to the Review

The Review was completed in June of this year and the Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Ray, released it at the beginning of August. It was initiated by the former Minister, Mr Kim Beazley, who was concerned that too few Australians gave enough thought to the defence of their country. The Minister wanted to explore how the Australian community could play a greater role in strengthening Australia’s security and how more weight could be given to the Government’s policy of eliminating unnecessary duplication of civilian and military skills and capabilities. According to its terms of reference, the Review was to:

* seek ways of having the Australian community — as individuals, in business and at various levels of public administration — become more involved in the protection of the nation against external military threats, and hence broaded the total support base for national defence; and

* identify opportunities for greater efficiency or economy in countering military threats to Australia’s security, through the use of capabilities and capacities that exist or might be developed in the Australian community.

The Review was to be undertaken within the framework of the strategic guidance endorsed by the government and the force structure outlined in the 1987 Defence White Paper.

Strategic Guidance: The Self-Reliant Defence of Australia

During the last twenty years, Australia’s defence strategy has evolved from its historical position in which the three services had, as their primary role, the preparation of expeditionary forces to be sent abroad to form parts of some much larger allied expeditionary force which so largely supplied and supported them. But since the mid-1970s successive governments have directed that the primary role of the armed forces is to become effective when operating together in national tasks directed at providing self-reliant defence for Australia’s direct sovereign interests.

From the Coalition Government’s 1976 Defence White Paper right up to the present there has been political agreement on the basis for our defence posture. The Coalition Government’s White Paper set the tone:

“...A primary requirement emerging from our findings is for self-reliance. In our contemporary circumstances we no longer base our policy on the expectation that Australia’s navy or army or air force will be sent abroad to fight as part of some other nation’s force, supported by it. We do not rule out an Australian contribution to operations elsewhere if the requirement arose and we felt our presence would be effective, and if our forces could be spared from their national tasks. But we believe that any operations are much more likely to be in our own neighbourhood than in some distant or forward theatre, and that our armed services would be conducting joint operations together as the Australian Defence Force.”

Eleven years later the Labor Government’s 1987 Defence White Paper, when setting down the principal contingencies that must shape Australia’s defence planning, said:

“The government believes that Australia
must be able to provide for its own defence in circumstances, presently quite unlikely but still credible as a future possibility, of a threat posed to Australia by a nation operating within our region. Such developments would place great demands on our defence capacity. Our force structure planning will ensure that we have, and can be seen to have, the capacity to respond effectively to them."

So the defence policy imperative is quite clear. Self-reliant defence of our own sovereignty is to be the primary determinant of our defence planning.

Of course this does not exclude the kinds of tasks the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, in his recent ministerial statement 'Australia’s Regional Security' called politico-military capability — tasks like contributing to UN forces and working with regional governments in operations under defence cooperation programs and regional security agreements. Governments have said they are prepared to handle such tasks by choosing suitable elements from a defence force shaped by the needs of national defence. This is entirely practicable because our contribution will often be a demonstration of national resolve rather than a substantial military capability.

**The Importance of Matching Military Management to Strategic Guidance**

There are real benefits to be gained from developing our defence capacities on the basis of national defence, rather than on the expeditionary characteristics of the past. But to obtain these benefits we need to change the way the defence force uses its personnel, and the way it relates to the wider Australian community and its infrastructure.

Consider first the two extreme ends of the spectrum between a force optimised for expeditionary operations in many different parts of the world and one optimised for territorial defence of its homeland.

The purely expeditionary force, designed to fight far from home and to deal with different kinds of wars in different geographic environments, needs to be as versatile as possible. It favours the use of full-time regular military forces trained for a broad range of missions. And since it needs to travel to distant places to fight it requires a large investment in transport, communications and logistical capacities, as well as in all the ancillary services such as medical and dental support, fuel and water handling, and so on.

As a result, the expeditionary force must deploy large numbers of military personnel to do essentially civilian support jobs — but do them in uniform because the locals may be unreliable or hostile and the uniform provides both a disciplinary framework and personal protection. Because these overseas deployed support personnel expect only fairly short posting periods, especially in peacetime, at least as many again must be held at home to provide relief. And because those held at home must be kept occupied, they do jobs there which would otherwise be done by civilians. The result is that the expeditionary force employs far larger numbers of uniformed personnel in providing support services than it does in combat-related duties.

The outcome of all this is that the expeditionary force is very expensive per unit of combat power — because of the high cost of the people and equipment needed for military self-sufficiency.

At the other extreme is the classical territorial defence force which operates on and around its national borders in order to deter or defeat any threat which might emerge there. It usually has a good idea of who it might have to fight and where. Its core regular forces are usually small but these are backed by substantial reserves — often through conscription.

The deployment of combat forces is made easier because the supply lines are mostly internal. Base-level support is provided from the homeland and plans are prepared to make full use of the national transport, communications, medical support and other facilities — so military needs are taken into account when these facilities are developed. This strong interdependency between the national support service infrastructure and the armed forces means that those in uniform, both regulars and reserves, can be largely assigned to combat-related duties.

All this means that the territorial defence force provides substantially more combat capability per dollar than the expeditionary force — because it is not burdened with the high
overheads of military self-sufficiency.

Australia's defence needs, as expressed by the major political groupings, are for neither totally expeditionary nor totally territorial defence. But any thoughtful analysis of their more substantial statements on defence policy would conclude that our needs are closer to the territorial defence force end of the spectrum than to the expeditionary force end. This means that we ought to be aiming for what the Review has called a sovereignty-defence force: one primarily designed to cope with future uncertainties in the defence of our national sovereignty but with enough flexibility to cope as well with limited expeditionary or politico-military operations, mostly in our region. The Review called these latter tasks 'constabulary tasks'.

It is illuminating to compare the defence force today with that formed under the greatly boosted defence expenditure and associated defence build-up of the late 1960s. Two developments in our region drove this defence build-up: Indonesia, where the rapidly growing and Soviet-supplied military forces had far exceeded our own; and Vietnam, where the government in the south was collapsing under what was perceived as a unified world communist thrust down through South-East Asia. There was a real sense of urgency then in the government guidance to the three services, which were exhorted to be:

"...ready today to cope with emergencies which could occur with little or no warning ... insurgency or local conflicts in which immediately available forces could have a decisive effect..."

Yet despite the enormous change in the strategic guidance since, the changes in the fundamental posture of our defence forces are negligible. What went wrong? Why did we fail to recognise that the character of our defence forces had to change markedly if they were to be well suited to these dramatically changed needs?

Why has the Defence Force been Unresponsive to our Changed Defence Needs?

The Review argues that the defence force has misread the goal of self-reliant national defence. Instead, it has pursued the self-sufficient military force which was its ideal under the expeditionary force tradition. Our military history, founded on expeditionary forces, has long moulded our military training, doctrines and procedures as has our close association with the regular 'expeditionary' forces of Britain and the United States. The expeditionary force tradition is so deeply ingrained in the experience of Australian military officers that it is rarely even questioned. We have had negligible direct contact with any other alternative.

Australia's full-time armed forces entered the 1960s some 48,000 strong but neither the appearance nor the spirit of an integrated national force. The three services, each with its own Minister and its own priorities, were each set up to contribute in its own way to allied 'expeditionary forces' in South-East Asia and beyond. At this time our forces were not self-sufficient — depending instead on the military infrastructure of the larger forces.

By 1963 the government's growing disquiet about threatening military developments to the north began to be translated into positive action. Australian defence spending nearly doubled over the next five years, reaching an all-time post-war peak of about 4.3% of GDP in 1967-68. Over the ten year period from the beginning to the end of this spending boost, virtually every major piece of capital equipment in the armed forces was replaced by world-class new items.

By the early 1970s the armed services had increased their full-time personnel strength by nearly 50 percent (not counting army conscripts). Yet while the quality and capability of their equipment was now much better, the total numbers of combat units such as aircraft squadrons, destroyers, and infantry battalions remained much the same. The growth in personnel numbers seems to have been soaked up, not by increasing the combat capability, but by increasing the breadth and depth of support services supplied by uniformed personnel in the pursuit of greater military self-sufficiency.

Since the mid 1970s practical force structure changes have been marginal. Except for small reductions following the paying off of the navy's aircraft carrier and its fixed-wing aircraft, personnel numbers and their balance between the three services and between regular and reserve forces remain essentially unchanged. Large numbers of full-time military personnel continue to provide support services in the name of military 'self-sufficiency'. The Australian
defence force has at least as high a proportion of non-combat support services personnel as the most dedicated of expeditionary forces.

From the mid 1980s through the 1990s the defence force faces a second wave of major capital equipment expenditure as the major equipment bought in the late 1960s must be replaced at the end of its (typically) 25-year life. Without the huge boost in the defence budgets of the earlier period, this expenditure demand will dominate defence resource allocations through the 1990s and grow even stronger because of the demand for new capabilities such as early warning aircraft and extensive defence communications systems.

The result of all this is that we must now pay for both this large capital expenditure and the large personnel burdens of military ‘self-sufficiency’ within a probably reducing defence budget. So the defence force goes from year to year ‘salami slicing’ its operational capacity — less flying hours for aircraft, ships prematurely paid off, and minor equipment and exercise budgets for the army trimmed — while at the same time it falls far short of the numbers of skilled people needed to operate its expensive capital equipment at full capacity in time of need.

The Pursuit of Irrelevant Goals — and Their Price

The Review argues that the defence force has taken on all the support trappings of an independent expeditionary force and has ignored the enormous parallel capacities that exist in the Australian community and the national infrastructure. Capacities that would be available to it under a sovereignty-defence posture. It uses costly full-time military personnel in the pursuit of an almost uniform level of readiness across the whole defence force, when our strategic circumstances make an overwhelming case for making use of a capable reserve force, to be mobilised if necessary for all but the constabulary tasks.

The price of this is a defence force which has military capabilities far below its potential and far below those other countries achieve for the same money: it ties up so many of its people and resources, that it has far too few people in combat related jobs. It has very little planning aimed at sustaining and expanding its capacities should a military threat develop in the future. And, in the absence of any prepared source of additional trained personnel, it adopts a fatalistic view of such things.

The Review examined some eighty-eight force element groups within the current force structure. It found that shortages of skilled people provide far the greatest constraint on the effective use of this force structure. This constraint is pervasive and deep-seated. For example, with more skilled personnel the sea time of the navy’s combat ships could be increased by around 50 percent, and the flying hours for the fighter, strike, transport and maritime patrol aircraft fleets could be more than doubled. And in the army there are marked shortages in the skills involved in combat support: these, not riflemen, would determine the army’s ability to sustain operations.

The Review argues that these shortages are mainly due to the historical choices the defence force has made — choices about how it recruits and trains full-time military people, how it uses reserve forces, and whether particular jobs are done by military personnel or civilians. Choices which are primary the product of a doctrine of military ‘self-sufficiency’ which has its origin in our expeditionary force tradition.

But we have now reached the stage where something must give — and that something must be the elusive and largely anachronistic pursuit of military ‘self-sufficiency’. The public realises this, in an intuitive way. Surveys have shown that around 60 percent of Australians do not think the defence force could adequately defend them against a military threat, and less than 25 percent think that the defence organisation spends the taxpayer’s money wisely.

Self-reliance in the defence of Australia calls for a very different approach: the defence force must plan to draw on, and be structured to draw on, the resources of the community in times of need. If the community saw that this was being done, perhaps it would be more persuaded than it is that the defence force was truly professional in its approach to defence.

Where Would the Review Take the Defence Force?

The Review argues that the defence force needs to make use of people in ways better
matched to Australia's strategic environment, our defence needs, and our cultural preference for voluntary defence forces. In this way the defence force and the community can be brought closer together, to the considerable benefit of our shorter-term defence capacity and our longer-term defence support base.

But first it is essential, for a healthy relationship between the defence force and the community, that both understand what it is that the defence force is expected to do. The Review argues that Australia's peacetime defence force should be seen as having two broad roles.

The first is what the Review calls 'constabulary tasks'. By this is meant the rapid response tasks that governments expect to be able to use the defence force for at short notice — and without disturbing the rest of the community too much. Tasks such as:

* extracting Australian citizens from some nearby place if public order breaks down, and assisting the legitimate government there to restore order;

* contributing to United Nations peacekeeping and similar operations — including such things as the current naval deployment to the Persian Gulf; and

* assisting the civil authorities to deal with terrorist incidents and the like.

The Review proposes that constabulary tasks should be primarily handed by the full-time forces. Such tasks would usually be of limited duration but they need not be restricted to 'low level' military capabilities.

The second main role for the peacetime force is the key task of preparing the national military machinery to contribute to an effective total national defence posture, able to provide the necessary insurance against the uncertainties of the future. Self-reliant defence is realistic for Australia only if prepared for at the national level, drawing as necessary on the skills and capacities available in the entire community. It is not a task for the defence force alone. And if the national defence machinery is to work when it is needed, then both the defence force and the community have to understand what would be expected of them — and be prepared to adopt, in peacetime, practices that would speed the transition to an effective defence effort if the need arises.

The Review proposes that the sovereignty defence role be assumed by a 'total force' comprising the full-time forces and a much expanded and more capable three-service voluntary reserve force (which the Review calls a 'militia'). The militia would be called only when operational tasks arise out of persuasive national sovereignty concerns — concerns which are supported by a community which would in such circumstances accept the need for national infrastructure resources to be committed to the defence effort and citizen soldiers to turn from their normal civilian life.

So who would this total defence work in practice?

**A Sovereignty-Defence Force for Australia**

In practical terms the Review proposes that the defence force make the best use of people within the Australian military and civilian population by:

* using military personnel for those functions which are directly associated with combat, which exercise specialised military skills, or which can only be done under law restricted to military personnel;

* using full-time military personnel only for those military functions which involve sustained peacetime duty or demand high readiness and use part-time militia for the others;

* using Defence civilian employees only for those non-military tasks where the public interest is important, such as policy advice to government, program management, financial controls and so on, or where the task does not lend itself to competitive commercial contracting; and

* allowing competent and reputable commercial organisations to compete to provide defence support services, particularly for the supply of goods and services of a commercial nature.

Broad guidelines such as these divide defence tasks in such a way as to provide the most effective force for our defence dollar. They use people in the most efficient way — matched to the tasks they are expected to perform, not just put in jobs in accordance with traditional practices — with costly military training given only for truly military tasks and with the civilian infrastructure providing support services wherever practicable.

Following these guidelines, the number of full-time regular military personnel — both
combat and combat support — who could be deployed for high readiness operational tasks would be almost the same as now. The Review took full account of the ADF Headquarters’ readiness directive in assigning particular capacities to the regular forces.

The combat-related strength of the mobilised defence force would be increased by one third through the addition of capable new part-time militia. The militia would be full partners with the regulars: they would fly and maintain aircraft in operational squadrons, crew and support ships in the fleet, and make up combat and combat support units in the army. The militia would increase the overall combat capacities of the mobilised defence force by around:

- 50 to 100 percent in the airforce;
- 50 percent in the navy; and
- 40 percent in the army.

It would achieve this increase by giving the defence force access to key skilled people — who are needed to operate and maintain its equipment and weapon systems at full capacity during a defence emergency. But people who in peacetime would only be used on a part-time basis and so would cost the defence force much less than full-time regulars.

And how would this militia differ from the current reserves?

First, the Review proposed about doubling the total number of reserves by encouraging those leaving the full-time defence force for civilian life to transfer to the part-time militia — rather than be lost to defence as they are today. By continuing to do ‘sharp end’ jobs part-time in the militia they would preserve and sharpen their military skills so Australia could call them quickly in time of need. The overall number of personnel joining the ‘total force’ from outside would actually be about the same as it is today. The difference would be that over one third of the personnel leaving the regular force would be encouraged by incentives to put in more military service in the militia — probably after a shorter term in full-time service.

Second, the Review proposes upgrading the capability and training of both ‘off the street’ and ex-regular members of the militia: by initiatives such as providing many full-time militia support staff so the part-time members would maximise the time they spent in useful training, and spending $1 billion dollars over six years to provide the militia with advanced training and operational equipment where needed.

**Support Jobs Transferred to the Civilian Infrastructure**

To release the funds to ensure that the militia becomes capable and well equipped, the Review proposes almost halving the number of full-time military personnel providing support services of an essentially civilian kind in base workshops and administrative units: repairing equipment, transporting, storing and packing goods, catering and cleaning on military bases, providing medical care, training others to do these civilian jobs and so on. Support work which is done at facilities located in or near population centres in south-eastern Australia. Work that would still need to be done in these places even when the combat forces and their support personnel were deployed in the north — and work that could be done more efficiently in the wider community.

The support services work transferred from the defence force would go to the civilian community and be exposed to commercial competition. Similarly, the Review proposes that around half the jobs now done by Defence public servants would be opened to competitive bidding from the private sector.

Transferring this defence work in the civilian infrastructure would not just free up defence money: it would free military managers to concentrate on their core military mission. And — with the expanded militia proposal — it would increase the proportion of military personnel with combat-related jobs from 46 percent to 60 percent. It would also substantially strengthen the links between the civilian infrastructure and the defence force, making it much easier to rapidly expand the provision of support services to the defence force in times of need.

**Summing It Up**

The end product would be a more capable defence force with a better capacity for expansion, and a more involved community with a bigger stake in defence. It would be a defence force in a much better position to defend Australia against any credible regional aggressor. And it would be a defence force which would cost less to run — because the extra cost
of the larger and more capable militia would be more than recouped by the savings from transferring many defence support services to the more efficient and commercially competitive civilian infrastructure.

It would reverse the drift towards the ‘hollow force’ which the current defence force seems unable to avoid.

Are There Risks to Australia’s Defence?

Any major reform carries some risk if the planned benefits fall short of expectations. However, the proposals in the Review aim to maximise the benefits in such a way as to minimise risks. And it is important to remember that the issue of risks is not one-sided. If the defence force does not turn away from the current “death by a thousand salami-slicing cuts” which is the result of its single-minded protection of full-time personnel numbers — both military and civilian — the risks of a hollow force must continue to grow stronger.

Under the Review’s proposals almost the same number of full-time regulars as now — both combat and combat support personnel — could be deployed for operational tasks. The ADF Headquarters’ high readiness requirements would not be reduced, so there is little risk here. Indeed, they may become more real than they are today.

The defence force would look to the new militia to strengthen these capacities when our sovereign interests were threatened, so here the issue of risk boils down to whether the militia could provide the skilled people needed to do the job. But with the militia we are in a ‘no lose’ situation because we currently have little capacity to mount more intensive operations and nothing in the pipeline, whereas the potential capacity offered by the militia is substantial. The key factor is the political and military will to genuinely press the implementation of a ‘total force’ approach — and that means trade-offs.

Ex-regulars transferring to the militia would be the most important source of this extra capacity on call. Under the Review’s proposals the defence force would aim to recruit between one third and one half of those resigning from the regular force into the militia. This would be monitored over time and transfer and retention incentives would be used to keep on target. But even if the militia falls a bit short, the defence force would still have much more latent capacity than it has now. So long as the commitment of leadership is there, this risk is low.

The Review proposes transferring the provision of support services using military personnel to the civilian infrastructure — but only at defence facilities near population centres in the south east of Australia and only to the extent allowed by deployment rotation needs. So the risk here is also low.

Fear of having military operations disrupted by industrial action comes up repeatedly when the subject of transferring work to the civil infrastructure is raised with Australian military officers. The Review found that the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the US, Canada, and Britain all do this more extensively than Australia in their various ways and all manage very well without putting the workforce into uniform and under military law. All were baffled by any suggestion that their civilian workforce would not support the needs of military operations carried out in their defence.

The story could be less clear-cut in peacetime. However the Review saw no reason for the community to pay the cost of providing the defence force with privileged protection from industrial disruption in peacetime, when some risk of disruption is accepted in many important peacetime activities such as transport and banking. In any case, the evidence is that the risk is low. Military managers may find it frustrating, but to reject the enormous advantages from community involvement in defence merely to reduce the effects of industrial disturbances in peacetime would be short sighted indeed. Nevertheless, the Review makes some suggestions for reducing the vulnerability of the defence force to such things: one is to transfer many Defence public sector civilians from the general public service to a dedicated Defence Support Agency with a single union and with specific conditions of service which recognise the national significance of their duties.

Overseas experience has been that because the commercial sector providing support services does not have tenure on defence work, both management and labour have stronger than normal incentives to develop good industrial relations.

Finally, some critics have suggested that the great distances in Australia — between the well-
populated south-east and the northern hinterland that is our prospective operational area — mean that our military deployments would be very like expeditionary force operations. So we could not expect to get the advantages which the Review claims.

That is simply not correct, for several reasons.

First, the Review proposes reducing the numbers only of depot or base level regular personnel — not those who under any reasonable assumptions would be expected to deploy into a combat zone. As the Review notes, even the United States with its large peacetime overseas deployment, does not use military personnel to do many of the support service jobs the Australian forces do.

Second, it would be quite unrealistic, when dealing with an attack on our own nation, to stay with the posting relief standards that have been accepted for overseas expeditionary forces in the past.

Third, the Swedes and Norwegians — whose priority combat areas beyond the Arctic Circle are just about as remote from their population centres and certainly less hospitable than ours — go much further than the Review proposes in planning to use the civilian community for support. Certainly transport, communications, construction and other equipment not already in the north could be readily drawn from the civilian infrastructure in the south-east in time of need — if we plan for it.

**So Where Next?**

Support from the major political parties and strong and resolute commitment from the government and our present military leaders — but more importantly, their successors — is crucial to the success of the Review’s proposals.

Only then would these major long term benefits to our national security be fully secured. Because only through a clear commitment to replacing the present resource-starved and poorly managed reserves by a new well-equipped and capable militia will the necessary numbers of good quality recruits be attracted and retained — from both the community and the ‘flow-through’ of full-time military personnel. And because only through commitment to a defence force which draws its support strength from the resources of the community will the current ethos of the full-time regular forces be moved — from that of a small self-contained professional force set apart from the community to one with its roots into the nation firmly buttressed by community support.

The Review argues that, without a commitment to these major changes, the defence force will make at best only small moves towards correcting the gross mis-match between the defence force we have today and Australia’s current and future needs. Such marginal moves will be ineffectual, because they will not confront the Australian defence force’s current attitude that defence is a job that should be left to the specialist — a job which the community cannot be expected to understand, much less contribute to. The community will likely not even notice the current ‘deckchair shuffling’ changes within the defence force, let alone see in them the major new initiative needed to make self-reliant defence seem truly credible.

If Australia is to take this new direction in managing defence, the time for change is now, while our strategic environment is benign, because it will take many years to achieve smoothly. The end result would be well worth the effort: a much more capable defence force bound to a much more involved Australian community. For the first time in our history the Australian community would have confidence that Australia can be defended by Australians — and it would be right.

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Alan Keveral Wrigley joined the Department of Defence under the Tange re-organisation in 1975 as Assistant Secretary — Project Development. He rose through various positions to Deputy Secretary B, responsible for the Defence program and budget, strategic and international policy, force structure planning and defences intelligence oversight. In 1985, he became a Director-General of Security. He was appointed Special Advisor to Senator Button in 1988 on an Australian-Japanese proposal for a ‘City of the Future’ to be built in Australia. He is currently Special Advisor to Senator Ray, Minister for Defence.
Thoughts on Peace and War in Australian Circles

By Lieutenant Commander R.F. Grezl, RAN

Introduction

In order to discuss Australian thoughts on war and peace, perhaps it is important to understand an Australian approach to these matters. Australians use the phrase Bangsa Australia cinta damai tetapi lebih cinta kebebasan i.e. Australians love peace but prefer their freedom. This phrase derives from the conflicts in which Australia in general, and its service personnel in particular, have been involved. The only instances where armed conflict occurred on Australian soil was during WWII when Darwin was bombed by Japanese aircraft and Sydney Harbour was attacked by Japanese mini submarines. In every other instance, Australian troops have fought, and in some instances died, on foreign soil or in foreign waters in defence of a greater ideal — that of world freedom and peace everlasting.

The Reasons for War

War is often regarded as an extension of a conflict which cannot be resolved by means other than armed combat. The main sources of conflict in the world appear to be:

a. Projection of force by superpowers to regions outside their own, in order to extent their ‘area of influence’ and in doing so to form a natural buffer zone for their own country;
b. Problems of economy including famine and suffering, over-population, desires on natural resources, etc. — probably the most common cause of conflict these days;
c. Religion — not so prevalent, but still a factor, especially in the Middle East conflicts; and
d. Idealism, interference by international organisations in a country’s internal affairs especially where that organisation is based in a country whose relations may not be too good with the country concerned.

In assessing whether a conflict, and resulting war, is required, the following methodology is applicable:

Assess national interests towards the problem

Integration

Conflict

Accommodation

Use of Force

Direct Force (war)

Coercion
It may be seen that, at the higher levels of government, the decision making process involved before deciding on "war" allows for several "softer" options. Only when all other avenues have been explored, should the decision to use force be taken.

By looking at the main causes of war, together with their applicability to Australia, we will see that in general terms there are very few reasons for any nation to attempt to control Australia through the use of force or any other means.

a. **Imbalance in Force.** Whilst there is no struggle for a balance of power amongst the nations in the region of Australia's interest, i.e. from Cocos Islands in the West to W/SW Pacific (approx 4000nm), the ongoing struggle between the two superpowers in protecting their powers and influence throughout this region is a cause for concern. The SE Asian region is strategically important, especially as it sits astride the Malacca Strait, the principal trade route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Should any conflict arise between the two Superpowers, the expansion of this conflict into the SE Asian region would most likely be directed at this area with both sides aiming to ensure freedom of manoeuvrability for their forces on both sides of the Indonesian Archipelago. Whilst this may not represent a threat to Australia, we could be involved, perhaps in support of our neighbouring countries, i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. With involvement comes the inherent risk of retaliation.

b. **Nationalism or Separatism.** There are no countries with claims on Australian land, nor has Australia claims on any other lands. Thus the possibility of war (occurring) on this basis is remote. The only likely occurrence which may generate conflict would be claims over Australian Territories or over the territories of one of the many island nations in the region with whom Australia has defence or other close links.

c. **Communications Breakdown.** In this context, we must speak of a communications breakdown or failure at the higher level of government activities. At low levels, most minor problems in this area can be resolved through mutual acceptance of differences. At present, Australia maintains good, open relations with the nations within its area of interest.

d. **Arms Race.** Again this area is not really applicable to Australia, as there are no regional arms races. The arms race between US/USSR, similarly has no direct bearing on Australia and would cause conflicts or war only if there was a clash between the two superpowers which spilled over into this region.

e. **Internal Cohesion through External Conflict.** With the system of government and freedom of speech available in Australia, never has a situation become so bad that, in order to stabilise the internal situation, a war was deemed necessary. With the present stability throughout the area of Australia's interest, no regional government is seen as likely to require such an expansionist, action to stabilise itself.

f. **Instinctive Aggression.** As there are no "warmonger" type countries in this region this possibility has been discounted.

g. **Economic and Scientific Stimulants.** The economies of most nations in the world, apart from the superpowers, are subject to economic slumps these days. Whilst this is the case, the majority of SE Asian Countries enjoy a fairly good trade and economic base, and trade relations both within the region and outside are stable and open.

h. **Military — Industrial Complex.** This situation would only apply where one or the other of the superpowers, or perhaps another major trading nation, able to influence countries in the area of the need to initiate military action in order to achieve an economic goal. With trade relations in particular and relations between countries in general being maintained constantly, the possibility of this occurring is remote.

i. **Relative Poverty.** The large numbers of aid programs in the region to which Australia contributes, together with emergency relief it provides leaves no room for this cause in general. Again maintenance of good relations with neighbouring countries forestalls any reason for large scale requirements of Australia's resources.

j. **Conflict Resolution.** At present no conflict exists at a sufficient level to warrant armed aggression towards Australia nor is it considered likely in the foreseeable future.
Whilst, as with every country, small disagreements or differences in culture cause problems in international relations, generally speaking these are resolved by time and space. Australia has no land borders; because of this a potentially hostile neighbour is denied the opportunity to overreact immediately to statements made or actions taken by Australia which contradict their own ideas or vice versa, thus allowing a breathing space — time and opportunity for reactions to be pacified through means other than violence.

Were a conflict to arise which involves Australia, it could stem from one of three levels:

a. **Super Power Conflict.** Continuing high level strategic competition and military expenditure combined with continuing, perhaps increased tension between super powers, especially in regions of instability and confrontation may give rise to eventual global or nuclear warfare. Should this occur, Australia would almost certainly sustain either direct or indirect damage. A strong deterrent to nuclear attack on Australia, which cannot be separated from deterrence to global or nuclear war in general, must therefore remain central in Australian defence thinking. It is fortunate that, overall, there is a clear comprehension by both super powers of the awesome consequences of escalation to nuclear conflict. The threat of general devastation that a nuclear war could entail not only deters nuclear aggression but serves as a very powerful deterrent against some acts of conventional aggression. Australia's policy should therefore remain as invoking not only maintenance of the status quo between the super powers but, where possible, urging a decrease in the numbers of nuclear arms.

b. **A Large Scale Attack on Australia.** This possibility is thought to be remote, even improbable, in the foreseeable future; however there is the danger that the emergence of such a threat may take less time than is necessary to obtain long-lead items of heavy equipment and increased trained manpower, particularly if Australia becomes involved in a theatre of action outside its shores. If there is any consistent lesson in the history of military conflict, it is that undue reliance on the theory of perceptible threat is dangerous — time and again forecasting has proved defective with serious consequences. In the words of General Macarthur — The history of loss in war can be summed up in two words “TOO LATE”: Too late in preparing for a threat, realising the danger and comprehending the deadly purpose of an enemy!

c. **Intermediate and Low Level Conflicts.** This level is perhaps the most realistic when considering possible threats to Australia. The S.E. Asian region is strategically important in that it sits astride the principal trade route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans i.e. the Malacca Strait. This area also covers Australia's main trade routes to and from Japan. In recent years, the build up of a Soviet presence in Vietnam, together with the continuing American presence in the Philippines, has brought an increased level of threat to the area. The Soviet presence is of particular concern in that it now places parts of Australia within reach of Russian military units. Soviet political and economic influences may come to bear more on countries in the region by offering an alternative to the economic giant of Japan, and by reducing apprehension regarding China, a long time enemy of Russia, as well as a long term threat to the stability of the region.

The types of low-level contingencies which may occur, were the present situation to change, could include:

1. Sporadic attacks on key defence installations,
2. Harassment of shipping,
3. Intrusions into Australian airspace,
4. Military support for illegal exploitation of offshore resources — fisheries and oil,
5. Support for dissident elements, both in Australia and in a regional country whose security is important to Australia, and
6. Assistance to overseas based terrorist groups using violence in Australia.

The relative absence of short and medium range threats arises not only from Australia's fortunate geographic position, but also its many alliances with major western powers. With the withdrawal of British Forces East of Suez and statements by America that it will have to consider carefully before coming to the aid of its allies, Australia has had to re-think its defence posture in our region.

In the case of an invasion not only would time and geography play important roles in defence preparations, it would seem logical that Australia's strategic position should warrant inter-
vention by the US. Similarly with global conflict, the Australian Defence Force role would be seen as being concentrated in the waters and airspace of the immediate region, both in national defence and in supplementing the efforts of allies. This role is enhanced by present day Defence Co-operation Projects, with a view to mutual co-operation should the need arise.

The third possible source of conflict is low-level and has been addressed since the early 1970s, however only in broad terms. Since 1982, Australia has formally adopted a forward or peripheral defence posture, similar to that adopted by most 'small' nations and in fact the super powers themselves. Again this has been through close defence cooperation with neighbouring countries in the region. The Soviet presence in S.E. Asia and the Indian Ocean and its effect on the countries in the region must now be the area of major concern for defence planners.

In recent years, defence planning was seen as being disjointed. This has recently brought about a review of Australia's defence capabilities, based on perceived threats, present equipment and individual service requirements. The essence of the report is that the best type of defence for Australia is a strategy of denial based on layered defence:

First Line: Intelligence and surveillance backed up by air and naval forces capable of denying the sea and air gap between Australian and neighbours to an adversary in order to prevent any successful landing of significant forces on Australian soil.

Second Line: A range of defence capabilities including air defence assets, surface ships and mine countermeasures.

Third Line: Highly mobile land forces capable of dispersed operations and having the ability to protect our military installations, infrastructure and civilian population in the north of the continent.

A strategy of denial would be essentially a defensive policy. It would allow our geographical location to impose long lines of communication on an adversary and force an aggressor to consider the ultimate prospect of fighting on unfamiliar and generally inhospitable terrain.

**Conclusion**

From the above, it may be seen that the expression *Australians love peace but prefer their freedom* is indeed applicable to Australian thoughts on peace and war. At all times, attempts are made to maintain peace in the world through peace and security within our own country and area of interest. This is done, not only through defence pacts, but also through mutual trade agreements, defence co-operation projects as well as civil aid projects not only in the region, but throughout the world. In this way it is hoped war at any level can be avoided.

The Indonesian statement *Barang siapa yang ingin damai hendaknya bersiaplah untuk berperang* (*He who wishes peace must be prepared for war*) still has relevance in Australian military circles, as it does in military circles throughout the world. There is no country in the world who can place itself in a position where it does not prepare in some way for war, as it will be swallowed by its adversaries.

It is hoped that this discussion in some way provides an insight into the thinking on war and peace in Australian military circles. Australia is a large country with a small population and industrial base, but through a strategy based on the fundamentals of our geographic location we can maximise the benefits of an essentially defensive posture in our region.

*Lieutenant Commander Grezel joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1974 as an Observer, graduating on No 3 Observers course in 1975. He served on both VC851 and VC816 Squadrons on Grumman Tracker aircraft until 1980. He has held various staff positions including two postings to RANC. In 1985 he undertook Indonesian language training at the RAAF School of Languages, Point Cook. In 1986/87 he completed the Indonesian Staff and Command Course. He is currently the Course Implementation Officer for Special Duties, Short Service and Reserve Officers at HMAS Creswell.*
A Review of Key Defence Opinion Polls in the 1980s

By Alistair Marshall, Research Executive

Introduction

The Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force have been making concerted efforts in recent years to monitor public opinion on defence and security issues, since both organisations ultimately depend on the general public’s support for their effective functioning.

As part of this process, the Department has commissioned several large public opinion studies during the 1980s, and the results of independent opinion polling, conducted by various market research agencies, have been followed with interest.

The information derived from the studies conducted, and the polling, has had an immediate practical use - giving valuable feedback in areas such as the image of the Forces, and their defence role. It has also assisted in the formulation of the Department and the A.D.F.’s public relations activities, and in areas like recruitment.

The need for such information has also been growing, as the major recommendations regarding Australia’s defence strategy, and the organisation of the Defence Forces, are implemented, and as an increasing emphasis is given to the Department and the A.D.F.’s ‘interface’ with the public.

In the light of this, reviewing some of the key polls in the 1980s, for what they indicate about the contemporary state of public opinion in the area, is a useful exercise for defence strategists, policy makers and administrators.

Limitations of Polling

In reviewing the polls, it is important though to keep in mind that polls are quite crude instruments for measuring what the public thinks, and that they are subject to a wide range of constraints.

The latter includes the way that the questions are asked, the order of asking, the response ranges offered, how representative those being asked are, of the whole population, and the time of polling.

Furthermore, few ascertain whether the public are either interested or informed about the issues they are being asked about. As such, polls can on occasion be accused of misrepresenting public opinion.

Most polls though, can at least give a broad indication of what the public thinks about an issue at a point in time. A general ‘feeling’ or trend can usually be discerned.

While this process is more difficult when polls are looked at over time, (since many of them are not directly comparable), it is nevertheless also possible to draw some conclusions from them about the essential shape of opinion, in key areas.

In the defence field, key areas covered by the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of Australia’s believing..</th>
<th>1980%</th>
<th>1982%</th>
<th>1983%</th>
<th>1985%</th>
<th>1986%</th>
<th>1987%</th>
<th>1988%</th>
<th>Poll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Other countries threaten our security</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Morgan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- An external threat likely in next 10 years</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>ANOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A military threat likely in next 10 years</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Newspoll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A military threat likely in next 10 years</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Defence-trac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- An attack likely in next 10 years</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 2 polls
* 33% found it too difficult to tell either way
Department's work and the independent polls in the 1980s, include perceptions of threat to Australia, capacity to repel, and attitudes to current defence resources and the ANZUS alliance.

Results in these areas, while clearly subject to many of the outlined constraints, do illustrate the essential shape of opinion.

**Threats to Australia**

The polls for instance, indicate that historically, a significant number of Australians have seen this country as either threatened (or likely to be threatened) by other countries.

Though the data is scarce, and not always directly comparable, the overall picture does suggest that perceptions of threat have decreased over the course of the decade. While a significant number of Australians still think a threat is likely to emerge in the next 10 years, a growing number have been less sure.

Part of the explanation for this may lie in a perception by many that the world, is currently a safer place than it used to be, as tensions between the Superpowers have decreased in the last couple of years.

It can not be assumed however, that the decline in numbers in the late 1980s thinking a threat likely, is necessarily part of a long term trend.

What can be said though, is that with all the polls on threat, bar three (two of them at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) indicating that less than half the population think a threat likely, it cannot be concluded that the public is xenophobic about outside threats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of Australians believing...</th>
<th>ANOP 1987</th>
<th>Defence 1987</th>
<th>Poll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Terrorist acts likely in next 10 years</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Small scale raids on specific targets likely in next 10 years</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Interference with shipping routes likely in next 10 years</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Attempted invasion with conventional weapons in next 10 years</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Armed invasion likely in next 10 years</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Nuclear conflict involving Australia in next 10 years</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the early 1980s, it appears that between five and six people in every ten thought that other countries posed threats.

However, it should also be noted that polls in the second half of the decade, indicate that significantly less people, typically between three and four people in every ten, think this to be the case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of Australians believing...</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>Poll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Australia could defend itself effectively</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>ANOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ADF could defend if Australia attacked</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Defence-trac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Adequate Defence Forces to defend Australia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Newspoll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Average ADF individual member capable</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>ANOP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 2 polls
Types of Threats

Some of these more recent polls, do however indicate that the public thinks some threats to Australia in the coming decade, more likely than others.

While the data is once again not as comprehensive as it could be, it does appear that the threats which Australians are most inclined to think likely, tend to be relatively low key ones, (eg. terrorist acts, shipping interference, small scale raids), rather than high profile ones, such as full scale attack or invasion.

Furthermore, polling on the threat thought most likely (terrorism) took place at times when the issue of Middle Eastern terrorism was featured prominently in the media. This is likely to have had an impact in inflating the numbers thinking such events likely in Australia.

Defence strategist perceptions that the country will not be faced with any major threats in the next ten year period, appear to be perceptions also currently shared by the majority of the population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of Australians believing...</th>
<th>1971 %</th>
<th>1978 %</th>
<th>1987 %</th>
<th>1988 %</th>
<th>Poll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Too little spent on defence</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Defence-trac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-At present too little spent on defence</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>McNair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Australia should increase defence spending</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>ANOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Oppose present size of the Forces</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Defence-trac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Numbers in Forces should be increased</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>61*</td>
<td>Defence-trac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Size of Armed Forces should be increased</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>McNair</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• 2 Polls  * Filtered question

Capacity to Repell Threat

Despite this current relative low in the numbers thinking that a major threat exists, the few polls available in the 1980s show that the public does not appear to have much confidence in the abilities of the A.D.F. to defend the country.

They indicate that between only two and four
people in every ten have confidence in the Forces’ abilities. Importantly though, this lack of confidence is not a reflection on the perceived capability of Defence Force members. The great majority of people appear to believe that the average member of the A.D.F. is capable.

The data on public attitudes to defence spending, and to the deployment of more defence personnel, indicates that between four and six people in every ten would like an increased commitment in these areas.

Critics of the argument that such results indicate the public is ‘hawkish’ on defence, point out that the support for increased spending and personnel, is by no means clear from the polls. Furthermore, it can be argued that what support there is, may be a product more of the polls ‘creating’ the issues, rather than reflecting the public’s own alleged concern with defence capacity and resources.

Public opinions in the area are certainly not based on information assessments about the current resources devoted to defence. In one Defencetrac poll for example, only a quarter of those asked could correctly estimate the numbers currently serving in the A.D.F. The public’s ability to estimate current defence spending is also likely to be rather limited.

**Current Defence Resources**

There has been significant support in the few polls conducted, for the upgrading of the country’s defence resources, whether as a product of the apparent lack of confidence in current capacities, or as a product of other factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of Australians believing...</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>Poll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Favour defence relationships with the US</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Defence-trac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Australia needs US defence alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Spectrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Treaties with US of real value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Morgan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ANZUS important in protecting our security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Morgan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Trust in US protection if threatened</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Morgan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Trust in US protection if attacked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Defence-trac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ANZUS essential for our security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Defence-trac</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 2 Polls  * Filtered question

Just why the majority of the population seems to believe that Australia cannot defend itself has not to date been investigated by the polls.

It could be that such beliefs are based on a perception that Australia is inherently vulnerable, (given its large size and small population), rather than on anything negative about the quality of the current Defence Forces, or the current perceived level of outside threat.

A point to note though, is that polling questions in the area asked have been generalist ie. they have not asked about Australia’s defence capacities in terms of the different types of threats. It could be that confidence in the capacity to repel the more low key threats, (the ones perceived as most likely), is a good deal higher, than with the more major (and more distant) ones.

**Conscription and The Reserves**

Support for the strengthening of the country’s defence resources is also possibly evident
in the position taken on the issue of compulsory military service, and on the importance of having reservists.

In the 1980s, the polls indicate that between five and six people in every ten have consistently claimed to support the reintroduction of the former.

Care does however have to be taken in interpreting such measures, since conscription support can also reflect perceptions about a range of other issues, such as youth unemployment, and law and order.

That there is support for civilian involvement is however, also apparent in the endorsements given to the role of reservists.

About nine people out of every ten think that it is important to have Defence Force reserves to back up the permanent Forces, and to create a pool of trained civilians (ANOP 1987).

**The ANZUS Alliance**

The polls also indicate historically high support for the alliance with the U.S.A.

The ones in the last five years show that between six and seven people in every ten support the alliance, and believe that the defence partner will come to Australia’s aid, if the country is threatened.

The U.S. appears to be seen as a protector, and one that will defend Australia, where it is unable to do so itself.

Following this line, one school of thought argues that as long as Australia is perceived as threatened, and/or incapable of defending itself, ANZUS will be supported by the public.

Critics of this can argue though, that the public’s apparent ‘hawkish’ stance on the defence linkages, is as much a product of current and historical popular associations with the US, as fear of Australia’s incapacities or of foreign threats.

Beyond this, what is clear however, is that Australians know little about the alliance. A significant component of the public is simply not aware of it, or else has only very limited knowledge. In one poll, only about seven people in every ten were aware of ANZUS, and less than two thirds of them could correctly identify its name (Defencetrac, 1987).

**The Overall Picture**

While such caveats must strongly influence interpretation of polls results, as noted earlier, an overall picture of public opinion on defence can still be drawn.

Firstly, it seems that the public has been divided in the 1980s, as to whether Australia faces outside threats in the next decade, with fewer people in the last couple of years thinking threats likely.

Secondly, those threats that are perceived to exist are more likely to be low key ones, rather than ones involving full scale attack or invasion.

Thirdly, the public’s confidence in Australia’s ability to defend itself is generally low, (although it seems fair to presume that it is probably higher in the case of the threats thought most likely in the next 10 years).

Whether as a product of this, or of other factors, support for an upgrade of defence resources, and civilian involvement exists.

Lastly, and also possibly related to Australia’s perceived inability to defend itself, there is considerable support for the ANZUS defence alliance with the USA, (despite low awareness and knowledge).

**Behind The Polls**

Such a picture, is of course essentially descriptive. It does not conclusively indicate how opinions in the area are related to one another, or what thinking lies behind them.

Rather than being simply autonomous or random, it seems fair to assume that such opinions are reflective of the beliefs and attitudes people hold, and the ways that these are articulated and interpreted in forming ideas and views about defence.

In other words, there is likely to be a great deal behind the numbers!

Polling of course, is not designed to capture such information, and collecting it really, requires a range of alternative approaches and research techniques, not many of which have been applied to date. Much of what has been currently taken to lie behind the numbers instead remains in the realms of theory and speculation.

One theory for example postulates, that data in the key areas covered is closely linked and can generally be traced back to the
public's current perceptions of a threat to Australia. It argues that the higher the level of threat perceived, the greater the feelings of vulnerability, doubts about domestic defence capacities, and the greater the support for ANZUS. Conversely, a decline in perceptions of threats, leads to declines in the 'downstream' areas.

Other theories downplay such casual linkages, and argue that public opinion is a good deal more random and segmented by issues, than is otherwise supposed. They point to the relatively high levels of public ignorance and likely apathy, as evidence that the public simply doesn't think much about defence and security issues, let alone linking them together.

**Future Prospects**

While little exploratory or empirical work has been done to verify such theories, about the structure of opinions in the area, and what lies behind them, this is likely to change in the future, as polling becomes more sophisticated, and as researchers begin to apply exploratory qualitative techniques in the area.

Getting beyond what is currently known about the essential shape of opinion certainly would be useful in giving defence strategists and others active in the field a wider or 'macro' context, in which to interpret the views of the public, as expressed in the polls and the studies conducted to date.

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Threat Assessment

By Air Commodore N.F. Ashworth, RAAF (Ret.)

One of the more difficult aspects in any consideration of the defence of Australia is the assessment of potential threats to national security. This is because, currently, Australia faces no obvious threat. However, while we may not be threatened today, we cannot be so sure of the future. The threats facing Australia all lie in the uncertainties of the future. Hence, we have to base our defence planning on possibilities that cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. We cannot even say for certain that Australia will ever be seriously threatened, any more than we can say for certain that it will not.

Because of this lack of a clear threat upon which to base our defence planning, one approach might be to ignore threat assessment and put our faith in the maintenance of a general defensive military capability, one that would be suitable to meet a wide range of military situations. Such an approach has many difficulties, not least of which is deciding on the degree of military preparedness required. If nothing else, this approach is inefficient, which is serious given the high cost of maintaining even a moderately sized modern defence force.

Notwithstanding the difficulties, some attempt at threat assessment must be made. With threat assessment what is required is not an assessment of current strategic circumstances or of the mostly likely course of future events, but rather an assessment of the possibility of an adverse set of events that could lead to armed conflict. In this context, a threat is any potential situation that could involve the use of military force against Australia's vital interests.

Before getting down to the assessment of threats to Australia's security, it is necessary to be clear as to the process whereby two nations move from a state of harmonious relations to a state of war. War, for the purposes of this discourse only, is any situation in which military force is used as an element in international conflict. As such it strictly excludes civil war, not because such conflicts are unimportant on the world scene, but because civil war is a remote prospect for Australia. Excluding civil war makes for ease of explanation without invalidating the logic of the argument.

Before there can be war between two nations there must be a situation in which:

- relations between the two are at a low level;
- there is a serious conflict of interest, which may be either single or multi-faceted; and
- at least one of the protagonists must have the capability to use military force against the other, and a belief that the use of military force will be to its net advantage.

This formulation is an elaboration of the concept that for a threat to exist there must be both an intent and a capability to use military force.

Of the two elements of intent and capability, the latter is by far the easiest to measure and assess, especially when looking into the vaguer, more distant future. Because of this, all too often threat assessment is based on military potential alone, with intent being dismissed with the claim that, "intent can change overnight". Such a claim is false and flies in the face of all historical evidence. Where the misunderstanding lies is in confusing the various dramatic, and sometimes sudden and unexpected, events of history with the totality of the process whereby two nations move from a state of harmonious relations to a state of war.

Intent and capability are also interrelated. It is intent that leads capability. Also, without the perceived military capability to attain its objectives a potential aggressor nation, while it may have the desire, is unlikely to have the intent to commit military aggression. Nations do not willingly embark on war unless they believe that they have a reasonable chance of winning, and doing so in a short time. No one wins in a protracted war, and nations do not throw themselves into a hopeless war unless driven to do so by desperate circumstances.

The path between harmonious relations and the war is one of the development of a serious conflict and the deterioration of relations between the two nations. This path consists of a series of events, each of which contributes to the development of the conflict and/or the state of relations. Such events can act in a positive or a negative sense. Events can be on the international
front or they can occur within the internal political fabric of one or other nation. Some events can occur without warning, but not out of context in the overall situation. There is also a connection between the state of relations and the impact that any given event might have. When relations are poor even minor incidents can have serious consequences, consequences that would be quiet out of the question under a more normal, state of harmonious relations.

If the starting point for threat assessment is one of poor relations, then the possible time scale to the advent of armed hostilities could be quite short. What does take time, because it requires the occurrence of a series of major adverse events, is the change from a state of harmonious relations to one of poor relations. In this context the term 'harmonious relations' is taken to mean relations of substance, and the absence of significant underlying differences based on traditional rivalries, territorial disputes, racial or other cultural disputes, or past serious armed clashes. Relations that are cordial, but which have underlying tensions, are not 'harmonious relations'.

One useful starting point for threat assessment is a review of the military options open to a potential enemy whereby the nation's vital interests may be threatened, and of the military requirements for each option. For example, one option for an assault against Australia is military invasion and occupation of the whole country. Given Australia's geography and likely military opposition to such an action, invasion would be a difficult task and would require substantial military forces, with a particular emphasis on maritime forces.

In assessing, say, the invasion option, one difficulty is in deciding what level of defence preparedness to assign to Australia. Clearly, to use the current level of preparedness, which is based on the absence of an immediate invasion threat, is as invalid as assuming that Australia would at all times be prepared to the limit of its capability. Thus, some intermediate position must be taken, even if only for the purposes of assessment and analysis. Here it must be kept in mind that the conclusions of any assessment must be judged against the assumptions made during the assessment process.

Another difficulty in assessing the military requirements for various threat options is what to assume in regard to alliances. For example, in assessing the invasion option should full United States assistance be assumed, or, indeed, any assistance at all? Here again an arbitrary mean needs to be struck, again for the purposes of assessment and analysis.

Before looking at threats from particular sources, some assessment needs to be made of possible global and regional developments in so far as they might adversely affect both Australia and its potential adversaries. Australia could become involved in military conflict either as a result of a two-way conflict between Australia and, say, one of its neighbours, or as a consequence of some wider conflict in which Australia is merely a secondary player.

Having made an analysis of the military options and of the world and regional scene, the next step is to identify possible adversaries and to match them to the military options. Here it should be kept in mind that a threat requires both intent and capability, and that it is future possible intent and capability that is relevant, not present intent and capability. Furthermore, threats must come from some specific source, be that source a single nation or an alliance, not from 'a regional power' or like vagary.

Wars are started, not by the nation as a whole, but by its political leadership. Thus, assessment of intent must focus on the political processes. Also, while the international political scene and its future directions may be important, it is the internal political scene that is paramount.

In looking at the threat situation for the nation it is useful to draw up a threat profile. Such a profile consists of a list of threats, existing and potential, set down in some order of concern to the nation. Here concern is a matter for individual judgement, based on a combination of probability and seriousness. Each threat should show: the source of the threat (country, combination of countries); nature of the threat, e.g. invasion, raids, interdiction of sea lines of communication or harassment of nationals; level of probability (high to remote); and warning time. Here warning time is defined as the time between the present and the possible outbreak of hostilities, given a reasonable worst case set of events that could lead to the situation in question.

Clearly, drawing up a threat profile must necessarily involve a great deal of inspired guesswork. It is a process that requires a knowledge of history as well as of the nations under consideration. It also requires balance, in that too pessimistic a view of possible future adverse
events could well lead to an unnecessarily high expenditure on defence and the pursuit of policies that may render the threats self-fulfilling. On the other hand, too optimistic a view could lead the nation to disaster due to a lack of defence preparedness and an inability to see and respond to adverse changes in circumstances.

Threat assessment carried out now is based on current circumstances and the forward view, as seen at present. With time circumstances change, and so should the threat assessment. Indeed, threat assessment is far from infallible and that, in with a fresh assessment being made every one or two years, depending on the rate of change in national and world affairs. The monitoring of affairs between review should clearly be part of this process. Periodic assessment is preferred to continuous assessment due to the often slow pace of change. Under continuous assessment important changes may not be as readily recognised as with the “fresh look” of a period review.

Clearly, changes in the threat profile should lead to a review of defence policy and, where necessary, changes of policy to accommodate the changes in the perceived threat. In particular, defence readiness should be responsive to changes in warning time, while defence force structures should be responsive to changes in the nature of the threat.

Threat assessment can also point to areas where national and defence policies should seek to influence the course of future events and so, to a degree at least, control the threat environment. Prevention of war is far preferable to fighting a war, no matter how well prepared the nation may be.

A threat assessment of itself may not lead easily to a definitive defence policy, particularly in the circumstances of a set of threats that are vague, ill-defined and low on the scale of probability. What is required is a defence policy, and attendant defence strategy, that will cover the more serious possible threats, while at the same time allowing some flexibility to cover unforeseen possibilities. Such a policy must recognize that threat assessment is far from infallible and that, in any case, one hundred percent security is an impossible goal. Any defence policy that must necessarily operate in an environment of uncertainty must involve a degree of risk.

To speak of the process of threat assessment is simple, to actually carry out a full and thorough threat assessment is a major but necessary task. Without such an assessment realistic defence policies cannot be drawn up. Also, if the Australian public is ever to understand defence issues, then the process and results of threat assessment must not remain for ever clothed in secrecy. Official Government threat assessments must be made public, and in all, not abbreviated into meaningless generalities, notwithstanding the supposed sensitivity of Australia’s neighbours to public debate of future possibilities related to Australia’s security. Australia has nothing to hide and nothing to fear from being honest with its neighbours, and itself, about where and in what way its security might be put at risk. Assessments that are subject to public scrutiny have a far greater chance of being correct than those that remain the secret preserve of their anonymous authors.
Public Relations - The Way Ahead

By Captain J.E. Huston, Aust. Int.

"In the Staff Corps and Militia were men who had something to say and knew how to say it, but their writings were to be seen in British journals, chiefly in the Army Quarterly which was read in Australia almost solely by officers of their own services. Criticism was discouraged by Political Leaders and their attitude affected the serious officers of the services and seeped downwards. As far as the Staff Corps was concerned the truth was that a member's otherwise outstanding education had included no instruction in what later came to be known as "Public Relations".

The low pay helped them from taking their proper place in social life outside the Army, and the Corps slowly became isolated. A fully-justified resentment of the parsimonious treatment that they had received from Governments, developed into mistrust of their political Leaders who decided the policy they had to administer, and of the press which alone could educate the public and as to the principles of Defence".

"To Benghazi"
Gavin Long, 1953

Introduction

How remarkable and thought-provoking it is that the words of Gavin Long still ring true, yet they were written soon after the Second World War to depict Australian Defence Policy in the twenties and thirties. If Gavin Long's description of the malaise in Australian Defence is any guide progress has been in the production of the Australian Defence Force Journal and perhaps the Pacific Defence Reporter. These are excellent publications but the Services have failed to make an impression on the non-converted. Thus an inroad is still to be forged into the non-Defence mass media. The Australian public perhaps still regards "an Australian who made the military a hobby, as likely to be regarded by his acquaintances a peculiar fellow with an eccentric taste for uniforms and the exercise of petty authority".

The fundamental obstacle is the difficulty the military has in accepting the perception concept. For in the concept lies the premise that it does not matter how genuinely professional the Army is, the public image will be shaped by media stereotypes and hackneyed anecdotes (i.e. As perceived by the public).

The challenge is to reverse the trend by capturing the medium that projects the misleading image. This ultimately is a major task for Army Public Relations.

There will be military sub-cultures who will care little for public perception, probably less for Public Relations. The fact of the matter is that the primacy of civil authority is paramount. Our beckoning to the public will is embedded in the Constitution and Conventions of the Commonwealth.

The Army then has a democratic responsibility to inform the public, not to mention a vested political stake in encouraging public interest. An isolated service will eventually wither and perish. The problem with current PR is that it is well intended and founded, but perhaps loosely implemented and controlled given the media opportunities.

Aim

This article aims to propose a Positive Relation Strategy that will enhance the position of the Army in Australian Society.

The Current Position

Public Relations in the Australian Defence Force at present is the responsibility of the Director General of Public Information (DGPI). DGPI is responsible for the development of policy, procedures and practices in the field of public information. In fulfilling this function DGPI directs and controls the activities of the Directorate of Public Relations (DPR). DPR implements PR Policy, coordinates PR activities and provides advice on Service PR promoted activities.
Within each service there are Public Relations Liaison Officers who provide an interface between the Service heads and DPR. In addition there are regional Army Public Relations Officers who have responsibilities to both their single service commanders and to DPR. Regional Public Relations Officers report to Single Service Commanders, e.g. MD Commanders, however on occasion where differences of assessment of relative priorities occur, the primacy of the broader charter of DGPI will decide terms.

Moving down the pyramid, at formation and unit level the responsibility for PR rests with members who are appointed as Public Relation Officers (UPRO). More often than not this is an extra-regimental duty and receives varying degrees of application from fanaticism to tokenism. There is no guaranteed strand of continuity from year to year, or from region to region.

Reporters or Image Makers

The various PR agencies in the Army aim to portray the lifestyles and norms of their respective units etc. It could be true to say that the reach of Army Public Relations is limited by several factors:

a. Army PR tends to generally 'connect' only with garrison mediums such as community newspapers and provincial information supplements. This generally is conducted by the UPRO.

b. Concentrates on the very manual expressions of the Army i.e. Fire Power Demonstrations, introduction of new weapons and equipment, armoured vehicles etc.

c. It is very print orientated, with lesser utilisation of the electronic spectrum.

Further it has to be recognised that much military media material is not originated by the Army PR machine. Criminal acts by service personnel, mismanagement of resources and environmental issues all receive substantial coverage, generally more piercing and penetrating than our own efforts.

The Hoddle Street massacre was perhaps the classic example of the media seizing the initiative, the result was to lay partial blame on the Army training system for the vicious deaths. This was a ridiculous assertion given the facts. The point here is that despite our efforts, we must accept that a small element of the Press will endeavour to generate controversial anti-military material which may have greater reach and effect. The psychologically dormant effect of this media campaign does much to slowly erode the credibility of the Defence Forces. However, it should be remembered that there is similarly a number of journalists who are both sympathetic and indeed supportive of the ADF and often write and report accordingly.

Market Research indicates that although 95% of Australians believe it is important to have a Defence Force, only 14% claim to have a working knowledge or understanding of its functions. The challenge for PR strategists is to broaden the scope of our image, extend the range of reach and fully exploit the mediums of transmission. The point here is that the public probably awaits our input, but is not prepared to seek it themselves.

A New Positive Strategy

Given the critical perhaps preying anti-Military press and our own limited means, a new revigorated positive strategy is needed. A new marketing orientated strategy stressing the value of the Army to non-penetrated segments is required. The campaign must be slick and polished. Well tried non-profit organisations marketing tools can be well employed.

The strategy could be planned around the following objectives:

a. Penetrate the non-garrison public audience.

b. Switch to electronic mediums.

c. Upgrade the image niche from a manual expression to a command-management expression.

d. Target select reference groups or segments.

e. Centralise resources.

f. Qualify the 'Threat' concept in terms of "national insurance policy".

Implementation

The strategy would be implemented utilising a multiple pronged approach. Firstly DPR would commence a campaign of professionally contracted television and radio advertisements (i.e. Corporate Imaging). These rolling captions
would displace Recruiting media, which perhaps only reinforce a misleading manual image.

The new electronic matter would stress various positions of responsibility in the Army each centred around a common theme. For example Caption 1 could be a Brigadier arriving to present his orders at a windswept CP, Advertisement 2 may be a Tank Squadron Commander manoeuvring his elements indicating the swiftness of reaction. Advertisement 3 could be a Sergeant commanding a Bridge laying team with Advertisement 4 covering your classic Infantry soldier in position of great physical and psychological stress. The aim here is to stress the less robot like image i.e. planners, thinkers, decision makers.

Out in the streets the Units of the Service would be selling their story by moving into professional organisations, community groups, schools and Servicemen's Clubs particularly in those areas exclusive to the immediate garrison area. A haphazard plan would fail. Various Units would be assigned individual geographic and function zones to penetrate. The objective would be to blend and sell. Over time most would relish the opportunity. The result would be a breakdown in stereotype perceptions. Soon the public themselves would do the work for us. The use of RSL clubs cannot be overlooked. As the RSL is in decline as a power base, dual benefit could be gained by a new marriage of interests.

The new scheme would require great dedication and perservence. Yet the reward would be greater public support, leading in time to a guaranteed budget and more motivated servicemen. These two quests alone must satisfy the need for at least a broad investigation.

**Conclusion**

This article aimed to map a new strategy for the Army PR machine. There are two essential sub-plans. First the need for an electronic campaign at National level and secondly the movements outward of officers into new untapped segments such as community groups and professional organisations. The thrust to inform not persuade. Ultimately we must aim to shape the image. The popular perception over time then would become reality in future surveys it would be hoped, an equal number of people would support and understand the nature of the Army.

**NOTES**

1. Gavin Long, "To Benghazi" (Australia War Memorial, Canberra, 1953).

**Editors Note:** This article was prepared by Captain Huston prior to recent policy initatives in the Defence Public Relations area.
Social Change, Leadership and the Services

By Lieutenant Commander A.J. Hinge, RAN

In 1915 scores of thousands of young Australians flocked to induction depots throughout Australia to fight and if necessary die for God, King and Country. Yet, barely five decades later many grandchildren of the original ANZACS refused to fight in Vietnam and effectively said, like their American cousins: 'Hell no. We won't go'!

What happened during the half century 1915–65 to so drastically change the attitude of our young toward authority? Were these changes for the better or worse of society and the services which defend it? Even more importantly, what will young Australians do when called on to fight again, especially in a situation where we cannot afford to lose! Obviously these questions must be asked and answers found now. We simply cannot wait to find the answers on a future battlefield.

Many would argue that refusal to fight for one's country and failure to exhibit unquestioned loyalty and obedience to authority is symptomatic of a decadent, spoiled generation of permissive youths — the 'Gimme' generation — which have no respect for the traditional virtues of honour, discipline, self-sacrifice and sense of duty. Others may suggest that freedom to dissent is a good thing and youthful challenges to authority, tradition and discipline are not only healthy but highly desirable. This school of thought might argue that a modern youth cannot be as easily deluded by authority as his grandfather and is capable of serving every bit as well as his ancestor if the cause is right. There is some truth in both these views of modern youth. However, as is often the case in such matters, the best description of today's young probably lies somewhere between these extremes. But where?

This article investigates the effect of social change on the performance of the disciplined services. It looks at the important social changes which influence tomorrow's recruit and today's veteran. Moreover it aims at providing the reader with a framework by which to determine just how decisive or indecisive social change can be in terms of maintaining service performance in time of war and peace. The methodology used to achieve these aims first involves treatment of the following questions:

* What is the function of the disciplined Services?
* What is *the* major social change affecting the Services?
* Who is the recruit of the 1990s? What will he or she be like and how can the Services best train the new recruit?
* What are the technologically derived social changes affecting today's military personnel and what of the repercussions of these changes on the future Services?

Finally, we must ask ourselves: Have we got to the heart of the problem? Just how decisive are social factors in influencing military performance and what contribution can good training and leadership make to mitigate the effects of detrimental social change?

The Fighting Function

A military organisation's overwhelming function is to fight. Consequently the ability of a disciplined service to come to grips with the enemy and dominate him is as good a measure of service effectiveness today as it ever has been. Whichever way one chooses to define a disciplined service the very hallmark of discipline must remain the ability to maintain cohesion under extraordinary stress and act as a highly motivated team dedicated to organisational goals. In short, a military organisation can seldom impose its 'will' on an enemy in combat unless it has cohesion. Cohesion will be a fundamental measure of military effectiveness in this way since maintaining material and morale cohesion in a time of lessening social cohesion presents the real challenge to the disciplined services.

Cohesion makes disciplined service effectiveness greater than the sum of its individual parts during peace and war. Cohesion is the ability of a unit to stick together and maintain operational effectiveness despite heavy com-
bat stress involving enemy violence, fear of death, injury and the extreme uncertainty inherent in war. In peacetime, cohesion can be challenged by a number of factors including breakdown of the traditional military ethos and erosion of material benefits — salary, conditions of service etc. — which sociologist Frederick Herzberg identified as social ‘hygiene’ factors. The ability to maintain military cohesion under pressure in peace and war is probably the single most important attribute of successful military forces throughout history. The requirement for cohesion in the services is paramount since it bestows a resilience which enables the organisation to survive against the most bitter moral and material challenges.

The major social change which has tended to destabilize general community cohesion and military cohesion in the Western world

### Value Changes in Economically Developed Western Nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Values</th>
<th>Emerging Values</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Based on the unitary and uniform values of an accepted “establishment”</em></td>
<td><em>Based on the pluralistic, pragmatic values of a diverse society</em></td>
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</table>

1. **Respect for authority of position and traditional dogma, sanctified by religion.**
   - **Respect for social consensus based on open inquiry and participative decision-making.**

2. **Acceptance of the status quo**
   - **Acceptance of dissent and social transformation.**

3. **Acquiescence and resignation to one’s lot in life; conformity to established social norms; ideal of service to others.**
   - **Emphasis on personal fulfilment, self-realisation, human potential and self-expression.**

4. **Absolute moral principles, including sexual fidelity.**
   - **Situation ethics, moral/ethical relativism and pluralism; judgment of action by results on self and others, including a rejection of sexual “ownership”.**

5. **Sanctity of property ownership; exploitive materialism; economic “progress”.**
   - **Sanctity of individual consciousness, awareness; emphasis on access to resources rather than ownership; emphasis on quality of life and ecological ethics.**

6. **Clear hierarchy of group-based loyalties: “God, ruler, country, family”**.
   - **Unclear loyalties; existential responsibility and situation ethics.**

7. **Rugged competitive individualism within bounds set by group loyalties.**
   - **Interdependence and collaboration by autonomous individuals.**

8. **Maintenance of stability and routine performance.**
   - **Innovation, change, and flexibility.**

9. **Ends orientation - postponment of immediate rewards for long-term outcomes (heaven, superannuation, promotion).**
   - **Process orientation - “live now”; work and leisure must provide immediate satisfaction.**

10. **Economic security.**
    - **Personal growth.**

*Editors Note: This article was first published in the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, August, 1987.*
has been a fundamental change in our social value system. A value system is an order of principles and standards accepted and generally practiced by society. The change in our social value system is largely derived from the transformation of society from one with conservative, conformist values — which existed at the beginning of the century — to one adopting a value system based on pluralism and the individual. Individualism, in itself, is not a bad thing but if non-conformism merely becomes an excuse for the mass pursuit of self gratification, society will suffer. It is necessary to take a good look at the origins and implications of this value system change.

**Social Values**

A certain sense of 'permanence' which characterized the pre World War One era has faded. Obviously, practically everything had a name and a place but nowadays we are swamped with new definitions of work, family and sexuality. (See Table 1 for a comparison of the 'new' and 'old' values). Respect for authority and desire to maintain the status quo has been replaced by an acceptance of widespread dissent, challenge to established institutions and social transformation. Uncritical acceptance of rules is no longer the norm as we move from an industrial society steeped in the protestant work ethic into an age of ambiguity. Our once clear and rigid value system has become blurred. Such substantial shifts in western community values have had the net effect of transforming the western 'ethos' from one of a uniform, conformist authoritarian character to one based on a pluralistic value system oriented to change. Thus it comes as no surprise that the challenge of military 'socializing' the recruit of the 1990s will be far different than that of socializing his father or grandfather.

Developing an insight into the problem of social change and its effect on the disciplined services involves looking at the attitudes of the new recruit and noting above all that individualism is very important to him. He must 'seem' to be different and is far less happy with apparent conformism than his grandfather was. In large measure he will have been exposed from earliest childhood to the cult of the 'anti-hero' — a maverick tough guy who doesn't play the game by the rules but always comes out a winner in the end! Service traditions will be questioned and it will simply not be enough to tell him to do as he is told. Reasons for action will be increasingly called for. He will be a product of liberalism and has been brought up in a permissive society which has developed a high tolerance to radical and deviant behaviour.

**Nihilism**

In many ways today's recruit has been raised in an age of increasing nihilism. Nihilism involves a rejection of traditional beliefs in religion, morals or ethics. It is the practice of negative doctrines embodying a scepticism which finds little to approve in the established order of things. Essentially, in its extreme, nihilism involves a lifestyle based on the view that nothing is good or bad, right or wrong, and represents an almost complete inversion of the so-called protestant work ethic which characterized the western ethos during the first half of the twentieth century. The results of increasing nihilism in the young is manifested in hedonistic, self indulgent tendencies which seem to be taking an increasing toll of society at large. Nihilism ultimately gives rise to boredom, apathy, dejection and despair. The nihilist is simply not accountable to his society, a God or in the final analysis to himself.

An age of nihilism ultimately encourages the development of sloth within the community. Sloth in the full sense of the word is not merely laziness. It is acedia — a lost, apathetic melancholy — a form of profound dejection which leads to spiritual death. To the individual affected by sloth, life becomes an arid waste of hopelessness. It is little wonder that from earliest days sloth was listed among the seven deadly sins.

Of course, nihilism has by no means reached full bloom in western society and perhaps it never will. Yet few among us would dispute that nihilism is affecting the community and increasingly infecting the young. The services cannot go back to the 'good old days' and count upon recruits coming into military organisations with something approximating a protestant work ethic and a sound 'Christian' or even pseudo Christian upbringing.
The loyalty of the new recruit will be more difficult to earn than has previously been the case. Formal rank will not automatically breed respect since today’s eighteen year old recruit rightly believes he is basically equal, as a person, to any senior officer. There is no such thing as a ‘station in life’ for him. How then can he be successfully inducted into an almost purely hierarchical chain such as a military organisation and be happy with his lot?

Perhaps in this age of encroaching nihilism the services may have an unexpected advantage in the very traditions which many see as weaknesses. The increasing numbers of recruits from broken homes and single parent families may in fact be looking for a firmer framework for their lives. In many ways service comradeship, affiliation and so called Esprit de Corps may displace nihilistic tendencies and act as increasing incentives to join the services. But this can only be the case if the services market these assets effectively in the years to come and offer a career and training package to the recruit which will appeal to deeper needs of individuals. These needs will be treated in detail later.

**Technology and Change**

The driving force behind much post World War Two social change has been the accelerated pace of technological development. Rapid technological development has had a major effect on western society in particular and has been treated in great detail by authors such as Alvin Toffler — *Future Shock and The Third Wave* — and John Naisbitt — *Mega Trends*. Though these authors tend to overdramatize the effects of technological change they also seriously appear to underestimate human adaptability. Despite the pace of change in modern times it is hard to seriously envisage industrialised man being under any more stress than his neanderthal ancestor struggling to survive or the medieval serf fighting hand to hand for his lord on a brutal battlefield.

Social changes arising directly from technological change involve increased leisure time, increased opportunity for women, wider general educational access and a broadening of social values through mass media dissemination of information. These technologically derived social changes can have considerable effects on the services.

Broadening of social values and attitudes through the media has generally made consensus more difficult to achieve and has encouraged the development of a pluralistic society. There is far less emphasis on a policy of social integration than there has been in the past. The ‘White Australia Policy’ of the 40s and 50s was displaced by the principle of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism was an inevitable consequence of the post World War Two change in Australian population composition and has been largely developed through the media.

Pluralistic attitudes which stem from multiculturalism encourage the development of the so-called egalitarian society. Australia has been described as the most egalitarian or classless society in the world and it is worth bearing in mind that the transition from a relatively classless society to a set military hierarchy will become even more marked in the 1990s.

Increased opportunity for women will also have a considerable impact on the services. Certainly women will take up an increased proportion of positions in the services but this is only one side of the coin. As women become more educated they will increasingly seek their own careers and perhaps be less happy to move where their husbands have been posted. In 1948 only 8% of married Australian women were in the Australian workforce but in the early 1980s this percentage had risen to 42%. Similarly, in 1950 only 20% of all females over the age of 15 participated in the workforce while the figure increased to 45% in 1980.

Growth in female work participation arose from a period of rapid economic growth, increased control of fertility and a general technological contribution of making women less confined to the home. A byproduct of the growing capacity for female independence, coupled with certain Government policies leading to the devaluation of the institution of marriage, has been the effective undermining of the basic family unit. The Family Law Act (1975) for example led to a long term doubling of the *per annum* divorce rate from 23,000 to about 45,000. It can be argued that this result is good, in terms of allowing many unhappy
couples to part. However, despite the arguments for or against the Family Law Act, the bottom line of the argument is that in 1986 over one half million Australian children lived with one parent. It is from this pool that a high proportion of 1990s recruits will be drawn.

Technological change has also been largely responsible for increasing community leisure time. The 35 hour week is here for many and this figure will almost certainly decrease toward the end of the century. This has several implications for the services and our personnel managers must begin to ask the following questions: How does a service officer working some 55–60 hours per week feel about the 35 hour week? How does he feel when other groups in the community are developing increased negotiating power with employers while his conditions of service and salary are being eroded because of his inability to collectively bargain? Certainly he is a professional and prepared to make sacrifices but for what?... to be exploited by his society and political leaders because he cannot withdraw his labour?... to be kept working by a system stuck in 'auto', a system unwilling or unable to make a stand and reduce commitments?

Given the widening gulf between military and civilian working conditions together with a major, continuing real erosion in salary it is little wonder than an organisation such as the Armed Forces Federation of Australia (ArFFA) was formed. ArFFA is not currently a union as such but its establishment is an outgrowth of the now socially accepted right of collective bargaining. This right is widely practiced throughout Australian society and it may take on an increasing importance to servicemen as they witness continuing erosion of their quality of life.

The services are becoming less and less competitive with other organisations in terms of attracting the most highly talented of the young. Furthermore, unless this situation is corrected not only will recruiting continue to be very difficult but the retention of skilled personnel already within the services will become an ever increasing problem. While military personnel are generally held in less esteem nowadays, remuneration and conditions of service must nevertheless offer relative advantages to that of workers outside. However mercenary this reasoning may sound to a dyed in the wool military professional, most servicemen will not see their families disadvantaged beyond a certain level regardless of love of service.

Civilization

Yet another change induced by technology has been what sociologist Morris Janowitz describes as the 'civilianizing' of the services and military institutions. Progress in technology has led to a commensurate demand for trained technologists throughout the services. Janowitz states that:

'... the complexity of the machinery of warfare and the requirements for research, development and technical maintenance tend to weaken the organisational boundary between the military and the non-military, since the maintenance and manning of new weapons systems require a greater reliance on civilian oriented technicians.'

Naisbitt also deals with the growing power of the technocracy and outlines how we are moving from a centralized, industrialized, economically self contained world to an ill defined one in which the technician will be supreme. The transformation will involve a major leap in general skill levels within the population and it is suggested that the computer will become the decisive element in our civilization. Widespread use of computer technology is said ultimately to lead to the abandonment of hierarchies which worked so well in the centralized, industrial era. Naisbitt claims:

'... The computer will smash the pyramid. We created the hierarchical, pyramidal managerial system because we needed to keep track of people and things people did; with the computer to keep track, we can restructure our institutions horizontally.'

Military hierarchies evolved in order to keep track of large numbers of people and what they were doing. The computer may indeed have a 'flattening' effect on the traditional hierarchy with repercussions on group leadership styles and unit size.

Civilianizing of the services can lead to a degree of convergence in which military conditions of service may eventually duplicate civilian conditions. Civilian elements of the
defence structure will have an increasing impact on service attitude and identity as their influence continues to expand. The autonomy of military leaders will decrease as they become more accountable for their decisions, all of which will come under increasing scrutiny. Since the Vietnam War there has been a substantial rise in the level of critical distrust of military motives, competence, integrity and rationale for secrecy. The Freedom of Information Act, for example, will probably be used with more frequency as both civil and military personnel of the various Departments of Defence in the Western World choose to exercise their rights against the numerous ‘closed’ systems which have for so long been used by the military.

Up to a point there are certain advantages to be had from the increasing-civilianization of the military. An increase in political and economic awareness can broaden and improve an often narrow and escalatory military approach to problems. This allows the uniformed services greater scope to constructively reflect and accommodate the society which they serve. Nevertheless, at the same time a definite danger exists involving the compromise of service efficiency and cohesion as a result of non-selective absorption of a civilian work ethic and attitude. This is not to say that there is anything wrong with a civilian work attitude and ethic — the so called 9 to 5 syndrome. This is usually entirely appropriate to civilian organisational objectives but not to military organisational objectives. Ultimately, the important sense of unique service identity, as we will soon see, can be adversely affected by civilianization of the services with grave repercussions on service performance.

The Decisive Factor

Several major effects of social and technological change on the services have now been examined and it is evident that these factors must be increasingly taken into account by the personnel management organisations of the services. Increasing nihilism within the community, breakdown of the family unit, civilianizing of the services, poor ‘hygiene’ factors and a fundamental change in the value system of society are all formidable problems in terms of their long term effect on service performance. But are their effects decisive? If not, what are the decisive factors in maintaining excellent service performance? How can military’s own socialization process, or training, contend with detrimental results of social change in the wider community? In considering these questions we must now look at the ‘forest’ after having seen the ‘trees’ of social change.

The answers lie on the modern battlefield. If we return to the military quagmire of 1960s Vietnam we will see that the political and social disarray of a generation may not have been the decisive factor in poor military performance.

An excellent scholarly examination of the breakdown of a modern military service — the US Army in Vietnam — is found in Gabriel and Savage’s book, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*. This treatise was commenced in the mid 1970s after two US Army War College reports indicted US Army performance in Vietnam under conditions of relatively low combat stress. The first study was commissioned by General W.C. Westmoreland, MACV Commander Vietnam, who restricted its distribution to officers of general rank only. The second study fully endorsed the findings of the first.

Gabriel and Savage argue that:

"... Our data suggest that the Army in the field exhibited a low degree of unit cohesion at virtually all levels of command and staff... The data indicate a very high rate of drug use among US field forces in the country, repeated attempts to assassinate officers and senior non-commissioned officers, combat refusal that bordered on mutiny, skyrocketing desertion rates in the Army as a whole... the Army began to border on an undisciplined, ineffective, almost anomic mass of individuals who collectively had no goals and who, individually sought only to survive the lengths of their tours."

What was the cause of this disciplinary collapse? Drug addiction, desertion and mutiny were seen by all researchers as the symptoms and not the cause of the disintegration of the US Army in Vietnam. Was it the low quality of troops which the generals had to
Gabriel and Savage state that dozens of high ranking officers had a tendency to blame the disciplinary breakdown on society at large. The officers complained that they could not develop good soldiers from a 'drug ridden' and 'openly permissive' society. It was argued that traditional military values such as honour, sacrifice and responsibility were all but impossible to maintain in the military if they did not receive support from the wider society value system. Yet the three studies convincingly argue that there is no historical basis for this charge. Similarly they argue that the US Army breakdown of 1969–71 was not significantly influenced by the ordinary soldier recognising the 'immorality' of the war and a stirring of 'true consciousness'.

Gabriel and Savage concluded that:

"... We know, however, that military cohesion exists quite apart from issue politics and ideologies in the civilian political system. Specifically, a sense of active patriotism, nationalism, or other ideologies are not demonstrably central to military discipline and cohesion. Responsible scholarship on the subject of military cohesion heavily discounts the conventional psychological elements often assumed so important to military spirit. It appears that a continued sense of 'cause', at whatever level of saliency is not very important to military cohesion. Contemporary literature further calls into question any sense of mission on the part of the soldiers other than the immediate tactical mission.

The finding that events external to the military organisation had relatively small influence on the cohesiveness of the US Army in Vietnam is supported by the two official US Army War College reports. Bearing in mind that both War College reports are cases of the Army 'looking at itself' we note the interesting finding that:

'... There is no significant evidence to suggest that contemporary sociological pressures — which are ever present —were primary causes of the difference between the ideal and actual performance climate in the Army; the (disciplinary) problems are for the most part internally generated... Neither does the public attitude to the Vietnam War, or the rapid expansion of the Army, or the current (civil) antimilitary syndrome stand out as a significant reason for deviations from the level of professional behaviour the Army acknowledges as its attainable ideal.'

So, what went wrong? According to all three studies and others, the breakdown in cohesiveness was primarily attributable to the failure of the officer corps to provide the leadership necessary in a combat Army. It is suggested that the loss of officer professionalism was derived from a legitimate civilian concept called 'managerial careerism'.

The managerial careerism which dominated the US officer corps in the 1960s had its origins in General Marshall's rapid expansion of the US military in the early days of World War Two. A halcyon age of managerial careerism prevailed in the civilian dominated McNamara Defence Department through the decade of the 1960s. A new set of values began to replace the traditional military ethos as the tools of financial and personnel management were indiscriminately applied to train personnel and win wars.

Gabriel and Savage suggest that the officer corps began to evolve into business executives in uniform interested in getting their 'tickets punched'. In short, the Army began to resemble an entrepreneurial structure based on a modern business corporation. Officer attitudes, according to the US Army War College reports, began to be dominated by self interest and the military ethos was degraded by a sort of industrial ethic. It is little wonder that American soldiers often refused to be 'managed' to their deaths!

While many civilian business practices satisfied the technical, scientific and administrative requirements of the Vietnam episode, they did not take into account the basic and unique social and psychological needs of the troops. Failure to satisfy these needs was decisive in terms of accounting for the root cause of the US Army disciplinary breakdown in Vietnam.

If, as the evidence suggests, socio-political factors outside the military had little effect on the performance of the US Field Force in Vietnam, and poor leadership was of primary importance in the disciplinary breakdown — What aspects of leadership can make the
crucial difference in maintaining the cohesion of a service under stress in war and, perhaps even more importantly, peace?

For an insight into the answer to this question we must avoid delving into the hazy world of psycho-social conjecture and consider what counts; that is, military performance.

**Fighting Power**

The Israeli historian Martin Van Creveld, in his book *Fighting Power: US and German Army Performance 1939-45*, pinpoints several critical differences between respective Army performances in World War Two. These differences remain very relevant today.

Van Creveld first establishes that the German Army managed, man for man, to outfight its opponents under all circumstances. Citing Colonel T. Depuy's (US Army Retd) quantitative study of German performance he notes:

"... (The) record shows that the Germans outfought the far more numerous allied armies that eventually defeated them... on a man for man basis the German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost."30

Van Creveld then asked the question: Were socio-political factors responsible for the incredible cohesion and fighting power exhibited by the Germans? Like the sociologists Shils, Janowitz and many others he rejected the view that national character made the German soldier any better a fighting man than an American soldier.31 This conclusion is adhered to despite the plethora of theories explaining German superiority in terms of social factors. These theories ranged from the belief that Germans were better soldiers because their mothers 'potty' trained them at an early age, to theories dealing with the effects of Nazi propaganda.32 Van Creveld convincingly argues that propaganda had only a marginal effect on German Army — as opposed to SS — fighting performance. Drawing also on his own experience as an Israeli Army intelligence officer in the 1960s and 70s he states:

"... Except where the propagandists are men of very high calibre and conviction, the dish laded out by them will be regarded by the recipients as anything between mere entertainment and another load of bullshit. It may even be counter-productive... it does not matter much what is said, but by whom."33

Ultimately Van Creveld attributes the fighting power of the German Army in this war, and in its other wars from 1870 onwards, to a better Army organisation which was built around the basic social and psychological needs of the individual fighting man. The decisive importance of the individual was clearly emphasised throughout German military literature and the Army's doctrine, command and technique, organisation and administration was geared accordingly.34 A critical priority of the German Army was to keep men in a primary group of individuals who developed affiliative ties with their immediate peers, particularly at the section equivalent (10 man) and platoon level (up to 40 men).

Van Creveld's research, which used numerous other studies to support it, suggests that the extraordinary cohesion of the Wehrmacht was also largely dependent on an extremely high quality of leadership exhibited by German officers who reinforced the primary group organisation. German officers were carefully selected and trained throughout the war despite losses which led to a 13,000 officer shortage in 1944.35 Officers tended to lead their men by example and develop role model ties with them. German officer casualties were well above the proportionate number of ordinary soldier casualties. The ability to live and if needs be die with the troops is accepted by Gabriel, Savage and Van Creveld as a crucial and eternal aspect of morale and unit cohesion. Indeed, during the early years of World War Two a German officer stood twice as much chance of being killed as that of an ordinary soldier.36 It was only due to a refusal of the German High Command to replace numerical officer deficiencies with second rate personnel that the proportion of officer deaths
to enlisted deaths decreased. There were simply less officers available to die. During the Second World War one third of all German field generals were killed in action and 30.8% of all German field officers shared the same fate. The proportion of enlisted men killed was 26.1%. These figures stand in stark contrast to officer deaths among allied units and it is interesting to note that the Vietnam war studies mentioned previously indict the US Army officer corps for their lack of visibility in forward areas while ‘falling over themselves’ in the rear echelons.

It is not for a moment suggested that the German style of military leadership be emulated by modern officers. Indeed, that style would generally be inappropriate to modern needs. However, the example of officer leadership and involvement in the daily lives, risks and problems of the individual serviceman is very appropriate. Good leadership is a critical, if not the critical factor in the behaviour of military units under pressure. The US officer corps in Vietnam did not develop within their troops dedication to organisational goals, loyalty or sacrifice. The responsibility for this failure appears to live at the feet of the officer corps, not society or the so called ‘drug-ridden, permissive youth’ of the nation.

Now it remains necessary to place socio-political factors in their proper context since the previous discussion may have left the reader with the impression that troops will fight and die if only good leadership and primary group affiliation is present. The nexus between these factors is probably best crystallized in Charles Moskos’ theory of Latent Ideology. This theory suggests that to maintain cohesion a serviceman should have an underlying commitment to the worth of the larger social system from which he comes. However, this commitment need not see eye to eye with the specific purpose of the war.

We are then left with an indication that, despite the inexorable advance of technology and the social changes inevitably associated with it, the cohesion of the services are much more heavily influenced by good leadership and supportive organisation than by the specific social factors external to the military.

This proposition makes sense if we assume that, despite entering the service with a number of ‘permissive’ characteristics — both good and bad — our new recruit has much more powerful drives. These drives, or higher needs run much deeper than ephemeral social trends. They include basic drives for power, affiliation and achievement. Researchers such as McGregor and Maslow emphasise the depth and permanence of these higher needs which are associated with the ego and individual self actualization.

The implications for the military socialization or training process are clear. If the recruit has a basic bias in favour of wider society, service training can continue to appeal to his basic drives and satisfy them. Commitment to the services and their organisational goals can still be engendered through a training programme offering affiliation, achievement and the prospect of getting ‘on’ in the organisation.

Commitment is a function of psychological satisfaction and by neglecting the human dimension of leadership and substituting for it exotic forms of personnel management we compromise some of the prime attractions of service life such as comradeship, responsibility and tangible achievement. Indeed, in an increasingly nihilistic world the offer of these things under the aegis of superior leadership can become a great drawcard for the youth seeking direction and a sense of belonging. Such psychological gratification may be particularly sought by the huge numbers of children from single parent families in the future.

Sound military training is instrumental in developing commitment and training is not merely a technical process. First class training is indeed the best form of welfare for the troops and it can transform experientially diverse groups into cohesive, disciplined units. New values and ‘traditions’ can be assimilated through the military’s own adult socialization process which is military training. Recruits can be taught to obey orders, harness anger, develop patience, manners and responsibility if leadership is sound. Leaders must be role models for their subordinates and not merely managers.

In view of our considerations regarding cohesion and leadership it would be remiss not to test our findings and look at a modern Australian service such as the Royal Australian Navy. In terms of leadership and co-
In cohesion we can't but help note that we are doing some vital things wrong! We are increasingly building our Navy around ships and technical packages rather than the basic social and psychological needs of our officers and sailors. The hallmark of our posting system is still chronic personnel instability. Even for married personnel, postings are ridiculously turbulent and this not only affects marriages and children's education. It also allows relatively superficial working relationships to develop within the service.

In terms of the Officer-Sailor relationship we traditionally overcommit our junior officers and NCOs to such a degree that they had inadequate time to invest in maintaining a strong divisional system. Modern sailors live in a far different, option filled world than did their fathers and more needs to be explained to them.

The Future

The future is not a dark, unknown world into which we are destined to stumble and over which we have no control. Today's political-military leadership can 'invent' a bright future for the services if the will exists. The road to well developed, disciplined services begins with getting the 'hygiene' factors right. Some higher level leaders have tended to dedicate too much attention to the instrumental factors of war preparation during peacetime at the expense of morale factors. There is no use having a capacity to fight if there is no will to fight!

Men and their families cannot be expected to serve efficiently under increasingly lousy conditions of pay and service. Continued erosion of these service benefits relative to the rest of the community is inimical to service morale. There is an increasing onus on higher level leaders to make a visible, united and determined effort to be more heavily involved in the defence of service salaries and conditions, for example. No doubt this will be politically difficult but such efforts must be made. Only then can we reach the base line of sound motivation and start to build an excellence of service morale and performance for the future.

After satisfying the basic needs of the individual serviceman and his family the military organisation must ensure a quality of leadership and supervision second to none. New recruits, regardless of their social background, can be socialized into the services through a first class training system directed by sound leaders. The training system must make a particular allowance for the ego needs of the individual and affiliate the recruit in a primary group structure. Coupled with the provision of job satisfaction after training, the serviceman's efforts can then be fully directed towards organisational goals.

Conclusion

The leadership challenge of today is probably greater than ever before because formal rank has probably meant less than ever before to a new recruit. The new recruit's social tradition of tending to challenge authority has seemingly become just as legitimate as the services' tradition of expecting automatic obedience to authority. One thing leaders at all levels must not do is fall for the 'soft cop' of blaming poor performance on decadent social values or assuming that today's recruit is any less of a 'man' than his father was. Despite the emergence of nihilism as a force to be reckoned with as we enter the next century, our recruits will all have deep rooted ego needs which run far deeper than ephemeral social trends and the values they produce. Often, the very fact that a person applied to join a service is a strong indication of desire to accept the military ethos. Also, as long as the military can offer job satisfaction and a sense of personal worth and importance it is likely that high retention will be achieved in future.

The new recruit is no less capable of exhibiting the values of loyalty, honour, sense of duty and elan which his forebears have demonstrated for thousands of years. It is the height of presumption for the military to consider such values exclusively as military virtues. These values are still present throughout society and have evolved as a result of the need for human societies to survive and maintain cohesion. Society could simply not survive without the widespread practice of these values and the trusts they produce. It is most unlikely that late twentieth century aberrations such as nihilism can overwhelm their dominance.

In the face of increasing nihilism and a
general social assault on the concept of authority, service leaders now and in the future must remain even tempered. Traditional ways of doing things will come under increasingly close scrutiny and stumbling blocks must be removed. As T.S. Eliot said ‘... A tradition without intelligence is not worth having’, But, by the same token the services must never fail to enforce discipline since a situation will otherwise be created in which anti-social behaviour, violence, personal animosity and larceny will abound. If such a compromise is made the title of ‘disciplined service’ becomes a misnomer.

The arguments and case studies put forward in this essay indicate that, despite the accelerating pace and often unfavourable direction of social change, the art of leadership remains the decisive factor influencing military performance. We observed that the effects of social change on the services tends to lead to low military performance only if leadership and the traditional military ethos is diluted by non-selective adoption of modern ‘business’ practices and ethics.

Leadership must provide first class training which develops a serviceman’s identification with organisational objectives. An enduring basis for disciplined service is then formed within the individual. Good leadership transcends social change and remains the very cornerstone of military success in peace and war.

Thank God some things never change!

NOTES

1. This expression was commonly used on US College campuses during the late 1960s in protest against the draft.
2. See Sarkesian, S. (Ed) Ch 7 and 8 for a comprehensive discussion of military cohesion.
3. See Vroom and Deci (Ed) Ch 7 for a resume of Herzberg's Motivation — Hygiene Theory. A full treatment of this theory is given in the Herzberg, Mausner, Snyderman work.
5. See Dunphy, Chapter 1 entitled “The organisational Vortex” for an excellent discussion on the social values. Also, by the same author, see, ‘The Challenge of Change’, Boyer Lectures, Australian Broadcasting Commission, Sydney 1972.
6. Heroes of the modern screen are often of the ‘Rambo’ and ‘Mad Max’ ilk, both of which epitomize the anti-hero. ‘Rambo’ emerges victorious over the establishment represented by the Police, National Guard and Army.
8. The Protestant Work Ethic is basically represented by the ‘old values’ in Professor Dunphys’ table. (See Table 1). Also, a part of this ethic involved a high degree of justification by work. Work was seen to have a redemptive power. See May, p 192.
9. May, W. p 195
10. In the authors’ opinion all three books tend to contain overstated cases and this results in drawing sensational conclusions.
13. Ibid, p 113, indicates that in 1975 the number of divorces granted under the Matrimonial Causes legislation was 23,000. In 1976, under FLA, divorces reached the 65,000 p.a. level and then stabilized on the 40-45,000 mark. In 1984, 43,012 marriage dissolution affected 50,603 children. The average number of children affected has been about 50,000 since 1976. This compares with an average of 24,850 p.a. in the 1971-75 period. (p 114). The number of ex-nuptial births has averaged at over 30,000 p.a. since 1980 (p. 107).
14. The so-called ‘Can-do’ attitude still prevades the services. Given reduced manpower ceilings and lower relative value of resources at service disposal, it should follow that Parliament be informed of a commensurate reduction in capability. This is not done for reason of saving service ‘face’. The services still want to do more with less.
15. ARA has a membership of approximately 3,000 persons. It has made representation on behalf of serviceman to the Remuneration Tribunal on a number of occasions and enjoys the provisional support of the Minister for Defence. See ‘View Point’, February 1986 and January 1986 editions for statements by the Minister and CDF respectively.
16. The most up to date and comprehensive discussion of service officer attitudes towards their services, careers and conditions of service is found in the Jans Report (See Bibliography).
19. An example of a ‘closed’ military system is that of the Royal Australian Navy Officer Reporting System as described in Defence Instruction (Navy) 52-2. Each year the number of officers within the service seeking access to reports under the FIO has increased. At the time of writing no application had been successful. Applications from officers having already left the service have also increased.
20. Janowitz (p 18) specifies the unique character of the services as follows, ‘... The unique character of the military establishment derives from the requirement that its members are specialists in making use of violence and mass destruction. In the language of a soldier this is recognised as a commonsense basis; military mission is the key to military organisation... The consequences of preparation for future combat and the results of previous combat pervade the entire organisation.’
25. Gabriel and Savage, pp 40-41. The authors draw on an impressive series of post World War Two reports which are listed in the notes section of their work (pp 197-236).
27. See Gabriel and Savage, p 18-21.
28. Having one's 'ticket punched' involves manipulating the system by getting the 'right' assignments for promotion. A combat command is a 'right' assignment.
29. Gabriel and Savage, p 54.
31. Van Creveld, p 15. See also Rodnick, p 18.
33. Ibid, pp 83-84.
34. Ibid, p 165.
35. See Gabriel and Savage, P 33-39, for a description of the extraordinary cohesion exhibited by the Wehrmacht during World War Two.
36. Van Creveld, p 156.
38. Moskos p 147.
40. See Vroom and Deci (Eds), Chapters 22 and 2 respectively.
41. See Katz, K and Kahn, R., Ch 12 for a very good discussion on the psychological requirements for organisational effectiveness and the importance of leaders acting as role models.
42. This quote is from Eliots' "After Strange Gods" (1934), and is cited on p 980 of the Penguin International Thesaurus of Quotations.

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A Brief History of Australian Participation in Multinational Peacekeeping Operations

by LTCOL N.F. James, Aust. Int.

Note: The opinions expressed in this article are the authors and do not necessarily reflect Australian Government policy.

Introduction

In the post World War II period Australia's contribution to the promotion of international peace has been substantial and has comprised three main strands:

a. promotion of peace in the short to medium term, by contributing to the balance of power through strong support for the western alliance, both globally and within Australia's region;

b. promotion of long term peace by a significant diplomatic commitment to multinational disarmament forums; and

c. preservation or restoration of peace by participation in UN and other multinational peacekeeping operations.

This article is confined primarily to the third aspect, peacekeeping, but should be read against the wider background of Australia's peacemaking efforts. The aim of this article is to briefly record Australia's peackeeping and related commitments since 1945. The utility and long term effectiveness of multinational peacekeeping, particularly UN operations, will be examined in a separate article.

Australia's record of participation in multinational peacekeeping might at first appear to be less than other comparable western countries. However the record should be read bearing in mind that many of these contributions occurred in the 1948-1972 period, when the Australian Defence Force (ADF) was also heavily committed to directly helping restore peace, by assisting allies defend themselves against external aggression and/or internal terrorism.

Background

Before studying the history of Australian participation in multinational peacekeeping it is necessary to clearly differentiate between peackeeping and related activities. Traditionally multinational peackeeping operations are divided into three types:

a. Peace Restoration or Stability Operations. These involve the use of combat forces, including where necessary, offensive air and naval support. Such operations, often termed 'police actions', are usually mounted under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter (Maintenance of International Peace), and are intended to deter aggression, or restore peace or order by force.

b. Peacekeeping Forces. These are armed forces mounted under Chapter Six of the UN Charter (Settlement of Disputes), to establish local security or act as a buffer force between the belligerents. Such operations may involve the use of limited force, but this is usually restricted to self protection.

c. Military Observer Missions. These are also mounted under Chapter Six of the UN Charter. Unarmed Military Observers are used to monitor ceasefires, mediate and alleviate ceasefire tensions, provide 'good offices' as the basis for negotiations, and provide a means of impartial verification of armistice or ceasefire agreements.

As listed at Annex A, the UN has mounted twenty-one peacekeeping operations since World War II, although different UN documents claim different figures. The confusion as to what constitutes a peacekeeping operation is reflected in much of the other published literature on multinational peacekeeping. It is largely caused by the definition of what constitutes a peacekeeping mission being unduly influenced by political perspectives and cultural biases.

In particular, there is a frequent unwillingness to acknowledge that the three UN peackeeping operations in Korea were genuine peackeeping efforts. This is especially outrageous for the two Observer Missions (UNCOK and UNCMAC) and only marginally less so for UNC-K. This comparative lack of candour largely stems from the ingrained UN habit of attempting to avoid controversy at all costs,
including the omission or suppression of 'unpopular' facts.

Finally, confusion also arises because not all UN activities involving military personnel are peacekeeping operations. UN verification operations, such as UNAVEM in Angola (1989-90), had roles requiring some military participation but were not peacekeeping missions. Similarly, UN humanitarian operations such as the mine awareness training of Afghan refugees, involves military instructors but no peacekeeping function. Other UN sanctioned military operations, such as the Royal Navy blockade of Beira during the Rhodesian rebellion, are not regarded as UN peacekeeping missions due to the force not being under UN command and being constituted from only one member state.

Excluding combat operations in Korea, the other twenty United Nations peacekeeping operations have involved over half a million personnel. Again excluding Korea, over 700 UN peacekeepers have been killed during these operations, including five Australians. Over 10,000 soldiers from over forty countries are currently involved in nine UN peacekeeping operations; UNTSO, UNMOP, UNICIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNIOMOG, UNGOMAP and ONUCA.

Since Korea, with the partial exception of ONUC in the Congo, UN peacekeeping has been restricted to the employment of Observer Missions and Peacekeeping Forces, and has not involved Peace Restoration or Stability Operations. Since Korea no UN peacekeeping force has been deployed without the agreement of all the belligerents, including their right to veto countries from participating in the force.

There have been innumerable non-UN multinational peacekeeping operations since 1945. The largest current example is the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai. It is worthwhile noting that non-UN multinational peacekeeping has often included peace restoration or stability aspects and has not been limited to the use of Peacekeeping Forces or Observer Missions.

UN Peacekeeping Operations

Australia has officially contributed support to eleven UN peacekeeping operations and temporarily loaned personnel to another two (UNYOM and UNTEA) in which there has been no permanent Australian contribution. Furthermore, many Australian UNTSO observers have operated in support of UNEF I, UNEFII, UNIFIL and UNDOF, three of which had no separate Australian contribution. Australia has therefore been directly involved with sixteen of the UN's twenty-one peacekeeping operations since 1945 and, unlike most countries, has contributed financial support to all of them.

Depending on the UN mission and its role, the Australian contribution has included diplomats, military or police forces, and administrative and technical specialists.

UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI)

UNCI was the first UN peacekeeping mission and was originally established by the Security Council as the Good Offices Commission (GOC) in August 1947. It was strengthened and renamed UNCI in January 1949. UNCI's role was to delineate and supervise the ceasefire between the forces of the Netherlands East Indies and the newly independent Indonesian republic, and eventually supervise the repatriation of Dutch forces to the Netherlands.

The ceasefire was tenuous at the best of times and seriously broke down in December 1948. Given the strong feelings on both sides and the generally chaotic situation throughout the Indonesian archipelago, UNCI's effort in preventing large scale disaster was an excellent baptism of fire for UN peacekeeping.

The Australian commitment began in early August 1947 when locally based diplomatic staff were seconded to the GOC. They were joined by four military observers later that month. When the GOC became UNCI in 1949, the Australian military contingent increased to fifteen and remained at that strength until it was withdrawn in early April 1951.

UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

UNMOGIP grew out of the military adviser staff from the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), and was separately established as an Observer Mission in late January 1949. UNMOGIP's role was to monitor the ceasefire in Kashmir at the end of
the first India-Pakistan war. It has continued
to do so after subsequent wars as Kashmir
remains a 'territory in dispute' under inter-
national law. UNMOGIP is especially busy at
the moment as the Kashmir dispute undergoes
its worst flare-up in a generation.

The Australian contribution began in Octo-
ber 1950 when Lieutenant General R.H. Nim-
mo CBE was appointed the first Chief Military
Observer (CMO). Nimmo held the appoint-
ment for a UN record of fifteen years until his
death on 4 January 1966, a death probably due
to the strain of the position before and during
the second India-Pakistan war in 1965.

Australia added a contingent of six military
observers in 1952 with members generally
serving for one to two year tours, although
several served long extensions. Army reservists,
many of them World War II and Korea
veterans, were extensively used to man the
commitment during the Malayan Emergency,
Confrontation and the Vietnam War. In 1985
the contingent was withdrawn with its members
progressively departing as their twelve month
tour ended. The last member of the contingent
departed in December 1985, providing an
ironical and unfortunate end to the year of
international peace. Two Australian UNMO-
GIP observers were also seconded to UNIPOM
during its short duration.

Australia also provided the Mission's air
unit from March 1975 to January 1979 with a
38 Squadron RAAF detachment of one Carib-
bou and twelve crew on six month tours. The
altitude ceiling of a loaded Caribou is approxi-
mately 21,000 feet in icy weather and Kashmir
contains some thirty three peaks over 25,000
feet. It also has a climate featuring extremes of
temperature and vicious weather even in Sum-
mer. The detachment's successful record in
operating without accident in these conditions
was an impressive achievement.

The UNMOGIP are of operations is mostly
extremely mountainous, making duty there
exceptionally arduous and subject to extremes
development of climate and weather. Due more to
good luck than anything else no Australians
were among the five UN observers killed
serving with UNMOGIP, although several
were seriously injured in vehicle accidents and
avalanches. The nature of the Line of Control
(ceasefire line) and the mountainous terrain
resulted in many close shaves, particularly
regarding uncharted minefields; and the dis-
quieting tendency for mines to be moved
about by the avalanches.

UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK)

UNCOK was originally established in 1948
as a diplomatic mission to monitor the with-
drawal of World War II occupation forces
from Korea, and provide UN good offices for
unification of two regimes fostered by the
USA and USSR as occupying powers. As the
threat of hostilities increased, military observers
were added to UNCOK in May 1950 and it
became a military Observer Mission.

By the eve of the outbreak of hostilities only
the two Australian observers, Major F.S.B.
Peach and Squadron Leader R.J. Rankin,
were on the ground in Korea. Between 9-23
June 1950 they inspected military dispositions
south of the 38th parallel. Their very detailed
and thoroughly objective report, which was
instrumental in establishing that it was North
Korea that had commenced hostilities on 25
June, was a vital factor in establishing the
moral and legal basis for the UN subsequently
deploying its only peace restoration opera-
tion.

United Nations Command - Korea (UNC-K)

UNC-K was established as a Peace Restora-
tion Mission in 1950 to defend South Korea
from North Korean aggression, a role later
requiring it to also fight Communist Chinese
reinforcements. UNC-K was the UN's largest
and most controversial peacekeeping opera-
tion. It is the only time the UN has deployed
forces without the prior agreement of all
belligerents (which the UN is entitled to do
under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter), and with
the partial exception of ONUC in the Congo,
the only UN peace restoration operation. The
deployment of the mission was only possible
because the USSR was boycotting Security
Council meetings at the time and could not
exercise its permanent member's veto.

UNC-K was Australia's largest and costliest
contribution to a UN peacekeeping operation
and lasted until 1956. At its height the Austra-
lian commitment included an RAN Task
Force comprising an aircraft carrier and two
destroyers or frigates, two infantry battalions
with supporting arms and services, and a RAAF fighter squadron. The human cost was also high with 339 Australians killed before peace was restored.

**United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC)**

UNCMAC was established as an Observer Mission in 1953 to represent the UN in its adherence to, (and subsequently the monitoring of), the 1953 armistice between the UN and North Korea. UNCMAC’s observer role is limited to the investigations of serious incidents, monitoring of the armistice and participation in relevant negotiations. UNCMAC does not permanently deploy observers along the cease-fire line.

Australia’s contribution is one senior service officer. Since the withdrawal of the last Australian combat forces from UNC-K in 1956 the position has been filled, through concurrent accreditation, by the Defence Attache at the Australian Embassy to South Korea.

**UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)**

In April 1948 the UN established a Truce Commission to supervise the various armistices and truces agreed to after the first Arab-Israeli war. In mid June 1948 military observers were added to the Commission and UNTSO was formed, becoming an independent Observer Mission in mid August 1949. UNTSO has continued to supervise subsequent ceasefires after the 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982 Arab-Israeli wars. UNTSO’s area of operations includes Lebanon, Israel, Syria, Jordan and Egypt.

The Australian commitment began in July 1956 with four observers, rising to six in the mid 1960s, ten in mid 1978, and thirteen in 1982 when UNTSO strength was increased following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. As with the UNMOGIP contingent, experienced Army reservists were extensively used to man the commitment during the Malayan Emergency, Confrontation and the Vietnam War, with the last one returning to Australia in mid 1977.

Currently this means that Australians serving with Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) work closely but not exclusively with UNIFIL, and those serving with Observer Group Golan (OGG) work closely with UNDOF. In the past, Australians serving with Observer Group Egypt (OGE) worked closely with UNEF I and UNEF II during the existence of those missions. In the case of UNEF I, this was despite Egypt’s veto of formal Australian participation in the force.

During the establishment of new peacekeeping missions, UNTSO observers have often been redeployed to provide initial personnel until the new mission is up and running. When the new mission has been a short one, seconded UNTSO personnel have often remained for the duration of that mission. This redeployment of UNTSO observers has resulted in Australian participation in four other UN peacekeeping missions. In 1963 a small number of Australians assisted with the establishment of UNYOM in Yemen. In 1965 another Australian was seconded to UNIPOM in India-Pakistan for the entire but brief duration of that mission. When UNEF II was established in October 1973, two Australians were seconded to assist with the raising of the new mission.

In August 1988 one Australian was redeployed to Iran-Iraq to assist with the establishment of UNIIMOG. Any future UN mission in Cambodia will probably be established using personnel from UNTSO (and UNFICYP), and it is highly likely Australian UNTSO observers would be included.

Traditionally most Australian observers are employed in OGL in southern Lebanon and OGG on both the Israeli and Syrian sides of the Golan Heights. In March 1984 the Australian government reviewed Australian participation in Observer Group Beirut (OGB) and restricted it to a maximum of two observers. To considerable HQ UNTSO chagrin, this approval was withdrawn in late 1986 with the last Australian leaving OGB in March 1987.

To considerable operational experience gained, and stemmed from concern about the value of OGB versus the considerable danger involved. UNTSO remains most unhappy with this special restriction on the operational employment of Australian observers, and it is hoped similar difficulties will be
avoided in other missions.

Australia's most recent operational casualty occurred with UNTSO. On the 12 January 1988 while on an OGL patrol, Captain Peter McCarthy RACt was killed when his jeep hit a landmine. Captain McCarthy was the twenty-second UNTSO member to be killed since 1948, although over four hundred UN peacekeepers have been killed in the Middle East missions. Other Australians serving with OGL have been kidnapped and maltreated by irregular militias.

UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)

UNIPOM was the Observer Mission which operated from September 1965 to February 1966, to supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal of forces along the India-Pakistan border at the end of the second India-Pakistan War. This did not include Kashmir, which remained an UNMOGIP responsibility, as the ceasefire line there was in 'territory in dispute' under international law and not in Indian or Pakistani territory as such.

Due to the short duration of the task, nearly all UNIPOM personnel were temporarily seconded from other UN peacekeeping missions. Australia provided three observers, one seconded from UNTSO and two seconded from UNMOGIP. Australia also provided the acting CMO, Lieutenant General R.H. Nimmo CBE (concurrently CMO UNMOGIP), until October 1965 when a separate CMO UNIPOM was appointed. After October 1965 UN headquarters delegated Nimmo the oversight of both missions due to their symbiotic interrelationship.

UN Force in Cyprus (UNIFICYP)

UNIFICYP was established as a Peacekeeping Force in 1964 to prevent communal violence on Cyprus between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Following Turkey's intervention in 1974, UNIFICYP's role expanded to include supervision of the ceasefire between the Turkish Army and the Greek Cypriot National Guard, and the maintenance of law and order in contested areas.

UNIFICYP mainly comprises four infantry battalions deployed along a 180 kilometre long buffer zone between the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Army. However UNIFICYP also has a 34 strong civil police component currently manned by Australian and Swedish police. The police component (UNCIVPOL) is responsible for ensuring law and order in contested areas where this cannot be provided by the law enforcement elements of the warring parties.

From UNIFICYP's inception in 1964 to 1976 Australia's contribution was thirty five Commonwealth Police, many of whom were seconded from the state police forces for the duration of their UN posting. Since 1976 the commitment has been twenty police drawn solely from the Australian Federal Police (as the Commonwealth Police were renamed in October 1979). In March 1988 another milestone in peacekeeping was reached when the first Australian policewoman began her service with UNIFICYP, and the contingent has included three policewomen since March 1990.

The UNCIVPOL component of UNIFICYP are unarmed and have very restricted legal powers. The conduct of police functions in a military ceasefire situation among a population racked with ethnic and political tensions is a most difficult task, and one requiring a very tolerant and flexible approach. The Australian police contingent has won considerable international respect for the manner in which it has carried out this challenge.

Three Australian police have been killed on duty with UNIFICYP; Sergeant Lew Thomas in a vehicle accident in July 1969, Inspector Paul Hackett in a vehicle accident in August 1971, and Sergeant Ian Ward when his landrover hit a landmine in November 1974. Chief Inspector Jack Thurgar, who had himself been badly wounded by mines while serving with the Army in Vietnam in 1970, was awarded the Star of Courage for his rescue of a badly wounded civilian from a minefield in October 1979.

UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II)

UNEF II was the Peacekeeping Force established in October 1973 to supervise the ceasefire in the Sinai following the Yom Kippur War between Egypt and Israel. Australia offered to contribute forces when it was established but the UN declined the offer (for reasons discussed...
later in this article). Two Australian UNTSO observers however were seconded to UNEF II during its establishment46, and others served in support while posted to UNTSO’s Observer Group Egypt.

Australia began contributing forces in 1976 by providing the Force's rotary wing aviation unit comprising a RAAF detachment of four helicopters and 46 men on six month tours47. The detachment became a joint RAN/RAAF one in July 1977. The UNEF II mandate was not extended in July 1979, and the detachment was withdrawn in August that year.

The Australian contribution also included the provision of an Army officer as a staff officer at HQ UNEF from July 1977 to December 1979, and the provision of a Warrant Officer from July 1979 to December 1979, both positions being twelve month tours48. The Warrant Officer returned to Australia early (in December 1979) on the winding down of the mission, but the officer was posted to UNTSO for the final six months of his tour49.

**UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)**

UNIIMOG was the Observer Mission established in August 1988 to supervise the Gulf War ceasefire between Iran and Iraq. Australia has contributed observers since its inception with one temporarily seconded from UNTSO, and a dedicated contingent arriving within a week of the mission being formed50.

Australia contributes fifteen Military Observers on six month tours, although some earlier tours were as long as ten months. All the Australians serve on the Iranian side of the ceasefire line. Iraq vetoed their presence in Iraq as a consequence of Australian participation in the UN Chemical Warfare Investigation Team which established that chemical weapons had been used in the Gulf War51.

The nature and conditions of the Gulf War have meant that UNIIMOG service is particularly arduous due to a combination of climatic extremes, devastated infrastructure and the social hostility and deprivation engendered by extreme Islamic fervour. The volatility of the ceasefire has also made it quite dangerous. Australian observers have gained experience not seen by UN observers on so large a scale since UNMOGIP service in the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars, and UNTSO service during the 1967, 1973 and 1982 Middle East wars.

**UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)**

UNTAG was the Peacekeeping Force which operated in Namibia, and to a limited extent surrounding countries, from the beginning of April 1989 to the end of March 1990. Its purpose was to supervise the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia, the conduct of general elections and Namibia’s transition to independence. Together with UNTEA, it holds the rare distinction of being a peacekeeping operation that achieved its mission within its initial mandate period.

The Australian military contribution arrived in three groups in the period mid March to mid April 1989, and was rotated in three groups in early September, late September and early October 1989. The first contingent consisted of 304 personnel comprising a Chief Engineer Works Staff, 17 Construction Squadron and 17 Construction Squadron Workshop. The second contingent consisted of 309 personnel due to the addition of a five member MP detachment, and included one RAAF exchange officer and fourteen New Zealand personnel52. The contingent was progressively withdrawn from early February 1990 as the Mission’s mandate expiry date approached, with the last members of the contingent departing Namibia on 9 April 199053.

From 27 October to 20 November 1989 Australia also provided a civil contingent comprising an electoral expert and thirty electoral supervisors from the Commonwealth Electoral Office, and a fingerprinting expert from the AFP. The contingent assisted with the general elections conducted in early November 198954.

The Australian military contribution was vital to the success of the mission as the ceasefire collapsed at the beginning of the mission’s mandate. At this time the advance party of the Australian contingent was the only large formed body of UN troops in Namibia and, together with the British Signals detachment, was instrumental in the UN being able to plan, negotiate and monitor a ceasefire, and the withdrawal of SWAPO forces from Namibia55.

The Australian contribution to UNTAG
was our largest UN peacekeeping contribution since UNC-K. The professionalism of the contingent in arduous conditions won wide and detailed praise from both the UN and the protagonists. It also provided a very useful test of the Army’s planning and support procedures which had grown distinctly rusty since the withdrawal from Vietnam eighteen years earlier. It is also interesting to note that due to initial concern about the danger involved, the contingent was classified as being on operational service and received the best conditions of service ever provided an Australian peacekeeping contingent. Ironically UNTAG proved to be the least hazardous UN peacekeeping operation Australia has been involved in.

**Other Proposed UN Commitments**

Australia has twice formally offered forces to the UN during the establishment or reinforcement of peacekeeping missions without the offer being taken up by the UN. In both cases the main reason was that an Australian contribution did not suit the UN policy of maintaining a geographic and political balance of countries within the force. However the size, nature and type of forces that were available for offer may also not have suited UN requirements.

This latter aspect stems from the UN preference, when constituting a Peacekeeping Force, to approach the wealthier or more developed western countries for the technical elements such as communications, engineer, medical and aviation units, and the poorer or less developed countries for the less technical elements such as infantry. However because most third world countries have difficulty in affording UN commitments, the wealthier or more developed countries can also often end up contributing infantry units.

The first UN rejection was to an offer of a rifle company group (mounted in APC) and supporting RAAF air transport when UNEF II was being established in October 1973. The second rejection was to an offer of an independent infantry company group with associated support elements when UNFICYP was being reinforced in July 1974. In each case, the offer of a battalion group may have been more readily accepted.

In August 1989 Australia also offered to provide twelve Military Observers, a forty strong signals unit and minor support elements, to the proposed UN Observer Mission to monitor the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia at that time. Due to the failure of peace talks between the combatants, the mission was not established. Further to this offer, Australia has advised the UN that it is prepared to make a substantial commitment to any future UN Peacekeeping Force deployed to assist with a UN mediated settlement of the Cambodia problem.

**OTHER MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Since 1945 Australia has also contributed military forces to two non-UN multinational peacekeeping operations. The first commitment reflected the continuing Commonwealth role in decolonisation, and the second one Australia’s close relationship with the USA.

**Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF)**

The CMF was a Peacekeeping Force of 1548 troops from five Commonwealth countries established in December 1979 to supervise the Lancaster House Agreement. Under the agreement the unilateral declaration of independence by the rebellious British colony of Southern Rhodesia was withdrawn by the rebel regime, legality restored, a ceasefire implemented, general elections held, and independence subsequently achieved by the Republic of Zimbabwe. The CMF was tasked with monitoring the agreement and resembled a UN Observer Mission, except that its duties were more extensive and had municipal legal backing, and its personnel were armed.

The Australian Army contingent of 152 all ranks arrived in Rhodesia on the 23 and 25 December 1979 and departed on the conclusion of the Mission in mid March 1980. Australia also provided Mr K.C.O. Shann, a former head of the Public Service Board, as the Australian member of the attached eleven nation Commonwealth Observer Group (COG) tasked with verifying the conduct of the general elections held in February 1980. An eight member Australian National Observer Group comprising four parliamentarians and four government officials, also observed the general elections but were not part of the CMF or COG.
The CMF consisted of a headquarters and three groups. The first group were deployed throughout the country to monitor the Rhodesian security forces at all levels down to company bases. The second group were deployed, generally in teams of one officer and nine other ranks, to man the 23 rendezvous points where the Popular Front guerillas were initially concentrated. Once this had been completed, they were deployed in teams of one officer and sixteen other ranks to monitor the 16 assembly areas where the guerillas were accommodated during the ceasefire period. The last group consisted of seven border crossing teams who monitored the return of civilian refugees.

As far as possible, all monitoring teams contained troops from each participating country. The Australians were deployed throughout the force and much valuable experience was gained, especially by junior leaders. One interesting aspect was that personnel tended to strongly identify with the force they were monitoring, and senior commanders had to take strong action to ensure the force's impartiality was preserved.

**Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)**

The MFO was the Peacekeeping Force established in 1982 to supervise the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, under which Israel withdrew from Egyptian territory in the Sinai. The creation of a non-UN force was necessary due to the likelihood of the Soviet Union vetoing the mandate for a UN mission. The MFO consists of three infantry battalions, a large technical monitoring and observer element, and maritime and air units.

Australia provided forces from the MFO's inception until April 1986 when the contingent was withdrawn for internal political reasons. Australia and New Zealand combined to provide the force's rotary wing aviation unit consisting of a joint RAN/Amy/RAAF helicopter detachment of two helicopters and thirty personnel, on six month tours. The Australian contingent also included five Army and two RAAF officers on twelve month tours as staff officers at HQ MFO.

**RELATED OPERATIONS**

Australia has also provided personnel to the UN for diplomatic, judicial, military, scientific, humanitarian and law enforcement tasks related to or in support of peacekeeping, but not involving participation in peacekeeping missions. Such tasks do not directly fall within the ambit of this article, but are included to emphasise the distinction and prevent confusion arising as to their status.

**UN Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB).** From 1947-52 Australia provided a special diplomatic representative to UNSCOB to assist in its deliberations on the border dispute between Greece and her communist neighbours, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

**UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).** In 1948 UNCIP was established to investigate and report on the situation in Kashmir, and mediate in the dispute between India and Pakistan. The major attempt at formal diplo-judicial UN mediation occurred in 1950, when a Justice of the High Court, Sir Owen Dixon, was appointed the UN mediator. No resolution of the dispute resulted due to a refusal by India to accept unfavourable results.

**UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA).** In 1962 UNTEA was established to supervise the transition of Netherlands West New Guinea from Dutch to Indonesian control. A detachment from 16 Army Light Aircraft Squadron, consisting of four Army pilots, seven RAAF airmen and two Sioux helicopters, were attached to UNTEA from 18 November to 25 December 1962 to assist with a cholera eradication programme. The detachment was withdrawn near the end of the programme after one of the helicopters crashed. While UNTEA was a peacekeeping mission, the Australian contribution was to the civil component of the Mission not the military component (UNSF).

**UN Headquarters Logistic Support Adviser.** From September 1983 to March 1987 Australia provided a military logistics expert, Colonel N.R. Bergin, as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary General for the Office of Field Operational and External Support Activities (OFOESA), at UN headquarters in New York. His task was to advise on how the logistic,
communications and administrative support to UN peacekeeping operations might be reorganised in order to increase effectiveness and reduce costs. Many of the necessary reforms were not proceeded with due to bureaucratic and diplomatic inertia.

**UN Chemical Warfare Investigation Team.** In 1984, 1986 and 1987, Australia contributed a scientific expert, (Dr Peter Dunn from the Materials Research Laboratory's Protective Chemistry Division) to the Secretary-General's four man team investigating the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War. At considerable personal risk the team was instrumental in proving chemical weapons use.

**UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO).** In mid February 1989 Australia contributed two AFP officers to UNBRO for a twelve month tour. They worked as part of a five man security liaison team that operated with the Thai Army elements responsible for maintaining law and order in the UNBRO sponsored Cambodian refugee camps on the Cambodia-Thailand border. The UNBRO police liaison officers also trained the Cambodian civilian guards responsible for the provision of basic police functions in the camps.

**UN Mine Clearance Training Team (UNMCTT).** On 16 July 1989, nine Army field engineers were seconded for a four month tour as technical specialists with the UNMCTT in Pakistan. The contingent was rotated in late October 1989, early March 1990 (when it was reduced to six members) and late July 1990. The UNMCTT, comprising contingents from nine countries, conducts the United Nations' Operation Salam, a humanitarian activity mounted under the auspices of the Geneva based UN Co-ordinator for Afghanistan (UN-OCA). Its purpose is to instruct Pakistan based Afghan refugees in mine and ordnance recognition, and basic clearance tasks. The UNMCTT is not part of the UN peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan (UNGOMAP).

**UN Fact Finding Mission to Cambodia.** From 6-22 August 1989 a fact finding mission of senior officers from several countries, led by the CMO UNTSO, was sent to Cambodia and the Thailand-Cambodia border. Its purpose was to study and plan how the UN could monitor the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and, if agreed, supervise an internal peace process between the Cambodian government and the three opposition non-communist and communist guerilla forces. Australia contributed one Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel R.A. Stuart, and one RAAF officer, Wing Commander G.D. Weekes. Due to the failure of contemporaneous peace talks to reach agreement, no UN mission resulted.

**UN Technical Survey Mission.** From 29 July - 12 August 1990 a UN team comprising military and civilian experts from several countries, was sent to Morocco and the disputed Western Sahara territory. Its purpose was to study and plan how the UN would monitor a ceasefire between Morocco and the Western Sahara guerilla force POLISARIO; and supervise a referendum on the territory's future status. Australia contributed a communications expert, Lieutenant Colonel I.C. Gordon, and an electoral expert from the Australian Electoral Commission, Mr M.C. Maley.

**Conclusions**

Australia has an impressive peacekeeping record stretching back to the immediate post World War II period. Such commitments are entirely consistent with Australia's notable record of combating aggression in both World Wars, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam. Of particular note was Australia's willingness to make a major contribution to the UN's only peacekeeping combat action, Korea 1950-54.

At the strategic level, Australian involvement in multinational peacekeeping operations provides an excellent means of contributing to world peace. As Frederick the Great remarked, 'diplomacy without arms is like a symphony without instruments'. Australia's peacemaking efforts on the diplomatic front continue to rely heavily on Australia's military contribution to the balance of power and, in the final analysis, our national will to take military action to counter aggression. The use of the ADF and AFP on peacekeeping tasks is not a tangential role but a complementary facet of Australia's commitment to the cause of peace.

At the tactical level, the professionalism of ADF personnel and their willingness to undertake the necessary but risky tasks often balked at by other contingents, greatly assists in the practical resolution of the unit level tensions inherent in any ceasefire. This tactical success has often been of greater practical humanitarian
value, as it has helped the civilian population at the mission's working level, even where there has been little or no resolution of the problem at the national political or international diplomatic levels.

Australia has a good reputation for providing well trained professional servicemen rather than professional peacekeepers. In return the ADF receives good experience of a semi-operational nature and of considerable long term benefit. The record is one Australia can be proud of.

NOTES
1. Even the UN information handouts commemorating the 1988 award of the Nobel Peace Prize to UN Peacekeeping Forces omitted the three missions in Korea.
2. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) was established, as part of the Namibia settlement, to verify the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.
3. This operation is discussed later on in this article.
6. Ibid.
7. The contribution to UNTEA however was not to the peacekeeping component of the force (UNSF).
8. In the 1970s, four Australian UNTSO observers were actually cross-posted by the UN to UNIFIL and another twelve were cross-posted to UNDOF; however cross-posting was replaced by the current practice of attaching UNTSO observers to UNIFIL and UNDOF for observer duties. (Advice from the Military Secretary's Office dated 2 May 1990).
9. In addition to the compulsory and voluntary contributions levied by the UN, Australia has also contributed in other ways, such as financing the re-arming and provisioning of the Fijian battalion which joined UNIFIL in 1978.
11. Ibid., p140.
12. Ibid., pp140 - 143.
13. Ibid., p142; As the first UN peacekeeping mission, the procedures used to establish and operate UNCI were different from later peacekeeping missions. One major difference was that the military observers were not directly seconded to the UN as has subsequently been the case, but were loaned to the UN through the consular missions. They were also only drawn from countries with diplomatic representation in Indonesia and not the UN membership as a whole, as later became the custom. Because of this, some peacekeeping references do not include UNCI on their list of UN Peacekeeping Missions.
14. Ibid.
16. The Blue Helmets, op cit. p338; Correspondence with Mrs Anne Truman (daughter of Lieutenant General R.H. Nimmoc CBE) dated 15 Jan 90; Correspondence with Brigadier W.R. Artis RFD ED (RL) dated 28 Jan 90.
17. Discussions with Brigadier W.R. Artis RFD ED (RL) on 13 Dec 89; Brigadier Artis, as a Lieutenant Colonel, served as Nimmo's Chief of Staff at HQ UNMOGIP during 1958-60 and 1964-65.
18. The ostensible reason for the withdrawal was a perception that the Mission was not achieving its aim due to severe mobility restrictions imposed by India. The actual reason is believed to have been strong diplomatic pressure from India which is anxious to have UNMOGIP removed but unwilling to request the UN to terminate its mandate. The decision to withdraw was undoubtedly assisted by an inadequate appreciation of the Mission's value and poor understanding of the Mission's operation, particularly the value of the Australian observers as the only Commonwealth country and the only native English speakers, (see Rikhye et al. p270). The degree of this high level ignorance is best exemplified by the then Foreign Minister, when visiting the contingent in 1984, asking an Australian Observer 'how long have you been in UNICEF?'
20. Discussions with Wing Commander J.H. Benjamin on 27 Feb 90.
21. The last as late as 1981 (author's experience during UNMOGIP service in 1982-83).
23. Ibid.
26. Advice from International Policy Division, Department of Defence (Central Office) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
28. Ibid. pp17 and 330; Discussions with Colonel K.D. Howard RFD ED (RL) on 27 Apr 90, Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Crossman (RL) on 26 Apr 90, and Lieutenant Colonel D.A. Smith and Lieutenant Colonel M.C. Peck (RL) on 16 May 90.
29. Howard, op cit. Colonel Howard, as a Lieutenant Colonel, served with UNTSO 1967-77 and was Deputy Chief of Staff at HQ UNTSO for his last four years including several long periods as acting Chief of Staff.
30. The number is not known but research is continuing.
31. Major J. Copeman MB E MC MM served with UNIPOM from September 1965 to March 1966;
32. Lieutenant Colonel K.D. Howard and Major A.R. Windsor both served with UNIFIL from October 1973 to March 1974; (Howard, op cit).

33. Captain C.M. Burns served with UNIMOG 12 Aug - 11 Sep 88, both at Group Headquarters in Tehran and at the Iranian Forward Line Own Troops (FLOT) demarcating what was to become the ceasefire line; (Discussions with Captain C.M. Burns on 9 May 90).

34. Department of Defence (Central Office) Ministerial Briefing Minute SPD 84 40315 dated 21 Apr 86. (Army Office File 86-23844 (1)). Letter from Minister for Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister dated 16 Dec 86. (Army Office File 86-23844 (3)).

35. The last Australian in OGB was Major I.A. Lynch RAA. (Discussions with Colonel L.N. Turner (RL), the then Director of Operations - Army, on 14 May 90). Discussions with Major L. Tranter, Major F.E.G. O'Brien and Major I.A. Lynch on 17 May 90.


37. The Blue Helmets, op cit. pp329-337.

38. Discussions with Major G.J. Young and MAJ M. Davey in May 88.


40. Ibid. p167; Copeman, op cit.

41. The Blue Helmets, op cit. p167; Copeman, op cit.

42. The Blue Helmets, op cit. pp265 and 287-288.


44. Advice from International Division, Headquarters Australian Federal Police. It should be noted however that Australian female nursing staff did serve with UNC-K.

45. Platypus, op cit.

46. Howard, op cit.

47. Discussions with Air Commodore J.H. Dunn on 27 Feb 90.

48. The three officers were Majors L. McClean, W.D. Tresise and A.J. Mcgee, and the Warrant Officer was Warrant Officer Class Two C.P. McLinden; (Discussions with Lieutenant Colonel L. Maclean on 28 Feb 90).

49. Discussions with Warrant Officer Class One C.P. McLinden on 19 Mar 90.

50. The contingent arrived in Iran 16 Aug 88.


52. Author's experience at DGOP-A.

53. Army Operations Room Diary - ASC UNTAG.

54. Author's experience at DGOP-A.

55. Discussions with Colonel R.D. Warren and Lieutenant Colonel K.W. Pappard over Sep-Dec 89, and the author's own experience at DGOP-A.

56. DGOP-A Presentation to Command and Staff College in 1982 (held on file at DGOS-A).

57. Discussions with Lieutenant Colonel R.A. Stuart in Sep 89, and the author's own experience at DGOP-A.

58. Public statements by Senator G. Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, on several occasions in the Sep 89 - Feb 90 period.


60. 152 Rhodesia campaign medals were awarded but a five man reconnaissance party also deployed 23-30 Dec 79 (Army Office File MS6-7-3 (R1)); Discussions with Brigadier F.K. Cole on 16 Nov 89, and Major B.J. Agnew on 14 May 90.


62. Ibid.


64. Agnew, op cit.

65. Flying operations ceased on 31 March 1990.

66. Discussions with Wing Commander R.S. Neilson on 28 Feb 90.

67. Discussions with Colonel A.I. Mattay, Colonel G.W. Hurford and Major S.D. Meekin over the Sep-Dec 89 period.

68. Rikhbye, op cit. p144.

69. Discussions with Doctor W.J. Hudson, Editor Historical Records, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, on 10 Nov and 15 Nov 89.


71. Discussions with Colonel N.R. Bergin (RL) on 9 Nov 89, and Army Office File A85-13741.


73. Platypus, op cit. p5, supplemented by advice from International Division, Headquarters Australian Federal Police on 23 Apr 90.

74. Army Operations Room Diary - ASC UNMCTT.

75. Discussions with Lieutenant Colonel R.A. Stuart and Wing Commander G.D. Wekes on 23 Nov 89.

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Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence - Zimbabwe, Australian
Lieutenant Colonel Neil James graduated from RMC with a BA (Mil) in 1976. After regimental service as a platoon commander in 1RAR, he served in a variety of intelligence regimental and staff appointments at HQIMD, 1 Div Int Coy, 72 EW Sqn, 14 Sig Regt (EW) in BAOR, DMI, HQ3MD and the Doctrine Development Cell at SMI. Non-corp appointments have included service with UNMOGIP in Kashmir and as SO2 Operations DGOP-A. Instructional appointments have included two postings to SMI, and an attachment to the Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security (CFSIS). During his UNMOGIP service from May 82 to May 83 he served both on the Line of Control and on the Operations Staff at UNMOGIP headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel James graduated from Command and Staff College in 1988 and is currently SO1 Intelligence Plans at JEPS.
The Lighthorseman — A Forgotten Concept?

By Bombardier S.J. Smith, RAA

Historical Background

The use of horses in warfare is as old as history itself. Australian Forces have employed horses in many varied roles from the New Zealand wars to Korea. From the Deserts of Palestine to the Jungles of Asia, mounted ANZACs have forged traditions and legends that endure still.

Of all traditions perhaps the one most readily called to mind is that of Harry Chauvels' Lighthorse and the charge at Beersheba. These men, and more importantly their horses, had ridden many miles and in many cases without water for 48 hours over some of the harshest terrain on earth — Terrian not unlike that of Northern Australia — to reach and take their objective.

It is not the intention of this article to seek or relive old glories, rather, to propose a revival of the techniques developed and battle tested in wars past.

Current Situation

Under current Australian Defence Doctrine, many ARA and ARES units have been tasked to defend vital Northern assets. To help achieve this, we have modern Aircraft and Vehicles with dedicated forces such as Norforce, the Pilbara Regiment and 2 CAV Regiment.

Situational Difficulties

The main problem is that between peacetime financial constraints and the very harshness and distances of the terrain involved, it could prove to be extremely expensive to operate and, more importantly to maintain vehicles and aircraft in the projected AO's. Further, foot mounted patrols are very limited in the distance and load they can travel and carry.

Notwithstanding the cost of fuel, track hours, spares, flying hours and other problems involved in supporting Northern operations, the cost of training troops and preparing and deploying them must be considered. For example, to conduct a drivers course involves thousands of dollars and manhours to enable a soldier to operate and maintain a vehicle.

A Possible Solution

In view of the above, a possible solution would be that the Army re-raise a new lighthorse regiment.

In the North of Australia there exist large herds of wild horses — proving they can survive the climate and terrain.

A horse can carry a man and equipment more than 20 miles a day — quietly and into very difficult terrain.

There are certain to be many soldiers who can ride — extensive training is required to learn to operate and maintain vehicles.

A low loader can carry one APC — a semi-trailer can carry a dozen horses.

If a vehicle breaks down it must be recovered — if a horse breaks down it can be treated or destroyed and if necessary eaten.

Vehicles require petrol, oil and water, create noise and dust — horses can forage, smell out water and move quiet inconspicuously.

Finally, and possibly most important, horses have more freedom of movement in the wet season where vehicles and men on foot have great difficulty.

Organization

In the employment of horse mounted troops a platoon consisting of four, five-man patrol sections comprising one junior NCO and four soldiers, with a further HQ section of one SNCO, one Lieutenant and mounted logistic and medical element, this HQ section would also hold the remounts.

Employment

Each five-man patrol section would be equipped with the new family of small arms with Project Raven communications. Given an area to patrol, a suggested method would be to keep approximately 2000m between sections with the HQ element moving behind and centrally located. Patrols should be competent with the use of 1:25 000 scale maps and compasses, be equipped with binoculars and have a working knowledge of survival practices.
Conclusion

Even in modern warfare horses would be a valuable reconnaissance asset. None of the ideas put forward are intended to be inflexible or a final solution to the problem of surveying and protecting or North. Simply, they represent an achievable and financially cost-effective course of action, a course of action which could easily be trialled by unit commanders under the provisions of adventure training. Finally, the implementation of this idea could even have significant effect on Recruiting/Retention by offering a very challenging and traditional form of training.

Bombardier Steven John Smith enlisted in the Australian Regular Army in 1981. He was posted to 4 Field Regiment in March 1982. In 1986 he was promoted to Bombardier. He is currently serving at Headquarters Land Command Artillery.

Overseas Travel/Study Opportunity

Eighty Churchill Fellows are making plans to head overseas during 1991 on their Churchill Fellowships. They will visit many countries and spend an average of about three months pursuing subjects as diverse as the control of woody weeds, seizing the benefits of crime, effluent recycling, cortical defects of vision and counterdisaster practices.

The Churchill Trust is now calling for applications for Fellowships to be taken up during 1992. Merit in any field, which must be of value to the community, is the major criterion in the granting of Fellowships.

To date, 1500 Australian residents have already been given the opportunity to study overseas with their fares paid and a living allowance provided to allow them to seek out knowledge which they then bring back to Australia for the enrichment of our society.

An average Fellowship is worth about $12,000. Churchill Fellowships are available to all Australians regardless of academic or other qualifications.

Apply now for a 1992 Churchill Fellowship. Send a self-addressed stamped envelope 24 x 12cms to:

Applications Forms
The Winston Churchill Memorial Trust
218 Northbourne Avenue
Canberra ACT 2601

Applications close on 28 February 1991.
To be or not to be, that is the question.

This famous quote of William Shakespeares when the word 'respond' is substitute for 'be', would not honestly reflect the ability of the Australian Government to react to unforseen events in our region. The ARA could provide a Battalion of infantry (750 men) at short notice, fully equipped for field operations within 24 hours of callout, and the RAAF could similarly provide several C130 Hercules for their transportation. Even so, they would need a secure arrival point or risk the hazards of an Arnhem style aerial insertion.

How then can a fiscally strapped economy provide the nation with a militarily feasible option to enable diplomatic negotiators to confront a tense situation from a position of strength? The answer is not as simple as it at first may seem; one group may see that a true Aircraft Carrier with a full combat air group is the only sane conclusion, whilst the other end of the societal spectrum may hold the view that a nation with only a small standing army may only be able to produce little more than a foolhardy token response, so why spend the money? Hopefully this article will produce some answers to this vexing question.

It is widely accepted that Australia has no immediate threat to its sovereignty, however, allowances should be made for the unpredicted event. This article is not about economics, nor is it about politics, it is simply an interpretation of reality. Australia has taken on the role of a de facto rich uncle to a number of small Pacific nations, this is not because of some jingoistic national self-pride, but due to geographic location.

Is the fully fledged Light Carrier a viable option? — No. At a cost of approximately 2 billion dollars it is certainly not an affordable avenue of enterprise. However, lack of a major air capable ship is not an acceptable position either. So how do we solve this dilemma? The conversion of a suitable merchant hull would seem to be the only alternate solution that can cater to the demands of the ARA, the RAN and the treasury.

The K-Mart Carrier when forming the core of a highly visible and adaptable surface force is an invaluable asset at the disposal of the nation's policy makers. Though not an aircraft carrier in the true sense, being in actuality a Roll-On-Roll-Off (Ro-Ro) hull with a modified upper deck, capable of carrying helicopters or VSTOL aircraft, and a body of infantry if used as an amphibious support unit.

Not constrained to wholly military roles, this vessel with the ability to carry some 15 odd helicopters would provide an extremely flexible asset in any natural disaster. The South Pacific region (including Northern Australia) is prone to cyclonic depressions, and, in some areas active vulcanism. In the event of a major catastrophe, an RAN Task Group could quickly be despatched after loading up, maintain a transit speed of 20 knots (480 NM per day), and carry substantial aid cargo to local authorities to assist in the repair of damage after the initial emergency response.

Where Do You Get a Cheap Carrier?

A standard Ro-Ro vessel is about 500ft in length, 100ft wide and weighs about 20,000 tonnes and would easily fit the bill. This generic merchant ship has many distinct advantages over a purpose built vessel, not only are the hulls readily available, they are purposely built to carry large volume internal cargo and many containers stacked high above the waterline, they are reasonably seaworthy (when fitted with stabilisers) and most importantly, extremely cheap, compared to over 2 billion for a small carrier. Structurally they have a high forward bridge allowing maximum flight deck area and a stern ramp as part of the hull form, which could be retained if required.

These factors are obviously the most favourable ones, and it is worth noting at this stage a few undesirable features. Being merchant ships they possess far fewer watertight bulkheads than a warship, the radar cross-section could be quite large, there is no hull quietening designed into the below waterline hull thus making it a comparatively noisy ship, power supplies would need to be significantly upgraded and the main transverse frames would also need strengthening. All is
not lost however, during the conversion period, these major deficiencies could be rectified, and it should be noted that the ship would not be tactically employed in an irretrievable situation where heavy damage is highly probable.

**Multi-Role Availability**

When the Aviation ship is used as a purely Naval platform it would embark a mix of mainly ASW or ASUW SH70 Seahawk helicopters and SKM50 Seakings. The exact complement of aircraft would of course be subject to the strategic mission of the force. If supporting the army was the task and no submarine threat was present, the ships LCA's could be used to land troops directly onto a secured beachhead, with Army UH 60 Blackhawks acting as troop transport and re-supply and most especially, gunships providing vital close support air cover. Apart from the helicopters the ship could disembark light vehicles directly onto the LCA's for transport onto the beach, and, by stern ramp, a mechanised composite squadron onto docks; In either case the concept is flexible enough to be used as a beach-head vessel or to operate in a secure port area.

However, if there was a surface or submarine threat present then obviously a compromise would need to be struck in the type of helicopter carried, between the needs of the Task Group Commander and those of the Chief of Defence Force.

**Is the Concept Viable?**

The short answer is yes. The Royal Navy in 1981 purchased the MV Contender Bezant and, after a three year conversion refit, was commissioned as RFA Argus (A135). This vessel has had a total cost of approximately 150 million dollars which includes full contractor responsibility for equipment, trials and completion to full operational status, including the fitting of Chaff Launchers, FSM kit, and Fire Control for 30mm automatic cannons. The former Ro-Ro deck serves as a hangar for 6 Seakings serviced by 2 lifts with the ability to ferry 12 Harrier VSTOL fighters on the deck.

In addition to the RN's operational unit, the USN has successfully trialled a similar concept, though it does not have an absolute need to utilise this type of arrangement (due to the possession of significant numbers of CVN, CV and LPD ships), the idea still forms a part of the USN's convoying scenario.

**A Complimentary Naval Force**

The RAN's Tier 1 ships (3 DDG's and 6 FFG's) will still provide principal Command, Control and Communications (C3) for the fleet, Tier 2 ships (8 Anzac FFs) would supplement these units. The Aviation Ship, Jervis Bay and Tobruk would provide a sizable force projection capability. Additionally the Aviation ship would allow the RAN to totally employ its projected Rotary Wing group (16 SH 70's, 7 SK50's and 6 AS 350's) at sea, and a number of Army UH 60's (possibly as many as 10 with a mix of armament).

If the strategic imperative was to produce a local superioriy of naval forces, and exclude any nation from covertly entering the area, then a platform able to operate homogenous air assets is essential. The helicopter force could act as a screen or as a potent interdiction asset against non-friendly vessels (up to Corvette size), and in doing so enhance the diplomatic position of the Government.

An aircraft carrying ship in a submarine threat with approximately 15 helicopters would be vital in supplying the force with constant ASW helicopter coverage, whilst others remain on deck ready to attack any submarine found. Even in a mixed threat environment this unit would still carry out the same role with the escorts providing the Anti-Surface Cover (2 SH 70 per FFG and 1 per Anzac).

The decision as to a suitable mix of helo assets is made significantly simpler if there is no apparent submarine threat, then the majority of helicopters carried could be used to supply a formidable airborne offensive asset. In this role the ship would not prove a liability to the force, but, an extremely valuable asset, particularly if an allied nation could provide VSTOL fighters on a rental or loan basis, thus bridging the gap between radar detection and interception of hostile raiders. These fighters would act as the final piece in a complicated jigsaw puzzle.

**Conclusions**

Does Australia need a flexible multi-role vessel to fill this vacuum? if so is such a ship affordable when arguing in purely monetary terms? The
answer to both questions is yes. It should be well remembered that when Athens lost her ability to project an image of maritime strength she was forced to rely on a small land force to maintain her position, this policy ultimately proved an inadequate solution.

Although Australia has no direct aggressor on its borders, there is always the unknown factor that needs to be provided for. Just as an insurance policy provides the insured with financial security if an ill wind blows, so the Defence Forces act as an insurance policy for the nation. When an individual considers buying an insurance policy, they would not consider an offer from a broker that was only valid for a few circumstances of chance, similarly why would the nation wish to pay for an insurance policy that is limited in its ability to provide adequate coverage for unforeseen events.

The acquisition of an air and amphibious capable unit would appear to be the only justifiable solution to the question posed by this article, and would assume the role of a multi-cover clause in the nation’s insurance policy.

Petty Officer Michael Ryan has served in the Royal Australian Navy for the past 13 years. He has specialised in Anti-Submarine Warfare for the past six years. He is currently posted to HMAS Stalwart as the Senior Radar Plot sailor.

Book Reviews

AMERICAN GUERRILLA — MY WAR BEHIND JAPANESE LINES. By Roger Hilsman. Published by Brassey’s (US), Inc. New York. 1990.

Reviewed by Wing Commander Ian MacFarling, RAAF.

There is an apocryphal story about a famous British General who wanted to publish his memoirs after World War Two. The old, and hitherto successful, warhorse had some trouble getting his book into the shops and out to his admirers because, in those pre-desktop publishing days, the printing firm involved ran out of capital Is halfway through setting up the type.

Happily for the readers of American Guerilla Dr Hilsman has avoided the egocentric style of narrative accredited to the celebrated British warrior. The book flows effortlessly, presenting a "warts and all" view of a young American junior officer's war for which he and his comrades had never been prepared.

Hilsman is the son of a demanding, unsympathetic US Army colonel who was captured by the Japanese in the Phillipines in 1942 and spent the rest of the war as a prisoner. The young Hilsman graduated from West Point in 1943 with his own liberal views still intact and was sent to fight with Merrill's Marauders in Burma. He was flung, literally, into battle and badly wounded on the first day. His life was saved because one of the bullets that should have killed him glanced off the cigarette case that his curmudgeon of a father had given him as a farewell present, and he recovered after enduring battlefield surgery under local anaesthetic.

Following a brief recuperation Hilsman became a liaison officer with the British 14th Army where he established an excellent rapport with his hosts. The fact that relations were generally so bad between most Americans and the British in wartime South East Asia reinforces the perception that the author is an unusually gifted and tolerant man. Despite his success he felt that he was not pulling his weight and volunteered to be the commander of a guerilla battalion, covering the 14th Army's flank as it drove south through Burma. He put his ideas on irregular warfare into practice and made a significant contribution to the Allied war effort before going to rescue his father from a POW camp in Manchuria,
where he was met with the opening words “Son, what took you so long?”.

The remainder of the book deals with Hilsman’s postwar decision to leave the US Army, how he became an academic, and then with his involvement in the Vietnam crisis during the early part of the Kennedy Administration. He counselled restraint and fought to keep America out of Vietnam, but after Kennedy’s assassination the hawks in the new Johnson Administration set the policy and he resigned.

American Guerilla is a pleasure to read because of the balance between narrative and opinion, and between places depicted and people described. The people come to life vividly; Stilwell continually misunderstanding the value of guerillas as well as their limitations and being detested by his men; Johnson deliberately manipulating people like a puppet master for his own ends, and the simple Burmese people appearing at once so gentle and stoic and yet so savagely cruel. Humor plays a large part: a Harley Davidson motorbike is returned to stores by the liaison team because “...it rounded a bend and tried to climb a tree”. Hilsman receives a package from home in an airdrop behind the Japanese lines. It contains his favourite (pre-war) food-chilli con carne and a pound of rice. The airdrop also delivers 12000 lb of rice to the battalion so the guerillas hurriedly disperse into the jungle “...carrying 12001 lb of rice”.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said that “it is required of every man to be a part of the passion and action of his time in peril of being judged not to have lived”. Dr Hilsman’s book provides plenty of evidence to show that he not only lived but had the wisdom to appreciate his good fortune. Readers should be grateful that he chose to share the experience with us and perhaps be a little envious that he was able to do so much in his life with humour and compassion.