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A special handover ceremony marking the delivery of the Royal Air Force's final Hornet was held at RAAF Base, Fairbairn on Monday 14 May, 1990.

Group Captain Ray Conroy representing all RAAF fighter squadrons.
Dear Sir,

I was most interested in Michael O'Connor's postulation (Letters DFJ No 79) that Western historians have created a myth of weak and corrupt leadership in the Republic of Vietnam, to justify the withdrawal of military support from that country in 1972.

There is no single cohesive Western view of the Vietnam War. The vast and growing body of literature produced in recent years (particularly in the US) ranges over widely divergent interpretations of US involvement, from the patriotic or nationalist view, through the liberal-realist approach, to the radical. But in all, the problems of RVN political and military leadership are well documented.

I have no doubt that the RVN managed to create some of the social and political elements of democracy in its brief 20 year history, as Mr O'Connor points out, in the face of war and terrorism on a scale unfamiliar to us in the West. But should we be surprised at the reality that humans, whether democrat or communist, will make judgements both as individuals and as states, about the cost effectiveness of their commitments, particularly to remote others?

Note, for example, the dearth of physical support by the established Western democracies for a number of nascent Central European nations attempting to establish democracy after World War I in the face of increasingly blatant Fascist aggression.

The reality of Vietnam is that, irrespective of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, the stated intentions of the DRVN to re-unify Vietnam under Communist control, or the balance between democracy and dictatorship in the RVN, the US, particularly after Tet, regarded the price of continuing involvement as too high. American public doubt about the casualties and cost of a war with no discernible end increasingly coincided with the government realisation that expenditure on Vietnam would seriously impair capacity to meet essential strategic commitments, i.e. in Europe and the Middle East.

The intent of my article (DFJ No 77) was to examine the significance of the 1968 Tet Offensive in changing North Vietnamese and American approaches to the conflict. That it did so is clearly indicated by the sources. And one of the factors in increasing American reluctance to continue their commitment was the assessment (at the national level) that the RVN could not be sustained indefinitely from outside. This was based partly on the nature of the RVN, but more importantly on US long-term global capability.

The lesson, I found, was that for a nation to prosecute war successfully, there needs to be (as Clausewitz pointed out) unity of the people, the army and the government. It is the value of the political objective of war that determines the cost a nation will bear, both in magnitude and duration.

Mr O'Connor correctly warns against judging Vietnamese (and Asian) democratic leadership by Western standards, but then proceeds to draw a very long bow in his references to RVN freedom of the press and trade unions, and, particularly, in his comparison of elections in the RVN with their suspension in Britain during World War 2. How many four-year-interval elections did the British forgo? And how many major political parties were excluded from the wartime National government?

Finally, it does not assist the cause of those of us interested in increasing Australian's awareness of the issues involved in national defence preparedness to be careless of detail. Criticism of weak, repressive or corrupt leadership, or poor military discipline and inconsistent combat effectiveness, in no way infers, per se, that the unfortunate and sorely pressed people of South Vietnam were not worth supporting.

John Jackson
Colonel
Basic Fitness Test

Dear Sir,

Captain Molloy presents a logical rationale for aerobic activity (DFJ No 80), and in his title claims it as a justification for the BFT. A number of issues raised require response. Firstly, the BFT contains four items, only one of which is aerobic. The other three have purported relevance to strength.

The author notes that "a good proportion of military personnel shudder at the thought of the dreaded physical fitness tests. ...For most Army personnel it is the aerobic (run or walk exercise) which engenders most anxiety". I suspect that it is the run which is the culprit, rather than the walk, as I have yet to encounter a soldier who dreads a walk.

This then begs the question; why do the troops 'dread' the run, when, as cogently put by Capt. Molloy, there are numerous benefits to aerobic exercise? The answer is simple, it hurts them. While there is no question of the benefit of aerobic exercise, the method of achieving it is the subject of heated debate.

There are a number of activities which produce an aerobic improvement; cycling, swimming, walking. The Army has chosen the run as the administratively simple way of testing aerobic fitness, and consequently in many eyes running is the only legitimate form of aerobic activity. It is my belief that this blinkered approach has led to an epidemic of lower limb injury in the Army. By example, PM24 (Report of Injury/Illness) statistics for 2MD (JAN-JUN 89) revealed 640 reported lower limb injuries, causing 5,164 lost mandays and 11,433 days of restricted duty. Of these 640 injuries, 384 were attributed to PT/PTT - Running/Marching. It should be pointed out that these are new injuries, there being no accurate gauge of total existing levels of injury.

The issues of frequency and duration of exercise are still of some contention. Captain Molloy cites three sessions per week for 30 mins, and I support this view in regard to aerobic capacity. However, many units have daily PT for up to an hour. These activities greatly increase the risk of overtraining and consequent overuse injury. In addition, the distinction between aerobic and endurance capacity needs to be drawn. They are quite different capacities, but unfortunately, too often viewed as one.

The central issue is not whether aerobic fitness is desirable, but whether our current methods of achieving it are appropriate. Alternatives exist and have been validated. I trust that the processing of compensation claims is as ‘administratively simple’ as our training and testing methods.

S.J. Rudzki
Major

Changing the Australian Defence Environment

Dear Sir,

In the article "Changing the Australian Defence Environment", published in your Issue Number 80 of the Defence Force Journal, the writer has left one of the most important elements out of the question of any reorganisation. In the Defence Forces, to an even greater extent than many commercial organisations, it is the people that make it tick. Senior management may set the scene and the policies, but it is the people at the coal face, the middle level officer and NCOs that actually make it work and interpret the policies that are set by "those that must be obeyed". Coincidentally, it is these very same people who have been leaving the Defence Forces in large numbers over the last few years.

One way of changing the defence environment, as your writer suggests, is to start at the top and revamp structure, lean the management team, and thereby reduce the number of management layers and increase the speed of decision on the battlefield. This is a recognised response in modern theories, and assists companies quickly to the changing environment in the marketplace. The responsibility and authority for important decisions is then passed to the lowest effective level that is possible. In peacetime, incorrect decisions cannot be treated in what has become the traditional way, by moving the responsibility further up the chain rather than accepting that this is a routine part of the learning process. Focusing on failures is not necessarily accepting slipshod performance. Rather if a member has made a good try and failed, and has learnt from it, he is in a better position to make the next effort better. The example used in “A Passion For Excellence” is
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that of a pilot. We as passengers want our pilot to have made and learnt from every conceivable mistake that is possible. Our training of that pilot is designed to expose him to other peoples mistakes through safety bulletins etc, and new ones of his own, so that when he is sitting in the cockpit of our aeroplane, he is the best that he can be. The unfortunate thing about the way that the Defence Forces operate is that when a person is posted, he takes his skills with him. Outsiders see the same set of mistakes being made by the same office and move to have some expertise moved into it. Hence a predominance of civilians in what has been “poorly handled” Service positions, and the associated difficulty of short term service people have with dealings with the long term entrenched civilian counterparts.

What must go hand in hand with the approach suggested, is to focus on the people in the organisation. Many of the prized personnel that leave the Services are driven away by an organisation that doesn't or won't listen or respond to their personal needs. In many cases, they left reluctantly, because the Service could not make the small adjustments that they wanted to keep their lives in balance. People are important and if retention of experience and skills is place on a higher priority, listening to the real wants and needs of the individual becomes increasingly important. This does not mean that a response to each and every person and their problem is required, and thereby changing the whole balance of the system that has evolved over many years. Rather, if the requests of those people who are important to the organisation are considered openly and honestly, and time is spent on explaining the reasons for some decisions, those people are more likely to respond to a service requirement. In some cases, this may merely mean an explanation of why a member has been posted to an area or position that he did not want. Make him feel wanted, and convince him that he is an important part of the organisation, and his performance and response will be more positive. I believe that many of my colleagues who left the Service, in many cases with a pay cut, still feel a responsibility to the Service and those people they left behind. The dedication is there. Now let's try and get the services to show some dedication to its people.

The success of leaning of the management tree depends on how the people in the Forces react to it. Developing a trusting environment in the workplace, encouraging widespread experimenting and accepting that sometimes good attempts fail, giving real jobs to real people, and developing a network of small teams that can work together and feed off the comradeship and competition that can be generated is the only way that members will reciprocate to the faith that is placed in them. This emphasis on people need not be some mushy acceptance of all complaints, and seconding the requirements of the task to the requirements of the people. A balance between task and people can be made to the benefit of all.

Maintaining this standard will require all personnel who write evaluations on fellow servicemen to look carefully at what that person has contributed to the organisation and to his development. The propensity in other Defence Forces is to promote the middle of the road person who will do all dismantling the new face of the Defence Force. Promotion on merit on the basis of the skills that are recognised as being important throughout the whole range of the tasks that will be required in the members service will lead to an entrenchment of the lean and dedicated team that will provide the real deterrence to conflict.

The bottom line to all this is that any failure in our attempts to deter aggression, will require Australians to put their skills on the line, and face the horror once again of conflict. Not a pleasant thought, and the deterrence that is developed, the more chance there is of avoiding the hard options.

R. Vonhoff
Flight Lieutenant
Perestroika: Strategic Implications for Australia

By Lieutenant Commander Alan Hinge, RAN

‘To stand up to the Russians you can’t go on an emotional jag. We are not going to get rid of the Soviet System so we have to live with it’.
Advice to Henry Kissinger, May 1972

Introduction

The global relationship between the Communist East and Capitalist West has been compared to that of two chess players in a darkened room involved in a game they can hardly see. Each player relies on the other not to upset the table and believes the other player has a sinister master plan which is in reality a mirror image of his own worst aspirations. Distrust and misperceptions abound.

During the late 1980s the Communist World player represented by the USSR has made a number of surprise ‘moves’ which have not only changed the direction of the geopolitical game but also its very nature. These moves may or may not upset the strategic global chessboard but we of the West are nevertheless fully committed to playing the game as our own survival is inextricably interwoven with that of the player on the other side of the table. We must be aware of the implications of the other player’s moves so that our responses will be appropriate.

The surprise moves derive from a radically new dimension of Soviet policy known as Perestroika. Perestroika means reform or restructuring as applied to economic, industrial, bureaucratic and even political re-organisation of many Soviet institutions. Perestroika aims at productivity enhancement by encouraging initiative throughout the Soviet populace. Initiative has been markedly absent in the stagnant institutions of the USSR and a complementary policy known as Glasnost is meant to support Perestroika by building confidence. Glasnost aims at encouraging domestic and international confidence through the open discussion of issues relating to the USSR and its relations with other countries.

The aim of this article is to assess the strategic implications of Perestroika, the new centrepiece of Soviet policy.

Methodology

In assessing the strategic implications of Perestroika we must ask and attempt to answer a series of important questions. These are:

- Who are we ‘playing’ with?
- What are the goals of Perestroika and the reasons behind it?
- Is Perestroika here to stay or is it merely an aberration?
- If Perestroika survives as the permanent centrepiece of Soviet policy what are the main strategic implications for the West in general and Australia in particular, and
- Do we of the West change the way we play the ‘game’ with the Soviets?

An Image of the Enemy

Winston Churchill once described the Soviet Union as ‘...a riddle within an enigma wrapped in a mystery’. In many ways he was right but today we are not looking at the USSR through a prism distorted by the excesses of Stalinism. Soviet society is much less closed than has been the case and we are more able to judge Soviet motive and intent on the basis of objective conditions currently existing within the USSR. If we fail to judge on the basis of objective conditions we stereotype the USSR and can completely misread the implications of the situation.

By stereotyping the Soviet player we run the risk of either minimising or exaggerating the implications of Perestroika. For example, if we commence our analysis by taking the classical view that the Soviets are expansionist fanatics implacably committed to ‘burying us’, Perestroika is pigeon holed as a sinister, evil trick designed to weaken Western commitment, milk capital and sap military strength. On the
other hand, if we look through the rosy prism of liberal democratic values we tend to sympathise with a harmless, misunderstood, xenophobic culture and Perestroika becomes a means of cultural convergence by which we can recreate the Soviets in our own ‘decent God fearing image’.

The truth is that both stereotypes are dangerous nonsenses and we must resist using them. Soviet actions have to be judged on the basis of objective conditions existing within and without the USSR and the known constants of communist behaviour.

**Why Perestroika?**

Perestroika is the policy of the Soviet Communist Party aimed not primarily at reducing pressure from outside but coping with a systemic economic and social crisis from within.

The fundamental ideology of the Soviet Union, Marxism-Leninism, implies that under the guidance of the Communist Party the Working Class has the leading role and together with the peasantry is building a prosperous system. Under the system social justice and equality would be established together with the elimination of exploitation of the masses once collectivisation and nationalisation of the means of production has been implemented. However, the promised economic miracle did not occur and the Soviet Union has become the antithesis of a ‘Workers Paradise’. Societal differences persist (the Soviet Union has over 100,000 millionaires!) and growing disenchantment has derived from the many inherent hypocrises now evident within the system.

Consequently, the Party faces a number of fundamental challenges to its legitimacy and authority. The revolution has appeared to have frozen. Ideological fervour has not only declined within the USSR but disillusionment is increasing in the Third World. Other than a few heavily subsidised and extremely stagnant nations such as Vietnam, Cuba and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has few friends. To make matters worse the managers at the Kremlin see ‘decaying capitalism’ prospering, even booming with a revitalised Europe, dynamic Japan and the US still doing very well.

The Soviet economic situation has become so bleak that the Chairman of the State Planning Committee, Mr Maslyukov, stated before the Congress of Deputies that the economy was sliding towards disaster. The deficit for 1989 was US $250 Billion, constituting a massive one seventh of the USSR’s GDP. Steps proposed to remedy the situation include reducing state enterprise losses by selling off unprofitable industries, severely trimming defence expenditure, introducing a new system of taxes and also price/credit regulation.

Major labour unrest has resulted from the appalling economic situation. The Kremlin was forced to pledge $86.58 US Billion in food and consumer goods to bring an end to the Siberian miners strikes of mid 1989. An earthy indication of the chronic shortage of consumer goods is represented by the fact that in a population of 287 million there exists only 3.5 million television sets (less than in Australia which has a population of one seventeenth that of the Soviet Union). The Kremlin has pledged to triple television production to 10.6 million by the end of 1990.

The Soviet Union is also now showing several objective signs of disintegration with Marxism-Leninism having failed as an instrument of rule over racial minorities. The Ukraine, with a relatively prosperous population of 50 million is strongly claiming more autonomy and even full independence. Economic failure of the system is contributing to the growing assertiveness of national elites in eastern Europe, especially Hungary and Poland. Consequently the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact group of countries has seriously deteriorated with Hungary and Poland being new democracies, Romania and, to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia being hard line and East Germany starting to show definite signs of a national ‘identity crisis’.

Economic tensions have also brought to the surface racial and religious tensions which abound in the USSR. In the worst publicised case of its type the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan has placed an economic blockade on the adjacent Republic of Armenia coming almost to the brink of war. Bearing in mind that well over half the Soviet Armed forces comprise of non-Russian Soviets it is logical to assume that growing disciplinary problems exist within the forces, especially given the well publicised criticisms made by Defence Minister Yazov concerning the sharp rise in the number of people trying to avoid military service.

The Soviet system is simply not delivering
the ‘goods’. Therefore the Party must show to the world and its people that communism can succeed as an economic and political system. From the viewpoint of its very survival the Party must genuinely restructure industry and rebuild the national economy and the most important element of rebuilding involves a necessary transfer of substantial resources from the military to the civil sector.

To support the Arms Race the Soviet Union has had to invest a staggering 17 percent of its GDP to support its defence establishment. If this were not bad enough, over 50 percent of the Soviet budget goes to the Military-Industrial complex in one form or another. These escalatory expenditures have also led to the revitalisation of Western military forces in the 1980s and the Soviet Union can only maintain its position of parity on the basis of continued sacrifice by its people in terms of standards of living. Many of the people are unwilling to make these sacrifices and the Party knows it will face even more critical challenges if it is not serious about Perestroika and doing its utmost to make it work. To make Perestroika work and divert resources from the military sector Gorbachev has introduced a national defensive doctrine based on ‘reasonable sufficiency’. Rather than extend Soviet influence by direct or proxy involvements which characterised the Brezhnev era, Gorbachev states he is only concerned with repelling aggression and avoiding war. At the 27th Party congress in 1986 the Party military policy was changed from ‘...to constantly ensure that the armed forces have at their disposal all means necessary’, to ‘...making every effort to ensure that the armed forces are at a level excluding strategic superiority on the part of the forces of imperialism’.

Gorbachev, as head of the Soviet Defence Council, actually changed the formal definition of Soviet Military doctrine from ‘...preparing for and conducting war’ to ‘prevention of war’. In May 1987, the Warsaw Pact formally adopted a defensive as opposed to a dominantly offensive doctrine. Substance was added to this otherwise nominal change by the withdrawal of many Soviet specialist and tank units from the Eastern Block. According to the London based International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) the withdrawal of these groups, including vital bridging units, could delay a Soviet offensive against NATO gaining full momentum by up to two weeks.

This has been seen as a significant confidence building measure aimed at encouraging Western Europe to believe that Soviet intent is not malevolent or pre-emptive.

The Soviet policy aimed at reducing political-military tensions and drastically dampening the Arms Race has been manifested in a number of other Arms Control initiatives in the Conventional and Nuclear armaments areas. Gorbachev and his representatives have made several surprise concessions in a number of Arms Control forums and agreements. These include:

- Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This Treaty was signed by Gorbachev and Reagan at the 1987 Washington Summit.
- START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). In August 1989 the USSR made concessions which removed a stumbling block which had stalled START for five years by not requiring the US to limit the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). The potential now exists to reduce Soviet and US long range nuclear arsenals (ICBM) by up to 50 percent. Ratification of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty is also expected.
- Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).
- Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Soviet combat units and specialist units have already been withdrawn as discussed above.
- Conventional Stability Talks (CST). A Conventional Focus in Europe Treaty is currently being negotiated in Vienna and should be agreed in late 1990.
- Conference on Disarmament. A major result has been that the USSR ceased chemical weapon production on 26 December 1987 and claimed to have reduced its stocks up to 50,000 tonnes. The US and USSR are discussing a reduction of up to 80% in their stockpiles and encouraging third world nations to do the same.

The views of Gorbachev and other like minded reformers in the Soviet Union concerning the link between Perestroika and Soviet international relations, including Arms negotiations, was summarised in a conference keynote address given by the USSR Ambassador to Australia, Mr E. Samoteikin in 1987:

'...Last year the Party Congress, the highest forum of Soviet Society, set forth our vision of the world, our philosophical concept of its present and future. We did not just proclaim a pure theoretical doctrine but formulated a definite political platform for an all embracing system of international security. This is a system based on the principle that one's own security cannot be ensured at the expense of others; it is a system that organically links all main areas of security - military, political, economic and humanitarian.

We consider this system to be an essential international background for the process of restructuring and acceleration which has been launched on such a large scale in our country. The reasons are quite obvious - we simply won't be able to reach our goals at home in a hostile international environment, spending material and intellectual resources of our society on the Arms Race and confrontation.'

The strategic implications of this viewpoint are already being felt, particularly in Western Europe and the Asia-Pacific basin where the USSR focuses much interest. Looking first at the European Theatre or Central Front, major military and political change has already taken place as Gorbachev has successfully consolidated his personal power in the USSR and his prestige abroad in a quest to minimise traditional hostility to his country.

Implications for Europe

Europe has been and will remain the principle focus of Soviet strategic interest and, more than ever, the USSR needs a stable, prosperous and friendly Western Europe on its increasingly blurred, "unfenced" borders.

For almost half a century the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been the guarantor of Western Europe's defence. But times are changing. With Perestroika comes a belief in some excessively optimistic strategic circles that the Cold War is over and the very relevance of NATO has been questioned. After all, the three elements on which NATO relied for initiation and sustenance have been seriously eroded. These elements are:

* Soviet Obduracy or hard heartedness
* European dependency, and
* US Prosperity.

The Soviets have now formally admitted that a NATO attack on their territory is unrealistic in terms of capability and intent. Important Warsaw Pact forces have been withdrawn as confidence building measures and the Kremlin has seemed to have given Warsaw Pact nations a de-facto carte blanch in terms of domestic reform. It is also apparent that the Soviets can no longer rely (if they ever could) on Warsaw Pact forces in a major offensive or counter offensive against the West. Consequently, many in Western Europe have, with some justification, lost a sense of danger and threat from the Soviet Union.

Hand in hand with the growing perception of a lack of Soviet threat to Western Europe is a dawning sense of independence of traditional US military assistance. Western Europe has emerged in the 1980s as a highly stable, increasingly prosperous community which can afford advanced weaponry, reasonable stand-
ing armies and, in the case of the UK and France, even independent nuclear deterrents. This growing and substantial military autonomy coincides with less inclination by the US to act as the bulwark of free Europe's defence.

The third element on which NATO has traditionally been based is US prosperity. Even this element is atrophying as the US finds it harder to maintain its heavy military commitment to NATO in dollar terms. Particularly since the Vietnam commitment the US is far less inclined to act as the 'World's Policemen' and no longer believes it is able to achieve everything. To many Europeans, who welcome the US presence less and less, the US appears to be a young but tired giant whose presence in Europe is increasingly questioned as a liability and may even be escalatory. On the US domestic scene several US interest groups question the heavy American commitment to NATO and advocate increased 'burden sharing' among the Western European nations.

A trend is thus emerging in the US which advocates 'full burden sharing' by Western Europe and the phased withdrawal of some 300,000 US Servicemen comprising the US ground forces in Europe.

With the erosion of the three factors which have traditionally propped up NATO comes a strong likelihood for increased burden sharing in Western Europe corresponding with a substantial withdrawal of both US and Soviet forces from the Central Front. Ultimately it is possible that the brunt of Europe's defence could be borne by the UK, France and the FRG with the FRG financially assisting with maintaining the UK-France independent nuclear deterrent forces.

A matter of importance is whether an autonomous European defence coalition can develop the necessary political-military cohesion to deal with Moscow alone. If history is any guide this could only be done with great difficulty given that Europe has traditionally been a hotbed for warring nation states.

Of course Western Europe is not alone in the question of unity and cohesion. The Warsaw Pact countries have innumerable problems of their own which dwarf those of the Western States. The great concern is whether the Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union generally is starting to fall apart and whether from the consequent chaos and ethnic violence new and unpredictable dangers may arise. Change is occurring at a disconcerting rate in the Soviet Union. Perestroika may not deliver the 'goods' quickly enough, if ever. and some fear that the USSR will again be in conservative hands, reminiscent of Stalin or Brezhnev. Foreign 'adventures' may be sought to take peoples minds off their stomachs. Failure of Perestroika would lead to much instability, and the global 'chess board' would be thrown into confusion.

This is particularly true if Europe disintegrates into a group of loosely aligned, rival states some of which are equipped or will be equipped with their own independent nuclear deterrents. Obviously this is a worst case contingency and there is no reason to believe it will eventuate.

Yet if Perestroika gets past its first few faltering steps, as has been the case to date, there is the important prospect that Europe as a whole is likely to be less a focus for superpower militarisation. This is not only in the direct interest of the Superpowers and Europeans but is beneficial for the world as a whole.

**Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region**

While being regarded as a legitimate European power for centuries Russia has traditionally been viewed with much suspicion by the nations of the Asia-Pacific Basin. Apart from in North Korea and Vietnam; which are both poor, heavily subsidised and have new friends, the USSR has little political or economic clout in the region. For decades the USSR has been at odds with the major players in the region, China and Japan, over a variety of issues ranging from ideological to the territorial. The Soviets have been frequently at war with both Japan and China this century.

As with Europe, the Kremlin seeks to normalize bi-lateral relations across the region, particularly with Japan and China. But the complexion of the problems faced in the Asia-Pacific region are very different to those faced in Europe and are in many ways more intractable.

Growing Soviet interest in the region is primarily economic and secondly strategic. Economically the region is considered dynamic and widely deemed as taking the central place in the future world economy if it has not already done so. The US now carries out more bilateral trade with the region than with
Europe and it has been said that '...the pendulum of history has swung from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and it is now pointing towards the Pacific'\(^2\). This may be overstating the case; however, the USSR is accepting the challenge of normalising relations with Asian-Pacific nations very seriously indeed.

Gorbachev aims to avoid having to further militarise the far Eastern USSR and if possible reduce forces there so that funds can be released for the development of Siberia. At the same time he wishes to capitalise on the economic dynamism of the region by attracting investment for the exploitation of the Soviet Far East. After the Siberian miners' strikes he is more than ever acutely aware of the need to make conditions conducive for developing the far eastern regions of Siberia, and improving the lot of the Soviet populace there. Joining in the growth of the Asia-Pacific region would be a major step in his economic restructuring process and in the attraction of substantial foreign reserves.

In 1986 Gorbachev made it what is known in the West as the Vladivostok Initiative. During a visit to Vladivostok in that year he made a comprehensive statement on the Soviet Union's role in the Asia-Pacific region. He stated that the Soviet Union was a legitimate Pacific power which was entitled to have an interest in the stability of the region. Not only did the Soviet Union have important Sea Lanes of Communication passing through the region, he argued, but the region involved potential serious military threats especially from the US-Japan-South Korea 'militarised triangle'\(^2\). He also emphasised the Soviet desire to increase trade, tourism and cultural exchanges in the region while making it clear that the USSR was not after any special rights or privileges.

The stated aim of the Vladivostok Institute was to invigorate bilateral relations with all the countries of the Asia-Pacific region 'without exception'. Moreover, the Soviets have made several moves to improve dialogue with countries ranging from the economically powerful Japan to the far more distant and less influential Indonesia\(^2\). Specifically, Gorbachev made mention of the following regional needs:

- Joint efforts required for settling regional issues in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Korea.
- Scaling down of conventional and nuclear weapons and preventing nuclear proliferation in the region.
- De-escalation of naval activity.
- Resumption of talks on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, and
- Practical discussion on confidence building measures, particularly with regard to Sea Lanes of Communication and Counter-Terrorism.

Domestic reform imperatives have led to the USSR making genuine concessions to carry regional favour in terms of removing major obstacles to dialogue and diplomatic advances. The stumbling block of Afghanistan has been partly removed through the Soviet pullout in 1987-88 even though the Kabul Regime is now propped up with over SUS 3 Billion in Soviet aid. Similarly, in Cambodia the Soviets continue to provide much economic and military aid to the current regime but the Soviets have been seen to have used their leverage to encourage the Vietnamese to withdraw forces from the troubled area. While Soviet leverage over Hanoi should not be overestimated, as it was by US analysts during the Johnson-Nixon Administrations, it is nevertheless significant. It is likely that decreased military supplies to Cambodia is only part of a Soviet package to engineer a Vietnamese withdrawal. Of course, Vietnam itself is also heavily dependent on Soviet aid to the tune of SUS 3 Billion, and may well have been threatened with reductions unless it became responsive to Soviet preferences involving Vietnam making a political act or gesture to end the Cambodian dispute.

Undoubtedly the respective withdrawals from Afghanistan and Cambodia have enhanced Soviet prestige and credibility in the region which has been at a very low ebb. If nothing else the Soviets are more and more perceived as being sincere in their efforts to develop a relaxed political climate in the Asia-Pacific Basin. This now allows the Soviet Union much more scope to improve bilateral relations throughout the Basin.

The Soviets appear to place special importance on improved bi-lateral relations with Japan and China for conspicuous strategic and economic reasons. Japan has often been described as 'America's unsinkable aircraft carrier' and the close linkage between the US
and Japan on the USSR's eastern flank has always been deeply resented by the Soviets. Japan is decisive as an element of the US Maritime Strategy in the north west Pacific. Geographically the Soviets are hemmed into constricted submarine bastions in the seas of Japan and Okhotsk and their surface fleet would be unlikely to prevail against the concentration of US Naval forces stationed in and around Japan. Obviously the Soviets would be interested in reducing the military nexus between Japan, South Korea and the US but even Gorbachev sees a falling out between the US and Japan as a low probability outcome at least in the medium term. Nevertheless Gorbachev seems determined to minimise the prospects of further militarisation in Japan involving either an increase in Japanese defence expenditure or enhanced US capabilities based on the Island, especially in the light of the uncertainty concerning the US Phillipines bases.

Soviet strategic intentions in the Far East must be considered as almost entirely defensive. Despite setting up a Far Eastern Theatre Command in the early 1980s Soviet force structure appears geared under Gorbachev to fulfilling only two modest but fundamental objectives. These are:

* to maintain the integrity of land based and sea based nuclear deterrent forces, and
* to maintain conventional superiority over China in the Air-Land battle.

While the subject of US alarmism in recent years, an objective assessment of the Soviet Pacific Fleet (SOVPACFLT) reveals that while platform numbers and total tonnage is impressive it has a small capability to operate outside the cover of shore based Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) assets if it were matched against the Americans. Other than its nuclear submarine forces SOVPACFLT is not a fully capable blue water force able to conduct balanced, sustained operations. Its main tasks involve covering the Soviet submarine bastions in the seas of Japan and Okhotsk and blunting the intense US ASW efforts which would take place in the bastions as declared in the official US Maritime Strategy statement of 1986.

Similarly, the role of Soviet forces maintained in Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam is seen as being far more benign than formerly due to a failure on the part of the Soviets to use it to its full potential. It remains a limited logistic support and surveillance centre more than anything else. While it has a potentially valuable interdiction capability it is now deemed in many circles to be a non-decisive element in Soviet naval strategy in the Pacific. Based on several objective analyses of infrastructure and units stationed at Cam Ranh Bay, the following remarks by Ambassador Samoteiken are quite legitimate:

"...About some 'Superpowerful naval base' at the port of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, a base which allegedly poses a threat to Sea Lanes and Straits. In this regard I must emphasise that the USSR has no naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in the sense of which it is customary to define such bases, namely, ones with complete infrastructure. What exists over there is only a point for the material and technical resupply of the Soviet Navy. Ships call there to replenish stocks of water and food or to make minor repairs on their own. Cam Ranh Bay can in no way be compared with the US Subic Bay Naval Base in the Phillipines, or with any of the 350 US military bases scattered around the region." Based on several objective analyses of infrastructure and units stationed at Cam Ranh Bay, the following remarks by Ambassador Samoteiken are quite legitimate:

Consequently the Soviets are apparently not taking an aggressive force structure stance in the Pacific and in fact are being quite restrained given declared US intentions and established US force structure and procedures in the area. For example, in 1985 the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins stated before the US Senate Committee on Armed Forces that:

"...In the North West Pacific our feeling is that at the very front end of conflict, if we are swift enough on our feet, we would move rapidly into an attack on Alekseyevka (a major Backfire Bomber base)."

Indeed, the Soviets have shown remarkable restraint given the nature of some US-Japanese exercises in the region. For instance, elements of the Japanese Self Defence Force played an important role in the US FLEETEX 85 Exercise which tested US ability to protect Japanese Sea Lanes of Communication. The exercise, like many of its type, was potentially provocat-
tive in that it took place very close to sensitive areas of Soviet territory to test Soviet defences and standard operating procedures in a highly activated situation. The exercise involved 20 US vessels and various Japanese air assets.

Seemingly wishing to avoid further escalation of Naval activity Soviet strategic developments in the Far East have been relatively conservative and unprovocative. A further example of apparent Soviet forbearance is indicated by positive actions undertaken to reduce tensions along the Sino-Soviet border. This involves the withdrawal of several Divisions from the border in addition to wide exchange of observers from both sides. Steps have also been taken to boost local trade and ease freedom of movement across the border generally.

Chinese response to Soviet moves to reduce tension has been favourable though measured. China is now more inclined to maintain its policy of 'Equi-distance' between the US and USSR and is not likely to become involved in a de facto Japan-US-China alliance which has been so dreaded by the Kremlin since the Nixon inspired rapprochement with China in the early 1970s. In fact the Sino-Soviet relationship was warmed even more since Gorbachev's mid-1989 visit to China and the failure of the USSR to criticize the Chinese leadership over the Tienanmen Square incident.

While a comprehensive rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union cannot be expected, increased dialogue is occurring and China will ensure it is not seen to be tied to the Soviets who it seems will never be above suspicion. China is also an important element in Japanese decision-making regarding closer economic ties with the Soviets. The Japanese are very conscious of the fact that China must not feel threatened by a large scale Soviet-Japanese joint enterprise in Siberian development. China would clearly see a comprehensive build-up of Siberian infra-structure as an adverse development in terms of its own long-term security. Furthermore, the persistent Soviet denial of Japanese sovereignty over the Southern Kurile Islands presents strong barriers high levels of Soviet-Japanese economic co-operation. This situation was crystallized in May 1986 when Gorbachev told the visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Mr Abe that progress in Soviet-Japanese relations required "...the understanding that no-one will be encroach-
nous regional nations have been reduced by Soviet actions and influence. This is particularly so in terms of reducing regional animosity towards Vietnam by encouraging the pullout from Cambodia. As a consequence the probability of China giving its 'Second Lesson' to Vietnam is reduced and ASEAN nations can move towards improving relationships with Vietnam. Vietnamese expansionism will no longer be an issue.

Implications for Australia

A potentially more relaxed strategic climate in the North West Pacific and Indochina is a favourable development for Australia in terms of reducing the prospect of direct superpower confrontation and hence minimising the chance of nuclear war, be it at the tactical or strategical level. This is in itself is a major bonus for Australia, the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of the world. However, the clearly stated Soviet objective of normalising and enhancing bilateral relations with all nations in the region has potentially significant and perhaps even unsavoury implications for Australia.

Despite the low Soviet economic and ideological penetrability of Australia's neighbours in the South West Pacific and South East Asia, the very fact that a political dialogue may one day exist between the USSR and a neighbouring State influences Australian security decision-making. For example, if an island state in the South West Pacific develops a political-diplomatic affiliation with the USSR this fact must necessarily be taken into account in any Australian action involving that state. During the 1987 Fijian Coups the Australian Government must have examined the possibility of a limited Australian military involvement as one of many options in influencing this situation. As it was, a limited naval presence option was selected and naval units with a small force projection ashore element, comprising an ODF infantry company, was dispatched to visibly represent Australian interests. However, if Fiji had a political dialogue and had developed amenable relations with the USSR at the time, even this small Australian force would probably not have sailed without far more complex deliberations by Cabinet and the respective interested government departments. Soviet entree with even the smallest State in the region involves a finite possibility of supportive intervention by the Soviets on that State's behalf. The Soviet Union could argue, along the lines of the Vladivostok Initiative, that it is a Pacific power with a legitimate interest in stability and the defence of the interests of its new friends. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that charges of neo-colonialism and even racism could be levelled as motive for any Australian intervention in these circumstances. In short, Australia's relative military power and consequently its range of political military options could be reduced by increased Soviet diplomatic entree in our region of primary strategic interest.

The Australia-Indonesia Relationship - A Special Case

The recent warming of relations between the USSR and Indonesia during President Suharto's mid-1989 visit to Moscow is another example of how increased Soviet entree in the neighbourhood may effect Australia's national security equation. For a number of reasons Indonesia may see increasing benefit in maintaining and perhaps increasing linkage with the Soviets especially if adverse economic trends continue and internal political cohesion is destabilised.

It is widely believed that President Suharto will retire in 1993 on completion of his current five year term as President. Succession in Indonesia is not clearly established and this somewhat disparate nation may tend towards increased instability such as existed before Suharto came to power in the late sixties. Indonesia is controlled by a military hierarchy, it still has a deeply rooted suspicion of the Peoples' Republic of China and is itself often looked upon with suspicion and a degree of resentment by some of the other members of ASEAN, particularly Malaysia and Singapore. (This is partly due to lasting memories of Indonesia's provocative policy of 'Confrontation' in the 1960s and Indonesia's unstated but apparent opinion that it is the de facto leader of ASEAN). These factors of potential instability and isolation may contribute to increased Indonesian involvement with the Soviets in the 1990s which may involve a military dimension. Certainly Indonesia's strategic position, where it straddles several straits vital not only to Australia's but Soviet and world trade, would be most attractive to the Soviets. Mili-
Military co-operation between Indonesia and the USSR in the 1950s and early 1960s was quite comprehensive and successful. This could be repeated if Indonesia becomes alienated and unstable in the 1990s following the end of the Suharto tenure. Concern over a possible revived Soviet-Indonesian military nexus becomes even more justified if Indonesia’s track record in the use of military force is considered.

An objective historical assessment of Indonesian military behaviour suggests a tendency to use military force as a lever for exerting national power. This should not come as a surprise given the military background of the nation’s higher officials and the influence of the military throughout the country as a whole. In 1963 Indonesia effectively annexed West New Guinea, now known as West Irian, to Australia’s consternation. Shortly after this, several years of confrontation existed between Indonesia and its neighbours Malaysia and Singapore. This involved a de facto guerilla war involving Indonesian regular troops against British, Australian, New Zealand and Malay troops in Borneo.

The apparent willingness of successive Indonesian leadership to use military force in the pursuit of national goals was further indicated in the annexation of East Timor in 1975. It must also be said that despite the passing of fifteen years since the controversial annexation of East Timor, Australian leaders still feel uncomfortable with Indonesia’s relatively low level threshold for using military force. This was indicated in 1989 by Lieutenant General O’Donnell, Chief of the Australian Army General Staff, who has suggested that the West Irian/PNG border is of considerable concern in terms of the possibility of direct confrontations between Indonesia and PNG and hence possible Australian involvement. Papua New Guinea officials are also understandably ill at ease with the Indonesian attitude to the use of military force and border problems are of obvious concern to a PNG Government increasingly occupied with maintaining internal stability.

It is also true that Indonesian diplomatic actions have sometimes surprised and dismayed Australian analysts and politicians. An example of the rapidity with which tension can be developed between the two nations occurred in April 1986 when Indonesia exhibited a surprisingly sharp reaction to Australian press reports concerning the Indonesian leader, President Suharto, and members of his family. A range of punitive actions was taken by the Indonesian Government but, for the purposes of this article, the preparedness of the Indonesian military to use quite vitriolic propaganda against Australians under these circumstances is noteworthy. An example of this appeared in the 22 April 1986 issue of the official Indonesian armed forces newspaper Angkatan Beresan. It stated:

‘...As a nation descended from the white race, Australians have a certain social attitude towards South-East Asian peoples which we take as arrogance, conceit and delusion in their ability to lead... The (Australian) desire to be recognised as a leader in South-East Asia and the Pacific is also motivated by the bitter fact that it is a white nation living among coloured races’.

The situation reached a tense stage when, in early May 1986, the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, said ‘...But no government led by me is going to have a grovelling relationship—one in which if there is a capricious action on the part of Indonesia, that (sic) we accept that without comment’.

That such a deterioration in relations could arise in so short a time frame is sobering testimony to the difficulty both nations have in really getting along and interpreting each others cultural perceptions as well as calculating reactions. It also indicates that levels of international tension between the two countries can escalate quickly and without real warning to a surprisingly antagonistic degree after a long, stable period.

The point remains that increased Soviet entree into the Indonesian political environment, no matter how symbolic it is initially, may add on entirely new dimension to Australian-Indonesian relations during future periods of real tension. The USSR, to demonstrate its ardour in the cause of its new friends, may intervene diplomatically or even militarily through the naval presence mission and completely disrupt the indigenous balance of power in Australia’s ‘neighbourhood’.

Thus, increased bilateral linkage between the USSR and our immediate neighbours due to policies derived directly from Perestroika have the potential to inimical to Australian
national interests. Such links can legitimise Soviet superpower involvement, even of a military nature, in Australia's neighbourhood, and limit Australia's choices for action. We could never be quite sure of the nature and degree of Soviet support and reaction. This is a significant planning constraint somewhat similar to that which would be experienced by a country contemplating action against Australia with its ANZUS alliance.

**Australia's Use of the Vladivostok Initiative**

Limiting superpower influence in Australia's area of primary strategic interest is a desirable Australian national interest and it can be argued as being necessary for the Australian Government to test the sincerity of the Vladivostok initiative in a measurable way. If the Australian Government can make the Soviets go beyond rhetoric and develop a meaningful and achievable 'test' for the Soviets in our immediate neighbourhood we can either be convinced of Soviet sincerity or, if the test is failed, discredit the Soviet 'peace offensive' as being meagre in substance. This will have the long term effect of reducing Soviet leverage and credibility in our neighbourhood.

To develop the 'Test', we must return to the Vladivostok Initiative and look at three particularly relevant objectives as specified by Gorbachev.

These are:

* Scaling down of conventional and nuclear weapons and preventing nuclear proliferation in the region,
* De-escalation of naval activity, and
* Resumption of talks on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace.

For many reasons the Indian Ocean provides a useful testing ground for Soviet intent and commitment to the Vladivostok initiative. It provides an ideal environment in which Australia can make concrete recommendations for Soviet action directly derived from the Vladivostok objectives.

The Indian Ocean region is a sparse or low density strategic area relative to the NW Pacific. Superpower naval forces are in far less concentration and their bases are relatively small and few. The Indian Navy maintains the largest navy in the region with 76 combatant ships and 50,000 men based around two carrier battle groups. India has 15 submarines, including a leased Soviet Charlie I Class nuclear powered attack submarine (SSBN) and five more Kilo Class conventional submarines are on order. This build-up also involves cross the board modernisation and establishment of a major fleet air arm comprising a large number of Harrier aircraft and Seaking helicopters. A major new naval base is also being built which assists the Indian navy in having the logistical and force in-being capability to project powerful military forces anywhere in the Indian Ocean. The development of the Indian Ocean. The development of the Indian Navy has been nothing less than extraordinary and clearly disproportionate to its stipulated national goal and needs.

The growth of Indian naval force projection capability has not gone unnoticed by Australian defence planners. Despite very good relations between India and Australia, such a force represents a potential indirection capability which could affect Australia's Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCS) through the Indian Ocean. Afterall, over 50 percent of tonnage shipped to and from Australia crosses the Indian Ocean, including 20 percent of our oil.

Australia's largest natural resource developments in the Kimberley's and Northwest shelf are also on the periphery of the Indian Ocean. The 1986 decision to eventually base half the Royal Australian Navy in Western Australia was largely due to the need to indicate the Australian Government's resolve to boost its naval activity in the Indian Ocean and offer some respectable countervailing military presence in the area. But a comprehensive Australian countervailing policy is not only comprised of one's own force build-up. The other side of the equation involves exerting influence to encourage de-escalation of naval activity on the part of India. This can be done using Soviet leverage.

An obvious starting point in discouraging escalation of naval activity in the Indian Ocean and hence testing and using the Vladivostok initiative involves eliminating the presence of nuclear powered vessels in the navies of littoral states. Very few littoral states would argue against this proposal. India is the only littoral nation using a nuclear naval vessel and this in itself establishes a disturbing precedent especially given the inherently escalatory and offensive nature of submarines in general and
nuclear submarines in particular.

The Charlie I Class SSBN is on lease to the Indian Navy for 'training and validation' purposes. The range and capability of the vessel is far beyond that needed for use in local conflict with traditional rivals, Pakistan and China. It is a long-range power projection weapon capable of exerting a decisive influence in a shipping interdiction role. The accumulation of additional SSBNs increases this threat enormously.

India's interest in extra long-range surveillance and interdiction operations is also reflected in the recent acquisition of eight BEAR-F (Tu 142M) long-range anti-submarine and strategic reconnaissance aircraft. The 8,500 km range of these aircraft gives them the ability to reach the Malacca strait and the West Coast of Australia. Once again, these assets are clearly disproportionate to India's defence needs.

The Indian naval build-up has proceeded apace with rapid development in the Indian Army and Air Force. Each development involves extensive use of large quantities of state of the art Soviet military hardware. The Air Force, for example, is now equipped with MIG 27 and 29 aircraft together with modern Soviet helicopters and Surface to Air (SAM) air defence systems. Consequently the military nexus between the USSR and India is very strong. The economic nexus between the two countries is also very strong with India and the USSR each being the others largest trading partner.

The Australian Government may consider taking the stance that provision of the Charlie I submarine and the BEAR-F aircraft is inimical to at least three of the fundamental platform objectives of the Vladivostok initiative and that the Soviet commitment to an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace is not genuine. Moreover, if the USSR continues to provide such provocative force structure elements to India it can be convincingly argued by Australia that Soviet practice is in fact contrary to its theory espoused in the Vladivostok initiative.

Ultimately, provision of these force assets to India and continuing support of these assets abets naval escalation in the Indian Ocean. It creates a distinct precedent for the proliferation of nuclear propelled and perhaps even armed vessels in the region and makes a nonsense of Soviet rhetoric about resuming realistic discussions on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace.

Australia is in a position to make the Soviets 'put up or shut up' on three of the six basic platforms of the Vladivostok initiative. Not only the rest of the Indian Ocean littoral states would be watching this challenge but also the remainder of the Asia-Pacific basin and indeed the world would observe with interest. By putting the Soviet leadership 'on the spot', the provision of escalatory military hardware to countries like India could be dampened. Australia's relative position could be maintained without major military expenditures being sustained to offset the buildup of Indian influence and interdiction potential.

**A Word of Warning - The Importance of Ideology**

Less than thirty years ago Nikita Krushchev made his famous pronouncement to the West that '...History is on our side. We will bury you!' This colourfully reflects how committed communists see history in terms of class conflict and revolutionary struggle eventually resulting in a victory of the proletariat. With this victory comes the establishment of the final historical era...the Socialist or Communist Order. In all our dealings with and assessments of Soviets we must not underestimate the importance or persistence of this tenet. Many of them are still likely to believe it.

While the Western world should welcome Perestroika and be biased to encouraging Michail Gorbachev's reforms it is important to bear in mind the central importance of communist ideology. Marxism-Leninism should not be dismissed as having been displaced or even killed off by pragmatism circumstances or Soviet Realpolitik. However enlightened Soviet leaders such as Gorbachev may appear to be they are nevertheless products of a system steeped in propaganda and anti-Western ideology. They are using Perestroika to modify communism not destroy it.

Gorbachev himself was born after the 1917 Revolution and was raised all his life under Communism. To achieve his current position he had to make a long progression through the Party ranks by doing and saying the right things and being under the patronage of devout communists. He was a protege of ex-KGB Chief Andropov. His appointment to the most powerful position in the USSR was
strongly supported by Andrei Gromyko who served loyally as Foreign Affairs Secretary under Stalin, Kruschev, Brezhnev and others. Gromyko in fact recommended Gorbachev as a 'promising, brilliant leader'.

On the home front Gorbachev's wife is one of the most highly qualified communist theoreticians in the Soviet Union, being a Professor of Marxism-Leninism. All this adds up to Gorbachev being a fully committed communist and he has never denied this. His life education, family heritage and political development all point to this. Let us also bear in mind that Gorbachev's Perestroika is an experiment and it, along with Gorbachev himself, could be gone tomorrow if the Party sees fit. The communist system and its Party is and will continue to be firmly entrenched in Russia for the foreseeable future.

We of the West should play safe and assume that the Communist Party of the USSR ultimately believes its own ideology and is still committed to a class struggle between two antagonistic and irreconcilable social, economic and political systems Communism and Capitalism. The 'struggle' remains necessary for Party survival. We must also assume that the communist gameplan is ultimately adversarial but has been modified for the present to achieve less pretentious objectives than export of the revolution and conversion of the world to Communism. The current Party objectives have been reduced to Party Survival through the maintenance of economic and political stability. If and when the current economic tribulation passes, a return to the centralism and perhaps adventurism of the Brezhnev and Stalin eras' cannot be ruled out.

How We Should Play the ‘Game’

The Soviets when under pressure have changed the direction of the geopolitical ‘game’ before. Kruschev’s Destalinisation ‘Thaw’ and Brezhnev’s Detente or Razriadka both promised much but both left sour tastes in the mouths of many Westerners particularly concerning Cuba and Afghanistan respectively. While Gorbachev’s Perestroika is more promising and the reasons for it seem more compelling we must not be too eager in assisting the Party as opposed to the people.

To maintain a momentum towards real institutional reform in the USSR, which can ultimately benefit the West, the Party must be kept ‘on the spot’ as it were in terms of having to keep making hard decisions. These decisions concern more free elections, increasing production of consumer goods, keeping pressure off pro-democratic Eastern Bloc countries and reducing conventional and nuclear force levels in Europe and the Asia Pacific Basin. After all, we want something out of the ‘game’ too. Our objective must be comprehensive bilateral disarmament on a global scale.

Keeping the Communist Party making the hard decisions involves not giving too many Western concessions too soon. For example, the proposal by parts of the US Administration to give the Soviet Union ‘most favoured nation’ trading status would appear premature in the extreme given the sustained high level of Soviet military expenditure. Bailing out the besieged Communist Party, even to a limited extent, too soon, may reduce the rate of positive change and reinforce conservative elements at the highest levels. At the same time the West must assist to a sufficient level as not to allow the USSR to disintegrate into possible chaos. No sane person would take comfort in this eventuality. This could produce incalculable dangers and ‘upset the board’ by placing unknown reactionary players in powerful positions. The risks involved in striking a reasonable balance of assistance to Gorbachev and his reformers are great but the challenge is clear.

In Conclusion

It is naive to believe that Perestroika heralds the beginning of a post confrontational era. This is excessively optimistic. Perestroika is fragile and Gorbachev has opened a Pandora’s Box involving an unexpected rate of change and internal threats to stability. Though his grip on power seems firm he may be white-anted or deposed by conservative or even reactionary elements within the USSR at any time. Nevertheless, we of the West should accept it as being in our best interests to assist the reform movement in the USSR since a greater convergence of interest and values may result between East and West. Tensions can be eased, communications can be improved and ‘accidents’ may be prevented. If we sit back, allow Perestroika to fail and promote the disintegration of the USSR, conservative leaderships which arise from the chaos will be far
more difficult to deal with. To focus attention away from internal problems they may embark on foreign adventures reminiscent of Salin and Brezhnev or worse.

The strategic benefits of the Soviet need to restructure and revitalise the system (Perestroika) are being felt in the West now. To concentrate on domestic reform and divert capital from the military to the civil sector the pragmatic managers of the Kremlin have now been forced to accept a conciliatory role on the world strategic stage. Meaningful and verifiable concessions in a wide range of nuclear and conventional armaments issues have been given in order to reduce international hostility to the Soviet Union. Not the least of these concessions is the removal of several barriers to major Intermediate and Long-Range ballistic missile reductions. Many confidence building measures such as the withdrawal of substantial offensive units from the Central Front and Sino-Soviet border have eased tensions and have led to several positive developments. The need to court assistance from a prospering West and to dampen the Arms Race has also forced the Soviets to remove three major barriers to more stable, global relationships. The removed barriers involve the withdrawal from Afghanistan, encouragement of the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and rending as under the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe. These efforts have involved much risk and are strong, objective indicators of the Soviet need to make Perestroika work.

Dampening of the Arms Race, partial demilitarisation of the Central Front and adoption of a defensive posture in the Asia-Pacific Basin indicates that the new Soviet doctrine of 'Reasonable Sufficiency' is more than just rhetoric. Consequently, the overall global strategic implications of Perestroika are positive and a more relaxed global strategic climate has emerged. But remember, this is only because the more pretentious aims of communist ideology have been temporarily subordinated to the maintenance of Soviet political and economic stability.

Bearing this in mind at the regional level, the Soviets must be kept 'on the spot', making the hard decisions and being tested concerning sincerity. All Western nations, large and small, can contribute in some way to establishing Soviet bona fides or lack thereof in their area of strategic interest. Australia can also assist in testing in testing Perestroika by challenging the Soviets to live up to the objectives of the Perestroika derived Vladivostok Initiative. Meaningful, practical and verifiable means of doing this have been suggested in this submission and we owe it to ourselves and our neighbours to establish whether the new Soviet theory works in practice.

NOTES
2. Ibid., p. 9.
3. Ibid., p. 7.
4. Ibid., p. 11.
5. Ibid., p. 16.
11. The Australian, 'Moscow Admits to Spiralling National Debt'. 7 August 1989. p. 6. Maslyukov was advanced to full Politburo membership in the September 1989 reshuffle which left Gorbachev firmly in control of Politburo and Central Committee numbers.
14. Ibid.
15. The Australian, 'Soviet cuts will end threat of Surprise Attack'. 5 October 1989. p. 8. The HSS Director, Mr. Francis Weisbourg, said that the USSR had already commenced pulling out crack units including those responsible for bridge building and assault crossings. He states 'Some of these divisions are divisions which NATO planner would like to see removed. After cutbacks it would take the Kremlin one to two weeks to marshal its forces for an attack. In shorthand that translates as no surprise attack'. Under Gorbachev's proposed reductions 50,000 troops would be disbanded and 5,300 tanks destroyed.
16. The Australian, 'Gorbachev Offer they could hardly...


22. This statement was made by Admiral James Lyons, USN a former Commander of the US Pacific Fleet. It appeared in the St. Louis Post Dispatch, 22 January 1987, p. 3. (Cited by Dr. P. Keal in his Conference Paper - Gorbachev's Vladivostok Initiative: The Implications for Northeast Asia, p. 1.)


24. In mid-1989 Indonesia's President Suharto visited Moscow. An agreement to increased dialogue and the frequency and ease of ship and official visits was made. Agreement to explore avenues of economic co-operation was also made.

25. See Babbage R. (Editor), 'The Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s' (Brassey's Pergamon, Sydney, 1989). The chapter by M. Mackintosh, a prominent British Sovietologist, analyses likely Soviet military doctrine and operational capability in the next decade. He examines a number of potential contingencies in the Far East and concludes that Soviet plans in the Asia-Pacific region are basically defensive. This stands in stark contrast to the US forward deployment strategy.

26. SOVPACFLT suffers many inadequacies. Compared to the 7 attack carriers in USPACFLT (7th and 3rd Fleets) the Soviets have 2 Kieff Class Medium carriers. Cruiser and battleship numbers are about equal. While SOVPACFLT has approximately 86 Destroyers and Frigates on paper, 45 of these are obsolete gun destroyers - frigates of the Skory, Kotlin, Kilder, Riga, Grisha and Petya classes. The US has 77 modern destroyers deployed i.e. twice the number as in SOVPACFLT. The US has 44 Nuclear Attack submarines in the area compared to SOVPACFLTS 30. While SOVPACFLT has 60 Attack Patrol conventional submarines on the books 75% of these are old hulls of the Z, W and F classes. They would not be operationally reliable outside the SSBN Bastions. Most of SOVPACFLTS 830 vessels and tonnage is made up of hundreds of minor war vessels such as minesweepers, transports, patrol boats and amphibious forces.


35. The first Soviet fisheries agreement with an Island state in the South Pacific involved Kiribati in 1985. The USSR found the arrangement unprofitable and failed to renew it.

36. The 'First Lesson' comprised China's 1979 invasion of Vietnam. Since then China has threatened another lesson (the 'Second Lesson') if Vietnam's behaviour, particularly with regard to Cambodia, did not improve. During the mid-1989 visit by President Suharto agreements were made concerning investigations into improved economic co-operations, more ship visits, easing of visit restrictions and generally implementing a more developed dialogue.


38. Cited by M. Cockburn, 'Australia not willing to grovel to Indonesians says Hawke', Sydney Morning Herald, 5 May 1986, p. 3.


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AUSTRALIAN SOLDIERS EXERCISE WITH MALAYSIAN ARMY

A company of 120 soldiers from the Army's parachute battalion, the Holsworthy-based 3rd battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR) combined with units of the Malaysian Army in the state of Sabah for Exercise Haringaroo 23 which began on 15 May.

The company, which is on a three-month rotation at the Royal Malaysian Air Force Base at Butterworth, made a parachute jump from a RAAF C130 aircraft into the exercise area before training began.

The aim of the exercise, run annually by the Malaysian Armed Forces, is to practice the Malaysian 5th Brigade Group in conventional operations.

Another company from 3RAR, serving at Butterworth last year, also parachuted into Sabah to take part in Exercise Haringaroo in May 1989.
The Force Structure Process - Are We Getting Any Better?

By Group Captain A.W. Titheridge, RAAF

Introduction

The force structure process and its associated mechanisms is one of the principal determinants of the shape of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). In any organization 'structures and procedures are not value free' as they are the result of 'competing interests and pressures' (2:138) and the Australian Department of Defence (DOD) is no exception because what is at stake is the control of extensive resources in terms of people, finances and equipment. The exercise of power is a natural feature of any political or bureaucratic organization and the functioning of DOD provides some worthwhile examples of such a phenomenon. This point is worth making at the outset because the effects of organizational behaviour on the process should be of considerable importance to those with a stake in the future of the force.

The essence of the force structure process is quite straightforward. The start point has to be Government-endorsed strategic guidance. Using this guidance as a basis it should be possible to derive the capabilities necessary to meet the demands of the strategic situation. Deficiencies in these capabilities would then become obvious and enable 'requirements' proposals to be processed to remedy them. From there it is just a matter of programming these proposals within the constraints of the budget (an indication of the Government's commitment to defence), making the necessary decisions regarding particular types of equipment, then managing the ensuing project until it has been introduced into service. The theory is simple, the execution is somewhat more complex for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are the overlap between the military's force development aims and the bureaucracy's resource programming responsibilities, and the regular flexing of organizational muscle.

The aim of this article is to review the history of organizational changes leading to the existing force structure process, review some recently completed changes, and then comment on the expectations of the current re-organization as they pertain to force structure.

Historical Perspectives

The Australian DOD was established in 1901 as part of the federation process and, except for the creation of a Department of Navy from 1915 through to 1921, was a single entity until the advent of World War II in 1939. A Defence Group of Departments was brought into existence for the duration of the war and started the post war period comprising the Departments of Navy, Army, Air, Supply and Defence Production.

Until the end of the sixties the demands of the force structure process was relatively simple, being merely that of a dependent ally. (10:9-10) In fact the Defence Committee in its 1946 review came to just that conclusion. (12:15) Britain and the US were the major allies and the concept of forward defence, or meeting the threat when and where it arose, provided little incentive for reviewing either the force structure or its associated processes. Nevertheless, against a background of low and stagnated defence spending, there were misgivings in some quarters.

In 1957 the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts identified deficiencies in some organizational aspects of DOD's operations, particularly with respect to issues involving co-ordination. The resulting review was headed by Lieutenant General Sir Leslie Morshad and found that DOD had to be 'more than a coordinator' of the individual Service departments. (2:140) One of his principal recommendations was to amalgamate these departments into a single Department reporting to one Minister for Defence. (12:17) However, this particular recommendation was rejected by the Government of the day, although the supremacy of DOD over the other departments was accepted. The reasons for the rejection of the single department option undoubtedly had a lot to do with the power of the individual services and their ministers. The other result relevant to the force structure process was the establishment of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) - a high level military committee designed to provide military advice.

Until the early seventies there were varying degrees of dissatisfaction with the way DOD went about its business, especially with regard
to the coherency of the force structure process. It was becoming increasingly evident that some form of centrally directed policy process was needed (12:20), more or less along the lines that Morshead had recommended. To that end there had been some changes during the sixties under the then Minister for Defence Allan Fairhall. (2:140) The power of the Service Chiefs had been reduced which undoubtedly went some way towards paving the way for the major re-organization that took place in the seventies and, significantly for the force structure process, a Policy Planning Branch was established. Here, finally, was a single branch with the task of developing strategic assessments and studies as a basis for Australia's defence policy. It was a hesitant but positive step towards a more centrally coordinated joint process.

The next major step in the evolution of Australia's force structure process was the re-organization that took place under Tange, but first it is necessary to be aware that the end of the sixties signalled a major change in the direction of Australia's defence policy. In 1969, President Nixon announced his Guam doctrine and left little room for doubt in the minds of Australia's more astute defence planners that greater self-sufficiency in defence matters was required. O'Neill correctly identified the basic problem (13:159-160) when he summarized the two major tenets of Australia's Defence Force policy. They were, of course, to contribute to the world balance of power and to protect Australia. The problem up to then had been the ascendancy of the former; the Guam doctrine changed that. There was now a recognizable need to transition from an 'assumption of joint action with a powerful external ally' to more realistic scenarios. (6:205) The Australian Department of Defence was ill-prepared to cope with this very fundamental change to its force structure needs.

The then Secretary, Department of Defence, Sir Arthur Tange, undertook a major re-organization of the department during the period 1973 to 1976 in an attempt to overcome many of the previously identified deficiencies. This re-organization had a major effect on the force structure process and one which is still evident today. There were many changes (10:12) but only those considered major or relevant to the force structure process will be discussed. A single department was created reporting to one Minister for Defence, just as Morshead had recommended fifteen years earlier. The position of Chief of Defence Force Staff (CDFS) was established to facilitate the joint forces concept. Those two star service appointments with responsibilities to the Secretary in areas such as materiel acquisition and logistics were made 'two hatted'. Of the five areas the department was divided into, four - supply and support, resources and financial programming, manpower, and organization and management - are peripheral to the force structure process. The fifth - strategic policy and force development - is a major participant whose role in the process has been the subject of considerable and on-going discussion.

This re-organization, which formed the basis of the 1975 Defence Act, has been the subject of considerable criticism. Tange himself was aware of the conflict that was likely to result but considered his recommendations to be the best compromise in achieving the Government's objectives. (12:29) Of perhaps even greater significance, however was the view that his responsibilities as a Department Head under the Public Service Act were of overriding importance in comparison to purely defence matters that the military considered important. (10:18) Hence much of the criticism emanated from the military, and centred around two main issues that directly affected the force structure process. The first was the pivotal role of the Force Development and Analysis Branch and the second was the plethora of departmental committees. Nevertheless, as Ball stated, a change was needed from the purely military approach to national security that existed in the sixties. (2:141) But was the post-Tange organization the answer to improving the force structure process? The roles of both the Department and the Military in the strategic basis and force development areas are relatively easy to delineate but the problem starts when the latter overlaps into the resource programming area in determining force structure priorities. The essence of the problem is who should decide how much of the cake should go to whom. (16:285:286)

Finding acceptable improvements to the force structure process has been, and still is, a difficult task, and was certainly not helped by the post-Guam-doctrine influence on defence policy. O'Neill believed that the termination of a policy of forward defence at the beginning of
the seventies led to a 'prolonged crisis' in the formulation of Australia's Defence Policy. (13:159) To this end the Tange review had the right objectives in that it was intended to provide appropriate mechanisms to overcome these difficulties. Specifically, it was to provide for the coherent development of suitable strategic concepts which would in turn lead to an appropriate force structure. Unfortunately, the resulting process still tended to be uncoordinated and to a certain extent disorganized (13:163), the reasons for which will be covered shortly. It was also a period where Australia needed two defence policies - one for the still relevant task of forward defence and the other for the new emphasis on the defence of Australia as expressed in the 1976 White Paper. Unfortunately, there were really only sufficient resources to fund one of these policies and it was the second one that suffered. (2:164)

Naturally, the pattern of defence spending has an extremely important influence on the force structure process, and this effect is perhaps never better illustrated than during the period between 1976 and 1985. In fact a study of defence budgets and the associated spending profiles in the latter half of the seventies provides a microcosm of the problem as it relates to force structure planning even today. From 1973 until 1975 the Liberal opposition was extremely critical of what it saw as Australia's declining defence capability. Consequently, the 1976 defence budget tabled by the Liberals was an attempt to remedy the problem. (19:2) The commitment to defence was to be $12,000 million over a five year period, starting with an allocation of five to six percent in the 1976/77 budget with an expectation to continue at that level for the remainder of the Five Year Development Program (FY-DP) However, when the realities of a difficult budget situation surfaced in 1977/78, Defence's share was only one percent in real terms (19:6), which contrasted sharply with the optimistic forecast of the previous year. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Defence received another boost to the tune of $17,600 million for the 1980/85 FYDP. Then, in 1982, constraint again became necessary. The difficulties this cyclic expenditure profile presented for defence planners were bad enough, but the fact that the Government, as Governments tend to do, was only concerned with the overall amount rather than how it was spent, meant that cuts were left to departmental discretion and tended to be somewhat arbitrary rather than being in line with specific Government direction. (12:13)

Paul Dibb was critical of this aspect of budgetry management in his review. Planners are faced with long term problems when guidance consistently exceeds the actual allocation over a long period of time. As he succinctly explained, a one percent change approximates $1,000 million over a five year program. (5:160-161) The results of such reductions are inevitable, have been going on for some time, and are still a problem. Programs have to be rescheduled, deferred or even cancelled and often the size or scope of the program determines its status rather than its position in accordance with force development plans. More often than not the long term commitment necessary for large defence projects has resulted in the need to find funds for capital equipment shortfalls in other areas of Defence such as operating costs, stockholdings and personnel. Aside from the obvious effects on the force structure planning process, this stop-go decision making, as Farren termed it (6:286), can be the source of a considerable waste of managerial effort.

From a theoretical view point, the force structure process has, on the surface, followed the framework generally accepted for such an activity. Guidance has been forthcoming, deficiencies have been indentified, and projects to rectify those deficiencies have been initiated. Strategic guidance has been in the form of a Strategic Basis paper published every three to five years. From 1968 onwards these papers have acknowledged the changing strategic environment, commencing with the early recognition of the requirement for greater self-reliance and passing through such milestones as the expansion base in 1973 and the core force concept in 1975. (5:24-26) However, this guidance has been very broad and as such has contributed to the generally recognized ad hoc nature of the resulting force structure process. The main cause of the problem has been the large gap between the guidance and the specific equipment proposals. There was a need for a further step that would give more specific guidance for the force structure planners. A further problem was the tendency for committees such as the Force Structure Committee (DFDC) to concentrate on the Major Capital
Equipment portion of the FYDP while falling
to address, at least in any detail, the many
other facets of defence activities (personnel,
training plans etc) that also contributes to
force structure.

The Defence Operational Requirements Com­
mittee (DO RC) was an attempt to bridge the gap
but it was largely unsuccessful, probably be­
cause it did not, or was not allowed to, address
resource issues. The first level at which force
structure planning took place to any real
extent was at FSC, as the name of that
committee implies. The production of Military
Strategy 85 (MS 85) was another attempt
which, according to Dibb, failed because of
inadequate consultation with the civilian policy
planning area. (5:27) The lack of more definitive
guidance has probably been a major factor
behind the host of problems that epitomized
the rivalry between the civilian and military
staffs in the Department, particularly since the
Tange re-organization.

At the heart of the problem was the respective
responsibilities of CDF (S) and the Secretary
as specified in Section 9A of the Defence Act.
On the surface the wording seems fairly clear
with CDF being responsible for command of
the force and the Secretary taking care of
administration. However, as Utz defined in his
report, administration encompasses everything
except strategy and tactics (10:26:27); where does
this leave CDF's command responsibilities
regarding such essential elements as combat
support and personnel? Interestingly, much of
the Services' criticism during the Utz review
was directed at the way the organization
functioned rather than the basic structure.
Senior military officers were concerned at the
tendency to ignore the 'experience, knowledge
and skill' of service personnel (10:28) - a
complaint which probably lay at the heart of
the military/civilian relations problem. In
evidence given to that review, Sir Anthony
Synnot (former CDFS) expressed the view
that force development and capabilities were
clearly service responsibilities. (10:29:30) In
his report, Utz rejected most of these criticisms
just as he also rejected an expanded military
role in the strategic and international policy
area. (10:65).

Current Mechanisms

Much of the criticism raised by the Services
on the workings of the Department seems to
be centred around the activities of the Force
Development and Analysis (FDA) Branch.
FDA was a product of the Tange re-organi­
zation and had its origins in the Systems
Analysis Branch in the sixties. (10:66) Its role
is essentially that of FYDP planning to best
meet defence objectives within the available
guidance.

The criticism covers a variety of related
areas. (10:74) Perhaps the most important is
the dominant and seemingly disproportionate
role played by FDA in the force structure
process. It is generally given the opportunity
to comment on all aspects involving force
structure including matters that have supposed­
ly passed beyond its purview. For instance, is
it right for FDA to be able to influence
Equipment Acquisition Strategies (E AS) which
are post project approval activity? Or should
its influence cease following FSC consideration
and approval? It has been accused of passing
issues on to higher committees if they have not
been resolved to its satisfaction as the appro­
priate level. Another significant criticism and one
that is the essence of organizational power is
the control of committee agenda. FDA com­
piles the agenda for FSC meetings - a key
committee in the force structure process.

Utz disagreed with the extensive criticism
levelled at FDA and noted that 'it is important
to appreciate that its role is not, nor is
intended to be, an overriding one.' (10:69) He
went so far as to claim that in fact it was the
Services that have the leading role. (10:70-71)
The Review conducted by the Joint Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JCF­
ADT) in 1987 on The Management of Aus­
tralia's Defence came to a quite different con­
clusion. The resulting report recommended
the force development and analysis function
be transferred to Headquarters Australian
Defence Force (HQADF) and be placed under
the control of CDF. (12:223) The essence of
the problem is how to separate force structure,
which is essentially a military responsibility,
from resource programming, which rightly
belongs to the Secretary.

As has been mentioned, the large gap between
broad strategic guidance and the raising of
specific equipment proposals has been a signifi­
cant obstacle to improving the force structure
process. This problem has been exacerbated to
a certain extent by tasking the three services
with independently raising and justifying these
proposals. Certainly, they liaised informally with one another throughout the process, but there was no formal mechanisms for resolving conflicts of opinion. The DORC was designed to overcome this problem but was never able to fully come to grips with all the issues, mainly because of its failure to take the really hard decisions so necessary in a resource constrained environment.

In 1987 some organizational changes were put in place in an attempt to redress these deficiencies. The DORC was replaced by the Defence Operational Concepts and Capabilities Committee (DOCCC) to be chaired by the Vice Chief of Defence Force (VCDF). At the same time a new branch, called the Force Development Planning Branch (FDP), was formed in HQADF. The two moves were to go hand in hand but, as will be seen, there have been some problems in the interim. FDP was established in an attempt to provide that essential intermediate guidance to fill the gap between broad strategic guidance and capability and equipment proposals. Its first task has been to develop four concept papers to provide more definitive guidance for the force development process. The first discussed operational concepts for credible contingencies and the other three concentrated on land, maritime and air concepts respectively.

The resulting force structure process calls for these papers to receive DOCCC endorsement and then be used as ‘umbrellas’ for more specific concept papers, which would also be presented to the DOCCC for endorsement. The final step in this process is the raising of Defence Force Capability Proposals (DFCPs) by the Services that would identify specific capability deficiencies. These too would be passed to the DOCCC for endorsement. A key feature of the DOCCC considerations is that they are intended to avoid reference to specific equipment solutions; these can be raised in subsequent project briefs for FSC consideration. Having the four initial concept papers developed and endorsed is proving to be a lengthy, albeit valuable, process and it will be some time yet before an acceptable series of lower level papers will have been submitted through the DOCCC and received the necessary endorsement. In the meantime, capability proposals still have to undergo some form of DOCCC consideration before they go before FSC as project briefs and some will have to do so without the cover of an appropriate concept paper.

Nevertheless, progress is being made in the right direction. But if this system is to work as designed then FSC should accept the concept as endorsed by the DOCCC and concentrate on the programming aspects of each specific proposal. Unfortunately FSC members claim they still need to make capability judgements if they are to correctly assess program priorities, and to do this they cannot simply accept a DOCCC endorsement without further analysis of the operational implications of each proposal. Thus force development is still too much the prerogative of the non-uniformed branch of the Department.

The Military's task is further complicated by the lack of a comprehensive operational analysis capability dedicated to supporting force development and with priorities dictated by CDF. At present, Central Studies Branch (CSB and formerly Central Studies Establishment) is under the administrative control of FDA and only responsive, rather than responsible, to HQADF. This arrangement has made HQADF's task in the force development area more difficult, particularly in relation to FSC deliberations, if for no other reason than it is often unable to adequately influence CSB's work priorities.

The JCFADT review of defence in 1987 expressed greater concern over the Department's force structure mechanisms than Utz did in 1982. It went so far as to recommend replacing both the DOCCC and FSC with a Defence Guidance and Capabilities Committee to be chaired by VCDF. (12;225-226) This suggestion was perhaps a little naive when the Secretary's responsibilities as regard resource management are considered and, not surprisingly, was rejected. Ideally, the DOCCC should set priorities and FSC should programmed accordingly, and it should be possible to structure the organization to achieve that aim.

Current and Future Prospects for Change

Despite the changes that have taken place recently, there are problems that remain to be fixed. Certainly, improvements can be expected as the above changes take effect. For instance, much of the acrimony could be removed from the force structure debate if a comprehensive set of concept papers, at differing levels of detail, can be agreed. However, the basic issue
of FSC (FDA) claiming the need to make capability judgements in order to program effectively is likely to remain. There is also the question of separate Service Operational Requirements Branches competing for the same bucket of resources and not resolving the conflicts until the proposals get into the DOCCC arena.

A current, and very significant, re-organization of HQADF is taking place which has the potential to redress the remaining problems. This re-organization is the result of a structural review conducted by Major General Sanderson and is aimed at 'increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the defence process' as well as substantially reducing numbers in the higher ranks of the services. (17:5) The review looked at past reports on higher defence management including those by Tange, Ut7. Dibb and the JCFADT, as well as studying the UK and Canadian Defence organizational models. Although the review was wide ranging in its content, the force structure process was an important element.

The review acknowledged the substantially improved nature of the present organization over that generated by the Tange review but noted that there still existed a lack of coordination and a degree of randomness in the overall process. (17:71) The problems were discussed in such terms as 'in accordance with perceived priorities' and 'squeezing of the force structure' (17:71); in short, force development lacked a 'total view'. General Sanderson expressed regret that investigating an even more integrated model along the UK lines was outside his Terms of Reference (TOR). However, despite the overall thrust towards a more joint approach, he recognized the importance of retaining an 'environmental' (as opposed to a service) approach to force development.

In forming a HQADF Development Division, the re-organization should strengthen the force structure process in two key areas. First, FDP Branch will be expanded and renamed the Military Strategy and Concepts Branch in recognition of CDF's role in the provision of military strategic policy advice as well as HQADF's requirement to translate agreed policy into development objectives. (17:69-70) Second, and perhaps more notable, is the plan to form environmental Operational Requirements Branches within HQADF in lieu of the individual Services' branches. (17:69) Hopefully, the grouping of these branches under a two star head will allow a more cohesive approach to force development while still maintaining an appropriate environmental flavour.

These laudatory aims, however, will be to no avail unless they are supported by appropriate structural mechanisms and processes. General Sanderson recognized this and proposed some quite significant changes to the committee structure for consideration by the Department in general (remember, this report was for CDF). (17:72) He suggested the DOCCC should be a one star committee chaired by the head of the new Development Division (ACDEV). FSC would become an Equipment Programming Committee (EPC), which would be chaired by the same departmental officer as FSC (Deputy Secretary, Strategy and Intelligence), and would be supported by an Equipment Programming Working Group co-chaired by ACDEV and the head of FDA Branch (FASFDA). He did not address the position of CSB in the new structure (outside his TOR) but strongly intimated that it more rightly belonged within HQADF. (17:73) The committee structure is still under consideration by the Department and indications are that it may be somewhat different to the review's recommendations.

What, then, is the prognosis for the force structure process once this latest re-organization has been effected? The answer to this question will depend to a large extent on the outcome of current discussions on the final shape of the various committees. Certainly, the Secretary will have to be convinced that his responsibilities as regards resource management and programming will not be affected. The key will be to see what, if any, changes take place in the functioning of FSC or its successor, since it is this committee that has been the target of the majority of service criticisms in the past. On balance, it is hard to see FSC members, particularly on the civilian side, relinquishing their perogative to make capability judgements to assist them in their programming decisions.

Yet there is a solution that may possibly appease all the 'players'. The DOCCC can make capability judgements and allocate priorities as is intended. FSC can then attempt to program these capabilities. If programming proves to be a problem for what ever reason, the matter in question can be simply referred
back to the DOCCC for revaluation. Some may say that such a procedure merely lengthens an already cumbersome process, yet it is no more than what happens now when FSC often considers a certain proposal on several occasions before finally recommending it to DFDC.

Another segment of the force structure process that could be improved is the analysis support for HQADF’s force development area. Such support is most important for what is essentially a CDF responsibility. However, improvement could only be possible with a subtle change to FDA’s role. FDA’s name could be changed to Force Development Programming where it could provide, as it does now, essential support for the successor to the FSC. CSB could then be transferred to the control of HQADF where it could provide a more appropriate degree of analysis in terms of CDF’s priorities. Such a recommendation was beyond the TOR of the Sanderson review and the only change in the short term will be the move of the Service offices’ Operational Analysis (OA) staff into HQADF. Alternatively, re-instating CSB’s independent stance under, for instance, DSTO would certainly be an improvement over the current arrangements.

Having suggested these further changes to help improve the force structure process, it would be remiss not to comment on the likelihood of their being accepted. Certainly, the Secretary would still be in control of the purse strings and as such would be able to comply with his ministerial directives. However, the twin issues of FSC and FDA as sources of contention have been around for many years and have not really changed a great deal over that period. The arguments have almost become institutionalized, perhaps even symbolic of the respective stances of HQADF and the Department. Until these stances soften, on both sides, any expectation of significant change may be a trifle optimistic.

Conclusion

Despite the apparent straight forward nature of the force structure process before 1970, there were still misgivings about the direction it was taking. Morshead had some relevant suggestions but was unable to convince the government of the day to take more than a token step towards a more centralized process. The change towards a more self-reliant defence policy gave a degree of urgency to the need for improvement but it was not until the Tange re-organization that substantial progress was made. The creation of a complete division - Strategic Policy and Force Development - dedicated to the force structure process was certainly a step in the right direction. However, post Tange changes have caused considerable dissension in the Department, mainly centred on the power of FDA and the cumbersome nature of the committee process.

But perhaps a more serious deficiency has been a lack of co-ordination in the process caused by the large gap between strategic guidance and the capability acquisition mechanism. This, in turn, has been exacerbated by a budget framework that sees ambitious financial guidance being overtaken by somewhat lower resource outlays. The DORC failed to satisfactorily fill the gap in guidance and now the DOCCC is attempting to redress that problem by achieving consensus on a series of broad concept papers produced by HQADF’s FDP Branch.

Two fundamental problems remain and were addressed, but only to the extent possible, by the structural review. The first is the overlap between the DOCCC and FSC in making capability judgements, and can only be remedied by turning the latter into the EPG as recommended in the review. However, in order to successfully program resources, is likely to remain unless it becomes accepted that both committees should be part of a loop that may go through several iterations before settling on a programme acceptable to all participants. The second, that of transferring CSB out from under FDA, was not addressed in the review yet remains a prerequisite to an effective force structure process. We are certainly getting better, but we haven’t got it right...yet!

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ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY TO GET TWO MORE MINESWEEPERS

The Government has approved the acquisition of two second-hand tugs to undertake minesweeping duties for the Royal Australian Navy. The Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Ray, announced that the contract was signed on April 18, 1990.

The tugs, to be purchased this year, would be used to tow the new 'clip-on' sweeps designed and developed by the Royal Australian Navy Research Laboratories in Sydney and the Material Research Laboratory in Melbourne. The RAN has been using three fishing trawlers, acquired in 1988, to develop the tactics and doctrine to be used in the operation of the new sweeping equipment. These trawlers are not powerful enough to tow the large sweeps, hence the requirement for the tugs.

Senator Ray said that because the waters in which we could need to counter mines vary in their characteristics, we need minesweepers to complement our catamaran minehunters. The two tugs would form an integral part of the Navy's minesweeping force, which is being established by utilising 'craft-of-opportunity', comprising fishing trawlers, tugs and other small craft.

Because of the vast coastline over which our mine countermeasures force could be expected to operate, our minesweepers and minehunters need to be capable of rapid deployment to any mine threat area, Senator Ray said. This would be achieved by using specialist mine warfare support personnel operating from mobile trailers.
Character Guidance in the Australian Army: Thirty Years On

By Chaplain Hugh Scott

Character Guidance in the Australian Army has been conducted now for over thirty years. The history of its development has been recorded previously (Sabel, 1981): it is the purpose of this writer to address the social and educational rationale of Character Guidance today, to consider some aspects which may need development and some possible future directions.

Prompted by an article on The Source of Military Morale in a 1952 issue of the Australian Army Journal by Lt. Col. L.J. Loughran (who was, incidentally, my C.O. in 1953 in 19 N.S. Trg. Bn.) character guidance courses were begun after the Korean War and developed against the background of the insecure years of the sixties and seventies, when it had an obvious role to fulfil. Handling the stresses of combat plainly demand a depth of all those resources which we associate with 'character' (M.L.W. 1983). But what of the situation when we are on the 'brink of peace?' (Warner. 1989). This situation places the defence forces in an ambiguous situation in relation to society and calls for responses from its members to a new set of conditions.

Society

Australian society at present seems quite ambivalent about the maintenance of armies and the reality of war. The anti-military, anti-war, lobbyists have been successful to the extent at least that 'peace studies' have appeared in some schools through which potential recruits and officer cadets gained their first exposure to theories of peace and war, patriotism and nationhood. The standards of objectivity of these courses appear to vary greatly from State to State and give cause for concern to educators who seek some standards of intellectual integrity, while on the other hand they receive quite passionate support from those who wish to rewrite history and remake human nature. Rewriting history received considerable attention in the bicentennial year: it is a risky business with orwellian implications; remaking human nature tends to be Utopian when it ignores the realities of the humanity it seeks to change and permits only its own ideology into its interpretative field: it will then surely confirm itself. It is one thing to glorify war and to do so is as dangerous as it is odious, but to ignore the reality of war in the hope that it will go away is equally dangerous. Blainey (1988) offers an analysis of the causes of war which he argues is, at the same time, a study of the causes of peace. Such an approach is worth following. Previous periods of peace which have engendered their own ideological distastes for war have not succeeded in abolishing it. George Orwell in his 1940 essay Inside the Whale wrote, concerning the dominant ideology of his circle in the 1930s.

“Patriotism, religion, the family, the sanctity of marriage, the Old School Tie, birth, breeding, honour, discipline - anyone of ordinary education could turn the whole lot of them inside out in three minutes. But what do you achieve, after all, by getting rid of such primal things as patriotism and religion? You have not successfully got rid of the need for something to believe in”. (the emphasis is in the original).


“Generals, in the time of my growing up, were something to be hidden under history's bed, along with the chamber pots. Anyone who chose the army for a career was a fool or a failure. ...We were conditioned, it is true. The generation that was to respond to the last man on Pearl Harbor's dawn had been conditioned to the last man to believe that wars accomplish nothing. Had America been an enormous laboratory and had we all been albino rats, no more elegant experiment could have devised to test the powers of social conditioning. ...Ours was as total (an effort as the Soviet Union's) in its own way, and it lasted for twenty three years, and it failed in a dawn's bad hour”. (Ardrey, 1969, p. 225).

Young men and women entering today's defence force have to cope with similar conditioning which they have received and which has been imparted to their peers to whom they are
often called to justify their choice of career. It is not easy.

Qualities of character in soldiers are just as demanding in peacetime as in war, though of a different sort and application. Self-control, carefulness in work, application to tasks, a realistic sense of purpose, perseverance in the face of frustration and the customary discomforts of service life, all make their demands on the character of the soldier. Coping with boredom and a relative and sometimes quite positive lack of support and interest, bordering on hostility, calls for a firm commitment to and conviction of the worth of the vocation on which one has embarked. The reality and extent of the problem presently facing the Army is indicated by the responses of many good soldiers to the Discharge Questionnaire July 1986-March 1988. There is a fundamental lack of honesty in a society which challenges the young soldier for being 'trained to kill' but expects a sympathetic hearing for those who wish to promote abortion on demand, eutanasia and non-evaluative approaches to the control of AIDS. The present level of analysis of Australian society is largely a matter of popularising some immediate issue for a while and then looking for another: four years ago I taught a course on 'Children at Risk' in a tertiary institution; it was an issue at the time, but I suspect that now 'violence in the home' or 'the greenhouse effect' would qualify as well for attention. There is a sense of urgency about making our society a better one to live in, but it is a very material society which is being developed, with little direct attention being given to the underlying beliefs which enliven this urgency. If it should be found that there are no beliefs there, then the urgency for improvement may well run out and may be doing so even now.

Against this background, young Australians and their leaders are expected to form a disciplined and responsible defence force. Resources of judgement, patience, a broad toleration of viewpoints different from one's own, together with a clarity of articulation of one's own beliefs, are qualities of character especially associated with military service but which are not strongly communicated to or expected from these entering the services from the community today. Character Guidance and character training generally, exists to make its contribution to building not just a strong defence force, but strong men and women.

**Educational Processes**

Character Guidance assumes what all educational undertaking assumes, that people can change and grow. Theories of development in thinking and moral judgement based on the work of Piaget and extended by Kohlberg (1973). Kohlberg and Mayer (1972), are receiving much attention by life-span developmental psychologists. These views of human development are stage-based, that is, that there are distinctly different abilities in thinking and judging which an individual acquires over time, each ability involving, more complex processes and taking into account more sophisticated considerations in forming opinions and judgements. If for some reason, one stage or level of ability is not mastered, then progress to further stages is impeded.

Studies in the past fifteen years or so have shown that the attainment of higher level thinking and judgement can be encouraged educationally by students observing and interacting in problem solving tasks with people whose accustomed level of workings is a stage or two in advance. (Rosenthal and Zimmerman, 1972. Zimmerman and Lanaro, 1974. Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975; Walker, 1983). There is increasing interest in adult development of thinking and its application to moral questions (Labouvie-Vief, 1980; Baxter and Rarick, 1987), which attempts at identifying and clarifying sex differences (Gilligan, 1977; Pratt, et.al., 1983; Pratt et.al. 1984; Smetana, 1984; Platt, et.al., 1988), there being some equivocal evidence to suggest that males more typically orient their judgements towards considerations of fairness and the balancing of individual rights, while women focus more on the consequences of actions and acting responsibility for participants welfare. Women would seem to seek more information than men before coming to a decision. This work is still at an exploratory stage, but suggests some useful insights for those involved in character training with both sexes.

The overall picture presented by the work currently being published is that individuals' basic attitudes to life and how it should be handled is influenced by his or her own level of maturity; that that level of maturity is influenced upward (though apparently not downward) by interaction with others at a higher level;
and that there is a consistency of use throughout life.

An interesting recent study by Elder (1986) of WWII and Korean War veterans has highlighted the long term influence of military service on character influenced life outcomes. Soldiers from disadvantaged backgrounds substantially overcame those disadvantages, raised educational aspirations and achievements and "generally had more stable marriages up to middle age than did non-veterans" (Elder, 1986, p. 233). The sample studied was quite specific (males from the Berkley/Oakland area of California born during the depression) and their military service was vastly different to that of the Australian peacetime soldier: yet 'boot camp' and recruit training share similarities over armies and over time. The demands on character and the opportunities for development are the most positive long term learnings which members of the Services take with them wherever they go.

**Training Methods**

Since the inception of Character Guidance in the Army, the basic method used has been the small group discussion, and to this extent, Character Guidance has been in the forefront of advances in adult teaching method. The Army School of Instructional Training (Precis MOI 53, 1981) affirmed the value of group discussion with appropriate subject matter, which character guidance plainly is.

Experimental studies in the use of discussion of problem situations and the use of film and audio-visual based approaches, have repeatedly confirmed their effectiveness in achieving advances and development in moral understanding (Kohlberg, 1973; Selman and Lieberman, 1975, Cline and Feldmesser, 1983). The cross fertilization of ideas among the students in the courses, who are often quite observably at different levels of moral-ethical thinking is an effective stimulus of growth, as has already been commented on. Audio-visual material is useful as motivation, but is particularly useful for instruction and the basis for analytical discussion of situations. Motivation is not to be confused with learning, nor entertainment with instruction: but by fitting appropriate media presentations with the stated aims and learning objectives of course segments, they can be most effective instructional tools.

**Course Content**

While the content of character guidance has undergone certain formal variations over thirty years, there are easily identifiable consistencies, which is to be expected. At present the segments of the course in recruit training are entitled: Me, Family, Character Building, Life in the Army, Value of Life, Faith, Sex, Love and Marriage. Considering the reasons for character guidance being introduced into the Army, arising out of the learning of the allies from the Korean War, the two central segments of the Course must, I think, be Character Building and Faith. I suspect that these are the two weakest segments of the course at present, having received the least attention in the organisation and writing of the course material. Part of the reason for this may be that they are the most difficult to deal with adequately. This is not to say that they are not at present effective, but that they could be more effective if the learning objectives were clearer and directly addressed in the segments. It seems to me that currently, method and motivation have more influence on these two parts of the course than the specific objectives. Character building is not an easy subject to address in a climate of opinion which says that anyone's values are just as good as those of anyone else. Faith is not an easy subject to address in a militantly secular and anti established region society. There seems to have been a shift in the responses of recruits to the various topics over recent years. In the period of about 1984-1986 my colleague Rod Tippett (P.D. Chaplain of the Character Training Team) found that over that period, 'Faith' was rated second after 'Life in the Army' and ahead of 'Sex, Love and Marriage'! A much more limited analysis of my own (one month of three courses, March 1989) showed that males rated 'Family' highest with 'Sex and Love' ('Marriage' being rate separately) lowest. Probably we did not reach their expectations. 'Faith' rated low by comparison with the other topics, but still above 'Sex and Love' and 'Me'. For the females, 'Character Building', and 'Life in the Army' rated equal highest, 'Marriage' well down the list and 'Faith' last. It needs to be noted that these ratings encompass only 10 percentage points for the females. The male sample varied their ratings by thirty percentage points. While the sample is small it suggests an interesting difference in response between males and
females and one which I would not have expected, anticipating women to have been more widely differentiating in their reactions. I hope to look into this further.

While there may have been some shift in attitudes among recruits, which reflect a shift in attitude of society at large (after all that is where recruits come from) it would be rash of the Character Training Team to change, or be expected to change the emphasis of the Course. Kohlberg has proposed a latest stage of development which is, in a broad sense, 'religious'. "The concept of the self's integrity is psychological, but the concept of the integrity of the meaning of the self's life is philosophical or religious". (Kohlberg, 1973). It is this awareness of meaning for one's life that is the focus of the latest stage. (Kohlberg and Power, 1981).

**Developments**

Character Guidance and the various areas of continuing training provided in the Army (at Initial Employment Training, C.O.'s Hours, Character Leadership Courses, Officer training Personal Development Courses and eventually, I hope and expect, with S.S.O direct entry training) will continue to be modified and upgraded in methods of presentation and content. One of the more obvious developments needed is the extension of the Army type of courses into the three services, which is not yet the case, but which is not far off. The conduct of a character guidance segment of direct officer training would be challenging but extremely rewarding and entirely appropriate, considering the nature of the moral and ethical problems military service raises for doctors, nurses, educators, psychologists - and chaplains. I would love to be a fly on the wall at the first one. Character Leadership Courses are an extension of character guidance courses for officers and other ranks of all Services: it would be a worthwhile exercise to open these courses to Defence Department personnel, so that there could be a sharing of perspectives of the common task and the development of a mutual awareness of the demands on character which military and public service presents.

**Conclusion**

This article has been written as Character Guidance in the Australian Army records its thirtieth year of operation and in recognition of this. It has been shown that there is much lively interest in moral education and development. This is not simply academic but practical, as we seek to find more effective ways of living in a more and more fragmented and sectional society.

The Defence Force is called on to represent the whole society and act in its defence when called on. This requires of its members great responsibility and wide sympathy for and understanding of the society it represents, even when that society does not reciprocate.

Aspects of educational psychology and method have been addressed as they refer to character training, with some thoughts of present needs and future developments, so that, under God, this training will continue to help equip members of the Defence Force with the personal qualities that make them not just more efficient or effective, but better Australian citizens.

**REFERENCES**


THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE TAKES DELIVERY OF FINAL HORNET

The delivery of the RAAF's 75th F/A-18 Hornet jet at Canberra's RAAF Base Fairbairn on Wednesday afternoon (May 16) marked the successful completion of the 4.8 billion dollar fighter project.

The aircraft A21-57, piloted by the Officer Commanding 81 Wing, Group Captain Ray Conroy, flew into Fairbairn at 3.30pm with four other F/A-18s representing all the RAAF fighter squadrons.

The special handover ceremony will be attended by the Minister of Defence, Senator Robert Ray, the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Ray Funnell, McDonnell Douglas Vice-President and F/A-18 project manager Mr Jim Spehr and Rear Admiral David Rogers from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy.

The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Funnell said he was delighted with the program. "The 75 aircraft were built on time and to cost", he said.

"It was a remarkable achievement and full credit must go to McDonnell Douglas, GE Aircraft Engines, the United States Navy, the RAAF project team and all the Australian companies".

Air Marshal Funnell said the Hornet was proving itself in squadron service to be the best multi-role fighter in the world and had given the RAAF the quantum leap forward in technology, flexibility and versatility needed as reassurance against the uncertainties of the future.

"Without doubt the F/A-18 is the best multi-role fighter in the world", Air Marshal Funnell said. "The final decision to purchase the F/A-18 was the result of the most thorough and incisive evaluation in RAAF history".

Five aircraft were assessed for the RAAF Mirage replacement - the Mirage 2000, Panavia Tornado, SAAB Viggen, General Dynamics F-16 and the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18.

The final decision was made between the F-16 and F/A-18.

The purchase was announced on October 19, 1981, by the then Defence Minister, Sir James Killen. The first two aircraft were delivered to RAAF Williamtown on May 17, 1985, after a 15.2 hour direct flight from the Lemoore Naval Air Station in California.
Educating officers in the complexities of military strategy is an intellectual challenge that bemuses staff colleges, not just in Australia but around the world. The difficulty is that military strategy can be viewed from a multitude of perspectives. On the one hand, there is Professor Michael Howard’s persuasive argument that war is conducted in four dimensions, operational, logistic, social and technological. On the other hand, Edward Luttwak argues that war is conducted at the technical, tactical, operational, theatre strategic and grand strategic levels. Conflict can also be divided into high, mid and low levels, as well as escalated low level, more substantial and low intensity conflict. To complicate matters, strategy can be sequential or cumulative, direct or indirect, and war can be limited, general or total. The ordered military mind wants some clear framework, and indeed for almost two hundred years military analysts have struggled to provide a scientific or an intellectual structure for the study of war. The military student therefore needs some assistance to make his way through this minefield of terminology and conceptualisation.

Perhaps the most useful way to view military strategy is to consider the four or five major theories of strategy. This is the approach suggested by Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, USN in his small book *Military Strategy*, in which he argues that there are four main schools of strategic thought, maritime, continental, aerospace and revolutionary. Other writers have added another school of strategic thought - the nuclear.

The advantage of Wylie’s approach is that it reflects the historical development of strategic theory, the theories underpin the *raison d’être* of the various branches of military forces, and the underlying assumptions of the five schools of strategic thought can be found in actual strategies pursued around the world. The disadvantage of the approach is that the student might tend to see strategy as being divided into neat boxes, whereas in practice the theories do not stand alone.

Notwithstanding this disadvantage, many military staff colleges have decided that the schools of strategic thought provide a convenient starting point for their teaching of military strategy. There are some variations. For example, the US Army War College examines Low Intensity Conflict rather than the revolutionary school, while the Australian Army Command and Staff College looks at non-conventional military strategy instead of the revolutionary school. The Australian Joint Services Staff College generally follows Wylie’s approach, and its teaching is assisted by the recent reprinting of Wylie’s book by the Australian Naval Institute.

One common problem in this approach to the study of strategy has been obtaining a clear statement of the continental school. As Wylie wrote:

The Continental theory is the loosest of the four (theories) insofar as its structure and clarity are concerned. It consists in large part of one central theme plus a great deal of experience and common sense, leavened by bits and pieces of doctrine and lore, held together by some generally unrecognized assumptions, and limited by the writings of those few men who have addressed themselves to the problem of the strategic direction of armies.

It is true that these days military planners do not speak in terms of a continental school. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, and the wars in the Middle East and the subcontinent, the continental school has been, and continues to be, the most important influence on the shape of conventional warfare. This article therefore attempts to put some shape on the continental school of strategic thought.

There are few actual definitions of the continental school. Admiral Wylie’s definition of the continental school was shortened by John Collins in his book *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices*, and it may be useful to quote his definition which he admits is deliberately oversimplified:

Land power proponents, the direct strategic descendants of Clausewitz, tend to compartmentalize the globe into separate theatres. They are committed to the conviction that
the destruction of enemies armies is the ultimate object of war. Navies and air forces exist primarily to transport troops to the scene of the action and support them after they get there. Land power will force a decision leading to lasting control, by physical occupation of enemy territory, if necessary.

Other writers, such as Liddell Hart and Michael Howard, have referred to continental strategy, but from a British perspective. That is, they saw it as the alternative to Britain's traditional maritime strategy.

Those who actually practised continental strategy felt little need to describe it as such. To them it was self evident. For example, it is doubtful whether the equivalent of the Joint Services Staff College in the Soviet Union would approach strategy from the Wylie perspective, or study the continental school as one of a group of strategic theories. To the Soviets the continental school of strategic thought is so obvious and pervasive that war is automatically viewed on a continental basis. Furthermore, to the Soviets, the continental school is so central to their thinking that nuclear war, maritime and revolutionary war are all part of the supporting cast for land conventional war.

Evolution of the Continental School

A strong case can be made that Napoleon Bonaparte was the father of the modern continental school of strategic thought. The French Army of the Napoleonic era was based on the levee en masse and along with a centrally directed war economy the French produced the first mass army in modern history. This army then became an instrument for expansion under Napoleon, and the other nations of Europe were forced to allow the French example in an effort to counter him.

Part of Napoleon's genius was to develop a system whereby he could manoeuvre these huge armies, sometimes up to 600,000 men, before and during battle. He invented the army corps of from two to four divisions, and corps and divisions usually marched on separate axes, coming together for battle. Thus Napoleon mastered what we might now call operations, he called grand tactics, and most of his contemporaries called strategy. His view of grand tactics is demonstrated by his Maxim No 77:

"Commanders-in-Chief are guided by their own experience and by their genius. Tactics, manoeuvres, the science of the engineer officer and of the artillery officer, may be learned from treatises; but the knowledge of grand tactics is gained only by experience and by the study of the history of the campaigns of all the great captains."

But the Napoleonic wars made other contributions to continental strategy. The wars demonstrated that while continental strategy could succeed in conquering a neighbouring continental country, it was less effective against a maritime power. After failing to defeat the British forces in the Egyptian campaign Napoleon resorted to what was called the Continental System whereby he coerced most of the countries of Europe into instituting a blockade of British trade. The Royal Navy dominated the seas, but Britain was not content to remain isolated from Europe. The British Army joined in the continental war and played a significant role in defeating Napoleon. The Royal Navy could prevent the defeat of Britain it could seriously weaken Napoleon's Empire, but in the long term Napoleon was defeated by a coalition of land powers in which Britain was part.

Napoleon might have been defeated, but his brilliant land campaigns caused a number of military writers to examine his campaigns for clues as to his success. Antoine Henri Jomini, a Swiss bank clerk who in 1805 managed to attach himself to Marshal Ney's staff and later joined Napoleon's staff in several campaigns, published an important book, Precis de L'Art de la Guerre, in 1838 in which he attempted to introduce order and precision into warfare. He sought to plan for war according to mathematical and geographic formulae.

Although he recognised the difficulties, Jomini tried to reduce war to principles. Furthermore he argued that by choosing the correct lines of approach within a theatre, a general could force the enemy to leave the area rather than giving battle. The writings of many British, French and American military thinkers of the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth century show the influence of Jomini's fervour for the discovery of scientific principles to guarantee victory in war- preferably for relatively small numbers of casualties.

Jomini's views are often seen as being contrary to those proposed by the Prussian soldier, Carl Von Clausewitz, who lived at the
same time as Jomini, but died much earlier. His unrevised book On War was published after his death in 1831. There are many valuable ideas in On War. Perhaps the best known is the statement "that war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means".

But military men, seeking simple answers, seized upon Clausewitz's summary of the use of battle:

1. Destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war, and, so far as positive action is concerned, the principal way to achieve our object.
2. Such destruction of forces can usually be accomplished only by fighting.
3. Only major engagements involving all forces lead to major success.
4. The greatest successes are obtained where all engagements coalesce into one great battle.
5. Only in a great battle does the commander-in-chief control operations in person; it is only natural that he should prefer to entrust the direction of the battle to himself.

These facts lead to a dual law whose principles support each other: destruction of the enemy's forces is generally accomplished by means of great battles and their results; and, the primary object of great battles must be the destruction of the enemy's forces.

In fact Clausewitz had little use for universal rules for waging war, but German military men who read On War chose to see it as evidence that maximum violence was the surest road to victory.

Jomini and Clausewitz were theorists and it remained for more practical men to develop the concepts of continental warfare. Perhaps the most significant contribution Napoleon made to Continental warfare was the effect he had on the Prussian Army. Humiliated by Napoleon, the Prussians rebuilt their army during the early part of the nineteenth century. The Prussian generals, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, led the way and the Prussians were well represented in the coalition that finally defeated Napoleon.

The Prussians continued to build on this base. The Prussian Great General Staff was created and warfare was studied intently. Jomini, and to a lesser extent Clausewitz, were read, but General Helmuth von Moltke developed his own practical concepts. While the great continental powers, France, Austria-Hungary and Russia established long-service professional armies based on conscription, the Prussians had a more finely-tuned conscription system. Their conscripts served for less time than the other countries - full time for only three years - while the French and Austrians served seven to twelve years and the Russians for life. But the Prussians had a reserve obligation which meant that by 1870 Prussia could mobilize half a million combat troops in two weeks, half of these reservists.

This rapid mobilization supported the operational concepts of the Prussian General Staff headed by Moltke. He based his plans on the doctrine of the Kesselschlacht or the planned battle of encirclement and annihilation. The idea was to use strategic manoeuvre to encircle large enemy forces, after which he would go to a tactical defence to allow firepower to destroy the enemy. As one historian described it, Moltke "developed the concept of out-flanking the enemy in one continuous strategic-operational sequence combining mobilization, concentration, movement and fighting. By seizing the initiative from the outset, he intended to drive his opponent into a partial or complete envelopment, destroying his army in a great and decisive battle of annihilation or encirclement, the Vernichtungs - or Kesselschlacht". Such a scheme relied on a decentralised command system involving mission tactics or Auftragstaktik, although this took some years to refine.

In some respects, of course, these developments were a matter of necessity. Placed centrally in Europe, the Prussians were constantly faced with the possibility of having to fight on two or more fronts. The questions whether they could neutralise one enemy by diplomatic means or whether they would have to defeat one enemy in time to transfer troops to deal with another enemy, were clearly in the realm of strategy. The problem of manoeuvring their armies on each respective front was in the realm of operations were part of the one sequence.

The Prussian and German grasp of the relationship between strategy and operations was shown when under the command of Moltke they conducted their successful wars against Austria in 1866 and against France in 1870. It was underlined even further by their rapid advance into France in 1914; their pre-
war mobilization and transportation plans had been shaped to fit in with their operational concept, described loosely as the Schlieffen Plan. The Germans Army successes in East Prussia culminating in the Battle of Tannenberg were a further illustration of its mastery of operations.

It is often assumed that the blitzkrieg, was invented by men like Liddell Hart and Guderian after the First World War, but in fact the blitzkrieg owes much to the thinking of German planners like Moltke and Schlieffen before the First World War and to the senior German commanders during that War. Although lacking the technology to put many of their ideas into practice the Germans broke the Allied line in the Michael offensives of March 1918. In Eastern Europe, in a series of brilliant, lightening campaigns during 1916 and 1917 in which they pushed deep into Russia and Rumania, the Germans showed what could be done with mobile operations.

By the beginning of the First World War the German Army, successor to the Prussian Army, was the most efficient instrument of continental strategy. But in the period of peace before the war the very concept of continental strategy had been threatened by the publication in 1890 of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. In fact Mahan’s book was a counter to the Jeune Ecole school of the French navy that had argued that a fleet built around torpedo-boats, mines, coast defences and commerce raiders could make a naval blockade impossible. The Germans took the message from Mahan and started to build their High Seas Fleet.

The British naval writer, Sir Julian Corbett, however, believed that maritime strategy was an extension of continental strategy. Maritime activities were ancillary to the operations on the continent of Europe. As the First World War approached the British were unsure whether to employ a maritime strategy in which the British Expeditionary Force would be an amphibious force-of-distraction on either the Belgian coast or perhaps even the German Baltic coast, or to employ a continental strategy of joining the French Armies for the opening land battles. The continental school won.10

But the advocates of a maritime strategy would not admit defeat and as the war progressed there was a long drawn-out argument between the so-called Easterners and Westerners. The Easterners, including politicians like Winston Churchill and Lloyd George, advocated attacking Germany’s weaker allies, Turkey and Austria-Hungary, in the East, rather than attacking Germany’s strength in France. Taking advantage of the strategic flexibility conferred on them by the large French and British navies, the idea was to weaken Germany by knocking her allies out of the war.

This was the purpose of the attack at Gallipoli in February 1915 culminating in the landing on 25 April. Advocates of the strategy still argue that if the campaign had been better managed Constantinople would have been captured and Turkey would have surrendered. Later in the war Britain devoted vast resources to conducting campaigns in Palestine and Mesopotamia, while France and Britain became heavily involved in the Salonika campaign and on the Italian-Austrian border. The British generals, however, argued that whatever happened in the East, the German army in France had to be defeated and this was the area where both France and Britain, and later the United States, could concentrate the maximum amount of power.

The argument appeared again in the Second World War during 1942 and 1943 when the British preferred to strike at Hitler’s “soft underbelly” in the Mediterranean while the Americans were anxious to open a second front in France as soon as possible.

Returning to the period before the First World War, Britain’s decision in favour of a continental commitment was testimony to fact that maritime and continental strategies could not stand alone. Whereas Mahan seemed to indicate that a powerful maritime nation such as Britain or the United States could rule the world, there was a developing theory arguing the opposite. In 1904 the British geographer Halford J. Mackinder argued that improvements in technology would alter the relative strength of land and sea power in favour of the land. The pivot position of the Eurasian Heartland would gain in power as land communications improved. His argument was supported by a map showing Western Soviet Union (then Russia) as the natural seat of power.

In 1919 Mackinder summarised his argument as follows: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island: Who rules the World
Island commands the world". The German army officer and geopolitician Karl Haushofer picked up this idea and led a group of German geopolitical scientists who argued for a German panregion stretching to the East of Germany. This area would provide Lebensraum, or living space. The only method of achieving this expansion was by war. The Germans might have been attracted by the Heartland theory but it was the Soviets who were best placed to pursue it. Mackinder never ceased warning that Russia and Germany must be kept apart.

It is interesting to consider some of the major wars of this century in terms of continental strategy. The First World War involved a number of peripheral land campaigns - Gallipoli, Palestine, Salonika, Mesopotima and Tanganyika. But essentially the war was decided in the great continental campaigns in France and Eastern Europe. Despite pressure from the advocates of maritime strategy, the British generals insisted that Britain's major effort had to be against the German main army in France. Britain could not allow continental Europe to be dominated by a triumphant Germany. The Royal Navy's blockade played its role in weakening Germany, but it was clear in the autumn of 1918 that had the war lasted longer the allied armies could have invaded Germany itself in a few weeks or months.

The Second World War was more complex but again Germany pursued a continental strategy, supported by naval forces acting as an ancillary to the land forces. As in the First World War, Britain (eventually) and the United States, realised that a continental army had to defeat the Germans in France and on the northwest plain of Europe. Britain's maritime power, assisted the US Navy, enabled her to avoid defeat when threatened by the German submarine blockade, and enabled the allies to continue the war in the Mediterranean. But it remained for the allies to win the war; in the long run Germany was beaten by superior land force, and most of those land forces came from even greater continental power, the Soviet Union.

The war in the Pacific was different, although some historians have argued that Japan's advance into the Pacific and South East Asia in 1942 was merely to provide resources to continue her war in China and to provide protection against the allies. As he wrote: "the Imperial Navy was purely a "sea denial" force, oriented to denying control of the Western Pacific by the US fleet in order to allow the army to win the main war on the continent. At no time before or during the war did the Imperial Navy desire or attempt "sea control" of US waters east of the Marshalls!"

At first glance, Reynolds appears to have overstated his case. It is true that from the perspective of the Philippines, the Netherlands, East Indies and Australia, the Japanese initial triumphs were the result of a superior maritime strategy. It is also true that the US defeated Japan with a maritime strategy, supplemented at the end with the application of air power. But for most of the war, it was the Army and the continental strategists who held power in Tokyo.

Thus the continental school of strategic thinking owes its development to the Napoleonic wars, the theories of Jomini and Clausewitz, the practical concepts of the German General Staff. It made a number of assumptions: that decisive land battles were the guarantee of final victory, that it was best to take the offensive at the outset, and to invade the enemy's territory, encircling and annihilating his armies near the German frontier so as to reduce logistic problems. These assumptions have affected the thinking of the practitioners of continental strategy through to the present day.

The Nature of Continental Strategy

Continental strategy is marked by five main characteristics: big wars, mass armies, offensive action, alliances and geo-strategic inevitability, and each of these will be discussed in turn. Firstly, big wars. The First and Second World Wars (in particular the European theatre) and almost all of the conventional wars since 1945 have had a continental strategy as their main feature. The Korean War, the Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 and the Iraq-Iran war form 1980 to 1988, all involved large armies fighting across a mutual frontier. Air and Naval operations were, in each case, designed to support the continental strategy. There is
something more irrevocable about sending an army across a frontier than conducting an isolated air raid, or sinking a ship. Continental strategy involves a large number of men and the resources of the entire nation. And when troops are lodged on foreign territory the war is difficult to terminate short of one side crushing the other. The Iran-Iraq war is a vivid example of this fact.

The second characteristic is that continental strategy usually involves mass armies. In this respect, most continental armies have three concepts: conscription, mobilization of reserves and home guards. Maritime countries might be able to afford the luxury of a small, highly trained, well-paid volunteer army. But continental countries usually require some form of national service or conscription to provide the large numbers of men necessary to defend their borders or to wage offensive warfare. Even these conscript armies are not big enough, and most continental armies rely on reserves either to supplement their regular forces or to form the bulk of their army on mobilization. Mobilization schemes are vital to the prosecution of continental war. It is only through a finely developed mobilization system that Israel has been able to match the superior numbers of her enemies. In addition to these forces, most continental armies make use of home guards or regional forces with an integral role in their concept of operations.

The third characteristic of continental strategy is offensive action. In Germany’s view, the key to continental strategy was the offensive. As the German writer, Colmar Von der Goltz, pointed out shortly before the First World War in his book *On the Conduct of War*, an offensive against an enemy might lead to his annihilation, while if the army on the offensive suffers a defeat it merely has to abandon the project in hand.

On the other hand, if the army remains on the defensive, defeat may mean annihilation and the loss of the country. It was for this reason that the Germans took so much care over preparing for their offensives.

Despite their ultimate defeat in the First World War, the Germans continued to pursue the idea that the only way to protect their western flank against France and Britain was to conduct offensive operations into France and the low countries. The blitzkrieg therefore has its true origins in the notion that wars are won by rapid offensives into a neighbouring country. During the Second World War the most important offensive conduct in continental strategy was the blitzkrieg, and examples were Germany’s invasions of Poland in 1939, France and the low countries in 1940, Greece and Yugoslavia in 1941 and Russia in 1941. Blitzkrieg remains to this day, with added emphasis on the air dimension, the most effective offensive strategic concept in continental strategy.

There has been some semantic argument about the term blitzkrieg. To some, it is a strategic concept involving the massing of a large, powerful army before hostilities begin, and then the unleashing of this army in a rapid campaign of annihilation. To others, blitzkrieg refers to the operational concept of striking deep with powerful columns to upset the equilibrium of the defender - the classic indirect approach of striking at the strategic centre of gravity. And to others blitzkrieg refers to the combination of tanks, mechanised infantry and air support.

These three ideas, of course, are linked. But as described earlier, historically the term blitzkrieg applied more to the strategic and operational levels, than to the tactical. The tactics developed as new technology became available. Initially it was the railway and the telegraph. Then it was the tank, dive bombers and radio communications. Perhaps the technique of using tanks, mechanised infantry and air support, could be called simply “offensive operations” and the term blitzkrieg could be left to apply in its pure form - a strategic concept of rapid annihilation. In any case, there is a compelling reason for military commanders to think of blitzkrieg as a strategic and operational concept - not to do so will probably lead to tactical success but operational and strategic failure.

The idea of offensive land strategy has also been dominant in Russian and Soviet military thinking. The fear of Russian “steamroller” was a factor in German planning before the First World War, and after the humiliating attacks on the Soviet Union in 1918 and 1919 the new military leaders such as Frunze and Trotsky began to develop Soviet doctrine with an emphasis on offensive operations. Marshal Tukhachevski, the young hero of the 1920 war with Poland, was a leading figure in preparing the Red Army for mobile armoured
operations in the 1930s. The Soviets learned both from the Germans and from foreign thinkers such as Fuller and de Gaulle. The idea of consecutive operations, striking deep into the enemy's rear area stems from this era. Stalin's purge of the Red Army in 1938 arrested these developments but they were picked up again in 1942.

Like the Germans, the Soviets emphasised mobilization, armoured formations and the offensive. But unlike the Germans they emphasised numerical superiority. The Soviet concepts from the 1940s are still reflected in their present day concepts. For example, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Nikolay Ogarkov, wrote in 1982: "Soviet military strategy considers that the conduct of modern war demands the availability of multi million mass armies". He affirmed the "offensive as the basic kind of strategic action".

The present day Soviet concept has been described as a blitzkrieg concept, and accepting that generalisation, a blitzkrieg-type strategy was employed by the Soviet Union in its invasion of Manchuria in 1945, of Hungary in 1956, and of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was also used by North Korea in its invasion of South Korea in 1951, in Israeli's seizure of the Sinai in 1956 and in 1967, in India's rapid capture of East Pakistan in 1971, and in North Vietnam's attack on South Vietnam in 1975. Both the Soviets and the North Koreans seem to structure their forces for a blitzkrieg offensive. Other countries have tried to employ a blitzkrieg-type offensive with less success. Iraq's attack on Iran was poorly thought through and imperfectly executed; they did not strike deeply enough at strategic targets, the Iranians were able to reform and it became a protracted war of attrition. Israel's offensive into Lebanon in 1982 failed to correlate strategic purposes and operational concept. Because the Israeli Government would not initially endorse a deep strike to the gates of Beirut the Israeli blitzkrieg lacked firm strategic purpose and had to meet the Syrians head-on. But clearly the blitzkrieg, with its emphasis on rapid, offensive land operations, is still attractive to many countries.

It is interesting to speculate as to whether there is any offensive concept for continental warfare that is not based on the blitzkrieg. One possibility is a slow war of attrition, aimed at wearing down the morale and resources of the enemy. There are few, if any, examples of this strategy being employed successfully by the initiator of a war in modern times. However, it was used by Iran following the attack by Iraq, and by China once it joined the Korean war.

Another possibility is if two neighbouring countries had people of the same ethnic group, one country might encourage an insurrection against the neighbouring government in the hope that it could detach part of the neighbour's territory. Alternatively, it might aim to overthrow the neighbouring country's government and replace it with one more amenable to its wishes. This is roughly what happened in Vietnam. North Vietnam did not have the resources to mount a conventional invasion of South Vietnam and chose a slower alternative. It might be noted, however, that ultimately North Vietnam did resort to a blitzkrieg in 1975. Without getting into the area of revolutionary strategy, it is hard to think of cases where such a strategy has been successful elsewhere.

The fourth characteristic of continental strategy is the importance of alliances or coalitions. Alliances have been a feature of European warfare since the days when the nations of Europe came together to oppose Napoleon. It has been argued that one reason for the rapid escalation of the First World War was the system of alliances in Europe. Nations enter alliances to off-set perceived weaknesses. Nato and the Warsaw Pact are classic examples of alliances in a continental setting. Unlike the First World War, these recent alliances appear to have deterred war.

The final characteristic of continental strategy is geo-strategic inevitability. It hardly seems necessary to labour the point that nations pursue a continental strategy because they have no other option. In this context, therefore, it might be more profitable to examine the situation where a nation does have an option. The one country which consistently has had the option of following either a maritime or a continental strategy is the United States. Despite its huge navy, the United States has usually employed a continental strategy. In Korea it was obvious that the only way to stop North Korea's advance was to make a substantial contribution of land forces. The US Navy supported the land campaign. Again, in South Vietnam the US decided on a continental commitment. From the time of the Truman Doctrine in the late 1940s the US has had a continental commit-
ment to Europe. Indeed in Korea, Vietnam and Europe the American commitment was considered to be part of the containment of the great continental power, the Soviet Union. The US approach paralleled that of Britain earlier in the century, although on a larger scale. Like Britain, the United States could have withdrawn to safety across the sea. But it perceived that it was not in its interest to allow the Soviet Union to dominate the Eurasian heartland and it sought to establish a coalition of allies, and to support that coalition with an actual commitment of troops.

However, in the 1970s the situation began to change, and in the early 1980s a considerable debate developed in defence circles in the United States over the most appropriate strategy for the coming decade. Essentially there were two schools of strategic thought, the maritime and the continental. It is not the purpose of this article to describe the US Maritime Strategy, with its aim of direct attack on Soviet naval, air and ground forces using US maritime resources, including amphibious forces and the rapidly deployable forces held by Central Command. Critics of the maritime strategy argue that, by itself, the maritime strategy could not win and that conventional land forces in Europe had to be improved. Allies in Europe and Asia had to be persuaded to pull their weight.

The Reagan Administration tried to pursue both strategies. The US Joint Staff publication *Military Purpose for FY 1989*, states:

> Because the pivotal element of Soviet power remains the Red Army, US and allied capabilities for deterring and, if necessary, defeating Soviet aggression will continue to depend heavily on dictating the outcome of the land battle in Europe.

But the same publication states:

> the United States is inescapably a maritime nation... Should deterrence fail the objective of US sea power are to destroy the Soviet Navy, influence the land battle by ensuring reinforcement and resupply and by directly applying carrier air and amphibious power, deny the Soviets the ability to apply a single front strategy by exerting global pressure on Soviet forces, thereby aiding in terminating the conflict on terms acceptable to the United States and its allies.

At present the US Navy has reached a strength of 568 ships, heading towards 600 ships by the end of the decade.

Australia is another country that has had the option of pursuing a maritime or a continental strategy. Traditionally a maritime state has been defined as "a nation whose interests are centred on overseas trade, possessions, and dependencies and not on any continental land mass". There is a free enterprise ethic, democratic government and a relatively small, volunteer army. The nation depends on its navy to control the surrounding home waters and to protect its oceanic trade routes. Britain and the United States are modern examples. By contrast, the continental power has an authoritarian government and a large conscript army. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are modern examples.

By these criteria Australia falls in the category of a maritime power, but throughout its history, the maritime force has been largely provided by its allies. Where there has been a maritime threat, such as the one posed by Japan from 1905 to 1945, Australia followed a maritime approach to its defence. However, in the 1930s the Australian Army doubted the reliability of maritime defence and pushed for a larger army to allow for the continental defence of Australia. And where Australia’s interests have been threatened by a continental power Australia has joined with its allies in their efforts to defeat those enemies in their own land. Thus substantial forces were sent to fight Germany in France in the First World War. Land and air forces confronted the Axis continental forces in Europe and the Middle East in the Second World War. And land forces were deployed to South East Asia to help stem the “downward thrust of communism” in the 1950s and 1960s.

Historically, the Australian Army has had many of the characteristics of a continental army. By 1918 the Australian Corps was a highly effective contributor to the Allies’ continental forces. But in the Middle East in the Second World War Australia’s capable infantry divisions needed the support of British armoured formations. British logistics and the Royal Air Force. When Australia raised armoured and motorised divisions in 1942 it was found that they were not suitable for use in the operations to support MacArthur’s strategy against Japan. We might ask ourselves: what is the driving ethos of the army today? Is it the
ability to raise a large, balanced armour-oriented army capable of fighting a continental war? Or is it a smaller, hard-hitting, easily deployable army capable of supporting a maritime strategy? If it is the latter, do we have the maritime resources to support such a strategy? And the essence of traditional maritime strategy has not just been to patrol the home waters, but to seize vital points beyond the home shores.

**The Conduct of Continental Strategy**

So far this article has discussed the evolution and nature of continental strategy. It is now necessary to look more closely at how a nation actually conducts its continental strategy and how the military professional implements it. Essentially, the practitioner of continental strategy has three choices; he can defend his own territory, he can invade and seize his neighbour's territory, or he can destroy his neighbour's capacity to wage war, primarily his army. The decision about which option to pursue relates to a large extent on the nation's geo-strategic position. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the political and higher level strategic aspects of deciding whether to attack or remain on the defensive, except to note in passing that while the German decision to invade France in 1914 by advancing through Belgium was clearly the best operational plan, in the long run it was a political and strategic disaster because it ensured that Britain would immediately enter the war against Germany.

The essence of land operations is manoeuvre: what is to be moved, where is it to be moved and how, will the enemy allow me to conduct the manoeuvre, what will be the impact on him, and will I be better off not moving at all? The role of manoeuvre has been discussed at some length elsewhere, but what are the factors affecting the capacity for manoeuvre?

The most obvious factor is terrain. It is not a factor which greatly affects the sailor or airman but it is crucial to the soldier. The terrain will partly determine whether a country decides to remain on the defensive or plans to invade its neighbour. The Germans did not hesitate to invade Belgium in 1914 and again in 1940 to gain the maximum advantage in their war against France. On both occasions they decided not to go through the more mountainous area of Switzerland. The Israelis have usually planned to remain on the defensive in the Golan heights, facing Syria; but in the more open Sinai area on their border with Egypt they have preferred to strike at the Egyptian army with a deep offensive. Clearly, the terrain of a theatre requires analysis that differs from tactical appreciations. Ports, airfields, road networks and major physical features such as mountain ranges, desert regions and marsh areas are the centre of such analysis.

Another obvious factor is logistics. At the strategic level, it is the capacity of a country to sustain its army with the equipment, munitions and fuel to achieve its strategic aims. During the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Germans were drawn south by their desire to seize the Soviet grain producing areas and oil fields. At the operational level logistics is concerned mainly with the transportation of supplies, ammunition and fuel to the manoeuvre groups. Operational commanders have repeatedly found themselves more constrained by logistics than tactical commanders have been. In north Africa at El Alamein in 1942 Rommel had to remain on the defensive because he did not have the logistic resources to attack. In western Europe in 1944 Patton's advance ground to a halt when he ran out of fuel. Both commanders had their freedom of manoeuvre restricted by logistic considerations.

It is not generally realised that the German blitzkrieg grew out of logistic limitations. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century their armies could be moved quickly and efficiently to the concentration area by railway, but thereafter the logistic support was provided by horse and wagon. The logistic system broke down at the railhead. Consequently it was preferrable if the enemy could be encircled and defeated close to the border, with the introduction of tanks and armoured personnel carriers in the 1930s the problem became even more acute. Since the infantry divisions marched to battle supported by horse and wagon, the panzer divisions had to win the campaign before the infantry were exhausted.

Another factor is human resources. Obviously a fairly large population would be an advantage if a country is going to prosecute a continental strategy successfully. To compensate for lack of numbers a nation might try to use superior technology, training, morale and
surprise, but these have their limitations. The Israelis know that even with the advantage of technology, training, morale and surprise, they still cannot afford to allow a protracted war of attrition to develop. Thus human resources become an important determinant of land operational concepts, and conscription, mobilization and reserves are prime considerations in the development of concepts for continental strategy.

One method of offsetting a numerical inferiority is by the use of superior technology. From the days of Moltke, technology has been a driving force in the development of concepts for land operations. As mentioned earlier, it was the railway and the telegraph which enabled Moltke to mobilize his army, move it rapidly to the concentration area, and sometimes to the battlefield, and to keep control over these widely dispersed forces. The development of the tank, armoured personnel carriers, close support aircraft and the radio enabled the Germans to apply their blitzkrieg concept with such devastating effect in the early stages of the Second World War. More recent technological developments have further increased the capacity for manoeuvre. But the reality of warfare is that no country can rely for very long on its technological advantage, and concepts for the use of the technology are just as important as the technology itself. It is well known that the allies had more and better tanks than the Germans during the battle for France in May 1940, but the Germans had a better concept for their use.

Operational Concepts

It now remains to bring these factors together and to examine some of the concepts which might be applied in continental warfare. It has already been described at some length how a blitzkrieg strategy depends on effective offensive operations, and the key to successful offensive operations in manoeuvre. It is noticeable that the Soviets have developed operational manoeuvre groups so that they can maintain the momentum of their advance. Countries which intend to conduct offensive operations usually structure their force to include large numbers of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled guns, helicopters and ground attack aircraft. There has been a gradual tendency to try to give the complete combat team the same mobility and protection as the tank. Thus the Israeli Merkava tank is able to carry soldiers in the back for short periods. There are some analysts who consider that the main battle helicopter will become the armoured vehicle of the future. While armoured fighting vehicles are the traditional means of achieving manoeuvre within a theatre, other means include helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, parachutes and amphibious warfare ships. There is no easy prescription for successful offensive operations. But if the war is not to bog down in a bloody slugging match, the offensive commander must strike deep at strategic targets. As the Egyptians found in 1973 and the Iraqis found in 1980, it is not sufficient to win the first battles.

While the continental school is built around offensive land operations, countries threatened by the possibility of a powerful land attack have been forced to undertake a range of defensive measures which must be considered in any discussion of the continental school. Historically there have been a range of defensive measures. Before the First World War the French sought to match the Germans in their ability to mobilize, and their antidote to a German offensive was to mount one of their own. The German's out-maneuvered the French and the latter had to resort to static, linear defence of the worst type on their own war-ravaged soil. In the lead up to the Second World War the French resorted to fixed defences - the Maginot line. And in each case alliances were formed so that theoretically, the smaller countries could defend themselves against the powerful, centrally-placed Germans.

There have been other defensive concepts. The Finns resorted to mobile defence in the harsh terrain of their centre and north while establishing static defences in the south. Mao Tse Tung's Communists in China showed that guerrilla warfare was an effective means of defence against Japan's powerful continental army. Further defensive concepts include mobile defence, deep area defence and forward defence.

One feature of continental strategy is that many smaller countries simply do not have the capacity to defend themselves against a large continental neighbour. They either come to an accommodation with their powerful neighbour, as Finland did after losing two wars to the Soviet Union. Or they put flowers in the
barrels of the invaders rifles as the Czechs did in 1968.

Although defensive measures sometimes held the continental aggressor at bay, they rarely won the war if one broke out. The allies in the First World War were the defenders, but they were forced to mount their own offensive operations to win the war. In the Second World War the British and Americans painfully had to mass the forces and learn how to conduct their own offensive operations to drive the Germans back in North Africa, Italy and France. Generals such as Montgomery and Patton became skilled exponents of the operational art, even if they did not use that term.

This idea has continued in the post Second World War period. The Israelis knew after the war of 1948 that they could not rely on purely defensive concepts. Their forces were structured for offensive operations and their generals were masters of the operational level of war. Furthermore, the Israelis knew that they might not be able to absorb an Arab attack and still mount their counter-offensive. As a result they relied on another concept, the pre-emptive strike. It is a matter of perception whether such a strike is offensive or defensive and to win this diplomatic, political and psychological argument requires considerable preparation before hostilities begin.

The NATO allies have been ambivalent in their approach to defeating the Soviet blitzkrieg. For many years, in theory and in practice, they planned to fight a series of defensive battles across Germany, or as the Germans insisted, along the eastern border. But the American Airland battle concept and its NATO variant, Follow on Forces attack, introduced in the early 1980s, was an acknowledgement that if nuclear weapons were not used, the Soviets had to be countered not by static defence but by offensive operations. It is certainly true that the NATO allies have not intention of striking first. Nor is it the NATO plan to strike into Eastern Europe with ground forces. But they do intend to defeat the Soviet ground forces in a campaign of manoeuvre and to drive them out of Western Europe. To match their restructuring, the Western allies have spent much effort in retraining their senior commanders to appreciate the requirements of the operational level of war.

**Conclusion**

This article began by describing the historical development of the continental school of strategic thought. It then argued that the nature of continental strategy noting that it is characterised by big wars, mass armies, offensive action, alliances and geo-strategic inevitability. The important factors affecting the conduct of continental strategy were considered to be terrain, logistics and human resources. Finally, in considering some of the concepts that might be used in continental strategy, it was noted that blitzkrieg is the dominant offensive strategy relying on well-planned offensive operations, while there are a variety of defensive strategies and concepts.

In its historical context, the continental school of strategic thought was concerned with the preparation for and the waging of an offensive war to defeat the neighbouring country’s army and thus its ability to wage war. In more recent times continental strategy has involved not only the waging of war by land forces across a land frontier, but the deployment of forces to prevent such wars. Short of a nuclear attack, invasion by ground forces is the greatest threat faced by any country. In most countries that threat is the driving force in the structuring of their defence force.

Unlike the practitioners of continental strategy, Australia does not have a land frontier and has a relatively unique strategic environment. What then can we learn from a study of the continental school? Firstly, we learn how land warfare has developed and why modern armies are structured the way they are. Secondly, we gain insight into the imperatives behind the strategic plans of the world’s major powers. Thirdly, we need to recognise that the Australian Army has been shaped by the lessons of continental strategy. Like it or not, it is Australia’s military heritage. Some might argue that there is little relevance to present circumstances - that Australia need only use selectively the concepts of continental warfare. But Australian planners will not be able to use the concepts selectively without understanding the whole theory of the continental school. It is hoped that this article goes part of the way towards providing that understanding.
NOTES


8. Clausewitz, On War, p 258.


11. If Britain had not sent troops to Europe, France would have been defeated and Britain’s maritime strategy alone could not have defeated Germany.


21. For examples and discussion of these concepts see ibid.


BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence libraries.


Rayward, R.J., More than a Mere Bravado: Duntroon Slang, Canberra, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1990.
SAS: PHANTOMS OF THE JUNGLE: A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN SPECIAL AIR SERVICE. By David Horner. Published by Allan and Unwin Australia.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel D.E. Lewis.

David Horner's latest book is a further example of this author's significant contribution to the body of military history in Australia. SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle is a story long overdue in the telling, and while it was not the author's intention to produce an official Regimental History, this work goes much of the way to do just that.

Horner has provided a blend of historical fact with the personal experiences of those immediately involved. In my own years of association with the many patrol commanders mentioned in the book, I have heard the stories, both the fact and I expect the embellishments, the humour and tragedy, the effect of very small groups of men living, playing, fighting and sometimes dying together. The bonding effect that total reliance on fellow patrol members creates is easily understood.

This book will do much to lift the veil of mystery surrounding SASR activity and to dispel some of the myth. It is good reading for the general public, but in particular it is recommended reading for young soldiers as an inspiration, and for not so young senior serving soldiers to better appreciate the asset they currently control.

Horner has traced the history of the SAS from its formation as the 1st SAS Company in 1957, through the expansion to regimental status. He then goes on to describe operations in Borneo and Vietnam with great accuracy and in sufficient detail to make interesting but not repetitive reading. His description of patrolling techniques and the often hair-raising situations in which patrols found themselves is nicely balanced with the wider political and military backdrop affecting the decisions of SAS Commanders of the time.

It is clear that Horner has deliberately omitted much of the anecdotal material enshrined in Regimental folklore. This material is generally very comical and would provide a story in itself. Scope exists for the publication of a further book on this aspect of the SAS.

An interesting aspect of Horner's book is the inclusion of those many developments with the SAS which have occurred in peace time. He describes how the highest standards of training and excellence were achieved before operational deployments, and how since the end of the commitment to South Vietnam in 1971, the Regiment has continued to develop and adapt to very changed circumstances. He describes the development within SASR of surveillance capabilities for continental defence, and the creation of a counter-terrorist force to meet a new international threat. The flexibility and utility of SAS troops, coupled with their inherent limitations is an aspect of SAS operations with which all senior commanders and staff should become familiar. The last 33 years have seen the evolution from humble beginnings of a highly trained and dedicated force which adds significantly to the strategic capability of the ADF.

In summary, David Horner is to be congratulated on his work. The standard of his research, the accuracy of his accounts and the sensitivity of his handling of what I know to have been contradictory reports given by individuals, has been remarkable. As one who continues to have personal attachment to the SASR 'family' I enjoyed this book and commend it to any reader, young or old who has an interest in what has hitherto been a largely untold story of the SAS in war and peace.


Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel R.E. Bradford.

This paper was produced as a thesis component of Lieutenant Rod Rayward's Fourth Year Honours programme at ADFA in 1988. Whilst the title suggests that Duntruan slang is the main topic, the author has incorporated a wide list of terms used by Cadets over the fifty years. As such it could be a trip down memory lane for past graduates and staff, but
to simply place the work in this category would denigrate the scholastic nature of the paper. The first three chapters which discuss the history of slang, the formation of slang and words of special interest, and the sociolinguistic aspects of slang are easy to read and provide a neat yet informative background to the main part of the paper. *Duntroon Slang 1930 - 1980.*

One aspect of the Duntroon slang researched, which is surprising, is the number of words adopted by RMC, which have remained in general use there for a long period of time without any real change in meaning. To mention a few, "bog, bump, furphy, in-after, leaps, mash, oil, poop and TOC" could be used in general conversation between graduates of all ages, and still be generally understood. The relative isolation of RMC in the past, geographic and imposed obviously had a deal to do with this; other terms however went by the wayside over the years, (such as "dogrobbers, fly walk, hop and nirnip"), obviously because of changes in usage, personalities and the reduction of cadet isolationism.

I can say very little else about the paper, except I enjoyed reading all of it, most probably because of my ride down memory lane. Those graduates who would like a similar trip could do worse than to procure a copy through the English Department at ADFA. Should you find that the list is not exhaustive, Dr Bruce Moore at ADFA on behalf of the author is keen to add to the work any additional words and terms that may come to mind as a result of reading the paper. Because of the constraints of time and study, the list in the book is not exhaustive and comments on the list would be appreciated.

**SEAGULLS, CRUISERS AND CATA-PULTS.** By Ray Jones. Published by Pelorus Publications, Tasmania.

*Reviewed by Commodore N.E. Lee, RAN, (Retd).*

This is a well researched book on a subject that has received little attention in the past. Much has been written about the beginnings of the RAAF but this is the first time to my knowledge that the early involvement of the RAN in aviation matters has been addressed in such detail.

Although titled *Seagulls, Cruisers and Cata-pults,* the book is in fact a short history of Australian maritime aviation, from shortly before the First World War, to the end of the Second. It gains its title from the fact that these were the three essential elements involved.

Jones' research has brought to light the fact that the RAN was considering establishing its own aviation organisation prior to the First World War. The Naval Board had decided in 1913 to establish three aviation bases for "waterplanes" plus an aviation school at HMAS Cerberus. The outbreak of the First World War thwarted this plan. One cannot help reflecting whether, but for the intervention of WW1, the RAN might have developed responsibility for maritime aviation matters along similar lines to the USN.

WW1 proved that naval aviation was an essential part of any modern fleet, the only question to be resolved was how was it to be provided. Shortly before the end of the war, a separate Royal Air Force had been established in the United Kingdom, combining the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps. This new service was to meet the needs of the older two services but the practical details of just how this was to be done were yet to be resolved.

Inevitably a conflict of interests arose, with the Admiralty finding itself no longer master of its own destiny in aviation matters. It tried to regain control, but did not succeed until shortly before WWII. Jones reminds us of how the RAN conducted its affairs as essentially an element of the RN (still very apparent in the post WWII years) and followed the latter in attempts to set up its own aviation organization, equally failing to gain the necessary control.

Jones leads us through the nonsense that then went on in the decade after the war, with naval officers being seconded for flying duties, with dual commissions and strange rules and regulations as to the wearing of uniform. It was all classically a compromise, with the RAN half-heartedly trying to have a stronger say in how it was to be provided with aviation support, and the newly formed RAAF doing its best to deny it that say.

The rub was that the RAAF needed the task of providing aviation support for the Fleet, since military aviation of that time in Australia was essentially maritime oriented. The CAS, Williams, had the irksome task of building his
fledging organisation through meeting the operational needs of another service. Whilst prepared to do so, he fought tooth and nail to retain professional control of aviation matters and, as is history, succeeded.

As a measure of inter-service relations between the wars, the RAAF was not consulted in the matter of ship characteristics when the seaplane carrier HMAS *Albatross* was being designed. Equally, Williams seems to have unilaterally decided the specification of the *Seagull V* with which she would be equipped.

In summary, the book sets out in some detail, the chronological development of amphibian operations from RAN ships between the wars. It covers the problems of command and control, difficulties with catapult selection, and the decision to build the Seaplane Carrier, HMAS *Albatross*. The selection and operation of the Seagull III and Seagull V aircraft and the latter's operation from Australian Cruisers during WWII are well covered.

Whilst an admirable piece of research, I found the book somewhat dry. I had a little difficulty with too much "on such and such a day a four hour patrol was flown by Smith and Brown in aircraft A-2". One must respect the aims of the author, however I believe life could have been injected by including interviews with some of the participants listed in the preface.


Reviewed By Lieutenant Colonel R.E. Bradford.

Technology in many forms has played and will continue to play a major part in warfare. In the past technological developments have been incremental in nature, with each succeeding development simply adding a little extra to the inventory of a particular weapon system. Over recent years however, discussion on *Star Wars* technology has added a new dimension to warfare, all seemingly caused by an exponential development. This transition to an added dimension will only come to fruition however, with a great deal of research and consequently an even greater amount of money. In this book Air Commodore Garden attempts to put into perspective the quantum leaps technology is making in weapons development, by comparing past achievements, current developments and then hypothesising on future developments. In doing so he has produced a more than adequate primer for those interested in the development of military technology.

The book has been broken into three distinct elements by Garden. Part One discusses lessons from the past, and how technological developments altered warfare on the land and sea, and in the air. His short histories indicated that governments have not been good at recognising developments which would give them major advantages in conflict. Where developments worthy of further research had been recognised, large time lapses invariably occurred between the critical scientific advance, and the acceptance and deployment of the resulting weapon system. Forty years is mentioned as the time taken from building of the first steamboat to its adaptation into the first steam powered warship. A similar timeframe was needed to develop the first submarine into a military weapon platform. Clearly not an enviable record.

In the second part of the book, the author covers present day scientific developments in areas of interest to the military. Developments in the areas of high energy physics, computing science, nuclear physics, space technology, chemistry, materials science, biotechnology and electronics are most adequately covered in such a way that the most non-technically minded of us can understand. This sympathetic approach by the author provides a good general background to the reader on these technologies, which is backed up by a large bibliography for those readers wishing to learn more on any specific area.

The final part of the book discusses the future of air, sea and land battles, as well as science and the military of the future. In this part he produces no easy answers on how we can successfully manage developments in military technology and warns that failures will continue to occur in recognising developments of military importance. Gardner also feels that incremental not exponential changes to weapon systems will be the norm, hampered by the lack of finance necessary to continue research and development of possible war winning weapon systems.

Air Commodore Gardner is a serving mem-
ber of the Royal Air Force who in between flying and commanding a Vulcan strategic bomber squadron found time to obtain a Physics degree from Oxford University and another in International Relations. Although I was disappointed with the lack of depth of discussion on some topics, I was most appreciative of the diversity of topics covered. All in all, I can recommend the book to those interested in gaining a general knowledge of technology and the military.

**GALLIPOLI CORRESPONDENT, THE FRONT LINE DIARY of C.E.W. Bean.**
Selected and annotated by Kevin Fewster. Published by George Allen and Unwin Australia. Price $19.95.

Reviewed by J. P. Buckley O.B.E.

C.E.W. Bean saw more of the Anzacs on Gallipoli than any other person. He landed with them on 25 April 1915 and remained until evacuation.

As well as being a courageous war correspondent, Bean had a marvellous talent for observation and expressing in words, the frontline heroism, tragedy and carnage of war.

Night after night, he sat in his dugout writing in his diary what he had seen and done during the long day. His written descriptions are a classic account of Anzac history. It is not necessary for me to elaborate on the contribution, Bean made to Australian pride, tradition and history. However like most people I cannot understand why he did not “go public” on his criticism of the British Army leadership and muddle during the campaign.

Kevin Fewster has spent years in researching the Bean diaries. He is a young historian with several other good books to his credit. Fewster in association with two Turkish authors, recently published *A Turkish View of Gallipoli* which will be published shortly.

In his entry of 17 December 1915, Bean writes “I saw the engineers 5th Coy (Sturdee) yesterday burning their rifles, picks, shovels...- breaking pumps. I smashed my home made furniture myself and put a knife through the water proof sheets when I left my dug-out. Somehow I don’t like to think of that furniture as a curiosity in some Turkish Officers home...”

*Gallipoli Correspondent* is an excellent publication, well illustrated by selected photographs of Gallipoli, together with master paintings (in colour) by G.W. Lambert.

Fewster’s selection of the diary entries and the supporting narrative are first class, I cannot find anything to criticize in the book. A significant contribution to Australian Military History by a gifted historian.

**THE WHITE GURKHAS - THE AUSTRALIANS AT THE SECOND BATTLE OF KRITHIA.** By Ron Austin. Published by R.J. & S.P. Austin, McCrae, Victoria. Available at major bookshops at $35.

Reviewed by John Buckley.

This is the story of the disaster at Krithia, Gallipoli, when soldiers of the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Battalions of the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade were sent to be cut to pieces by a solidly entrenched enemy in a series of frontal daylight attacks which had not the faintest chance of success. The first battle of Krithia was fought by the British and French troops from 28th April until 2nd May, 1915. The attack failed miserably and the 2nd Australian Brigade was a part of the force sent into assist on 6th May, 1915. The book includes viewpoints and experiences of the A.I.F. troops. The Brigade had 25 minutes warning and the Battalions had only 10 minutes to mount the suicidal attack.

General Sir Ian Hamilton must accept a significant part of the blame for his own lack of leadership in leaving Hunter-Weston in command at Krithia.

The details of the battle make very sad reading and horror at the needless sacrifice brought about by block-headedness.

Austin has researched his subject well and has presented his story with great detail and accuracy. Some of his quotations from other sources are most descriptive of the carnage; e.g. (a) Sir Ian Hamilton wrote - “Men rose, fell, ran, rushed in waves, broke, recoiled, crumbled away and disappeared”. (b) Private Glen Martin of the 5th Battalion wrote - “We fixed bayonets, and charged under a hellfire of shrapnel, machine guns, rifles and land bombs; it was nothing but murder”.

The charge of the Australians during the battle was compared with the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava; both battles resulted in reckless and needless destruction of precious lives.
Major General Roy Gordon, so well known and respected by all old soldiers, particularly those who served with or under him, wrote an excellent foreword.

Ron Austin has written a most interesting story about the beginning of the Anzac tradition. It makes one proud to read the wonderful story of our forebears on Gallipoli. I cannot understand why they are nicknamed “The White Gurkhas”. To call them “Anzacs” was enough: in my opinion the ultimate in soldierly qualities. Get this book - it won’t last long on the shelves.

THE GALLIPOLI DIARY OF SERGEANT LAWRENCE. Edited by Sir Ronald East. SERGEANT LAWRENCE GOES TO FRANCE. Edited by Peter Yule. Both Published by Melbourne University Press. Price: $19.95 each.

Reviewed by John Buckley.

Sir Ronald East, a distinguished engineer, had the vision to publish the Diaries of Sergeant Cyril Lawrence (later Brigadier Lawrence in World War II). His undertaking was a mammoth task and the end result is a significant contribution to Australian military history.

By the time Sir Ronald decided to edit the first diary, Lawrence had left Australia to live with his married daughter in South Africa. Ninety years of age, he was blind; but most enthusiastic about his letters home being published. It says much for East and Lawrence that the publication of the diaries proceeded efficiently and quickly and with outstanding success. Lawrence’s daughter, Dr Margaret Heese, assisted with the work.

This work has been continued by the excellent research and dedication of Dr. Peter Yule, who edited the second of these publications. Sir Ronald, in passing over the task of editing Lawrence’s letters from France, states, “The editorial work involved in this volume has been much greater, for Peter Yule has had to condense much, omit some, and identify localities left unnamed by Lawrence for reasons of censorship”. (I understand that Peter Yule is a grandson of Sir Ronald East).

The diaries indicate that Cyril Lawrence had great power of observation and a talent to translate these to picturesque and accurate pen pictures. His description of fighting on Gallipoli and in France is first class. The slaughter of huge numbers of patriotic soldiers on the Somme and elsewhere is told with feeling and horror.

The conditions under which some of the major battles in France were fought are almost unbelievable, but we know they are true. Sometimes the unfortunate troops were decimated by the errors of a few senior commanders. It is a pity that censorship prevented Lawrence from naming his officers. I feel sure that he served with many R.A.E. officers who were to become famous at Gallipoli, in France, or later in post war Australia.

In his diaries, Lawrence displays a talent for writing with a picturesque, clear and concise narrative which is used to perfection by some other “engineer” historians - Sir Ronald East, Major-General R.R. McNicol, Dr. R.R. O’Neill and Sir Bernard Callinan are a few examples. Last but not least General Sir John Monash. Who said engineers cannot write? Lawrence had a distinguished engineering career both in war and peacetime, part of which he spent under the leadership of Sir Ronald who was Chairman of the Victorian State Rivers & Water Supply Commission for many years. They were close friends.

I could write pages on the most interesting material provided in these two books and I am tempted to do so - but the Editor likes short reviews and I must abide by his requirements.

In conclusion, congratulations to Sir Ronald East - and his successor, Peter Yule - they have been instrumental in providing for prosperity a very important series of letters, written by Lawrence, which so clearly set out the horrors of the battles in Gallipoli and France in World War I. However, it’s not all sadness - there were also the good times and the priceless “mateship” of the troops.

Any reader interested in military history should have these books. They are another example of the skill of the Melbourne University Press in selecting classic stories of Australian Military History. Others are Monash by Pedersen, John Monash by Geoffrey Serle, Chauvel of the Light Horse by A.J. Hill, Frank Honywood, Private by Eric Partridge, Recollections of a R.M.O. by Blue Steward. I also include a well known writers “Joe” Gullett and Peter Ryan.

Reviewed by Lieutenant G.J. Harper.

With the Battle of Britain commemorating its fiftieth anniversary in 1990 it is entirely appropriate that the event be celebrated with a book of this magnitude and quality. This work aims to present the general reader with as full an account of the battle as possible without becoming bogged down in the mass of detail available on the Battle of Britain. The work is able to achieve its aim without missing any significant detail while maintaining a very vivid, readable style.

This work is the collaboration of two well-known historians: Denis Richards and Richard Hough. Denis Richards is well known for his three-volume contribution to the official history of the Royal Air Force in the Second World War and for his work An Illustrated History of Modern Europe 1789-1984, first published in 1938 and now in its seventh edition. Richard Hough, a fighter pilot himself during the war, is best known for his biographies on the Mountbatten family.

Although aimed at the general reader, the book still contains a wealth of significant detail. If the reader is searching for details of the battle he need look no further than the twelve appendices which contain amongst other information: a day by day chronology of the Battle of Britain detailing weather conditions, main events and the losses of the RAF and the Luftwaffe for that day; the Order of Battle for Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe, the basic statistics of the battle and even the benefits of using 100 octane fuel (as used by RAF Fighter Command) rather than the standard 87 octane fuel the Luftwaffe used throughout the battle.

The book has two qualities that make it distinctive. It details precisely the lessons learned from the First Battle of Britain - the bombing raids on Britain in the Great War - and then details how both sides developed their air forces in the years between the wars. This background material is essential to gain a full understanding of how and why the battle developed as it did in 1940. The outcome of the battle was the result of years of planning and experience and the book gives a full account of both.

The second quality of the book is the many personal accounts spread throughout the work of those who actually participated in the battle or were eyewitnesses to it. These accounts are spread liberally throughout the work as well as having a chapter of their own entitled "Scrambles". They have the effect of making the battle come alive for the reader and give the battle, very much a human face.

The book provides a thorough, easy to understand, analysis of the Battle of Britain. If a reader is looking for a well researched, general account of the Battle of Britain that would make the battle live as well as providing a wealth of significant detail then he should look no further than this fine work: The Battle of Britain: The Jubilee History.