Defence Force Journal

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Defending Freedom
Dear Sir,

I feel that Reverend Campbell Egan’s article, Defending Freedom and Pursuing Peace (DFJ Mar/Apr 89), certainly put into perspective the thoughts of a great number of service people. Because we wear a military uniform, we are often considered to be promoters of war and this image is mutually exclusive of the peace movement.

To actively pursue either the “Anzac Movement” or the “Peace Movement” is to risk being labelled as an extremist member of either group. It is possible to realise the need for an active Australian Defence Force and to advocate world peace. The idealism of world peace and harmony must be tempered with the need for vigilance and an active Defence Force.

Reverend Egan’s final paragraph encapsulates my thoughts. “The idealism should not be allowed to flower into utopianism, nor the realism degenerate into an iron or nuclear ghetto. The two must be linked in the defence of freedom and the pursuit of peace.”

K. G. Lilley
Cpl

Air Power in Packets
Dear Sir

Wing Commander Cavanagh in his May/June DFJ article on air power, reported that “experience and logical analysis showed that air power, divided, produces disproportionately large reductions in military effectiveness in comparison with effects of disunity in land or sea power”.

Into what specifics did the logical analysis go I wonder? Could one draw from it the conclusion that aircraft at sea, including those onboard aircraft carriers, should be part of undivided air power? Do we stop short of including all land and sea air defence missiles?

It can be difficult to interpret the application of doctrine to specifics. In any debate I suspect that many sea and land commanders would argue that air units which are vital to the success of their mission should not be just assigned to them for that mission but should be integral to their forces.

One reason is that otherwise they will not have enough control of the resources needed for preparing and adapting their individual forces for their specific roles; and the air units’ effectiveness once assigned can be reduced during the time taken to become fully integrated.

Besides, if the allocation of air units to sea and land commanders is subject to competing priorities at the time they are needed, and subject to decision of those who may not have full comprehension of the sea and land scenes, the sea and land commanders will not be able to count on the units being available. In their planning this may distort their assessment of risks, tactics and force composition; and it may affect the boldness of their plans.

A key question seems to be how long before a sea or land force is to be operational should air units be assigned? The answer may vary from the last minute assignment to permanent assignment, depending on the nature of the air units and the role of the force concerned.

Setting up general principles for the allocation of air units might help more than the doctrinal and ad hoc approaches.

D. S. Ferry
Commodore RAN
N-2-09

The Decline of the Military Profession
Dear Sir,

I read Dr Smith’s article in Issue No. 74 with great interest. He chooses to describe it as speculative, I would call it provocative, and if this is his aim, then he has succeeded.

I am loath to allow facts get into the way of a good story, but I am compelled to write to correct at least one of his examples of the “irreversibility of the trend” (towards civilisation), that of “civilian” doctors going to sea.

As I write, plans to send a highly capable surgical support team to sea aboard HMA Ships for Kangaroo 89 are well advanced. Six surgeons including an orthopaedic surgeon and an Ear, Nose and Throat surgeon, two anaesthetists, a radiologist, psychiatrist and support medical and nursing officers with operating theatre expertise will be embarked.

(Letters Continued on Page 38)
The ADF and the Operational Level of War

by Lieutenant Colonel D.M. Horner, RA Inf.

Introduction

WITH the release in October 1988 of the interim fourth edition of Joint Staff Publication No. 8, for the first time the Australian Defence Force (ADF) officially defined the concept of the “operational level of war” as being “concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns”. But as a military concept, it is still widely misunderstood. Indeed many senior officers still doubt the need for such a concept. After all, Australian forces have been involved in seven wars since Federation and have never before needed such a term. Why, these officers argue, is it necessary to introduce another term to describe warfare? Yet the concept has already played an important role in the development of the ADF. What then is the operational level of war? Why is it important? Is our definition right, and what does it mean for our commanders? In an attempt to answer some of these questions this article examines the development of the concept and assesses its value to Australia.

Development of the Concept

The terminology of warfare in general has been largely shaped by the practitioners of continental strategy. From the time when military thinkers first started systematically to analyse warfare, the term strategy was applied to land warfare. For example, in the early nineteenth century, the military writer, Jomini defined strategy as “the art of directing the greater part of the forces of an army on to the most important point of a theatre, or a zone of operations”. Writing at about the same time, Clausewitz had a similar idea, defining strategy as “the art of the employment of battle as a means to gain the object of war. In other words strategy forms the plan of the war, maps out of the proposed course of the different campaigns which compose war, and regulates the battles to be fought in each”.

For almost the remainder of the nineteenth century strategy was linked to land operations. For example, in 1866 General Sir Edward Hamley wrote:

“It is the object of strategy so to direct the movements of an army, that when decisive decisions occur it shall encounter the enemy with increased relative advantage”.1

Despite the fact that naval strategy had been exercised by Britain for centuries, it was not until 1890, when Admiral Mahan published his study of naval warfare, that a well articulated notion of naval strategy began to develop. The contemporary understanding of strategy is shown by the book Modern Strategy by Lieutenant-Colonel Walter H. James, first published about 1903.

The art of war is usually divided into two parts — strategy and tactics. Strategy deals with the military considerations which determine the choice of the offensive or defensive, the selection of the country in which to fight, the object against which armies should be directed, and embraces the Plan of Campaign or General Idea which dominates the conduct of the operations. Broadly speaking, therefore, strategy is concerned with the movement of troops before they come into actual collision, while tactics deals with the leading of troops in battle, or when battle is imminent.

The whole book was devoted to land operations, when reprinted as a second edition in 1904 it included a chapter on sea power because as the author put it, “command of the sea is so important a factor in England’s strategy, that even in a book which is purely military it is not out of place to deal with it”.2

Another book, The Foundations of Strategy, by Captain H.M. Johnstone, published in 1914, began with definitions. He wrote. “Strategy deals with movements and the taking up of positions of an army or armies, or parts of an army, up to the time when the next movements will bring about the collision”. He added that grand tactics were: “those ‘next movements’ of the units of the army”.3

That same year, Sir George Aston, in Sea, Land and Air Strategy, tried to give equal emphasis to land and sea strategy. Aircraft were seen as primarily contributing to sea and land methods of handling the sea and land forces.4

What we have to grasp, living in the 1980s, is that the world strategy a hundred years ago referred primarily to what we now call operations. Nevertheless, Clausewitz understood that there were three levels of war, and his
concepts can be summarised by the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Mass</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>referred to as ‘the next stage’ (strategy)</td>
<td>the war</td>
<td>the country</td>
<td>armies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strategy (operations)</td>
<td>the campaign</td>
<td>the theatre</td>
<td>army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tactics (tactics)</td>
<td>the battle</td>
<td>the position</td>
<td>division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The terms in parantheses are used today to describe these levels.5

Considering that in the early twentieth century strategy referred to the movement of armies or even naval forces, the experience of the First World War caused analysts a problem when they came to define strategy. What was the correct description for the process by which political and military leaders decided higher questions? These higher questions included Germany’s decision to extend the war to unrestricted submarine warfare, the allied decision to send forces to Salonika, Germany’s decision to allow Lenin back into Russia, and Britain’s decision to build aircraft large enough to bomb Germany.

Liddell Hart went only part way towards resolving the problem. The co-ordination and directing of all the resources of a nation was, in his view, grand strategy, while strategy was “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy”. That is, strategy included manoeuvre within the theatre and the allocation of military resources between theatres. Liddell Hart recognised the term “grand tactics” as used by Napoleon to describe the manoeuvre of large formations, but generally in his books he used the term strategy for these manoeuvres.6

The Second World War, the subsequent Cold War, and the introduction of strategic nuclear weapons, tended to push the term strategy into an even broader realm. We were left with nothing to describe what was going on within a theatre of war. Significantly, it was the traditional maritime powers, Britain and the United States, which failed to appreciate a need for a term to describe what happened within a theatre of operations.

By contrast, it was the continental powers, the Soviet Union and Germany, which developed terminology to cover theatre operations. And they did not develop terminology simply for the purpose of filling a gap in the military glossaries; they needed the terminology to focus attention on an area of vital study.

The Germans were, perhaps, the first to realise the need for an additional term, and during the First World War began to use the word “operativ” to describe the activities of large ground forces, usually armies or army groups, in a particular theatre. The German concept was fairly broad, as described by General von Freytag-Loringhoven in 1920:

“In the German Army, then, starting in the general staff, the employment of the term ‘strategisch’ (strategical) has fallen more and more into disuse. We replace it, as a rule, by the terms ‘operativ’, pertaining to ‘operations’ and thereby define more simply and clearly the difference from everything that is referred to as ‘taktisch’ (tactical)... the term ‘strategy’ ought to be confined to the most important measures of high-command”.7

The German generals, however, sold their souls to operations. Their early campaigns in the Second World War were smashing operational successes. Despite interference from Hitler, Barbarossa was an operational triumph. But it was a strategic error which led ultimately to defeat.

The Germans were defeated in the East by an army that in a short time also mastered the concept of large scale operations. As early as 1922 the Soviets had used the term “operational art” and it became official in the Red Army in 1926. In a document entitled “higher command”, the Red Army stated that the principles of the operational art were activeness, manoeuvre and massing. In the 1930s, particularly under Marshal Tukhachevskii, the Soviets developed the theory of consecutive operations.8 In the Soviet context, operational art refers to the activities of armies and army groups, and is a distinct form of activity lying between tactics and strategy. The Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff wrote in 1988:

“The separating of the theory of operational art from the area of the theory of strategy and its development as an independent part of the theory of military art were a major victory for our scientific thought and contributed to the subsequent more profound and thorough elaboration of the methods for preparing and conducting operations.

One cannot help but notice that the bourgeois armies reached the conclusion
of the existence of operational art after refusing to recognize the division of military art into three parts for several decades”.

As the Soviet general correctly states, for many years the Americans failed to recognize the existence of an operational level of war. Victory breeds complacency. While generals such as Patton and MacArthur demonstrated outstanding operation ability in the Second World War, the general American approach was a reliance on superior firepower, rather than on how forces could be manoeuvred at the operational level.

By the early 1970s, however, that complacency had been shattered by a number of events. First, the Americans had been defeated in Vietnam. Secondly, as the Soviets reached nuclear parity with the United States it became crucial that NATO conventional forces be able to defeat a Warsaw Pact conventional offensive. The Soviet forces were superior in firepower and numbers and the concept of holding the Soviet offensive with firepower no longer seemed workable. And finally, the 1973 Middle East war showed that precision guided munitions might render expensive, high technology weapons, such as tanks and ground attack aircraft, less effective on the battlefield.

With customary energy the American Army began a detailed analysis of how it could “win the first battle” and “fight outnumbered and win”, and for a model it looked at the success of the German Army in its defensive battles during the last half of the Second World War. Throughout the late 1970s the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), under General Conn A. Starry, developed plans, built around manoeuvre and offensive operations, that eventually crystallised as the Air Land Battle concept. By June 1981 a final draft of Air Land Battle was ready for publication in the new edition of Field Manual (FM) 110-5, Operations.

Meanwhile, the Winter 1980-1981 edition of the journal International Security carried an article by Edward Luttwak entitled The Operational Level of War. After a detailed explanation of the concept, with historical examples Luttwak concluded:

“Given the defensive orientation imposed by the grand strategy of the NATO alliance, only some relational-manoeuvre operational method based on the principles of avoidance (to side-step the major Soviet thrusts), deception (to mask the defenses), elusiveness (in small scale counter-attacks), and momentum (on the counter-stroke) would offer some hope of victory, although with considerable risks”.

A similar idea was being developed by Colonel Wallace P. Franz at the US Army War College, and in the December 1981 edition of Military Review he advocated the development of doctrine for the operational level of war. (Although he acknowledged the term, operational level of war, he preferred to call it “grand tactics”). As a result, the new commander of TRADOC, General Glenn K. Otis, determined that FM 100-5 was eventually published in August 1982, for the first time the US Army acknowledged the three levels of war. According to the 1982 US definition, “the operational level of war uses available military resources to attain strategic goals within a theatre of war. It also involves planning and conducting campaigns”. The manual explained that campaigns were sustained operations involving both simultaneous and sequential battles designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified space and time.

In the months following the release of FM 100-5 there were numerous articles in US Army journals explaining the operational level of war and its relationship to Air Land battle.

The British Army was quick to follow the American lead, and the 1985 edition of the British Army Field Manual, The Application of Force, states that the operational level of command is “concerned with the concept and conduct of operations at higher formation level where the tactical battles fought by lower formations are controlled and co-ordinated. The term applies particularly to the corps level but may equally apply at the divisional and occasionally at brigade level”. The UK definition is more narrow than the US definition and has a different focus. While the US Army includes operations within a theatre of war as being at the operational level, the British Army describes these operations as being at the military strategic level. Above that, the British have grand strategy.

The difference between the US and British definitions is that while the US definition refers to attaining strategic goals, the British are concerned with handling formations. Despite their heritage of the First and Second World War, the Germans are presently closer to the British definition than they are to the Americans in that they
regard “operational” as meaning the handling of divisions and corps. The Americans are closer to the Soviet definition of operational art. In the Israeli Army the operational level of war is concerned with brigade and division operations; although it was not until 1973 that the division became a regular formation in the Israeli Army. Thus the operational level refers to the activities of the largest formations in the Israeli Army, and considering the nature of their wars, the operations of brigades and divisions have a direct strategic effect. The Israeli understanding of the levels of war is shown in General Avraham Adan’s book about the 1973 war. Referring to the outbreak of the war he wrote:

“On top of the strategic surprise and the decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike, there was a serious operational mistake: failure to deploy the active Sinai Division according to the Shovach Yonim Plan. ...We were heavily outnumbered and had made mistakes at the tactical, operational and strategic levels”.

Introduction of the Concept in Australia

The Australian Army was first alerted to the operational level of war when the Army Attache in Washington, Brigadier David Butler, forwarded a copy of Luttwak’s article to Canberra in July 1981. It did not excite much attention among Defence staff in Canberra, but at the end of that year Butler returned to Australia to the appointment of General Officer Commanding Training Command. The Australian Army was in the process of rewriting its Manual of Land Warfare, and Butler directed the inclusion of the concept of the operational level.

By this time Butler, who was from the same Duntroon class as the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Bennett, had persuaded the CGS to accept the concept. Meanwhile, Brigadier John Essex-Clark, the new Commandant of the Command and Staff College, on an overseas study tour, had discussed the operational level of war with Colonel Franz at the US Army War College. Consequently a Training Command team led by Colonel Steve Gower was tasked to produce the key volume of the Manual of Land Warfare and include the operational level of war. Furthermore, the concept was introduced by Essex-Clark to the Senior Officers’ Study Period (SOSP) held in June 1983.

The draft of the Manual of Land Warfare, The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations, met resistance from some quarters, but was endorsed by the new Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Gratton, and was eventually published in January 1985. The manual stated:

“The operational level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. Campaigns take place in an area of operations. Where several areas of operations adjoin, they are collectively called theatres. It is at the operational level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions and resources to tactical missions”.

The definition therefore closely follows the Americans. But while the Australian manual mentions that it is at the operational level that military strategy is implemented, it fails to link explicitly (although it does implicitly) the activities of formations at the operational level with the attainment of strategic goals. Unlike the British definition, in Australia the operational level is not linked directly to the size of the formations. The Australian manual acknowledges that campaigns are usually conducted by forces such as armies or corps, but recognises that for conflicts at lower levels and intensities, a campaign could be conducted by smaller forces.

Recent Overseas Developments

In 1986 the US Army published a revised version of FM100-6 and further developed the concept of the operational level of war, now described as “operational art”. Rather than discussing levels of war, the publication states: “Military strategy, operational art and tactics are broad divisions of activity in preparing for and conducting war”. Operational art is described as “the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theaters of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations”. The manual also notes: “Air Land Battle doctrine distinguishes the operational level of war — the design and conduct of major campaigns and major operations — from the tactical level which deals with battles and engagements”.

But there is still confusion, and a senior staff member of the US Army War College has
claimed that Air Land Battle is a tactical not an operational doctrine. Moreover, a recent commander of the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency has argued that the manual still does not devote enough space to describing why the operational art is qualitatively different from tactics. The operational art, he says, is not tactics on a larger scale but has a different purpose or intent — where tactics are designed to win battles, operations are designed to win campaigns.

Despite widespread discussion of the concept in the US Army, there is still a lack of unanimity about its exact meaning. For example, the US Army definition refers both to a theatre of war and to campaigns. But Edward Luttwak, who began the intellectual discussion in 1981, has argued that there are five levels of warfare: technical, tactical, operational, strategy and grand strategy. Luttwak is influenced by the NATO environment in which the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Central Theatre commander both have concerns which are strategic in nature. To Luttwak, the operational level of war involves the handling of large formations, and this is also the view of the British Army.

After defining operational art, the 1986 US Army FM 100-5 goes on to describe how campaigns are conducted at the operational level of war. But the US Army definition also relates operational art to the achievement of strategic objectives by tactical forces. The advantage of this approach is that it is more useful in describing what happens in low level conflict and is more applicable to the navy and the airforce.

Following the lead of the US Army, the US Air Force has begun to develop the concept of the operational level of war, and the US National Defense University has published an excellent book called The Air Campaign. The book has the aim of coming "to grips with the very complex philosophy and theory associated with air war at the operational level".

Like the Americans, the British have continued to develop their understanding of the concept. For example, in a number of articles a recent Commander Northern Army Group, General Sir Martin Farndale, has outlined his concepts at the operational level. Furthermore, the British Army now conducts a three month Higher Command and Staff Course for brigadiers which concentrates on the operational level.

Effect of the Concept in Australia

Although the full ramifications of the introduction of the concept of the operational level of war have yet to be seen, there has already been a widespread effect on the ADF, especially in the Army. The complete series of Army pamphlets is now being examined to ensure that it reflects the three levels of war, and two recent pamphlets, Low Level Conflict and Directive Control, have been written with the operational level in mind. The preface to Low Level Conflict states: "This bulletin is concerned with the operational level of war". A crucial pamphlet, Campaigning, is now being produced, focusing directly on conventional operations at the operational level. The operational level is being taught at the Army Command and Staff College, and the Army's Strategic and Operational Study Period (SOSP) is the principal means by which senior Army officers are prepared for war at the operational level.

The other two services have been relatively slow to embrace the concept and some officers have argued that while it is fine for the Army it has little relevance for their service. The answer is that the operational level has already played a crucial role in ADF development, and this is shown by the important changes to the higher command structure of the ADF during the last five years. First the Chief of the Defence Force Staff was redesignated Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) to emphasise his command function, and at the same time Headquarters Australian Defence Force was established to assist the CDF in his command of the ADF. Then, a little later, a Vice Chief of the Defence Force was appointed to act as chief of staff of HQ ADF. Meanwhile, to enable the CDF to command the ADF's operational forces, steps were taken to form three environmental joint headquarters. The first of these, the joint Maritime Headquarters, was established on 1 July 1985, based on the existing Fleet Headquarters in Sydney. Land Headquarters and Air Headquarters were formed on 1 February 1986 from the existing headquarters.

Since the CDF exercises direct control over the joint headquarters for operations, the most significant aspect of the new arrangements was the removal of the single-service chiefs of staff from the chain of command for joint operations. In March 1988 the Minister for Defence approved the formation of Northern Command, another joint command, operating
under Land Command. And finally, the most recent step in this evolution was the decision to appoint a Commander Joint Forces Australia (CJFA) to co-ordinate the activities of the three joint force commands. The position of CJFA would only be required for higher level contingencies and would not be filled in peacetime.

The changes to the command structure of the ADF have been the subject of widespread discussion and debate and there are many matters still to be resolved. But there has been no debate about the underlying premises behind these changes. The first premise, that in future almost all operations will be joint, has not been challenged and in the light of recent military experience is self-evident.

The second premise is that there are three levels of warfare, and the new command arrangements have been designed to provide for command at these three levels. This notion developed only slowly. For example, in April 1985 the Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Operations), Air Vice Marshal Collings, described the ADF’s command arrangements as follows:

a. at the strategic level, it is the CDF (with the advice of the Chiefs of Staff Committee) who designates strategic military longer term actions and, through his integrated staff at HQ ADF translates those strategic plans into operational responses;

b. at the operational or “theatre” level, a Joint Force Commander is assigned forces with which he will prosecute his mission but the raising, training and equipping of those forces is not his concern; and;

c. at the tactical level of command, commanders of task groups, brigades and wings will fight the battle using their single Service doctrine, joint command procedures, under a single commander, and on the basis of a single plan.

Two months later, when the CDF, General Sir Philip Bennett, wrote to the Minister to him of his plans to develop command arrangements, he stated that for land operations there was “a need in peace to establish an operational level headquarters (i.e. one which would operate below Army Office level in the field as necessary) which could be earmarked as a JFHQ…”. However, Mr Paul Dibb’s Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, submitted in March 1986, made no mention of the levels of war in its discussion of ADF command arrangements.

The government policy information paper, The Defence Of Australia 1987, also failed to mention the levels of war in its discussion of ADF command, but the three levels were emphasised by Brigadier John Baker when in November 1988 he produced his Report of the Study into ADF Command Arrangements. He stated:

“The implementation of a military strategy involves consideration of the broad levels, the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Because the nature of considerations, the factors, time frames and staff processes vary at each level, military command structures will normally contain three matching levels of headquarters”.

He went on to explain that the “operational level of command is concerned with the planning, conduct, and control of campaigns… It is at the operational level where command arrangements are crucial”.

Following the Baker Report, the CDF directed the establishment of the position of Commander Joint Forces Australia (CJFA), and it was explicitly linked to the operational level of war. For example, in December 1988 the CDF, General Peter Gratton, stated:

“I see the role of the CDF and that of HQ ADF to be properly at the strategic level. Much of the CFF’s time and effort will be directed ‘upwards’ advising Government and participating in strategic decision-making including such matters as bidding for natural resources. CDF should provide overall military direction of a conflict and is the channel through which Government decisions are implemented. He should not be involved at the operational level of conflict”.

Gratton added that arrangements were therefore in place to “provide, in higher level operations, for an operational level commander, the Commander Joint Forces Australia, to be responsible directly to me, located away from Canberra, and commanding the three Joint Force Commanders”.

The term “operational level of war” was finally accepted in the ADF in October 1988 with the publication of an interim fourth edition of the Australian Joint Service Publication, Joint Operations, Command and Control.
of Australian Defence Force Operations, which gives the following definitions:

- The **strategic** level of war is concerned with the art and science of employing national power.
- The **operational** level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns.
- The **tactical** level of war is characterised by the application of concentrated force to gain objectives.

Although the operational level of war provides the rationale for the new ADF command arrangements, it has wider ramifications in that the operational level commanders will have to develop procedures and planning guidance for operations at that level. Yet there is still little understanding of the operational level of war within the Army, in which it was introduced in 1985, and even less in the Navy and Air Force.

The four designated operational level commanders are all joint commanders, and future campaigns will be joint in nature. But there is little doctrine covering the planning and conduct of joint campaigns. It is true that a series of joint staff manuals detailing procedures for the conduct of joint operations has been produced over the past twenty years. But, at this stage, only one manual (Command and Control) defines the operational level of war. The ADF is therefore faced with the major task of rewriting most of its joint staff manuals to take into account the levels of war and the responsibilities of commanders at those levels.

In 1989 the key Joint Service Publication, Joint Force Operations Doctrine, was revised to reflect the important changes to Defence concepts that had resulted from the Government's Defence White Paper of 1987. The operational level of war received only passing mention, gaining the most mention in the section referring to strategic, operational and tactical planning of joint operations. The manual argues that the fundamental principles of joint planning remain the same, regardless of level. This is hardly helpful to the operational level commanders.

The mechanism by which the operational level commander ensures that he achieves his mission (the achievement of a strategic goal) is the campaign plan. Campaign plans are not the same as contingency plans. As Colonel David Jalonsky of the US Army War College has written: "At the theatre of war level, the campaign plan serves as a bridge between the deployment-oriented operations plan that the CINC has developed in response to JCS guidance and the progressive employment of forces over time".

During the Second World War campaign plans were routinely prepared to direct theatre-level operations. Campaign plans usually include the mission, the plan of manoeuvre in phases, the identification and allocation of resources, logistic considerations and a deception plan. Most importantly, campaign plans synchronize, air, land and sea efforts into a cohesive and synergistic whole. While the present Joint Staff Manual explains the principles of preparing joint operational plans, it gives no guidance on the preparation of campaign plans. There is no definition of a campaign, let alone a campaign plan, in the Joint Staff Manual, but according to the Oxford Dictionary a campaign is a series of military operations in a definite area, or with one objective, of forming the whole or distinct part of a war.

The only other specific guidance, in the new Doctrine manual, on operations at the operational level is found in the chapter on land operations where it is observed that a "superior concentration of combat power is developed as a consequence of the assignment of resources and their manoeuvre at the operational level of war". The chapter goes on to explain that "at the operational level of war, manoeuvre is aimed at decisively influencing operations by gaining the initiative and maintaining freedom of action in order to implement one's own concept of operations". There is no mention of the operational level in the chapters dealing with maritime or air operations.

The manual fails completely to explain the levels of war, and key questions are not even asked, let alone answered. For example, although the manual sets out Australia's military strategy and lists the types of operations that could be carried out by the ADF, it does not suggest what missions the operational level commanders might be given. The only exception is Northern Command (NORCOM), which has the task of planning and conducting the defence of northern Australia, and the focus is primarily on land operations. As an aside, it is noted that in the new JSP manual a diagram of the ADF higher command organisation...
shows NORCOM at the tactical level, while the Army's *Low Level Conflict* pamphlet describes NORCOM as being at the operational level.

Guidance is needed as to what is meant by the operational level of war as it applies to maritime and air operations in general, but also particularly in the Australian environment. Some Naval officers claim that the operational level does not apply in maritime operations, arguing that in relatively small scale operations it is difficult to differentiate between the tactical and operational levels. The more levels of command there are, the greater the confusion and the greater the requirement for staffs. They argue that while Admiral Nimitz, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Command in the Second World War, as well as his subordinate, Admiral Halsey, commanding the South Pacific Command in its campaign in Solomon Islands, were at the operational level, Australia could never contemplate operations of this magnitude. In a more contemporary setting, however, Admiral Fieldhouse, the commander of the Falklands task force, based at Northwood near London, was the operational level commander. And even in *Operation Morris Dance*, the small scale deployment of elements of the ADF to prepare to evacuate Australian nationals from Fiji after the coup in May 1987, had that proved necessary, the Australian Maritime Commander was at the operational level.

Air forces have always recognised the operational level of war, albeit subconsciously, and the formation of independent air forces could be said to illustrate the need for a force that could contribute directly to the achievement of strategic objectives, independent of the daily demands of the surface war. In future the RAAF will not be able to conduct large scale campaigns such as those of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris over Germany or General George Kenney in the South West Pacific, but nevertheless, the Air Commander Australia still has the responsibility of air defence of the continent. Furthermore, in a low level conflict situation this mission would involve the management of resources and the conduct of operations, many of which might have political and strategic ramifications. This campaign, however, would not be conducted in isolation; it would be under the direction of a superior commander (CJFA or CDF), and in concert with land and naval operations. In addition to this operational level responsibility, the Air Commander generally will support the campaigns or operations of the other two joint commanders. The Air Commander might be given the once-off task of a strategic air strike on a distant target. This task would immediately be given to the Strike/Reconnaissance support from other Air Command groups be co-ordinated by Air Headquarters: this is hardly the planning and conduct of campaign which by definition marks the level of war. Furthermore, the strategic strike will probably be part of a wider campaign run by CJFA. If these comments are contentious, they merely underline the current shortcomings in thinking about the operational level in the ADF.

The truth is that discussion of the operational level lends itself more readily to high level contingencies and the more simple examples from major wars and from nations with large forces. We are left with the question of how the operational level relates to the credible contingencies envisaged in the Dibb Report and in the White Paper, given that it is not intended to activate CJFA in low level contingencies. The Minister has said that control will be held at the highest level and the force structure is designed for credible contingencies.

As described earlier, the operational level of war was derived from the continental setting yet the decision has been taken to accept the operational level as a determinant of the ADF's command structure without first determining whether it is relevant for a strategy that is predominantly maritime. My view is that it is relevant, and the Falklands provide a good contemporary example. Even in the US Army there is a realisation that "a great deal of the educational emphasis concerning operational art might more profitably be shifted from the current focus on large-unit campaigns of World War II to Grenada or Inchon-type operations where the most common higher operational echelons are land and JTF commanders". 29

Much work still needs to be done on the meaning of the operational level. At present in both the US and Australian forces the concept has at least three quite different meanings. To many analysts and military officers the operational art is concerned with the handling of large formations. According to the Australian definition, the operational level is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. However, the *Manual of Land Warfare* also suggests that if a military force (regardless of size of unit employed) is being used to achieve
a strategic objective, then it is being employed at the operational level. The British military analyst, Richard Simpkin, tried to account for modern political, strategic and technological factors, and concluded that "for a concept, plan or warlike act to be considered as 'operational', it must meet five criteria. It must:

- have a mission lying at one remove, and one remove only, from an aim which can be stated in politico-economic terms (in other words from a strategic aim);
- be a dynamic, close-loop system, characterised by speed and appropriateness of response;
- consist of at least three components, one of which reflects the opponent's will;
- be synergetic — that is, its whole must have an greater than that of the sum of its parts;
- be self-contained within the scope of its mission".  

Whether Simpkin's criteria are helpful in the Australian environment is debatable. It is not intended to argue the definition of the operational level further in this article, but merely to indicate the nature of the questions yet to be resolved.

The operational level of war is more than just a determinant of our command structure. It focuses attention on the problem of translating strategic goals onto achievable military objectives. Whatever the exact definition of the operational level might be, it is clear that attention needs to be given to preparing officers for command and staff appointments at that level.

Both the Army and the RAAF conduct SOSPs and the RAN runs tactical courses that consider the handling of fleet assets in a theatre, or campaign in which the land and maritime aspects are balanced evenly. General MacArthur’s campaigns in the Pacific were maritime. Furthermore, if the operational level headquarters has maritime, land and air component in the conduct of campaigns in their own environment. Therefore, there appears to be a case for each service too have a SOSP as well as a joint SOSP. Perhaps the SOSP is not the answer; perhaps a joint SOSP could be subsumed within an Australian national defence college; but clearly there is a need to prepare officers for command and staff appointments to conduct campaigns and to handle large formations at the operational level. It is doubtful whether the operational art can be learned fully in the one week devoted to it in the current Army SOSP.  

The CDF, General Gration, has argued that there have been three main implications flowing from the shift in Defence policy from "forward defence" to "self-reliance". Firstly, in the past "Australia's military leaders art in conjunction with the forces of major allies against international rather than national threats" — the Australian military therefore needed to become more intellectually self-reliant in the development of strategic concepts to deal with a national threat. Secondly, in the past the individual Australian services operated overseas as part of larger allied formations — the Australian services therefore need to learn to operate together with their own logistic support. And thirdly, the Australian military infrastructure needed to be moved north, away from the south-east corner of the country.  

There is, however, a fourth implication (although is might be part of Gration's first point). In the past Australian commanders of all three services have had only limited opportunities to exercise command at the operational level during war. The most recent Australian commander Australian Force Vietnam, only had administrative responsibility for the Australian forces in Vietnam. He did not have the task of planning and conducting a campaign according to strategic direction from Canberra. The preparation of officers for command at the operational level is therefore an important ingredient in the development of Australia’s strategy of self reliance.

The concept of the operational level of war is now part of the ADF’s doctrine. Already it has played a role in the development of self-reliance. In the long term it will affect the ADF’s ability to conduct independent operations, the training of military leaders and the development of operational plans. In the meantime work needs to be undertaken in the three services and in the joint arena to further understand the art of conducting war at the operational level.

NOTES

10. Franz, 'Grand Tactics'.
14. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Paul T. DeVries, 'Manoeuver: The and the Operational Level of War', *Military Review*, February 1983; and Colonel Wallace P. Franz, 'Manoeuver: The Dynamic Element of Combat', *Military Review*, May 1983. Since these papers have been numerous publications, and the US Command and General Staff College has published an 89-page annotated bibliography on the operational level of war.
18. The SOPS is now known as the Strategic and Operational Study Period.

Leadership and Management in the Military

By Captain Mark Hughes, RAAC

"Man management is a horrible term, and I'm ashamed that the Army ever introduced it. Men like being led - not managed." Field Marshal Sir William Slim.

Introduction

Leadership is a subject often regarded as distinctly military. The image of officers leading their men into the heat of the battle is seen as the epitome of the art of influencing men. The ability to obtain soliders' "willing obedience, confidence, respect and loyal co-operation" in order to achieve a given task is vital in the military environment. However, good leadership is applicable in all areas of human endeavour, and does not stand alone in increasing performance.

In most people's minds management is associated with industry. Management relates to "planning, organizing, directing, co-ordinating, controlling and evaluating the use of men, money, materials and facilities to accomplish missions and tasks". For some people it is difficult to associate the process of manipulating resources to maximise output with the harsh reality of war. Initially, management appears to be too businesslike for dealing with humans who may be asked to sacrifice their lives.

The desire to gain maximum value for money in our Defence Force has necessitated a more economical outlook. Although the ability to lead men in battle is still paramount, resources are scarce, and must be carefully organised to achieve the given task effectively.

Aim

The aim of this article is to discuss the relative value of management ability and traditional methods in leadership techniques, and their relevance to the staff officer.

Leadership and Management

Leadership Qualities

The recent refinement of psychological techniques has enabled researcher to study and collate information on interpersonal relationships. This information has been used by the military in studies on effective leadership. Prior to this type of study, military personnel depended on a subjective view of what being a good leader involved. A list of desirable qualities was produced, usually characteristics that good leaders had portrayed. The list gave no indication of how to aspire to those characteristics. In many ways this was a reflection of the adage that leaders are "born, not made". The qualities required for great leaders are still used for leadership instruction. They include courage, knowledge, initiative, loyalty and selflessness. The difficulty is that they are the "what" not the "how to" of being a leader.

Management

Management is an important subject of study at many tertiary institutions. With the introduction of the industrial revolution, proprietors were interested in gaining the maximum output from their employees. Proper management was seen as an important tool to ensure this economy was achieved. Due to the initial economic basis of the term, and in some part to the impersonal working conditions of the time, management has developed an aura associated with the indifferent processing of inanimate objects for maximum output. Seen in these terms, management will continue to be linked to industry and commerce.

Yet, seen in detail, all techniques of management consider the position of the human element. Most of these techniques are based on the belief that the human factor can be manipulated to achieve a better performance. The principal means of directing human resources is effective leadership. The military environment also requires this maximisation of resources to achieve a given task.

Traditional Views of Leadership

To successfully complete a mission, a leader must ensure his organisation works as a coherent group. This group coherence, or discipline, is the realisation that more can be achieved as a group than as individuals. Group discipline can be maintained by various means, each with corresponding levels of effectiveness. Discipline achieved through fear or material reward is poor. This method will fail when the external reward or punishment is removed. Group allegiance to high ideas such
as nationalism is difficult to maintain in a
democracy which encourages the primacy of
the individual. Discipline through the intellect­
ual reasoning is better, but can be time consum­
ing to achieve in even the most favourable
circumstances. The most immediate, long last­
ing, and effective method is for the leader to
show the group what he expects. By personal
sacrifice, the leader also indicates his behalf in
his task. This is leadership by example.

While all these leadership methods have
been tried, the concept of leadership by example
has proven most effective. Leaders were select­
ed because they were the best fighters, best
hunters or best businessmen. They could show
others how to do well, and thereby improve
group productivity. When groups became too
large for personal influence, however, this
system was less effective. Consequently, a
second aspect of personal example developed.
Namely, studying the great leaders to develop
theories about the qualities that these men of
history portrayed. In this way, lists of desirable
characteristics were developed.

Functional Theory. Recently, studies have
attempted to determine what a leader does to
be effective. This functional approach has
been of great benefit to organisations which
aim to teach their members how to become
leaders. By carrying out certain aspects of
planning, controlling and evaluating, leaders
accomplish their tasks. If the leader is effective
this is accompanied by the satisfaction of
individual and group needs. This method
implies that an individual will work better if
his needs are catered for.

The Application of Management in the
Military
Management techniques are often goal orien­
ted. When used to study humans, these techni­
ques examine one element of a production
cycle. The ultimate goal of management is to
make production efficient. This efficient use of
all resources to achieve a given mission is
directly applicable to a military system.

Equipment. It is with little argument that
efficient management techniques are intro­
duced to the material and financial aspect of the
army. In fact, the military has been in the
forefront of management development in these
areas. Techniques such as executive develop­
ment, project management, operations re­
search, forecasting and systems analysis were all
developed by the military.

Personnel. There is a reluctance to apply
these efficiency principles to the Personnel
Branch of the Army. Manpower is often
touted as the Army’s most important resource.
Yet there is a reluctance to apply scientific
theory to personnel. This may be due to a
mistrust of things technical, belief that the
requirement to engage in combat makes our
personnel problems unique, or a desire to
humanise the management interface when
dealing with a personal resource.

This interpersonal relationship makes the
traditional view of leadership attractive to the
military. Most officers are uncomfortable treat­
sing soldiers as consumable commodities. This
should not be seen as an area of conflict
between management techniques and leader­
ship. Both are committed to achieving the task
in the most effective and efficient fashion.

Management is a generic term. It encom­
passes all resources, human and material, and
allocates them to achieve a task. Leadership is
part of the interaction necessary to maximise
the human output. There are so many personnel
management techniques as there are leadership
techniques, each attempting to relate to a
particular theory of human behaviour. Which
technique is chosen depends on whether or not
the leader believes that humans are self-motiva­
ted or must be forced to work. Good leadership
techniques will enable a person to cater for the
individual needs of his human resource and
apply these needs in an ever changing environ­
ment. The reactive and adaptable aspect of
leadership makes it unique. Good leadership
complements good management. Similarly,
good management enhances a leader’s ability
to do the job required. If an individual is aware
that all necessary and available resources are
being used effectively to assist him in his task,
he will feel more comfortable. Consequently,
his output will increase. This is particularly
true in times of stress, such as in combat.

Australians have become well known for
the adaptability of their leadership techniques.
In World War I, where authoritative leadership
was popular, Australian leaders were different.
Often they would explain “why” giving the
soldiers a greater understanding of the whole
situation, including the level of commitment
required. The high level of initiative and
determination of Australian soldiers has earned
them a place in history. This shows that by
keeping the soldiers interested and informed
the leaders were able to maximise their output.
Styles of Leadership

The army is organised for combat, or the support of forces in combat. To ensure the mission is achieved, the army structure and application of leadership must be flexible enough to cater for crises in war and peacetime. In times of crisis, or when a quick reaction is necessary, an authoritative technique is most effective. In peacetime instruction, when teaching complex skills, in times of personal hardship or when solving problems without stress, a more participative approach may be more effective. Adaptability is of particular importance in the army today. Military leaders must accept that they receive a more alert, generally more intelligent and better informed soldier into the ranks. With the current level of affluence, these soldiers are more able to satisfy their physical needs for survival. According to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, once physical needs are satisfied, individuals aim to satisfy higher order needs such as status and creativity. Leaders must therefore ensure that soldiers are provided with opportunities to fulfill these needs. The ability to provide development opportunities is different to being able to lead men out of the trenches. This new approach is partially the result of a long period of peace as well as social change.

Application to the Staff Officer

A staff officer must be able to adapt his leadership techniques. He is required to direct and supervise his subordinates, as well as being prepared to fight. A staff officer is also a vital resource manager. Whether in Operations, Logistics or Personnel Branch he must make the most effective use of scarce resources. This becomes vitally important when considering the accuracy of decisions affects many people.

Conclusion

Leadership has been given a great deal of attention by the military for many years. Traditionally, it was the qualities displayed by great leaders which were studied. Recently, attempts have been made to identify what a leader actually does to be effective. It is the reactive, interpersonal aspect of leadership that makes it attractive to the army.

Management, however, has earned itself a more clinical reputation. It is very applicable to any military problem. Management is the most efficient use of resources to succeed in a mission. It studies all resources, including human. When seen in this light it is apparent that leadership is a very important tool in effective management. The two subjects complement each other in the best systems of command.

Recommendations

The recommendations are:
- that management techniques be studied by all potential leaders;
- that good leadership be emphasised as an essential tool in personnel management; and
- that both subjects to be studied in terms of an army's ultimate test, combat.

NOTES

Psychological Operations: Victoria per Mentem

By Captain M.J. Davis, Aust Int. Corps.

Victoria per Mentem was the motto of the 1st Australian Psychological Operations Unit which supported the 1st Australian Task Force in Vietnam. Literally translated it means, Victory Through Mind.

Commanders have always understood that a soldier's willingness and ability to fight depends greatly on psychological influences, such as morale, stress, fatigue and fear. Understanding and managing these psychological influences in warfare can be used not only to the advantage of one's own soldiers but to the disadvantage of one's enemy. During World War II and in Vietnam, the Australian army developed the capability to manage these influences through the use of psychological operations or psyops. Since Vietnam however, the psyops capability of the Australian Army has all but disappeared. This is despite a growing interest in the subject regionally and within the armies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

The aim of this article is to show that the need for the Australian Army to maintain a psyops capability is just as relevant today as it was in World War II or Vietnam. To achieve this the following areas will be examined:

• What is Psyops? An examination of the current Australian Army approach to Psyops.
• Recent Psyops Campaigns. From Vietnam to Grenada, American and British Psyops campaigns.
• Australian Experiences with Psyops. The Australian Army's use of Psyops in World War II and Vietnam.
• Psyops in Low Level Operations. The possible use of psyops in support of an Australian Defence Force (ADF) operation against a low level threat in Northern Australia.

What is Psyops?

Psyops is defined in the Australian Army's current Manual of Land Warfare on Psyops, MLW 1-2-10, as:

"... planned psychological activities directed towards enemy, friendly and neutral audiences (target audiences) in order to create attitudes and behaviour favourable to the achievement of national, political and military objectives".

There is nothing particularly mysterious or sinister about psyops. Essentially it is a form of advertising. Like any advertising campaign it uses a detailed understanding of the psychological make-up of the market or “target audience” so that they “buy your product”. The products that a psyops campaign will attempt to sell in support of an operation are varied. Psyops can be used to weaken the morale of a committed enemy or to influence defeated soldiers to surrender. It can also be directed at gaining the active support of a local population for government programmes or in providing information on enemy movements.

Planning and Conduct of a Psyops Campaign

The planning and conduct of a psyops campaign at all levels is based on two essential principles, sound intelligence and close co-ordination. The intelligence support required in a psyops campaign is extensive. Initially basic intelligence regarding all aspects of the opposition's culture, geography, religion and communications is required. This intelligence, in the form of a Basic Psychological Operations Study (BPOS) identifies what target audiences in the opposition group might be susceptible to psyops. Once a campaign has commenced there is a constant requirement for current intelligence. This intelligence may indicate how effective or ineffective the campaign is, as well as other information that might be used to form the basis of psyops themes or messages.

The successful conduct of a psyops campaign relies heavily on close co-ordination, planning and control at all levels of the government and military. To be effective, a psyops campaign must support government aims and be conducted in accordance with government policy directives. Once these aims are clearly identified, they must be understood and supported by commanders and psyops elements at all strategic, operational and tactical levels.

There are three aspects to a well-planned and effective psyops campaign. The first aspect, psychological action, begins well before the actual military campaign or even the war. The
aim of psychological action is to reduce an enemy’s prestige or influence within a region and to increase friendly influence and attitudes within potentially hostile or neutral countries. Defence co-operation programmes, combined exercises, training of foreign military personnel and exchange postings are all typical psychological action activities.2

The next aspect, psychological warfare, aims to bring psychological pressure to bear on an identified enemy and to influence the attitudes and behaviour of hostile and friendly groups in enemy controlled areas. This is probably a more familiar area, of psyops, one which involves the planning and execution of campaigns such as, surrender leaflet distribution, loud speaker or radio broadcasts and so on. Psychological warfare can be conducted at the strategic level to pursue long-term political objectives or at an operational level to bring psychological pressure against target audiences in an area in which operations are planned.3

The third aspect in a psyops campaign is psychological consolidation. It is not, however, the final stage because it can be conducted concurrently with psychological action and psychological warfare. The aim of psychological consolidation is to gain the support of the population in order to advance political and military objectives. This stage is effectively civil affairs orientated.4

Psyops and Public Relations
Psyops and public information or public relations (PR), while closely linked, are not the same thing. PR is largely concerned with promoting a favourable image of friendly forces and their activities. In practice this is often a reactive process which promotes its message by providing facts and information to media organisations. It is the media which makes the ultimate decision of when, how and with what interpretation to publish these facts. Psyops on the other hand is an active, preemptive process. Its messages both support the PR promotion of the favourable image of the friendly forces and actively discredit the opposition. A psyops campaign controls the creation, interpretation and dissemination of its own messages through the use of loud speakers, leaflets, posters and so on.

Psyops and PR must always be separate agencies. The media’s trust in the credibility of a public relations agency will very quickly disappear if it feels that it has been “used” to pass propaganda.

Recent Psyops Campaigns
In recent years there have been a number of military operations which have been successfully supported by a psyops campaign. The following examples give an indication of the flexibility and diversity of psyops campaigns.

Vietnam
During the Vietnam War, the United States deployed four Psyops Battalions to Vietnam. These battalions conducted what was perhaps one of the most successful aspects of the Vietnam War, the psyops campaign known as the “Chieu Hoi” or Open Arms Programme. The campaign aimed to encourage Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops to surrender and used a variety of means including radio and TV broadcasts and “surrender” leaflets. The success of the campaign was such that approximately 250,000 Viet Cong and NVA soldiers were encouraged to desert or surrender.5

Northern Ireland
In the early 1970s British Army security forces deployed in Northern Ireland used psyops measures both directly against the terrorists and to win the civilians over to the government’s programmes. One approach used against the terrorists by the police and the army was to infiltrate these groups and attempt to destabilise their internal group and individual psychology.6

The winning of “hearts and minds” in Northern Ireland was a major part of the psyops campaign. Given the circumstances of the Northern Ireland Conflict, one of the major problems of the security forces was its image within the community. To attack this, by what is virtually psychological consolidation, the army and the police attempted to improve their image by becoming involved in community activities and improving their abilities when dealing with the press.7

Northern Ireland provided a very clear example of why PR and psyops agencies should be separate. The psyops effort in Northern Ireland initially attempted to pass psyops related themes and messages through the public relations network. No distinction was made between the facts and information
of the security forces PR campaign and the messages and themes of the psyops effort. Once this became clear to the media it very seriously affected the credibility of the security forces and the PR network.8

The Falklands

During the Falklands conflict the British used psyops techniques against the Argentinian forces deployed on the islands. One group targeted by the British were the young, ill-equipped Argentinian conscripts. To communicate with this group the British established their own radio station using BBC resources in London and on Ascension Is. “Radio Atlantico del Sur” broadcast a variety of Argentinian sports and music linked with carefully worded commentary discussing issues such as the size of the advancing British forces or the traditional links of friendship between the Argentinian and British people.

The overall success of “Radio Atlantico del Sur” is difficult to assess as there were political and logistic considerations preventing detailed interrogation of Argentinian prisoners. Two possible indications of the success of the station were that attempts were made to jam transmissions and that the Argentinian soldiers were told by their priests and officers that listening to “Radio Atlantico del Sur” was “a sin”.9

The British experience with psyops in the Falklands confirmed two basic psyops points. Firstly that psyops is a very cost effective combat tool. The entire British psyops effort in the Falklands only cost some $40,000. The second point was that the effectiveness of a psyops campaign is significantly reduced if access to vital current intelligence, such as prisoner of war interrogation, is denied.10

Grenada

Prior to the American deployment to Grenada in 1983, psyops elements planned and prepared a campaign which would give the United States and allied forces a means of mass communications with both the enemy and the civilian population. Using a series of radio transmitter, loudspeakers and leaflets, the Americans were very successful in controlling and calming the civilian population. The psyops campaign also aimed to encourage the people to report People's Revolutionary Army and Cuban troop movements and locations.12

Australian Experience with Psyops

World War II

It was not long ago that Australia was a leader in the field of psychological operations. During WWII, Australia had a fairly extensive psyops organisation operating in the Pacific theatre. The Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO) was established in September 1942 with one of its aims being to conduct “combat propaganda”. By the end of the war FELO had a strength of over 500 personnel and during the three years of its operation it distributed over 60 million leaflets in some 14 different languages and dialects.13

The campaigns conducted by FELO were directed against Japanese forces for both general purposes and for specific operations. Other campaigns were also directed towards native populations in occupied or uncommitted areas. The means of delivering the campaign’s themes and messages included leaflet dropping, radio and loudspeaker broadcasts and face to face liaison. In many respects, FELO was a pioneer in the field of production and dissemination of psyops campaigns. FELO was actually responsible for training the nucleus of the American Psyops Branch and provided support to Dutch, Free French and Chinese forces, as well as Lord Mountbatten's Far Eastern Command.14

Vietnam

Psyops support to Australian operations in Vietnam was initially provided by United States Army units. By early in 1970 however, the growing Australian involvement in Vietnam necessitated an Australian unit to provide intimate psyops support to Task Force operations in Phuoc Tuy Province. In April 1970 the 1st Pyschological Operations Unit was raised and by July 1970 the unit was fully operational. The 1st Psyops Unit was heavily involved in the application of the Chieu Hoi programme in Phuoc Tuy Province, as well as supporting Task Force military-civil operations.15

Psyops in Low-Level Operations

Roles and Aims

In low-level operations in Northern Australia, the overall strategic, operational and tactical campaign should consider the value of using psyops. The roles of psyops in such a conflict would initially include psychologically
undermining the will or resolve of potential enemies to attack Australia or their allies from supporting such attacks. At the same time, the psyops campaign would also aim at influencing world opinions to support the Australian position. On an operational or tactical level, the campaign would aim at influencing the psychology of the enemy deployed on Australian territory.

A psyops campaign conducted in support of low-level operations in Northern Australia would require considerable support from all arms of the ADF. In addition, support would also be required from Federal Government departments such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and civilian groups, particularly media organisations. As previously discussed, an effective psyops campaign would be conducted in three parts: psychological action, psychological warfare and psychological consolidation.

**Psychological Action**

The aim of psychological action in supporting a low-level operation would be to establish in the minds of neighbours, friends and potential enemies (target audiences) that Australia was more than capable of defending herself. Government foreign policy initiatives could achieve much of this. It would be the role of the ADF to demonstrate that Australia was capable of militarily backing its policies. The reputation of the ADF as an efficient and modern fighting force, capable of meeting low-level or conventional threats, would have to be established in the minds of these target audiences.

In addition to those means of psychological action previously mentioned, there could also be increased regional involvement on KANGAROO and other large defence exercises. Foreign observers or units deployed on these exercises would see clear demonstrations of the ADF’s ability to meet all potential threats, as well as gain first hand experience with the difficulty of operations in many parts of Australia.

**Psychological Warfare**

In the event of an attack on Australia the strategic, operational and tactical responses to the attack should be planned using the support of psychological warfare. On a strategic level psychological warfare would be directed towards number of target audiences. The first of these target audiences would be the leadership of the attacking nation. As with the Argentinian involvement in the Falklands it is unlikely that a whole government or political structure would support the attack. Opponents or critics within the government structure could be given various forms of diplomatic or covert support to increase the possible success of their opposition.

The next target audience would be the people of the attacking nation. Again, it is unlikely of that the whole population would support that attack. Opposition groups, racial minorities, religious groups and the ‘silent majority’ could be influenced not to support the national war effort. The aim would be to split the people from the government and to create sufficient disharmony at home so as to influence the psychology of the troops deployed in Australia. The means of achieving this could include agents provocateurs or radio broadcasters similar to the “Voice of America Broadcasts” or “Radio Atlantico del Sur”.

A third target audience would be world opinion. A well-planned media or press policy could be used to influence world opinion to support the Australian position. This policy, combined with the efforts of the Diplomatic Corps, could be used to discourage the attacking nation’s potential allies from involvement, whilst encouraging support from our own allies.

By creating and publicising the internal dissonance in the attacking country, the psychology of the troops in Australia is immediately affected. The aims of the psychological warfare campaign, at an operational level, would be to build on the sense of isolation from friends, family and possibly command-and-control structure begun at a strategic level. To achieve this it would be necessary first to isolate individual attackers or attacking groups from contact with higher headquarters and direction. This could be achieved by: manoeuvre, to physically cut the troops off; Electronic Warfare, to jam communications and thirdly by ensuring that the local population remains hostile and uncooperative to the attackers.

While the enemy is being isolated, a means of communications with the attackers would have to be established by the ADF. This means of communications could be television, radio (both military and civil frequencies) posters and loudspeakers. By these means,
messages emphasising the attackers, isolation and the futility of the current operations would be passed.

The tactical application of psychological warfare in low-level operations would be against specific targets or situations. Against an enemy group in a defensive position or a terrorist action, psychological warfare could be used to exploit the tensions of the situation and bring about a surrender.

 Psychological Consolidation
One of the keys to the successful conduct of low-level operation is to maintain the support of the local population. Whilst the nationalism of the Australian population should not be underestimated, neither should the effects of prolonged military operations or even enemy's use psyops. The aim of psychological consolidation in these circumstances would be to provide support to the PR plan.

A psyops staff or unit could be used to support the PR plan through the provision of material support such as loudspeaker operations or posters. In addition the psyops staff could provide advice and assistance on countering the effects of enemy psyops within particular areas of operation.

Psyops Unit
MLW 1-2-10 outlines a suggested organisation for a psyops unit although there is currently no unit allocated to this task in the Australian Army. The pool of trained psyops operators available currently to support such a unit is very small and limited to a handful of personnel in Aust Int Corps and AA psych Corps. The successful conduct of a psyops campaign in support of operations in Northern Australia would require the creation of a psyops unit or staff and the allocation of trained psyops personnel to Land Headquarters and Headquarters 1st Division. Some notes on the role, manning and equipment of a psyops unit are detailed at Annex A.

Training for Psyops
There are a number of steps that the Australian Army should be taking now, in peacetime, to ensure the we have a psyops capability for war. While it is probably not necessary to raise a full psyops unit now, it is necessary to develop a more detailed structure for the unit's organisation. Sources of external support to the unit, such as media organisations or advertising groups should also be identified. Doctrinal links between such groups and the government and the ADF should be examined fully.

One of the major facts in the success of any future psyops campaign should be the level of intelligence support available. Now is the time for strategic intelligence organisations to match our current threat perceptions with specific psyops information data bases.

Finally, the pool of trained psyops operators would also have to be greatly expanded. To establish an initial training base, personnel would have to be sent either to the United Kingdom or the United States to learn the latest psyops techniques. Subsequent training could then be carried out at the School of Military Intelligence, Canungra.

Conclusion
Many of the activities discussed so far are, or would normally be, carried out by the ADF on operations. The aim of this article has not been simply to group them under a new title but to show how their planning and conduct can be supported by a psyops plan. Australian experiences in WWII and Vietnam and recent American and British experiences in areas as diverse as Grenada and Northern Ireland show that psyops can be an extremely flexible, useful and cost effective combat tool.

The keys to successfully using psyops in support of any operation, is to ensure that it is planned in accordance with overall strategic, operational and tactical implications and requirements in mind. It must also be remembered that the psyops campaign should begin well before the first shots are exchanged. Planning therefore, to meet a low level threat in Northern Australia in the future, should be considering psyops now.

NOTES
2. MLW 1-2-10. op cit. para 110.
3. Ibid. para. 111.
4. Ibid. paras 112-115.
7. Ibid. p. 31
8. Course Notes from No 66 Staff Officers' Psyops Course (hereafter cited as Course Notes) conducted at Defence Intelligence and Security School, Ashford, UK 18-28 Apr 89. Notes held by author.
Role. The role of the psyops unit is to produce and disseminate propaganda and conduct psychological activities in accordance with direction provided by the commander.\textsuperscript{16}

Manning. The manpower of the unit would be largely drawn from the Aust Int Corps and AA Psych Corps. The need for co-operation between psyops specialists in both Corps would be extremely important.

Support could also be drawn from other Corps such as RA Svy for the Production Company.

Equipment. The type of equipment used to the unit to fulfill its role would largely depend on the specific nature of the operation. The production of some psyops material could be done through local civilian printing or media organisations. Equipment held by the Unit; such as loudspeakers or audio visual facilities could be purchased "off the shelf" or leased by required.

It would be essential that equipment held by the unit be portable and in some cases, such as loudspeakers, be able to be mounted in aircraft.
Defence outlays for 1989-90 will be maintained in real terms at the level of 1988-89. In money terms Defence outlays will increase by 6.5 per cent from $7782 million in 1988-89 to $8327 million in 1989-90.

Expenditure under the defence function will actually increase in real terms by $54 million which Defence will retain from the proceeds of property sales in 1989-90.

A sum, equivalent to 0.5 per cent growth in the Defence budget overall, will be included in the base for determining next year’s outlays. In the general circumstances of expenditure restraint this is a satisfactory outcome.

Defence continues to account for about 9.6 per cent of Commonwealth budget outlays and will consume around 2.3 per cent of GDP in the coming year.

As estimated 87 per cent of Defence outlays will be spent in Australia, including 23 per cent of spending in stores and equipment, up from 22 per cent in 1988-89.

Defence Minister Kim Beazley said that the opportunities to redirect resources to areas of high priority through property sales and other management initiatives enabled the Government to sustain a vigorous Defence program without overstepping the Government’s strong commitment to expenditure restraint.

The main priorities in Defence are to:
* improve conditions for Service personnel and their families, including $103 million on Service housing; and
* maintain investment in the major re-equipment program for the Australian Defence Force.

This year investment will account for 27 per cent of expenditure, covering major equipment programs including two types of frigates (FFG and ANZAC class), new submarines, continued deliveries of F/A-18 aircraft, and two new types of helicopter, as well as new communications equipment, vehicles, computer equipment and much more.

Major facilities investments will include the re-location of 2 Cavalry Regiment to Darwin and developments at HMAS Stirling to support the development of a two-ocean Navy.
Review of Promotion and Selection to Lieutenant Colonel

Major W.J. Graco, AA Psych

As a member who has been involved in the design and use of assessment forms (eg the PR 66 Confidential Report - Soldier), the study of military competence and the management of servicemen's careers in Army computing, it is timely to reflect on procedures used for promoting officers to lieutenant colonel and to highlight some of their deficiencies. These procedures involve promoting an individual and then selecting him for an appointment. The steps are referred to as promotion and selection (P&S). Before the shortcomings of P&S are noted, they were extensively reviewed by the Regular Officer Development Committee (RODC) ten years ago but only a selected number of the Committee's recommendations was subsequently implemented. It is not intended to cover the territory the RODC examined; rather than the aim of this article is to concentrate on a few failings of P&S and recommend a number of reforms.

Since P&S decisions are primarily based on the results of assessments of officers' performances, attention will be focused on this issue. The Army uses rating-based assessments to help determine the competence of members. Rating-based assessments consist of rating scales which a superior "ticks" to indicate the standard of performance of a subordinate. An example is rating a subordinate's appearance as "good", "satisfactory" or "poor". A word picture of the subordinate and his performance is also included in the assessment written by the superior.

Major Failings

Two major failings of rating-based assessment forms, regardless of their design and content, are their:

- inability to provide data which enable career managers to make valid discriminations amongst members who fall in the middle range of performance, and
- proneness to bias — especially a culprit called "halo". More will be said about this shortly.

Discrimination

The RODC criticised the former Officer Confidential Report A AFA 26 on the grounds that although the very good and the very bad were readily identified, the system did not provide management with information of sufficient discriminative power to distinguish between those officers in the middle group i.e. the bulk of officers. A project team was formed to review the former confidential report and to devise a new one. Though the project team produced a better report than its predecessor, it is debarable whether it managed to overcome the problem of discrimination in the middle range of performance.

There are two reasons for this view:

- There was no validation of the confidential reporting process to confirm that those rates falling in the middle range of performance were being arranged in a valid and discriminating order of merit.
- A problem which bedevils most written assessment forms is that those assessed are usually rated by different raters under different circumstances. Reporting officers differ in the ways they assess subordinates. Some are hard, some easy, some erratic, some indecisive preferring to play safe by giving middle ratings. The remainder are accurate. Furthermore, jobs differ in difficulty. Therefore an officer could obtain a good report for an easy job well done, whereas an officer who discharged a very demanding job to a satisfactory standard might receive a middle-of-the-road assessment. All well designed reports, such as the current PR 19 Evaluation and Development Report - Officer, acknowledge these sources of error but only indirect and imprecise countermeasures can be taken to account for them in promotion decisions.

Bias

All rating-based assessment reports suffer from the perennial problem of bias. This issue has been the subject of considerable research with no one yet devising a workable method for controlling bias in ratings. There is not one but a number of biases in rating-based assessments. In addition to central tendency or the habit of giving middle ratings, there is the ubiquitous and pervasive "halo" or the predilection to rate a person high on all ratings.
Halo is demonstrated by the tendency to stereotype a member as either a “good” officer or as a “bad” officer. This tendency can cause those assessing to overlook faults in people viewed as competent and to ignore strengths in people judged to be incompetent.

**Conditions**

The bottom line is that to overcome the problems of middle-range discrimination and rating bias a number of conditions have to be met in the assessment process. These include:

- Those assessed are rated under standard and uniform conditions i.e. they perform the same tasks/tests under the same conditions.
- There are a number of assessors. A working rule is no fewer and preferably more than six raters. The more assessors there are, the higher the probability that reliable ratings will be obtained.
- Assessors are trained in the rating process i.e. they are made aware of potential rating errors and the steps they should follow to avoid them.
- Properly constructed and validated rating scales are used by those who assess.

In practice, it is not possible to meet all these requirements in most assessment situations. There are usually too many constraints and therefore less than ideal ratings are usually obtained. The failure of rating-based assessment forms to provide sufficiently accurate and discriminating data for career management purposes has led many private and some public organisations to abandon this traditional form of assessment in favour of what is called “goal setting”\(^1\). More will be said about this topic later.

**Promotion**

P&S to lieutenant colonel was extensively reviewed by the RODC\(^2\) and the Committee made a number of recommendations for improving these procedures. The discussion below will concentrate on one key failing.

Up until promotion to major, officers involved must serve a minimum time in rank and then be cleared by a board for promotion. At the promotion to captain decision-point, an unsatisfactory performer who does not improve in a prescribed period of time can be discharged, while unsatisfactory performers at the promotion to major decision-point can be passed over for promotion.

Promotion to lieutenant colonel is more involved than promotion to the preceding ranks. It starts with an individual interview where the Assistant Chief of General Staff-Personnel and the Military Secretary establish personal contact with the member being considered for promotion. Both senior officers are involved in subsequent P&S committee deliberations. Thereafter, the P&S involves three boards which review each member’s record of service, qualifications, extracts from confidential reports, recommendations from heads of corps and other items. The highest board, the P&S Committee, assists the Chief of the General Staff in making decisions on promotion to lieutenant colonel\(^3\).

**Shortcomings**

What then are the perceived shortcomings of this procedure? In the author’s opinion there are two major ones:

- The problem of visibility i.e. of ensuring that authority recognises the talents of officers being considered for promotion.
- It is unnecessarily time-consuming. This issue was addressed by the RODC\(^4\) so it will not be discussed further in this article.

With regard to the problem of visibility, ultimately all P&S decisions, regardless of institution, are subjective. They are subjective because they are made by human beings who must weigh and consider the facts and exercise their judgement. The employment of three committees in the P&S for lieutenant colonel is meant to be a safeguard against bias. However, the effectiveness of the process is ultimately determined by the quality of the information that is placed at the disposal of those who make decisions.

The primary determinant of an officer’s chances of gaining a favourable promotion decision is, of course, his reporting history. As was pointed out above, this information is useful for indentifying the very good from the very bad but is questionable for making valid discriminations amongst officers who fall in the middle range of performance.
Since there are problems of discriminating amongst middle performers, what additional sources of information can be used by decision makers to make judgements on an officer’s suitability for promotion? Two major ones include views and recommendations of heads of corps and views and recommendations of committee members who sit on promotion boards. These sources are not foolproof as cases can arise where an officer, as a consequence of a personality clash with his Head of Corps, is written up in a negative perspective for promotion. If the officer is not well-known to members of promotion boards, his chances of being cleared for promotion are reduced — especially if he is a middle-of-the-road performer.

This problem is compounded when there is a large number of officers vying for a small number of promotion vacancies. In these circumstances, it can take only one negative comment to appear on an officer’s promotion file to give those making promotion decisions an excuse to deny clearance.

Politics of Promotion

These problems allude to another underlying cause of an organisation’s talents. A study carried out by Pauline Hyde and Associates, who examined executive survival in times of uncertainty, found that those who were retrenched were more likely:

- to be alert and independent,
- have higher leadership scores, and
- to be conscientious, imaginative and unconventional.

However, they were not organisational people and lacked self-awareness about how their behaviour affected others. The researchers drew the conclusion that they did not have the ability to make allies fast and that they were not political and "street wise".

Another study found that managers who were promoted quickly, spent nearly 50 percent of their time forging useful relationships with others while managers who were effective in achieving corporate goals, devoted their efforts to communicating with and managing their subordinates.

The results of these studies are highlighted because they can be applied to military institutions. There are officers who are shrewd and sophisticated and therefore can sell themselves to authority. Likewise, there are those who are not “political animals” and therefore do not seek to advertise themselves to senior officers. The author has observed ambitious officers who have played the promotion game to their advantage. Three of these were successful in gaining promotion to lieutenant colonel but they had one common denominator: the assessment system failed to detect: they created morale problems in the units they commanded. Their subordinates were quick to see that these officers put their interests ahead of those of their troops.

These observations indicate that one of the weaknesses of P&S is the difficulty in discriminating between subordinates who seek to gain their promotions by merit and those who seek to gain their promotions by politicking.

False Positives and False Negatives

The real test of a promotion system is the extent it minimises the incidence of false positives (i.e. those who appear to be suitable when they are not) and the incidence of false negatives (i.e. those who appear unsuitable but if promoted would be effective). The observations above all point to the need for an assessment system which gauges accurately talents of subordinates and arranges them in a valid order of merit. It is not possible to achieve a perfect solution, but steps can be taken to minimise error in the assessment process. There is outlined below an alternative P&S system.

Selection and Promotion

The alternative system shifts emphasis away from promotion to streaming i.e. placing members in streams or musters which match their talents) and includes a more comprehensive range of assessment data in the administrative process which determines where and how officers are employed. In simple terms instead of a P&S, a selection and promotion (or S&P) approach to career management is advocated.

In order of priority, the suggested S&P should be oriented towards:

- **Classification** — determining where and in what ways officers can be best employed in the Service. — i.e. the streams they are suited to. Some suggested streams are identified below.
- **Development** — ascertaining education, training and on-the-job experiences officers require to realise their talents.
Promotion — establishing their promotion ceiling within their employment stream.

Air Commodore (now Air Marshal) Funnell outlined in a paper on the professional military officer in the Australian Defence Force that two categories of officers are required. One is the warrior to fight the wars on the battlefield and the other is the Defence bureaucrat to fight the “wars” in Canberra. The RODC also saw need for a command stream and for special preparation of staff officers who serve in the Canberra bureaucracy. The RODC recommended that General Service Officers should be streamed into staff specialties such as Operations and Force Management, Personnel Management and Training Management. The argument about generalisation versus specialisation in officers’ careers is a perennial one in the Army and it is not intended to pursue it at length in this article. What is emphasised is that the assessment system should, if officers are to be usefully employed, identify their aptitude for command, for staff and for technical appointments. Examples of technical appointments include scientific, engineering, medical and other professional employments which require incumbents who have appropriate tertiary qualifications. The assessment system should also ascertain if those assessed are suited for service in the Canberra bureaucracy. Once an officer’s aptitudes are determined, the next step is to ascertain his developmental needs, which if met, would help sharpen and hone his talents to razor’s edge.

If officers are employed according to their abilities it has a two fold advantage. Firstly, they are more likely to be satisfied with their lot in the Service and therefore less likely to resign. Secondly, it helps simplify promotion decisions in that officers are promoted in their stream on the basis of merit. This aids in reducing the incidence of misemployment i.e. “square pegs in round holes” which is more likely with a P&S system. By clearing for promotion before a selecting for employment, it cannot be guaranteed that those cleared are suitable for all vacancies that have to be filled.

For those who argue that Army officers, especially General Service Officers, should be “jack of all trades and masters of none” are ignoring the reality that in this age of increasing sophistication of war, increasing complexity of technology and with increasing costs, both in time and money, of education and training, it is no longer possible to maintain a strict generalist approach. Officers should be streamed and for this process to be effective, their aptitudes for a command should be recognised at an early stage in their careers to ensure that their subsequent development is directed towards preparing them for jobs which match their talents.

This leads to the assessment system which can be used for classification and the other purposes mentioned previously. Rather than concentrating on job performance per se the assessment should embrace the results of psychological assessments and situational testing.

Psychological Assessments

Psychological assessments, are likely to be viewed with suspicion and mistrust in many quarters. One reason for this guarded attitude is the mystique which surrounds this form of assessment. It has unfortunately gained an undeserved reputation of being a clinical process which probes deeply into the secrets of those being tested. Another reason for a guarded attitude is the mixed results which have been obtained from using psychological tests and inventories. They have not always proven effective in predicting future performances of those assessed.

In their defence the following reasons are put forward for using these measurement devices in the S&P:

- They are used extensively in industry to assist management to make employment decisions.
- There is evidence that psychological tests can assist management to identify those who have potential for higher responsibility.
- The author in a paper on personality traits of competent commanders argued on the basis of the results obtained, that assessment of personality would help identify those who possess the attributes to be competent commanders.

There are a number of ways in which the use of psychological assessments could assist those involved in career management. One way is to help pinpoint officers who have a low threshold for stress. The author has seen a number (admittedly a small number) of officers promoted to senior ranks whose ability to
manage stress/pressure was questionable. These officers would be suspect in war, and like Lieutenant General Sir Allan Cunningham in the Western Desert 1941\(^2\), would be candidates for nervous exhaustion if circumstances went against them on the battlefield. Cunningham was relieved from command because of stress related symptoms after he lost control of events at the “Crusader” Battle in late 1941.

Another way the use of these instruments could help is to determine if candidates for senior promotion are capable of seeing the bigger picture. Again the author has seen many officers promoted to lieutenant colonel and beyond who were either unable or unwilling to see the broader implications of the actions. Instead of seeing the bigger picture, these officers continually immersed themselves in matters of detail and were parochial in their outlook preferring to look after their own backyard rather than taking a course of action which would benefit the Army as a whole. It is significant that one of the reasons why General Giffard, Slim’s superior in Burma in World War II, was relieved of command was his inability to think big\(^2\). He suffered from a lack of imagination and an inelasticity of mind.

The data gathered from psychological assessments can assist to make visible the strengths and weaknesses of officers which might otherwise go unrecognised. This data in return can assist those in authority with classification decisions in terms of employing officers according to their talents.

There are a number of precautions in using psychological assessments. First and foremost the contents of psychological reports should never be the sole determinant of a posting or promotion decision. At best they should be regarded as supplementary information. Secondly, under freedom of information legislation those reported upon have the right to sight their report and to make a representation to authority if they consider they have been inaccurately reported. This is a safeguard against bias. Lastly, rather than making recommendations on suitability for promotion, those compiling the psychological reports and providing interpretative data should restrict their comments to evaluations of the officer’s personality and the jobs or roles he is suited. This approach would avoid placing psychologists in the role of having to play “god” and of encouraging those assessed to be overly defensive.

### Situational Tests

Psychological assessments provide one type of data. A different type is provided from situational tests. Situational tests are not new to the Army. They are included in selection boards of officer entry and they are becoming popular in industry to assist management to identify potential managers and their development needs\(^3\). Situational tests involve simulating critical aspects of jobs or roles that are to be filled by candidates. Participants are rated on a number of criteria which, as a result of job analyses, are found to be associated with job or role success. A number of assessors are employed to minimise the influence of bias.

The major advantages in using this form of assessment include:\(^1\):
- candidates are evaluated under a set of uniform, standardised conditions thus reducing differences that result from assessing candidates in different situations using different yardsticks; and
- it allows candidates working in appointments where they are not widely seen by senior officers to become visible.

The major disadvantages of situational testing are:
- they are expensive to run and are time-consuming;
- only a small number of candidates can be assessed at any one time; and
- assessments are made on the basis of a limited contact with the candidate, the time frame varying from a few hours to a few days.

Situational testing is advocated for three reasons. Firstly, it would enable those in authority to test officers in situations they would face if they were promoted to the next rank or higher. To give an example, participants could be called upon to analyse, evaluate, discuss and recommend from a panel of suitable tenderers, a vendor to supply the Army with a new small vehicle. These tests provide assessors with opportunities to observe candidates and the way they approach and resolve dilemmas such as the vehicle selection process above. Where there are areas of doubt about a candidate, these can be probed in a follow-up interview with him.

The tests not only have face validity (in the sense they simulate the requirements of the
jobs or roles to be filled) but they provide those in authority with insight into each candidate’s talents and his ability to manage higher responsibility. Along with assessment data from other sources (e.g. psychological reports), situational testing would help determine his promotion ceiling. To illustrate it is expected that members who are not likely to advance beyond the rank of major would include those who are practical and concrete rather than imaginative and thoughtful in their approach, are narrow rather than broad in their thinking (i.e. they cannot think big), become over involved in details at the expense of essentials, are lacking initiative and drive, are overly conservative in their outlook, possess traits which cause friction and disharmony amongst colleagues and/or are found to have serious defects in their character.

The author has seen officers promoted to lieutenant colonel and beyond who were good organisation men in the sense they knew how to dot the i’s and cross the t’s but where lacking in vision, imagination and drive. They were not only pedestrian in their thinking but were obstacles to progress.

A second and complementary reason for recommending situational testing is that it assists those in authority to determine where and how candidates should be employed and to resolve their development needs. For example, if a candidate has a low threshold for stress, he should not be posted to a key operational appointment in war. Similarly, if a candidate lacks political sensitivity and tact, he should not be given diplomatic assignments.

Lastly, since candidates are assessed under uniform and standardised conditions in situational testing and there are multiple assessors, this provides a basis for placing candidates in a valid order of merit. For the order of merit to have substance, the situational tests would have to be sufficiently comprehensive to ensure that all relevant aspects of the jobs or roles that are to be filled by candidates are covered. This way situational testing would help senior officers to make valid discriminations in the middle range of talent.

Situational tests could never be substitutes for command and tactical assignments. Command and tactical abilities by providing additional data on each officer’s suitability to fill senior staff appointments in the Canberra bureaucracy and other areas of the Army.

Results - Based Assessments

Earlier in this article it was stated that many private and some public organisations have abandoned the traditional rating-based assessment forms, such as the PR 19 The Evaluation and Development Report - Officer in favour of management by objectives (MBO). It was stated that one reason for this decision was the problem of middle range discrimination. Another reason was that when used correctly, MBO is a very effective motivational tool. MBO basically entails both the superior and the subordinate agreeing on the goals, objectives or results the subordinate is to achieve in the next reporting period. This approach has four important advantages:

- Subordinates are involved in the goal setting process rather than being passive participants.
- Subordinates receive direct feedback on their performance in the sense they either achieve or do not achieve their goals.
- Superiors are also involved in the process in that they have to guide, counsel and motivate their subordinates.
- Superiors do not have to play the role of “god” in terms of rating their subordinates as “good”, “satisfactory”, or “bad”. They are required only to indicate whether or not their subordinates achieved the goals set for them.

Provided MBO has support of higher management, is carefully implemented and realistic and attainable goals are specified for subordinates, it promotes both employer and employee commitment and it can improve productivity and morale of organisations.

It is not suggested that MBO is a panacea but it has the strength that rather than assessing subordinates on sliding scales of excellence in terms of rating-based assessments, MBO evaluates them in terms of results they achieve. Results-based assessments are a widely used benchmark in industry for determining financial and non-financial rewards of executives and for determining their promotions. Though many executives receive attractive salaries and fringe benefits, these rewards are conditional on their meeting specified goals and standards.
If they do not perform, they face the prospect of either being demoted or sacked! One of the key characteristics of successful people is that they achieve results. They are very efficient in accomplishing their tasks and they are hard workers.

The major reason for advocating MBO in the Army is that, despite the protests that it would be difficult to implement because of the problem of identifying measurable goals for officers, it would assist those in authority to discriminate between achievers and non-achievers. Instead of rating subordinates on what they are like as individuals and the capabilities they possess (e.g. ability to speak, organisational ability and the like), attention is shifted to what they actually did in the reporting period. In the author's opinion the Army should be promoting people who are producers and achievers rather than assuming that because a member has many high ticks on his rating-based assessment forms, that he is a performer. The author has seen too many officers who were "coasters" and, in some cases, non-achievers were promoted to higher ranks. Some were promoted because they possessed agreeable personalities and others because their limited abilities were not a threat to those above them.

Summary

It is now time to tie together the threads that have been woven in the article. To recap, a number of key recommendations have been made and these were:

- Rather than having a P&S it was advocated that it be reversed as S&P and be oriented towards classification, development and promotion. Attention should be focused on where and how the officer is employed in the Service, his developmental needs and his promotion ceiling.

- Psychological assessments should be instituted to provide those who make S&P decisions with supplementary information on officers' strengths and weaknesses which might otherwise go unrecognised.

- Situational tests should be used to test officers in situations they would face if they were promoted to the next rank or higher. Situational tests are ideal for determining the streams to which members are suited and for resolving developmental requirements. They also provide discriminatory data for promotion purposes.

- MBO, or results-oriented assessments, should replace the traditional rating-based assisting those in authority to discriminate between achievers and non-achievers. The solutions offered above are seen to help overcome the problems alluded to earlier i.e. middle range discrimination and lack of visibility of candidates. Situational tests provide a means of making officers' talents visible and a basis for arranging officers in a valid order of merit. The use of psychological assessments also assists to make officers' strengths and weaknesses apparent. Likewise, the use of results-based assessments helps those in authority to identify performers from non-performers. Another advantage of these measures is that they provide safeguards against bias.

It is acknowledged that employment of situational tests is expensive in terms of time and other resources but is argued that these costs should be borne by the Service, if it assists those in authority to make fairer employment and promotion decisions (i.e. reduces incidence of false positives and false negatives).

In conclusion as the Army moves towards the Year 2000, it is considered that though rating-based assessments may have sufficed in the past they will not in the future. In their place the Service will have to consider new procedures, such as those advocated in this article, to meet the demands for a fair and equitable selection and promotion system. 

NOTES

1. The author was a member of the project team which devised the PR 66.
3. The author was formerly a desk officer responsible for management of officers and soldiers' careers in computer applications.
6. The term “halo” stems from the analogy of an angel. It refers to the tendency of raters to see either all good or all bad in those they evaluate.
7. Regular Officer Development Committee. para 105a.
8. Officer evaluation Study Team Final Report.
9. In both the officer and soldier rating systems, assessors are required to indicate if their members were allocated difficult duties in the reporting period. Statistical measures are also compiled of assessors' rating tendencies e.g. harshness of ratings.


15. The P & S Committee consists of two star officers such as the Assistant Chief of General Staff-Operations and GOC Training Command. See Regular Officer Development Committee, paras 424-430.

16. ibid, paras 431-471.


21. General Service Officers are those whose education, training and experience enables them to serve a wide range of corps and non-corps appointments in the Army.

22. A recent example from the literature is Major D.A. Benge. Officer Management in the Army. Defence Force Journal May-June 1987, 8-12.

23. If there is streaming it will lead to a situation where some streams will have higher rank ceilings than others. This should not be a problem provided the highest rank an officer could normally aspire in a twenty year career. If officers have aspirations of climbing to the top of the "ambition tree" they will have to choose a stream which allows progression to the senior ranks.


27. There are a number of questionnaires, which purport to measure managerial potential, available on the market. See G. Pickworth. How to Become a Successful Executive. Personal Success, 1987, 2, 73-74; P.A Webb and W.J. Graco. Psychological Assessment of Managerial Talent. Unpublished paper which has been submitted for possible publication in the Human Resources Management Journal.


31. Regular Officer Development Committee. Study Three Career Management. paras 2145-2149.

32. These criteria are based on the author's review of the literature on managerial performance.


34. See Locke et al.


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The Social Problems of Imposed Residential Relocation

By Captain David Craig, RACT

It has long been an established requirement of military service that defence force personnel move regularly (every two or three years) from military area to military area, in order to satisfy the operational needs of the Army. It has been suggested that the imposed residential relocation of defence force personnel (and their families) is a major contributing factor to many social problems faced by the family unit.

Introduction

"The military with its structure, responsibilities, processes, services and resources, impacts directly on the lives of not only its employees, but also directly on the lives of the employee's family."

There is growing recognition, as indicated by the above statement by De Jongh, that demands made on defence force members, affect not only them as individuals but has a direct affect on their family units. This situation is highlighted by the Defence Department's need to relocate personnel on a regular basis (every 2 to 3 years) to various military establishments both inside and outside Australia to meet our security needs.

This imposed residential relocation of defence force personnel and their families is seen as a major factor in many of the social problems faced by the family unit within a military environment. This article will investigate the major social problems faced by the defence force family as a result of imposed residential relocation and offer recommendation in an attempt to reduce the detrimental effects this “nomadic” way of life has on the family unit.

The Eternal Triangle

Maintaining an effective family unit within a military environment is not an easy task. The key problem faced by a family in this situation is outlined by Lagrone who talks about the formulation of a relationship triangle made up of the defence force member, his family, and military employer.

The fact the military system blinds its members tightly and demands much time and effort from them is often at odds with the demands of a member's family. The individual is expected to enforce compliance of family members to the military system, often resulting in a strengthening of the father's coalition with the military at the expense of the family unit.

This “powerplay” within the family is put to a further test every two or three years when the family unit is expected to move from one location to another purely to satisfy the needs of the military system. It is during this imposed residential relocation that military families have to face great social problems relating to not only the internal mechanics of the family as a unit but the integration of the family unit into the greater military and civilian community.

This article will discuss five very important social problems facing the military family as a result of imposed residential relocation, they are:

1. Alienation of the wife/mother/family unit from the wider society in a new posting locality.
2. The imposed separation of the father from the family for periods of up to four to six weeks during the imposed relocation.
3. The numerous problems faced by children within a nomadic defence force family.
4. The pressure placed on the marriage of a defence force member due to the mobility requirement of the services, and,
5. The financial burden placed on the migrating family as a result of the need to move.

It is important to note at this stage, that not all families who move regularly within the military will experience the problems discussed in this article. Many families in fact thrive on regular movement, and face problems if they remain in one area for too long. As Sorokin noted, geographical mobility has both positive and negative corollaries. On the one hand
geographical mobility and relocation can be associated with a broadening of the mind, making life more intensive and entertaining, while on the other hand it could cause serious emotional and interpersonal problems. This article deals primarily with the family unit which experiences these and other social and family problems due to military mobility and periodic residential relocation.

Alienation

This section will deal with alienation suffered by the wife and mother of the family unit within the new posting locality. It will be assumed that the male defence member enjoys quick integration into his workplace due to the nature of his military employment.

McKain argues that the degree of alienation experienced by the wife/mother in a new posting locality is determined by how easily that particular individual integrates herself into the new society. For ease of discussion he considers two major groups, firstly those who do not experience feelings of alienation, and integrate themselves quickly into society, and secondly, more important to this article, the group who remain isolated from the greater society (both military and civilian) and have great difficulty in settling into their new environment.

Of the wives and mothers within the second group, alienation within the new posting locality is potentially a very serious social problem. People in this category see residential relocation as an imposed family crisis, that must be endured in order to maintain continuity within the "breadwinners" career. She is often thrust into a new locality without friends and often without support of close relatives. A study carried out by Dr Monica Hayes into The Incidence Of Problems Experienced by RAAF Families, And The Resources They Use To Deal With Them reveals two important problems:

1. That defence force wives rely heavily on help from close friends and family in time of need, and
2. That defence force families feel inhibited from seeking support from welfare services within the military due to fear or lack of confidentiality of the request, and the determinate impact this may have on the husband's career.

This fear of relocation is not restricted to a minority of families within the defence force. In a survey of service personnel conducted by Marsh, there was a strong negative response to the concept of residential mobility. Table 1 below highlights this problem.

| Table 1 Frequency Distribution of Scores on Attitude Towards Relocation of Scale |
|------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Positive | % Negative | % |
| 1. First impression of new post on arrival | 85 | 120 | 59 |
| 2. Feeling towards having a job that requires moving periodically | 24 | 12 | 88 |
| 3. Respondent's immediate reaction when notified of posting to new post | 62 | 30 | 143 | 70 |
| 4. Family's first reaction when notified of posting to new post | 62 | 30 | 143 | 70 |
| 5. Family's current feeling about living at new post | 66 | 32 | 141 | 68 |
| 6. Commitment to the military as a career | 36 | 17 | 169 | 83 |
| 7. Respondent's feeling about living on the new post | 63 | 31 | 142 | 69 |

The figures presented do not mean that everybody providing a negative response to the posed questions experience strong alienation in their new posted locality, as it is clear that some families adjust to residential relocation better than others. The evidence however indicated strong dissatisfaction by key members of the family unit regarding the military requirement for periodic moves.

McKain and Sorokin perceive a positive correlation between (residential) mobility/alienation and family problems. Sorokin argues that residential mobility influences the "close intimacy within other men (women), the desirability of real community feeling, and urgent need of a unity of understanding (and) close friendship" and provides a casual link between mobility and alienation. The human being who is basically a social being, needs emotional and social contact to promote satisfaction and contentment. Removal of social outlet and friends creates problems for the military spouse. The "breadwinner" has a job where social and professional interaction occurs, and hence the feeling of alienation is minimised. This tends not to be the case with the military wife/mother.

McKain reveals that alienated wives experience three times the number of psychiatric
symptoms, and markedly more personal, marital and emotional problems than the less alienated wives. Marsh argues that the most important factor in predicting whether residential relocation will have a determinable effect on the family unit is the attitude of the parents themselves. A positive attitude directly affects the family's problem solving ability, and its resilience in coping with the imposed change. Although empirical studies of problems encountered by migrating families, (moving and settling) are rare and findings generally inconclusive, he regards the attitude of parents, and existing family characteristics as vital elements in coping with regular moves.

McKain argues however that alienation suffered by the wife mother of the family unit is strongly influenced by the individual's personality and background. He writes that “alienation seems to be a much more pervasive and enduring personality trait than others”. Table 2 below indicates some interesting links and trends associated with both alienated and non-alienated wives.

It is interesting to note the strong correlation between the number of pathological personality characteristics and the degree of alienation felt by defence force wives. The survey revealed that:

a. That alienation was inversely correlated with the wives' social class of origin and education i.e. the lower the social class of origin and education level attained, the greater the degree of feeling of alienation, and

b. Alienation was positively linked with the number of problems characteristic of the family origin (deprivation of either parent, divorce, behavioural problems and emotional problems).

The final factor I will discuss concerning the degree of alienation felt by the wife/mother is the possible importance of the army families' living arrangements. McKain concludes that the incidence of family problems and feelings of alienation, is increased if the defence force family lives off the military base. This problem was highlighted by a civilian member of the Army Community Services (ACS) in his statement that "if one is interested in locating a lot of family problems, all one has to do would be to talk to the army wife who is living off post.” Living away from the military environment reduces identification with the “military community” and hence promotes alienation and isolation. This contention is supported by McKain who writes that increased identification with the military community and the Army way of life, correspondingly reduces the number of integrational problems faced by the wife/mother and the family unit.

As discussed, the feeling of alienation of the wife/mother is a major social problem faced by the military family unit. Caused by periodic residential relocation, alienation can be potentially disastrous for the continuing harmony within the family unit. The fact this problem is primarily encountered by the mother, who in turn can relay strong negative feelings to the other members of the family highlights the dangerous pressures existing within the eternal triangle.

### Family Separation During Relocation

The requirement often exists within today’s military forces, that as a result of imposed residential relocation, the defence force member (primarily male) must travel to his new posting locality in order to locate and organise a suitable residence. This is done alone, leaving the wife/mother in the old location with the pressures of packing, tying up the families' domestic administrative details and maintaining the normal day to day functioning of the family unit.

It is often the case that on the arrival of the family into the new location the defence force member is required to work for briefings, training courses and trade or qualifying courses that could see him away from the home for a further period of time. The combined separa-
tion period could be as little as one week, but could easily extend from six to eight weeks at a time.

This is a problem is highlighted by Scherer and Rahmani who argue that father absences from the family unit average 9.7 months every five years, and 200 days over a three year period. These absences occur for courses, exercises and family relocation requirements. (This article will not attempt to differentiate between the various reasons for father absence).

Two basic family unit threats occur as a result of father absence during residential relocation. Firstly there are the problems created by the absence itself, and secondly the problems created by the father’s re-integration into the family unit.

Separation

Pearlman writes that “no matter how often the experience has been repeated, each separation is a physical crisis”. Each separation requires a number of important role changes by the mother to cater for the father’s absence:

a. She must modify her role to continue the influence of the father — even during his absence.
b. She must become more independent and self reliant and continue the effective functioning of the family unit.
c. She must take on the role of mediator between the family children and the absent father.

These changes in role play create a number of problems for the family unit. Firstly, it displays the family’s ability to exist without the father, and secondly, it generates within the mother two basic changes in attitude:

a. a subtle negative change in her attitude towards a military life.
b. a feeling of resentment towards the father due to his neglect in leaving the family.

Due to such changes in perceptions and roles of the wife/mother, Lafrone argues the husband can often return home to face a “different” wife. The change in the power relationship within the family introduces an uneasiness between parents and between parent (father) and children that was not there before the separation. This all goes to make re-integration of the father more difficult.

Imposed separation of the father figure can also have determinable effects on his children. Crumley and Blumenthal argue that as a result of such separation children can react in many potentially serious ways, including rageful protests over desertion, intense fantasy relationships with the lost parent and fits of depression. (Bloom adds reduced academic performance to this list of child reactions to father absence). The fact only the mother figure is there to react to those problems, develops a new, strong child/mother alignment, reducing what was the responsibility of the father. Crumley and Blumenthal stress that the degree of effect caused by father figure separation depends on the strength and effectiveness of the mother relationship with the child.

Re-integration

When the family is reunited after a lengthy period of separation (i.e. from three to six weeks) a period of re-integration occurs. The father has to re-introduce himself into the family environment after imposing on them a necessary and painful adjustment to his absence. Pearlman writes that the wife/mother has initial impulses to punish the husband for being away and deserting the family. The relationship can often remain uneasy for a period of up to eight weeks, characterised by emotional turmoil and gradual re-association.

The re-integration of the father figure creates great emotional turmoil and readjustment within the family which is not as evident in families that have a stable home base. The ability of the father, mother and child to this situation will determine the future of that particular family unit.

Relocation Effect on Children

One of the major social problems faced by the military family during its numerous (posting) locality changes, is the care and maintenance of their children. Generally when a military family moves, their children move with them unless boarding school facilities are used. This section of the article will discuss two social problems concerning defence force children:

a. Child education, and
b. Child abuse.

A Child’s Education

This problem is highlighted when one realises that 70 percent of incoming mobile children demonstrate deficits in academic achievement and class behaviour. Blair, Marchant and Medway argue that subjecting children to education disruption caused by imposed residential relocation...
IMPOSED RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION

Rahmani supports this contention and argues that children who have faced more than three changes in school tended to score lower in achievement testing. These two cases highlight the disadvantages faced by children belonging to defence force families. The studies carried out indicate that educational disruption reduces the ability of the student to produce effective results.

Two other problems concerning defence force children and their education should be mentioned. Firstly the diversity of educational systems in Australia poses a problem concerning geographically mobile children. Varying standards and differing equivalent levels offer little continuity for a child forced for one reason or another to move from state to state. This problem is emphasised by Mackay and Spicer who, after an investigation into education turbulence among Australian Servicemen's children, concluded that, "Almost a third of the children who had changed schools were reported to have had to repeat a grade, and almost a third had been placed in the same grade but in a lower academic stream in the new school."

"However almost twice as many children have reported to have been placed in a lower academic stream. More than four times as many children were reported to have repeated a grade as were reported to have skipped a grade."

This disturbing revelation indicates two immediate social problems for the military family unit:

a. The child has wasted a year by repeating academic work already achieved, lengthening his/her school attendance by 12 months, and

b. The child's parents face the financial burden of having their child (children) attend an unnecessary year at school.

Secondly, various writers support the contention that psychological disorders are greater in children undergoing periodic educational (and residential) relocation, than in the general, more stable public. Tetize argues that psychological disorders in children increase for those experiencing shortened residence than for those with longer residence. He is supported by Bloom who has found that behavioural disorders are greater amongst military children (24 percent), experiencing regular residential relocation than children in the general public (16 percent). It is interesting to note that of the military children in the above sample two out of three (66 percent) had a history of father absences from the family unit.

Child Abuse

Child abuse in the context of this article is defined as:

"a parent or caregiver who inflicts or allows to be inflicted, either actively or passively an injury or deprivation which results in harm to the child."

The extent of this serious social problem within the defence force becomes apparent when one realizes that it is five times the national average. De Jongh and Basset-Scarfe argue that the factors leading to child abuse within a military environment are more prevalent than in society in general. They see the main factors in leading to child abuse as isolation of the family and economic stress factors. De Jongh and Basset-Scarfe argue that isolation increases the incidence of child abuse "because the isolated adult is unable to check and review their child rearing strategies with the norms of a wider community."

They go on to argue that increased parental social interaction leads to emotional satisfaction, and hence reduces the demands on their children to fill that void.

Economic and stress factors within the family unit also contribute to the incidence of child abuse. De Jong and Basset-Scarfe argue that as stress within the family increases so does the potential for harm to the children. This is particularly so when the various stress factors faced are cumulative, and the family enters a period of stress — in particular absences of the father figure and imposed residential relocation.

As can be seen, the problems faced by the military family unit concerning their children's education, psychological make up and potential abuse are all greatly affected by imposed residential relocation. Greater care and consideration needs to be given to the ramifications of such military policy prior to its continued use within the system.

Marital Problems

Quite often writes Lagrone, when a woman marries a professional defence force member, she marries a man who is already married
—professionally! The fact she does not assume number one priority in his life promotes feelings of rejection and insincerity, which in turn strike at the very foundation of the marriage. When this is combined with the pressures of periodic separation and imposed residential relocation unprecedented pressure is applied to the marital relationship.

McKain argues that when taken in conjunction with alienation, there is a correlation between the degree of alienation felt by the wife/mother in the new posting locality and the number of marital problems. He goes on to state that marital problems are often started or exacerbated at the time of transfer and often worsen as time progresses.

The situation becomes even more complex when a wife/mother has a career to cater for. Jans writes that military wives are becoming more career conscious, which creates additional pressure when both careers are no longer compatible. Brett argues that working wives of "mobile" men tend to stay at the bottom of their career ladder. There are two main reasons:

a. Employment transfers to the place of the husband's posting are at times impossible, causing the wife to change career streams with corresponding drop in pay and pride.

b. If a wife is lucky enough to receive a transfer to a similar position within the new location she faces reduced promotional prospects as she firstly has to become integrated into the new environment, and secondly has to prove her competence to her new employer prior to recommendation for promotion.

The Financial Burden of Imposed Residential Relocation

Apart from the social problems of imposed residential mobility, the military family unit must also be burdened at times with excessive financial costs as a result of relocation. Marsh argues that many military members receive only marginal incomes, and therefore face additional hardships through the increased expenditure faced as a result of moving. Although the military do pay allowances and certain costs to move personnel and their families from one location to another, the costs of moving are higher than the allowances paid.

Some of the unforeseen costs the military family cannot expect assistance with are highlighted by a study carried out by Marsh, whose findings are revealed in table three below.

Along with these unforeseen costs are costs expected to be borne by the migrating family, including school costs (new fees, new books and uniforms, etc.), membership of new clubs and associations, the costs of moving personal items not acceptable to the removal agent, and many, many more.

The financial burden faced by the military family unit can be quite severe. Families often have to go into debt in order to finance relocation which is required by military service. Facilities should exist within the military to compensate adequately defence members for the costs and inconvenience incurred during residential mobility.

Conclusion

As I have discussed throughout this article, there is a large number of potentially serious social and financial problems faced by the military family as a result of imposed residential relocation. The future of family life in many instances is put to the test by many of the previously "accepted" pressures of military life.

As a result of the problems investigated and discussed, I have compiled a number of recommendations designed to minimise the dilemmas by the family unit. If implemented they will substantially reduce the detrimental effects
these problems have not only on the family but also indirectly on their general attitude toward a military career.

By caring more for the family unit and the members' morale, commitment and dedication a military career will improve, benefiting the service and the country in the longer term.

Recommendations
1. The professional welfare and support service should be strengthened and programmes to welcome new families into military areas expanded.
2. Tax relief should be granted to families forced to live in areas of temperature, and locational extremes.
3. Financial benefits to the family should cover all costs incurred by the family. This should be in conjunction with timely payment and quick reimbursement action.
4. Information packages on the new military area should be developed and sent to the family prior to relocation.
5. Functional parent training programmes should be implemented in major military areas with the aim of educating parents in the special limitations and problems faced by the military child. This would help to reduce child abuse in the service.
6. At least six months' warning can be given of an impending posting.
7. Special educational expenses (tutors, fixed costs on joining new schools, uniforms and books) as a result of residential relocation should be paid for by the Government.
8. The posting period in one locality should be extended to three years.
9. Consecutive inter-locational postings should be employed in order to maintain the family in the same residence to reduce the relocation requirement.
10. A visitational program should be introduced to allow the family to visit the new location to assimilate themselves with the area, schools and their new home prior to the posting taking effect.

NOTES
3. ibid. p.1041
6. ibid. p.209
7. Hayes M (Dr.) An Investigation of the Incidence of Problems Experienced by RAAF Families. The Resources They Use to Deal With Them. essay from Dr. Hayes.
9. ibid. p.96
14. ibid. p.89
15. ibid. p.89
16. ibid. p.89
17. ibid. p.71
22. ibid. p.347.
26. ibid. p.1042
29. ibid. p.778.
30. ibid. p.779.
33. Mackay, Spicer "Educational Turbulence Among Australian Children" (ETASC) Vol 1. Canberra. AGPS.
34. McKay J. "Alienation: A Function of Geographic Mobility Among Families" opcit. p.73.
to support the existing RAN medical officers and sailors at sea. They are indeed civilians, however they also hold commissions as Officers in the RANR and proudly wear uniform, now indistinguishable from those of the RAN, for their training periods in their respective port divisions, and also when undertaking important deployments such as this.

Prior to being accepted into the RANR, they have each undergone a rigorous selection process, and will then have progressed through Officer training at HMAS Creswell, and NBCD training prior to service at sea. They are also highly committed military medical officers whom I would prefer to regard as part time civilians. They certainly do not commit themselves in this way for financial gains as the monetary recompense is paltry in comparison to their private practice incomes.

I cannot categorically refute the assertion that civilian doctors have been sent to sea in HMA warships, however I am unaware of any such occurrence in my 20 years in the RAN. If they have been, I suspect it would not be for operational reasons. Having served with the USN, and RN, I believe that this also holds for our major allied naval forces. No doubt, the same applies to both the Army and RAAF.

Civilians, as private security guards may well be able to effectively and cost efficiently patrol RMC Duntroon, or even lecture at ADFA. It is quite another matter to expect a civilian, however highly skilled and motivated he or she might be, to fulfill the exacting requirements of a key billet in an operational warship.

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The Stability of the Global Nuclear Balance

By Martin O’Hare

Introduction

This article seeks to define the global nuclear balance and determine how the balance is maintained. The article then examines factors that enhance or threaten the balance.

The Global Nuclear Balance

The United States and the Soviet Union both possess around 2,000 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV), consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and long-range strategic bombers. The SNDV of both superpowers are fitted with over 10,000 warheads. Although the Soviets have a greater number of SNDV and the US a greater number of warheads, there is a rough parity in numbers. There are, however, some significant differences in the means of delivery of the strategic nuclear arsenals. The US has about half of its warheads on ICBM, and a third on SSBN. Similarly, there are significant differences in the utility or capability of the two strategic forces. The Soviet force holds twice the megatonnage of the US force, but it is delivered with somewhat less accuracy and reliability. Other measurements of capability indicate a Soviet superiority in equivalent megatonnage and a U.S. superiority in countermilitary potential.

The raw figures do not reveal the Soviet superiority in air defence and civil defence, or the US lead in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), space assets and retargeting capability. Nor do the figures show that US control systems are more sophisticated, flexible and vulnerable that Soviet control systems. Soviet availability rates on daily alert are lower than the numbers of US SNDV on day-to-day alert. Despite these differences, and periodic fears that one side or the other possesses a window of vulnerability, the US and the Soviet Union “have developed and deployed strategic nuclear forces that are, by any general criteria, remarkably similar”. That a strategic arms limitation agreement was first reached in 1972, and that this and subsequent agreements have by and large been adhered to despite non-ratification, is testimony to the perception on the part of the superpowers that there is a global nuclear balance. In a “nuts and bolts” sense: the balance is the essential equivalence or parity of the strategic forces in terms of numbers and performance.

The global nuclear balance also depends on an acute awareness of the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons. Ironically, protection from the destructive power of nuclear weapons is obtained from the possession of nuclear weapons, or a reliance on a nuclear power for such protection. Protection from nuclear destruction is based on the fear of retaliation, on a scale such that both sides are deterred from using nuclear weapons. Deterrence depends on the possession of a sufficiently formidable and survivable retaliatory capability possessing the requisite mix of command systems, destructive capability, accuracy, reliability and penetration. To be credible, it must also be backed by a will to retaliate that is acknowledged by the opponent. Thus far, it seems that the global nuclear balance rests on a combination of the following factors: parity in numbers and performance (including survivability), fear of destruction, and political determination.

A former US Secretary of Defence, Harold Brown, described the global nuclear balance in terms of a parity in political and military factors. From a US perspective, he defined an equivalence in four conditions as essential to the maintenance of the balance:

- Soviet strategic nuclear forces do not become usable instruments of political leverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage;
- Nuclear stability, especially in a crisis, is maintained;
- Any advantages in strategic force characteristics; and
- The US strategic posture is not in fact, and is not seen as, inferior in performance to that of the Soviet Union.

Brown’s definition of the global nuclear balance, and the one adopted for subsequent discussion, would appear to contain the following elements: political and military parity, crisis stability, technological parity, and credibility. Implicit in military parity is the capability to wreak unacceptable damage on an opponent even in a worst-case scenario.
An Examination of Stability

Before examining factors which enhance or threaten the stability of the global nuclear balance, there is first a need to ascertain how the balance is maintained. This will establish a basis from which to discuss the main factors that influence it.

The global nuclear balance underpins the balance of power between the two superpowers. The nations of Europe are clustered around the ideological disparate superpowers in two relatively stable blocks. The immediate postwar bipolar balance of power, however, has been complicated by the efforts of many nations to pursue a non-aligned stance in international politics, the emergence of China as a non-aligned nuclear power, and the increasing economic strength of Western Europe and Japan. Direct military confrontation between the superpowers and their allies in areas of strategic importance, such as Europe, carries a real threat of nuclear war and has injected an element of restraint into the actions of the superpowers.

The extent to which limited war has been deterred by the nuclear threat is dependent on the significance of a particular conflict to the interests of the nuclear powers. There is a tacit understanding that direct confrontation in areas of strategic importance to both parties must be avoided, and this fact has worked to enhance stability. Confrontation between the superpowers has largely taken the form of an arms race, and political, economic or military rivalry in peripheral areas, often through proxies. Thus far, nuclear war has been avoided. This can be taken as proof of stability, but less credibly, could also be interpreted as luck as opposed to good management.

A prime factor that works to ensure stability in the global balance is the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are not weapons of use but weapons of deterrence. The comparatively insignificant 20 kiloton bomb dropped on Hiroshima produced an explosion equal to that of a salvo of 4,000,000 WWI field guns. Harold Brown’s report dealing with the US strategic nuclear arsenal commences, quite deliberately, with a description of the effects of the use of one typical nuclear weapon — the equivalent of 1,000,000 tons of TNT — against a major city: typical residences within 7km of the explosion would be completely destroyed and a half a million people would die. A Soviet attack on US ICBM silos could cause from two to 22 million facilities, and an all-out nuclear war could result in up to 165 million casualties in the US alone. Yet even these examples underestimate the effects of a nuclear war. Only 30-odd people died as a result of the Chernobyl meltdown, yet the effects were far-reaching: the simple death count: 135,000 people within a 30km radius were evacuated; radioactive fall-out occurred across much of Europe; 20 countries imposed restrictions on some foods and outdoor activity; the importation of fresh food from seven East European countries was banned; and 100,000 people will need medical checking throughout their lifetime.

It is the awareness of the direct and indirect destructive potential of nuclear weapons that underscores the global nuclear balance. Yet, this awareness alone cannot guarantee the stability of the global nuclear balance. It is conceivable, but difficult to credit, that a country could accept millions of fatalities if it believed it would “win” a nuclear war in terms of the post-war environment. It is more credible that a country would attack with nuclear weapons another country if it believed that the other country (or any other country) would not, or could not, retaliate. Such a situation occurred in WWII. It is also conceivable that a nuclear war could start by accident.

In the joint statement issued at their fourth summit meeting, the Soviet leader and the US President “reaffirmed their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. The maintenance of a condition in which a nuclear war cannot be won appears to be the key to stability. It follows, therefore, that any factor that increases the possibility that a nuclear war can be won is destabilising, and any factor that maintains or increases the condition in which a nuclear war cannot be won is stabilising. If a nuclear war cannot be won under any circumstances, there would be no incentive to pre-empt. Thus, another way of defining stability is the lack of incentives to pre-empt.

Factors That Enhance or Threaten the Balance

This section deals with three factors:
- Invulnerability;
- Nuclear strategy and crisis management; and
- Strategic arms control.
Invulnerability

A key requirement of stability is the possession by the superpowers of an invulnerable or survivable retaliatory force. Such a retaliatory force must contain two elements: firstly a weapons system that is capable of delivering unacceptable damage, and secondly, a command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) infrastructure to manage the weapons system. Both systems must be capable of surviving a first strike. The stability is dependent on parity: should one side’s retaliatory force be seen to be vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike, stability is threatened. The side with the invulnerable retaliatory force may believe that it could win a nuclear war with a pre-emptive counter-force strike, whilst the vulnerable party might be tempted to pre-empt in order to ensure that unacceptable damage is suffered by the superior side.

Strategic forces gain protection through hardening proliferation, mobility and camouflage. All these factors have limitations. In regard to ICBMs, 6,000 p.s.i. appears to represent the limit to which missile silos can be hardened. Hardening beyond 3,000 p.s.i. against missiles with accuracies of around 600 feet and below (such as the MX), reduces single shot kill probabilities by only a few percentage points. Protection through proliferation and camouflage has been negated largely by arms limitation and verification agreements, as well as by sophisticated surveillance methods. Fixed-base ICBMs do not guarantee a second-strike capability. Mobility appears to offer some degree of protection for ICBMs, but satellite observation and rapid retargeting capabilities may negate this advantage substantially. Long-range strategic bombers are vulnerable to destruction-in-place, but their survivability can be increased by high states of alert, and substantially guaranteed if they are airborne. Air-launched cruise missiles, which can be fired from considerable range, increase the bombers’ ability to retaliate effectively. The SLBM appears to offer the most reliable second-strike capability. Submarines are difficult to locate when operating passively at depth, and in particular areas such as in ice floes where warm and cold currents converge.

They can release their missiles with considerable accuracy from comparatively short range, thus allowing little time for reaction. Of the SNDV, the SLBM appears most capable of surviving a first strike, the ICBM least likely. That the SLBM is comparatively invulnerable is a factor that enhances the global nuclear balance. Technologies that increase its vulnerability can be compensated by another arm in the Soviet strategic triad, such as mobile ICBMs.

Turning to the second element required for invulnerability, a survivable C3I infrastructure. It is generally accepted that the C3I systems are more vulnerable and possess less assurance that the strategic nuclear forces they control. Insofar that this is true, it is a factor that threatens stability. If, for example, it was believed that the US would be incapable of communicating with its SSBNs after absorbing a first strike, the Soviet fear of suffering unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike would be diminished considerably. Such a situation could lead to the belief that a nuclear war could be won, and could offer an incentive to pre-empt in a crisis.

Stability at the brink of strategic nuclear war is enhanced if both superpowers are confident that their command systems and forces could ride out an attack. Efforts to improve C3I survivability assist in the maintenance of stability. Technological developments that decrease the survivability of strategic nuclear weapons are destabilising. The US argues that its Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) enhances stability, but ballistic missile defence (BMD) and the Soviet civil defence program threaten stability.

Clearly, such a view is illogical because any factor that works towards achieving a condition in which nuclear war cannot be won is a factor for stability. BMD deployments and civil defence programs, therefore, enhance stability. The SDI program would enhance nuclear stability provided both superpowers possessed the technology that negated substantially a first-strike advantage. If the US alone successfully developed this technology, global nuclear stability would be threatened. In a wider sense, the economic cost for the Soviet Union of developing similar technology may threaten its political stability, and thus threaten the stability of the global balance.

Nuclear Strategy and Crisis Stability

The nuclear strategies of the superpowers probably have the same goals. That is to deter aggression against themselves and their allies; and, in the event that deterrence fails to end war as soon as possible on the most favourable terms possible. There are different views on the
force structure and strategy required to achieve these goals. Some argue that, say, 50 invulnerable warheads directed at 50 cities are sufficient to deter, no matter how large the strategic nuclear force of the opponent. Others argue for a war-winning strategy as means of ensuring deterrence, particularly for a deterrent posture that extends to allies. A strategy lying between minimum deterrence and the war-winning strategy is that of flexible response.

Irrespective of the strategy adopted, and planning for war must consider worst-case scenarios, any strategy that suggests a nuclear war can be won threatens the stability of the global nuclear balance. Pre-emption appears to be the only strategy that has any chance of winning a nuclear war or of limiting damage to the aggressor. Nevertheless, it is inconceivable that a pre-emptive strike could succeed in either of these objectives. Pre-emption would invite all-out retaliation and could result in more, rather than less, damage to the initiator. Just one Trident submarine, for example, on learning that the US had been destroyed, could destroy 100 Soviet cities and 30 million people in retaliation. Calculations based on post-nuclear exchange relativities become quite meaningless in the context of total nuclear war. The tendency to focus on relative advantages instead of absolute costs, exaggerates the advantage that pre-emption offers. A strategy that encompasses a quick-launch option after certain warning of nuclear attack probably enhances stability because it lessens considerably the incentive to pre-empt. Such a response, however, requires almost instantaneous decision-making as well as foolproof safeguards against a false alert, and thus may be unrealistic given present technology and procedures.15

A strategy that accepts that nuclear war can be controlled or limited threatens stability. A US counterforce or counterpolitical attack would be barely distinguishable in terms of fatalities to a countercity attack. Given that Soviet doctrine in the event of a nuclear exchange appears to be the simultaneous and massive employment of missiles against a wide range of targets, a doctrine that assumes that nuclear exchanges can be controlled may have disastrous consequences. The opposition may not play the game. C3I systems may not survive a "controlled" exchange which allows for the possibility of uncontrolled escalation.16 A decision to use even one nuclear weapon carries a risk of loss of control and possible mutual destruction.17 For a Secretary of Defense to be only "highly sceptical" that escalation of a limited nuclear exchange can be controlled, or that it can be stopped short of an all-out massive exchange, threatens the stability of the global balance.18 To assume that nuclear war will result in assured destruction to all parties enhances the stability of the global nuclear balance.

Crisis stability is dependent on organisational structures and decision-making procedures as well as force structure, strategic doctrine, and targeting policy. There is no magic formula or procedure to prevent, or manage, a crisis. Many factors that impinge on the outcome, such as personality traits and stress, cannot be quantified. C3I systems and nuclear war plans are extraordinarily complicated, and the ramifications of a particular course of action may not be immediately apparent. Successful crisis management must be alert to the danger of pre-emption, or loss of control due to the actions of subordinates. Miscalculated escalation could occur if one adversary crosses the other's threshold to war believing incorrectly that his action will be tolerated.19

As previously noted, stability is largely guaranteed by the certainty that devastating retaliation precludes any advantage to the side that initiates a nuclear attack. This knowledge enhances stability in a crisis, insofar that there is less pressure to place strategic forces on higher states of alert or delegate the authority to use nuclear weapons to subordinate commanders.

**Strategic Arms Control**

A factor that enhances the stability of the global balance, particularly in a psychological sense, is mutual and verifiable agreements to limit strategic nuclear weapons. Unilateral disarmament, however, would threaten stability. Arms reductions which leave one side feeling or appearing vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike also threaten the stability of the balance. Stability comes from the relationship between forces, not from their overall numbers. The level at which the stability is maintained is of secondary importance.20 Parity between the strategic nuclear arsenals is arguably more easily maintained at higher levels than at lower levels. Minor changes to specific indices or strategic power currently have little political or military effect because the two nuclear arsenals are so
vast.21 "The lower the number of weapons, the higher the premium on the invulnerability of those remaining and the greater the perturbations caused by unforeseen technological changes", 22 This is not to suggest that there is no place for arms reductions. The superpowers could reduce the number of warheads by 50 percent without upsetting the balance because the arsenals are so large. Reducing the number of warheads to 6,000 would enhance the stability of the global nuclear balance, if only in a psychological sense. Command and control of strategic weapons may be simplified, and the possibility of accidents lessened. Reductions to 60 or six warheads, however, would probably threaten the stability of the balance.

Measures such as data exchanges, on-site monitoring and inspections, and agreements on procedures that enable verification (such as banning telemetry encryption during missile flights), work to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence which enhance the stability of the balance. The provision of information such as advance notification of exercises, and the improvement of communications between the superpowers through, for example, the hotline, are examples of confidence-building measures. Such measures create a political climate that lessens the change of a crisis occurring and enhances crisis stability.24

The notion of strategic arms control is of doubtful value unless it is part of a process which aims to maintain stability. Agreements must, therefore, maintain the situation in which neither side can win a nuclear war and where no incentive to pre-empt exists. Any agreement that improves the survivability of the command systems and strategic forces of the superpowers enhances the stability of the balance. For example, half of the primary and secondary C3I targets in the US could be struck within five to eight minutes by missiles fired from Soviet SSBN on offshore patrol.25 An agreement that proscribed SSBN operations within, say, 1500 km of Washington or Moscow would give both nations greater warning time in the event of a missile attack. The greater warning time could mean the difference between a massive launch-under-attack response and a more limited response. Similarly, an anti-satellite weapons ban would enhance the survivability of US and Soviet space-based C3I systems and would therefore enhance the stability of the balance.

Non-proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons enhances stability. The emergence of a sixth strategic nuclear power would not necessarily threaten the stability of the global balance but would complicate matters and introduce a further element of uncertainty.26

Summary
The global nuclear balance describes the equilibrium that exists between the superpowers in military and political terms. It is based on an essential equivalence in the numbers and performance of strategic forces as well as determination to employ those forces to protect primary strategic interests. The destructive potential of the strategic arsenals acts as a deterrent, but the destructiveness of these weapons alone does not guarantee stability. Rather, stability comes from the knowledge that a nuclear war cannot be won under any circumstances and by any measurement. Any factor that maintains or strengthens the condition in which nuclear war cannot be won enhances stability. Any factor that increases the perception that a nuclear war can be won threatens the stability of the global nuclear balance.

A key requirement for stability is the possession by both superpowers of a survivable retaliatory force. As long as the superpowers remain confident that part of their command systems and strategic forces can survive a pre-emptive attack, stability is maintained. Technological developments that increase the survivability of command and strategic weapons systems enhance stability. Developments that decrease the survivability of retaliatory forces threaten stability. A war strategy that accepts that a nuclear war can be won or controlled threatens stability. A strategy based on the assumption that nuclear war will result in mutual destruction enhances stability. As the possibility of nuclear war is greatest during a period of high political and military tension, successful crisis management must be alert to the dangers of pre-emption, loss of control and miscalculated escalation. Arms reductions that maintain the condition in which neither side can win a nuclear war enhance stability. Arms reductions which leave one side feeling or appearing vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike threaten the stability of the balance. Confidence-building measures such as frequent communication and exchange of information, as well as improved political, economic and social relations, create a climate in which crises are less likely to occur and thus enhance stability. Nevertheless, both
superpowers will continue to strive to maximise their relative strategic advantage, and therein lie the seeds of instability.

NOTES
2. R. Glasser, Nuclear Pre-emption and Crisis Stability, 1985-90, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Canberra, pp.31-2.
8. H. Brown, op. cit., p.27.

21. H. Brown, op. cit., p.44.
24. R. Lebow, op. cit., p.44.
25. D. Ball et al. (eds), Crisis Stability and Nuclear War, op. cit., p.88.
Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Forced Marching and Were Afraid to Ask

By WO2 R. Payne, RA Inf

Introduction

HOW often have you been perambulating along a leafy lane contemplating the wonders of the world when some illegitimate necromancer endowed with the status of neo-Nazi officialdom, hurls suggestive abuse at you; abuse, mind you, that indicates your inability to synchronise your skeletal frame with your autonomous muscular action... You cannot march properly!

Considering the amount of marching we do, and the effort expended in doing so, very little is written about how we should do it; and what is in print is extremely vague. Most of what we teach has been passed by word of mouth and like anything communicated in this manner, is inconsistent, contradictory and usually wrong.

Since the 1914-18 war when the 15km battle efficiency test was first devised, the distance between the front line and the reserved trenches, we have been assessing the ability of our soldiers to march. Has that need diminished? In recent times the Falklands war showed us that it has not. The purpose of this article is to assess and re-evaluate the forced marching technique and produce logical teaching points that can be used by us all.

Formation

The first thing that must be understood is forced marching is not a parade ground formation and it is certainly not drill. It is, by reason of its being, a tactical movement of troops. To this end three ranks is a closed grouping of men which is an excellent way of getting them quickly decimated.

Secondly, from the individual viewpoint, if you have ever had the misfortune to march in the middle rank of a squad for any length of time, you would understand the physical and psychological discomforts of spending two or more hours confined by four other sweaty, grouchy men. The smell, limited movement, heat and other related problems make it extremely uncomfortable simply being there. This often leads to the early onset of heat related illness and outbursts of anger, which once started, are difficult to control.

The ideal formation for forced marching is three files, staggered on alternate sides of the road. the advantages of this are:
(a) it is tactically sound;
(b) it gives everyone plenty of breathing space;
(c) individuals get specific alongside-coaching and assistance;
(d) movement up and down the squad is quick and easy;
(e) files can be in sections so that section NCOs retain intimate control over their men; and
(f) greater safety is maintained as the section is dispersed on the extremities of the road making traffic control and flow easier. There is also the added bonus of ensuring that if an accident does occur, minimum personnel will be injured.

Sizing

"Shortest to the front and tallest to the rear". How often have we heard this command? It makes the assumption that we are all built the same and, therefore, walk identically; not true! Although we may be mechanically the same; height, build and weight ensure each of us requires varying lengths of step and footfall to balance and co-ordinate our movement.

If we accept this fact then we must agree that sizing for forced marching is a waste of time. To simplify this even more, it is a biological fact that taller people take fewer steps over a given distance than shorter ones, yet they both can travel at the same speed.

I have no doubt the paranoia associated with sizing arises from the need for regimentation. In this instance an unnecessary excuse for packaging people. We should not do it as it has no value. In fact, it can aggravate a whole series of leg problems.

Keeping in Step

Being made to keep in step is like being sized: totally wrong in its supposition. As has already been explained, because of the wide range of step distance it is feasible to allow individuality of pace distance without affecting the squad configuration. Providing everyone is maintaining the same speed there is no logical reason why the squad should be in step.

At this point it must be made clear that control over the squad does not diminish:
squad discipline is still very important. Calling the time is still critical, for when you do so you give the squad an external source of rhythm and speed, like the musician's metronome, an extra tool we all need at times.

Fall Behind Syndrome

We often see a man dragged to the front of the squad where he is supposed to lift his name. This action presupposes that his motivation will receive the required kick start to keep him going. If that fails then enough verbal, or physical encouragement will boost his failing ego.

I do not believe in the majority of cases that this is an effective solution. The nature of the beast for most people is mental aggression, the willingness to keep going. Physically, even the weakest men have ample strength left in their muscles even though their minds tell them to stop. Most of us learn to switch off the muscular discomfort when physical tiredness affects our performance. Unfortunately, some people have great difficulty in overcoming this problem.

Forced marching is very often a battle of the mind because so many factors influenced it. Fitness, weather, weight load, distance, terrain and speed all act upon your ability to march efficiently. Each subtly pressurises the mind in one way or another. Obviously, the fitter your physical condition the less these influences affect you as generally the fitter you are the more alert your mind is. But nevertheless, the anchor for a good marcher is mental fitness, and it requires a more subtle approach than the usual yelling and screaming.

In most circumstances the quickest way to create a failure psychologically is to drag someone to the front of the squad and focus everybody's attention on him. Because his erratic marching behaviour disrupts everyone's rhythm and concentration you produce a no win situation, a problem within a problem. It is a vicious circle which both the section and the individual can do without.

In certain situations, such as combat or simulated combat, time does not permit the luxury for coaching and speed is essential. You have little option but to drag your weak marcher with you. But you still need to identify and pre-place him within the section. You do have the advantage of each section member knowing all the others' problems so they relate very well. They will carry him for the rest of the march, giving him whatever support he needs. This will work only where you have a very close knit group of men.

In a teaching environment the best way to coach the poor performer is at the back of the squad where he is out of the limelight and more susceptible to psychological and physical coaching. He may not remain in close contact with the squad but he is less likely to give up, and he will not affect the performance of anybody else.

Don't Run Syndrome

The don't run syndrome comes from the misguided impression that if you force someone to do something often enough it will become an automatic reaction. Unfortunately, the laws of nature which govern human movement and body mechanics, defy that rule on occasions.

At a certain speed, which is different for each of us, walking becomes shuffling, shuffling becomes jogging and so on. If we relate this to forced marching there is a point beyond which we cannot march any faster. It is an instinctive action and should not be stopped. We have all done it at one time or another and no doubt, in the future, will do it again.

If a person is having difficulty with the march pace then he or she should be encouraged periodically to shuffle, either to maintain the speed, or to catch up. Generally the problem is related either to calf, or shin soreness. Once someone has this type of injury, forcing him to remain at a marching cadence is compounding the problem. Rest is the ideal solution, but impossible during the march. So by changing the action of the muscles slightly, we at least ease the discomfort.

There is a group of people who cannot do true forced marching for any length of time and however much training they do they will never grasp the technique. For them the shuffle step is the most efficient way of moving. They will often spend up to 80 percent of the time shuffling. These people rarely drop back, or fall out, and will quite comfortably complete even the longest of marches. Leave them alone!
this occur, good coaching and medical attention are the only answers in the long term. But whatever the reason for shuffle step, under no circumstances should you limit the action.

**How do you Forced March Correctly?**

Forced marching is a combination of speed marching and shuffle step jogging; the distance of each being controlled by the length of the march and the terrain covered. The marching style is a blend of several components adapted to suit the individual.

**Weight Distribution**

The distribution of equipment around your body is one of a number of governing factors controlling how efficiently you march. It not only affects your marching style, but your energy consumption as well. The heavier the burden the greater the need for adjustment to stride length, balance and posture. Equipment should be spread evenly so that both legs are carrying the same weight and curvature of the spine is as near to normal as possible.

If feasible, avoid carrying a weapon across the shoulder, slinging it across the chest or back and hanging off one shoulder. Each of these positions restricts arm movement to such a degree that it can alter walking cadence radically. The arms are part of the mechanism of walking as well as balance; try walking with your arms held by your side and see how much they alter the co-ordination of movement.

If it is possible, the best place to carry a weapon is at arm's length. In this position the weapon acts as a limited pendulum assisting arm swing. Changing arms periodically will allow each arm to rest and balance out body posture over the period of the march.

Finally, keep the chest area clear of restrictions that will prevent maximum chest expansion. Early on in the march you may not notice it too much, but as oxygen demand increases during the latter stages, any restriction of movement can reduce lung capacity to such an extent that you are forced to slow down to compensate.

**Arm Action**

It has already been stated that arm action is one of the controlling factors of forward movement. To maximise efficiency and minimise energy consumption your shoulders should be relaxed and your arms allowed to swing as low as feasible; hands should never be permitted to form a tight fist. A good point to remember is the tighter you clench your fists and the higher you hold your hands, the more energy and effort your arms and shoulders must use to work.

**Head Posture**

To ensure that the body can get optimum advantage out of co-ordinating all its movements for forward propulsion, the head must remain upright. Any tilting forward of the head immediately rounds the shoulders, which in turn pushes the spine out of alignment. If this is kept up for any length of time it results in an uneven weight distribution along the length of the spine which will cause an aching back.

**Leg Action**

A great deal has already been said about leg action but it is essential that we define the ideal movement and sequence for walking. Each leg in turn must bear the total weight of the body, including equipment. When it does so it must adjust its stride length to compensate, this allows it to limit the amount of pressure on each leg at any given time. The same rule applies when you want to speed up: shorten, not lengthen, your stride and speed up your rhythm. This, and avoiding driving your heels into the ground (Regimental Drill Movement), which is extremely bad for ankle, knee, and hip joints, will ensure as smooth walking action as can possibly be achieved under the circumstances.

**Shuffle Step**

The validity of the shuffle step is often argued, both from the vaunted medical injury syndrome viewpoint and its efficiency value. There is no doubt that boot running on hard surfaces, over long distances, aggravates ankle, knee and shin injuries. Whether there has been any controlled research conducted to specify a limit of two kilometres of running at any one time I doubt very much.

To this end I don't believe that shuffle step can be classed as true running. Shuffle is the operative word. The action is very similar to an old person's walk. The foot is lifted sufficiently clear of the ground to ensure forward movement. The emphasis being on swinging
the lower leg forward rather than picking the whole leg up. Finally, the foot is placed down in a limited heel and toe action: all this continues at a very efficient action.

The reason for the shuffle step is summed up in the often used term "to shake it out". The periodic shuffle helps prevent that mental tunnel vision that many people fall into: it wakes them up. It also gives the whole body, especially the legs, a break from the enforced walking action, allowing them to stretch the muscles in a slightly different movement. Besides this, there is the added bonus of having a method of moving that maintains the march speed without disrupting the marching rhythm.

When to Shuffle Step

The shuffle step should be introduced, when on flat ground, about every 800 metres, and should continue for up to 200 metres — no more! The distances would shorten once the squad become tired. Never run up hill, but shuffle down hill, terrain permitting, until the ground levels out, then marching should begin. The golden rule to go by is: keep the shuffle speed the same as the marching pace unless there is a need to increase the overall speed of the march.

Water

Water conservation is one of those grey areas that can be argued over all day. Each of us seems to have his own ideas on how we should control the intake of water during military activities. I am a firm believer in the medical practice of encouraging drinking in any conditions once you start to sweat. Marching is very vigorous activity, vigorous being the key factor.

The human body contains more water in it than any other single element. It will not register thirst until approximately one litre of water is lost; and once sweating commences and activities continue, you cannot keep up with the water loss. Water plays a large part in energy conversion and muscle movement, so the more we lose the quicker the onset of muscle fatigue and mental disorientation. I wonder how many people often border on heat exhaustion throughout a march when they limit water intake?

As soon as you start perspiring you should commence drinking and every 10 to 15 minutes thereafter you should drink again. Never swill your mouth and spit out, never pour it on yourself, unless suffering heat illness. Water has more value inside you. If any restriction should be made it is in the quantity you swallow at any one time. One of the best ways to gauge this is to drink no more than three mouthfuls at once, and space the consumption out over about 50 metres: this aids digestion. I reiterate: you will never keep up with water loss until you stop activity. The best you can do is limit the amount you lose.

On distances of up to 20 kilometres do not stop when you are marching, drink on the move. Stopping and starting, even for short periods, makes the muscles tighten up, in some instances even causes severe cramping. All you need to do is drink during the marching phases, if necessary slow the march pace down slightly.

Boots

Next to physical fitness, boots seem to constitute the second biggest problem during marching. There is a whole range of evils that boots cause. I personally believe that a little bit of own man management stops most boots injuries, for example:

a. If you insert the liner from the inside of your jogging shoes you create a perfect pad for the bottom of your feet; no need to use two pairs of socks.

b. When you put your boot on, pull your sock up and turn it over the top of the boot then tie the lace around the top of the sock and boot. This stops your socks running down.

c. Don't tie your laces too tight where the boot bends around the ankle.

d. Use the issued oil-based cleaning agent to keep your working boots supple.

Conclusion

This article was written because of the disparity in teachings I have observed over the years. Like many of the good old skills that are becoming lost as the years go by, forced marching is a dying art. Nobody seems to care, so consequently the ignorance persists. I expect that a number of people will disagree with much of what I have written, but at least it will stimulate enough thought to revive the art of forced marching.
Military Strategy

By Air Commodore N.F. Ashworth, RAAF, (Ret)

The Australian Joint Services Glossary defines “military strategy” as being, “the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force”. Like most definitions in the military lexicon, it sounds great, but does not really explain the full meaning of the term. In particular, it sets no limits on the scope of matters that might properly be included within its ambit.

That the word “strategy” comes from the Greek stratēgia that means “the art of the general”, is well-known. Does military strategy then mean the military art of the general? In this context the word “military” appears superfluous. Hence, there is a need to look further in order to understand fully the meaning of “military strategy”.

Most people who know anything about military matters understand the difference between strategy and tactics. However, few know or understand that there is a further, and equally important, division of strategy into two components. Unfortunately for the process of understanding, these two components go under a variety of labels.

Captain B.H. Liddell-Hart was one strategic writer who stressed the division of strategy into its two components. In his excellent book, Strategy, the Indirect Approach (which, incidentally, should be required reading for all military professionals) he introduces and explains the terms: “higher, or grand, strategy” and “pure, or military, strategy”. Grand strategy, he explains, is “practically synonymous with” what Clausewitz termed policy. Its role “is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of the nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy”.

Military strategy, he goes on to explain, can thus be confined to its original meaning as, “the art of the general”. Thus we have strategy at the political level and strategy at the military level.

The choice of the term “grand strategy” is unfortunate in that it carries connotations of war at the major power, world wide level, of such Second World War conferences as those at Tehran, Cairo and Casablanca. Yet in concept grand strategy is as applicable to a small, insignificant, third world country as it is to the major powers. Also, it is as applicable to defence measures in peacetime as it is to war. Any situation dealing with the use or potential use of military force has aspects that are the rightful province of grand strategy.

The division of strategy into the political and the military recognises the important fact that war is a political act and is waged for political purposes. Thus any consideration of war, or, as it tends to be termed in peacetime, “defence”, must have a political as well as a military dimension. Furthermore, while the two are sure to become inextricably mixed in practice, each has a different “professional” basis, politics being the sphere of the politician or statesman, the military that of the general (or admiral or air marshal). Another way of viewing the division of strategy is to think of grand strategy as, “the art of the statesman in the conduct of war”; and military strategy as, “the art of the general”. This concept could be further extended to tactics, as being, “the art of the soldier”.

Liddell-Hart goes on to stress the close relation, and blurring at the margin, between tactics (military) strategy and grand strategy. He also makes an important observation when he points to the implications of past failure to the appreciation of the division of strategy. “It encouraged soldiers to make the preposterous claim that policy should be subservient to their conduct of operations, and, especially in democratic countries, it drew the statesman on to overstep the definite border of his sphere and interfere with his military employees in the actual use of their tools”. This then leads on to a consideration of the respective role of the statesman and the general in strategic matters.

Grand strategy is clearly the business of the statesman. It is the statesman who must take prime responsibility for its formulation and accept full responsibility for its success or failure. But, what of the general, does he have any part to play? Here the answer must be an unqualified “yes”. The role of the general in
grand strategy is that of an advisor. Grand strategy cannot be formulated without a consideration of the possibilities of the application of military force, of its strengths and limitations and of its inevitable side effects. Military strategy, which clearly is the business of the general, is, in large part, the means by which grand strategy is put into effect. To formulate grand strategy without proper consideration of military matters is pure folly, a folly only marginally greater than that of abdicating grand strategy to the military.

Does the statesman have a role in the formulation and execution of military strategy? Here the answer is a heavily qualified “no”. If the political objectives of the nation are clearly detailed, if the generals have a clear appreciation of, and sympathy for, political matters and if the political setting for the conduct of military operations is simple, then there should be no need for the political leadership to interfere in military matters. Unfortunately, politicians tend to shy off laying down clear objectives. They are much more at home dabbling in the details of government, especially at the point of contact between the government and the public. For their part generals, due to inclination and upbringing, tend to be conservative and strongly nationalistic in their politics and to be men of action with a less than sympathetic appreciation of the facts of political life in a democracy. And about the only political setting for war that might be considered politically simple is one in which the opposing forces are operating in an unoccupied and worthless desert.

For his part, what the politician has to learn is that every shackle that he places on the general, either through the dictates of grand strategy or by direct interference in military matters, reduces the effectiveness of military operations. It is essential that he understand, and be willing to accept, reductions in effectiveness his policies may impose. He must also learn to trust his generals in their handling of military matters, while at the same time holding them to the political aims and objectives of the nation.

The facts of political life also mean that the general must accept a much lower dividing line between grand strategy and military strategy than he might desire. To have a free hand to wield military force unshackled by political restraints may be attractive to the general and indeed would allow him his greatest chance of military success. However, war is not waged for military purposes, it is waged for political purposes, and it is the politician, not the general, who is responsible for the defence of the nation.

In a great deal of modern United States, and in Soviet, strategic writing the twofold division of strategy is at least recognised, even if its precise boundary lines are not always clear. Here the terminology divides war into three levels: strategic, operational and tactical. For strategic in the United States lexicon read “grand strategy”, and for operational read “military strategy”. What appears to be less well accepted in this scheme, at least in its application, is the respective roles of the statesman and the general, with the general appearing to claim a higher place than would, and should, be tolerated in the Australian political setting.

Going back to the AJS definition of military strategy as being, “the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force”, it is clear that it does not fit Liddell-Hart’s meaning of the term. The AJS definition, as it stands, makes no distinction between the political and the military aspects of the use of military force. What is needed up front is the qualifying phrase, “the military aspects of...”.

When we think about defence issues we need to be clear as to the place we set for ourselves in the schemes of things. For the most part, be we military professionals or otherwise, we tend to put ourselves in the position of the informed citizen who has both a right and a duty to look at defence problems from an overall national or political point of view. Thus we take the grand strategy viewpoint in which military expertise is but one of the factors in formulating an opinion. If, on the other hand, we wish to look at things as a military professional, we must accept that, while we may thus claim far greater expertise than others, our horizon must be correspondingly lowered to the purely military aspects of defence.

Yet another illustration of the distinction between grand strategy and military strategy, between the responsibilities of the politician and the general, is the fact that war prevention strategies, such as deterrence, are not military strategies. Military strategy is limited to matters directly related to the use of military force.
generally to overcome opposing military force. It is politicians who start wars, not the military. It is the job of the politicians to prevent war where possible while at the same time preparing the nation for war should it be unavoidable. It is the job of the politician to direct the conduct of the war, should it occur and, in due course, to bring it to an end. The only role for the military in all of this, aside from the general advising the statesman, is the dirty, distasteful and dangerous one of doing the actual fighting. War is the business of politicians: fighting the business of the military and each should let the other get on with the job without undue interference, but with a maximum of mutual support and understanding.

NOTE
Service Policy on Honours Years at the Australian Defence Force Academy

By Midshipman J.S. Sears, RAN

Introduction

The year 1986 marked a new era in the education of officers of the Australian Defence Forces with the first entry of officer cadets into the Australian Defence Force Academy. The primary role of the Defence Academy is to provide officer cadets and midshipmen with a balanced and liberal tertiary education within a military environment. It is an institution dedicated to promoting academic and military excellence as well as tri-Service spirit. Yet, since the initial intake, each of the single services has developed its own policy on the selection of cadets to undertake a fourth year of an Honours Degree. Consequently, the aim of the article is to evaluate the present Service policy on the awarding of an Honours years to midshipmen and officer cadets at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

Current Single Service Policies

Australian Navy

The Royal Australian Navy will allow a maximum of 10 percent of midshipmen to undertake a fourth year of study leading to an Honours degree. The figure of 10 percent is a maximum only and subject to eligibility as determined by:

- Grades in the academic discipline concerned. The minimum mark acceptable is a Credit or above and this must be maintained at all times in the subject in which the Honours degree is being studied;
- Interviews with Academy staff leading to recommendations from the midshipman’s Divisional Officer, Squadron Officer Commanding, the Adjutant and the psychologists; and
- Confirmation by Navy Office subject to their stated policy as well as manpower, financial and Service constraints.

Consequently, there is no guarantee that a midshipman will be granted the fourth year of study until Navy Office confirmation at the end of that midshipman’s third year.

Royal Australian Air Force

The Royal Australian Air Force may allow one General Duties and one Supply officer cadet to have a fourth year to complete an Honours degree. The Air Force stresses that the Honours degree will not help a person’s career and appears to discourage officer cadets from applying for it.

Australian Regular Army

The Australian Regular Army will allow any officer cadet, eligible by academic Department and Academy selection, to complete an Honours year after he or she finishes military training at RMC Duntroon.

The Case For an Honours Degree

“To Lead, To Excel”

The motto of the Australian Defence Force Academy is To Lead, To Excel. Over the past four years both the academic and military staff have expressed dissatisfaction with what has been termed the “51 percent Syndrome”. That is, officer cadets seek to do only as much work as is necessary to pass. This is illustrated by the cadets’ unofficial motto which has become “51 percent — wasted effort: 49 percent — wasted year”.

If students are to excel academically in the Academy environment, which places upon them the additional demands of the military such as parades, leadership, and social and sporting activities, then this excellence must be encouraged. The promise of a better degree, one which recognises excellence, as does an Honours degree, is such encouragement. Clearly, if each Service and the Academy is serious about wanting its officer cadets to excel, then the incentive must exist. Without incentive, those Navy and Air Force officer cadets who perceive that they are not the top of their class will content themselves with simply passing and not strive for higher marks.

The Recruiters’ Promise

Young men and women join the Academy having been promised a “first class degree”. Recruiters select from the top 10 percent of students in Australia. These intelligent, motiva-
ted people enter the Academy believing that they are being given the best possible opportunity to study for the best possible degree. Unfortunately, Navy and Air Force recruits are being unfairly misled as many who work hard, undertake extra study and achieve creditable results may not be given the chance to complete a fourth year simply because they are not in the Army and not at the very top of their Service. These Services will not deliver what the recruiters promise. If the Navy and Air Force really intend to recruit from the top students in the nation, then they must offer all who are capable of completing an Honours degree the chance to do so; otherwise, they do not really offer the best possible education.

Consistency

One of the major reasons that the Academy was developed was to promote co-operation and understanding between the three Services. Each Service, however, has a different policy concerning the level of achievement to which its officer cadets may realistically aspire. In the Navy at the moment, the top two Arts students may be allowed to complete an Honours year in 1989. At the beginning of Second Year 1987 at least seven midshipmen were enrolled in Honours courses in Arts. When informed of the maximum limit of 10 percent, two midshipmen immediately discontinued their additional Honours subjects and became Pass students.

In the Air Force, many officer cadets at the end of the First Year indicated a willingness to undertake an Honours programme of study. The fact that only one would be awarded a fourth was such a disincentive to the aspirants that only the top student wanting to do Honours actually enrolled in the course.

All Army officer cadets wanting to study at the Honours level have already enrolled even though, in many cases, their marks were significantly lower than their Navy and Air Force counterparts studying Economics, English, Politics and History. If the Services wish to foster understanding among themselves then they must look at implementing more consistent policies. If not, the result will be resentment within the Corps.

Fairness

Students enroll for an Honours degree in Arts at the beginning of their second year of study. They must undertake to study additional subjects, thus significantly increasing their academic workload, usually for no extra credit points. These Honours subjects are taught at a higher level than Pass subjects. A minimum of Credit grades must be maintained in all Pass and Honours units in the subject. It is unfair to expect students to commit themselves to extra work and maintain the effort for two years without the assurance of gaining a fourth year. In the fourth year were not awarded, then much of the preparation for the Honours year would have been in vain. Certainly the students would be bitterly disappointed not to have completed their study. Consequently, they would consider themselves to have been unfairly treated and this may later be reflected in their attitude towards their chosen Service.

Merit

The policies of the Navy and Air Force to restrict numbers of Honours students based on a percentage or number limit also detracts from their arguments that the best are selected on merit. One year a number of excellent students may miss out on an Honours year while the following year students of a lower calibre may gain the chance to do a fourth year.

The Future

An Honours degree is the usual pre-requisite for enrolment in a Masters or Doctorate course. The Services have expressed a clear desire for their officers to undertake postgraduate studies. Yet, in limiting the number of their future officers able to complete an Honours degree, the Navy and Air Force effectively place their graduates at a severe disadvantage in competing for postgraduate positions on courses such as the Master of Defence Studies or any more civilian orientated study. The Services, in particular Navy and Air Force, are thereby limiting the future level of education within the Officer Corps, leaving their members at a disadvantage when competing for higher education positions with civilians.

The Case Against an Honours Year

Value To Service

Traditionally, senior officers, while talking about the need for a better-educated Officer Corps, have tended to see the debate about academic qualifications only in terms of the direct and seemingly noticeable benefit that a
course studied brings to the job. Thus, commanders of the Arms Corps have been known to criticise English as being worthless while sections of the Navy consider History a "basket-weaving" subject. The Air Force has been even more restrictive in its thinking. Pilots are strongly encouraged to do Physics and Mathematics even though studies have shown that the best potential fighter pilots are children with excellent reflexes and an aptitude for computer games. When a pilot finishes his flying career, the Mathematics and Physics that he learnt may be out of date and may be of no direct use.

Staff officers go to management positions where a knowledge of History, Politics or Economics is more relevant to the work than Physics or Mathematics and a better basis for further education and training. To suggest to the Services that a further year spent on these subjects would be of benefit to them naturally is greeted with disbelief. Yet, an Honours degree in any subject considerably develops a student's analytical and writing abilities as well as contributing original research in areas usually military. These benefits may not be seen by the short-sighted but in the long-term, new knowledge combined with better educated people can play a critical role in shaping the Defence Forces.

**Manpower and Financial Constraints**

The Defence Forces are suffering very real shortages in manpower and finance. In the short term it would appear reasonable to get people through the Academy and out into their work as quickly as possible. In addition, a fourth year costs the Services more money although the beneficiary must repay it through his return of service obligation of an additional year to the Services.

However, the Navy and the Air Force attitudes to the granting of Honours years aggravate these problems. If people cannot achieve a first class education in the Services then they will not join and manpower problems will worsen or educational standards fall. Furthermore, if the Academy can develop well-educated, persuasive officers able to compete with the best of their civilian counterparts in other Government Departments, then finance for Defence can be increased or at least kept at a higher level than would have otherwise have been possible. These highly educated graduates of the Academy may even return to the Academy and teach there. Thus, they will bring their own knowledge of Service needs into the education of officer cadets while further developing the standard of education within the military as a whole.

**Conclusion**

The different Single Service policies which determine the awarding of an honours year to officer cadets at the Defence Academy are confusing and unnecessarily complex. In addition, they are incompatible with the tri-Service philosophy of the Academy. Honours Students in their second and third years of study have significant additional workloads. Hence, it is unfair not to allow them a fourth year to complete their Honours degree. Honours degrees are desirable. They promote excellence, aid recruiting and provide a firm basis for the post-graduate study that the Services now see as necessary. In the long-term, a better educated Officer Corps in the Australian Defence Forces means better officers more able to cope with their civilian counterparts in other Government Departments. The Services clearly desire a better educated Officer Corps. More Honours graduates is the first step towards achieving this. There may be short-term manning and financial costs but in the longer-term these will be overcome as the highly motivated graduates begin their careers and are in a position to undertake post-graduate study when their Service requires it of them.

Following from these conclusions, I believe that the three Services should develop a single policy to determine the conditions for the award of a fourth year to students to complete an Honours degree. This policy should:

- Allow all students an equal opportunity of doing Honours provided that they meet and maintain the Academy's standards;
- Acknowledge that an Honours degree will aid the student's long-term professional career as well as being of benefit to the Services as a whole; and
- Include aspects of planning to allow for the additional manpower and financial burdens that the fourth year awarded to students may place upon Service resources.
Foreign Service Students at Australian Service Schools

Do we throw any prawns on the barbie for our foreign Service students?

By Major Bruce Copeland, RAAEC

Introduction

In recent decades, many foreign students have attended courses in Australia at schools of the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Army and the Royal Australian Air Force. All such training is part of the foreign aid commitment of Australia as set in place by the Federal government.

Apart from the training aspects, there is considerable importance to be attached to the return of these visitors with positive attitudes both to Australia and Australians.

Too often, it may well be that many such visitors return to their countries with negative attitudes that derive from their perceptions that many Australians with whom they come into contact are cold, uncaring and lacking in basic courtesy.

Aim

The aim of this article is to establish a scenario of the avoidable absence of interaction between many Australian Service members and foreign service visitors who attend courses in Australia.

Background

This article has been written in conjunction with five (5) articles that have been published in the Defence Force Journal. These are:

* "In Support of our Friends, the Foreign Instructor and Student" DFJ No 50 Jan/Feb 85.
* "In Support of the Papua New Guinean Student in Australia" DFJ No 54 Sep/Oct 85.
* "In Support of More Effective Texts for Papua New Guinean Students in Australia" DFJ No 65 Jul/Aug 87, and
* "Towards the Effective Training of Foreign Students in English as a Technical Language" DFJ No 65 Jul/Aug 87, and
* "The Training of Foreign Students" DFJ No 68 Jan/Feb 88.

The articles are not cited as references but as supplementary texts for the reader who may wish to study this topic within a wider context.

The purpose of these articles has been to give support to policy makers, course managers and instructors.

No training manuals have yet been written on the subject. Some years ago the Strategic International Planning (SIP) Division had plans to prepare a Defence Co-operation Handbook and invited the writer to provide a chapter on Training of Foreign Students. Certain wisdom was demonstrated by the writer who also submitted the work to the Defence Force Journal where it was published in issue No. 68.

The writer has confidence that the thrust of each article is accurate and that a number of important issues have been brought out into the open. Feedback has always been positive with representatives of a number of Service schools indicating regular use of the articles.

Prawns on the Barbie

The image that Australia projects to citizens of the United States of America has been personified by Paul Hogan that lovable Ocker who demonstrates to the potential tourist that Australians are friendly, outgoing and generous to foreign tourists.

The question arises as to whether or not this image is appropriate for Australian Service personnel in their relations with Service visitors from Asia and the Pacific who attend courses in Australia. It may well be that many such visitors find large numbers of Australians to be cold and far from generous. It may be that many Australians are unable to handle any warm relationship with anyone who does not drink beer nor follow the football (most people from South East Asia do neither).

Grass Roots Diplomacy

For many years, the view has been expressed that Australia is part of Asia and the Pacific and that our diplomacy should be focused towards the people of the region.

It is too easy to point the finger at the good sense or otherwise of our politicians and the quality of their performance on the world stage. Perhaps a politician may be reported as having slurped his soup at a state banquet in Asia. Perhaps another may have angered an Asian leader by an unguarded remark. All such incidents will be reported with gusto in the media.
Yet the death of friendship between two nations may be fostered daily in the discourteous ways in which some foreign students are treated in some Australian Service schools.

It must be emphasised that this depends very much on the individual personalities at any given school at any given time. The writer is familiar with the way the students of a RAAF school recently gave considerable warmth, friendship and support to a Thai officer.

**Loneliness on Course**

Many foreign students on course will have suffered the loneliness of Australian Service messes.

Many will have attended the Defence Co-operation Language School (DCLS) and will have left with positive expectations of the reception that they will receive at the Service Schools which they are to attend.

Some Service schools will make foreign students welcome. Yet, at other schools, foreign students will be sadly disillusioned. Some will be dropped off at the unit messes and may be virtually ignored by Australian mess members during the duration of their stay. At the very worst, they may be neither welcomed nor farewelled.

For some foreign visitors, their expectations on course may be their only contact with Australians.

**Bases in the Bush**

Many bases in Australia are situated in isolated areas. This means that foreign students have to travel long distances, particularly on weekends if they are to escape the boredom of living in messes and if they are to see Australia.

At one Service base in Australia, foreign students have the added difficulty of being unable to walk off the base as it is situated on an island, joined to the mainland by a causeway. Pedestrian traffic is banned on the causeway. With one bus available on weekends the foreign visitors have to order taxis just to get off the base and to return. This means that these visitors are condemned to spending many weekends alone at the mess, thousands of kilometres from home, drinking beer, playing billiards and making ISD calls home.

There will be some foreign personnel, particularly those from Papua New Guinea who find that they mix with ease with Australians if they demonstrate skill at rugby league. At one base, the local selectors have been known to go out to greet the newcomers at the airport. What a friendly lot of Australians we have here.

**Ease of Contact**

Many Australians are ill at ease with foreign visitors, particularly those from cultures markedly different from our own.

Many Papua New Guineans are in a category of their own because of the extensive contact that they have had with Australians in their own country. They are comfortable with Paul Hogans of Australia and can readily identify such people from the ranks of missionaries, teachers, patrol officers and others who worked in Papua New Guinea in years past. At the same time, they undoubtedly know our weaknesses as well as our strengths.

Many Papua New Guineans understood the Ocker sense of humour in the past. Yet often they are left too much to their own devices in Service messes.

On the other hand, the Indonesian, Malay and Thai personnel are culturally very different from us. They will adhere to a greater sense of formality than we are used to. This requires sensitivity on the part of Australians. It also requires us to be more formally correct in our relationships with overseas visitors. Avoiding them may seem like the easy way out.

From the point of view of foreign visitors, the behaviour of some Australians may be seen as completely lacking in terms of what they would have expected.
Many foreign visitors come to Australian Service units bearing a gift in the form of a plaque to be hung in the mess. Plaques from South-East Asian and Pacific nations are proudly displayed in many Australian units. Yet such a courtesy may well not be reciprocated.

Perhaps the view is that our visitors are expressing gratitude for the training that they have received. This is probably so even if they were unhappy with the training anyway. Training is the fulfilment of a system requirement. Gifts occur between individual people. Presentation of the unit plaque would not be a courtesy wasted.

If any British or American visitors arrive at a Service unit, the red carpet is rolled out, with all due pomp and ceremony.

Support to Visitors

There are Service schools in Australia where effort is made to make foreign visitors welcome. At the Army Staff College, students have long been allocated a sponsor from the town who gives friendship and support during the study year.

Other schools have allocated Australian personnel to give support. It is an important task for any Commanding Officer to ensure that regular support is made available to give the opportunity for genuine friendship to flourish. It is equally important for every Service member to extend the hand of friendship.

The writer is aware of Australian apprentices at HMAS Nirimba who have taken a PNGDF apprentice home for a leave period. A lecturer at Rockingham Technical College has made a practice of taking DCP students home for dinner.

PNGDF students at No 1 Flying Training School at Point Cook and the RAAF School of Radio at Laverton are supported by two PNGDF exchange Officers. As well, exchange officers are posted to HMAS Nirimba and the RAAF School of Technical Training.

Awareness of Training for Australians

A barometer of the increasing awareness in relation to the training of foreign students is the attendance of Service personnel on familiarisation courses at the RAAF School of Languages.

There are quite a number of Service schools involved in training foreign Service personnel. Yet not all send training personnel on the familiarisation courses.

The following organisations have indicated to the writer over the years, an interest in this area of awareness training as follows:
- Defence Co-operation Language School
- HMAS Nirimba
- Infantry Centre
- RAEME Training Centre
- Army Aviation Regiment
- RAAF School of Technical Training
- RAAF School of Radio
- RAAF School of Languages
- RAAF School of Management and Technical Training
- RAAF No 1 Flying Training School
- Rockingham Technical College

Conclusion

Foreign Service students continue to attend courses at Defence schools in Australia. Training of foreign Service personnel is an important part of Australia’s commitment within the region.

Many Service schools strive to give maximum support to such personnel.

There are, however, Australian units which leave much to be desired in the support given.

Continued lack of support by units and lack of friendship by Australian personnel will probably contribute significantly to a weakening of friendship at a national level.

The responsibility for fostering friendship lies with every member of the Defence Force who comes into contact with foreign Service students.

Recommendation

It is recommended that all Australian Service units assess the effectiveness of their awareness training in relation to training of foreign students and to the actual support given.

Major Copeland has worked at the RAAF School of Languages for 10 years. During that time, he has trained Service personnel for posting to Papua New Guinea and for training duties in Australia.
BOOK REVIEWS

FIGHTING WORDS. Edited by Carl Harrison-Ford. Published by Lothian Books. Price $29.95. Reviewed by John Buckley, OBE

It is true that many of our most famous writers have been greatly influenced by their experiences in war. No doubt these experiences helped them to become successful as authors in later life.

How many know that Banjo Paterson and J.H.M. Abbott served in the Boer War and wrote some first class stories about their exploits? Harry "Breaker" Morant wrote his famous poem the night before his execution. Paterson and Abbott went on to become famous authors. Some of their stories are included in this volume.

number of first class authors who wrote of their experiences and adventures. These include Facey, Bean, Dyson, Gammage, Gallert, Boyd, Hurley, Matthews, Maxwell and Gullett. Many of these are mentioned in the book.

Reading some of their stories is most rewarding and educational. Most of them wrote with deep feeling and their powers of description excite the reader.

The Second World War brought another crop of excellent authors. Joe Gullett, Mant, Moyes, Glossop, Lambert, Paul, White, Legg, Braddon, Peter Ryan, Arniel, Johnson, Harrison and Campbell are mentioned but for some strange reason some outstanding contributors are missing. The most glaring omission is Chester Wilmot who many regard as one of the very best authors. I know personally of Chester's brilliant work in the Middle East and North West Europe, both in print and in the radio. Some of his stories and writings were to become classics.

The Korean and Vietnam wars are not overlooked and finish off a most excellent list of wartime stories. Pity no index is included.

The work involved in editing this book is obvious to the reader. However, it is more than justified by the result. It should be a most welcome addition to any bookshelf. Many old soldiers will remember their own experiences in war and relate them to similar experiences so clearly set out in this volume by gifted authors.

Harrison-Ford has selected his contributors with ability and success.

NEW ZEALAND PREPARES FOR WAR by W. David McIntyre, published by the University of Canterbury Press, Christchurch. Price SNZ44.00. Reviewed by Colonel J.V. Johnson, RFD, ED, Reserve Staff Group

This volume fills the gap in New Zealand's military history between the First and Second World Wars. It is, perhaps, mistitled, as it is more a military history of the Dominion's defence forces in the period than an account of defence planning per se as the title suggests.

Professor McIntyre identifies the dual aims of New Zealand's defence planning — the provision for both local and imperial defence contingencies and notes that this was a continuation of the pre-war pattern set by the Defence Act of 1909. In his Background to the Armed Forces I was surprised to find no reference to Alexander Godley who played such an important role in setting the stage for imperial defence schemes before the Great War, and I was a trifle disappointed to see no reference to the Ripa Island Incident in his otherwise excellent coverage of the conscientious objection movement in response to boy-conscription. These minor criticisms aside, I felt that the background was set clearly and objectively and made picking up the threads of imperial and local defence in 1919 much easier than might otherwise have been the case.

The book provides a most interesting insight into the position of the defence forces in the community in the period, covering as it does every use made of the forces — and every proposed use — in aid both to the imperial and the civil power. Frequent reference to parliamentary debates and private papers gives a fascinating revelation of popular attitudes, and there is a short but important analysis of the social background of Permanent Force officers which makes particularly interesting reading. The references to Sir Carl Berendsen give valuable indications of the attitudes of the Civil Service at the time. Good use is made of contemporary newspaper cartoons — although I believe the Dominion’s contribution on the Manifesto of the Four Colonels might, perhaps,
have been more appropriate than the one from the *New Zealand Herald*.

Of particular interest is the section on the Pacific Defence Conference and the attitude of New Zealand to the Pacific Islands in the context of trans-Pacific air navigation. Professor McIntyre draws together several themes to produce a most interesting analysis of the importance of this region to New Zealand in the years leading up to the Second World War.

Possibly the greatest contribution the book has to make to New Zealand's military history is in its tantalising leads for further research. The bibliography is excellent, and the note on institutions and collections in the preface gives a valuable guide to any researcher. I would add to it the General Assembly Library in Wellington, for its outstanding newspaper collection. Too few researchers — civilian or military — have examined New Zealand's military history. This book might promote more activity in this field.

Regrettably, the price of the book is a trifle high and might preclude it from gaining the wide circulation it deserves. I consider it a "must" for any New Zealand officer candidate (and serving officer) and for any Australian officer with an interest in the history of our nearest neighbour. It certainly should be found in the libraries of RMC, ADFA, JSSC and the individual service staff colleges.

As both a source of interesting reading and a stimulus to further research, the book is highly recommended to service personnel on both sides of the Tasman.

**WING ACROSS THE SEA** by Ross Gillett.

Reviewed by Air Commodore C.R. Taylor, CBE, RAAF, Ret.

This is "the first ever complete history of Australian Naval Aviation, from the first world war to the present" and the contents certainly live up to this claim.

Starting with an incident in November 1861, when the American Confederate Army attempted aerial observations of the enemy using a balloon anchored to a ship, Ross Gillett diligently traces the history of naval aviation with particular reference to the RAN, until the close of writing his book in February 1988.

In relating early aircraft operations, he tells how Australian developments began during 1913 when the Navy and the Army became interested in the aeroplane as an elevated observation platform as well as a possible adjunct to conventional armament of that time. Early experiments leading up to the first successful launchings of shipborne aircraft are described and illustrated with reference to the Royal Navy and the part played by RAN ships such as the HMAS *Australia* and the HMAS *Sydney*.

With the end of the Great War, the RAN continued its interest in acquiring a naval air arm and during 1920 orders were placed for six seaplanes. However, with the approaching formation of an Australian Air Force, the Government finally determined that military and naval aircraft would be controlled by an Air Board with the Air Force responsible for the actual operation and maintenance of naval aircraft to meet all RAN operational plans. This position was to remain until the end of WWII when the Federal Cabinet finally approved the formation of an RAN Fleet Air Arm with the right to operate and maintain its own seaborne and land-based aircraft.

Throughout the eight comprehensive chapters of fascinating narrative — which are supported with unique tabulated information, detailed specifications, and magnificent coloured and B&W photographs — the author proceeds from the delays of early RAAF seaplanes and amphibians to the more sophisticated conventional aircraft and helicopters of today's RAN Air Arm.

Special features are the chapters dealing with the first RAN aircraft carrier tender HMAS *Albatross* which operated during the period January 1929 to April 1933, and the light fleet carriers HMAS *Sydney*, *Vengeance* and *Melbourne* which operated for varying periods between 1948 and 1982.

The book provides a feast of interesting reading and technical detail for all serving and retired RAN and RAAF personnel, as well as civilian aviation enthusiasts and model makers. Its 162 pages bear witness to Ross Gillett's own enthusiasm, patience and perseverance in compiling a book of considerable historical and reference value. The result is so good that he deserves to be congratulated and the book deserves a more durable cover.


Reviewed by Lloyd Brodrick

For those interested in the study and collection of the orders, decorations and medals of the British Commonwealth, the 1980s have been fruitful indeed. In addition to the publication of many new medal rolls and casualty rolls, and the reprinting of many standard works long out of print, such as Sir O'Moore Creagh's volumes on the Victoria Cross and the Distinguished Service Order, we have been offered some completely revised works which are a credit to all those associated with them. Abbott and Tamplin's British Gallantry Awards is one such book. The sixth, revised edition of Major L.L. Gordon's British Battles and Medals is another.

British Battles and Medals is concerned with British campaigning and service medals from the Armada to the present day. The emphasis falls on medals awarded from the Waterloo Medal of 1815, when it became customary for the recipient's details to be engraved or impressed on the medal. Indeed, it is this individuality that makes the collection of British medals so absorbing. British Battles and Medals examines each medal and clasp chronologically, giving the qualifications for award, a brief account of the battle or campaign for which the award was made, and in most cases the unit which qualified for each medal or clasp. Many extras are included, such as the medal roll for HMS Amethyst on the Yangtze in 1949, and the Order of Battle for the Anglo-Allied Army at Waterloo.

There have been major improvements since the fifth edition appeared in 1979. The photos and presentation are much better, and the change of format from octavo to quarto is most welcome. Quite a bit of new research has been included, as well as sections on the three awards to appear since 1979; the Rhodesia Medal, the South Atlantic Medal, and the "Lebanon" clasp to the Campaign Service Medal.

In a work such as this, errors and omissions are inevitable. It is unfortunate, however that many of the errors seem to concern the naming or entitlement of medals to Australians. As examples, there is no mention of the fact that a few members of the new AIF qualified for the 1914 Star: nor is it noted that the United Nations Medal for Korea was named when issued to Australians. Another error that particularly annoyed me was the statement that "The Australian commitment to the Vietnam War was a maximum at any one time of some 4500 troops and for the most part rather less than this."

My other criticism is that the text seems rather less sensitive to the native victims of European imperialism than it might be, although this is perhaps to be expected.

However, these are minor criticisms when considering the value of the book. It will remain the definitive work until the next edition is published.

Readers who are familiar with the price structure of high quality, specialist publications such as this will know that $75 is a reasonable price. For medal collectors the price is, as a friend of mine is fond of saying, nothing more than a round of drinks. I hope so, because this outstanding book deserves a wide readership among those who are interested in the military history of the Empire, and the Commonwealth. Major Gordon and his successors have provided a worthy tribute to generations of British and Colonial campaigners.


Reviewed by John Buckley, OBE

This book tells of the story of wartime Northern Territory, part of western Queensland and the Kimberley area of Western Australia. At the outset, I must say it is an excellent book written by Professor Alan Powell, foundation Dean of Arts at the University College of the Northern Territory. Powell is recognised as a top authority on the Territory.

The author traces the development of Darwin before and during WWII. He spent years researching and developing the narrative. It is most comprehensive, covering every conceivable aspect of wartime Darwin. It gives details of the Navy, Army and Air; the civil administration; our Allies; the Allied Works Council. Details of the war in New Guinea, Timor, Ambon and even the Coral Sea and Midway battles are mentioned in relation to their influence on wartime Darwin.
BOOK REVIEW

The relationship between the Armed Forces and the Administration has been well researched; likewise, Powell has interviewed or corresponded with many of the people who lived in Darwin during the period under review.

I served in the regular Army in Darwin from November 1939 until August 1940, during which time I was also honorary ADC to the Administrator, Hon. C.L.A. Abbott. During that period the Union power was hard to combat; but Abbott worked well with the Services without friction. When the Japanese attack took place, the problems were difficult for the Administrator, the Hon. C.L.A. Abbott. During that time Abbott was dismissed in May 1946, a sad ending which many thought unjustified. He had worked hard for progress in the Territory.

The magnitude of the first air raids in Darwin took everyone by surprise. The Japanese air craft carriers were under the command of Admiral Nagumo, one of the heroes of the Pearl Harbor attack. The story of the confusion and ineptitude of some of the Armed Forces has been told many times, but Powell's description is first class — it was a sad period in the history of the Australian services. He describes the evidence and the findings of Mr Justice Lowe's inquiry into the Darwin debacle.

Major General, Edmund Herring (later Lt General, Sir Edmund Herring) GOC, 6th Aust. Division, who had just returned from the Middle East, was sent to Darwin to organise its defence against expected invasion. Herring was ruthless and highly successful in his work: so much so that he was appointed the GOC, New Guinea Force when General Rowell was relieved. Herring was a great soldier and a great Christian.

Powell describes the formation and activities of the North Australian Observer Unit (Curtin's Cowboys) under Major W.E.H. Stanner.

The last chapter is devoted to the many ways in which the Aborigines participated and supported the war effort. Even in my time Aborigines were employed at the various messes; in the RAEME Workshops; at Ordnance Depot and they carried out other duties, including guard duties at the Navy Oil Fuel Tanks. I remember Lieut. Ron (Wilbur) Hughes (later Major General Ron Hughes) was in charge and he was proud of the way his black soldiers were almost invisible at night and so silent in their movements.

I could write pages about this excellent book but the Editor demands that I keep the review short.

I congratulate Professor Powell on a splendid publication which has been extremely well researched, then written in a most interesting and absorbing manner. His stories about some of the legendary characters in the Territory are most appealing — there were too many to mention here.

In conclusion, this is perhaps the last of the Melbourne University Press books published by its outstanding Director, Peter Ryan, who has retired on reaching 65 years. Over the years Peter has made a most significant contribution to the standard of publications in Australia. MUP is regarded as a pacesetter for books on military history or Australian history. Peter will be sadly missed — his act will be a very difficult one to follow. Few people know that he was a coast watcher (aged 18) in New Guinea, won a military medal and was critically wounded before the attack on Lae and Nadzab. Good luck to Peter. He will be working with Sir John Young who is so much admired and respected by all members of the RSL.


Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Peniakoff, DSO, MC.

WORLD War II saw the emergence of a number of special force units on both sides of the conflict. Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Peniakoff, DSO, MC, may be known to students of special warfare. He is certainly better known by his universal knickname of “Popski” the founder and Commanding Officer of Popski's Private Army (PPA) — one of the British special force units raised in the Western Desert Campaign.

Originally intended as a special duties squadron of the famous LRDG, but for technical reasons raised as an independent unit, PPA was designed to conduct reconnaissance and limited raiding operations in North Africa. Popski describes the sequence of events leading to the eventual extension of the unit role and its successful employment in reconnaissance operations in Italy. This provides an interesting
insight into a specialised unit undergoing a change of role and organisation to cope with the changing requirements of operations.

*Private Army* spends over 200 pages describing events leading to the formation of PPA, concentrating initially on the early personal involvement of Popski in the North African war. It deals in varying detail with the emergence of various special units. The remaining 300 pages lead the reader through an intensely personal involvement in the fortunes of the unit. The text is supported by a good array of maps and photographs, however as usual the reader tends to stumble over place names seeking constant reference to the maps.

The book is as much a study of the man as of his unit. It provides an intriguing insight into the character of a man who saw this as his personal war. An elderly veteran of WW1, Popski fought bureaucracy to establish a personal role in an area of the world with which he was thoroughly familiar. In doing so, he and his unit established the basis for regional forces. He abandoned his family and personal life completely to become totally involved in war. The loss of a hand late in the conflict was taken philosophically as a small token of the life he would equally have given. The final line of the book leaves Popski at the last day of the war but there is no doubt that the impending peace held no attraction for him. One wonders at the eventual fate of this unusual soldier.

*Private Army* provides no bibliography, it is a source document in its own right. It is an immensely readable book, not only for being technically interesting, but for being written in a very personal style. The reader feels no difficulty in accepting the author’s depiction of an intimate association with warfare, comrades and comradeship.

**Militarization and Arms Production.** Edited by Helena Tuomi and Raimo Vayrnen. Published by Croom Helm Ltd. Retail Price $28.50. Book published by Croom Helm Australia Pty Ltd.

Reviewed by Major M.C. Verrier, RAAOC

The charter of the United Nations defines as two of its main purposes the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of social and economic development. Since 1962 a series of studies have been commissioned linking the twin objectives of disarmament and development, mainly from the perspective that the enormous amount of resources vested in the arms race might be utilised to facilitate development. In December 1977 another study was commissioned with three main areas of inquiry:

a. present-day utilisation of resources for military purposes;

b. economic and social consequences of a continuing arms race and the implementation of disarmament measures; and

c. conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development purposes.

The study was carried out by a group of experts who analysed the various economic and social costs of the present day arms race. A hundred scholars in 20 countries were involved. 40 studies were submitted and 12 of these studies are included in this book. Two papers on the same topic but not involved with the UN study were included by the editors. Many different topics are considered but the overall tone of the book is that reduction in military spending is not only urgently required but is also practically possible. This reduction would not cause economic dislocation and could lead to many great benefits such as more spending on Third World development.

The majority of the papers approach the problem from a purely economic point of view and leave the social and political issues untouched. These include personnel, national and global security, national heritage and pride and cultural and political differences. These are formidable problems. This approach results in large quantities of statistics being manipulated and interpreted by the experts who then draw conclusions. A large percentage of the papers not only discuss the stats supplied but also discuss previous papers. One paper in particular which comes under heavy criticism from the experts is one by Emile Benoit, titled *Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries*, Lexington Massachusetts, 1973. To obtain full benefit from this book, Benoit’s papers should be read first. This paper is not included in the book.

The statistics within the book have two major problems. The first is that there are no data available from the Communist Bloc countries and the second is that the data from some Western countries are incomplete. Examples
are that some foreign aid is in reality military aid yet it is not recorded as such. Some countries such as Denmark and Norway claim not to have defence industries. These countries consider factories which do not make a complete item and/or can produce other than military items non-defence factories.

The reviewer had no disagreement with the overall theme of the book and was convinced by the first two papers that there could be economic advantages in disarmament and subsequent conversion of these funds into development funds. The next 10 papers were then of little value as they were only restating similar facts with slightly different interpretations. A better solution would have been for the editors to summarise the remaining papers and to highlight any additional facts or interpretations.

As stated previously, the book discussed the economic advantages of disarmament but did not offer any solutions to the remaining formidable problems. Some suggestions were offered and these include complete disarmament and conversion of funds to development, control of production either by legally imposed quantities or by taxation. The taxation methods are the much touted “French Fund” as reinforced by the Brandt Commission, the New Currency and Raw Material Price Fund. These control systems are criticised without better solutions being offered.

All papers mentioned legislation, yet the one paper which dealt solely with this topic handled it in such a way that it highlighted the futility of previous attempts.

Some further criticisms are that the printing although of very good quality is very small making the text very difficult to read. The topic lends itself to economic gobbledygook and buzz phrases which at times is difficult for a layman to understand.

This reviewer would not recommend the purchase of this book. However, it would be useful as a reference book in a library to provide one facet of the disarmament and development problem.

AUSTRALIA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS
IN THE 1980s, edited by Paul Dibb. Senior Research Fellow, Department of International Relations, Australian National University. Published by Croom Helm Ltd 1983 pp.225 $17.95. ISBN 0 312 06120 X.

Reviewed by Captain C.G. Cunningham, RAAOC.

T HIS book brings together leading academics and industrialists with experienced public servants to discuss how economic political and strategic factors interact in Australia's external relations.

The book had its origins in a conference held in 1983 which attempted to answer the question: What can be done to provide more effective and coordinated external policies for Australia? The conference was attended by senior representatives from the private sector, government departments, academic and the press. Politicians and trade unionists declined to attend.

From the papers presented by guest speakers at the conference, Paul Dibb has presented the reader with a comprehensive insight into Australia's external relations dilemma.

In recent years economic issues increasingly have come to threaten relations between nations. This has been particularly so in recent times as western economics have had to battle the worst economic conditions since the Great Depression. Theories as to why Australia became embroiled in world problems are expounded. The author then examines those factors that are mostly likely to affect Australia's role in world economic affairs of the future.

He sets the scene by explaining our position in the world economy and our role in relation to world political and strategic trends.

Highlighted are the difficulties facing our foreign policy strategists. Such as the interaction of defence and security needs with those economic requirements of industry. "Hard times"of the 70s have seen a growing tendency towards protectionist sentiments which in the long term may serve only to damage Alliance solidarity.

Subsequent chapters examine the interaction of these political, economic and strategic factors as they affect Australia's attitude towards the various political and economic regions of the world. Australia's approach to the European Economic Community, South East Asia, Japan, China, the US and the USSR are all analysed in detail.

On the homefront, the role of government is examined. What level of economic planning and control should be exercised by government? Should international trade be left to industry and the natural forces of economics? What degree of protection should be given to Australian industries by way of tariffs, trade
sanctions and agreements? To these, and other questions the reader is presented with well-founded solutions.

Australia's importance in the world in the 1980s will be determined to a great extent by the approach policy makers take to the handling of foreign relations. This work provides the guidelines necessary for a coordinated long term external relations policy. Political, economic and strategic factors affecting the policy are examined in the broadest possible sense. The result is an authoritative reference that provides the seasoned foreign policy reader with some excellent food for thought. For the uninitiated it is an excellent cornerstone on which to build such a knowledge.

Perhaps indicative of how the articles in this book may well represent our future foreign policy is that since its publication three contributors have been appointed to the Prime Minister's Office and a fourth is now an Australian Ambassador.

Informative reading.

HURLEY AT WAR. Edited by Daniel O'Keefe. Published by the Fairfax Library in association with Daniel O'Keefe.

Reviewed by John Buckley, OBE

FRANK Hurley became a legend in both World Wars and in the Antarctic for his unique photography. He made six trips to the Antarctic. His feature films and documentaries were outstanding. He continued his professional photography well into his old age. At 76 he suffered a heart attack filming a cave under the Nullabor Plains, but managed to haul himself up a 90-metre rope to safety. He died in Sydney in 1962.

Hurley was known to thousands of AIF soldiers in both wars. He was always up where the action was. His photographs of Passchendaele in WWI show the stark, appalling conditions and the dreadful waste of human life and property; where 250,000 casualties were inflicted during this ghastly battle. His photographs of other battles in Flanders and the Somme are equally tragic.

The following year he covered the exploits of the Australian Light Horse in Palestine with typical Hurley talent. Some photographs are in colour which was in its infancy at that time.

In WWII, he covered the North African campaigns. Dan O'Keefe has selected a most outstanding assortment of classical photographs to cover the major battles including El Alamein. These are very well reproduced in the book. I don't think I have ever seen so many very good photographs in one publication.

The book is an excellent tribute to a great Australian, who was a master professional photographer, possibly the top Australian in his field not only in war, but in the Antarctic and other special places.

Photographs are explained by extracts from Hurley's diaries. Dan O'Keefe has done justice to Hurley with his excellent narrative, selections of text, photographs and extracts from Hurley's diaries.

In person, Hurley was a most interesting and extremely charming character. Always working with never-ending enthusiasm and capacity, he got pleasure from his work. Frank was very popular with the AIF.

The book can be obtained by members of the RSL at a special price of $22 from Fairfax Publications, 55 Mountain Street, Ultimo, NSW 2007. At $22 the book is an absolute bargain.