Defence Force Journal

Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:
The Managing Editor
Defence Force Journal
Building C, Room 4-25
Russell Offices
CANBERRA ACT 2600
(062) 65 2682 or 65 2999

Photography
D.P.R. Stills Photo Section

Published by the Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, for the Department of Defence.

© Commonwealth of Australia 1988
ISSN 0314-1039
R 85/1198(15) Cat. No. 86 1364 9
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Printed by Ruskin Press, North Melbourne
Letters to the Editor

Tank Handbook
Dear Sir,

I would like to comment on the book review in Defence Force Journal No 71 July/August 1988 by Lt Biglands on the Churchill and Cromwell tank handbooks from HMSO. It appears that Lt Biglands has little knowledge of armour or has not read the books critically. While a book review may exist to merely 'review' a book, I would have expected Journal contributors to pass a critical eye over the contents of the book/s rather than accepting what is written.

With the proliferation of publications these days, it would be nice to know if a book breaks new ground or is to be regarded as a key reference. If this reviewer's comments are correct, then the books in question are inaccurate and hardly worth consulting. Such is rarely the case with the books from the Tank Museum at Bovington. Unfortunately I can only lay my hands on my copy of the Cromwell book.

Firstly, the comment that the Churchill was phased out in 1942. The Churchill had been in action at Dieppe but this was not regarded as a true battle experience. Desert experience led the War Office to believe that speed and reliability were more important than heavy armour and they made the decision to cease production in 1943. However, the Churchill’s first actions with the 1st Army in Tunisia proved most successful in the hilly terrain and this earned the vehicle a reprieve. In fact it continued in production throughout the war.

In 1943 the Churchill was upgunned with the British version of the 75mm gun. Although it was undergunned by German standards this was common to all allied tanks in 1943 and indeed, nothing larger than 75mm was fielded from 1942 up until the introduction of the Comet and the 76mm Sherman in late 1944. I acknowledge the Firefly but that was almost a field expedient, done by the British users, not the American designers. The lack of gun size was to a large extent offset by the Churchill’s heavy armour (152mm on the Mk VIII which compared well with the Sherman’s 75mm maximum). It was very effective throughout the Italian Campaign and served well with the Tank Brigades of the 2nd Army in North West Europe. 5640 vehicles of all marks were built.

The Churchill was also developed into a wide range of specialised armour, called Funnies, the subject of another HMSO book on the 79th Armoured Division. The tank soldiered on well after the war, with specimens in Irish service until fairly recently. Australia acquired some and I recall there used to be the hull of one up near Gisborne, Vic where it had been used as a farm tractor after being disarmed and sold out. “Not bad for a tank supposedly phased out in 1942”.

Secondly, the Cromwell. The impression given by the review is that only on the advent of the Cromwell did the British finally get their act together in combining ‘...armour and firepower as an aggressive fighting element.’ I point to the Matilda II, the heaviest armoured tank with a powerful gun for its time when it was used at Arras in 1940 as a prime example of ‘...armour and firepower (used) as an aggressive fighting element.’ Maybe what the author meant to add was mobility. Even so, this ignores the development and use of the A9, the A10 and A13 as well as the 6pr equipped Crusader. Further, the Christie suspension had been used on the A13, the Covenator and the Crusader before the Cromwell was put into production.

The Cromwell was the main equipment of the Armoured Recon Regts of the British 2nd Army and also equipped the 7th Armoured Division entirely. The original marks had a 6pr gun but from Nov 1943 on, the main armament was mainly the 75mm gun, in various types. The 95mm gun was actually a howitzer, designed in the days when tank main armament could not fire HE. Thus some tanks were equipped with a tank howitzer to enable tanks to engage such things as anti-tank guns. The 75mm was designed as an anti-tank weapon though able to fire HE if needed and optimised for high muzzle velocity (2030fps) while the 95mm was a weapon where muzzle velocity wasn’t that important (1075fps). We must remember that at this stage, solid shot was the main armour defeating weapon needing such a high velocity. The 95mm did have a larger pro-
jectile weighing 251bs as opposed to the 131b shell of the 75mm. Hence the 95mm gun was only found at squadron headquarters able to be deployed in the support role when needed. The Americans did the same thing when they equipped Squadron HQ tanks with a 105mm howitzer armed Sherman.

Interestingly, the reason the War Office was dissatisfied with the 6pr was not lack of range or hitting power. In fact the first Tiger to be destroyed in Tunisia was killed by a 6pr. It was the lack of dual AP/HE capability. But as I have indicated, they kept using 95mm howitzers in tanks at a time when the 75mm could fire HE. Another example of inertia in design or did the extra weight of shell really make a difference? The Cromwell was superseded in late 1944 by the Comet and then of course the Centurion came on the scene.

I must add that I appreciate the Journal and the Book reviews. They give me a guide as what to look for, if not purchase. I am just disappointed that Lt Biglands did not examine his review items in more detail before publication.

R.J. Hart
Major

Officer Education

Dear Sir,

Captain Huston’s article on officer education (DFJ No. 71) may cause alarm. There is of course no consideration being given by Defence to changing the system of educating officers which was introduced in January 1986. Apart from the fact that alternatives were argued terminably before the Academy was approved, we have not yet reached a stage when a rational judgement of our progress can be made post facto.

I agree with Captain Huston’s conclusion on the need for more officers to have successfully completed tertiary studies but not with the way he arrived at it.

- The Academy is subject to the tides of recruitment but does better in attracting young people than the Service colleges.
- There is no “loophole” which permits leakage to a shorter commissioning course. This myth is harder to kill than a cockroach. How do you explain the success of West Point or the simultaneous operation for over 30 years of both Portsea and Duntroon?
- Time will show whether there is an advantage in being an Academy graduate. My own view is that it will become a necessary but not sufficient condition for high rank. There are 800 cadets at the Academy now who believe this also.

One could spend more time dealing with the importance of a university degree to succeed in the Profession of Arms. It is of course not necessary to have a degree to prove intellectual ability nor is a degree a guarantee of managerial skill. A bachelor’s degree is awarded after the candidate has proven an ability to study, think and express conclusions on a range of topics. It therefore acknowledges skills which are important in all Services.

A myth which is hard to counter is the irrational belief that military and academic education systems are fundamentally opposed. Of course the bias of those who peddle this rubbish use the term “military training” so that they can more easily describe it as a conditioning for obedience and against enquiry. You might as well say that a person cannot learn to drive a car while attending university because his or her mind will become over-heated. Yes, officer cadets do have to obey orders and observe certain military procedures. They also have some scope for questioning aspects of their military education. They will have more opportunities throughout their careers particularly during staff college courses. I am not sure what led to the author’s use of the term “inflammatory internal politics”. The broad areas of potential military-academic disagreement are the competition for the scarce time cadets have to meet both parties’ requirements, and the academic emphasis on personal achievement compared with the military approach to developing teamwork. Both these areas can be kept free from conflict through careful planning and goodwill. My own experience is that for a really fiery confrontation two academic departments are hard to beat. Tertiary studies in a military environment do provide a challenge to officer cadets but I doubt that this is more stressful than the situation of an undergraduate who must work part-time while studying and travel perhaps several hours each day.

Alternatives to our present officer development system have been studied exhaustively. I do not understand why anyone would seriously propose that civilian universities should be the main source of our graduates. We cannot attract enough graduates, nor could we hold those who might be offered Defence cadetships with-
out measures which would be politically unac­ceptable. In the case of the British Army, the description of the graduate scheme in the article is wrong. There are seven ways in which that Army obtains officers with degrees. All do a 28 week course, as probationary second-lieute­nants, at Sandhurst after University. Those who do the 44 week course, as officer cadets, may after commissioning be picked to study for degrees at Shrivenham. The system may turn out to be the best for Britain. It would not meet our requirements for the range of degrees, the depth of military training, nor the Government’s decisions for a tri-Service establish­ment.

For those dinosaurs who doubt the benefits of a tri-Service Academy two things must be said. Firstly, the benefit to the officer cadets and midshipmen will not be obvious for about 10 years. Secondly, the benefit to the staff is visible already. Those reluctant to be posted to us become enthusiastic and those who come for a short posting often seek a longer tour. The future evolution of all three Services will be influenced for the better as a result of their experiences.

I suggest that Captain Huston seek a posting to the Academy where he may have the privilege of being responsible for 48 young men and women of three Services. The challenge is in­vigorating and the experience will allay his fears. As the anonymous philosopher said: “It’s not the things we don’t know which get us into trouble; it’s the things we know which ain’t so.”

P. J. DAY
Major General
Commandant

Fitness or Fiction
Dear Sir,

Major Rudzki’s article “PTT — Fitness or Fiction” (DFJ — May/June 1988) has encouraged me to make a confession!

I graduated from OCS Portsea in December 1967 with the Governor-General’s Medal. But according to the letter of the law I should have failed the course, for I never completed the Heaves and Rope Climb. (Horror!)

I was very fit; I could march 25 miles and be ready for battle. But I could not climb up and down a rope three times! It was partly a matter of technique and partly — the way I explained it — too much body weight for too little arm strength.

However it seems that our PTIs were enlight­ened men. They recognized that, as the article points out, those exercises were not a measure of military fitness. How do I know this? — One day I turned up for my regular afternoon appearance at the gym to find that the required tasks had been marked as complete! — a nudge and a wink, and confession 21 years later.

Stephen Rudzki has given the “naturally ro­tund” new hope, for the heaves are still nearly impossible. (Curiously enough, I can do dozens of sit-ups!).

The PTIs with prophetic insight are, no doubt, no longer in the system — so they are safe. However, I am grateful to them.

I am still in the system, no longer as a fit but “arm-weak” Engineer Officer, but as rather unfit and still “arm-weak” Chaplain. I don’t really expect anyone to turn up on my doorstep to demand the return of my commission!

At last, common sense in the fitness area. Major Rudzki is a brave man and needs our respect!

R.P. HAYMAN
Senior Chaplain (PD) 3 Div

The Profession of Arms
Dear Sir,

I read with interest the article by Captain G.P. Hogan, The Profession of Arms and Officer Career Development (DFJ No. 69 March/April 1988).

If his conclusion, that the ‘profession of arms in Australia is moving . . . into the state of social integration detailed by Janowitz’, is valid then there must be some cause for concern.

What of leadership? Good managers do not necessarily make, nor need to be, good leaders. But does the converse hold true?

I submit a leader needs to possess a number of qualities; management ability but one. Has Captain Hogan identified a fundamental problem facing the ‘profession of arms’ today?

G.R. SHANNON
Lieutenant Colonel

Defence Cooperation Program
Dear Sir,

I was reassured to hear from E.F. McCrum (DFJ, No 71, Jul/Aug 88) that an increase in Soviet and Libyan influence will not result from DCP. The implication, however, that an aim of DCP was to encourage these influences, puzzled me.
Perhaps there was an error by either the author or the typesetter in inserting an ‘e’ instead of an ‘a’ in the word ‘affected’. This is not intended to be smart-aleck pendantry: I am often unsure of the intended meaning of a passage which carries such an ambiguity. Also there are occasions when written imprecision is more than amusing or irritating: in a legal or regulatory document it is potentially disastrous.

Meanwhile I am relieved that DCP will never put into effect the growth of Soviet and Libyan influence.

M. de VRIES
Lieutenant Colonel

A Vehicle for History!
Dear Sir,

Firstly, let me say how much I always look forward to receiving a copy of your excellently produced Journal. However, I regret to say that in my view, it has gradually developed into a vehicle for the history, thoughts, plans etc. of the Army, and as such is really the old Army Quarterly in another guise.

An examination of the number of Army oriented articles in the 1988 series, as opposed to those of the other Services is a strong reflection of this.

However, it is apparent that this situation is neither the fault of the Board of Management nor yourself, but rather the lack of interest in the personnel of the RAN and the RAAF in producing articles on their particular services to help make your publication a true Defence Force Journal.

B.J. HAYES
WG CDR (Ret)

The Management of Australia’s Defence
Dear Sir,

I read with interest the article which discussed the report on the management of Australia’s Defence by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (DFJ No. 70). As the article’s author, Mr Gary Brown, points out, this report (the Cross Report) is most important and it deserves informed public debate. However, to my mind, Mr Brown’s article does not constitute informed comment as he seems to have misunderstood or ignored the driving force behind some of the Committee’s recommendations.

Mr Brown disagrees with the proposal to transfer Force Development and Analysis Division (FDA) from the civilian element of the Department of Defence to Australian Defence Force Headquarters (HQADF). He argues that FDA is not popular with the Services simply because it plays the “devil’s advocate” role in the procurement cycle. Furthermore, he claims that the relocation will result in either the emasculation of FDA or the transfer of its “odium” to HQADF. He has missed the point on two counts.

I will not dispute Mr Brown’s assertion that FDA is generally unpopular within the Services. However, I will debate the reason for that unpopularity. The Services are well aware that Defence is publicly funded and that all expenditures must stand up in the light of public scrutiny. Therefore, it is essential for the Department to have a specialist “devil’s advocate” so that all aspects of any equipment proposal can be debated thoroughly “in house”. The reason for FDA’s unpopularity has nothing to do with its “devil’s advocacy” role, but rather the way it has been seen to fulfil that role. The Division has often been perceived as adopting a negative, to the point of being obstructionist, attitude and of “moving the goal posts”, with respect to the guidance it gives, to suit the position it wishes to adopt. (Whether or not these perceptions of FDA are valid is another matter, however, the Cross Report highlighted what it saw as “the continuing failure of the . . . Division to develop adequate defence guidance”). Also contributing to this unpopularity is the fact that FDA’s formal input occurs only when an equipment proposal is fully worked up; a process which involves considerable time and effort. When that effort is nullified because of a difference in point of view which could have been resolved much earlier, FDA is unlikely to remain on the sponsor’s list of most popular departments.

The Committee’s recommendation to relocate FDA would have three effects:

Firstly, it should integrate FDA into the equipment proposal development cycle. This will serve to remove the “we/they” syndrome as FDA will be seen as just another agency contributing to the process.

Secondly, FDA’s input will commence earlier. This should see the highlighting of Mr Brown’s “gold-plated, . . . over-stated and (misleading) financial” documentation well before significant time and effort is wasted. (It could be argued that this should be happening now. I agree!)
And finally, and probably most importantly, the move will serve to break down some of the schism which exists between the uniformed and civilian components of the Department.

So, far from emasculating FDA or transferring its "odium", I believe the change will have very positive results. In fact, I see FDA's position gaining rather than losing strength and the development of equipment submissions becoming much more efficient and effective as a result of the closer contact between the ADF and the "devil's advocate". Any move to develop a more cohesive Department must be a step in the right direction. I am not at all sure that "creative tension" is any substitute for harmony.

I have three other points to make on the article. I do not agree with the suggestion to create a "career stream for people who will (mainly) occupy posts ... within the Russel Hill complex". The ultimate purpose of the Department is to equip, maintain and sustain the fighting sailor, soldier and airman. The Service representatives within the Department must appreciate the conditions at the "sharp end" and a professional "bureaucracy in uniform" may not achieve this. It is much more important that Defence Central postings are filled with pragmatists who understand the full depth of military needs. The solution to the problem is not to develop a race of military bureaucrats who can "deal successfully with the demands of bureaucratic decision making"; it is to use the civilians in the Department to play the bureaucrat while the serviceman provides the essential guidance on requirements.

My second point concerns careless word usage. Throughout the article Mr Brown uses the term "civilian" to mean public servant. He than says that "the principle of civilian control of the military ... has lain at the heart of Westminster government at least since 1688". Let us be quite clear on this important principle. In Westminster government the term "civilian control" refers to control by the elected representatives of the people and not by the civilian bureaucracy.

My final point relates to the inference that military officers cannot see past single service loyalties when considering major equipment proposals. I take umbrage at this suggestion. Moreover, such negative and extravagant generalizations do not constitute informed debate.

I also totally refute the claim that officers might "suffer social or even career penalties" for questioning the value of specific equipments. I have, for about the last seven years, argued openly that the ADF's greatest need is for airborne early warning aircraft (which I am delighted to see have now received the recognition they are due). I have not suffered social or career penalties. Could I suggest to Mr Brown that he review his sources of information on the military modus operandi or widen his circle of service acquaintances so that he may become better informed.

C.H. Hunter, R.A.A.
Lieutenant Colonel

Cover Problems
Dear Sir,

Having just received issue No. 71 and being an enthusiast about the military history of the Colony of Victoria, I was quite taken with the cover illustration, Keep at Fort Queenscliff.

At the risk of appearing to be utterly pedantic, I must make a couple of observations on this illustration.

— The officer standing in the foreground is wearing his forage cap cocked to the left and his pouch belt over the right shoulder whereas the opposite was what was actually done. Can it be that the image was reversed during the printing process?

— The Keep was built in the early 1880s (1882 if memory serves) whereas the uniform worn by the officer features the so-called Garibaldi jacket worn in the 1860s which passed out of use approximately a decade before the Keep was built.

Never mind, I'll still buy the book.

L. SCHEUCH-EVANS, RL
Major

Why Not Play GODS?
Dear Sir,

Do you want more zip in the quick decision exercises on TEWTs? Do you find computer war games testing only for the "boss"? Do you need some individual decisive actions? Do you want to test your tactical mettle against your mates? Then why not play GODS (Ground Operations: Decisions and Schemes). It is like a war game for two commanders on the ground in real time.

You will need an aim, a nice piece of ground, two commanders, an adjudicator and a couple...
of cars. (A picnic lunch may be a welcome addition).

A fun start level is an Australian infantry battalion mounted in APC with a squadron of tanks being an advance guard, moving against a Missorian motorized rifle battalion in delaying defence.

About two weeks before GODS day the adjudicator should issue outline scenarios to the opposing COs and require them to return an overlay OPORD.

The adjudicator should consider both plans and decide on a location for GODS to start making decisions at unit level. Don’t pick the Line of Departure, that is too predictable; pick a nice delay position 20-30 km along the axis. Somewhere where there are plenty of options open.

Pray for a pleasant day and go to the ground. The adjudicator should direct the COs to vantage points and describe the battle situation, “now”, to each in turn. A burning tank, the signature of a sagger, signs of defensive positions, tanks and APCs deploying across obstacles and the panoply of war becomes as real as the perception of the adjudicator and the imagination of the COs.

In response to the situation painted, COs issue orders to their sub-unit commanders specifying actions and times. The adjudicator analyses the orders and translates the resultant actions into effects on the opposing force. “Secure that hill” is translated into “four tanks and about seven APC sighted crossing Sandy Creek and heading for Mulga Hill, I will engage with artillery”.

COs should move to vantage points from which the critical actions can be “seen”. Who can see who is a task for an expert eye on the map but it is easy on the ground.

As decisions are made with shorter and shorter lead times the two COs need to move into close proximity so that the adjudicator can describe the action in real time, interpreting the results of each CO’s decision and how that decision would appear to the enemy!

The adjudicator is not to pontificate about good or bad orders. The only bad order is one which results in the enemy gaining an advantage; this requires the enemy to identify, analyse and react to the weakness. So the adjudicator may need a poker face for when decisive engagement is imminent.

The COs may benefit from an offsider to help in discussing a plan, maintaining a map or making a brew, but decision making is the key to GODS. Similarly the adjudicator may need an offsider to help keep track of the battling forces, their losses and the times that they will be at locations on the battlefield.

The CARO experience is that a sub-unit of one side or another will be decisively engaged within three hours of the start of play. But playing GODS for longer than six hours continuously requires relief adjudicators and administration beyond that which can be taken “out of the line” at CARO and still maintain normal daily operations at work. Besides, you need to stop before egos are crushed, or the effects of a bottle of red with lunch overtakes events.

GODS is decisive. It is low cost and high intensity. It gets decision makers out of the office on to the ground. It is exciting and fun. GODS is training for war! Try it!

J.R. BRETT, Colonel

Causes of War and Peace.

Dear Sir,

Geoffrey Blainey overplays the negative effect multiculturalism may have on the nation’s ability to defend itself. His claim that it encourages disunity should be questioned.

In the Second World War Australia was less culturally diverse than it is now. Although non-Anglo-Saxon cultural minorities — namely Aborigines and Chinese — sought to contribute to the national war effort, their offers were rejected by the Anglo-Saxon majority.

In February 1940 the then Deputy Chief of the General Staff told War Cabinet that the normal Australian would not serve satisfactorily with certain types of aliens, and... on psychological grounds, the admission into the 2nd AIF of aliens or of persons of non-European descent would be inimical to the best interests of that force.

This attitude encouraged War Cabinet to restrict voluntary military service to persons of European descent. Both the Aboriginal and Chinese communities had pleaded for the right to join the 2nd AIF and not unreasonably, made the offer of their support of the war effort conditional upon the achievement of equality (at that time Aborigines did not have the right
to vote). Had they been accepted as they are now under the policy of multiculturalism, they could have contributed much more to the war effort. Despite this barrier to their service, when the Japanese entered the war and the demand for manpower increased to meet the new threat, Aborigines and other cultural minorities began to be enlisted in larger numbers. Officially, the bar to their service remained in force throughout the war.

The war ended with Aborigines and Chinese Australians having made a significant contribution to the National war effort within the limitations of their population. It may come as a surprise to many, including I suspect, Geoffrey Blainey, that Torres Strait Islanders made a larger contribution to national defence, in proportion to their population, than did white Australians.

If we are to fight the next war in north Australia, we will need the support of Aborigines and Islanders. Their local knowledge, survival and bushcraft skills, knowledge of water sources and ability to communicate with other Aborigines and Islanders may be as valuable in the next war as it was in the last. We are more likely to get their support if we respect their culture (through multiculturalism) than if we return to the already failed policy of assimilation.

Lastly, Blainey worries about the possibility of divided loyalties among the migrant population. However, if the acquisition of Australian citizenship is a measure of migrants’ loyalty, then Australia has most to fear from British migrants. It is they who are least likely to obtain Australian citizenship, thus demonstrating their split loyalty and hence, according to Blainey, contributing to national disunity. Perhaps Professor Blainey would argue that the number of British migrants should be restricted because of the threat they pose to our security.

R.A. HALL
Major

Officer Education
Dear Sir,

In his article *How Best to Produce an Officer with Education* (DFJ No 71) Captain Huston argues for the separation of officer academic education and technical training processes. His arguments are presented in general terms and some assumptions are I believe, at best, questionable. However, I wish to specifically address his arguments for the separation of these functions, and also his comments concerning the Defence Academy.

Firstly, it should not be overlooked that the Army draws on no single source for its officers. There is no single “ideal” officer training system. Accordingly, the officer corps is best served by a portion of its members undergoing Academy type training, others entering RMC and others entering by direct entry or being commissioned from the ranks. Each method caters for the capabilities and maturity of officer cadets from different backgrounds, experience and ages. Each has its strengths and weaknesses. Also, it must be remembered that many RMC entrants come from distinguished academic backgrounds, whilst others will go on to gain degrees after graduation.

I reject Captain Huston’s argument that the Defence Academy is failing to attract the right people because RMC offers a quicker avenue to a military career. Whilst some “leakage” will inevitably occur, statistics do not support his argument. The Academy has no shortage of capable applicants. These people are attracted to the Academy as a starting point to their military career precisely because of the educational opportunities offered. Captain Huston suggests that the new function of RMC provides a “loophole” which will lead to an “intellectual slide” within the Army. The evidence does not support this contention.

Secondly, the military environment is vital to the fulfilment of the function of institutions such as the Defence Academy. Australia after all has a “Defence Academy”, not a military university or, as often thought, a school of management. I reject Captain Huston’s assertion that the simultaneous education and training of officers is incompatible and “fraught with danger”. Indeed this is how such institutions derive their strength. Officer cadets simultaneously receive their academic education and are imbued with those attitudes and characteristics appropriate to junior officers. By so doing they are simultaneously exposed to a wide range of political and ideological views on subjects such as the role of the military in society and are forced to balance and reconcile them with military ideologies and realities. Surely it is better to resolve moral and ideological difficulties without prejudice at an early stage in their development and within a supportive en-
environment? Also, I believe that the "conflict" between the academic and military components of the Defence Academy is often exaggerated. Tension will inevitably exist at times, but this is neither destructive nor unhealthy. The Academy's diversity is its strength.

To remind readers, the Charter of the Defence Academy is:

a. to provide military education and training for officer cadets for the purpose of developing their professional abilities and the qualities of character and leadership that are appropriate to officers of the ADF; and
b. to provide officer cadets with a balanced and liberal university education within a military environment.

Captain Huston argues that the concept of the "military environment" is unclear. Defence Academy cadets live in a supervised regimental environment which provides for the development of leadership qualities and also provides support to its members. They undergo military training designed to introduce them to their chosen Service, to achieve proficiency in basic military skills and to foster the development of character and leadership. This environment has not proven incompatible with the academic function of the Academy.

Finally, Captain Huston implies that Academy degrees are suspect and that the range of courses available is restrictive. Graduates from the University College graduate from the University of New South Wales — Australia's largest university and a leader in many areas of research. Its graduates are universally held in high esteem. The University College is no exception, its courses being innovative and varied, and its research funding the highest per capita of any Australian tertiary institution.

The University College offers a wide choice of undergraduate courses in Arts, Science and Engineering (Civil, Electrical and Electronic, Mechanical, Maritime and Aeronautical). Officer cadets may also take subjects offered by ANU and CCAE as part of their degrees. Some cadets complete their degrees at other universities. Recent innovations within the academic offerings at the Academy include the Master of Defence Studies, Master of Management Economics and Master of Arts in Australian Studies. Academic choice is certainly not restrictive.

Conventional Deterrence

Dear Sir,

In his article on "Conventional Deterrence and Australian Military Strategy" (DFJ Jul/Aug 1980), Colonel Smith dismisses conventional deterrence as being of little relevance to the defence of Australia. I disagree.

Whether or not deterrence is relevant depends on one's point of view. If you are a soldier (sailor or airman) like Colonel Smith, whose job it is to fight the war should that become necessary, then deterrence is largely irrelevant. However, if you are the national leadership, whose job it is to avoid war if at all possible, then deterrence could be a valuable strategic option.

Where Colonel Smith's thinking gets off the rails is in his use of the term "military strategy". Here, is he talking about strategy for the employment of military forces in battle, or is he talking about the broader issue of national defence? The distinction is important. The employment of military forces in battle is the province of the general (and at the tactical level of the soldier), whereas national defence is the province of the politician, of the national leadership, with advice from the generals on the military aspects of defence.

In discussing deterrence it is important to avoid getting tangled in the semantic jungle that has grown up as part of the argument that conventional force deterrence should replace nuclear deterrence in the East/West power struggle. For the defence of Australia the only
issue of direct relevance is that of conventional deterrence.

In a general sense nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence are quite separate and distinct. Nuclear deterrence relates only to attack and has as its central issue the likely resolve of a nation to actually use nuclear weapons, and so risk annihilating itself along with the rest of us, should the deterrent fail. Conventional deterrence can relate to attack or defence. While there may be some concern over a nation's resolve to "deliver an unacceptable blow on the enemy", usually in the form of bombing raids on his cities, there is likely to be far less doubt as to the resolve of a nation to defend itself if attacked, notwithstanding Professor Blainey's concern for the moral fibre of a multicultural Australia (DFJ Jul/Aug 1988).

In his excellent article on "Low-Level Conflict" (DFJ Mar/Apr 1988), Colonel Crawshaw points to the difficulties of mounting low-level land operations in Northern Australia. Given a reasonable level of defence preparedness such attacks could be rendered so difficult for a potential enemy as to deter him from even attempting such a course of action. Thus would not a strategy of deterrence be reasonable in the circumstances of a possible threat of low-level land attack?

Where I do agree with Colonel Smith is in his contention that deterrence should not be a force structure determinant. Deterrence relies on credible military force, either in being or capable of being made ready within the timeframe of the threat. Deterrence is not a substitute for defence expenditure and preparation. Let us not write deterrence out of the list of strategic options that we may wish to use in the defence of Australia.

Yours faithfully,

N. F. ASHWORTH
Air Commodore (Retired)

Fitness or Fiction

Dear Sir,

Correction to Article PTT, Fitness or Fiction.

Due to the enthusiastic use of left Justification by your typesetter, your readers could be excused for believing that I learnt my physics in a Lebanese Pizza Bar.

To lift your body weight (M), muscle force (F) must equal or exceed weight force.

Therefore \( F_a \geq M_a \)

where \( F = \) Muscle Force
\( a = \) acceleration of body upwards
\( M = \) Body Weight

Therefore \( \frac{F_a}{M_a} \) must be greater than or equal to 1.

\[ M_a \frac{F_a}{L^2 xL} = \frac{1}{\alpha} \]

\[ M_a \frac{\alpha}{L^3 xL} = \frac{1}{\alpha} \]

Where \( L \alpha \) Cross-sectional area
\( L^3 \alpha \) Volume

With 2 People of differing size say 150cm and 200cm the ratio is 1:1.33

Thus:
To lift your own body, it is proportional to the ratio 1

L

for the smaller person this \( \frac{1}{1} = 1 \)

is

1

for the larger person this \( \frac{1}{1.33} = 0.75 \)

Thus the larger person must work harder to lift his body weight than the smaller person. Hence the stronger individual is actually at a disadvantage.

I hope this clears up any confusion in the original article.

Yours sincerely

STEPHEN J. RUDZKI
Captain
The Protection of Children in Military Families: Implications of the Hamilton Report

By John de Jongh, Lynn Bassett-Scarfe and Joan Malpass

Introduction

The primary responsibility of the Military Forces are to defend the citizens of a nation in a time of war.

The primary responsibility of parents is the protection and nurturing of the children in their care.

These responsibilities can only be realized by mature and stable adults. The likelihood of adults conducting themselves in a mature and stable manner can be improved by their access to appropriate support and required resources. Whenever these safeguards are not available there is an increased potential for individuals to be ineffective, unstable or immature adults which will impact directly on their ability as parents and service personnel. The broader community then has the option to accept the responsibility to assist those in need. This discussion will not be further developed in this article, however is an aspect that is worthy of consideration by those professionals employed as a result of the implementation of the Hamilton Report.

In an earlier article, de Jongh and Bassett-Scarfe, explained the phenomena of child abuse and the vulnerability of military families.

This earlier article will be used as the backdrop to the current presentation. It is also the belief of the current authors that the Hamilton Report implies an ongoing responsibility for the protection of children of military families as part of a range of supports to those families.

In 1986 the Minister for Defence commissioned Sue Hamilton to undertake a review of the needs of military families and this review, has the potential for major implications for the Defence Forces in terms of its human resource management. The social services which are recommended in the Hamilton Report will impact directly on military families, and consequently on the lives of children in military families.

When implementing the recommendations of the Hamilton Report in the context of intrafamilial violence — particularly that violence which is directed at the children in military families, the Defence Force Social Services and Social Work Departments need to be cognizant of the issues raised in this and the earlier [de Jongh and Bassett-Scarfe 1987] article.

It is not the intention of the authors to critique the Hamilton Report, but to enhance its potential. It is also not the intention of the authors to suggest that children in military families are at greater or lesser risk of abuse than children in the civilian population. The potential for harm, however, is heightened for those families already at risk of harming the children in their care, because of a range of factors which are common to military families [discussed in de Jongh and Bassett-Scarfe].

Literature

Currently very little Australian literature exists, which addresses the issue of child abuse within military families. It cannot be assumed from this, however, that it is therefore not a problem, as most instances of child abuse are handled by civilian agencies, with little discrimination because of the family breadwinner's occupational status. Overseas literature demonstrates that child abuse does occur in military families (Bowen 1984, 1986, Broadhurst et al 1980, Howe 1983, 1983, Kaslow and Ridenour 1984, McCupbin and Lavee 1986, McNelis and Awalt 1986, Morrison 1981, Neidig 1986, Nichols 1982, Raiha 1983, Srbastein 1983 and Wasileski et al 1982) and it can be extrapolated that there are unlikely to be differences between the overseas experience when compared with the Australian situation.

A number of authors have examined programmes which currently exist for military families (Baresh 1979, Bowen and Scheirer 1986, Bowen 1986, Howe 1983, Hunter 1986, Kohen 1984 and Scheirer 1986) and some other authors have reviewed programmes designed to assist military personnel cope with the stress they are experiencing. (McCupbin et al 1976, Waldron et al 1985, and Watson and Thomas 1983).
It is the intention of the authors to inform the reader that such literature does exist and that when developing social services for military personnel and their families due consideration should be given to the literature. It is the contention of these authors that reference has not been paid to the literature by Hamilton in the presentation of her report.

The Hamilton Report

The purpose of this article is to consider the issue of child abuse in the context of the Hamilton Report.

While not wishing to detract from the significance of the Hamilton Report and the potential for the impact of the recommendations it must be pointed out that, as a research document serious methodological weaknesses exist, the most obvious being the absence of use of the current knowledge base (use of, and review of, the existing literature, both professional and non professional).

As was noted above the aim of this article is to extend the recommendations of the Hamilton Report, to ensure the development of appropriate policies, programmes and procedures particularly as they pertain to child abuse and ensuring the safety of children at risk.

Military Life

With each posting service families have to constantly discover, establish and negotiate support networks. This disruption is heightened by the actual and potential relocation of other military families, because of their postings, who may form a part of a family's support network.

The most significant and immediately available support network is the military one; that system of contacts which is accessed because of the employment status. Within military families this system is unique, as access is potentially immediate, through the work environment, accommodation areas and social setting such as unit or rank messes.

The messes are an important meeting venue in that they create an environment in which service personnel, spouses and children can link up with others and develop friendship systems. Systems, therefore do exist to help families and individuals increase their accessibility to other people and thereby break down the potential of geographic and or social isolation.

Messes however can also be negative environments because of status factors associated with rank. Messes also provide a potentially volatile setting in which private issues within families and among friends become public property.

One of the major factors that inhibit individuals from utilising any support system, is the individual’s abilities to communicate. These abilities may be due to people self perceptions, the esteem with which they perceive themselves and anxieties about future losses (for example the belief that, “I or others will be leaving in a short time so why bother spending time and effort linking up with others when they or I will be forced to leave fairly soon”).

The need to “reinforce (ment of) the self-esteem of service families” (Hamilton 1986 p10), is a major issue and cannot be purely addressed by “internal public relations strategies”. It is not enough for a system to say that it’s members are valued.

The responsibility rests with the military system to demonstrate to its members and their families that they are a valued resource (at all levels and ranks) and this needs to be reaffirmed by the larger society. If it only happens within the military system the danger which exists is that the microsystem develops a siege mentality against the broader community and thereby increases the alienation.

Strategies must be developed which reaffirm; for military families and military members, that they are a valued resource with the ability to make worthwhile contributions to the Service and to their community.

Unfortunately the system of rank and the process of the chain of command, which is authoritarian and often patronizing, can be seen to work against the enhancement of self esteem of the Service person and their family.

Chain of command and the rank system are central to the milieu of the military. The problem of defeated self esteem is not one which can be resolved simply by intervention from military systems existing or proposed by Hamilton.

Defeated self esteem is a linchpin in factors related to abusive behaviours (de Jongh and Bassett-Scarfe). It is not just the province of military social services working with the spouses and family members of military personnel.

To try and impact on specific parts of the broader aspects of military life is inappropriate. The issue must be addressed on the broader canvas.
The Hamilton Report is endeavouring to address the empowerment of individuals within the military system, and attempts to enhance the self esteem of Service personnel and member of their families. If this is just oriented towards the dependents of military families the impact is doomed to failure. Potentially the danger to these individuals is exaggerated as any future attempts to address these issues will be double judged [That is judged on the merits of the idea and judged on previous attempts to deal with it.]

Problems will arise if resources are directed towards parts of military families, for example the dependent spouse and children. To empower them and create mechanisms which support, encourage and foster them in realising their potential, is unrealistic if the military member is being denied access to comparable resources within their work environment. The empowering of individuals must occur throughout the whole system to be effective.

However this is, and will be difficult given the manner in which members of the military interact and relate to each other within and between the ranks. Anecdotally situations exist where members of the Service member’s family may adopt the rank and status of the Service person, and use this in their interaction with members of other Service families. The process of reaffirmation must also occur in the work environment. When this happens the efforts of the whole family unit to effect positive change in their self esteem will be enhanced.

This very broad issue of “people feeling good about who they are and the role that they are playing” is possibly the greatest factor in the process of effecting change in military families. Having accepted the importance of the family base for the service man or woman this recognition must go beyond lip service and be paid for. It will be effective in the long run. Many of the issues raised in the Hamilton Report, such as: provision of child care, disturbance allowances, housing, superannuation, reunion, health services, education of children, and removals, are all aspects of enhancing self esteem, but tend to focus on dependency.

These authors believe that the implementation of the Hamilton Report must be concerned with developing strategies for the Department of Defence to enhance the self esteem of military families by positively impacting upon the broader Australian society.

This effort must be, and must be seen to be, legitimate by the military system in its entirety and by the Australia community. It cannot be pure tokenism.

Many of the philosophies contained in the profession of arms, through offence and defence and the process of mobilisation can be utilised to greater effect in this type of endeavour.

It is inappropriate, potentially dangerous, and may have major negative consequences, if the Department of Defence is responsible for sending out two contrary messages to its members. An example would be the development of strategies to enhance self esteem and empowering members and their families to take control of their lives and then at the same time order them to relocate to locations where they do not want to go and accommodating them in substandard accommodation, in poor and/or resource starved locations.

The potential for heightening the feelings of frustration and consequentially the potential for danger is exacerbated.

This aspect is clearly articulated by Hamilton in paragraph 89, in which she focuses on the hostility which is directed at military families by the civilian population, and the belief that Defence authorities are indifferent to their needs. Other areas of concern were lack of access to the service system and the anxiety about the impact upon the members’ career.

Family life and, the roles that the family members play in relation to each other is seriously affected by tours of duty, training programmes and involvement in exercises. The impact on the family unit is such that for a period of time (sometimes extensive) an important member of the family is not an active part of that unit.

The roles and responsibilities of the absent member within the family need to be and will be allocated to other members. The family and service member will probably experience a sense of loss (and possibly abandonment) at the time of the separation.

A considerable volume of literature currently exists on the phenomena of loss and grief and the impact that this has on individuals and groups. While most of this has concentrated on life events such as death, serious illness and divorce it can be extrapolated that many of the issues do occur in family units when individuals
A related and equally important issue is the re-engagement of a member in the family unit. The issue that must be addressed is that the roles and responsibilities of the returning individual have been taken on by another member of the family and the expectation is that they will now relinquish them back to the previous owner. This may not always happen, particularly if it is not anticipated and even if it does it can be a traumatic process for all those involved. New levels of equilibrium will have been established within the family, and everyone in the group has developed new ways of interacting with each other. When a person enters this new system the equilibrium will be disrupted.

When the soldier returns from exercises, training programmes or manoeuvres s/he has to relearn being part of the family unit. The spouse and children also have to relearn how to incorporate the soldier back into family life. Many service families are able to handle the anticipated separation, however the reunification process is often more difficult because it is rarely articulated. Often the abilities to deal with the events exist before there is an understanding of why the feelings exist.

Individuals, particularly in their role as a spouse and parent are not taught how to handle the fluctuations in power, role, responsibilities and the difficulty of establishing the balance. The potential for the consequences on the children is obvious. Many individuals in service families experience this phenomenon, without recognising both cause and effect and it is an instance which requires urgent education and/ or training.

All of these factors must be addressed by the Defence authorities in their entirety, otherwise the underlying difficulties raised in the Hamilton Report will be addressed and the potential dangers within military families will not be decreased.

The pressures on military families are almost exclusive to that system. It is this which heightens the potential danger. It is not that the individuals within the military system are different from the individuals in the civilian population but that the military system as it currently exists and the demands that it makes on those associated with it, increases the potential danger for individual family members.

The implementation of processes to enhance family life needs to be very carefully considered and addressed in a legitimate fashion by the entire Defence Force across all three services from the Minister for Defence to Service personnel at all levels in the chain of command.

Equally, regard must be given to, and the Defence Forces must be cognizant, of what the members of the Defence Force families are saying. Information from all of these sources must be incorporated in the development of principles and strategies to enhance family life of military families.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this article has been to acknowledge that a step has been taken in the direction of enhancing family life for members of the Defence Force.

If the Department is sincere in its aim it is the belief of the present authors that serious consideration must be given to the strategies which need to be implemented to realize this aim.

In this article this has been attempted using the backdrop of the phenomena of family violence in particular child maltreatment. The enhancement of family life and the protection of the family members from harm perpetrated against each other by members of the family is a most important issue.

Ultimately if people feel good about what they are doing, are clear about the reasons for their actions and committed to their actions and finally if they feel good about themselves and their role and place within the Defence Force either directly or indirectly the potential for them to function effectively is enhanced. Therefore the likelihood of family life being safer for all those who are part of it is increased.

The process of undertaking this task is too important an issue to be undertaken lightly. Strategies and processes need to be clearly considered, articulated and debated openly, with a sincere and strong commitment to the consequences by all of those involved.

All of the concerns raised in the Hamilton Report are legitimate. Much more thought however, needs to be given to the manner in which they are addressed. More strategies must be undertaken than those suggested within the Report. As well as this consideration must be given
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Joan Malpass worked as a Personnel Clerk to the Assistant Welfare Officer for 2 1/2 years with the Royal Air Force. For 12 years she was an "Army wife" married to a British Army Sergeant, travelling widely (Kenya, Aden, Germany and throughout the United Kingdom) following her husband's career and raising four children. She holds a Bachelor of Social Science. (Social Work) and a Graduate Diploma in Social Sciences both from the Western Australian Institute of Technology (now Curtin University of Technology) as well as a Master of Arts (Public Policy) from the Murdoch University. She is currently employed as a consultant in the W.A. Public Service Commission having recently been employed as the Principal Officer funding Management with the W.A. Government Department for Community Services.
The Fourteenth Battalions — A Military Tradition

By Major J. C. McAllester R.L.

Introduction

One of the most valuable of service concepts is a military tradition. Although the regiments of Australian infantry have existed for a far shorter period than those of the United Kingdom, there was built up between 1914 and 1945 a tradition as strong and effective as those of the Brigade of Guards or the Highland Regiments. An example of this concerns two battalions — 14 Battalion of the First AIF and 2/14 Battalion of the Second AIF.

Tradition

Tradition has been defined as the unwritten delivery of historical information but military tradition, to be effectively perpetuated, requires recorded information in regard to regimental titles and colours, battle honours, individual honours, badges, mottos and alliances. Australia has a patchy record in the encouragement of preservation of regimental traditions; in fact Australian Army Headquarters has linked and disbanded units with complete disregard for preservation of unit identities or the feelings of present or past members. In wartime this may be necessary to confuse the enemy but in peacetime there seems to be no justification for it, apart from the convenience of people whom Wellington described as “mere quill drivers in your Lordship’s office” by whom he was “debarred from the serious business of campaigning”. The fact that an effective Australian military tradition has developed is due more to the excellence of the work of official war historians, unofficial unit historians and the strength of ex-service bodies, principally the RSL and the AIF Unit Associations. However a far-sighted Australian Government in 1917 conceived the need for the Australian War Memorial which has provided historians with the information essential for their work and has preserved an enormous amount of material which is of great value to those interested in Australia’s military tradition. But the AWM alone cannot carry on tradition; this can only be done if permitted by continuity of unit identity.

14 and 2/14 Battalions

In Defence Force Journal No. 52 is an article by R. Leiston titled “Williamson, Stanton, Wadsworth and Orr”. That article provided much interesting information not previously published on 14 Battalion of the First AIF. It aroused great interest in the 2/14 Battalion Association and by courtesy of the Managing Editor, over seventy copies were circulated among members of that Association. Some of those members have asked if similar information could be compiled regarding the 2/14 Battalion which, as Leiston points out, was introduced to the traditions of the “Old Fourteenth” shortly after its formation at Puckapunyal in 1940.

There are many similarities between the raising of 14 Battalion in 1914 and 2/14 Battalion in 1940. On each occasion only one battalion was being raised at the time in Victoria and was to be grouped with battalions from other states to form, in 1914, 4 Brigade and in 1940, 21 Brigade. The recruitment of soldiers on an area basis had been implemented since 1912 following the visit of Lord Kitchener in 1910 and whilst this led to an established citizen army of units recruited in specific areas, the First and Second AIFs were recruited on a national basis. This might have been expected to make the development of unit esprit de corps somewhat difficult but in 1939 and 1940 it was not long before recruits with no previous military experience had learned of the achievements of the battalion of similar number in the First AIF.

Lineage

14 Battalion had its origin in 6 Australian Infantry Regiment formed in Victoria under General Order 296 of 1903 from the pre-Federation Victoria Military Forces. In 1912 this regiment was split into 49 and 63 Infantry. In August 1918 the Australian Army made one of the few sound decisions it has ever made in the direction of maintaining tradition. Recognising the distinctions won by the First AIF it was decided to alter the designation of CMF units to conform to the numbers borne by the AIF Battalions. Thus 49 Infantry Regiment became the Second Battalion of 14 Infantry Regiment, the First Battalion being the AIF Battalion and
the Third Battalion being a senior cadet unit. The Regiment remained when the AIF Battalion was disbanded and in 1921 14 Infantry Regiment became 14 Battalion AMF. Later, territorial titles were allotted by Australian Army Order 132 of 1927 and 14 Battalion was designated The Prahran Regiment, with the motto "Stand Fast". 14 Battalion trained many citizen soldiers between the two world wars, and in 1940 it contributed a strong complement to 2/14 Battalion of the Second AIF including an officer who became its longest serving CO Lieutenant-Colonel P. E. Rhoden, OBE, ED. Later the militia Battalion was linked with 32 Battalion to form 14/32 Battalion and served in the New Britain campaign of 1945 with casualties of 3 officers and 61 other ranks.

Raising 2/14 Battalion

For some months after the formation of 6 Division in 1939 very few AIF appointments could be offered to officers of the AMF until 7 Division was formed in May 1940. As a result there were several hundred officers in Victoria keen to secure AIF appointments but with only one battalion to be formed. The CO appointed on 23rd April 1940 was Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Cannon ED, until then CO of 58 Battalion AMF. He was instructed to visit all militia battalions in Victoria and secure nominations from each CO of two or three officers to ensure that the new Battalion was as widely representative as possible in officer appointments; this in turn ensured that many militia men joining the AIF asked for allotment to 2/14 Battalion to enable them to serve with officers under whom they had received their militia training. The table below shows the areas from which militia men were recruited and the AMF Units in which they received their training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>AMF Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>5 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Northern Suburbs</td>
<td>6 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildura &amp; Mallee</td>
<td>7 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballarat &amp; Vicinity</td>
<td>8 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner South Eastern Suburbs</td>
<td>14 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geelong &amp; Vicinity</td>
<td>23/21 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitzroy &amp; surrounding suburbs</td>
<td>29/22 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Suburbs</td>
<td>24/39 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footscray &amp; Western Suburbs</td>
<td>32 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bendigo &amp; Castlemaine areas</td>
<td>38 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brighton to Mornington Peninsula</td>
<td>46 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Eastern Suburbs to Gippsland</td>
<td>52 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern Suburbs</td>
<td>57/60 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essendon/Coburg area</td>
<td>58 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goulburn Valley &amp; North Eastern Victoria</td>
<td>59 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Melbourne</td>
<td>Melbourne University Rifles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the foregoing units except 38 Battalion were represented among the original officers of 2/14 Battalion.

It is not possible from the records available to ascertain the proportions of militia men and recruits without previous training which made up of 2/14 Battalion during its formative period. However, a typical example for which figures are available arising from recent research for its history comes from 5 Battalion (Victorian Scottish Regiment) which provided 40 members to 2/14 Battalion. Of these 40, ultimately 16 held commissioned rank and 18 non-commissioned rank. During the Second World War, 5 of them were killed in action and 11 decorations were won.

Influence of Tradition

Two salient facts emerge from these studies. Firstly, the availability of officers and other ranks with previous training is invaluable in the formation of an infantry battalion in wartime; some would say, essential. Secondly, if the battalion so raised is linked by tradition and is otherwise identifiable with a predecessor unit with an outstanding record of performance in a previous war, then all factors are favourable for the formation of a worthy successor unit. To quote Major W.B. Russell, its greatly-esteemied historian:

"The 2/14 Battalion inherited a great tradition. The 14th Battalion of the First A.I.F. with its record from Gallipoli to beyond the Hindenberg line, its special hero Albert Jacka, Australia’s first V.C. in the First World War, its great number of decorations, its long casualty list and its record of battle honours, became known and honoured throughout Australia. The 2/14 Battalion received this tradition with intense pride and the Regimental Battle Flag presented by the 1/14th on 18th August 1940 became at once a treasured possession and a symbol of that high courage and devotion which were to carry the Battalion through its own trials during the next 5½ years."

The tangible symbols of tradition which 2/14 Battalion inherited were only three in number — the title, the colour patch and the flag mentioned above. As pointed out in Leiston’s article the allocation of colour patches to the Second AIF was initially carried out with no regard to tradition and 2/14 Battalion was allotted a black over blue diamond. Protests from
the First AIF Associations led to this system being changed a few months later so that each 7 Division Battalion wore the colour patch of the corresponding First AIF Battalion on a grey diamond background as had been done in the 6 Division, (which had a rectangular background).

Campaign Experience

Just as 1 and 2 Divisions of the First AIF went to the Middle East in 1915, 6 and 7 Divisions of the Second AIF went to the Middle East in 1940. There could not have been a greater contrast between the experiences of 14 and 2/14 Battalions. 14 Battalion in 1915 had 737 casualties in just under seven months on Gallipoli whereas 2/14 Battalion suffered only 113 casualties in fourteen months in the Middle East. On return to Australia in 1942 2/14 Battalion bore a distinct resemblance to the situation described by Leiston as the standard of 14 Battalion in the European Spring of 1917 — it was trained, fit and battle tested. It was not until August that 2/14 Battalion was committed to battle in the campaign being waged against the Japanese in Papua. In that campaign the Battalion also lost three of its finest company commanders and it may be of interest to compare their careers with those of the three company commanders of 14 Battalion who were killed in the Battle of Bullecourt — Williamson, Stanton and Orr. Captains C.C.P. Nye, A.S.D.J. McGavin and M.A. Treacy, MC were three company commanders of 2/14 Battalion who lost their lives in the Papuan campaign of 1942; they were all original members of the Battalion.

C.C.P. Nye

Claude Charles Purvis Nye in early 1940 was a lieutenant in 59 Battalion AMF. He was born at Port Melbourne on 1st November 1916 and educated at Middle Park Central School and Melbourne High School. He had two younger brothers, Bill who served in the RAN and Jack, who served in 2/12 Field Regiment. Like his father who became Station Master at Spencer St. Melbourne, Claude sought a career in the Victorian Railways. He joined the Victorian Scottish Regiment in 1935 and soon achieved NCO rank, winning trophies for rifle shooting. His railway duties took him to north-eastern Victoria and in 1938 he transferred to 59 Battalion where he was commissioned on 6th November 1939. He was the original 8 Platoon Commander in A Company, 2/14 Battalion and greatly respected by his men, leading them throughout the Syrian campaign of 1941. During the occupation of Syria he served as Signals Officer in which appointment his railway experience proved useful. As a senior and well-regarded platoon commander he was promoted captain early in 1942 and returned to Australia as second-in-command of B Company. Before the Battalion left for New Guinea he had succeeded to the command of B Company which was the second company to meet the full force of the Japanese advance at Isurava on the Kokoda Trail. In the words of the Official Historian, “savage and continuous thrusts were made at Nye’s company”. Two of his three platoon commanders were killed and the third wounded; Lieutenant Maurice (Mocca) Treacy, Nye’s second in command, replaced one of those killed, but became separated from the company whilst arranging to evacuate wounded.

Many brave deeds were performed in Nye’s company, the most outstanding being by Corporal Charles McCallum who earned the DCM, accounting for 40 Japanese soldiers with a Bren and Tommy gun in covering the withdrawal of his mates. The Company, with two platoons commanded by sergeants, played a key role in the subsequent withdrawal through Templeton’s Crossing and Myola, until on 8th September it was ordered to attack with two companies of the 2/16 Battalion to clear Japanese occupying positions on the track between the bat-
talions and Brigade Headquarters. In the words of the Official Historian “on the right Nye struck the heaviest opposition . . . Warrant Officer Noble with 8 men, some of them wounded, finally stormed through to the Brigade area. “Behind him, however, the gallant and lively Nye lay dead with 16 of his men, among them, the heroic Corporal McCallum”.

Although 21 Australian Infantry Brigade had returned from the Middle East in March 1942, months were spent training in Queensland when the brigade might have been better employed learning to face the problems of terrain and climate in New Guinea. In the event it was rushed to New Guinea in August and forced to meet the Japanese advance in the most difficult country possible, with no artillery support and heavily outnumbered in strength. The Japanese force comprised three battalions of 144 Regiment and two battalions of 41 Regiment supported by mountain guns, engineers and dismounted cavalry. Although the Australian Army had mountain artillery it was not committed until 19th November 1942 on the Buna front.

A.S.D.J. McGavin

Alan Stewart Denzil James McGavin was born in Calcutta, India on 25th July 1920, the elder of two sons of a British officer of the Indian Civil Service and a nursing sister of the First AIF. His father’s work was that of administering the rule of a Native State during the minority of its ruling prince.

Alan attended primary school in Darjeeling and as was the custom, was sent to school in England in 1930. His parents remained in India until his father’s retirement in 1937, so that except in the summer holidays in 1935, the children were effectively separated from their parents for over six years due to the exigencies of the service of which his father was a member.

The school holidays in England were therefore spent with an English family whose two sons were officers in the British Regular Army, one in the York and Lancasters and the other in the Sherwood Foresters.

In his formative years, Alan had grown up with a family history going back several generations of service to the Crown, and in his early teens formed the ambition of becoming an officer in the Regular Army, hoping on completion of his schooling to obtain a place at Sandhurst. This ambition was largely fostered by the associations he had and the admiration he felt for the two officers with whose family Alan lived. His schooling was at St. Edmund’s College, Hertfordshire, where he completed his education. At school in addition to satisfactory achievement in class, although of average height and slight build, he was a keen and proficient sportsman, representing the school at Rugby Football and for three seasons in the First XI at cricket, in his final year being captain and a prefect. He was a forceful and aggressive batsman, and a dashing scrum-half.

At the end of 1937, on his father’s retirement, the whole family settled in Victoria, his mother’s home State, moving to Melbourne — so that his plans for Sandhurst went by the board and in fact he elected to seek a place at RMC, Duntroon to fulfill his desire for a career in the Regular Army. It was necessary to establish residence in Australia for one year, so that in 1938, in addition to maintaining his studies he layed rugby football for the Harlequin Club and joined 6 Battalion AMF (Royal Melbourne Regiment). In England he had taken seriously the training offered by the school Officers Training Corps and enjoyed the life provided by military training.

In early 1939 he was allotted a place as a staff cadet at Duntroon, which he attended throughout 1939. He did well in purely military subjects, but at the end of 1939 the Commandant reported that his qualities suited him for duty
as a regimental officer, rather than staff officer, so that he left Duntroon in December 1939. Despite his parents’ dismay at the abrupt end to his ambitions, Alan was undeniably pleased as he felt that he could now engage in active military service rather than spend the next three years in Canberra.

He then enlisted in 58 Battalion AMF where he was commissioned. As the youngest officer appointed to 2/14 Battalion on 6th May 1940, he was the original 18 platoon commander in D Company. En route to the Middle East the Battalion staged at Deolali, India, where McGavin’s parents married in 1919. To his dismay Alan was allotted on 13th April 1941, for duty at the training battalion, before the battalion went into the Western Desert. He considered resigning his commission and re-enlisting as a private but fortunately did not do so. However, the casualties at Jezzine in the first month of the Syrian campaign necessitated reinforcements being sent forward from the training battalion on 24th June 1941 and McGavin ensured that he was with them. Fortunately for him 16 Platoon’s commander had been evacuated ill and McGavin was able to take his place in this platoon, which was believed to be the youngest in the AIF — one member had enlisted at 15, two at 16, two at 17 and four, including the platoon sergeant, at 18 years of age. The acting CO realised that putting the impetuous McGavin in charge of this platoon was perhaps risky but his decision was vindicated within a week when McGavin attacked a stone blockhouse near Jezzine manned by the redoubtable 6 Regiment of the Foreign Legion. Accompanied by only one corporal he rushed the blockhouse, capturing 10 prisoners. On taking them outside for identification they were fired on by a Vichy machine gun post only 200 yards away. But McGavin had not been caught unawares. His Number 1 Section moved on the post as pre-arranged and forced it to surrender. However, the prisoners took advantage of the diversion and fled back to the blockhouse. McGavin, undeterred, followed them and held them at gunpoint, warning them in schoolboy French that if the other post did not surrender, their fate might not be a happy one. The patrol withdrew under fire from other machine guns but brought all 14 prisoners back into the battalion area. There they were identified as belonging to IV Battalion of 6 Regiment, previously located on the Damascus front, thus giving valuable intelligence on the Vichy commander’s plans.

The acting CO Major J.G. Evans MC, a veteran of 1914-1918, set out to meet the returning patrol immediately on hearing of their success and later expressed privately his opinion that McGavin’s effort was “Well up to the standard of First World War MC winners”, but McGavin received only a mention in despatches for this exploit.

Only a week later while D Company was advancing on Damour from the east, McGavin urged his company commander to press on to the town because they were short of water and food, which were likely to be available in the houses. However, the houses were empty of inhabitants and food, but there were numerous Vichy soldiers. McGavin with one corporal and two men grenades a post into submission, capturing five prisoners. Ultimately the Company and their prisoners, who outnumbered them, spent an uncomfortable night being shelled by both allied and Vichy artillery.

After being promoted to Captain, McGavin went to New Guinea with the Battalion in August 1942 as second-in-command of C Company and played a staunch part in the with-
drawal from Isurava. At one stage to clear enemy from the track his company participated in a classic bayonet charge of a rather bloodthirsty nature, driving the Japanese before him. Succeeding to command of B Company on the death of Claude Nye he led them as advance guard in the formidable task of attacking Gona village on 28th November 1942. It would have been impossible for a leader like McGavin to have survived and he was killed by a sniper. The Japanese were in underground, heavily-roofed strongpoints and the Battalion losses of seven officers and 36 men killed could well have been far worse. Total casualties of the Battalion on the Kokoda Trail were 14 officers and 242 men and at Gona were 14 officers and 124 men. In warfare of this kind the odds against survival for a company commander of McGavin’s courage were incalculable.

M.A. Treacy, MC

Maurice Austen Treacy was born at Nathalia on 24th November 1915, the son of a well-known River Murray steam boat captain. Having served in 7 Battalion AMF since 1936 he enlisted in May 1940 in 2/14 Battalion as a private and rapidly attained the rank of sergeant. In the Middle East he was an early nomination on 3rd January 1941, for OCTU and was commissioned Lieutenant on 26th April 1941, rejoining the Battalion at Jezzine on 23rd June. B Company had lost all its platoon commanders in the first fortnight’s operations in Syria and welcomed three new officers, including Treacy, who had all been promoted from the ranks — unlike the situation later in the war when to send a sergeant to OCTU was to lose him forever. A little over a week later B Company attacked Hill 567 on the eastern flank of the Damour battle. 11 Platoon, commanded by Treacy, beat off seven counter-attacks leaving 20 enemy dead in front of the position. A prisoner disclosed that 50 Vichy soldiers had been wounded.

By the time the Battalion went to New Guinea Treacy was second-in-command of B Company. However 11 Platoon’s commander had been killed in the defence of Isurava and Treacy took over his old Platoon.

In the words of the Battalion historian:

“11 Platoon had been under incessant attack all day. Lieutenant Treacy, who had shown his courage and leadership on taking over the Platoon on the death of Lieutenant Moore, had by skilful defence and counter-attack, kept the position intact all day. Towards evening when enemy infiltration from the flanks and rear had caused a withdrawal to be ordered he allowed the platoons on his right flank to move down from the high ground while he held back the enemy. During the height of the fighting and gunfire he personally attended to the construction of stretchers and the recovery of the wounded. During the withdrawal that night he skilfully conducted a rear-guard action so that his platoon and stretcher cases broke contact without casualty. For his coolness, courage, devotion to his men and skilful leadership, Lieutenant Treacy was awarded the Military Cross.”

In the withdrawal from Alola, Treacy and some of his wounded were cut off with the rear guard commanded by Captain S.H. (Ben) Buckler. The story of this party, which regained the unit after six weeks in the jungle, is an epic in itself. On 4th September Buckler ordered Treacy with 2 men, to attempt to make contact with the Battalion. The Official History reads:

“…during the following days they passed through many Japanese bivouac areas, sometimes just avoiding death or capture, sometimes lying hidden as they watched their enemies moving in numbers near them, sometimes killing Japanese who seemed isolated from large groups. They were living on rice which they took as a result of these killings. They were desperate men who killed
both as a duty as for food. Often they ate dry rice as they walked although it was generally mouldy.

On the 10th they suddenly encountered a party of eight Japanese face to face. The constant wet had affected all their weapons except Treacy’s pistol. With it he killed three of the enemy soldiers but Private Rockliffe was shot through the leg. The track was too dangerous for them now so they left it, probably between Templeton’s Crossing and Myola, and plunged into the wild country to the east. They were worried about Buckler and the rest but could no more than they were doing. They shot a pig and its flesh sustained them for many days. On 21st September they met a patrol from the 2/6th Independent Company and were given food and help.”

They arrived back at the Battalion on 2nd October. In spite of his ordeal Treacy took over A Company and led it into the Gona battle on 28th November. He survived the initial abortive attack but the next day his company was ordered to attack through B Company’s position. Again from the official history:

“Treacy showed the same grim courage that had carried him back across the mountains after he had been cut off at Alola. His fine physique made him conspicuous as he coolly directed his attack to within 30 yards of the defending posts which were crossing each other’s fronts with fire.”

From the Battalion History:

“Captain Treacy with his fine physique so obviously directing and encouraging, was a marked man and although he seemed to bear a charmed life, was finally killed by a sniper. Maurie Treacy was all that a man could wish to be — kind, brave, sincere, rich in common sense and sublimely unselfish. Completely efficient on duty, he enjoyed life to the full at other times. He understood and loved his men and they understood and worshipped him.”

Memorials

Nye, McGavin and Treacy were outstanding among those who carried on the tradition of the First Fourteenth. While comparisons between the conditions of the two wars are meaningless, it is noteworthy that Williamson, Stanton and Orr, the 14 Battalion company commanders who did not survive Bullecourt, received no recognition, not even a posthumous MID. Nye, McGavin and Treacy live on in the honoured memory of their comrades but the Association has no record of any other tribute to their memory except their graves in New Guinea and Treacy’s name on the Kenny Park memorial at Merbein.

V.C. Winners

Like 14 Battalion, 2/14 Battalion had one VC winner, but there the similarity ceases. While the name of Jacka became a household word in and after the First World War, Bruce Kingsbury’s award is not well known, although his name lives on in the suburb of Melbourne where his family’s business operated. However, a member of 2/14 Battalion found recently that the Kingsbury Boys’ Football Club did not know why their suburb was so named. So the Association has presented a framed portrait of Bruce to the Boys’ Club and this led to requests from three sub-branches of the RSL for similar photographs.

Links With Tradition

The connection between 14 Battalion and the City of St. Kilda developed after the First World War. The original Padre, Chaplain Andrew Gil­lison, killed on Gallipoli on 22nd August 1914, was the minister of St. George’s Presbyterian Church at St. Kilda and the 14 Battalion Association held a memorial service there every year on the nearest Sunday to the date of his death. As their numbers dwindled the 2/14 Battalion Association was asked to assist by providing a guest speaker and its members supported the service each year until 1985, when only one member of 14 Battalion could attend. Therefore in 1986 the service was reluctantly abandoned and another link with tradition was broken. The St. Kilda connection was no doubt strengthened by Albert Jacka becoming Mayor of the city and a replica of the colours is displayed in the St. Kilda Town Hall. Yet the Army in its wisdom designated 14 Battalion CMF, “The Prahran Regiment” in 1926. Certainly, its drill hall was located in Prahran, but since the Second World War, no Army Reserve unit has been given any identity which could enable it to be regarded as a successor to 14 Battalion. This is doubly disappointing because 16 and 2/16 Battalions (with which 14 and
2/14 Battalions were closely associated in all their campaigns) are perpetuated in 16 RWAR which also has independent rifle companies numbered after 11 and 28 Battalions, units of outstanding service in both world wars. It is understood that the Army Reserve will ultimately include an 11/28 Battalion.

Links Between the Battalion Associations

Perhaps the best example of the camaraderie which prevailed between members of the two battalions occurred on the 20th September 1957. In his capacity as Honorary Colonel of the West Yorkshire Regiment (Fourteenth Foot) the Governor General, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, met the members of 14 and 2/14 Battalion Associations at Hawthorn Town Hall. The alliance of 14 Battalion with the West Yorkshire Regiment was approved in Australian Army Order 51 of 1928. The Field Marshal spent over three hours talking to small groups, exchanging stories of wartime experiences. His unrivalled ability to converse with all ranks and his obvious respect for the achievements of both battalions left a lasting impression on all who attended. It amused some of those present, who observed the Aide de Camp’s efforts to persuade the Field Marshal to leave on schedule, that he ignored the timetable and spent an additional hour completing his circuit of the hall with a greeting for everyone.

Slim’s outstanding book Defeat Into Victory had been published in 1956 and in it he had written “some of us may forget that of all the Allies it was Australian soldiers who first broke the spell of invincibility of the Japanese Army; those of use who were in Burma have cause to remember”.

Early in August 1915 Slim was commanding a company of the Royal Warwicks on Gallipoli and had moved through the area where 14 Battalion had lost 5 officers and 97 other ranks killed in the attack on Koja Chemen Tepe on 8th August. In the Second World War Slim did not have Australian units in any of his commands but he was well aware of the achievements of 7 Australian Division in New Guinea and his own words “of which, as a morale raiser, I made great use”.

The mutual respect and affection which existed between 14 Battalion Association and 2/14 Battalion Association was exemplified by the attendance of representatives of each Association at the other’s reunions. When 14 Battalion Association ceased operation in June 1983, the balance of its funds was transferred to 2/14 Battalion Association and used for the latter’s memorial plaque at Puckapunyal.

On a lighter note, the long time Secretary of 14 Battalion Association Percy Whitelaw, now 97, is regularly visited on his birthday by John Stirling, Secretary of 2/14 Battalion Association since 1962, with the standard present — “a couple of cans”.

The 2/14 Battalion representative in Bendigo, Fred Boys, the original bugler and later a Signals NCO, keeps in touch with Bill Fitzpatrick MM the original bugler of 14 Battalion, who lives not far away.

These men are typical of those who have fostered the maintenance of tradition through their Unit Associations.

Family Links

Although it is traditional in the British Army for sons to serve in their father’s regiment, there appeared to be a contrary trend in the allocation of recruits to units of the Second AIF, where it was left to recruiting depot staff to decide the question. Even personal requests for friends joining together to serve together were sometimes ignored by those officials. Bruce Kingsbury wished to join 2/14 Battalion because his close friend Alan Avery had been allotted there a few days earlier. But Bruce was sent to 2/2 Pioneer Battalion and if the two CO’s had not known each other as well as they did, and agreed to transfer him, Bruce could well have spent much of the war in a Japanese PW camp. As events turned out, Alan Avery, MM shot the Japanese sniper responsible for Bruce’s death in the action in which he won the VC.

Whether this system of recruiting inhibits family records of regimental service is debatable, but a few individuals defeat the system. Corporal H.C. Clements, MM with a fine record in 14 Battalion and later Secretary of its Association, encouraged his son Lieutenant J.G. Clements to apply for 2/14 Battalion and he was so appointed, later being killed at Gona and mentioned in despatches. Graham Whiting an original and long-serving member of 2/14 Battalion is the son of Stan Whiting of 14 Battalion.
Lieutenant N.J. Bear, MM of 14 Battalion was the uncle of Lieutenant L.A. (Teddy) Bear DCM, MM one of 2/14 Battalion’s outstanding soldiers and Private C. Buckler, killed at Pozieres, was the uncle of Captain (later Brigadier) S.H. Buckler, OBE the original adjutant of 2/14 Battalion.

The fathers of at least three other members of 2/14 Battalion are believed to have served in 14 Battalion but the complete separation of personnel records of the First and Second World Wars makes any thorough check of family records of service almost impossible.

As far as the Association is aware, three individuals succeeded in serving in both battalions. Major W.W. Crellin, a platoon commander in 14 Battalion was the original second-in-command of 2/14 Battalion but was soon promoted to command 2/43 Battalion. Privates Harry Bell and Ted Bellamy claimed service with 14 Battalion but their service with 2/14 Battalion was, not unexpectedly, relatively short.

**Battle Honours**

The battle honours of 14 and 2/14 Battalions have not suffered the indignity of being reallocated to a unit of which its members had not previously heard — the Royal Victorian Regiment, which by authority of Australian Army Order NO. 85 of 1962 “became heirs to” the honours earned by all Victorian battalions except 2/14 and a few others. By what stretch of imagination a new regiment can acquire battle honours is a mystery; it is a practice apparently not recognised by the British Army because a magnificent recent publication of battle honours of British and Dominion armies makes no reference to honours held other than by the unit which won them. Strangely the battalions of the RAR do not seem to have become heir to unearned battle honours. Yet the formation of RAR battalions has no doubt contributed to the elimination of any need to maintain the existence of several battalions in the Army Reserve.

**Regular Battalions**

It will surely be regarded as heretical to suggest that today’s Defence Force is oversupplied with regular battalions. The cost of servicing these units with married quarters, retirement benefits, fringe benefits etc. must be far greater than the cost of supplying an Army Reserve battalion with training facilities. Australia has shown in both world wars that citizen soldiers can meet any emergency, providing all ranks from private to general. It seems possible that the formation of a standing regular infantry force, never needed before the Second World War, has its genesis in the situation described by Gavin Long in Volume 7 of his official history, page 74 — “there were good reasons for making an effort to ensure that the post-war regular officer corps contained a due proportion of men who had commanded troops in the field”. Few citizen soldiers of the Second World War would disagree with this. However, it seems a pity that a side effect of this policy is the disbandment or removal from the army organisation of the names of many units which had built up a strong tradition of effective service in two world wars. There seems to be no reason why 14 Battalion could not remain on the Army List in the same way that 11 and 28 Battalions have been perpetuated in the form of Independent rifle companies.

**Honours and Awards**

When honours and awards to individuals are discussed at reunions the comment is often heard — “Joe should have received a decoration”. Infantrymen of the Second World War are philosophic about such matters; they realise that on average their battalion suffered less than a quarter of the casualties of its counterpart in the First World War and was probably in action for a far shorter period. Decorations were therefore proportionately less. But it is interesting to compare Bullecourt with the Papuan campaign in the following table for the two battalions.

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>14 Battalion Bullecourt 1917</th>
<th>2/14 Battalion Papua 1942</th>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>Other ranks</td>
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<td>366</td>
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<td>Total deaths:</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
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<td>151</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC or bar</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM or bar</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEM</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of engagement:</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Death of a Unit

Whilst deaths of individuals in battle bring great sorrow to relatives and comrades, the disbandment of a wartime battalion gives rise to mixed emotions.

On its return from the Balikpapan campaign of 1945, 2/14 Battalion was a proud unit welcomed by crowds lining the Brisbane River. Suddenly, by virtue of the CO’s signature testifying to the doubtful fact that all stores were accounted for, the Battalion ceased to exist. By a stroke of a pen it became a mass of individuals, who felt deflated, sorrowful yet glad to know that the war was over. But those whose homes were in Victoria found that an Association was already formed, ready to welcome them and assist them to preserve the tradition they had helped to maintain for over five years. Later the Association extended to every other state.

The Function of Unit Associations

The lack of any official effort to perpetuate the name of the Fourteenth in today’s Army is offset to some extent by the existence of 2/14 Battalion Association which for over 40 years has kept in touch with those who served in the Second World War and the next-of-kin of those who did not return or have since passed on. Currently there are well over 500 members and over 200 next-of-kin (widows, sisters and daughters) of deceased members. Among the honorary members are the four known survivors of 14 Battalion 1914-1918.

The Association has a strong Welfare Fund which provided scholarships for almost 200 children of members in earlier years and now provides assistance and Christmas cakes for the next-of-kin.

After the Second World War, many members of the Association served with distinction in the Regular Army and the Army Reserve until the years overtook them. But how much more could have been contributed to Australia’s defence preparedness if the Association had been permitted to support an Army Reserve unit, bearing its name and determined to uphold the proud “Fourteenth” tradition. It could have provided speakers for training courses, funds for furnishing depots, encouragement of recruiting, employment for soldiers on discharge and in many other areas so well catered for by the regimental associations of the British Army. Foundations were laid for such associations in the 1920s but were sabotaged by the policies of subsequent decades.

The Association has now faced the inevitable — that it will lose 99% of its membership over the next 25 years. In an attempt to provide a continuing service to those seeking details of members, copies of the histories of both battalions, etc. the Association has decided to seek honorary members among the close male relatives of its departed comrades. Hopefully some of these honorary members will be of later generations and will provide a continuing source of information on the tradition of the Fourteenth, well into the next century.

Note: The author gratefully acknowledges help from many members of 2/14 Battalion and relatives of deceased members in compiling details. The photographs were taken by the author.

Major J. C. McAllester was commissioned in the Victorian Scottish Regiment in 1939 and completed the degree of Bachelor of Science in the University of Melbourne in the same year. He held appointments up to company commander in 2/14 Battalion in 1940-42 and commanded 2/1 CW Laboratory RAE 1943-45. In 1951 he was awarded a Fulbright Scholarship at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and has worked since in the Public Service and in industry.
The Employment of Military Intelligence Officers and Military Intelligence Liaison Officers for Low-Level Operations in Australia

By Major G. Hourn, Aust Int.

Introduction

Times change and we change with them

Old English Proverb

General

The First Duke of Wellington, during his Iberian Peninsula campaign of 1808, used men known as 'exploring officers' to gather local intelligence relating to an area of operations (AO). These field intelligence officers were the forerunners of the modern Military Intelligence Officers (MIO) and Military Intelligence Liaison Officers (MILO) who today have the main function of close liaison with civil authorities and the local population in an AO.

Military Intelligence Officers

An MIO works with civil authorities, specifically police and security intelligence organizations, namely Police Special Branch or its equivalent.

A principal source of operational intelligence for low level operations within Australia will be from local police and civilian security intelligence agencies. Military commanders must have early and regular access to this intelligence and it is the function of an MIO to ensure that this intelligence reaches military commanders in time for its use, and in a useable form. As well as striving to obtain the full co-operation of the civil authority with whom they work, MIOs also act as advisors to them on military intelligence matters. MIOs are fully integrated members of an agency and are well placed to prepare for an expansion of the existing intelligence services, if necessitated by military operations.

Military Intelligence Liaison Officers

MILOs are military personnel who are attached to formations or units, for intelligence liaison duties with local civilian authorities, to provide the link between military commanders and the community in an AO. From this liaison they develop their own contacts and provide local military commanders with information and combat intelligence.

Previous Use of MIOs and MILOs

MIOs and MILOs have been used by the Australian Army for a number of years but little current doctrine exists on their employment. MIOs and MILOs were used by the Australian Army during operations in Malaya, Borneo, South Vietnam and Papua New Guinea. The last MIO employed overseas is believed to have been Major (then Captain) M. B. Cullen (RL) in Rabaul during the early 1970s.

Although previously employed overseas, the use of MIOs and MILOs within Australia is a relatively recent innovation. It is believed that the Australian Army has not used MIOs with the Federal or any State or Territory Police Force.

The use of MIOs and MILOs by other western armies is fairly widespread. Australian Army use of MIOs and MILOs has largely been based on British Army doctrine and experience. The British Army currently uses both on Operations in Northern Ireland and Belize and conducts regular training courses at the Defence Intelligence and Security School at Ashford, Kent. The Malaysian Army also uses MIOs and MILOs and the concept is used in various forms and under various names by the United States, Pakistan and Canada.

The Current Level of Australian Doctrine

Despite the apparent acceptance and use of MIOs and MILOs by the Australian Army, there is currently little doctrine existing on their employment. The Manual of Land Warfare (MLW) series briefly mentions MIOs and MILOs in a number of pamphlets. What little material there is concentrates on MILOs. In all pamphlets, writing on both subjects is shallow and only introduces the principle of their use. Basic information, such as their method of operation, command and control and reporting, has been omitted.
MLW One 3.1 Counter-Insurgency Operations states that:

'It may not be possible to accurately forecast the additional support which may be necessary, but consideration will need to be given to the overall requirement for . . . military intelligence officers to work in the headquarters of the (Police) Special Branch and military intelligence liaison officers for employment on intelligence liaison duties'.

MLW One 3.2 Aid to the Civil Power states that:

'. . . the intelligence staff must quickly establish close contact with the intelligence staffs of the civil authorities. A close working relationship can be facilitated by:

a. the collocation of the police and military intelligence staff, and
b. the appointment of military intelligence liaison officers'.

MLW One 3.3 Peacekeeping refers to 'Military Information Officers' who 'should be . . experienced and senior intelligence officers'.

The pamphlet states that:

'In cognizance of the impartial position which the UN (United Nations) strives for in peacekeeping operations the term 'information' is used in favour of 'intelligence'.'

Notably there is no mention of MIOs or MILOs in MLW Two 1.1 Intelligence General, MLW Two 1.3 Combat Intelligence or MLW Two 1.4 Counter Intelligence in War. The draft Training Information Bulletin Number 68 (TIB 68) Low-Level Operations refers to 'intelligence liaison' but does not expand further. Reference to intelligence liaison, MIOs and MILOs is not known to exist in any other current Australian Army doctrine.

Recent Increased Awareness For The Need for MILOs

Despite this current lack of doctrine, interest in the use of MILOs has recently been rekindled and steps taken to begin development of doctrine for their employment. For example the Priority Three Objective for Exercise K86 was: 'to practise and evaluate the effectiveness of the relationship between the Operational Deployment Force (ODF) and the civil authorities'.

The Joint Exercise Planning Staff Post Exercise Report (PXR) for Exercise K86 commented that: 'MILO were located at police stations throughout the Brigade AO and at Police Headquarters at Rockhampton' but there was no 'formulated source for the provision of ODF MILO'.

The PXR recommends that 'a source needs to be established for the provision of MILOs within the AO assigned to the LFC (Land Force Commander)'. Similarly the 3 Brigade PXR for Exercise K86 states:

'Exercise K86 emphasised the fact that low-level conflict is very much an intelligence war. Because of fleeting sightings of the enemy and often inaccurate information from a variety of civilian sources over a large AO, it is essential that the ODF Brigade quickly establishes a network of MILO working in close co-operation with the police and other civilian authorities'.

The report recommends that 'intelligence procedures for ODF low level operations (and particularly MILO procedures) should be developed'.

Aim

The aim of this article is to examine the employment of MIOs and MILOs for low-level operations in Australia.

Scope

This article will not seek to examine the legitimacy or otherwise of low level operations in Australia. This has been clearly stated in the Australian Government's Defence of Australia 1987 based on eminent opinion. It will not examine the appropriateness or otherwise of MIOs and MILOs being used offshore, except in Australian island territories, nor will it discuss the requirements for their training.

The article will examine the need for, and role, of MIOs and MILOs in Australia for low-level operations. It will then propose a concept for their employment including their organization and the information and intelligence flow from, and to, civilian agencies. The article is only concerned with their employment at the tactical and operational levels.

The Need for MIOs and MILOs

General

Jock Haswell in British Military Intelligence wrote:

'In almost every war a field intelligence system has been built up and brought to great efficiency only to be disbanded when the shooting stopped'.

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The same could be said of the Australian Army over the past few decades.

In conventional war, information about the enemy can be obtained by many different means ranging from a soldier in a ground observation post using binoculars to sophisticated airborne sensors and electronic intercept. Few of these sources have any direct physical contact with the enemy. In low-level operations sources and agencies using such methods will continue to provide valuable information but the most important source of operational intelligence is likely to be the local population and civil authorities. The 1st Division Intelligence Unit PXR for Exercise K86 stated that 'the use of MILOs in the exercise proved to be an outstanding success. The civil population provided a significant proportion of the information obtained on the enemy throughout the exercise'.

In any level of operation, if intelligence is to be of value it must be timely and accurate: this truism applies as equally to the need for background knowledge of an AO as it does to a current knowledge of enemy operations. The collection of basic information cannot be accelerated: all available intelligence relating to an AO should therefore be collected prior to the commencement of military operations and be constantly updated and expanded. The collection of information and its conversion into intelligence requires an efficient organization able to exploit all available sources and agencies to the full. This includes collecting local information by utilizing civilian sources and agencies. This will require close liaison, and some integration of military and civil agencies.

**Intelligence in Low-Level Operations**

In low-level operations the primacy of the civil authority is likely to be paramount and therefore a local population as a source will be outside the control of military commanders. The obtaining of local intelligence prior to, and during low-level conflict, however, will form the basis for successful military operations. It follows, therefore, that a system to utilize local information is required to be put into place by the military. By establishing an intelligence system in the form of field intelligence officers such as MIOs and MILOs the existing civil intelligence sources and agencies can be exploited with a detailed, systematic and economical collection plan.

A military intelligence system for low-level operations which uses field intelligence officers would have a corollary. An intimate knowledge of local civil capabilities to counter or contain a low-level threat would help prevent a disproportionate military response. This is important, as any premature military deployment or overreaction may risk the loss of any political initiative. It may be in the Australian Government's interests to portray a 'business as usual' approach as a military deployment may cause an apparent or real disruption of normality in a region. By deploying MIOs and MILOs only, a military intelligence system can begin at the operational level with no local interference or disruption.

When a military force has deployed to an AO, the role of civil authorities is unlikely to diminish and the need for field intelligence officers will continue.

**Areas of Operation**

The potentially large size of AOs for low-level operations highlights the need to utilize all available intelligence sources and agencies within an AO. The vastness of Australia and the paucity of infrastructure in many areas will require maximum use of the local population to acquire information. Whilst not overlooking the possibility that enemy activities may occur anywhere within Australia and her interests, the threat assessment indicates that it is most likely that such activities will be initiated in the remote regions of the far North of the continent, and on Australia's offshore islands and territories. Because operations will be based on the primacy of the civil authority, regardless of the location of low-level conflict, the key to achieving effective civil military relationships will be to institute systems of liaison at every level; from the local policeman, through tactical headquarters and regional centres, to Land Headquarters (LHQ) and State and Federal authorities. This would be best facilitated by the use of MIOs and MILOs.

**Summary**

Intelligence is the key to successful operations in any level of conflict. The provision of good operational intelligence in low-level conflict will be essential to the successful countering of a threat: without it much effort will be fruitless or wasted. A lack of timely and accurate op-
erational intelligence may lead to the premature deployment of military forces or a disproportionate military response.

At the tactical and operational levels there is a need to establish a field intelligence system within an AO to provide the intelligence required by a commander. Precedents for such a system based on MIOs and MILOs have been set by the Australian and overseas Armies at least as far back as Wellington’s Peninsula Campaign.

The potential size and remoteness of AOs, and the fact that the primacy of the civil authority will prevail, make it essential that an effective civil-military intelligence system is established both prior to, and during low-level operations.

A Concept of Operations for MIO

General

The interface between civil authorities and the military at the national and state or territory level will be determined by the Federal, State and Territory Governments in consultation with Headquarters Australian Defence Force. For low-level operations this may need augmenting and be expanded to include other civil agencies. For example, MIOs may be required to be employed with the Australian Federal Police because AFP have the responsibility of maintaining criminal intelligence records for all States and Territories and they liaise with overseas police forces through INTERPOL.

The employment of MIOs at the national level is beyond the scope of this article and will not be discussed further.

Security intelligence in Australia is the responsibility of ASIO which is the sole agency specified under Australian law (the ASIO Act) that has authority to collect and assess information about persons conducting sabotage, espionage and subversion. State and Territory Police Forces work closely with ASIO through their Special Branches (or their equivalent).

At a regional and local level the need for MIOs to work with ASIO and Special Branches for low-level operations will be important. Special Branch, or its equivalent, is based in each respective state or territory capital. Similarly, ASIO Regional Offices for each State and the Northern Territory are located in respective capitals. Local intelligence for these agencies is gathered by officers based in regional centres or by deploying officers for specific tasks. In the case of the police, detectives from the Criminal Investigation Branch in regional centres may be used for local Special Branch tasks.

Because ASIO Regional Offices and State or Territory Police Special Branches, or their equivalent, will be the principal civilian intelligence agencies able to gather operational intelligence on a low-level threat, MIOs should be attached to these organizations.

Regardless of the location of enemy activity, intelligence gathering by these agencies in each state will be controlled by their capital city head office and it would therefore be appropriate to locate MIOs at each. There may also be a need to deploy MIOs with these organizations in selected regional centres. For example, if enemy activity occurs within the Kimberley region it would be necessary to deploy approximately five MIOs as follows:

a. one each with ASIO Regional Offices in Perth and Darwin;
b. one each with Police Special Branch Offices in Perth and Darwin; and
c. one at the Police District Headquarters at Broome.

Method of Operation

MIOs conduct a liaison function but they are also intelligence analysts and provide military intelligence requirements to their agency. Unlike liaison officers, MIOs will require to be fully integrated into the agency with which they are working. This fact is the critical difference between MIOs and MILOs. If anything less than full integration occurs a MIO merely conducts the tasks that can be effectively achieved by increased Military District liaison or by a MILO. A close personal and working relationship between the MIO and his fellow Special Branch or ASIO officers must be carefully established if he/she is to be really effective.

In his post the MIO will be the subject to direction by the Head of Special Branch or the ASIO Regional Director, to whom he must give his allegiance. His employment as a Special Branch or ASIO officer will depend on local requirements, but he should try to achieve a position with access to all current intelligence, and to gain the confidence and trust of the local officers. He may be tasked for duties just as any other officer and would be expected to have, or to develop quickly, a thorough knowledge of his region, its population, infrastructure, subversive organizations and the enemy...
threat. This would be necessary in his daily work and would enable him to present the Military District Commander, or the commander of a force deployed within his region, with complete basic and current intelligence gained from his agencies resources.

An MIOs military responsibilities will include preparations for military operations in the AO, in particular the advising of his agency on the arrangements necessary to establish a Joint Intelligence Centre, if one is to be formed. MIOs will also be able to advise on the effect of military operations on his agency's operations in an area, and vice versa. This will be vital in ensuring the smooth functioning of police and ASIO intelligence gathering operations and prevent misunderstanding between those agencies and the military. In this regard a MIO is the interface for operational planning between his agency, the MD and LHQ.

The main role of a MIO will be as a military reporting officer to ensure that relevant intelligence reaches the Military District and tactical commanders in a timely and useable form. This means that, as well as being involved in the gathering of information as a member of the ASIO or Special Branch team, the MIO will be required to conduct initial processing, add his own comment, and then disseminate the intelligence obtained by way of military Intelligence Reports and Summaries, rather than in police or ASIO format.

It cannot be assumed that the Australian Government will immediately deploy military forces to deal with a low-level threat. Threats and incidents at a low-level and widely dispersed could continue intermittently more or less indefinitely. The cost, in both political and financial terms, of maintaining a military force in an AO, where little or no enemy activity is occurring, may be high. Therefore, until military forces are deployed, MIOs will provide detailed and accurate local assessments of the enemy threat.

An adversary's operations could be covert, disavowable and not demonstrably military. Individuals and groups within Australia may also be sympathetic to the enemy. Disaffected local groups, ethnic communities from the enemy country or groups with economic, cultural or ideological bonds may be examples. Agents of influence inserted to exploit and subvert such individuals and groups may be active. Saboteurs and reconnaissance parties posing as business

people and tourists may also be active within Australia prior to, and even during, low-level conflict.

Any government restriction on overt travel by enemy nationals into and within Australia may be politically and diplomatically unacceptable, thereby allowing small groups of the enemy relatively free access to operating areas. Until the Australian Government deems it appropriate to restrict such movement, enemy agents may be able to complete detailed preparations for hostile operations.

In response to such threats, ASIO and Police will target individuals and groups to neutralise or exploit them for intelligence purposes. This will require physical and technical surveillance operations, the establishment of agent and informer networks in ethnic communities, and the penetration, if possible, of sympathetic groups who support the enemy.

Operations such as these are routine for both Police and ASIO. However, due to limits on manpower and resources, and the fact that day to day operations relating to other security intelligence and criminal matters will have to continue regardless of the low-level threat, MIOs should be used as case officers for enemy operations within their agency. MIOs will therefore need to be familiar with, and practised in, the tradecraft skills employed by their agency.

Summary

Initially the main source of operational intelligence for low-level conflict will be State or Territory Police and ASIO Regional Offices. Once military operations begin, both these sources will continue to be important.

In order to obtain timely and useable intelligence for military commanders from these agencies, MIOs should be attached to each. This should occur at the ASIO Regional Offices and Police Special Branch Head Offices in appropriate state or territory capitals, and in appropriate regional centres.

MIOs should be fully integrated into the agency to which they are attached. As well as being able to gain an intimate knowledge of enemy operations for military reporting purposes, MIOs will augment the limited resources of their agency. Unlike liaison officers, who are under military control, MIOs will be directed by the Head of their agency. The scope of their employment goes beyond simple liaison duties. Because of their unique position within the
agency, they will be able to obtain an understanding of the capabilities of the agency and a working knowledge of the intelligence sources used. They act as military advisors within the organization, provide the military intelligence requirements and prepare for their agency’s cooperation with a Joint Intelligence Centre if one is established.

As military reporting offices, MILOs will translate Police and ASIO intelligence reports into a military format and ensure their timely receipt by military commanders.

**A Concept of Operations for MILOs**

**General**

Local authorities and residents in an area of low-level operations will probably not be displaced by enemy activities or military action and will therefore play an important role in intelligence gathering. Arguably, the best surveillance asset is the local population. Some civil agencies, such as police and customs, have an inherent surveillance capability and a communications network to support it.

MILOs will provide the link between a military commander and local intelligence sources and agencies. In addition to intelligence gathering tasks, MILOs must also be able to brief certain agencies they liaise with, particularly the police, on all information and intelligence carried forward from Military Headquarters. In other words, a MILO must not simply be a courier.

MILOs will normally precede units to a designated area of operations, effect liaison with MIOS and relevant civil authorities and, when operations are protracted, provide continuity of intelligence for commanders. Their employment should be at the discretion of the campaign (eg Land Commander Australia [LCAUST]) or operational (eg Brigade) commander and, unlike MIOS, they will not be subject to control by civil agencies in any way. One or more might, however, be placed with Special Branch or ASIO to supplement the work of MIO in the area, or to become an MIO if necessary where one did not exist before.

MLW One 3.2 *Aid to the Civil Power* states: ‘The early appointment of MILO to form the links with all civil authorities involved in the operation is essential to the smooth working of the intelligence system. Ideally, MILO should be intelligence trained and experienced officers who are known to the civil authorities and have had an opportunity to develop the close rapport with them that is essential for the free flow of sensitive information’. This is axiomatic.

**Method of Operation**

Once an AO has been identified and military operations are planned, MILOs should be deployed as soon as possible. Once this is done local authorities should be requested to establish a Civilian Intelligence Centre (CIVIC) as a focal point for the collection, collation and evaluation of information provided by local residents. The CIVIC normally should be based on the local police headquarters, or the Police Forward Command Post, and will be operated by the police, with assistance by other civilians as necessary. A public information campaign should be implemented to publicize the function, requirements, location and contact details of the CIVIC. Military representation on the CIVIC, as well as with other police stations and civilian agencies throughout the AO, will be by MILO. The senior MILO should be located at the CIVIC. During Exercise K86 a similar system to this was successfully used by 1st Division Intelligence Unit.

In addition to information gained through the CIVIC, the most important source of information within an AO will invariably be the state or territory police. As well as being the focal point for all civil reporting of incidents or suspected incidents, the police have good mobility and communications and regularly travel throughout their jurisdiction. As a minimum requirement, MILOs need to be located in police district headquarters. For example, if operations are being conducted in 7th Military District this would include such places as Jabiru, Katherine, Nhulunbuy, Kununurra and Broome. In addition, MILOs may be required to be located in, or at least maintain regular contact with, smaller police stations within a region.

Liaison must also be established with other civil organizations. Most other government departments will not normally be concerned with the collection of intelligence but since they maintain contact with the population through their work they can, with proper briefing, be most valuable sources of information. Other agencies with which MILOs will be required to establish liaison may include:

- *The State Regional Co-ordinator or his equivalent.* A state public servant whose
role is to facilitate economic and social development in a region and who liaises with individuals and Local, State and Federal Government agencies.

- **The Coastal Protection Unit Commander.** A Federal Policeman whose tasks include the co-ordination of coastal surveillance and protection. He maintains day to day contact with State Police and Federal departments and organizations including Defence, Customs, Fisheries, Quarantine, Coastwatch, Territories, Transport, Primary Industry and Art, Heritage and Environment. He maintains very comprehensive regional data files.

- **The Collector of Customs.** He has a very good knowledge of points of entry to his region including the less orthodox routes of access and egress. The Customs Intelligence System also maintains area data bases including geography, roads, airstrips, properties, suspect persons and activities. He also has a good communications system, which includes secure facsimile, and he shares intelligence with other agencies in his region.

- **The State Emergency Service Regional Co-ordinator.** He has an intimate knowledge of his region in terms of its inhabitants and the resources available in the event of an emergency of any type.

- **The Senior Surveillance Resources Officer.** He controls the Department of Transport Coastwatch operation in his region. His main tasks are quarantine control and search and rescue along the coastline, including offshore islands. All Coastwatch personnel have an intimate knowledge of the coastline of their region, traverse it regularly by air, and are well aware of any activity along or near the coast.

- **The Royal Flying Doctor Service.** This organization traverses its region regularly by air and conducts daily communication checks with stations throughout its region.

- **Civil Air and Road Transport Firms.** These organizations regularly traverse their region and operators generally have a very good knowledge of an area and its inhabitants.

The effectiveness of MILO operations will also depend heavily on regular and personal contact with individuals and groups in an AO. During Exercise K86 it was found that an information campaign through the media was not sufficient to alert a local population to the requirement to report suspicious incidents. This will probably also be the case in operations. MILOS must therefore spend considerable time establishing and maintaining liaison with local information sources such as shop owners, roadhouse operators, publicans and selected property owners.

The art of liaison can be a difficult one and takes time to establish successfully. Rather than attempting to duplicate the civil information network that is in place, which is unnecessary and impractical, MILOS need to continuously maintain selected liaison. The sooner MILOS are deployed to an area the better will be the liaison that is established.

Information received by MILOS will be diverse. Some may be bogus or generated due to overreaction. Other information could be valuable but may not be readily identified as such by a civil source or agency. The job of a MILO will therefore be basically twofold:

- the collection of all relevant information from diverse sources, and
- the evaluation and initial interpretation of the information.

The use of MILOS will facilitate the timely passage of information from civil agencies to military commanders. By waiting for a civil agency to pass information on its own reporting chain (if one exists), for a higher level of exchange, not only slows the passage of information but also removes it from the very area where corroborative information can be collected to evaluate and provide a more balanced picture. Source comment and MILO comment will also be important when the information is later processed.

At times, evaluation of information will be beyond the resources of MILOS. For example the 1st Division Intelligence Unit PXR for Exercise K86 stated:

'Often information required verification through surveillance operations. In the rural environment the ODF had the capability. In towns it requires specialist training beyond the scope of the ODF or the local police. Surveillance was generally needed against suspected safe houses, resupply points (ie local service stations), and against suspected ... sympathisers.'
When such situations arise, the need for close liaison between MLOs and MIOS, if both are operating within the same area, is evident.

MILO operations will only be successful if they have ready access to secure military communications, and the mobility necessary to operate. The passage of information should not be dependent on civilian means of communication and these should only be used as a backup. Depending on the number of MILOs deployed, a separate radio net may need to be established.

Relationship Between MILOs and Civil Affairs

'Civil affairs are those matters concerning the relationship between the military forces located in an area and the civil authorities and people in that area.' By definition, this should include military liaison with a civilian community for intelligence purposes. The intelligence process, however, should be kept separate from civil affairs as much as possible. Intelligence gathering may not be compatible with civil affairs tasks and there is a need to maintain the security of intelligence.

Because of the nature of the civil-military liaison that will occur during low-level operations, information of intelligence value will be passed to the Civil Affairs Unit (CAU) located in the area. This information cannot be ignored and it will therefore be necessary to attach one or more MILOs to the CAU to exploit this source. The CAU should not be responsible for the provision of its own MILOs and a distinction between intelligence liaison and civil affairs should be maintained.

Summary

MILOs provide the link between a military commander and local intelligence sources and agencies. They should be introduced into an AO as early as possible.

No attempt should be made to duplicate the civilian information and intelligence networks. Liaison is established with selected organizations and individuals and a CIVIC should be established to act as a focal point for information provided by the general public. The function, requirements, location and contact details of the CIVIC should be advertised.

The relationship between civil affairs and military intelligence should remain distinct. There is, however, a requirement to exploit any information of intelligence value obtained through civil affairs operations.

Concept of an MIO and MILO System

General

There is currently no organization to provide MIOs and MILOs in the Australian Army. During Exercise K86 1st Division Intelligence Unit was tasked to provide MILOs for the ODF Brigade and nine were deployed. Since then, a study has been undertaken to determine the feasibility of establishing a MILO section in that unit. Land Headquarters (LHQ) is also studying the requirement to establish MIO and MILO positions.

Logically MIOs and MILOs should be members of the Australian Intelligence Corps. There is, however, little reason for not using experienced and suitably trained personnel from other Corps, particularly in the role of MILO.

Proposed MIO Organization

During peace and war, Military District (MD) Headquarters carry out certain intelligence functions and attempt to establish good working relationships with state police and security agencies. Both during the period of tension leading to low-level conflict and during the conflict itself the day-to-day dealings with these agencies for routine matters will continue. In addition, the Military District Commander may be responsible for command of any military response within his district in the early stages of a low-level threat. Intelligence gained from these agencies will be needed by the Military District Commander to plan a response. It follows that any increased liaison, or working relationships, will best be achieved by building on those which already exist.

MIOs therefore should be provided by MD Headquarters. For this to occur MD intelligence staffs will have to be increased in those districts where a threat is likely to occur.

MIOs should be in place at the beginning of the period of tension leading to conflict. To establish the system, develop the operating procedures, and provide a pool of experienced personnel, MIOs should be deployed in selected MDs now. This would require an immediate increase to MD intelligence staffs but could be restricted to one MIO in 1 MD and one in 7 MD.
In 1 MD an MIO with the Queensland Police District Headquarters in Cairns could be given an additional role of liaison with selected civil authorities, such as the Coastal Patrol Unit. An MIO with the ASIO Regional Office in Darwin could be given the additional responsibility of liaison with the Northern Territory Police, Coastal Patrol Unit and other selected civil authorities. A further task in both locations could include working with the local Regional Force Surveillance Unit (RFSU) to train their personnel in intelligence related tasks.

The establishment of this small intelligence organization now will provide the military intelligence interface between Police and ASIO and the MD and Land Headquarters. This will also provide a static intelligence system for MILOs to link with when they are deployed.

**Proposed MILO Organization**

The role of 1 Intelligence Company, to provide intelligence support to 1st Division, lends itself to the establishment of a MILO section within that unit for use by the Division. The MILO role is also aligned to tasks currently allocated to the Counter Intelligence Section of the unit, so there is some expertise held in this area already.

The planned integration of 1 Intelligence Company and 1 Field Force Intelligence Unit may provide the necessary manpower for the establishment of a MILO section. The Officer Commanding 1 Intelligence company has stated that ‘With three brigade level activities each year, it would be possible to have about 30 (three x 10) Army Reserve (AREs) personnel attached for training as MILOs each year.’ Whether this would be sufficient to support operations is unknown and further study is required to determine this. A 30 strong MILO section, however, should provide a viable number of MILOs to support current levels of training and to form the basis of the MILO concept.

Additional MILOs, to those from 1 Intelligence Company, could be provided by brigades and by selected local AREs personnel from within an AO. The use of local AREs members would have the advantage of using people who already have a good knowledge of their region and who are likely to be known within the area. This would remove any difficulties that may be experienced by introducing ‘a bright young lad from down south out of the cold’.

**Information and Intelligence Flow**

As well as flowing upwards, form sources and agencies to military intelligence staffs, information and intelligence also needs to be sent downwards to ensure that civilian agencies are kept informed. For instance, a Police Forward Command Post (PFCP) should be briefed at least daily on friendly and enemy activities and intelligence requirements by the MILO responsible for liaison. In this way an exchange of information and intelligence occurs. The amount of intelligence downwards will be dependent on the type of agency to receive it and security requirements. The briefing of sources and agencies by MIOs and MILOs is an important aspect of their work.

MIOs and MILOs should be employed wherever information and intelligence can be exploited by them and the examples of sources and agencies in this article are not exclusive. The information and intelligence flow for MIOs and MILOs, showing representative sources and agencies, is at Annex B.

**Summary**

MIO should be provided by MD headquarters for low-level operations but this will require an increase in the MD intelligence staffs. In order to establish the concept and develop expertise, one MIO should be attached now to the ASIO Regional Office in Darwin and one should be attached now to the Queensland Police District Headquarters in Cairns. For both to be fully utilized, during periods of no threat they could be given the additional responsibility for liaison with selected local civil authorities and intelligence training of RFSUs.

The provision of MILOs could be from selected AREs personnel from within an AO, from within brigades and by establishing a MILO section in 1 Intelligence Company. The MILO section could be manned by AREs personnel once 1 Intelligence Company and 1 Field Force Intelligence Unit are integrated.

The information and intelligence flow is an exchange between military intelligence staffs and civil sources and agencies, via a MIO and MILO. This is an important function for both. In particular, MILOs are not merely couriers of information and like MIOs, they must be familiar with the enemy situation at all times and be able to brief on current and planned military operations.
Conclusions

Little current doctrine exists for the employment of MIOs and MILOs in the Australian Army, despite both being used intermittently for a number of years. Recently there has been an increased awareness for their need. This is a definite and legitimate need to enable military commanders to exploit all available operational and tactical intelligence prior to and during low-level operations. The primacy of the civil authority will remain paramount for low-level operations and it will be essential to establish an effective civil-military intelligence system.

A principal source of operational intelligence will be State and Territory Police and ASIO Regional Offices. The use of MIOs with these agencies will provide the interface between them and the MD Commander or LCAUST. MIOs need to be fully integrated to permit the full exploitation of intelligence obtained by these agencies. As well as providing a liaison function, MIOs need to be analysts and provide military intelligence requirements to their agency.

MDs should provide MIOs but to do so will require an increase in MD intelligence staffs. This should be done now in 1 MD and 7 MD by locating one MIO with the Queensland Police District Headquarters in Cairns and one with the ASIO Regional Office in Darwin.

MILOs provide the link between tactical and operational commanders and local civilian intelligence sources and agencies. They should be attached to formations and units allocated a tactical AO and be deployed as early as possible.

A source of MILOs needs to be established. One solution is to establish a MILO section in 1 Intelligence Company, use selected AReS personnel from within the AO, and use suitably trained personnel from brigades.

MILOs should not attempt to duplicate existing civilian information and intelligence networks. Instead, liaison should be established with selected sources and agencies and a CIVIC should be established to act as a focal point for information provided by the public. The function, location and contact details of the CIVIC should be advertised.

Civil affairs operations conducted in an AO will produce information of intelligence value and this should also be exploited. The relationship between civil affairs and military intelligence, however, should remain distinct.

Recommendations

With regard to the employment of MIOs and MILOs for low-level operations in Australia, the following recommendations are made:

- that the Australian Army seek the necessary Federal, State and Territory concurrency and develop appropriate doctrine and training;
- that 1 Intelligence Company be tasked to establish a MILO Section following the units integration with 1 Field Force Intelligence Unit, and
- that the 1 MD and 7 MD intelligence staffs be increased and that they be tasked, respectively, to deploy one MIO with the Queensland Police District Headquarters in Cairns and one MIO with the ASIO Regional Office in Darwin.

NOTES

2. This information was provided by Major N. F. James of the Australian Intelligence Corps.
3. From personal knowledge and from discussion with students from these countries at the Australian Command and Staff College.
8. The 3 Brigade Post Exercise Report for Exercise Kangaroo 86 strongly recommended that steps be taken to develop doctrine for the employment of MILOs.
10. ibid, page 10.
11. ibid, page G-11.
13. ibid, page 41.
15. Haswell, op cit, dustcover.
16. 1st Division Intelligence Unit Post Exercise Report for Exercise Kangaroo 86, page 3. This unit is now known as 1 Intelligence Company.
17. Training Information Bulletin Number 68 (Draft), op cit, paragraph 309.
18. Compared with conventional operations, the size of an AO for low-level operations will be large. For example, the AO for a battalion group on Exercise Kangaroo 83 was 50 000 square kilometres and on Exercise Overlord 85 the ODF Brigade AO was 115 000 square kilometres. This information was drawn from A Concept of Operations For The ODF Brigade, 1986, page 4. As the size of an AO increases so does the necessity to have an intelligence collection plan that exploits all available local sources and agencies.
19. Training Information Bulletin Number 68 (Draft), op cit, paragraph 303. As well as being large, AOs will tend to be remote, containing only a few main popu-
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I assumed command of my first platoon on a bleak March morning in Japan almost forty years ago but the memory is still quite fresh. The three platoons of the rifle company were drawn up on the company parade ground which was a stretch of white gravel between two double-storied barrack blocks at Hiro, about four miles east of the devastated port of Kure.

The CSM, who was of Chinese descent, handed over the parade to the OC — a captain in those days — who returned his salute with the left arm, the right being in plaster due to an accident. The OC then introduced we two new platoon commanders and I began the long trudge — or so it seemed — to the far end of the parade ground because my platoon was the highest numerically. Then followed a normal inspection.

Our small draft of officers had been in Japan only three days and that included a weekend and, as there had been no platoon commander before me for a number of months, I knew the names of the platoon sergeant and two section commanders and that was about all. However, over the weeks and months that were to follow I think I came to know more about those 30 men than their mothers (and fathers) every knew.

About one third of the Platoon were under the age of 20 and one third had seen service during the Second War including four who wore the Africa Star. (One of these a Torres Islander). Their Average age was 29. The remaining one third were in their very early twenties. (No one in our company had been a prisoner of war of the Japanese but there were a handful of them in other sub-units of the Battalion — e.g. the C of E Chaplain; the RC Chaplain who had been a parish priest in Japan pre-war and who was interned as a civilian and I recall an NCO in HQ Company who had been in the 8th Division).

An overwhelming number of the Platoon gave “Church of England” as their religion more, I think, from the ease of entering “C of E” than from deep conviction.

Cigarette smoking was the accepted thing those days. Cigarettes could be bought cheaply in messes and canteens. In addition there was an issue of two round tins of fifty, from the Nuffield Trust, each pay day. However, a surprising number of my young and not so young soldiers did not smoke — about one third in fact.

Only two men in the Platoon admitted to being married. Their wives were in Australia and I think all parties preferred it that way. While fraternisation was officially banned, it was quite clear that such an order could never be policed and so authority wisely turned a blind eye, so long as relationships remained reasonably discreet. Some platoon commanders, however, were startled, when the hot June and July months came, by requests for leave from earnest soldiers so they could, “shift the missus up to the summer house in the mountains”.

Regimental numbers showed what the Army was going through then. (All this information is not the product of a retentive memory but comes from a buff coloured “AA Book 65” which I labelled “Platoon Note Book” and which somehow survived twenty removals). 1/9005 and 5/238 were obviously ARA — the oblique stroke was to disappear a few years later. Then there were RASR and Interim Army numbers like VX 503110 and SP 27533. One NCO still retained his second AIF number — WX 4140.

Four men in my Platoon had the same surname but they were not differentiated by their regimental numbers as occurs in the Gurkhas or Welsh regiments but by their initials — AE, — WS, — WA, — RP.

I suppose it’s fair to say our soldiers were less educated than those of today or where have all the countless millions tossed into the learning mill gone? Certainly our men had less schooling. A quick thumb through the old Note Book shows “8th Grade Farmer”, “7th Class timber worker”, “6th Standard boot maker” and so it goes on, at the same level of schooling — shearer, labourer, clerk, galvaniser, carpet cleaner, railways, file maker, storeman, shop assistant, factory hand, process worker, cane cutter, french polisher. Only two men had sec-
ondary education and for both it was for just one year. But, for all, that, the men of the Platoon were just as quick and lively, inquisitive and adaptable as those I saw in the same numbered platoon of the same battalion on active service sixteen and then twenty years later.

The men I inspected that cold March morning were extremely well turned out thanks to the laundry and other facilities in our lines. They wore Second World War service dress (but not the pattern with patch pockets) and the regimental tailor saw to it that the fit was good. There was a metal “Australia” on each shoulder strap, and, on each shoulder, a gold LXVII, the battalion’s number, on a dark red background. The BCOF emblem was beneath the LXVII flash on the right sleeve only. A green lanyard was worn on the left shoulder. Buttons and the AMF collar badges were oxidised. Webbing was white as was the .303 rifle sling. Boots and bayonet scabbards were highly polished dark brown. A green, brown, green colour patch with a grey edge was worn on the right side of the puggaree and there was a polished brass AMF (“Rising Sun”) badge on the clipped up brim of the hat.

The Battalion was understrength — only about 25 officers and 530 other ranks, with a Battalion Headquarters, HQ Company and three rifle companies. One company was on guard duties in Tokyo, another on guard duties in Kure and in barracks and the third training. In the warmer months the training was at Haramura, in the hills about 20 miles to the north.

It was in this steady rhythm of regular changeover of duties that my Platoon, in my eyes anyway, grew into a tightly knit and happy group.

There were the platoon in attack exercises at Haramura, range practices, 2 inch mortar firing, grenade throwing, 20 mile route marches from Haramura to Hiro, changing of the guard on the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, many guards of honour, runs before breakfast, leaves at Kawana, concerts, military funerals, bed checks, education classes, cricket, football, swimming, twenty first birthday parties and the dozens of day-to-day activities of a battalion on occupation duties. All these had their part in the moulding of the Platoon.

There were other events that played their part — a tragic death of a 19 year old member and the subsequent funeral and general court martial and, on the other side of the regimental coin, a marriage of a section commander to a daughter of an Australian ASC staff sergeant.

One even learned something about his men at the mundane pay parade — how much the two star soldier on 16/5 ($1.64) a day was sending home to Australia, when his NOK changed and why, how much was he drawing. Those who drew very little pay were regarded with suspicion. Could they be getting all they needed on the black-market? (In the Battalion there was little, if any, black marketing at this stage of the Occupation though I have no doubt soap, cigarettes, sugar and a few other items changed hands in Hiro and Kure). Pay was in sterling paper money from one pound to three pence, known as “BAFS” (British Armed Forces Special Vouchers) and/or yen — 1080 yen to one pound sterling.

There were few movements in and out of the Platoon — an occasional reinforcement, hospitalisation (and a feeling of sorrow if he went to Special Wing), time expired men marching out for discharge in Australia, transfers to other elements of the Battalion. I soon had a new platoon sergeant transferred in — a very good one too — who had seen service in the Second War and who was to soldier on for a number of years. One soldier (born 18 December 1920, 7th Grade, station hand, enlisted 10 October 1941, C of E, served New Guinea) desperately wished to be a transport driver. After some months he was transferred to the Battalion’s transport section in HQ Company. About twelve months later he was killed when his Chevrolet 3 ton 4 x 4 was hit by machine gun fire and set alight.

The policy in the Battalion was to rotate subalterns through different postings after a few months — from rifle platoon commander to Pioneer Officer, Assistant Adjutant, Transport Officer, Intelligence Officer, ADC to the C-in-C, attachment to HQ BCOF — and so it was with a sorrow and I think resentment, I handed over to a classmate something which had become very precious to me.

We went to war next year and the classmate who took over from me was killed leading the Platoon in a battalion attack. As we advanced, attacked, defended and withdrew the casualties mounted in the old Platoon — injured on getting out of a vehicle, killed on patrol, shot through the head, wounded by a mine, frost bitten, gunshot wound chest and -----WS (born 26 June 1929, RC, mill hand, 6th Grade, NOK
mother, address ------, rifle number 221542, boots size 8, 5 feet 7 inches, weight 148 lb, Remarks: cheerful, talkative, gets drunk easily, inclined to be argumentative, somewhat raffish dresser, easily led wrong direction, bearing OK, needs watching) died of wounds to stomach accidently received.

Most of the news of the Platoon came second hand. Even in a compact battalion, one does not know much about what is happening in the company next door. But whenever I came across them, Siegfried Sassoons' "Twelve Months After" with its opening line of "Hullo! here's my platoon, the lot I had last year" would take on an extra meaning and there seemed really little difference between the men of the Royal Welch Fusiliers and an Australian Platoon more than a generation later.

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Introduction

THERE have been numerous stories written of the Australian Forces campaign in Malaya. Many were written by those who had first hand experience of the terror and bloodshed encountered by all Units that took part. Within these stories much has been made of the suffering and hardships encountered by our troops that were imprisoned at the hands of the Imperial Japanese Army. Names such as Changi Jail, Burma — Thailand Railway, Parit Sulong massacre to name but a few, are now part of our Military history.

There is a side to these stories which has, for a variety of reasons, not been highlighted and as such credit for this insight into the suffering and frustration of being a prisoner of war has not been given. This insight is by the use of poetry. What I have attempted to do is to place together fragmented poems written by members of the 2/29th Battalion whilst prisoners at the hands of the Japanese Army.

The innermost feelings of every prisoner is echoed in the preserved pages of a record kept by my father, Lt P. C. Simmons who was a Signals Officer with the 2/29th and endured the 3½ years as a prisoner in Changi Jail and on the Burma-Thailand Railway.

Profile of the Authors

In order for the reader to firstly understand and appreciate these poems, I feel it is only reasonable to outline the background of my father and several of the authors who composed these poems. What is to be expected is that none possessed any special talent or exceptional ability in anything specific, but rather they were ordinary citizens in a variety of occupations and came from (in most cases) a working class family.

In my father’s case, he was one of 5 children brought up in the working class area of Box Hill and within walking distance to the coal fired gas works where his father worked. As a young man, he showed early promise of a solid career as a clerk, and it is probably not surprising to note that my father’s career began in the Gas and Fuel Corporation as an accounts clerk. In order to improve his position he began accounting studies and there developed the art of recording information in a logical and ordered manner. This together with his easy flowing hand writing style, enabled him to record with clarity and precision the events that were to alter his life for ever.

The background of Lt. W. E. Smith (Bill) is somewhat of a contrast. Bill was the only son of a well to do furniture retailing family in the fashionable suburb of Brighton, Victoria. Bill attended Haileybury College and was Captain of the school in his final year. Rather than inherit his father’s business, Bill was told by his father that he had to earn the right to take over. He therefore became a travelling salesman and was becoming quite successful in the clothing trade at the outbreak of the War. Bill possessed (and still does) an irrepressible sense of humour, and could be summarized as an extrovert. My father and Bill met as members of the 2/29th.

Another author of merit was Pte L. (Lew) Kelly. Lew joined my father’s platoon following the battle of Muar Road, where a total of 13 Officers and 296 other ranks were killed. Lew was a contrast again, in that he was a dairy farmer from Redcliff, Queensland, and was older than my father and Bill. My father recalls that Lew was a quiet type, preferring to keep to himself, but expressing his thoughts in poetry. It is not known for certain whether Lew was a prolific writer of poetry before the war, but above all, his poems convey the feelings of many of the prisoners at that time. Sadly, Lew did not survive the ordeals of imprisonment, and died in Thailand in 1943.

Regrettably, I am unable to list all the authors or those that simply contributed a verse or two, as in many cases my father recorded the author as “anon”. This is understandable as many of these poems were written on scraps of virtually anything, and then transcribed by my father into his record book. With the passing of time and the fading of the memory, this is a sad testimony to the talents of many good men who never returned.
**Early Days at Changi Jail**

Early days of captivity in Changi Jail for my father and the members of his Battalion were spent toiling in the burning tropical sun building roads and unloading goods from the wharves. Although the work was back breaking, the monotony of each day is expressed in the following poem by Sig J. A. McQueen on 19th March, 1942.

"CHANGI"

A bugle call a whistle shrill
A task his duties to fulfil
Of waking up the boys until
That first parade at Changi.

The sunrise bright with tropic hue
The morning sky an azure blue
When he parades at Changi.

We wander out upon the grass
The roll is called — What a farce
Then maybe we'll go back and bash —
From that parade in Changi.

At half past nine that mess parade
A dish of rice the cook has made
We wish 'twas toast & marmalade
When we parade at Changi.

Our rice has sunk our stomachs tight
Four hours before another bite
And so we go to work alright.

We dig the garden — not so hot
Or maybe sink a hole a foot
Or carry great big logs of wood
And curse parades in Changi.

Each Sunday we attend the Church
Around the rubber trees we perch
And listen to the padre dirge
And wish we weren't in Changi.

But soon we hope we'll get away
Right back to Aussie — what a day
And all that food we'll put away
Three thousand miles from Changi.

Many attempts were made to describe the life in Changi Jail, some descriptions could be considered humorous, but mainly each description had the same theme — freedom — freedom from the endless hunger, the disease and the violence meted out by the Japanese guards. Another description is titled "The POW'S Day", written sometime in 1942, author unknown.

No doubt we were bunnies
To swallow all their talk
Of Yankies at Port Dickson
And Pommies air support.

They marched us out to Changi
The thousand men or more
The fallen by the roadside
Make us yearn no more for war

We’re planting beans by numbers
We’re sloping arms no more
We’re thru with bloody fighting
For Tojo topped the score

We live in shell torn barracks
Less water, roof and tile
The NCO's and pipers
Eat with the rank and file

Our clothes they are most scanty
Our trousers ripped & torn
We're bloody near as naked
As they day that we were born.

Our charpoys they have taken
We step on them no more
There's nought for us to do
But up on the floor

We rise at 7.30
And creep down to the tongs
We think of old Rexona
And hope it won't be long

We fall in at the A Parade
And answer to our names
Its stand at ease stand easy
Then the OC cries again

Tales of Jappie violence
Tales of Changi jail
A long trek thru the jungle
And God help those who fail

Next up we have our breakfast
Our appetites to sate
In single file we get it
Its rice upon our plate
Next we’re duty Coy
Its work to make us hard
Collecting meagre rations
Or sweeping up the yard

Our after lunch siesta
Is spent in many ways
With dreams of steak and onions
We knew in better days

We are wakened from our slumber
By a voice that’s loud & harsh
Come grab your dirty washing
And to the tongs we march

With shades of evening falling
There’s visits we must pay
To Dave & Bill & Harry
Who live across the way

There are pals from other Units
There’s mates we’ll never see
When we think of dear old Aussie
Their homes across the sea.

Lights out will soon be sounding
And though we all are broke
We know that one among us
Will have to “bite” a smoke

Homeward to our billets
We wind our weary way
To lie upon the concrete
So ends the prisoner’s day.

Monotony and boredom are ingredients for
a lowering of morale and a general air of despair.
The need to keep a soldier involved in constructive and purposeful activity is paramount.
This basic idea is one of the responsibilities we teach our NCOs and young Officers
today and never was it so true during my father’s Battalion.
This feeling changed as the weeks, months and years dragged by to despair, bitterness and finally submission
with the realization that escape was impossible and their lives were literally in their captors’ hands.

The priority now became not only to stay alive and keep others alive but also to ensure
that non work times (which were few and far between) were spent in some meaningful way.
Many social activities were organized, such as football matches, cricket matches, concert nights
and the endless lectures in anything from teaching shorthand to accounting and legal lectures.

Despite the never ending efforts of people like my father, despair and bitterness became
the “new enemy”. This feeling is expressed all to clearly in the following poem written by an
unknown author in 1942.

**Freedom For Liberty**

One day we found existence
Was becoming quite a bore
So on impulse made decision
To join the ruddy war
Yes we threw away our freedom
To join the bloody war.

So we sailed across the ocean
With open easy mind
Without the least commotion
Left civil life behind.

We landed in Malaya
Midst mosquitoes and the heat
And found that martial glory
Was falser than defeat
While we threw away our freedom
Learnt withdrawal for retreat.

We met the foe at Genios
And fought against the odds
But fortune was against us
Or was it Nippon’s Gods
Yes we threw away our freedom
To fight those “yellow Gods”

We had no air defences
No system in attack
Our leaders lost their senses
And they knew was falling back
We had no blasted ammo
And rarely rations in our pack

Yes we learnt the word withdrawal
For the lower word retreat
And we learnt it on our feet
And so we fled from Genios
Never mouthed the word defeat.

Has England’s code gone rotten
Behind traditions mask
Are Australians sons forgotten
That’s what I want to ask
Were we told before we landed
Was ours a fickle task.

We learnt the word surrender
Midst Singapore’s anguished cries
For we could not then defend her
From the dangers of the skies
We became the legal tender
Of the Japanese enterprises.

Whilst I believe that this poem expresses a
general feeling of bitterness but yet pride in the
determination and courage of the Australian
soldier, it is also equally true that a new type
of Australian humour which could only be written
by a soldier (with due respect to our other
Airmen and Sailors), now emerged. Some termino-
lology used in the following “parable” may
have since changed, however, the humour ex-
pressed in this passage, I hope never changes.

The Parable of the Kit Inspection

And it came to pass that there cometh one
which bore on his arm three stars, who spake;
saying;
“Bring into me Sergeant Major”.

And there cometh one which bore on his arm
a golden crown. Then he of the three stars saith
unto him of the golden crown;
“Tomorrow at the ninth hour, parade before
me a hundred men and all that is theirs”.

And he answered, saying,
“Lord it is done”.

And behold! On the morrow, at the ninth
hour, there did parade before him of the three
stars, an hundred men with all that they did
have, as had been promised him. Then cometh
others which bore on their arms two stars, and
yet others which bore one star. These were
called “Subs” which being translated from the
Latin meaneth “Small fry” or “Little pota-
toes”. Then he of the golden crown, standing
before the one hundred men, cried with a loud
voice, and did cause them to become as pillars
of stone.

And behold, there cometh one which was
called “Quartermaster”. This man held great
power, for he belonged to that tribe which said;
“These men must purchase from us”.
Thus did they wax fat in the land! And, passing
amongst the one hundred men he did say unto
this man and that man;
“Where is this thing”
and
“Where is that thing”.

And they all had, save one which was called
“Spudus Murphy”, and he lacked. Then he
that was called Quartermaster saith unto him;
“Friend, where are thy drawers woollen, long,
and thy boots, ankle, pair of one?”

And Spudus Murphy answered saying;
“Lord, on the third day of the week I did thirst
and had not the wherewithal to satisfy my thirst,
for I had not received my reward. And I did
take my drawers, woollen, long, and my boots,
ankle, pair of one, unto mine uncle of the tribe
of “Love”, and did say into him; “How many
pieces of silver for these things?” And he saith
unto me, “Seven”. And I said unto him;
“Give to me that I may thirst not”. And he
did trade with me. Then did I take the pieces
of silver unto the abode of him that sold wine,
and did say unto him;
“Give me to drink that I may thirst not.” And
he gave and I knew no more until the fourth
day of the week”.

Then he of the three stars waxed exceeding
wrath, and, calling two men, he placed one to
the east, and one to the west of Spudus Murphy
and, turning sharply on his left heel and right
toe, he was led away and cast unto prison.

And on the morrow, he was brought before
one which bore on his arm a crown and a star,
showing him to be above all men! This man
was called CO, which, being freely translated,
meanoth; “Putter up of the wind”. And he
saith unto Spudus Murphy;
“What are these things that I hear concerning
thee? Sayest thou aught?”

Then Spudus Murphy related to him how that
he had exchanged his drawers, woollen, long
and his boots, ankle, pair of one, for silver,
and silver for wine. Then he that was called
CO, waxed exceeding wrath and his anger was kindled against Spudus Murphy, and he saith unto him;

"Why hast thou broken the laws which I have made? Knowest not that thou hast sinned? Now, because thou hast done this thing thou shalt be punished. Twenty and eight days shalt thou labour."

Then was Spudus Murphy led away and was cast into a place where he would hear the tick of the clock, but could not tell the passage of time. And the name of that place was "The House of Glass". And he was in that place twenty and eight days.

So, my friends, be not as the one, but rather as the ninety and nine. Where thou thirsteth and hast not the wherewithal to satisfy thy thirst, wait until the day of reward; then shall the joy be increased a thousand fold.

And now may the blessing of that great Saint, the Regimental Paymaster, be amonst you, now and always.

**The Work Parties-Singapore**

Within days of capitulation, the Japanese were using members of my father's battalion as work parties. Much of the work comprised of building roads and airfields to assist the Japanese Army in its further conquests. In addition, because of the severe damage caused by Japanese bombers and artillery, the water supply and sanitary works within Singapore were non existent. Unless immediate steps were taken, disease and sickness would claim more lives than the Japanese caused.

My father's Battalion were assigned the task of repairing and rebuilding the water supply and sanitary plant. In addition the Battalion was involved in repairing the damaged wharves and unloading war supplies. All the time under the screaming and ranting of the Japanese guards who believed that beating and screaming at a helpless prisoner made him work faster. This soon took its toll as the numbers reporting for work each day soon dropped, so that out of a work party which my father was with dropped from six Officers and 150 OR's to three Officers and 100 OR's after only 3 weeks.

Despite the sickness, beatings and back breaking work, the Australian sense of humour still prevailed and the belief that this torment would not last. Even as early as 1942, thoughts of going home once the war was won were foremost in the minds of all members of my father's Battalion. The following poem by Lt W. E. Smith, written whilst part of a work party on road construction in the Caldecott Hill Estate typifies the feeling of all members of my father's Battalion:

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"Smoke O"

Smoke O' The welcome cry rings out
Along the toilin ranks of weary men
From mouth to mouth along it goes
An' every man is on 'is toes
To rest a 'wile an 'ave a blow
An' be 'is own sweet master once again — Smoke O'

Smoke O' Oo's smoulderin' someone ask
An' then "This boong terbacco's flamin' foul"
Giton 'im will yer, says 'is mate
E' knows the stuff's just second rate
An' strong enough to seal 'is fate
An' yet the stupid blighter's on the growl — Smoke O'

Smoke O' Ah that's the 'appy time
When all our thoughts is able for to roam
Then memory a riot runs
An' every jungle tree becomes
Filled with the scent of pines an' of gums
And we are back in dear ol' 'ome sweet 'ome — Smoke O'

Smoke O' When I gits back again
I'll never start complainin' at me meals
The missus'll taste divine
An' rice an' stew? No more for mine!
An' am I goin' to treat her fine
I'll buy 'er 'eaps of coats of mink or seals — Smoke O'

Smoke O' I'll take 'er for a trip
An' spend the lazy days beside some stream
Away from all the toil an' strife
An' bustle of this modern life
I'll make 'er 'appy she's me wife
When I puts into practise what I dream — Smoke O'
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Smoke O’ With care free ‘eart an’ mind
We’ll ’ave a bonzer time an’ live in clover
Lawn on a sparklin’ summer day
Bell birds up Fern Tree Gully way
An’ sandy beaches by the day
Wacko! What! Ah the’re shoutin’ Smoke O’s over
Smoke O’. ‘Ow are yer!

In addition to the work parties involved in road repairs, sanitary works and water supply restoration, several groups were transferred to the “Great World”, which prior to capitulation had been an amusement park. Here accommodation and communal kitchens were established, together with a hospital for the growing numbers of sick and injured. The allocation of work parties to the never ending list of tasks to be performed was controlled by the Bn H.Q. staff, who quickly realized that some work areas were more arduous than others. Therefore, by rotating work duties, the burden of the heaviest work was shared equally amongst the prisoners.

In other areas of the City, work parties were assigned the task of rebuilding several of the business houses. One of these business houses created a great deal of interest from the work party involved, in that the Japanese required a “comfort station” to be built, or more commonly known as a brothel. As a reward for constructing this establishment, the work party involved were given a ration of beer, but were not invited to sample the wares inside the building.

Amid the hectic re-building and repair work being undertaken, my father witnessed what could only be a contradiction in terms, as the Japanese systematically stripped Singapore of electrical wiring, brass, steel and any other metal that could be recovered. All these materials were then shipped back to Japan to be melted down and used to further fuel the Japanese war machine. A great number of prisoners were used to load this “booty” into the holds of Japanese cargo ships, and the disdain for this task is echoed in the following poem.

We’re working for the Army
And the Nippon’s word is law
Our rations are our wages
Much to be thankful for
Yes we work for Tojo’s Army
For we’re prisoners of war

Oh often times I wonder
Who sets the bloody stage
For war the wide world over
In this deemed wise Christian age
I fear there’s been a blunder
When ‘tis said the world is sage

And what will be the outcome
Of all these ruthless wars
Wholesale waste of useful commerce
And mortals for the cause
Shall we throw away our freedom
For the differences in law

Although I am disgusted
At the worlds hypocrisy
My only foolish worry
Is why the hell did we
Throw away our worthwhile freedom
For the sake of liberty.

Part of the indignation of being a prisoner at the hands of the Japanese Army were the parades through Singapore itself. Here the prisoners were not only subjected to the endless tirades by their guards but also by the silent faces of the remaining civilians. These parades had one saving grace, the opportunity to trade. A black market flourished in the stalls and roadside shops that still stood, and members of my father’s Battalion took full opportunity to buy small comforts to ease the never ending hunger pains.

It is difficult to imagine that day to day comforts we enjoy and take for granted were often gained by the prisoners at the risk of their own life. The following poem by Pte L. Kelly describes the trading by members of my father’s Battalion and the sights and smells of Singapore during the early days of capture.

To Singapore
Reveille blew at five o’clock upon the fifth day of May
The twenty-ninth were lining up for their ten cents a day
With eagerness they packed their kits and rolled their blankets neat
Twas evident that none had time to sit upon their seat
The morning meal was rather tight for travel on the road. Consisting of a plate of stew, a not too heavy load. Before the march all fall in line, some looking almost thin. Each then received two biscuits each second man a tin.

This tin without a label weighed at the most a pound in all. Inside pineapple chunks and juice all riding for a fall. This iron ration issue which looked more like dessert was carried with the water bottle all slung at the alert.

And all along the road to town in threes they marched along. The pace was almost hot at first the step was often wrong. A guide of Nippon walked in front to show the way to go. The twenty-ninth streamed on behind, the rice made the going slow.

Through villages they swing along, the sun was burning hot. The polished rice of early morn had shrunk to quite a spot. A call to halt came down the ranks, it was the guides command. Then all sat down beneath the shade, not many cared to stand.

The bungs arrived to do some trade, but business was not brisk. The twenty-ninth held bankrupt stock and buying was a risk. But some financial wizards to the envy of the rest. Bought smokes of various pedigrees, the cheapest weren’t the best.

The smell of weed upon the air, vied with the village stinks. The smoke ascended from the rich, the poor had forty winks. The minutes passed thus pleasantly until the order came. To carry on the Singapore, the guide copt all the blame.

Familiar brands of food in nature shops soon caught all eyes. The 29th were filled with joy, could scarce repress their sight. Then later as they approached the lawn, they stopped to eat. Their weight then automatically was taken off their feet.

Now this is why to this very day, pineapple reigns. Among the 29th as physic for most marching pains. But now this were for them to turn to Caldecott Hill Estate. The destination of their regiment, the hour is late.

Lavender Street they traversed fast, for they had heard pre-war. That it was strictly out of bounds, besides they’d been before. Twas there a convoy picked them up, by courtesy of Tojo. And bore them off to Thompson Rd as fast as they could go.

Arriving with no accidents the parties disembarked. And taking up their quarters soon had their bodies packed. Away from high authority away from prying eyes. To rest in peace and dream of food, away from Changi’s flies.

The Caldecott Hill Estate referred to by Pte Kelly, was mainly a European housing estate prior to the war, but was taken over by the Japanese and used as a staging camp for work parties involved in road construction. There were a number of English troops and the Australians consisting of men from the 2/30th Battalion, 2/29th Battalion, A.A.S.C., 2/4th M.G. Battalion and R.A.E., all told, approximately 900 men and under command of the CO of the 2/30th Battalion, LTCOL “Black Jack” Galleghan. It was from this estate camp that the men were told they were to build a road through “light jungle” around the MacRitchie Reservoir and Golf Links. For 12 days my father’s Battalion laboured and toiled in the jungle, clearing a path through and forming the road. The
general feeling of the men is expressed in the following poem by Lt W. E. Smith, written in the Caldecott Estate on the 4th July, 1942.

On The Road
A tropic sun is pourin' from a sky of azure blue
The jungle's stirred by not a breath of air
An' a thousand tanned Australians backs are bent in 'eavy toil
For our life as prisoners is full of care
An' worry for road makin' aint the best at any time
Let alone the stiflin' swelter of a lousy tropic clime.

An' we're sweatin' an' we're swingin' an' we're swearin' our luck
An' the chindle of the chungkol beats the time
An' we're diggin' an' we're mettalin' an' we're tearin' out the trees
Till our red-rimmed eyes are full of grit an' grime
But in spite us all we gotta do, we never give up hope
The yella bloke'll 'ang 'imself if we give 'im the rope.

Yes we're workin' on the roadway for the little yellow boss
An' I'm tellin' yer it's blasted 'ard to take
Oo'd a thought when we arrived 'ere that we'd ever suffer loss
Or that every bleeding soldiers' 'eart would break
But after all its part o' life, an' life 'as ups an' downs
An' fortune mostly smiles on us altho' she sometimes frowns.

So we're sweatin' an' we're swingin' but we're singin' as we work
An' then some 'ard case cracks a flamin' joke
An' then theres 'eaps of grand attraction in the cove wot's been in action
'E's a man that's proved 'imself a reg'lar bloke
When I think ov' the AIF, I'm glad I'm in the crowd
We're brothers an' Australians, an' we've done our country proud.

In reading this poem it summarises the qualities of the Australian soldier — determination, a unique sense of humour and a belief in his cause. It is also not surprising that the poem conveys another emotion — revenge — revenge for the deaths of many of my father's comrades and the chance to strike back at the Japanese wherever and whenever possible.

This resolve to “settle the score” could not be vented by direct action from the prisoners, for without weapons and a place for sanctuary the odds were overwhelming. The only way to strike back seemed (for some) through their own poems and songs. It is also not surprising that the anger of the prisoners was not only directed at their captors, but also at the Superiors in Australia which many of the prisoners considered had deserted them in their hour of need. This feeling of despair and disbelief is understandable in view of the intelligence reports which indicated an inferior enemy, poorly equipped and trained. Whereas in reality, most of the Japanese forces were fresh from the conquests in China and had perfected their battle procedure whilst the Allied forces were only exercising those similar skills in a controlled “safe” environment.

As time passed for the prisoners the opportunity to examine the conduct of the whole Malayan operation began to produce not only bitter recriminations in the form of open discussion and debate but also from the pen of the following anonymous poet:

"The Battle of Johore"
There's a strip of rubber country
To the North of Singapore
To the diggers t'was a death trap
On the map it's called Johore
T'was there against tremendous odds
The boys put on a show
That was equal to the Anzacs
At Gallipoli long ago

But those on the ground can never fight
The horrors of the sky
Without air support you just lie still
And wait on death and die

Face to face odds matter not
For the diggers love a scrap
But when the sky is full of planes
And every one a Jap

It makes you wonder was it a dream
Or in the paper you read
Air support will soon arrive
Production goes ahead

There's strip of rubber country
That some day we'll retake
For that is all He'll ask of us
The chap who was our create

Then we'll hand Malaya over
And with it goes Johore
And we'll pray to God we're never called
To defend it any more.

1942, Anon.

I have mentioned previously the physical abuse and subhuman conditions that my father and members of his Battalion suffered. However, the mental anguish of not only realizing the utter hopelessness of their plight, but of what news had been sent to each prisoner's family back in Australia. It became painfully obvious very early in my father's capture that the Japanese had no intention of allowing news of what was really going on to filter back to Australia and other Allied countries. Despite pleas from the Officers in my father's Battalion, no letters were permitted, only two lines on a post card twice in the first two years of their capture. Similarly, incoming mail was over a year old, and only served to aggravate the bitterness and desperation, as at this stage my father's family had only a vague idea where he was, or what had happened to him.

This worry is expressed by Pte Jones of the 2/30th Battalion whilst a POW in Changi Jail in 1942:

My Prayer
A silver haired old lady, kneels in silent prayer
Praying for her soldier son, to be kept in
God's good care
Where can my soldier son be, did he fall
'neath foeman's glave
Oh tell me does he live dear God, or sleep
in some shallow grave

Each day she sees the postman go wheeling
past the gate
She's hoping for a letter before it is too late
But unable to break the silence after dodging
death's hungry maw
In Changi camp exists her son, a prisoner of
war

He fought with a thousand others, from Ge-
mas to Singapore
He heard the Arty's whistle and Jap dive
bombers roar
But we were far outnumbered, so we had to
lay down arms
We were either sold a woolly pup, or the
heads had well greased palms

But what ever was the reason, we earned no
disgrace
We won't slink round corners, but will look
men square in the face
So mother mine take comfort and may God
hear your prayer
But most of all may He hear mine, and keep
your safe over there.

Another approach to the bitterness and disbelief of capture is treated almost flippantly by the following author who preferred to remain anonymous.

The Game a Gig
In July 1940 at Caulfield I camped
Twas at the racecourse that many 'fus
tramped
I met many soldiers, some small and some
big
I didn't know then that the game was a gig

Soon I entrained for Shepparton town
In the heat and the dust I got very brown
I learnt many things taught in the Army
I found out what gig meant, I know it's balmy
Four long weary months I spent in that part
Then comes the order I’m about to depart
Bonegilla’s the place, it’s final I bet
Is it a gig? I can’t fathom it yet

At last comes the news I’m about to go
Done lots of work and drawn many pays
But since I have learnt slit trenches to dig
I realize now that the game is a gig

I got quite a shock one day at the camp
I’m going away, some strange country to tramp
I’ve got pre — em leave after waiting a year
The games not a gig that calls for a cheer

I travelled Malaya for quite half a year
Saw a few sights, kept off the beer
I’m a prisoner of war and I’d like to shout
The game is a gig at last I’ve found out.

Feed The Mind, Not Just The Body
As I have mentioned earlier, in order to maintain morale and provide a distraction from the hunger and fatigue, many lectures and discussion groups were formed within Changi Jail. My father in fact became quite accomplished at shorthand, and also attended many lectures on accounting and law, (he was commencing his Accounting Degree when War was declared). Several lectures in particular are well documented by my father, and these were the reasons for the defeat of the Australian Forces in Malaya.

The following passage is from one of these lectures, and in fairness to the lecturer, it should be borne in mind that this lecture was delivered in 1942 and not at the end of the War, when more information and facts were known. However, his appreciation of the situation, and conclusion was very close to the end result.

“Strategical Appreciation by Command, July 1941”

- Although Japs had entered Indo-China and had started a program of aerodrome modernization and construction, it would take them approximately 6 months to become properly established.
- No Army would attempt to land on East Coast during the NE monsoon which blew until March.
- RAF could sink 40% of any convoy landing troops anywhere in Malaya. RAF was relying on Dutch assistance.
- Although America had signified it’s intention not to become embroiled in Malayan waters, command did not consider it necessary for any Naval Forces to be available, except for a few escort vessels.
- NE Indies stood or fell with us.

(NE: In Wavell’s opinion, Burma under Brooke-Popham’s non executive command was even in a worse state than Malaya, and in consequence it was taken back under his Indian command, and “I have often been given babies to hold, but never quadruplets before”.)

“Reasons for Defeat”

Some of the strategical reasons have already been mentioned. Japs had advantage of the initiative and command of the air. Our HQ estimate of the strength of the Japs that could be brought against us was 4 Divisions, and they did not think an attack on Burma could be carried out simultaneously, (1 Div of those available was not used and was later sent to Java).

As it was inevitable that the Japs would nibble at the West coast, serviceable ships should never have been left at Penang.

The political situation in Japan was stronger than a Dictatorship. The Army and Navy Ministers were serving men in their services, and if they disagreed with the Cabinet on matters affecting their sphere the Cabinet automatically fell. The Japs had reached the peak of their mobilization of 75 Divisions, but there were 25,000 wage earners coming into the market annually.

They employed surprise well and their secrets were well kept. Their fighter aircraft were faster than our Buffaloes and their bombers were very fast too. Their bomb sights were more accurate than anything we had experienced in the Middle East.

They had revealed none of their secrets in China, and their armour piercing bullets were a surprise.

They had the advantage of similarity of appearance with the Malayans and natives of the country.

They had their nationals well planted all over the country during peace time as barbers, fish-
ermen, photographers etc., and many of these men were staff officers.

Greater detail had been put into this campaign than any other.

Their engineers had been almost miraculous as regard speed. They had studied jungle warfare with greater thoroughness and their scouts excelled themselves.

Their junior Officers had been trained in the campaign against China. All ranks were full of the spirit of self sacrifice for their country and took hard knocks without flinching.

We suffered from lack of preparation, were far from home and when put to the test, had very inadequate forces. We had not received the planes, tanks, and men asked for, but in this connection no particular blame attaches itself to the then present Government.

If blame is to be allotted, it should be placed to the tranquil tenderness of the British people as a whole.

It would have been better if Malaya had been mobilized for war earlier instead of for 100% production of tin and rubber.

Large labour forces could have been used over a period of months, but were not provided.

The speaker did not deny however that we had made many technical errors. He concluded with the remark that if the American estimate of Jap losses were true, then the Japs would very soon have cause to regret they have undertaken conquests so far from home, and hoped that he and all present would have the opportunity of assisting in the comeback.

Following the above lecture, a great deal of discussion and questions were asked by those who attended. My father recorded several questions and the answers, which I believe are worth repeating here:

Q. “How many casualties did the Japs suffer in the campaign?”
A. “They admit 4,000 but it is open to individual opinion”.

Q. “What was the extent of European 5th column activity?”
A. “There were two possible cases, one at Jitra and the other at Bukit Mitagon. There was no doubt there was a first class organization among the Malaysians and to a lesser extent among the Chinese”.

Q. “Jap air tactics”
A. “They nightly by starting concentration on RAF establishments, but after Jan 18 they started attacking troops with Stuka dive bombers. They had great assistance from the ground, and every HQ was pin pointed. We ourselves had not received an item of tactical information from the RAF”

Q. “Why had not the defences been prepared on N coast of Singapore Island?”
A. “They had been considered in council but it was decided that any action would have had a bad effect on public morale. In addition, Singapore was not a fortress, never had been, and was undefendable as such. We doubted the wisdom of having a Naval base in the main getaway. Perhaps a ring of islands fortified against any bomb or shell or possibly the fortification of Changi would have been better.”

Q. “What was the effect of the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse?”
A. “We had never counted on a fleet being available in Malayan waters. A fleet of submarines would have been better.”

It is now interesting to consider some of the answers that were given, especially in respect to Singapore Island. Records show that Prime Minister Churchill had assured his fellow Ministers and Prime Minister Menzies and later Prime Minister Curtin, that Singapore was in fact a fortress and could be defended. More importantly, could not nor would not fall into Japanese hands. It is clear that Churchill considered only a sea borne invasion in view of the positioning of the heavy artillery, and disposition of Naval vessels at that time. This appreciation must surely rate as one of the most disastrous made at a time when the Australian Government, whilst demanding to have a say in the strategical employment of our forces, relied to a large degree on intelligence and advice from the Churchill Government.

Another disturbing aspect of the Malayan campaign is the loss of air superiority by the RAF. Again the experience and technology of the Japanese Air Force were far greater than the fledgeling RAF. My father noted that on Dec. 29, 1941, 50 Hurricane fighters and 12 inexperienced pilots arrived in Singapore. In just 10 days, only 25 of our fighters remained. The effect on the morale of our ground troops was disastrous, and was not forgotten by the following author of a poem titled “Uncle Sam”.

It did not take a General to conclude that Churchill, the RAF and the American Government had contributed to their present situation:
"UNCLE SAM"
We came to Malaya to hold Singapore
We had nothing to fight with and nothing in shore
But were we downhearted, we cared not a damn
Cause Churchill had fixed with our Uncle Sam

The enemy landed at Kota Bahru
The Chiefs scratched their heads, and said, "what's to do"
We'd smash up their troopships as fast as we can
Just as Churchill had fixed it with our Uncle Sam

We'd fight them on land and we'd fight them at sea
Prince of Wales steamed northward to find the enemy
But enemy planes sent her down to the sand
Just as Churchill had fixed it with our Uncle Sam

Then we withdrew to Penang Island fort
Once again with our trousers down we were caught
We had not a plane nor a gun we could man
Just as Churchill had fixed it with our Uncle Sam

We met them at Ipoh we'd fight there like hell
Next night we were ordered withdraw to Kuala Lumpur
But we didn't worry we still had our plan
For Churchill had fixed it with our Uncle Sam

The Infantry met them at Gemas Johore
We killed off 3000, it might have been more
But go south young men, were orders that came
Just as Churchill had fixed it with our Uncle Sam

And Singapore Island called come here and fight
Three Hurricane planes were a wonderful sight
But these were shot down by enemy planes
Just as Churchill had fixed it with our Uncle Sam

And now we are prisoners on ten cents a day
We work bloody hard and don't get much pay
But we still get our comforts, our smokes, and our jam
Just as Churchill had fixed it with our Uncle Sam

It is opportune now to pause for one moment and examine briefly the events that led to the defence and ultimate surrender of Singapore Island, as experienced by my father. Although my father wrote this report almost 12 months after capitulation, he expresses his own fears and anxieties of being separated from his Battalion and the realization that his fighting day were numbered.

25th Jan., 1942: 2/29th Bn reformed at GBD Johore Bahru.
Bn moved to Island.

29th Jan., 1942: Bn in position at Kranji Oil Wells.

31st Jan., 1942: Mainland now completely in enemy hands.

7th Feb., 1942: Enemy landed on NW coast.

8th Feb., 1942: Orders received at 0200 hrs to move to Tengah aerodrome. Sig truck bogged in C Coy lines. Went to find BHQ, on return truck had been pushed out, and was on hill near cross roads.
Ran out lines to A B C Coys. RA line connected to board. Approx. 1200 hrs Bn ordered to withdraw. Moved out in heavy rain to a position on side of a hill 1½ miles from aerodrome. Located an ASC dump of food, just on darkness. No lines laid, runners being used to Coys.

9th Feb., 1942: Bn withdrew from this position, and moved along road to 11 milestone. Bn spread out B C Coy in front. Sigs took up position to cover withdrawal of B Coy, but never saw them. Some Argyles came through and said they were the last troops in front of us.
No orders came, so we withdrew across road and reported to Argyles CO. and withdrew with them along road toward Bukit Timah road.
Major Hore wounded here. Capt Bowring took over. (Author's note: Maj Hore was OC D Coy and Capt Bowring later to win an MC was OC C Coy).
We passed through Bukit Panjang village and could not locate 2/29th Bn so decided
to head toward Bukit Timah. A DR then came up and told us to report to Holland Road where Bn was being reformed. On reaching Bukit Timah, MP’s gave us trucks and they dropped us at Anzac Club. I reported to an Officer in charge at Anzac Club, telling him of my orders to go to Holland Road, but driver of our truck was instructed to report to GBD on Island Golf Links. We arrived there about 1800hrs. Changed our clothes and had a meal at B Coy GBD. Same night B Coy moved to GBD HQ for security, and on the morning of the 10th returned to their own positions.

10th Feb., 1942: I asked repeatedly to get transport back to Unit, but met with no success, so decided to march. Had our names marched out of records at GBD, and commenced the march to find Unit. English MP gave us a truck, and we again arrived at Anzac Club and this time were taken, after hectic drive, to Botanical Gardens where 8 Div Sigs were. Orders from them were to report to 22 Bde HQ, and we took trucks under command of Lt Ellurman, and arrived at 22 Bde HQ. D Coy 2/29 had also reported at the same time to 22 Bde HQ, and I was given a PI in the Coy, making a 4 PI Coy, OC was Capt Salier. Approx. 1800 hrs went into position on railway line (Hill 200) with 2/4 MG on left flank and Gordons on right flank. Approx. 0100hrs, Lt. Metcalfe reported that I was to report to 22 Bde HQ and act as liason Officer for 2/29, he himself taking over my PI.

11th Feb., 1942: Tried three times to locate D Coy, but couldn’t find them. They had moved out during the night or early morning. I reported to Bde HQ, and was then told to wait for further orders. Had a rest during morning, and meal; but no orders came. On enquiry, I was told to attach myself to a platoon for defence of Bde HQ for the night. We moved into position on railway at rear of Bde HQ. We withdrew from this position and was attached to 2/18 Bn at approx. 0530hrs. (Sgt Mason of C Coy, now Lt) was there with some 2/29 men.

12th Feb., 1942: At approx. 0700hrs we heard from a Div Sig that the 2/29th were only about 1 mile away, and so we got permission to set out and find them. After marching about 3 miles we located them in a large house. I reported to Capt Johnson at Bn HQ and gathered what sigs were left and ran lines to A B and C Coys, and then took over part of the perimeter for the night.

13th Feb., 1942: Moved from this house to another one about 500 yards away. Sig truck turned up, and then gathered remainder of sigs and ran more line.

What transpired between the 14th Feb., and 15th Feb., 1942 has not been recorded by my father, nor was the fact that the only reason my father made a passing comment as to changing houses on the 13th Feb., 1942, was that the house he and his sig PI occupied was under attack by the Japanese from the air. My father and his PI evacuated the house just before it received a direct hit from a Japanese bomber.

The actual siege of Singapore Island began on the 1st Feb., 1942. The Japanese only took 6 minutes to cross from the mainland to the Island and began to overwhelm the entire Allied force of some 18 Battalions which were taking very heavy casualties.

Between the 1st and 15th Feb., frantic moves were being made by the depleted Allied Forces to prevent further incursion by the Japanese, however, with the air fields on the mainland in Japanese hands, together with the sea lanes now closed, there was just simply no where else to go but back onto the Island itself and from there — no where but back into the sea.

The Japanese increased their artillery shelling of the Singapore fortress where not only were gathered a large portion of Allied soldiers, but many civilians as well. Many died in the ensuing barrage and the situation now became hopeless. My father and his Battalion were trapped in a net which was rapidly closing and in order to save all remaining life on the Island, the decision to surrender was made by Lt. General A. E. Percival and his Staff Officers. After some negotiations with General Yamashita, Commander of the Imperial Japanese Army, the surrender document was signed at 1950hrs 15th Feb., 1942.

Conclusion and Final Tribute

My father’s memory of specific events is now either fading, or he has made the choice himself to block them out — who could blame him. What will remain is the record kept by my father and the neatly written words within the pages convey a feeling that I believe difficult to obtain from our Military history books.

Rather than complete this story with a poem, I would like to include the following passage
from my father's record which my father wrote in memory of his closest friend who was killed during the Muar Road battle in Jan. 1942. Whilst the words describe the life and times of one man, this epitaph could describe any fighting soldier who is prepared to lay down his life for his country.

MEMORIES
LIEUT A. C. E. SHELDON

He was a member of the firm in which I worked, and we had often met there when life was peaceful, easy going, and as much as possible, sane. My impressions during these times were that he was a keen enthusiastic young chap. Then, I thought him as being young; but what a war will do to age one is amazing. You will never forget the tremendous decision when war was declared. It converted the placid life into a turmoil of doubt, worry, and mental depression having a direct challenge and placing untold responsibility on us young chaps.

We were in the same boat. Both eligible to join the heroes and fight for our glorious heritage. Arthur was in Div Sigs (Militia) and was transferred to a new Unit called Southern Command Sigs. It was here that I met him on a military basis, he a Lieutenant and I as a humble signaller. After the camp, we went into a Sig school at Albert Park and there I saw him often. It was during the three months camp at Caulfield that the opportunity came for him to go as Sig Officer to 2/29th Bn, and he had permission to take his own NCO's. As I was a sergeant at the time he took me as sgt, and Cpl Sheppard as Cpl to the Sig Pl. We entered Bonegilla camp. What an adventure. Memory of this letter to me, telling of the conditions and job that lay ahead, float back and one is silent, quiet, dazed.

Happiness is always radiated and his platoon was happy because he was brimful, enthusiastic, keen and thoughtful of them. Can we ever forget him that night of the “night stunt”, when the niner was justly dealt with round a huge blazing fire. Yes he was merry — his men were merry and he was the toast of the evening, — our confident cheerful leader to be. Then the hard work. He was absolute and insistent on our training being hard, and many a time he, carrying the same pack, would try us to the full in a march. He had the utmost pride and confidence in his men and often this was perky banter at the Ol’ man. But what of it! We were young and healthy, he was proud and enthusiastic.

Often I would go to his room and chat, during which he smoked that almost large pipe against his thin face. What memories. Talk of home, of work, of love and the smell of that infernal pipe. Yes memories sacred to those who only remember those marvellous days. He was almost petite in his manner and carriage and dressed neatly and dashingly. Then our leave would arrive and he would lead us to the grand train to take us home. He was always amused at various ones in his platoon, and often took up their little catch phrases, such as, “Right” and “Righto Jack”, and the pertinent smile on his face when the culprits would emulate these sayings.

Life in Bathurst passed and we became closer, much happened and there were arguments too, but above all our boss still smiled and had a drink with the boys. Can you remember final leave? He was virtually in ecstasies and like many was just itching to be off. Then aboard the giant Mannix. I often yarned to him about things. He was a great philosopher and said that when the time came to go, it would be his call. What a great thought and the greater the thinker. It all seemed like a huge holiday cruise but came to an end too soon. What did life (or death) hold in store for us as we stepped off the boat in the Singapore harbour? He paid the supreme sacrifice but forever in my heart shall be his memory.
Book Review


Reviewed by Vic Jeffery, Defence Public Relations

The sixth annual issue of this aviation review lives up to the high standard set by its preceding issues. Containing 20 major articles by 15 renowned contributors, it is supported by 183 good quality black and white photographs.

Among the major articles covered are: Nimrod — the hunter killed, an interesting article on the final cancellation of the highly-publicised Nimrod AEW.3; Test centres of the US flying forces; and new aircraft of the year.

Two interesting features of this annual yearbook are the extensive chronology and Jane's Jubilees.

Among the other articles are stories on Farnborough, the evolutionary future of airliners, the re-organisation of China's unwieldy monolithic airline system and the fighter aircraft being developed today for the year 2000 and is the quiet revolution in airliner design.

This interesting book covers all facets of the aerospace industry and is a worthy ready-reference to the aviation year.


Price: Approximately $35.00

Reviewed by: Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Pope psc RAAOC (ARES)

When first presented with this book for review, my inclination before reading it was to dismiss it as either falling into one of the two categories of a self justification to explain that "It wasn't my fault — they made me carry out those tests" or the Doctor Strangelove approach of "Sure I blew the island away — my only regret is that wasn't for real"!

The reason I presumed to think along these lines is because atomic weapons and tests do not receive many accolades these days. Indeed, at a time when so many people are avidly rewriting and modifying history to bring it into line with today's attitudes and opinions, it did not occur to me that thirty years after "Operation Grapple", the British Thermo — Nuclear tests in the Pacific, the Commander of the base could tell the story without the influence of modern politics intruding. AVM Oulton has succeeded, against all the odds, in telling in simple and refreshing terms the real story of what it was like to be part of such an immense venture. He is able to express the feelings of national pride and independence that the possession and testing of the Bomb generated in Britain and throughout the Commonwealth in the 1950's. Now that I have read the book, I am happy to report that my first impression was wrong. The story is written in plain terms with little attempt to give it the appeal of a novel, but it is nonetheless readable and enjoyable as AVM Oulton has a natural writing style which needs little embellishment to make it flow. In fact, anyone with a Service background will recognise the characters and incidents which always arise in every isolated soldiers barracks — as they are not unique to the idyllic South Sea Island where the tests took place. The story of every project has the same four elements of planning, Preparation and Execution followed by the inevitable anti-climax of a winding-up phase.

Of course, as any soldier, sailor or airman knows, the common companion in each of these four phases is the 'constant of change' as plans are revised to meet new or unforeseen circumstances.

The Planning phase was done in the typically British style of restrained understatement. The Project was rushed, underfunded, undermanned and highly successful against all the odds. Interestingly, AVM Oulton was appointed to the task of organising the test facil-
ities by an Australian in the RAF, AVM Lees. AVM Lees clearly adopted the British style of understatement when he gave AVM Oulton the task with the words 'I want you to go out and drop a bomb somewhere in the Pacific and take a picture of it with a Brownie camera!' The Planning phase makes surprising exciting reading as a complete operation was created from scratch in a very short time.

The book also highlights the fact that the best commanders and units take problems in their stride and find solutions by improvisation, good management, innovation or in really difficult situations, by low cunning and using the 'old boy net' to the fullest degree. Considering the time and resources available, and the secrecy in which the work was done, AVM Oulton's achievements should not be underrated and in many ways rank with Britain's more recent enterprise in the Falkland's when once more they were caught off guard.

The book logically progresses through the Preparations phase by looking at each part in turn. Despite the complexity of the operation, this approach (which follows sound military principles) also makes the whole enterprise appear rather simple. Yet the detail of the planning to 'just make things happen' at the right time and place is an exceptional art which few have mastered. I once explained military operational planning to a civilian friend by way of: 'Imagine fifty people each with fifty pieces of a jigsaw, now all you have to do is plan it in advance so that you can have them all lay down their parts simultaneously so the whole picture is completed to an exact timetable'. AVM Oulton performed this task on a much larger scale — and makes it look easy!

Finally, there was the culmination of all the Preparations with the detonation of 'Short Granite', the first megaton bomb to be successfully tested by the British (though the Monte Bello Islands and Maralinga Range tests had preceded Operation Grapple by up to five years). In all, nine tests took place in the South Pacific, on Christmas or Maiden Islands. The last, on 23 September, 1958 took place almost 30 years ago now.

AVM Oulton does not dwell on the aftermath of the operation and the melancholy period of winding down everything that was so painstakingly built up to carry out the tests.

However, I did enjoy the short Postscript because it covers in factual terms, to a cynic like me what happens to discarded Atomic Test sites: They change their name from Christmas Island to Kiritimati, set up a hotel in the Officers Mess and open a tourist resort! Now, if that is not a variance with modern thinking on the atomic beast, I do not know what is!

I would recommend this book to anyone interested in the development of atomic weapons and those (of far greater number) who just like a good story of military operations and the comradeship and spirit they engender.

**FIREFORCE: One Man's War in the Rhodesian Light Infantry**. Galago Publishing Pty. Ltd., 1988, pp255 plus maps and photographs. $35.00 from Galago P/L Agent, 20 Rim Road, Buderim, Qld, 4556.

Reviewed by Major D. A. Wilson, RAI

**FIREFORCE** is the story of Chris Cock's service in 3-Commando, Rhodesian Light Infantry from 1976 to 1979 during the final phases of the Rhodesian bush war. Initially a reluctant draftee for 12 months' National Service, Cocks later signed on for three years as a regular. **FIREFORCE** is an account of Cocks' progress from naive youth to professional soldier, written in a very personal, if irreverent style.

Cocks describes his absorption into the RLI with his other National Service companions as a bewildering process due to the seemingly mindless regimentation instilled by the unit's NCOs. Among his companions in the RLI were volunteers from Britain, South Africa, Brazil, Portugal, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, making it the closest parallel to the French Foreign Legion in modern times. Anyone who has undergone basic training of any sort will sympathise with his reactions to this indoctrination. Many readers may be offended by both the language and the grim barrack room humour throughout the book, but it accurately portrays the realities of life from a soldier's point of view.

Despite problems caused by flat feet, Cocks completes his basic training and a six week course in conventional warfare, but the recruits cannot understand what this training has to do with fighting guerrillas in the bush. Its purpose was to instil a sense of aggression in the new
troops; at the same time, comradeship begins to emerge — a factor which will become so important later in combat. Finally, they are trained counter-insurgency operations, which is the reality of the bush war they are about to face. Cocks acknowledges here that snap-shooting was practised so often it became second nature — and later saved many RLI lives.

Cocks' adventures and misadventures in 3-Commando are followed in operational sequence. From his first fear-filled combat mission, his parachute training, promotion to stick leader and even his 28 days' CB for an accidental discharge with a pistol, Cocks shows he is a keen observer of himself and his fellow man. The dry troopers' sense of humour is always to the fore, even in the worst situations. However, there is no attempt to glorify the brutality of war and Cocks records the sights and reactions to guerilla warfare in a most convincing manner.

On an even more personal level, the author has included extracts from letters to his fiancee at the end of some chapters. They describe the boredom of daily military duties and the frustration of unsuccessful operational call-outs. This too is an accurate record of feelings and observations of men involved in the fight for a nation's survival. It is a much softer approach than the general barrack room theme, but is no less an important insight into a young man's emotional and professional development.

Another dimension to FIREFORCE concerns the techniques of low-level operations practised by the Rhodesian Security Forces and the RLI in particular. Faced with increasing worldwide sanctions, limited manpower and military resources, the Rhodesians were forced to adopt unusual methods to deal with communist-backed guerilla insurgents. Fireforce was a combat technique designed to rapidly deploy lightly-armed troops to sites of guerilla activity by helicopter or parachute. In the RLI, normal battalion organisation was changed to meet this role; companies became commandos, platoons became troops and sections consisted of two four-man sticks, each with a MAG 58 machinegun. Commandos were dispersed into operational areas, usually based around an airfield, for quick deployment on call-out tasks such as blocks, sweeps, cordon and search or surveillance. The scarcity of combat troops and aircraft meant that some Fireforce units were called out up to three times a day for parachute or hell-borne insertions, causing incredible strain on both man and machine.

FIREFORCE is the compelling story of one man's experiences in the setting of a small nation, fighting with few resources against growing odds and world apathy. The lessons of low-level operations should not be lost on the ADF. FIREFORCE is hard to put down — read it soon.

THE INDIAN ARMY AND THE KING'S ENEMIES 1900-1947. By Charles Chenevix Trench. Published by Thames and Hudson (Australia) $64.00.

Reviewed by LtCol R. E. Braford

In his foreword, the author, an ex Indian Army Officer, begins by stating that the book is not a history, but was instead a book on the British Indian Army. As such he concentrated on that Army, its officers and men in peace and war, in defeat and victory during the last forty years of its existence. During the Second World War it was to grow into the largest volunteer army the world has ever seen, and not a man in it was conscripted.

The book therefore, in many ways describes the genesis of the modern day Indian Army which presently numbers approximately one million men. The aim of self reliance and sufficiency in the present day Indian Army can be traced back to the days of the Second World War, especially in the Burma campaign where they were at the end of a tenuous supply chain, were governed by decisions made in Britain on items they received, and often were made to do with substandard kit. Although the book does not cover this problem in detail, numerous references are made to such equipment problems, and how in spite of those problems how well the Indian Army was able to cope.

Pride and loyalty to the Regiment is still a strong trait in the present day Indian Army, the background to which being well documented in the book. Because of the varied racial and religious backgrounds and the variety of language involved, the binding together as a cohesive fighting force within the regiments was of paramount importance. The virtues and defects of the various groups even within the regimental
system were most interesting to note; Sikhs if worked hard made splendid soldiers; Pathans were tempted to desert and sell their rifles; Mahsuds were unreliable; The Punjabi was the backbone of the Army; The Dogra was reliable and courageous; Jats were worthy and slightly dull, the Ghurkhas were the best infantry in the world. The comments in their various forms can still be heard today within the many regiments.

Another aspect of the book I found most interesting was the number of occasions that the Indian Army saw active service with Australians. Examples used in the book include the Western Front, Gallipoli and Palestine in World War One, and North Africa and Singapore in World War Two. The author relates some stories of interest in these battles, about the occasional interactions of the colonial troops.

One shortcoming I noted, relates to the book not being a history. Consequently, many battles are covered without the detail one normally associates with history. This coupled with the paucity of accurate battlefield maps, detracts somewhat from the overall quality of the book. Conversely, however the anecdotes included from previously unpublished diaries, provide a personal backdrop to the battles, particularly those not well covered in other histories.

All in all, I found the book easy to read, and full of personal stories, which provided me with a most useful background to The Indian Army. Anyone interested in the army would find this book useful and enlightening, and worthy of inclusion in any library.


Reviewed by John Buckley

HARVEY Barnett is very well qualified to write this book about the Australian Security Intelligence Organization. He joined in 1976 as Deputy Director-General, and from 1981 to 1985 was the Director-General. This followed after 19 years of distinguished service in the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS).

In all, Barnett had 28 years experience in the external and internal intelligence field. No other officer could match this performance: it is unique in Australian Intelligence history. I regard Harvey as the most versatile and able intelligence officer in my experience.

As the senior Defence Department officer (First Assistant Secretary) in Victoria from 1958 to 1973 I knew well the senior officers of both Intelligence Services. In fact I was the "cover" for one of them for several years. During this period I regarded Barnett as the outstanding performer — a man of exceptional ability; approachable, frank; open; plenty of common sense; fair minded; puckish sense of humour and above all else, a man of sound personal integrity.

Like his friend, Ian Kennison, who became Director-General of ASIS, Barnett was highly regarded and respected by his peers. Kennison was the most notable and able of the ASIS Directors. Both of these officers kept "their feet on the ground" whilst holding these important appointments.

The book exhibits the talents of Harvey Barnett. It is well written by a man who is the expert in the field he is writing about. It is detailed, clear and concise, with delightful touches of humour, which are typical of Harvey in the person. At all levels he is fair to the people he is writing about, including Valeriy Ivanov, David Combe and others.

Barnett mentions that:
"Since its foundation ASIO has attracted the labelling process . . . It has been the assumption of the Australian Labor Party, and in the left wing of politics, and possibly in the community at large, that a national security organization in a democracy must, ipso facto, be composed of right wing conservative people". He then proceeds to tell why this is not true. I agree!

The "Tale of the Scorpion" is a first class book written by an expert in the intelligence field — no hear-say or exaggeration or imagined colourful events in this book — just plain factual evidence blended with many touches of humour.

I strongly recommend this book: furthermore it is very reasonably priced at $24.95. It's worth more.
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