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Cover: Britain's Bicentennial gift to Australia, the Sail Training Ship Young Endeavour. Now operated by the RAN to provide adventure training for young Australians — Part of the heritage collection by Defence Artist Jeff Isaacs.

Contents

2. Letters to the Editor
3. Selection of Students for Defence Cooperation Programme Courses.
   Squadron Leader J. R. Leonard and Flight Lieutenant S. G. Williams, RAAF.
6. Low-Level Conflict.
   Lieutenant Colonel R. Crawshaw, RAR.
    K. M. Boyapati and J. G. Muir, Department of Defence.
25. The Malayan Emergency.
    Major R. F. Alcorn, RL
29. Police Dogs in the RAAF.
    Staff of Provost Marshal — RAAF.
34. Vietnam and the Kennedy Administration.
    Wendy Heckenberg, Department of Defence.
39. Embracing Manoeuvre.
    Major J. D. Kelly, RAAC.
44. The Profession of Arms and Officer Career Development.
    Captain G. P. Hogan, RAR.
49. America and Australia: Where the Future?
    Lieutenant Commander D. H. Else, USN.
56. Marshal Zhukov: An Insight into The Soviet Military.
    Captain D. W. Phillis, RAR.
60. The Lesson Plan that Worked.
    Major R. H. McAdams, RL.
63. Book Review.

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Managing Editor
Mr M. P. Tracey

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Letters to the Editor

A Res Retention
Dear Sir,

I read with interest the article by Lt Col Darryl Low Choy, MBE, A Res Retention Planning at the Unit Level. The 5th Field Engineer Regiment Retention Plan is on target, and I commend that Unit’s initiative in attempting to minimise what is a complex and costly problem.

I would be interested in the results of the Plan, if a follow-up article is possible.  

M. F. CAMPBELL  
P.N.G. Defence Academy

The Chain of Command
Dear Sir,

Major Warren Perry, RL, in his article, The Chain of Command (DFJ No. 67 Nov/Dec ’87) makes no claim to have produced an exhaustive work on the subject. In my opinion his ‘stray thoughts’ are more a sample of the characteristics of commanders rather than a study of command per se. His article concentrates on the art of commanders, their personalities, qualities and qualifications, development and training, yet Major Perry makes critical comments on past contributions by Air Commodore Ashworth and myself on the more fundamental aspects of command. I shall leave Air Commodore Ashworth, now retired, to defend his point of view, if he chooses, but I would like to reinforce my personal statements.

I attempted to reduce the definition of command to its simplest form. My letter did not seek to describe concepts of command, psychological factors, personalities, etc., which are the substance of Major Perry’s criticism. The only restriction I should have included was a limitation to military command, but I took that to be understood in the context of my letter. Indeed, I believe the word has little proper usage outside the military context. While Major Perry may consider my definition too legalistic, I think that the members appointed to command are the only true commanders. Such appointments are made in accordance with the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 and this gives the legal authority to command. Any other claim to military command is a misuse of the term.

Major Perry also takes exception to my description of control as the machinery by which command is exercised. He introduces organization as the machinery and supervision as one method of control. I agree that organization is a structure describing the levels of command and the elements under command. I also agree that supervisors are vital in overseeing the action of others. However, I believe my description covers the supervisors, the staff and the other many individuals who are assigned resources, such as weapons and vehicles, with no subordinates, yet collectively fulfill the responsibilities of the commander by control of the resources assigned, whether personnel or material.

There is probably no benefit in a serial debate on command through the pages of the DFJ. The importance of the subject and the lack of clarity in the understanding of command at all levels of the ADF suggests an authoritative policy is required.

J. B. MACNAUGHTON  
Air Commodore
Selection of Students for Defence Cooperation Programme Courses: The Role of the Defence Cooperation Language School

By Squadron Leader J.R. Leonard & Flight Lieutenant S.G. Williams, RAAF

Introduction

Most members of the ADF who have had any contact with Defence Cooperation Programme (DCP) students would be aware of the existence of the Defence Cooperation Language School (DCLS) at RAAF Base, Laverton. However, its rather misleading title leads many to believe that it has some connection with the RAAF School of Languages, that its staff have to be linguists of some sort, or that it exists to teach English to DCP students. Of these three common assumptions, only the third has even a grain of truth: it is true that DCLS does provide English instruction for approximately 10 foreign students per year out of a total of about 700! As to the first two, no amount of talking seems able to persuade the ADF at large that these assumptions are completely groundless.

The vast majority of DCLS students are engaged in the Australian Military Familiarisation (AUSTMILFAMIL) Course, which provides an opportunity for foreign students to adjust to Australian society in general, and to the Australian military in particular, before proceeding to their target courses. For those who are still in any doubt, AUSTMILFAMIL does not teach English to DCP students, although, in the course of their four weeks at DCLS, students invariably gain confidence and make far better use of what language skills they already possess.

Research and Development

A lesser-known function of DCLS is its research and development role, directed principally at the development and implementation of various projects designed to improve the quality of English teaching in DCP countries. An even lesser-known role concerns the creation of a selection system for DCP training which, when in place, will provide a very close match between student capabilities and course requirements. In this respect DCLS can rightly claim to be breaking entirely new ground in the field of language testing.

DCP Student Selection System

A system developed by Dr David Ingram of the Brisbane College of Advanced Education, the Australian Second Language Proficiency Rating (ASLPR), is used to assess a student's English Language proficiency. The same system is used to assess the language requirements of the student's target course, to develop a Course Profile, so that a decision to accept or reject his application, or to recommend further language training, can be based on a comparison between his capabilities and the demands to be made of him.

ASLPR

The ASLPR was originally devised for use by the Adult Migrant Education Programme (AMEP) to provide a clear picture of the process of development of, and to enable an accurate measure of, second language proficiency.

Direct Testing

The ASLPR constitutes a direct method of testing which focuses on the learner's proficiency reflected in his/her performance of actual communication tasks, rather than assessing the learner's knowledge of the language. To use an analogy, it requires the driver to fix the mechanical breakdown, rather than simply tell why the car won't go!

Administration

The ASLPR uses an interview in which the subject is involved in realistic language situations using graded reading and listening materials, and involving speaking tasks and role play. These situations are concerned with the four macro skills, Speaking, Listening, Reading and Writing. Although the writing proficiency of lower-level students can be tested during the interview, on most occasions writing is assessed
in a group test to expedite the process, since the average interview takes from 15-25 minutes to complete.

The interviewer leads the subject through a series of graded language tasks set in realistic situations that the student would encounter in the wider language environment. The interviewer will persist until the learner reaches the limit of his/her capability, the linguistic ‘breaking point’ at which he/she can no longer function, and will ensure that this limit is reached in each of the four macro skills.

At this breaking point the student’s performance is measured, in each macro skill, against a set of proficiency scales which describe language behaviour at nine levels; 0, 0+, 1−, 1, 1+, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The first and last are absolutes, describing, on the one hand, nil proficiency, and on the other, proficiency which approximates that of a native speaker of the same socio-cultural background.

Assessor Training

The system is designed for use with English as a Second Language subjects from any first language background. The interviewer has to be trained to use the system, and requires regular practice once trained. At DCLS, Thai, Indonesian and Malaysian students on the English Teaching Development Course (ETDC), a 14-week teaching methodology course, have been instructed in the use of the ASLPR by members of the Research, Development and Support Flight at DCLS.

Despite their being from non-English speaking backgrounds, comparisons of results from a variety of sources confirm the students’ ability to rate at least as accurately and consistently as native English speakers. Often, in fact, because of their intensive training, and because they tend to take less for granted in the testing, they produce greater accuracy than their Australian counterparts. They will support the selection system by carrying out the ASLPR testing in-country, with random testing of DCP students at DCLS ensuring quality control.

Course Profiling System

The ASLPR is also used to construct a profile of each target course offered to DCP students in Australia. To date, approximately 80% of courses have been profiled; the remainder will be completed early in 1988.

The Course Profile

Sample profiles provide basic information about the course, its location, duration, prerequisites, etc., but are primarily concerned with the features which impinge on a candidate’s suitability for selection.

They describe in detail the course content and the means by which the course is taught. The latter is important, since some courses will place greater demands on the more active elements of language, speaking and writing, than on the more passive, listening and reading. Some will make language demands under stressful conditions: the need to operate effectively in spite of background noise, to manage radio communications, or to adapt to a wide range of styles or rates of speech from different instructors, will all place considerable pressure on a student whose language proficiency is marginal.

Where safety is a critical factor, where a specialised background is assumed, or where the course employs teaching strategies unfamiliar to many DCP students, such as syndicate research projects, an annotation will be made to this effect.

The result is a comprehensive profile of all of the factors likely to affect a student’s language usage, along with an indication of the minimum levels of English in each of the four macro skills necessary to complete the course.

The Profiling Process

Each course is profiled during a visit to the training unit by DCLS staff. Each course, or closely-related group of courses, takes approximately 3-4 hours to profile. The process begins with a discussion with key instructional personnel to determine content, strategies, priorities and methods of assessment.

Materials used on the course, such as notes, text books, handouts, video/slide/film packages, etc., are then studied and, if possible, sample classes and/or practical sessions are observed.

Finally the assessment procedures are studied to determine whether they make any language demands which are different from those made by the instructional processes.

At the completion of the visit, draft profiles are forwarded to the unit for comment before the final version is produced. In addition, units
are invited to provide up-dating information whenever a course undergoes changes with implications for its Course Profile.

The final outcome is the incorporation of the individual profiles into a collection which is used by the Defence Attaches/Advisors (DAs) in their selection of DCP students. The more comprehensive the information provided, the better is the chance of the DA making an informed judgement.

Conclusion

The Defence Cooperation Language School is engaged in a variety of activities in support of the Defence Cooperation Programme, but only very occasionally in language instruction! The projects which have been completed, along with those in progress, are, nevertheless, significant steps along the road to an effective DCP, even if people’s expectations of DCLS are clouded by its unfortunate title!

NOTES


Squadron Leader John Leonard joined the RAAF as an Education Officer in 1980 after a career as a secondary teacher and college lecturer. He has had postings to RAAF School of Technical Training, Officers' Training School, RAAF Academy, RAAF College, and is currently OIC Research, Development and Support Flight at DCLS.

Flight Lieutenant Steve Williams joined the RAAF as an Education Officer in 1982 after a career as a secondary teacher. He had postings to RAAF School of Radio and DCLS before resigning in 1985 to take up a civilian appointment at DCLS, where he is engaged in teaching and course development in Research, Development and Support flight. He remains a member of the RAAF Active Reserve at 21 Squadron, RAAF Laverton.

CADRE BULLETIN

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which they appear are available at the libraries on most Defence establishments.

The U.S. Naval Academy’s New Yard Patrol Craft: From Concept to Delivery. *Naval Engineers Journal*, Jan 87: 37-58 This paper was delivered at Flagship Section Patrol Boat Symposium 13-14 Mar 86 Arlington, Virginia. The design of the new 108ft YP (Yard Patrol) craft for the US Naval Academy is described from its beginnings as a senior midshipman design project to the launching, builder’s and sea trials of the first boat. Paper contains 17 references, also figures and tables.

Recent Developments in Advanced Hull Types for Naval Ships. Carreyette, T.F. *Naval Forces*; 1/87: 73-79 Discusses various types of hull designs available for naval applications. Types mentioned are the bulbous bow; the catamaran; SWATH (Small Waterplane-Area Twin Hull); Planing craft; Hydrofoils; ACV (Air Cushion Vehicle); SES (Surface Effect Ship). Contains 10 references.

Conceptual Design of an Offshore Patrol Boat. *Naval Engineers Journal*, Jan 87: 70-82 This paper was delivered at the Flagship Section Patrol Boat Symposium 13-14 Mar 86 Arlington Virginia. The authors of the paper were Steven H. Cohen, Debabrata Ghosh, William B. Dodge, and William McEachen. The paper presents the conventional design being assessed as a potential replacement for the US Coast Guard’s multimission patrol boats and contains 24 references, tables and figures.


Successful Completion of Lavi Maiden Flight. *Armada International*, 1/87: 32-34 The future of the Israeli Aircraft Industries’ Lavi is undecided. Increasing costs and the present economic situation make it doubtful that Israel can continue to finance the Lavi project without severely jeopardizing the whole Israeli economy and Defence Force.

Topographic Research and Development. Cleva, Sandra J.; Laubscher, Alan L. *Engineer (US)*; Fall/Winter 86: 21-23 Discusses DTSS (Digital Topographic Support System) which will automate much of the work now involved in terrain analysis and QRMP (Quick Response Multi-color Printer) which will make it easier to copy terrain graphics, maps and other products in the field. Artificial intelligence and Computer Image Generation are two other areas where scientists are experimenting.

Indian Navy Commissions Type 1500 “Shishumar” — the first submarine with complete crew rescue sphere — and further developments in HDW. *Maritime Defence*; Nov 86: 448-450 HDW (Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft) has built the first of an ultimate Indian fleet of ten submarines, all but two to be built in Bombay. HDW is also working on the RAN submarine project with Kockums; on altering and modernising 12 German Class 206 submarines; development of the new Class 211; on fuel cells; and on the new Permasyn electrical propulsion motor.
Low-Level Conflict — A Closer Scrutiny

By Lieutenant Colonel R. Crawshaw, RAR

Introduction

Low-level conflict has certainly been the focus of attention for Australia’s defence community throughout the Eighties. In recent years, it has been extensively discussed and the ADF has organized, trained and planned in detail for such a possibility. Indeed discussion within the defence arena has been unusually uniform in its agreement, assuming that such a conflict is the most likely type of warfare which we face in the future. In the absence of others, this concept has, over time, assumed a certain permanence in our strategic thinking. The longer this situation continues, the greater becomes the need to regularly scrutinize the idea of low-level conflict in Australia to ensure it does not gain a false momentum and lead defence planning down the ‘wrong track’.

I for one harbour reservations about the likelihood of Australia or its territories hosting a low-level conflict on land in isolation from more serious warfare. The possibility that low-level conflict in the guise of urban terrorism will appear in the longer term in Australia may be inevitable. Fortunately to date we have been spared major terrorist activity. A programme of low-level activity conducted by hostile special force elements in advance of more orthodox operations against Australia also has credence. But the notion that foreign military elements would penetrate Australian sovereignty in a preplanned pattern of limited operations, in isolation of higher levels of conflict, is not so convincing.

Current Thinking

Hostile low-level campaigns in the maritime and air environments seem more imaginable than in the land environment because here Australia shares sea and air space with other nations and therefore a potential for future friction will always exist. This article will, however, only concentrate on low-level conflict in our land environment and analyse its feasibility. Current thinking postulates that on land, forces from a hostile nation could operate against selected civilian or military targets in Australia’s remoter northern areas and by limited but well-placed actions seek to degrade or embarrass Australian interests. Either as a complement to hostile sea and air activities or acting independently, small-sized ground forces would be covertly inserted and operate in a single remote location or dispersed across northern Australia. They would be mobile, well armed and elusive. A low-level campaign could be spasmodic, sustained at a limited level, or precede or accompany higher levels of conflict. It would have the potential to disrupt the Australian community and to force a disproportionate response from the ADF.

That essentially is the perceived threat or the credible northern contingency. But we need to ask some basic questions about the chances of a low-level conflict being successful in the Australian context. From a potential enemy viewpoint, is such a conflict worth considering? Can it be waged in isolation or would it be a part of a higher conflict? And are there factors which would inhibit initiating such warfare in the first instance?

The history of low-level conflict in our region is proven. Since 1945 there have been a number of such conflicts in Asia and the Pacific (Sri Lanka, Irian Jaya and the Philippines are current examples). Historically, of course, we too have been engaged in low-level conflicts, but always in someone else’s country. The difference now is that contemporary discussion has turned to speculating about low-level conflict in Australia. But can we point to past conflicts where our involvement was essentially limited and translate them into an Australian setting. I don’t think that it is that simple. There are major inhibitors which would discourage a foreign power in the first place from considering a low-level Australian campaign.

Geography

The first limitation to such warfare is geography. Australia’s geography offers distinct advantages to any defender irrespective of the level of war. All too often we overlook the natural benefits of our environment — the sea-air gap and the distances and harshness of most of continental Australia. Irrespective of the type
and level of conflict, the sea-air gap, while isolating us from our neighbours, serves as a formidable obstacle to any uninvited guest planning to operate on Australian territory. This barrier is one of the most formidable of its type in the world. It must be successfully crossed before hostile ground operations can begin either on the Australian mainland or the offshore territories. At the beginning of a conflict initial clandestine insertions by small enemy parties would probably pass unnoticed. However, the subsequent and very necessary efforts to reinforce, redeploy or administer these forces in any ongoing campaign will be liable to detection and interdiction in this gap. The task of finding and then engaging hostile craft that must continually cross this gap will be considerable, but not impossible. Therefore the need to successfully cross this space must markedly complicate an enemy’s capacity to develop, sustain and particularly to escalate a low-level conflict. Historically, most low-level conflicts have occurred between states with contiguous land borders (eg Israel, Borneo), which one side uses to advantage, moving from sanctuary on the home side of the border to an area of operations and then returning for refit. A low-level conflict in Australia waged by a hostile power having to move men and material across a formidable sea obstacle would have few historical precedents. Because of the difficulties and efforts involved, moving forces across seas is generally associated with higher levels of conflict.

If and when he lands, an enemy, irrespective of size and equipment, faces the vast distances of Australia. As our knowledge of the north develops we are coming to appreciate that distance will markedly complicate our military operations. Often however, we overlook that it will more profoundly aggravate the difficulties of any enemy activity. An enemy force in the remote parts of Australia must bring or rapidly acquire dedicated transport. Without it a force dependent entirely on foot movement has, even before it has been launched, immediately narrowed its tactical and administrative options.

The towns and vital assets of northern Australia are clearly defined; they contrast sharply with the vast emptiness of the outback. Being isolated they are easily identifiable, finely balanced communities particularly vulnerable to hostile interruption. But this vulnerability may be more difficult to exploit than many assume. First an enemy force has to get to these centres. Serving these communities are few, conspicuous lines of communication. In the interest of speed and economy of effort, these limited number of approaches must be used by any military force moving to or from these centres. Therefore, without air transport, an enemy force moving any distance to target areas in northern Australia is confined to distinct approaches. While moving along these, he risks detection — by day especially from the air, and by night from the ground. Unless he lodges on or very near his objective, without dedicated surface or air transport he has very little capacity to manoeuvre over distance. If he does lodge on or near his objective, he considerably increases his chances of being detected and engaged. Therefore the problems of moving to and from target areas in northern Australia must complicate any decision to embark on or to escalate a low-level conflict.

As northern Australia is characterized by distance, it is also characterized by harshness. Aside from the towns, settlements and stations, there are few resources in remote areas available to support military operations. Even those found in individual communities are limited and designed only to satisfy local residential and commercial needs. Although some would claim an enemy in northern Australia could, to some degree, ‘live off the land’ or expropriate supplies from local sources, in a demanding northern environment, this would be an unsound basis from which to plan and conduct any military operation. Therefore any enemy force with serious intent in the north would need a dedicated logistic system to support its activities. This must stretch from its homeland to northern Australia but in some instances could be supplemented on an opportunity basis with local resources. An enemy, from inception must establish a logistic system that caters for all his needs — ammunition, replacement weapons and equipment, spare parts, medical treatment, repair if not recovery, food, fuel, perhaps even water. The logistic problems of maintaining a hostile force (no matter how small) in northern Australia are compounded by distances to and within Australia, the need for clandestine resupply, and the likelihood of having to service widely dispersed elements. Maintaining any hostile campaign in Australia is going to be difficult and could even dissuade an enemy planner from placing forces in Australia for stand-alone low-level operations.
Population

Any enemy planning activity in the north must be prepared to operate on a demographically as well as a geographically hostile battlefield. A characteristic of successful low-level conflicts elsewhere has been the ability of hostile elements to draw support or at least acquiescence from local inhabitants or disaffected elements within a community. (These elements often have racial, religious or ideological affiliations with the intruder.) I doubt whether an enemy force could elicit support from local Australian residents, except by resorting to terrorism, which generally proves counterproductive in the long term. Communities in our remote areas are tightly knit, often conservative and wary of unproven outside influences. European or Aboriginal groups in the north or northwest would need to be highly dissatisfied with their lot before they would initiate an indigenous low-level conflict or could be effectively exploited by foreign elements, with whom they probably shared few values. Because enemy operations, for maximum publicity value, would concentrate on damaging key installations, often critical to the well-being of local communities, residents would quickly turn antagonistic to an enemy force and positively support ADF operations. As experience in the KANGAROO series of exercises shows, local communities are an invaluable source of information on enemy operations. Thus the hostile nature of our terrain and its inhabitants mitigate against the successful development by a foreign power of a low-level conflict in northern Australia.

Raids

The best option for an enemy to overcome distance and logistic problems is the raid; an operation characterized by covert insertion, limited but violent activity at a selected objective, followed by rapid extraction to a secure base. A campaign based on ground raids launched from offshore is an attractive option for an enemy planner. It would minimize the chances of detection and engagement by the ADF and alleviate many of the operational and administrative problems associated with sustaining hostile operations over distance. It also poses the thorniest problems for the defender. By its unpredictability, a campaign of raids would restrict ADF opportunities to close with an attacker. It therefore seems the easiest and most cost-effective conflict for a foreign power to initiate against Australia and indeed is the threat which our military planners have historically focused on.

But the raid option also has disadvantages. By their nature, raids are transitory and raiding forces have no opportunity to develop local affiliations or firm bases. A conflict based solely on raids, although highlighting Australian vulnerabilities, is therefore unlikely to foster political sympathies amongst disaffected or neutral parties either within Australia or abroad. Reviewing past examples, where an enemy engaged in low-level conflict has clearly achieved his goals, he has had to maintain a permanent presence in his opponent's territory.

In the Australian environment the raid option would also limit the choices of ground objectives available to an enemy planner. Objectives on the coast or in the immediate hinterland would be preferred because they limit the distance to be travelled and facilitate use of both sea and air transport. Obviously such objectives become first choices for a hostile force. But they are also the most obvious choices and therefore become a high priority for ADF protection. In a sustained low-level conflict, coastal or near coastal objectives would become increasingly defended and enemy activities if they are to remain on a limited scale, will be progressively forced inland to find 'softer', less defended targets. Again the problems of distance and supply would increasingly multiply for the enemy force. To a hostile power the attraction of sustaining a low-level conflict over time whether by raids or through a dispersed and permanent presence is diminished by distance, logistic difficulties and an unsympathetic population.

The South

Current discussion on credible low-level conflict rarely mentions the sharp contrast between hostile operations in remote northern Australia and those in the more populous south. In northern Australia, a potential enemy is faced with few targets, which although prominent and easily identifiable, are generally separated by distance and require considerable logistic effort to reach and engage. The difficulties of operating in northern Australia narrow the options available to any enemy planner. The situation in South West and South East Australia is markedly different. Here there are more lucrative
targets. They are serviced by established communications networks and little thought has been given to their protection. In addition, a successful strike in populous areas, where more people would be affected is likely to ring louder 'alarm bells' than those sounded by hostilities against isolated, northern communities divorced from the mainstream of Australian life. A low-level campaign in the South also decidedly complicates civil-military relationships. It is far easier to delineate these in remote areas, where population and infrastructure are limited, than in areas where Commonwealth, State and local jurisdictions are more closely intertwined. If we are to analyse the concept of low-level conflict then credible southern contingencies should be considered as well as emphasising those in the north.

A Different Perspective

Low-level conflict is often seen as a cost effective option for a developing nation wishing to achieve objectives by force. As currently postulated it would probably be within the capability of our regional neighbours to conduct without dramatic or discernible increase in their existing forces. The concept also currently enjoys popularity within Australian circles because in budgetary terms it is the most affordable level of conflict at which the ADF can direct its efforts. But there are a number of significant factors likely to deter a potential enemy entering into a low-level land campaign. The problems of distance, the need to successfully and continually cross the sea-air gap, the remoteness and harshness of the northern environment and the likelihood of encountering an unsympathetic population, all mitigate against waging a successful low-level conflict in isolation. To develop a low-level conflict and to achieve its objectives with only limited forces would be a very difficult undertaking. As the ADF responded and escalated operations within Australia and perhaps further afield, an intruder would have to cease or reduce operations (which would be seen internationally as an admission of defeat) or escalate them in an effort to realise his objectives. A low-level land conflict in Australia waged by small hostile forces in isolation of more serious military activity is therefore unlikely.

An aggressor could however use such a conflict as the opening bout for larger, more substantial operations. Through such a campaign, hostile forces could become familiar with operating in Australia (in both north and south), develop the basis of a logistic system and distract the ADF from mobilising or expanding.

When viewed as a backdrop to more substantial conflict, the significant efforts required to initiate and maintain low-level conflict (particularly in northern Australia) become far more worthwhile to undertake. This is nothing new in this scenario of developing conflict progressively. There are numerous historical examples of raids or special force operations preceding more serious developments.

If my rationale is correct, that in an Australian context low-level conflict would most likely precede higher conflict then warning lights need to flash. Currently within some defence circles, despite protestations to the contrary, low-level conflict is regarded as an end in itself and emphasis is placed on providing a force structure only for that end. As far as this approach goes it is sound. Unfortunately it does not go far enough. Insufficient consideration has been given by the defence community to the relationships between low and more substantial levels of conflict, warning time, mobilisation planning, expansion base needs and the higher level management of all these factors. Indeed, the need for properly constituted and well oiled expansion machinery in place before any level of conflict begins, is often imperfectly understood. We must ensure now that as well as forces for low-level conflict we have a healthy, well developed expansion base that can accommodate the transition to higher conflict. It will be too late to develop such a base, once we are involved in a low-level conflict.

As I stated at the beginning, we must continually scrutinize our thinking on the nature of conflict facing Australia in the future. To accept, without vigorous analysis, the current concept of low-level conflict could lead to serious penalties on a future more conventional battlefield. We need to be more curious about our concepts of likely conflict and the considerable effort sometimes devoted to justifying current interpretations could be more profitably channelled into deeper inquiry.

Lieutenant Colonel Crawshaw graduated from RMC in 1970. He has served in 1 RAR and as an instructor at Army Command Staff College. He is currently SO1 Operations at HQSMD.
Quality Assurance in Australia — Role of Department of Defence (Navy)

By K. M. Boyapati and J. G. Muir

Abstract

The importance of quality assurance in industry is now well recognised. One of the most crippling problems faced by Australia is the huge national debt which accumulates at an alarming rate of $1b per month. This is due to the severe balance of trade deficits experienced since the late seventies. There is only one recognised and accepted solution for overcoming the problem. It resides in increasing our exports at a rate which appears to be beyond our current capabilities unless industry as a whole uses techniques which have been successfully used by other countries to increase their exports. One of these techniques is the implementation of quality assurance systems. Due to high labour costs, products manufactured in Australia do not have a competitive edge. It is of course recognised that it is not cost alone that influence a customer’s decision to buy. Equally important is the quality of the product. The poor quality of goods originating in Australia has been the subject of attention by the Federal Government. It is the QUALITY of products that we should strive to enhance in order to gain that competitive edge and sell our products on international markets in spite of high labour costs. Total commitment to quality assurance by Australian industry is central to this task of turning around the balance of payments problem. The implementation of quality assurance systems, apart from enhancing quality, also leads to lower product costs.

The Department of Defence is playing a vital role in encouraging quality assurance in Australian Industry. The Department is one of the major buyers of large capital equipments. Billions of dollars worth of equipments are being purchased. The Department is in a unique position to press industry to adopt quality assurance techniques and to influence the development and implementation of quality systems. The actions of the Department of Defence regarding quality assurance are already having a multiplier effect on the quality standards of industry. The Department is fully aware of its responsibilities and is utilising opportunities to assist industry to implement quality systems. Some of the actions of the Department that have a direct bearing on quality assurance in Australian industry are:

* making the contractors accept responsibility for the quality of their supplies;
* strict and formal insistence of conformance to national quality control system standards; and
* total commitment to quality assurance systems and the initiation of awards to quality conscious industry.

This article outlines the structure of Australian industry and how this contributes to the present low level of QA in industry, and the need for Government assistance. The historical background in the development of quality assurance in the Royal Australian Navy, the present efforts of the Department in encouraging quality assurance in industry and how these efforts are being successful are explained. The paper also details present Defence policy and initiatives on quality assurance and the future role of the Department in spreading the message of quality.

PART 1: QUALITY ASSURANCE IN INDUSTRY AND THE NEED FOR ASSISTANCE

Introduction

AUSTRALIA is in an economic crisis as never before. We carry a heavy national debt of $100b (about 42% of Gross Domestic Product) and it is growing at a rate of almost $1b per month. The country was one of the most prosperous nations in the world during 1920s ranking only second on a ‘gross income per capita’ basis compared to other countries. Now Australia ranks about 18th. What happened between 1920 and 1988? How did the country slide so fast down the ladder? The dramatic slide is partly because other nations have been running faster down the track of wealth generation while we have been keeping
to the same pace, or at times have slowed down and, partly because of internal reasons.

The internal reasons for the decline in prosperity are many and complex but include:
- Previous Governments emphasis on 'Import Replacement'.
- Inflexible/high cost labour market.
- Perception/attitude towards work.

The overall effect of above factors is to lower industrial productivity.

Let us briefly examine each of the above reasons. During 1950 and 60s the Government's philosophy was to place heavy emphasis on 'import replacement' and to protect industry from foreign competition by imposing tariffs on imported goods. The local industries have thus been insulated for decades, have become non-competitive in their operations and quality as well as the cost of goods have suffered. With high levels of protection, there was no incentive for industry to become efficient.

Further, the emphasis during the 1960s was to earn export dollars by simply mining the minerals and exporting them. As long as the commodity prices stayed high, there was no cause for concern. However, with worldwide prices for commodities tumbling, it was time to reassess Government policy.

Our labour market has always been highly unionised with relatively high unit wages (taking into account penalty rates, leave loading etc) compared to our immediate neighbours and certainly higher than our trading partners. To add to these problems, the perception and attitude towards workmanship hasn't always been high. The "she'll be right" attitude is not conducive to achieving high quality. The low quality of goods manufactured in Australia has been the subject of comment by several organisations and investigating committees.

In order to make industry more competitive, the Federal Government has shifted away from the import relacement philosophy to an 'export' philosophy. The Government is slowly phasing out the level of protection and in some industries completely abolishing existing protection levels. It is encouraging industry to export, face competition and become more productive.

It is recognised that our mineral wealth is not inexhaustible. Instead of mining and exporting the minerals, the Government's policy now is to encourage the processing of minerals before exporting them, increasing their 'added value'. This would create a manufacturing/processing industry which would sustain the economy even when the mineral boom is finished.

The Government's industry policy can be summarised as encouraging the development of internationally competitive, export oriented, specialised and innovative industries which use technology, take advantage of scale economies, and pursue increased productivity.

Technology is wrongly perceived by many to be restricted to new product(s). However, the US National Academy of Science defines 'technology' as 'a perishable resource comprising knowledge, skills, ability to control product factors and ability to maintain goods and services having economical/social demands'. Thus, the use of technology includes the use of management or information systems including quality management system to control product characteristics.

The essence of improving productivity is to reduce the cost of a product. Certain industries, eg sheet metal industry, are now very inefficient and they need a strong dose of productivity induced efficiency. A box enclosing an equipment costs more then the equipment itself, and this trend has to be reversed.

There are at least three ways of increasing productivity:

- Through a substantial reduction in wages and working conditions.
- Through computer based automation.
- Through quality assurance/control systems.

Option a. is socially unacceptable. Referring to b., automation is widely considered by many to be the only route to increasing productivity. However, this is a wrong perception. If we consider a production item such as a cast iron section, the casting and machining of the section itself whether through numerically controlled lathe or through manual means takes less than 10% of its total manufacturing time. The other 90% of the time consists of design, procurement, product flow pattern, production control, operator training, inventory control, handling and delivery. c. The quality assurance systems control each and every activity from conception to delivery and are the preferred route to productivity. Hence, 'Productivity Through Quality' should be the motto for industry. The quality assurance system does not require us to work harder, but smarter.

The effect of a quality system on company productivity and hence profitability is demon-
strated by the AOQC survey\(^3\) which shows that firms with a documented quality system had higher profitability as calculated by the Return On Investment (about 24%) compared to those without such a system (14%).

**Structure of Australian Industry**

Before examining the need for productivity through quality and the level of QA in industry, it is pertinent to outline the structure of Australian industry. This would reveal the basic weakness of the industry and relate it to the need for improved productivity through quality.

Although Australia is considered to be a "developed" nation in terms of its standard of living, the structure of its industry is analogous to that prevalent in 'under-developed' countries. The Australian industry is 'truncated' in its development. A truncated industry is one which does not carry out all the functions from original research required for the conception of a product or process to the final art of marketing the product. One or more of these functions (eg initial research or design) are carried out by the foreign parent of the Australian firm.

A large number of industries have foreign ownership, particularly in high technology industries, eg:
- Electronics — 69%
- Plastics — 94%
- Agricultural chemicals — 86%

Further, 93% of all patents in Australia are granted to non-residents. Australian subsidiaries of foreign companies acquire conceptual technology including design from their head offices through internal transfer.

Australian industry is not composed of one monolithic structure. It is a collection of about 2,000 very big firms and about 30,000 small firms. The industry can be notionally split up into an agricultural sector and a manufacturing sector. The agricultural sector today is much more competitive than the manufacturing sector as the former has been well served by various agricultural extension services set up by the Government (eg technical information service, advisory service). However, the manufacturing sector has suffered due to the lack of extension services. Where such services existed they were fragmented and there has been no co-ordinated advisory service for the manufacturing sector.

A national advisory service on quality management is long overdue as quality management is:

- a well recognised path for increasing productivity and competitiveness,
- applicable to a wide range of manufacturing industries, and
- costly for initial implementation.

There has been no attempt to establish such a service, although this has now been recommended by the Review Committee\(^9\). The need for an advisory service on quality systems is due mainly to two factors:

- Truncated structure of the industry, where the foreign parent of Australian subsidiary is not keen to encourage or even allow subsidiaries to become too competitive by developing innovative techniques in quality management. This is exacerbated by the high foreign ownership of industries.
- Externalities peculiar to our industry: Australia's domestic market is very small and distances from major overseas markets are large. Unless goods excel in quality, it will be hard to compete in distant markets. As for the Pacific Basin and South East Asian markets, our labour rates are too high. Hence, unless we increase productivity, goods produced in Australia will not compete in overseas markets.

The decline in manufacturing sector started during the mid-1960s. The rate of decline varied between industries with the largest decline being in textiles, clothing and footwear. The industries most affected were those which gave least recognition to the introduction of quality systems.

Individual industries are themselves highly fragmented. For instance, a particular division of a firm producing certain parts for an assembly unit is located in one state while, other parts for the same assembly unit, are manufactured in another state. The reason for this diversification is historical in that different states have been, and still are, offering different incentives to attract industries to their states. The 'ad hoc' policies of industry management to fragment their divisions simply to obtain higher subsidies has been disastrous, in terms of overall productivity of plants. Further, the development and implementation of quality systems has suffered as a result of this fragmentation.

Australian industry does not have the industrial and consumer base to sustain large pro-
duction runs. The industry managers are accustomed to responding to 'ad hoc' market demands resulting in one-off production runs. The industry should move away from the 'local market' mentality and look towards overseas markets whereby large production runs, higher quality standards, and competitive prices are achievable.

Union co-operation for any change in work practices have been slow. In some cases, there is an outright hostility for any kind of technological change that would lead to higher productivity.

Thus, the basic weakness of the Australian manufacturing industry arises from high foreign ownership, fragmented structure, low level of technology and inadequate extension services.

**Level and Extent of QA in Australian Industry**

The general awareness of quality systems in industry is low and it comes out clearly in several reports including the Review Committee and the AOQC Survey of industries in NSW. This is not unexpected as the country does not have the basic infrastructure for the introduction of new technology.

The low level of quality systems can be attributed to several factors including:

a. Size of industry: Most Australian firms are small employing between 10-20 workers. These firms do not consider it worth having a formal quality system. This view is short sighted as a quality system is a management tool which can be applied to firms, large or small. For instance, several firms of this size are accredited to AS 1821 by the Department of Defence (DOD).

b. Nature of market: The markets to which the firms supply are often protected by import restrictions and face no competition. Australian firms generally look towards local markets and do not consider exporting. A protective market generally results in quality being overlooked.

c. Technology base: The technological base in Australia is low. The number of qualified engineers is disproportionately low compared to other industrialised countries, see Table 1. It is generally more difficult for unqualified managers to appreciate the advantages of introducing technology including quality systems.

d. Perception of Quality: Wrong perception of the philosophy and principles of quality systems is a basic reason for industry reluctance to introduce QA systems. This wrong perception relates both to estimating the cost of quality, and determining the responsibility for the quality of products as outlined below:

(i) Quality cost: It is difficult to appreciate the importance of quality systems without an understanding of the cost of quality. How much does a bad product cost the company? Australian managers are naive when it comes to estimating the cost of quality. According to the AOQC Survey, the cost as viewed by industry managers is about 3% of turnover. Studies in US state that the cost of quality is about 18-20% of turnover. Through a lack of understanding of the nature of quality costs, which include prevention, appraisal and failure costs, managers have not been motivated to implement quality systems to evaluate, reduce and control these costs. The cost of quality is not just the material cost of the rejected product but includes the cost of rework, scrap, decrease in sales and the cost of initial labour and decrease in company reputation. If these costs are taken into account, the importance of quality systems will be readily recognised.

(ii) Responsibility: A number of managers, according to the Survey, view that a majority of defects are operator-controllable. This view is against the established wisdom that the majority of defects are management controllable. It is based on the premise that a good quality system would identify the deficient work method.
and improve the system by means of effective work instructions or additional training where necessary. The management's practice of abrogating the responsibility of quality to operators confirms the notion that they do not have a full appreciation of quality system.

Apart from a general lack of quality awareness, the AOQC Survey also found a low level of QA in industry. For instance, while the statistical quality control techniques are an essential tool in managing quality in every facet of company operations, this view is not shared by industry. The statistical techniques are now used only in batch sampling. In the area of production, statistical techniques are used in only 38% of cases. Further, the essential control techniques such as X and R charts are used only in 1% of cases surveyed. These figures leave little doubt as to the serious lack of quality systems in industry.

There is very little evidence of the working of 'Quality Circles' in industry. 'Quality Circles' is a well established technique in quality management. 'Quality Circles' recognises that the best personnel for improving the quality of product is the process/production worker. In 'Quality Circles', the process/production workers get together to plan how quality can be improved in their work places and strive to find solutions. These plans and solutions to production problems are presented to company management for their approval. 'Quality Circles' is a proven and powerful method of improving productivity and efficiency and should be implemented by industry managers. This technique would not, of course, succeed unless the management is committed to it.

There is also a serious dearth of manpower skills in industry which can only be remedied through training. However, the organisations and institutions that provide training in quality are limited. The formation of a central co-ordination and guidance unit for identifying and establishing training requirements and available resources in each capital city is considered essential. The establishment and co-ordination of all training activities is strongly recommended by the well known quality experts even in the US. Such a co-ordinating body has long been in existence in Japan and formed the spring-board for the dissemination of quality techniques to industry.

In spite of scarce manpower resources, the DOD is contributing to the transfer of knowledge and skills to industry through industry visits by quality practitioners and through training courses. For instance, the basic QA Course run by the Directorate of Naval Quality Assurance attracts industry personnel, and about 12 have attended the courses.

A Case for Government Assistance

The Federal and State Governments have a vital duty and responsibility to gently guide Australian industry out of the spider web of protectionism, inefficiency and low quality practices developed in past decades. The assistance could take the form of direct subsidies for implementing quality systems, increased funding for establishing new courses and training schemes on quality assurance systems, and preferential treatment in awarding contracts to companies with approved quality systems.

It would be argued by many that Governments should not be in the business of interfering in the market place. This argument runs along the lines that the market forces alone will inject necessary efficiency into industries, and Governments should not give assistance to industries in any form. However, this view while having merits, would be dangerous to apply across the board irrespective of the state of the industries and economy. After all, even in Japan, the Government spends billions of dollars assisting local industries to improve their efficiency. Due to the critical nature of the need for Government assistance, it is useful to give a brief account of the reasons why Governments should be in the business of assisting industries.

The prime reason given for Government intervention is the co-called 'market failure'. Government intervention is considered to be justified when a large number of firms would benefit from certain knowledge but they are neither capable of developing nor using all the knowledge required to maximise efficiency. For instance, a certain firm will be unable to carry out the full burden of developing training strategies and developing techniques of quality management systems tailored to the particular industry.

Another form of market failure, and hence, justification for Government intervention occurs when an organisation's activities benefit others in the community but those creating the benefit cannot fully charge for the benefits. For
example, an organisation that develops a quality standard tailored to a particular technology, will be unable to charge for its services and recoup full costs from those firms operating in the technology field.

Justification for Government intervention also arises when it can be shown that the output of independent firms improves the general standard of living of the community. Individual efficiency improvement of firms may only be marginal. Yet, when overall efficiency improvement of industry as a whole, is taken into account, the social benefits could be high.

The science of quality assurance/control is an all embracing field which is essentially a ‘efficiency-getter’ and is applicable to a variety of industries starting from food industry to electronic and computer software industries. Thus, Governments which provide ‘seed money’ for encouraging industries to implement quality systems and provide extensive training and subsidise quality related activities ought to be the winners in the game of making industries competitive.

**PART 2: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE ROLE IN ENCOURAGING QUALITY ASSURANCE IN INDUSTRY**

**Development of Naval Quality Assurance Directorate in The Royal Australian Navy (RAN)**

Previous to the formation of Naval Quality Assurance Directorate, the quality of goods purchased by the Department was monitored primarily by inspection. The inspections were carried out by Navy field elements such as, General Overseer and Superintendent of Inspection (GOSI) and Inspector of Naval Ordnance (INO). It became evident that inspection alone does not give rise to confidence in the quality of goods accepted. Some of the problems associated with accepting goods based on final inspection are:
- Onus is placed on a single individual, viz inspector.
- Monotony of inspection leads to fatigue and inefficiency.
- Defects are often hidden.
- Contractors develop the ‘beat the inspector’ syndrome.

One of the golden rules of quality assurance is that ‘quality cannot be inspected into a product; it must be built in’. The realisation that inspection does not lead to quality and that the maintenance of quality systems is a more accurate indicator of final quality was strengthened by the Rabie report on quality assurance in Government purchasing, (UK). The Rabie report published during late 60s fuelled the drive towards adopting quality systems as the basis for Defence purchasing.

The Kent and Callaghan report commissioned by the Department in 1971 to look into the aspects of quality management in Defence procurements recommended several initiatives. The Directorate of Naval Quality Assurance (DNQA) was formed around 1972 as a result of this report. The report recognised the increasing importance of quality assurance in RAN and recommended the formation of a separate Directorate of Naval Quality Assurance. Fig. 1 depicts the formation and development of DNQA since 1972.

Previous to 1972, matters relating to quality assurance were handled by a Principal Engineer responsible for Materials Engineering and Standardisation. The DNQA during inception stages, consisted of two subsections. One was the old Materials Engineering and Standardisation (ME&S) and the other was Systems and Procedures (S&P). Initially, ME&S carried the bulk of the Directorate’s work dealing with the selection and standardisation of materials for the Navy. The S&P carried only a minor part of the Directorate’s workload. It was beginning to develop procedures and systems for the quality assurance of procurements.

As the complexity of naval procurements grew, the necessity for detailed work instructions in the form of Naval Quality Assurance instructions (NQAIs), the need for training of Navy staff and development of suppliers assessment criteria became apparent. It was being realised that assessment of suppliers for their quality systems is an integral part of assuring the overall quality of suppliers goods. Assistance with the introduction of quality control systems to major suppliers of Navy became a priority and more and more of the Directorate’s staff were conducting assessments and audits of the suppliers.

During the late 1970s, three FFGs were being built in US for purchase by DOD and this gave a boost to RANs quality assurance activities. The offset work as a result of the purchase led to contracts being placed on at least 20 Australian firms including Wormalds and John
DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL QA DIRECTORATE

KEY
CNE : CHIEF OF NAVAL ENGINEERING
DGNP : DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NAVAL PRODUCTION
PE MES : PRINCIPLE ENGINEER, MATERIALS ENGINEERING & STANDARDIZATION
DNQA : DIRECTOR OF NAVAL QUALITY ASSURANCE

FIG. 1
Valves. The contracts specified mandatory quality systems and DOD was required to assess the firms for their quality systems. The Defence industry as a whole was being called upon to meet the challenge of introducing quality systems to national standards.

During 1980, the Department as a result of the offset work, recognised the growing importance of assisting Defence industry on quality assurance and decided that the Directorate should fully concentrate on quality assurance alone. Accordingly, the section dealing with Materials Engineering and Standardisation was transferred to Design Branch. Since 1981, the Directorate has been assisting firms which requested assessment of their quality systems with a view to upgrading it and to be eventually in a position to bid for Defence contracts.

The RAN is fully committed to the principles and practice of quality assurance. Although the RAN has areas where there is a further scope for efficiency through quality systems, the Navy at least has the basic organisational structure in place for effective implementation and promotion of quality systems. The commitment of a company's management towards quality can be gauged by its organisational structure. Real commitment is reflected in the status of the quality manager, his defined authority and his access to the top manager. The proposed and current organisational structure of Navy (Quality) reflects an ideal organisational structure as recommended by Stebbing. (See Fig 2).

DNQA was, until 1984, responsible to the Director General of Naval Production (DGNP). A basic requirement of quality systems is that the quality assurance manager should be independent of any conflicting interests and be able to report direct to senior management. Accordingly, since 1984, the Director of Naval Quality Assurance (who has the status of Engineer Class 5), reports direct to the Chief of Naval Engineering. DNQA is one of only two officers of his rank with direct access to a senior officer with the rank of a two star General.

Since its formation, the work of the Directorate has considerable effect in the following areas (See Table 2):

- Productivity of some Defence industries through assistance on quality system implementation.
- Training of field Navy staff on quality matters.
- Standardisation of quality systems through Naval Quality Assurance Instructions.
- An increased awareness and a change in perception of quality systems by some industry managers leading to a willingness by industries to see quality systems as a tool to increase their profitability.

A broad view of the functions of the Directorate is shown in Fig. 3.

As outlined, the Directorate's work has grown in complexity and magnitude, reflecting the growing importance of quality systems in today's quality conscious world. The Directorate's tasks include policy development, assessment and audit of Defence industry, quality engineering, specification and contractual development and provision of training. Thus, the RAN through the Directorate, is playing a vital role in the management of quality systems in Defence industry and it is hoped that these initiatives will percolate to Australian industry in general, resulting in increased productivity and national wealth.

In summary, the formation of the Directorate was preceded by a world wide shift in emphasis towards quality systems from the old practice of inspection alone. Since the formation of the Directorate, the RAN has moved away from the philosophy of accepting goods based on inspection to one of insisting on the maintenance of quality systems in the contractors operations. Effective control on the maintenance of quality systems is carried out through audits, assessments and in-house procedural development.

### Department of Defence Initiatives on QA

The Department of Defence, as a responsible arm of the Federal Government, recognises its unique position to influence the introduction of quality systems in industry through preferential treatment of firms with approved quality systems when awarding contracts. A vigorous pro-
motion of quality systems through audits/assessments and training leads to a viable, competitive and profitable industry which will be in a sound position to compete with foreign companies for Defence contracts. A strong industry would also be able to compete for overseas Defence contracts and seek out overseas market niches. The Department would ultimately benefit in that the goods supplied by industry would be of better quality, and of lower cost.

The current Defence initiatives on quality assurance can be grouped into the following categories:

- Training
- Assessments/Audits
- Memorandum of Agreements
- Quality Awards
- Major Projects

The above activities have an impact on the quality systems in industry either through the simple process of raising an awareness or by direct enforcement by contract conditions. These initiatives are briefly outlined below.

Training

DNQA recognises the importance of training in increasing the overall quality of goods and services provided by the RAN. A summary of training programs conducted by DNQA is shown in Table 3. The Directorate aims to provide training and courses to essential areas such as Navy field elements, although a number of industry representatives have also attended the courses.

These training programs have contributed significantly in increasing the awareness of QA techniques and principles in the RAN. There is still considerable scope for improvement including:

a. An increase in the frequency and depth of QA courses to include sections on statistical quality control and new advances in quality assurance.
b. The provision of a formal training course on assessments and audits with certification requirement.
c. The availability of training to Defence industry executives.
d. Provision of in-depth training to other functional Directorates of Navy Office especially in QC of design.

Contractor Assessments/Audits

Contractor assessment is an essential function of the Directorate. The Directorate has been conducting assessment of firms for their quality systems to demonstrate contractor compliance
with contractual obligations and also upon request under other circumstances. However, due to increasing workload, assessments are now restricted only to those firms who are potential suppliers for the Department. Assessment and audits awaken firms to the likely improvements to their production costs and spreads the knowledge and skills of quality management. It has a multiplier effect in that the firms may, in turn, require compliance to the quality systems from their sub-contractors. Table 2 shows the number of assessments and audits conducted by the Directorate which is limited by the available resources. Hence, there is an urgent need for outside organisations to carry out assessments and audits.

Memorandum of Agreements with Foreign Governments

Many Australian firms manufacture and export Defence related equipments and parts to overseas Governments. Generally, the foreign Governments want to assure themselves that the Australian company maintains a level of QC system appropriate to the contract that may be awarded. Before awarding a contract to potential Australian companies, one of the factors that would be considered by a foreign Government include the ease of maintaining surveillance of firm’s QC systems. The foreign Governments prefer to arrange the quality assurance services through the Department of Defence rather than maintaining their QA representative in Australia.

Before such an arrangement can be in place, the foreign Government needs to make a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Australian Government. The MOA would form the framework on which the Department of Defence would carry out quality assurance on Australian companies on behalf of the foreign Government. The Department would assess the adequacy of the company’s QC systems including the technical inspection of materials, testing of components and end products and would certify to the foreign Government that the technical requirements of a procurement contract are met.

The Department recognises that the MOAs are an important element in putting the Australian industry on a solid footing when they tender for overseas contracts. Without the MOAs in place, the foreign Governments would be reluctant to let contracts to Australian companies. The MOAs primary function is, of course, to assist the Department in that it provides a mechanism whereby the QA of Defence goods purchased by the Australian Government can be carried out in the foreign country. Where necessary, the Department is striving to arrange MOAs with other relevant countries. Table 4 shows the countries with which the Department of Defence has a Memorandum of Agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>Feb 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Jul 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Oct 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Nov 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Oct 84 (later version)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Nov 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Nov 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>currently under negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>currently under negotiation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quality Awards

To encourage quality in Defence industry, the Department introduced in 1983, the ‘Quality and Achievement Award’ scheme. The award is presented annually. Australian organisations which achieve a high standard of quality of supplies (for contracts worth more than $200,000) and comply to stated time of delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>Award Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>North Queensland Engineers &amp; Agents Pty Ltd, Cairns, Qld</td>
<td>Navy 1822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Mack Trucks (Australia) Pty Ltd, Rocklea, Qld</td>
<td>Army 1822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Qantas Airways, Sydney, NSW</td>
<td>Air Force 1821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>British Aerospace (Australia) Ltd, Salisbury, SA</td>
<td>Navy 1821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Australian Training Aids Pty Ltd</td>
<td>Army 1821</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IDEAL ORGANISATION WITH QA

MANAGING DIRECTOR

QUALITY ASSURANCE

ADMINISTRATION

ENGINEERING & DESIGN

PROCUREMENT

PRODUCTION

MAINTENANCE

QUALITY CONTROL

CALIBRATION

QA ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE IN RAN (PROPOSED)

CLS

DNQA

ADMINISTRATION

DG FLP

DG FEDS

DG TMS

DG SS

KEY

CLS : CHIEF OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT
DNQA : DIRECTOR OF NAVAL QUALITY ASSURANCE
DGFLP : DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FORWARD LOGISTIC PLANNING
DGFEDS : DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FORWARD ENGINEERING DESIGN SERVICES
DG TMS : DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE SERVICES
DGSS : DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SUPPLY SERVICES

FIG. 2
and cost are eligible to apply. The award is intended to increase the awareness of quality in the goods produced in Australia and to encourage industry, particularly the Defence industry, to become competitive through good quality management. These awards are stimulating industry's interest in quality systems. Table 5 shows the past and present winners of the award.

**Major Projects**

Several projects now with the Department are having a major impact on the quality systems in industry. Between the New Construction Submarine and ANZAC Ship projects, the Department will incur an expenditure of $7b. The Australian industry involvement in the projects is well over 60%. These projects will introduce new technology, materials and processing techniques to the Australian industry.

Table 6 lists a number of major projects which are, and will have significant effects on Australian industry’s quality systems. There will be numerous opportunities for technology transfer in various fields such as software development, computer hardware, motor and valve industries and fibreglass construction. One of the significant impacts of these projects would be an increased willingness to implement quality management systems by industry.

**Table 6**

Major Projects — Industries Effected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Project</th>
<th>Industries Effected</th>
<th>Quality System Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Construction Submarine</td>
<td>Metal forming industries, motors and valve industries, ship building, electronics, software and hardware</td>
<td>AS 1821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZAC Ship</td>
<td></td>
<td>AS 1821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Frigate Project</td>
<td></td>
<td>AS 1821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minewarfare Systems Centre</td>
<td>Electronics/computer software/hardware</td>
<td>AS 1821-1822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minehunter Inshore Project</td>
<td>Fibreglass industries, shipbuilding, hydraulics</td>
<td>AS 1822</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Departmental policy that both the Prime Contractor and his sub-contractors should meet relevant quality standards results in the percolation of QC systems down to majority of subcontractors.

**Future Direction**

The RAN insists that all major Defence suppliers be assessed to relevant Australian quality standards. However, the Navy Office including design and other branches should themselves work to these standards. DNQA is working with other sections of Navy Office to this end, although much remains to be done. A Quality Assurance Manager, the industry equivalent of DNQA, would not only have ultimate responsibility for quality, but would conduct regular audits on various departments and maintain surveillance to satisfy himself that adequate quality levels are maintained within all facets of the organisation. Hence, the question of assigning these responsibilities to the Directorate needs consideration by RAN.

QA should be applied throughout the life cycle of military hardware starting from conception and design to storage and handling ("Total QA Concept"). The current practice of applying QA to procurements only is a ‘piecemeal’ approach. However, this is being realised and the Directorate is now providing input into design control and reviews. It is hoped that further QA input in other areas may occur in future.

The function and importance of training activities currently conducted by the Directorate could be expanded. The expertise on QA/QC within the Directorate is highly regarded by the industry. This expertise could be tapped to impart necessary training to Defence industries. The current organisations which have an impact on the development of quality Systems in Australia (eg SAA, AOQC and Australia for Quality) are fragmented and lack unified direction. We need to consider the Japanese initiatives to overcome this problem. During the 60s, the Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) got together to develop and define various training aids and material that was the beginning of quality awareness and eventual mastering of the art of quality control. The planning, organising and bringing together of various quality organisations with a view to establishing a comprehensive training program
RAN - DIRECTORATE OF NAVAL QUALITY ASSURANCE

AN OVERVIEW OF FUNCTIONS

DIRECTORATE OF NAVAL QUALITY ASSURANCE

QADAG
POLICY DEVELOPMENT
DEFENCE INDUSTRY CONTRACTORS
ASSESSMENTS AND AUDITS
RAN PROCUREMENTS
QUALITY ENGG SPECIFICATION CONTRACT DEVELOPMENT
NAVY FIELD ELEMENTS
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION (TRAINING, NQAIs)

KEY

QADAG: QUALITY ASSURANCE DIRECTORS ADVISORS GROUP

FIG. 3
throughout the country may be outside the charter of DOD and could be pursued by other relevant Government bodies. However, the Department enjoys the unique advantage of retaining a higher level of expertise on quality systems than any other public service organisation. It should thus be aggressively supporting new initiatives for a national body on quality such as that proposed by the Review Committee[1].

The number of Institutes/Colleges offering formal diplomas and certificates is very low and currently number about four. The Federal Government could take initiatives to influence the Institutes to offer more places in applied science and engineering. There is an immediate need for such courses in Canberra.

The Department could further strive to get the quality message to the industry executives and to the community at large. A certain month should be set aside nationally as the Quality Month of the Year. This system already operates in US where October is declared to be the Quality Month and Canada appears to be following this trend. The Department could persuade the Government to bring a similar arrangement to Australia.

The Department could consider further incentives to industry by restricting tenders to firms who already have an approved quality system in place. This has already been recommended by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Public Accounts, 1985.

The US, UK and Japan have pioneered various new techniques in quality systems. As Australia is isolated from these countries, it is essential that more quality specialists from the Department are seconded to these countries in order to pick up the advances and eventually pass the skills to Australian industry.

A detailed survey of industries across the country similar to the AOQC survey should be conducted by relevant Government bodies to study the extent and depth of quality systems in different industries and different states to identify trends in QA levels. This would form a basis for targeting the available manpower resources, skills and funds to those industries/states which need immediate attention.

Australia is running well behind its trading partners in the competitive game of winning overseas markets and the Federal Government should explore further options for effective dissemination of quality systems to Australian industry as a matter of urgency.

Future challenge for RAN and the Directorate lies in developing skills and procedures for the surveillance of new growth technology based industries, eg computer software and biotechnology. While the basic principles are the same, QA of software is different and the Directorate will need to develop procedures, assessment criteria and training aids tailored to these industries.

Conclusions

The road to national wealth generation is through quality assurance by improving the quality and productivity of products manufactured. It should be seen as one of the prime means for overcoming the current economic problems.

‘Productivity Through Quality’ should be the national motto for industry. The surest means of increasing productivity is through quality.

The low level of QA in Australian industry is attributable to the structural weakness of the industry. Government assistance is essential to increase QA in industry. The Department of Defence is uniquely positioned to do the job, and is playing a useful part in the dissemination of quality system technology to industry, although several new initiatives could be pursued and much remains to be done.

Assessments/Audits of companies and coordination of training in quality will increase the level of QA in industry. Money spent on these activities will be a future asset and should be vigorously pursued.

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Royal Australian Air Force Chinook helicopter taking on infantry soldiers from the Operational Deployment Force.
The Malayan Emergency

By Major R. F. Alcorn, RL, BA, Dip.Ed., JP.

It would be easy to dismiss the Malayan emergency, as yet another struggle for independence from colonial masters. An army made up of well meaning nationalists in revolt. This was not the case, because the Malayan Peoples Army was made up of mainly ethnic Chinese. An army attempting to force their political views upon the vast majority, by the typical communist revolutionary method.

Prior to World War II, Malaya was made up of three distinct groups of states. Each group was ruled by a Sultan under British protection and influence. They each had separate and distinct administrations, heavily influenced by the British. The three groups were: The Straits Settlements, consisting of Singapore, Penang and Malacca. The Federated Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, and the Unfederated Malay States of Johore, Kedah, Trengganu, Kelantan and Perlis. Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis and Kedah, were ceded to the British by Siam in 1909. This gave Britain control of the whole Malay peninsula. Britain continued colonial rule, until the Second World War interrupted the colonialists pleasant tropical lifestyle.

The Japanese invasion of Malaya in early 1942, and the eventual loss of the British Far Eastern Fortress of Singapore, dealt a heavy blow to the British war effort, and put Australia under the threat of invasion. The Japanese occupation of Malaya was very harsh, and the atrocities committed in Malaya, reflect a poor image of the Japanese soldier.

The Japanese occupation of Malaya, dissipated the myth of the white man's superiority in Asia. This gave the impetus to many ethnic populations under Colonial rule, to work toward eventual independence after World War II. The communists found the war to be a great advantage in their ideological struggle. The Malayan communists used the war to train and arm their fighters. Their eventual goal was to turn Malaya into a Socialist State. In return for British weapons and instructors, the communists formed an army to fight the Japanese. The Malayan Peoples Anti Japanese Army was formed, and the communists gained much valuable experience in fighting a guerilla type war. Their tactics tied up large regular forces. Years later the communists would use these tactics in an attempt to eventually destroy their enemy's will to fight, by long drawn out and costly sustained operations.

The Malayan communists hoped that the British might not return to Malaya after World War II. This would leave them with the only trained and disciplined force in Malaya, ready to implant their own political system. The communists believed this would be helped by support from the local population, because of their heroic stand against the Japanese forces. However, the communists' plans were not realised, and they turned to alternative objectives.

Immediately after the surrender of Japanese forces, the British returned and resumed colonial rule. The British had hoped that all would return to the pre-war days of elegance and luxury. They anticipated the complete acceptance of colonial rule by the local population. But the British noticed a different mood among the people. A drive from within to look toward national independence; a chance to govern themselves after the hardships of war. The communists sought to use this national feeling to their own advantage. This feeling of restlessness could be exploited to increase communist party membership and elicit much needed support.

The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) between 1946 and 1948 attempted to further their political ends by involvement in accepted political parties, and control of the trade unions. The MCP by mid March 1947, directly controlled 80-90 per cent of the unions in Malaya. Control of the trade unions gave the MCP political power. The use of this power by organised strikes and the general disruption of industry, would create social chaos. This would present a situation favourable for a revolution by the workers, with eventual overthrow of the Government. These attempts by the MCP to gain their political objectives eventually failed.

The faction of the MCP arguing for an armed struggle was strengthened in 1947, by the defection of the MCP's Secretary General, Lai
Tek. It was later learned that Lai Tek had been a double agent, and this was the catalyst for moving all MCP activities underground, and to prepare for an armed struggle.\(^{(2)}\)

On 1 February 1948, all the Malay States were Federated under one King. This Federation came about as a result of agreements between the British and the various Sultans. Singapore however, remained a separate British Crown Colony. After Federation the Central Government of Malaya moved to Kuala Lumpur, along with the British High Commissioner. This did nothing to stop the increasing violence in the streets, and the crisis looming ahead.

The communists aimed to spread rebellion against the British and their supporters (running dogs) wherever they could, and commenced on a campaign of terror. One June 16, 1948, three English rubber planters were tied to trees and murdered. This incident heralded the start of a spate of very brutal atrocities, and the commencement of twelve years of jungle war.

After strong public demand in Malaya and London, the Government of the Federation of Malaya declared an “Emergency”. The Government banned the Malayan Communist Party, and threw the British, Gurkha and Malay troops stationed in Malaya, against this communist army operating from their jungle hideouts. A communist army which had fought the Japanese, and since World War II had secretly built up their strength.

In retrospect, we can see that after World War II, the majority of the world’s conflicts have been undeclared, and not officially referred to as wars. For example, the Korean campaign was officially called a “Police Action” by the United Nations. But why did the Malayan campaign inherit the title “Emergency”? Certainly the idea of the communists was to strike terror and panic into their opponents and the population of Malaya, but they also had a well trained, disciplined, organised army. In the early stages of the campaign, it was estimated by some as totalling a figure of 70,000. This figure was broken up into fifteen fighting regiments (the main core uniformed army), the Min Yuen (a plain clothes organisation, incorporating special agents, couriers, and their “Cloak and Dagger” force), and the specialised “Killer Squads”, who carried out the assassinations from the elimination lists drawn up by the Political Committees.

They excelled in the art of striking terror, by brutal murders on lonely roads and plantations, and large scale attacks on isolated security posts in platoon and company strength. But their deliberate destruction of property, may have contributed to the naming of this conflict. It is possible that if the conflict had been officially declared a war, then British property (heavily insured in and outside of Malaya) destroyed during the campaign, would be rendered exempt from insurance claims. By calling the campaign an “Emergency”, the colonial property owners would still be able to claim on insurance for any war damage inflicted on property. Regardless of the title, it was a hard fought, drawn out campaign.

The first four years of the “Emergency” were very grave, and it was during this crucial time, that the communists came close to achieving their goals. The British were caught unprepared, and their troops were national servicemen, dreadfully inexperienced particularly in jungle fighting. Late in 1951, the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, was killed in a platoon sized communist ambush. The ambush was situated on a narrow road leading up to the resort of Fraser’s Hill, not far from Kuala Lumpur. This incident, coupled with the very grave situation on the battlefield, caused the British to view the situation in Malaya in a more serious light. The communist soldier was more than a match for the British National Serviceman, and the white man’s myth of superiority looked like taking a tumble again. London reacted accordingly, and took measures to reverse the situation.

General, Sir Gerald Templer, was given the dual responsibilities of Military and Civil administrations. In 1952 the situation began to look a little better, as Templer with his supreme authority, began to make decisions which would eventually lead to the defeat of the communist army. A defeat that has not been repeated since. He began to concentrate on the “hearts and minds” of the people, and ceased pouring more and more combat troops into the jungle. He began to contain the communists with the forces at hand, the Resettlement Programme, and the “Hearts and Minds” Programme. His tactics called for relentless pressure on the communists, to eventually wear them down by death, capture or surrender, and the denial of essential supplies. The tactics gave the communists no time to re-organise, train or go onto the offensive.
The first Australians to see service in Malaya, were members of the RAAF. Flying Lincoln bombers, they did splendid work attacking communist positions in the jungle. I had the great pleasure of witnessing one of their night operations, and was duly impressed with the value of bombers. The Australian Lincolns flew 4000 sorties between July 1950 and July 1958, dropping the major bomb tonnage of the entire campaign.

One area of the Malayan campaign in which bombers were of tremendous value, was pin point precision bombing. On many occasions, ground forces often assaulted empty communist bases. This happened because it was reasonably easy for the communists to detect large forces moving close to their main bases. To counteract this, an electronic signalling device was developed, and planted very close to, or inside, communist-occupied main bases, by small patrols of the Special Air Service. This allowed heavy bombers to accurately pin point communist positions, and drop their loads on target. This method was particularly successful during the campaign.

The Australian Army did not get involved in the Malayan campaign until 1955. The ending of the war in Korea, allowed the release of forces for duty in Malaya. The first Australian troops to take part were volunteers; battle hardened veterans from service in Korea. One Infantry Battalion, and one Artillery Battery were constantly on the ground until the Emergency ended. These troops easily slid into the role of jungle fighters and performed well.

The Australian political scene leading up to our commitment to the war, was of interest because of the accusations made against the Australian communist in the Federal Parliament.*

The 1949 Australian Federal Election, saw the end of the Labor Party in office, and ushered in a new Conservative Party led by Robert Gordon Menzies. During the election campaign, Menzies made the most of the perceived communist threat. The successful establishment of communist governments in a number of Eastern European countries, and the communist victory in China, helped play-up the fears of communist expansion. Menzies retied the commonwealth knot with Britain, which had come undone during World War II, when Curtin established intimate relations with the United States. Menzies was also concerned with the "domino" theory, of nations falling one by one to the communist revolution in Asia. He believed that if all else failed then force was justified. Malaya became a concern for the Menzies led Party when in Opposition. In September 1948, suggestions came from the Opposition to send HMAS Shropshire and HMAS Canberra to Malaya, to demonstrate Australian support for the British Government in their fight against communism. Mr Chifley the Australian Prime Minister replied, that certain requests have been made by the British Government for assistance. Consequently, a few rifles and sten guns were sent to Malaya as aid.

During 1948, the Opposition in the Federal Parliament pressed home their concerns about the Malayan campaign. In particular, they suggested that the Australian Communist Party was involved, by travelling to Malaya, and helping the Malayan communists to incite civil war in that Country. The Opposition accused the Government of not taking action against these traitors.

The Opposition continued to apply the pressure on the Government in late 1948, particularly in relation to the alleged involvement of the Australian Communists in Malaya. It was stated that a leading Australian Communist and Trade Union Leader berated the Malayan communists because they did not revolt quickly or violently enough, and this was published in a Malayan newspaper.

The Malayan campaign became a busy football in Federal Parliament, with kick and counter-kick between the Opposition and Government. However, there was a very serious accusation by the Opposition (with much supporting evidence), that an Australian communist had purchased Twelve ex-RAAF Catalina flying boats, and was smuggling guns and gold to the Malayan communists. The airline was operating out of Thailand, and this Australian communist was the Managing Director.

It appears very likely that the Australian communists were involved in the Malayan campaign. There is a lot of historical evidence to suggest that at least they might have made the
attempt to help, and certainly gave moral support, to the Malayan communists. It is significant that after World War II, Russia held high hopes for the expansion of communism. Stalin had urged communists the world over, not to worry about the "Capitalist strongholds" in the West, but to look to the Far East; to the peoples "coming to nationhood", and awaiting "leadership".

Malaya was only one of a string of Communist expansion attempts after World War II. China, Korea and Vietnam are well known attempts, but there were also Burma and Indonesia, who kept the communists at bay without major conflicts.\(^{(9)}\)

The Australian Government under Chifley, did not appear to have much interest in the situation in Malaya. In early 1949, a statement by the Opposition that Australians were being murdered by the communists in Malaya, brought a reply from the Government that "Malaya is no concern of ours".\(^{(10)}\) This Australian attitude lasted until the Federal Elections in 1949, when the new Conservative Government under Menzies, changed our Foreign Policies. Then in 1950, the RAAF were committed to action over the jungles of Malaya, and by 1955 we had inserted ground troops.

### Conclusion

The Malayan jungle is very thick, and difficult to describe, particularly to anyone who has never penetrated anything deeper than a well cooked pavlova. But it was not impenetrable, nor did it totally conceal a communist army. However, it did make the going tough, and coupled with other aspects peculiar to this campaign, led many British historians to describe the Malayan campaign as the most difficult small war that any government had to fight in British Colonial history.\(^{(11)}\)

The "Emergency" was officially declared over on 31 July 1960. At the end of the campaign approximately 5,000 Australians had taken part. The vast majority of the Australian force were combatants, with logistics being provided by the British forces in residence.

By the end of 1960, most of the communist army had come down from the jungle clad hills, except for about 2,000 hard liners, who decided to fight on from their hideouts across the Thai border. Now, in 1987 some 27 years after the "Emergency" officially ended, the Thais have offered a peace package to the hard liners and their supporters. This "package" included resettlement within Thailand, and no forcible return across the border to Malaysia.\(^{(12)}\) The "package" has been accepted by the communists, and the Malayan campaign is now finally over.

### NOTES

4. ibid., p. 31.
5. ibid., p. 59.
7. ibid., p. 52.
8. ibid., p. 69.
Police Dogs in the RAAF A Brief History

By Staff of Provost Marshal, RAAF

Introduction

Throughout the history of warfare, from the days of the Medes and the Persians and the conquests of the Roman Empire, to the police action in Korea, dogs have undergone active service at the sides of their masters or have been used in direct support of active operations. Initially, entire formations of attack dogs, frequently equipped with armour or spiked collars were sent into battle against the enemy as recognized and effective instruments of offensive warfare. However, with the development of long range warfare and the consequent change in military tactics, the value of dogs as combat soldiers steadily diminished. At the same time his usefulness in other military activities has increased. During World War I, vast numbers of dogs were employed as sentries, messengers, ammunition carriers, scouts, sled dogs and casualty dogs. It is estimated that Germany alone employed over 30,000 dogs for such purposes and about 20,000 served with the French army. The American and British forces had no organized dogs units, but borrowed a limited number of dogs from the French and Belgian forces for casualty, messenger and guard duty.

During World War II, dogs were used on the largest scale yet realized and in all, over 250,000 dogs served with the armies of the Allies and Axis powers. A number of these dogs established distinguished records and were officially cited for outstanding and faithful service.

During this war, dog training reached an all time high with patrol work, guarding, tracking, air-borne rescue work and mine detecting. During this period the RAF Guard Dog School came into being in November 1941 and later in April 1946 became known as the RAF Police Dog Training Centre.

The RAAF Experience

Dogs were first introduced into the RAAF during 1943 when, untrained and extremely savage dogs, were placed loose inside warehouses and compounds; tied to aircraft or fixed to long lines in such a manner that they could run back and forth. In 1954 trained Police dogs and handlers, operating as man/dog patrol teams, were introduced into the RAAF and an RAAF
A Job Well Done
Police Dog Training Centre was formed on 26 August 1954 at No 2 Central Reserve, RAAF Albury NSW. About 16 months later on 19 December 1955, the Centre was moved to No 1 Stores Depot, RAAF Tottenham, Victoria.

In these early stages, no trade mustering had been established for the personnel of various musternings and civilians employed on duties with Police dogs. These dogs, drawn from the German Shepherd, Labrador and Doberman Pinscher breeds were selected as much for their controllability as for their aggressiveness. During 1958 formal Police Dog/Security Guard training courses were introduced and only dogs of the German Shepherd breed were used. Graduates of these courses were employed on dog handling duties but remained in their original musternings.

In August 1962 the trade mustering of ‘Security Guard’ was officially introduced and most
Companions

of the airmen who had been trained in 1958 remustered to the new mustering, of 52 posts. In December 1962 No 1 Security Guard Course graduated twenty-two successful Security Guards who were posted to the RAAF's three Stores Depots and No 30 SQN, RAAF Williamtown. During the ensuing years, Security Guard Sections have been established at most major RAAF establishments as follows:

- BSDAR 1965
- BSFBN 1965
- BSTVL 1965
- BSWLM 1966 (Amalgamated with 30 SQN in 1967)
- BSAMB 1968
- BSBUT 1969
- BSEDN 1970
- BSRIC 1971
- RAAFSUTG 1971 (Closed 1983)
- BSPEA 1978
- BSESIL 1983
- BSWTDL 1988

In early 1969, the Police Dog Training Centre was re-located to 7SD and the first course to be conducted at the new location, No 14 Security Guard Course, graduated in April 1969. In 1972, a Security Guard Advanced course was introduced for personnel who had served for two or more years in the mustering however this course was subsequently replaced in 1987 by a Section Management Course which provides corporals with the skills and knowledge required to manage a Police Dog Section. In December 1982, the Defence and Security Training School (now RAAF Security and Fire School) was formed at RAAF Amberley. The Police Dog Training Centre was renamed 'Security Guard Training Flight' and became Detachment A of the new school. In January 1986, following completion of purpose built facilities Security Guard Training Flight moved to RAAF Amberley to become part of the Police and Security Service Training Flight which combined it with the RAAF Police training element however the term Police Dog Training Centre was re-established in the name of the new facility.

Since its inception, sponsorship and administration of the Security Guard, later Police Dog Handler (1986), mustering has rested with the Provost Marshal — Air Force. In 1985, the policing role of the mustering was formally recognised and the Police Dog Handler mustering joined with the RAAF Police and Police Investigator musteringS to form the RAAF Police and Security Service.

**Drug Detector Dogs.** In 1972, following extensive research and evaluation, Drug Detector
Dog teams were introduced into the RAAF to provide investigative search assistance in the detection and investigation of non-medical use of drugs. These Drug Detection teams work with RAAF Police Investigators at two Capital City RAAF Police Offices (Sydney and Darwin) and contribute to the RAAF Police effort in fighting non-medical use of drugs. Further, these teams assist many State and Federal law enforcement agencies involved in the war against drugs.

**Female Police Dog Handlers.** The end of an era came in 1985 when the first female Police Dog Handler, ACW Josephine Emslie, graduated from Basic Security Guard course and proceeded on posting to RAAF Williamtown. Since then more women have joined the ranks of the Police Dog Handler mustering after attaining the same academic and physical standards as their male counterparts.

**Conclusion**

The Police Dog Handler mustering will celebrate its 30th birthday this year, the year of Australia’s Bicentenary when it can look back over thirty years of service, in war and peace, providing protection to the RAAF’s aircraft and installations. The years ahead will no doubt provide challenge with new technology attempting to replace the ‘doggie’ however nothing yet invented or envisaged can match him in his ability to detect, track down and apprehend his adversary and with that capability the RAAF’s aircraft are in safe hands.
By Wendy Heckenberg, Department of Defence

Synopsis:

PRESIDENT Kennedy took office when the credibility and prestige of the United States in the international arena were reaching an all-time low. Vietnam would become the place where the US could demonstrate its firmness, and Kennedy could dispel rumours that inferred his Administration was "soft on Communism".

Up until 1961, the US had observed the ceilings for military personnel in Vietnam that had been stipulated in the Geneva Agreements of 1954. However, concerned by the growing insurgency in South Vietnam, Kennedy took a series of steps that breached the accords, and hence a period of increasing military intervention by the US began.

Although Kennedy had resisted pressures from his military and civilian advisers to commit US ground forces to Vietnam, his decision to engage in counterinsurgency operations and to increase the number of military advisers in that country, signified the start of an increasingly irrevocable commitment.

Vietnam and the Kennedy Administration

The Geneva Conference which facilitated the end of the First Indochina War was successful in establishing a period of "relative quiet" in Vietnam, short-lived though it may have been. The temporary division of the country at the seventeenth parallel permitted French Union Forces to regroup in the South, while the Communist forces regrouped in the North. Elections to unify the country were to be held within two years of signing the Agreements.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam expected to win any election, and throughout 1955 and 1956, "combined its constant appeals for them with a willingness to have them under international supervision as provided for in the accords."

As long as there remained hope for reunification through the conduct of elections, cadres who remained in the South were ordered to engage in "political struggle" only. Ngo Dinh Diem's government in the South, however, (with the encouragement and support of the United States) refused to accept the provisions of the Geneva Agreements and to respond to the call for national elections. (Neither government had been signatories to the Agreements.) The United States, with the events of Korea still fresh in its memory, wanted to ensure that the "creeping menace" of Communism spread no further. The provisional demarcation line at the seventeenth parallel had therefore become a permanent border to the US and the government in South Vietnam, and the foundations for the Second Indochina War were firmly in place.

"By May 1955 France to all intents and purposes was out of Vietnam and the US had assumed responsibility for large-scale economic and military aid to Diem, in particular the creation and training of a strong South Vietnamese army." Over the next five years American involvement increased in line with its broad commitment to prevent the Communist domination of South Vietnam. When President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, National Intelligence Estimate reports had indicated that the situation in Vietnam was "extremely critical". Although Kennedy had, during his three years of office, resisted pressures for sending in US ground troops, his decision to "break the armistice provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords ... and to engage ... in counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam" marked a new era of American commitment, one in which it would become increasingly difficult to consider withdrawal.

* * * *

Since the fall of China to the Communists in 1949, US global strategy had become increasingly concerned with the threat that Communism posed to the Free World. The "domino theory", bandied around in Washington, became even more pertinent to administrators after the Korean War and the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu. US defence planners had added "limited" or "conventional" warfare to the option of "massive retaliation" in the event of a clash with Communism, but "new-comers"
such as Robert McNamara, were now presenting the strategy of counterinsurgency for what became known as "brush-fire wars". National revolutions, argued McNamara and others such as Generals Maxwell Taylor and Edward Lansdale, could be suppressed through the "unobtrusive despatch of small numbers of US advisers to train and equip local inhabitants." It was this principle of SPECIAL WARFARE that was to become the basic strategy used by the Kennedy Administration in Vietnam.

In Kennedy's first year of office, Vietnam was only one of several problems facing his administration. Gelb argues that "other crises took most of the administration's attention, a situation that paradoxically was partly responsible for the increase in the US commitment to Vietnam." The failure of the American-backed attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs in April; talks between Khrushchev and Kennedy in Vienna in May and June, with the resulting "loss of face" for the young American; Khrushchev's pledge of support for "wars of national liberation"; and Kennedy's instructions to Averell Harriman to reach a diplomatic solution on Laos at the Geneva Conference, were factors that seriously eroded both the prestige and credibility of the United States. The need, therefore, to make its power credible was vital: "a demonstration of American resolve in one place where there existed an open Communist challenge to declared American interests . . . would prove the President's toughness not only to the Russians and Chinese but also to conservative critics at home." Vietnam was fast becoming the place to test the new strategy of "Special Warfare" and, more importantly, to re-establish US credibility.

Since 1959, the situation in Vietnam had deteriorated rapidly. The Communists in the South, with the open support of the DRV, had secured large sections of the countryside. President Diem, in his attempts to counter the insurgency, only succeeded in repressing and alienating much of the population, thus creating further pressure for armed struggle. During 1961, Kennedy authorised no less than three investigative missions to determine the extent of the "difficulties" in South Vietnam. While touring East Asia, Vice President Johnson visited Saigon in May and concluded that prompt American action, combining an increase in the size of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) with programs for political and economic reform, would save the country from the Communists. Professor Eugene Staley, in Saigon from May to July, urged for increased US aid to the country, and presented a general strategy which emphasised local militia defence. The third "fact-finding" mission took place in October, when General Taylor and Walt Rostow (White House adviser on South East Asia) travelled to Vietnam. Both argued that the problem was basically a military one, and stressed that US commitment was necessary.

Kennedy had also set up a special Task Force in April of 61, under the direction of Roswell Gilpatrick. In presenting its final report, the Task Force recommended, among other options, the covert deployment of 400 Special Forces troops and 100 other military advisers. This report provided the basis for National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 52, dated May 11, which detailed a program of steps designed to strengthen the government in South Vietnam. The adoption of these policies, together with those of NSAM 111 of November 22 (which further increased aid and the number of US advisers), led to a substantial escalation of America's intervention in Vietnam.

The Kennedy Administration had therefore undertaken a whole range of military, political and economic strategies in its bid to counter the growing insurgency in South Vietnam. It saw its increasing presence in the country "as a precondition, if not a guarantee, of eventual reforms" by the Diem regime.

Although military measures were given greater priority, the US introduced a broad economic and social program designed to have both a short-term impact, as well as contribute to the longer-term development of the country. The goals of the development program included:

1. the training of village officials;
2. rural and civil inoculation programs;
3. expansion of education;
4. improvement of communications;
5. road construction;
6. aid to farmers;
7. pest control;
8. resettlement of villages endangered by guerrillas;
9. Mekong Delta flood relief construction;
10. public works to end unemployment; and
11. industrial development.

To finance these programs, the US provided budgetary support, economic development as-
sistance, and continued its Commodity Import Program.

Of the "non-military" strategies, the program for the construction of STRATEGIC HAMLETS was accorded highest priority. Similar to Diem's earlier system of agrovilles, and consistent with Staley's proposals for local militia defence, the Strategic Hamlet program relocated peasants to fortified villages in order to separate them from local guerrillas. By denying the guerrillas food, intelligence, and recruits, the RVN and US governments believed they could eventually arrest insurgency in the countryside.  

In terms of military strategies, the US envisaged a "limited partnership" with the RVN: "in waging a Special War Kennedy hoped to keep US forces in the background, to support and build Saigon, not to do its fighting." The Presidential Action Program of May 1961 "approved the basic elements of the MAACV Counterinsurgency Plan and increased its financial aid by $41 million". NSAMs 52 and 111 made further provisions for increases in military aid and the number of US advisers in South Vietnam, while also approving the conduct of clandestine operations.

Hence, in spring and summer of 1962, the situation on the ground in South Vietnam had changed considerably. The ARVN had raised its force level to 220,000 men; the number of US advisers (now also permitted to accompany ARVN troops on anti-guerrilla patrols) had increased from 685 in 1961 to 11,000; Special Forces conducted civic action programs among the ethnic minorities in the central highlands; Civilian Irregular Defence Groups had been organised and trained; and programs in psychological warfare, village administration, technical assistance and propaganda had been established. The US had also recently introduced helicopter transport for the ARVN, while "American fighter pilots participated in air strikes . . . warships patrolled the waters below the seventeenth parallel and American military technicians handled communications equipment in combat." By the end of 1962, the ARVN, with its greater mobility, increased training, and new weapons, had gone on the offensive and temporarily held the battlefield initiative. This situation fostered an optimism in Washington, leading many to believe that the war would soon end, and that all US military assistance could be withdrawn by 1965.

While the United States had been stepping up its military and economic assistance to the Diem regime, the DRV had been using the Ho Chi Minh Trail to infiltrate men, arms and supplies to the South on an increasing scale. However, in 1962, the Communists' People Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) began to suffer sizable casualties, as the ARVN launched swiftly mounted search-and-destroy missions. In response, "the Viet Cong loosed a wave of assassinations and kidnappings of Saigon supporters, presumably to offset the drastic effect of its staggering losses." The unfamiliarity with the new weapons and equipment of the ARVN caused a sense of fear and urgency within the PLAF, one which its leaders believed could only be overcome by immediate counter-response. The PLAF began to study the new weapons and equipment introduced by the ARVN, and concentrated on overcoming the armoured strength of the enemy. What the ARVN had gained in mobility and firepower, they had lost in the element of surprise.

The Communists adapted quickly. They learned how to predict helicopter landing zones; how to bring the machines down with small arms and expose them to "preregistered mortars, upright bamboo poles, and punji stakes"; and how to ambush the landing parties at their moment of greatest vulnerability. With concentrated training, and equipment captured from the enemy, the tide of battle once again turned in favour of the Communists in 1963, as the battle at Ap Bac effectively indicated. Previous US and RVN optimism had proved to be premature and misplaced.

The gains for the Communists and their National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL) were not purely military, however. Success was still being achieved through the NFL's "political struggle". The corrupt and increasingly repressive nature of the Diem regime only further aided their cause.

As Diem strengthened his control of the bureaucracy, and repeatedly ignored US requests for political, economic and social reforms, his popularity among the urban classes fell dramatically. His policies for land reform, pacification and the construction of strategic hamlets, likewise alienated a great proportion of the
rural population he sought to control. Many South Vietnamese, Communists and non-Communists alike, turned to the NFL to pursue their calls for independence and the overthrow of the US-backed Diem regime.

The Strategic Hamlet Program, with perhaps the greatest potential for winning the "hearts and minds" of the population, was extremely unsuccessful in this regard. Overseen by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, the program concentrated on quantity rather than quality in the construction and development of the hamlets, and showed little concern for the needs of the peasants. Osborne suggests that if "This settlement program had been developed efficiently, and had been able, in some fashion, to take account of the social and economic problems involved, it might . . . have had success in preventing the contact between the peasants and insurgents."123

With the situation in South Vietnam once again deteriorating, the Kennedy Administration continued to provide military and economic assistance in 1963. However, US frustration with the Diem regime mounted, as the land and political policies of the Government created mass discontent, and the leader continued to ignore even the most modest US proposals for reform.24

As Diem's control over the military increased, the ARVN became relatively ineffective. It had assumed the role of reinforcing the existing political structure, and was not prepared to fight either a conventional or guerrilla war.25 The Communists were prepared for a long, protracted struggle with the enemy, but the environment being fostered by the Diem Regime indicated that this may not be necessary. Political infighting developed within the bureaucracy, discontent spread throughout the ranks of the military, and demonstrations became an almost daily occurrence. The Buddhists' struggle against the Government, in particular, became a focal point for many South Vietnamese, who identified the plight of the monks with their own calls for freedom: "the monks articulated a broad popular yearning to get rid of Diem, eliminate US influence, restore traditional morality, and establish national harmony. Their ultimate political goal was national reunification under a coalition government."126

With such a revolutionary climate looming in the South, Kennedy's concerns and fears for Vietnam heightened. Diem, once considered the best and most viable alternative for the leadership of South Vietnam, had become an encumbrance, and thus any hopes for the phase-out of American personnel from Vietnam were slowly dwindling. The Communists now had both the political and military advantage, and any withdrawal of US support would ultimately result in their victory.

Washington was to be further distressed by rumors that Ngo Dinh Nhu had approached the DRV, and was considering a possible neutralist solution in Vietnam. It is not surprising then, considering the amount at stake for the Americans in terms of credibility and their crusade against Communism, to discover that "President Kennedy knew and approved of plans for the military coup d'etat that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963."27

* * * *

In October, 1963, American involvement in Vietnam had reached 17,000 men, and with the political and military instability that prevailed after the overthrow of Diem in November, top White House aides convened in Hawaii to discuss their future options. The conference, held shortly before President Kennedy's assassination on November 22, ordered planning for what the Pentagon Papers call "non-attributable hit-and-run" raids against North Vietnam.28 This program was sanctioned by President Lyndon B. Johnson in his first Vietnam policy document, dated November 26, 1963.29

In coming to power in 1961, Kennedy had mulled over three important policy questions: Should the US make an irrevocable commitment in Vietnam?; Should it commit US ground forces to achieve its ends?; and, Should priority be given to military or political solutions? Kennedy's response was to commit American advisory personnel, to train and advise the South Vietnamese in their war against the Communists.

The shift in US policy in Vietnam, from Eisenhower's concept of "limited risk" to Kennedy's "limited partnership" with the Republic of Vietnam, paved the way for a dramatic escalation in the number of US personnel in South Vietnam. The question here is not one entirely of success, but one of efficacy. Kennedy's objective had been to prevent the Communist domination of South Vietnam, not to defeat the Communists per se, and in this regard, he had achieved his ends. However, the effectiveness
of Kennedy’s policies remains in doubt. Despite
the massive military build-up which occurred
during 1961 and 1963, the situation in South
Vietnam was little closer to being “amicable”
for the Americans when Johnson assumed Presi­
dency, than when Kennedy took office in 1961.

Kennedy’s strategies, it can be argued, were
fatally flawed from the outset because of their
lack of consideration for political, economic
and social reforms. Although such reforms were
often requested by the US, Diem’s refusals to
undertake them did not meet with much debate
and insistence. There had always been the un­
derlying belief that once military security had
been attained, all else would follow. (30)

The ability of the Communists to continue
to fight their war with such seemingly consistent
results was not only tied to their military
strength. Indeed, the quantity and quality of
arms they possessed were often inferior to those
held by the ARVN. It was the ongoing com­
mitment of the Communists to their political
struggle, and their willingness to fight a pro­
tracted war if necessary, that gave them the
initiative. American and South Vietnamese pol­
icy had almost exclusively been tied to military
measures because of their inability to fully un­
derstand the political nature of the insurgency.

NOTES

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nam. Refer Pentagon Papers OP. Cit., pp. 81, 111.
19. George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The
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22. In order to test their new tactics, in January 1963 an
ambush was planned by the Communists in the village
[the PLAF] soon attracted a heliborne force of over
three infantry battalions. In a quick engagement five
helicopters were destroyed and nine damaged while

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Embracing Manoeuvre

By Major J. D. Kelly, RAAC

How much truth can a soul bear?
How much truth can a soul dare?

Nietzsche

Introduction

There are no new ideas in war, there are only people who apply the old ideas more effectively. It is therefore encouraging to see in our army a growing awareness and discussion of topics such as directive control, the indirect approach and the operational level of war. These are all concepts the understanding of which contributes to the ability of a force to manoeuvre effectively, they are, however, only contributory. The key to manoeuvre does not lie in any technological gimmickry, nor in the discussion of a few concepts, the key to manoeuvre lies in the minds of the men who command. The commanders we need are those who are adroit, flexible, able to sense opportunities and capable of extremely rapid response.

Learning by rote and the regurgitation of incantations are not sufficient. Manoeuvre demands originality, flair and the ability to cope with complex situations while under extreme stress. To abandon our current anglophone fascination with positional warfare will require us to modify many of our current attitudes towards training and to adopt a system of training which will prepare people for the tactical environment in which we now wish to operate.

Manoeuvre Theory

"[Manoeuvre] means quick decisions, quick movements, surprise attacks with concentrated force, to do always what the enemy does not expect and to constantly change both the means and methods and to do the most improbable thing whenever the situation permits; it means to be free of all set rules and preconceived ideas. We believe that no leader who thinks or acts by stereotyped rules can ever do anything great because he is bound by such rules . . . . . War is not normal . . . . . we do not want therefore any stereotyped solutions for battle but an understanding of the nature of war."

Von Bechtolsheim 1931

From the outset it must be made clear that manoeuvre theory "has nothing to do with vast numbers of machines charging about the countryside. Manoeuvre theory is about amplifying the force that a small mass is capable of exerting." What Simpkin is saying is that manoeuvre theory is as applicable to operations in `credible contingencies' in the Australian context as it was to mechanised operations in World War II.

The concept upon which manoeuvre theory is based is that of the Boyd Cycle, a version of which is shown at Figure 1.

Figure 1. Boyd Cycle

A battle consists of two forces pitted against each other. The actions of each causes the other to modify existing plans, the force which consistently replans and reacts first gains and holds the initiative.

The aim of manoeuvre is to force the enemy to alter his plan. Having achieved this it is then necessary to get around the loop before he does, so that his amended plan is again in need of amendment. In a successful combat at each repetition the enemy response is increasingly inappropriate until, eventually, his organisation loses cohesion and he is forced to disengage or face destruction. At the intellectual level then manoeuvre warfare is a clash of wills and organisations rather than a simple clash of armed might.

There are, in this model, two aspects to manoeuvre. They are: the ability to make the enemy alter his plan and the ability to again alter the situation faster than he can react.

Surprise

To force the enemy to alter his plan, it is necessary to surprise him. That is, to do something which is, in his appreciation, unlikely — or better still, impossible. This is the true meaning of the term "Indirect Approach". The indirect approach has little to do with attacking from a flank, what it actually calls for are
operations against the psychological flank; i.e. that direction from which you are least expected. In the context in which Liddell-Hart was writing these were often the same thing. Barring a return to trench warfare, this is no longer the case. If we take the modern, intellectual, view it becomes possible to employ an indirect approach in both offensive and defensive operations. If Liddell-Hart had been born 50 years later he probably would have spoken of tactical lateral thinking rather than of indirect approaches.

To achieve surprise, i.e. to do something unexpected, requires some sort of risk. If all risk is minimised then the chosen course will be apparent. For example, an attack from the ideal FUP along a short straight approach directly onto the enemy's vital ground will obviously have featured in his defensive appreciation. It will therefore not surprise him. What is required is an acceptance of natural or man made hazards in order to threaten the psychological flank. The acceptance of risk is essential to the attainment of surprise.

Having attained surprise it is necessary to have an organisation which can act more rapidly than the enemy can react. This is where directive control becomes important. Given the chaos which inevitably reigns on every battlefield, the aim must be not to try to impose order, but to structure the organisation to cope with chaos. Directive Control, or Mission Oriented Command and Control, attempts to do this. In directive control it is recognised that the man at the point of contact knows best what the situation really is. Having previously been made aware of the intentions of his commanders three up he is then required to ask himself: ‘What would my commander want me to do in this situation?’ Having decided, he would then act accordingly. This system enables troops at all levels to seize fleeting opportunities and develop advantageous situations. It recognises that plans must be modified as a result of contact with the enemy. It is therefore a system tailored to cope with chaos. To be successful directive control requires trust and loyalty between commanders at all levels. It also requires commanders to be trained three levels up to enable them to comprehend fully the intentions of their superiors.

The other aspects of getting around the Boyd cycle quickly include battle procedure, communications and mobility. By far the most important is the intellectual ability of commanders at all levels. Not all men are suited to command. This is especially true of command in a manoeuvring force. Those people who are suited to command will require training to develop and practise their capacities for imagination and abstract thought as well as those admirable military characteristics; aggression, resilience and decisiveness. Unfortunately, it is in this vital area, the preparation of our commanders, that our training is most inadequate. Fuller speaks of ‘plasticity of mind’ as an essential characteristic of a tank (manoeuvre) commander. The modern battlefield will be typified by extreme violence, contact throughout the depth of the forces deployed and deliberate attacks on the means of control. To prosper in this environment commanders will need to filter vast amounts of information to ‘cobble together’ best fit solutions rapidly and continuously. The commander on the spot will need intelligence, intuition and self confidence. An examination of our present training system will show that we do nothing to practise or encourage these attributes.

Training

The training system adopted to enable us to cope with manoeuvre must be better structured than that under which we now suffer. If we are to be successful the people concerned must be properly prepared, this demands not just formal tactical training but a total system which develops desirable personal characteristics and hones intellects which can then be applied to the battlefield. The training system must train the whole man rather than just the tactician and it must provide a medium for selection and assessment. Eventually, our success will depend on the quality of the commanders whom we have caused to emerge.

Current Training

Our current formal tactical training is centred on a number of career courses. The progression on these courses is invariably as follows:

- Defensive Ops — Theory;
- Defensive Ops — TEWTs;
- Offensive Ops — Theory;
- Offensive Ops — TEWTs; and
- Special Ops — Theory only.

It is important to note two things; firstly, that practical instruction is entirely based on TEWTs
and, secondly, that the theory instruction in
turn invariably consists of a lecture on the me-
chanics of the operation, a discussion of the
principles which are held to govern the opera-
tion and finally a brief description of a suc-
cessful example from history. This system of
instruction has the advantages of tidiness and
total predictability — as such it admirably re-
fects the tactics being taught.

Failings of TEWTs
Originally intended to train people in the
appreciation process, TEWTs have become our
sole tool for the teaching and assessment of
tactics. As a preparation for manoeuvre warfare
TEWTs are woefully inadequate. By their nature
they prevent the development of timing and
aggression and condemn the trainee to posi-
tional, attritional solutions.

TEWTs teach the vocabulary of tactics, they
therefore strive to produce uniform solutions
to tactical problems. Unfortunately a know-
ledge of vocabulary does not, of itself, lead to
fluency. Because of our reliance on TEWTs
over a protracted period, we now view war as
a succession of neatly separated tactical prob-
lems. Every operation of war has been given a
neat definition and can only be conducted in a
given set of (listed) circumstances. Planning is
based on considerations which are themselves
listed and defined. The aim of TEWTs is to
get students to regurgitate the right definitions,
recognise the right set of circumstances and
decide which of the considerations has to be
sacrificed for the general good. At present we
are teaching and learning tactics by algorithm.
Our entire approach is fatally flawed.

Field Training
The shortcomings of our formal training are
highlighted rather than redressed by field train-
ing. Cost and practical constraints lead us to
rely heavily on one-sided exercises. Usually the
headquarters of the exercised unit is itself un-
exercised. Again, there is no opportunity for
commanders to develop timing nor will they
ever need to strive to achieve surprise, use
deception or take a risk. By revising schedules or
redeploying the enemy the effects of friction
can be ignored and the need to modify plans
can be avoided. No headquarters can exercise
itself properly, this is the responsibility of su-
perior headquarters. Too many exercises fail to
exercise staff work and battle procedure. Field
exercises can be useful training but in their
current form they rarely train for manoeuvre.

Training for Manoeuvre

Personal Development
Sport. Sport is often regarded by command-
ers as a useful break from 'proper' training.
This view is usually coloured by personal ex-
periences of PT and sport which are of an
unimaginative, uninteresting and non-progres-
sive series of ordeals and games. Well conducted
sport and PT offer a number of benefits to the
military organism. They:
- develop self and unit pride;
- develop self confidence;
- develop physical and mental wellbeing; and
- reduce the incidence of drug and alcohol
abuse.

In combination these benefits help to create the
kind of soldier who can perform well on the
modern battlefield. Pride, self-confidence and
fitness encourage initiative, aggression and re-
silience. PT and sport can be a waste of time
but properly conceived and executed they are
two of the best possible ways of training for
war.

Adventure Training. Adventure Training
takes those characteristics developed by sport
and enables their further development under
conditions of stress brought about by tiredness,
fear and responsibility. It is these conditions
which provide the real value of adventure train-
ing by providing the best approximation of an
individual's environment on the battlefield. The
ability to make hard decisions in the face of
physical and mental hardship, the ability to
gender enthusiasm and co-operation from ex-
hausted participants and the ability to take cal-
culated risks are all directly applicable to war.

The advantages of adventure training are its
appropriateness and the fact that soldiers at all
levels can, and should, be encouraged to or-
ganise and participate. The aim is to further
develop self-reliance, confidence, resilience and
initiative at all levels, not just at command
levels.

The preceding paragraphs deserve re-em-
phasis. Sport and adventure training are not
breaks from training, they are the best possible
peacetime training and deserve equal emphasis
with weapon training in the preparation of in-
dividuals for war.
Officer Education

A complete discussion of officer selection and education is beyond the scope of this paper. It should be noted however that our army is unique among professional armies in its decision to ignore the need for training in Current Affairs and Military History, in fact, to ignore the need to be trained in any form of informed analysis. We are apparently the only ones in step!

'The greatest weakness commented upon by most field grade officers who had served with battalions in Vietnam was the lack . . . of practical tactical training of company commanders and CP staff. Officer training sessions, TEWTs and CPXs are valuable, but a wargame system is also needed.'

Battalion Lessons
From Vietnam

Career Courses

The characteristics required of commanders have already been described. The courses attended by officers likely to command manoeuvre units should develop these characteristics. They should provide a worthwhile measure of the officer's ability to cope with rapidly changing situations and they should allow those officers with genuine aptitude to emerge. The solution to this problem is two sided training.

Two sided training is any training in which a trainee is pitted directly against a recognisable opponent. This may include two sided telephone battles, CPXs, exercises and wargames. The key is that the trainee is faced with the defeat of a personality. He is therefore forced to practise those forgotten aspects of war: bluff, risk, deception, acceptance of losses and surprise. To work effectively whichever activity is being conducted should be as close to realtime as possible. If this is impractical then the only proviso should be that both sides must be capable of simultaneous action.

Perhaps the most flexible and useful tool is an established wargame similar to the British Battlegroup Tactical Trainer (BAGTT), or, at a lower level, the Armoured Centre's Combat Procedures Exercise. Such a system can be used as the lower control for telephone battles and CPXs or can be used to teach the techniques of control. Even more usefully however it can be used to teach real tactics. The ideal teaching medium would be as follows:

A TEWT would be conducted with particular attention being paid to the production of exercise papers which contain a realistic amount of information. Following the TEWT a solution would be selected for play. Students would be given appointments with the author of the solution being the commander. After playing for some time the group should be given the opportunity to modify the starting plan. This would be followed by further play. During this time the enemy player, who has been allocated realistic objectives in accordance with enemy tactics and doctrine, would be free to change his plan and use the forces at his disposal as he wished.

A system such as this would confer the following advantages. It would:

- teach people the value of reconnaissance and early warning,
- teach the real value of control measures and practise people in their use,
- lead to the development of simple plans with sufficient flexibility to survive contact with the enemy,
- practice the use of directive control,
- enable the use of deception and surprise and teach the value of aggression; and
- really teach the value, use and establishment of reserves.

In short, such a system would teach practical tactics and provide a sound basis for training for war.

The use of wargames does have the major drawback that it is expensive in time and resources. The point which needs to be made is that, with wargames, you get a return from your expenditure whereas with the current system all you get is expenditure. Also, training of this type is only needed by officers of the arms, the old system provides training which is perfectly adequate for the needs of service officers. Wargames therefore represent a true economy by training people according to their needs instead of according to convenience.

Conclusion

As members of a standing professional army the task set for all of us is to prepare for war. In the long leisure of peace it is our duty to do
embracing manoeuvre

this as well as we can. The adoption of tactical techniques as sophisticated as those which will be required on the battlefield of the future demand proper training. The training we now conduct is inadequate. To be effective we must prepare soldiers, at all levels, for the environment we wish to create and this demands more of us than rote learning of tactical incantations and the reproduction of past glories. It is now necessary to prepare the personalities we wish to use and to practise those skills which have become essential. To do this we need to completely revamp our training system to include competition and character development. The establishment of permanent wargames and the regular rotation of headquarters through them should be treated as a matter of urgency. The current ‘universal’ tactics courses should be abandoned and replaced by courses which meet the training needs of the students. Above all appropriate measures must be taken to encourage the emergence of genuine tactical leaders for without them all our peacetime soldiering is mere posturing and a waste of our time and the government’s money.

NOTES

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The Profession of Arms and Officer Career Development

By Captain G. P. Hogan, RAR

"The bearing of arms among men for the purpose of fighting other men is found as far back as we can see. It has become at some times and in some places a calling resembling the priesthood in its dedication. It has never ceased to display a strong element of the vocational. It has also become a profession, not only in the wider sense of what is professed, but in the narrower sense of an occupation with a distinguishable corpus of specific technical knowledge and doctrine, a more or less exclusive group coherence, a complex of institutions peculiar to itself, an educational pattern adapted to its own needs, a career structure of its own and a distinct place in the society which has brought it forth. In all these respects it has strong points of resemblance to medicine and the law, as well as to holy orders."

— General Sir John Hackett 1962

Introduction

There are currently some 70,000 Australian men and women involved on a full-time basis in various roles within what Harold Laswell has termed "the management of violence." (The Analysis of Political Behaviour, 1947) This article will concern itself with the officer corps of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and more particularly with that of the Australian Army, as the professional managers of violence within the community. It will examine the extent to which the military may be rightfully regarded as a "profession", describe the process of career development within the officer corps and discuss a number of themes which arise in both of these areas.

The Profession of Arms

The profession of arms has been traditionally accepted as the second oldest profession in the world, its function being described by General Sir John Hackett as "the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem." Since the "discovery" of military sociology in the United States in the 1950s and 60s, however, there has been some debate over the use of the term "profession" in relation to the military. While there is a danger of being drawn into a slough of sociological semantics, the issue of profession vs. vocation of arms deserves discussion, since it is indicative not only of academic perceptions of the military but also, by extension, of the officer corps' view of itself.

The Sixth Edition of The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines a profession as a "vocation of advanced learning or science", citing the "military profession" as an example of this. In an article on military professionalism in the Australian Army entitled No Room for Complacency, Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Molan points out the permutations of meaning which have been placed on the term within the military itself, especially in the adjectival form: "In terms such as 'professional officer', 'professional infantryman' or 'professional non-commissioned officer', the term is used as a synonym for 'competent'." Both senses of the term are used throughout this article and are equally germane to the concept of the profession of arms.

Huntington vs. Janowitz

Following the Korean War, the US forces began to attract the attention of that group of academics dedicated to dehumanizing the study of humanity — the sociologists. In general terms, sociologists have belonged to one of two schools concerning the way the profession of arms conducts its business — the Huntington school, which sees a military set apart from society, and the Janowitz school, which sees a military not only integrated into society but also incorporating many of its managerial methods.

The first school gained prominence as a result of Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and the State (1957), which proposed the military as a politically neutral profession, isolated from society and concerned only with the achievement of victory on the battlefield, without regard to non-military factors. As M. G. Smith has observed, the Huntington model "saw the military..."
as a state-within-a-state: a profession mainly pursued separately from major societal influence, apolitical in nature, but totally obedient to the elected government of the day.”

Huntington defines professionalism in terms of the distinguishing characteristics of a profession — expertise, responsibility and corporateness. Expanding on the concept of expertise, he says that the professional “is an expert with specialised knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavour.” Writing on the other two criteria, Huntington sees the professional as a practising expert, working in a social context and performing a service which is “essential to the functioning of society”, pointing out that the members of a profession “share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen.”

In applying these guidelines to the military profession, Huntington concludes that while officership falls somewhat short of the professional ideal, “its fundamental character as a profession is undeniable.” In the Huntington model, professionalism can be achieved since high standards can be set and attained free from non-military interference. Huntington’s characteristics of expertise, responsibility and corporateness cover most of the features of the profession of arms detailed by General Hackett in the introductory quote to this article. However, rather than seeing an isolated military, exclusive of societal influences, Hackett claimed that “The movement of the military away from the civil has now in general been reversed. They have come closer together.” In this way, he could be seen as according with the theories of the second school of military sociological thought, which developed largely from Morris Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960).

The Janowitz model proposed a politically sensitive profession integrated with society and concerned with the “management of violence” in the interests of society. Like the Huntington model, the military was controlled by, and remained loyal to, the elected government. However, it was less passive than the Huntington counterpart since, as part of society, the military could contribute much more to the decision-making process.

Janowitz’s central argument was the so-called “Convergence Theory”, which propounded that armies and large civilian organisations were becoming more and more alike, leading to a “narrowing skill differential” between military and civilian elites. Janowitz observed that “The new tasks of the military require that the professional officer develop more and more of the skills and orientations common to civilian administrators and civilian leaders.” The introduction and advance of technology, the increased interaction of military officers with civil officials, the broadening of the officer recruitment base and the move toward social integration by military officers all contributed toward “civilianising” military institutions and “blurring” the distinction between the civilian and the military. Military managerial practice therefore moved away from autocratic domination and more toward negotiation and consensus. It is from this area that Janowitz drew the central contention of his work, stating that “The history of the modern military establishment can be described as a struggle between heroic leaders, who embody traditionalism and glory, and military ‘managers’ who are concerned with the scientific and rational conduct of war. This distinction is fundamental.” Corelli Barnett sees the dichotomy between “heroic leader” and “military manager” as the central theme of his book, commenting that: “. . . taken up and repeated by later writers in military sociology, one might almost say it has become the headline message of the pseudo-science.”

The Profession in Australia — Quo Vadit?

There is some debate over which of these sociological models better suits the ADF. At the individual level, there are elements of “heroic leader”, “military manager” and professional officer whose concern with things military is conducted in splendid isolation from social and political realities. As a group, however, it would seem that the profession of arms in Australia is moving away from the isolation of Huntington toward the integration of Janowitz. M. G. Smith holds that the role of the military in Australian society has traditionally reflected Huntington’s model. He sees a military loyal to government and separated professionally from society which has left questions of strategy to government and has addressed most of its attention to the implementation of decisions in a reactive manner: “The profession has concentrated its efforts in developing expertise in the techniques of warfare rather than in helping determine the most appropriate na-
tional and military strategy to be adopted. The feeling within the military traditionally has been that they should be told what to do, and then be allowed to get on and do it; and it is in this latter area that professional expertise has been concentrated." Smith balances this by pointing out that incremental change towards the Janowitz model has occurred in recent years. He cites the increased interest by the military in its social role and in the place of military managers in a bureaucratic environment, the increased integration of Service families within the community in respect to housing and the increased participation by the military in civil education courses and non-service sporting activities as evidence of this. A. J. Molan agrees that in the past the Australian Army has tended towards the Huntington-type model. However, he considers that it has been forced slowly to move more towards the Janowitz-type model since the end of the Vietnam war, seeing the reorganisation of the three single-service departments into the Department of Defence in 1976 as the catalyst for this change. Molan applies Huntington's criteria of expertise, responsibility and corporate-ness on the Australian Army, concluding that "the regular Australian Army officer corps today is militarily professional." This is a finding, however, which he claims "leaves no room for complacency." A number of writers have identified recent changes in Australian military industrial relations as clear evidence of a move by the ADF toward the Janowitz model. Lieutenant Colonel Graham Pratt points out that "Since the late 1960s a number of significant changes have occurred with respect to Australian military industrial relations." The adoption of a civilian style salary structure as a result of the Kerr/Woodward Inquiry (1970-72) permitted an accurate comparison to be made with civilian salary rates, providing a greater opportunity for a sense of relative deprivation to develop. The establishment of an independent body — the Committee of Reference for Defence Force Pay — to report on aspects of Defence Force remuneration and the advent of collectivism in the Australian military have also contributed to what Janowitz would call the "civilisation" of the military. Gerard Nelson has looked at more recent developments in military industrial relations, in particular the formation of the Armed Forces Federation of Australia and the creation of the Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal, as evidence that the trend toward Janowitz is continuing. Nelson claims that the Convergence Theory is applicable to the ADF and that large parts of the ADF are becoming civilianised, concluding that "It has happened in other countries of the Western Alliance, it will occur in Australia." The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre has also entered the military sociology debate, claiming that an increasing civilianisation of the military "is evident in areas such as organisational structure, operations, and occupational structure." Babbage sees that the military has become "a more 'civilised' profession", pointing out that, "Increasingly wearing mufti, today's military officer is much more concerned with management — in Russell Hill, in the Australian Defence Force at large, and even in the conduct of military operations." Given the changing nature of the profession of arms in Australia, then, it remains to briefly examine and comment on the way in which careers within the officer corps are being controlled and developed — or, how we are managing our military managers.

The RODC

The need for a comprehensive study of the education, training and professional development of Regular Army officers was first recognised in 1970. However, it was not until late 1976 that the Regular Officer Development Committee (RODC) was raised and tasked "to determine the professional development needs of Regular Army Officers and to produce a programme to satisfy these determinations." In conducting what Ross Baggage has described as "one of the most interesting and important tasks undertaken in this area since at least the Second World War", the RODC chose to interpret its terms of reference broadly and seek a wide range of submissions, "both formal and informal, structured and unstructured, specialised and general, from individuals and organisations within and outside of the Army." The open nature of the committee's inquiry brought them face to face with over half of the serving Army officer corps, as well as many civilians and members of the other Services. The RODC claimed that: "Our Report includes a concept for officer development which we believe can provide an enduring rationale against which current and future practices and
procedures can be measured.\textsuperscript{18} Almost ten years on, the Army has adopted and adapted the RODC’s recommendations on the career development of its officer corps. N. A. Jans defines “career development” as “a process by which the individual acquires the knowledge, skills, attitudes and identity he or she needs for effective performance at each career level.”\textsuperscript{19}

The RODC identified the service officers whose occupation is “the study and practise of strategy, tactics and logistics, and who are employed in a wide range of Corps and non-Corps, staff and regimental appointments” as members of the profession of arms. They considered that professions within the profession of arms, such as military doctors, lawyers and clergy, as close affiliates to, but not members of, the profession or arms.\textsuperscript{20} The remainder of this article will discuss a number of themes which arise in the context of the career development of the Australian profession of arms.

Education vs. Training

In his introduction to The Face of Battle, John Keegan makes a clear delineation between that part of an officer’s professional knowledge and formal development carried out in classrooms with the pen rather than the sword (education), and that body of knowledge imparted through drills which enables the officer to react instantly and instinctively in the fog and confusion of war (training). These two broad areas into which the corporate knowledge of the profession of arms may be divided are often discussed in terms of the values of Athens and Sparta.

The RODC recognised that education and training were the means by which officers acquired the attributes and capabilities required for professional competence, pointing out that elements of each were contained in the other and that the two processes were complementary. Education was defined as “The development of intellect by experience, study and instruction”, while training was seen as “The systematic development of the attitude, knowledge and skill patterns required by an individual to perform adequately a given task or job.” The committee considered that: “Whilst education is directed at producing discerning, literate and well-informed officers, training focuses on task competence and the acquisition of skills.”\textsuperscript{21} Education is the more complex and dynamic of the two.

The formal education of the military is carried out through a combination of civil and military universities, colleges and academies, such as the Australian Defence Force Academy, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Single Service colleges and staff colleges, Joint Service Staff College, overseas war colleges and national defence colleges. Babbage sees a rise in the general level of education of Army officers in recent years: “Tertiary education is no longer the sole preserve of an elite represented by the Royal Military College graduates; graduates from the Officer Cadet School, men commissioned from the ranks and non-commissioned personnel are becoming increasingly interested in lifting their educational standards, via universities, colleges of advanced education, technical colleges and staff colleges.”\textsuperscript{22}

It is clear that, in keeping with the Janowitz model, the responsibilities and requirements of the military profession have moved well beyond those areas traditionally associated with the “management of violence”. As Cheeseman and Sydney point out, “The requirement for the military profession to become more actively involved in defence-policy formulation, and the need for commanders at all levels to be able to foresee the political, social and economic consequences of their actions and recommendations, highlights the need for all career officers to be provided with some form of broadly based, liberal education.”\textsuperscript{23} Such an emphasis on formal education is viewed with a degree of suspicion by some conservative elements within this most conservative of professions, who see the primacy of the commander being increasingly challenged by the educated military technocrat, or, in Janowitz’s terms, the heroic leader being undermined by the military manager. However, as long as the Army emphasizes operational command experience as a criterion for promotion at the senior levels of the career structure, the heroic leader, or generalist, will prevail over the military manager, or specialist.

Generalist vs. Specialist

While Australian officers’ careers have been developed within a “generalist” philosophy for most of this century, professional changes and the increasing complexity of the conduct and administration of war and peace have meant that an army-within-an-army of “specialists” has emerged. The RODC recognised the dilemma of attempting to reconcile the demand
for increased specialisation of officer employment with the requirement to develop the essential breadth of knowledge and experience required at the most senior rank levels.24

The term "generalist" is used to emphasize the varied employment pattern outside the officer's corps specialty. Nick Jans considers its wide use to be based on two popular beliefs: "The first is that any officer should be able to do most of the non-operational tasks in the Army. The second belief is that such an employment policy develops a number of desirable attributes believed necessary for commanders and staff officers."25 However, in the aftermath of the Tange re-organisation and its emphasis on specialised military inputs into defence policy decision-making, "the more time that an officer spends on courses or in field postings the less time there is for him to develop the special skills required in policy formation."26 This situation has resulted in the call for a new kind of military specialist — the uniformed Defence bureaucrat. Such an officer would be selected relatively early in his career and his postings would be, in the main, at Russell Hill. As he progressed in rank, so the military bureaucrat would develop his skill in areas of defence policy formulation in a manner similar to the German General Staff system instituted last century.

While "gap-stopping" in officer postings will never completely disappear, it is clear that career development within a planned structure, whether it be as generalist or specialist, is necessary to serve the best interests of both the profession and the individual.

Summary

The profession of arms in Australia is moving further away from the exclusivist Huntington model and into the state of social integration detailed by Janowitz. The increasing complexity of "the management of violence" has educed a concomitant requirement to develop the professional officer corps within an appropriate and functional career structure. H. G. Wells once claimed that "the professional military mind is by necessity an inferior and unimaginative mind; no man of high intellectual quality would willingly imprison his gifts in such a calling." True or not, the challenge for the superior and imaginative minds within the military is to adapt to and meet the dynamics of social, industrial and technological change with a career development system which will attract men and women of high intellectual quality, as well as meeting the needs of the profession. 

NOTES

3. M. G. Smith, Strategic Thinking and the Australian Military Profession, Sub-thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, March 1985, p. 79.
5. ibid., p. 11.
8. ibid., p. 21.
10. Smith, op. cit., p. 81.
11. ibid., pp. 95-96.
21. ibid., p. 4-1.
America and Australia: Where the future?

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Introduction

AMERICA'S world wide defence strategy is based on three fundamental principals: (1) the use of very large numbers of forces (2) deployed as far forward as possible (3) with the cooperation of friendly local nations, whether through bilateral agreements or multinational treaties and alliances. While the European landmass seems largely the preserve of the Army and Air Force, the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions belong to the maritime forces.

The deployment of American power is built on the situation extant at the end of World War II, modified by the involvement in the Cold War, Korea and Vietnam. Over the decades, American bases and maritime forces have ringed central Asia to protect and support friendly nations and to confine the influence of those who might be less friendly.

Australia has maintained with the United States one of the longest continuous defence relationships of any Pacific nation, stretching back virtually to the founding of the Commonwealth in 1901. Both nations were allies in World Wars I and II and joined forces again in Korea and Vietnam. Australia is a major power in the region where the Pacific joins the Indian Ocean. It is a nation seeking to develop its trade and diplomatic ties with partners from Japan through the Middle East, in Europe and in the Americas. However, to defend both its overseas interests and a land mass roughly comparable to the United States, the Commonwealth relies on one tenth of the population and an armed force only one third the size of the United States Marine Corps (4). This gives Australia a viewpoint on Pacific defence radically different from that of the United States.

Today, the regional defence strategies of both nations are undergoing re-evaluation. The United States confronts an adversary with the ability and intention to give depth to its challenge, exerting influence behind America's forward bases and traditional deployment areas. The very nature of this challenge is changing to include the "hot peace" of local and regional insurrection and political instability. Australia is redefining its view of the threat to itself and is inclining toward defence self-sufficiency. Change is in the wind for both nations.

The Defence Policies of the United States and Australia

The stated defence policies of the United States are to deter the outbreak of war, to place American forces as close to potential conflicts as possible and to foster strong bilateral and multinational alliances. The American outlook is world wide, and American forces deploy to every continent. In the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, these forces are overwhelmingly maritime and are established along the edge of Asia, astride choke points to Soviet and Chinese waters and near major trade routes and lines of communication.

The policies of Australia are necessarily different. The Commonwealth, situated in the far southern hemisphere with an economy and a population minuscule compared to the United States, adopts a much narrower and regionally confined viewpoint, concentrated on those parts of the world most directly affected by Australian trade, diplomacy and politics. Declared policies include the development of an independent defence capability, the promotion of political stability in those areas where Australia can influence the actions of others, and the satisfaction of its defence treaty obligations to its American and New Zealand partners.

The Alliances

The alliance which has traditionally engaged the greatest attention from the United States has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Centred on Europe and the North Atlantic Ocean and dedicated to concerted political and military action, NATO gives its sixteen members a general framework upon which to base planning, policy and the design and acquisition of new defence equipment. No such organization exists in the Pacific/Indian Ocean
area. Rather, for the United States, there endures a patchwork of bi- and multilateral treaties with Japan, the Republics of Korea and the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand. Less formal friendly relations have been established with other nations, including those bordering the Persian Gulf.

Since the first few years of World War II, Australia's most important ally has been the United States. Tiny New Zealand by dint of physical proximity and common cultural heritage, is another close and longstanding friend. Formal bonds exist between these nations in addition to the much discussed Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) document. The other major Australian military commitment exists in the Five Power Defence Arrangement between Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom, under which Australian units are permanently stationed overseas.

The Threat

The United States is a huge nation, a global superpower with a population numbering in the hundreds of millions. It tends to view threats to its security in global terms and safeguards itself through the fielding of superpower forces. The Australians, on the other hand, occupy a country nearly as spacious with a population well below twenty million. They direct their energies towards a much narrower geographic area. Australia, like the United States, is concerned with a lessening of tensions between the superpowers and with realizing some measure of stability in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, but is much less confident of its ability to sway the protagonists. Rather, the Commonwealth uses its good offices on behalf of the more distant struggles and concentrates its energies on controlling the local and regional conflicts closer to home. For both nations, this era of no-war, no-peace presents difficulties and complexities undreamt of by previous generations of politicians, diplomats and military men.

New to Pacific and the Southern Hemisphere is a serious bid for influence by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Pacific fleet has long been that nations largest, and it is now undergoing dramatic qualitative improvement. The permanent Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean recently boasted the deployment of a Udaloy destroyer based surface action group. It was a Kuwaiti request for help to the USSR that precipitated reflaggings, convoy escorts and international minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf. Further recent bids at image enhancement have included overtures to Japan, the Peoples' Republic of China, the Philippines, several small southwestern Pacific island nations, Fiji and New Zealand.

The Strategies

The ultimate goals here for the United States are to preserve its own level of influence and to protect vital trade routes threading through these two vast, busy oceans. The means intended to achieve these goals are designed to sustain the greatest possible American freedom of action. Strategy is based on maintaining forces in being as close as possible to the borders of the Soviet Union and near the important Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). By keeping a significant military presence close to where it would most likely be used, the United States enhances its ability to influence local events and decreases the time needed to take quick, effective action in case hostilities threaten. This supplies ongoing friendly diplomatic relations and aid programs already existing within local host nations and the constant, regular schedule of international military exercises and port visits carried out by fleet units. Efforts to keep American power and influence visible are seen in forward bases and the vast military infrastructure in Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Diego Garcia and in the frequent military exercises and warship transits in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bearing Sea. In the event of general war, this organization supports a very bold, aggressive sea war of attrition, fought in and near the enemy's avenues of escape to the open ocean. In brush fire crises, it quickly brings to bear massive, crushing air, surface and amphibious weight of arms.

Because Australia considers itself far removed from probable areas of confrontation, its defence strategies appear more passive and encompass areas not now considered vital to the United States. The aims of Australia in peacetime closely resemble those of the United States — to enhance its diplomatic influence and protect its interests. These are accomplished through several low key aid and military training programs to small nations nearby and through regular deployment of forces throughout the Southwest Pacific, to Papua New Guinea, Malaysia and Singapore. Australia re-
mains a highly visible member of several international peacekeeping forces. The Australian Defence Force (ADF), numbering in toto only 74,000, are incapable of defending long sea lanes or supporting distant operations unaided, but the Government has defined an “Area of Direct military Interest” as falling within 2,000 kilometres (11,000 nautical miles) of the city of Darwin on its northern coast. The ADF is now being restructured to fight its war there. It is planned to assail an approaching hostile force with a multi-layered defence in depth, attacking with modern submarines and surface combatants, F-111C and F/A-18 strike aircraft, Harpoon-wielding P-3C Orions and, once ashore, a highly trained, highly mobile ground force. Australian defence is keyed to trading sea and land room for time and attrition of the enemy. Thus, the Australian warfighting strategy does not subscribe to American concepts of deep strikes and power projection, but the retention and modernization of the F-111C fleet, the conversion of military Boeing 707 transports to airborne tankers, the purchase of new submarines and the gradual relocation of the ADF from the nation’s east and southeast to the west and northwest demonstrate the Government’s willingness to retain the capability of supporting an ally further afield.

Co-operation Today

American and Australian forces already enjoy extensive experience in combined exercises and exchanges of personnel for training. In addition, several facilities within Australia, including a VLF naval communications station at North West Cape, the Pine Gap and Nurrungar arms control verification sites and the Defence Support Programme for ICBM warning are manned and operated jointly. Each nation has relatively free access to the other’s surveillance data and intelligence and there exists a mutual transfer of defence technology. For Australia, there are additional very important benefits. Through its relationship with the United States, the Commonwealth lays claim to a very large defence logistics base, reducing its owner need to stockpile war materials, taps a large reservoir of military doctrine and thought and gains access to state of the art technology. Through its links to Australia, the United States has a means of approaching and influencing third nations not normally considered friendly. Australian diplomacy and force deployments effectively give the United States depth where there has been shallowness — in the Indian Ocean, in southern Asia and the Indonesian Archipelago and in the region south of the Philippines and east of Papua New Guinea. David Lange, New Zealand’s fiery Prime Minister, showed rare perception when he wrote that the “low-key, practical role played by Australia . . . is one that is often not available to the United States as a superpower.”

Ongoing co-operative procurement programs demonstrate another facet of Australian-American defence efforts. These include versions of the F/A-18 strike fighter, the P-3 anti-submarine (ASW) aircraft, the Sikorsky Blackhawk and Seahawk helicopters, the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate and possibly a future airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. Project Nulka is an anti-ship missile defence system being developed jointly.

All of this must be set against the backdrop of ANZUS. The much discussed pact is not dead, but merely dormant. Though the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand, co-operation between the two nations continues, albeit at a much reduced level. In the meantime, Australia strengthened its already strong bonds with both countries, emerging with enhanced international stature and preserving the basic ANZUS framework for the eventual normalization of the defence arrangement.

In Conclusion, The Future

Given the locus of American attention and the ever strident battles over the federal budget, any dramatic increase in military presence or shift in emphasis from what is traditional in the Pacific is unlikely. The United States will observe its treaty obligations to Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and, for the most part, New Zealand. The Pacific based fleets will continue to maintain an aggressive stance far forward in the Persian Gulf, the northern Indian Ocean, the Aleutians, the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. Their missions to defend Korea and Japan, to counter moves by their Soviet counterparts and to protect Asian coastal sea lanes will doubtless remain constant. Yet, there will be gradual changes in emphasis and in patterns of deployments to meet the gradual changes in the challenges confronting the fleet. These challenges could come from what is now considered the rear areas and
Figure 1 depicts the region of greatest interest to Australia, bounded by the Persian Gulf, Japan, the mid Pacific and New Zealand. The newly defined "Area of Direct Military Interest" centred on the city of Darwin, is shown.
could be posed by a rival major power, from a hostile second line nation, or from one or more of the tiny, new countries fired with nationalism, driven by poverty or torn by internal disorder.

America's major South Pacific ally is vitally concerned with the very area so long ignored by the United States. Australia has declared its national goals to include a self sufficient defence, a clear role as a leader among its neighbours and the maintenance of political stability within the region. The gradual redeployment of the ADF and the continuation of overseas basing under the *Five Powers Defence Arrangement* support these objectives, but the Commonwealth will go further. The Government has declared its intention to increase (in coordination with New Zealand) the number of P-3 Orion patrols and deployments throughout the South West Pacific, to dedicate more frequent movements of its naval units into the area, and to providing more military training and assistance to the region's small nations.

Thus, the roles and missions of the two nations' maritime services are becoming more and more complementary. On the one hand, the American Third and Seventh Fleets concentrate far to the north, near the Persian Gulf, along the rim of the Asian land mass, to the coasts of China and the Soviet Union and to the Aleutian chain. On the other hand, Australian forces focus on Malaysia, Singapore, the ocean areas and islands from the south of Indonesia through Papua New Guinea and well into the southwest Pacific.

Extensive co-operation already exists between the armed forces of Australia and the United States. Exchanges of personnel, multinational exercises, technology transfer, logistics support, shared installations and intelligence and joint development and procurement are only some of the means by which the services are drawn together. Yet, in the face of uncertain and unsettling threats to security and stability, there are benefits to be derived from an even closer relationship.

It is thoroughly unlikely that the United States will expend assets to broaden the American military presence in the Pacific/Indian Ocean "backfield". The Soviets are not blatant in their military presence beyond their bastions in Afghanistan and Vietnam. Neither is the Soviet commercial offensive of negotiated port visit and fishing rights, trade agreements and the like yet apparently successful. But recent instability in the Persian Gulf, in Sri-Lanka, the Philippines, Korea, Fiji and Micronesia draws attention to the vastness of the expanse into which United States forces could be drawn.

The Australian Defence Force, through its restructuring and the redefinition of its roles and missions, will become ever more dependent on highly sophisticated technology. As the ADF re-equip with newer and more complex systems and develops new doctrine, it will become more important to exercise against a distant, sophisticated foe. The expected shift of its deployment patterns will place the ADF in those very areas where American forces are not.

Herein lies a compelling case for stronger ties between American and Australian maritime forces and perhaps a new emphasis in the joint exercises enjoyed by both. Their capabilities clearly complement each other and joint plans and exercises should test their ability to carry out the missions of both services — long range detection/strike and the highly mobile land defence of the ADF and the ASW, ASUW, deep interdiction, amphibious assault and special operations of the U.S. forces.

In the future, interchange will best be concentrated in seven areas:

- In complementing and augmenting each other's intelligence and surveillance data;
- In supplementing a presence in those Pacific and Indian Ocean theatres not normally visited by the other;
- In augmenting and integrating allied task forces and task groups during peacetime operations and in war;
- In testing each other's emerging strategic and tactical doctrines;
- In jointly developing and freely transferring the highest level defence technology;
- In preserving a framework for the revival of ANZUS; and
- In serving as a bridge to those nations reluctant to deal directly with the United States.

The payoff potential for moving together has never been greater.

NOTES
1. The Australian regular armed forces numbered 70,731 (Army 32,029, Navy 16,025, Air Force 22,677) in 1983/84, with reserves of 31,518. The United States Marine Corps at the time numbered 198,241. (Reference 1, pp. 11 and 119-120)
Figure 2 shows some of the sites figuring in the restructuring of Australia's defence:

- Upgrade to Major Naval Installations — HMAS Stirling (Perth), Jervis Bay
- New Mine Warfare Systems Centre — Sydney
- Major Manned Northern Airfields — Darwin, Townsville
- Military Capable Civil Airfields — Port Hedland, Broome, Kununurra, Mt Isa, Weipa, Cairns
- New Satellite Communications Facility — Geraldton
- 2nd Cavalry Regiment — relocated to Darwin
- 3 Brigade (Operational Deployment Force) — Townsville
- 6/7 Brigades (90 day Callout) — Brisbane
- 1 Brigade (Parachute, Mechanized, Armored) — Sydney
2. New Zealand’s population numbers 3,300,000, with regular armed forces of 12,443. (Reference 1. p. 130)

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ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE OF AUSTRALIA

PURSUING NON-NUCLEAR OPTIONS

The reverberations down through time of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the disaster at Chernobyl, the burgeoning realization of the “nuclear winter”, the proliferation of nuclear weaponry beyond the Superpowers and the ongoing tensions on a global scale between conflicting ideologies all serve to remind us of the horror that would be nuclear war. Though remote from the probable scene of a nuclear exchange, Australia and Australians have accepted their responsibilities to contribute to the processes of avoiding a nuclear conflict. In this context, the appointment in 1983 of Mr Butler as the world’s first Ambassador for Disarmament follows the spirit of the influence that past prominent Australians such as W. M. Hughes, H. V. Evatt and R. G. Menzies have had in international political affairs. It is appropriate that Australia’s historical influence should be reflected during the bicentenary year by this Seminar’s attention to one of the most crucial issues of the age.

What are the options? At one end of the spectrum — and the ideal — is complete nuclear disarmament. At the other is scepticism that power politics and mistrust would ever allow meaningful reductions in or prevent the proliferation of nuclear arsenals. Between these extremes lie an infinite range of measures that may be taken to control, proscribe and eventually reduce nuclear stockpiles. Also relevant to this contribution are confidence-building measures, international organizations and international law. Also crucial is the influence of politicians, the military, academia and the media. Ranged against these issues is the reality that resort to force has been historically the inevitable recourse of a State that seeks to pursue its national aims without regard to the consequences for international order.

THIS SEMINAR PROVIDES A FORUM WHERE THESE AND RELATED ISSUES CAN BE PRESENTED, AND DEBATED IN AN OPEN FORUM, WITH FORMAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEME BY SOME OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL FIGURES ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE.

SPEAKERS

The Opening Address will be given at 9 am on Friday, 13 May 1988 by
His Excellency Sir Ninian Stephen, AK, GCMG, GCVO, KBE
Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia
This will be followed by the Keynote Address, which will be given by
Admiral Ronald J. Hays, USN
Commander-in-Chief
United States Pacific Command
Other Speakers include:
Mr Kim Beazley
The Australian Minister for Defence
Mr Xu Yimin
The Secretary-General of the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies
Air Marshal Ewan Jamieson
Former Chief of Defence Staff, New Zealand
General P. C. Gratton, AO, OBE
The Chief of the Defence Force
Dr Magnus Clarke, of Deakin University
Currently Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies, Centre for Arms Control and International Security, University of Lancaster

GOVERNMENT SOURCES

Introduction

The aim of this article is to gain an insight into the Soviet Military by examining the career of Marshal Zhukov. Despite the large amount of interest and work on the subject on the Soviet Military, historically little is known of the internal workings and relationship of the Soviet Officer Corps and High Command. This has proved a difficult subject to examine due to the veil of secrecy surrounding the actual role of individuals in the Soviet State. This has been further complicated by official propaganda which can incorrectly associate the responsibility for military success at the highest level and ignoring intermediate commanders. Many in the West regard the Soviet Military as being very hierarchical in nature and therefore less capable of creative and independent action than their Western counterpart. This has often been seen by some as a weakness in the Soviet Officer Corps. The fact is that little is known about the individual performance of Soviet Commanders and it is unwise to make judgements based purely on our own military values and background.

The career of Marshal Zhukov and in particular the examination of his success on the battlefield also give a rare insight in the workings and relationship of the Soviet Army itself. Zhukov was seen as a Hero and his impact on the Soviet Army both tactically and particularly psychologically cannot be underestimated. Marshal Zhukov showed that their method of operation (massed armour tactics, rigid control, detailed planning and staff work, and a preparedness to accept casualties on a scale that would not be accepted by many Western Nations), best suits the characteristics of the Soviet Army.

Marshal Zhukov's Career up to WWII

Background

Marshal Zhukov was born in 1896 in the Kalunga region near Moscow. At a young age he worked as a tradesman in Moscow but was conscripted into the Russian Imperial Army in 1915. He distinguished himself in the 10th Novgorod Dragoons on the Eastern Front and was twice decorated for bravery. He was quickly promoted to NCO rank. When the revolution broke out, he sided with the communists and consequently joined the Red Army in 1918. During the following Civil War he served as a platoon commander and then as a Squadron Commander (1920) in the cavalry (he was also involved in the disastrous expedition into Poland). In reward for his diligent service he was given command of the 39th Buzuluk Cavalry Regt in 1923.

The Middle Peace Years

As a Regt Commander and later as a Commander of the 2nd Cavalry Bde he displayed much zeal for establishing effective training and adequate staff planning techniques. He placed a good deal of emphasis on arms co-operation and effective intelligence based on sound reconnaissance.

In 1930 he was appointed Inspector of Cavalry at the 4th Division where he placed much emphasis on the application of science to war and after which he spent a year at the Frunze Military Science Academy. After this he was promoted to Commander of the 4th Cavalry Division. Here he began placing much emphasis on the effective use of armour (en masse). In 1937 he gained command of the 6th Cossack Corps in Byelorussia where again he emphasised realistic battle training and detailed planning in all exercise operations.

The War Years 1939-45

There is some dispute as to the role and significance played by Soviet Commanders during the war, especially in the staff and planning area. This disagreement is largely a result of secrecy of the Soviet Military and the overbearing presence of Stalin. However it is still possible to determine, at least in part, the role played by Zhukov in WWII. As a field commander in 1939 in Mongolia and on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 Zhukov command style and
'success' can be more easily determined. As a result we will examine Zhukov's performance in general and will look at the battles of Khalku Gol and Berlin in more detail.

Mongolia 1939

In 1939 Russian Mongolia was under increasing pressure from the Japanese. To deal with this situation Stalin sent Zhukov first as an inspector and then as Commander in Chief to the East. Zhukov rightly assessed that the Japanese would soon take offensive action. He asked for and received substantial reinforcements in manpower, stores and, in particular, armour. He proceeded to concentrate this force. When the enemy crossed the border, penetrating into the Bain-Tsagan mountain region he immediately counter-attacked in force employed in particular his armour and mechanized force. After hard fighting the enemy was forced back with both sides suffering heavy casualties.

The Japanese 6th Army next advanced into the Bolshiye Peski Hills. In the interlude between battles Zhukov had again achieved high concentration of stores and equipment. Before counterattacking he also placed a great deal of emphasis on intelligence at all levels and in particular combat reconnaissance (patrols, ambushes, snatching persons). He went to great lengths to deceive the enemy of the impending assault only telling his troops three hours before hand.

When the assault started he achieved a good deal of surprise with many Japanese officers being absent from their units. He launched concentrated air, artillery and armour assaults along the enemy’s whole front with the main armoured thrust going to the flanks. As a result he was able to encircle the whole army and settled down to a battle of annihilation grinding the enemy away by continuous assault. The battle was a complete success for the Russians and its unexpected result stopped further Japanese aggression in this area for the remainder of the war.

Impact as Commander In Chief of the Eastern Front

Influence on Stalin. Prior to war with Germany Zhukov established a good relationship with Stalin who found Zhukov to be a reliable soldier who shared many of his views. This was to be of great help to Zhukov during the war, giving him unequal access and influence over Stalin. As Brigadier Young states ‘Zhukov often forced on Stalin his military decisions’. It is in this area of influence that some of the importance of Zhukov’s role in the end Russian Victory must be viewed.

On the 10 Oct 1941, when it appeared that Moscow was about to fall, Stalin appointed Zhukov the Chief of General Staff. His planning, determination and preparedness to accept casualties were among many other factors responsible for revitalizing the Russian defence. It is significant that after the battle of Moscow, he was hailed as its victor.

At Stalingrad and in the Kursk offensive, Zhukov played a large role in the planning of operations, with the execution left to other Generals. These battles reflected his planning style, massive preparation, massing of stores and equipment, cutting off an enemy salient and then annihilating this force regardless of one’s own casualties.

Field Command: The Vistula and Berlin Campaign

Zhukov was given command of 1st and 2nd Byelorussian Fronts. Through his influence with Stalin he also retained much influence over strategic planning. The success of his Ukraine and Vistula offensive were the result of this thorough planning and concentration of force (in particular armour). Again he had concentrated his attacks until he penetrated the enemy line. He would then exploit this with his massive reserve of armour forcing the enemy to withdraw or be encircled. Such tactics well suited the massive size of the forces at his disposal and the flat plains of the Ukraine and Poland. Here centres of resistance could be bypassed and later exploited.

On reaching the Oder River, Zhukov prepared for the final campaign of the war, the seizing of Berlin. In the pause before the attack he commenced concentrating troops, equipment and material on enormous scale for the final assault. He planned the offensive in detail, carrying out detailed reconnaissance, and holding a two day planning conference. Between the 8-14 Apr every aspect of the operation was rehearsed in mock war games and exercise rehearsals. He had his engineers construct an exact replica of Berlin which depicted every street and major building. Detailed assault maps were also drawn up. Zhukov decided on a frontal assault on a narrow front of 28 miles. He
concentrated the 47th and 35th Shock Armies and the 8th Guards Army for the attack. He had 2,500,000 troops; 41,600 guns; 6,500 tanks and 7,500 aircraft dedicated to the operation. A direct assault axis to Berlin was planned. He convinced Stalin that he did not need either Koniev’s or Rokossovsky’s direct armies help and that he alone be allowed to take Berlin.

At 0300 hr on 16 Apr he struck at the German lines with his massed air and artillery power. However, the German General Heinrici, having anticipated this, had pulled his men back. Consequently when Zhukov launched his assault at 0500 hr he found the German defence intact. The Russian armour in particular suffered heavily and after nine hours fighting the Russians were driven back.

The next day Zhukov again concentrated his artillery and air assault on the enemy’s gun positions and followed this by an immediate attack. Despite heavy losses Zhukov was able to force the flank of German defence. The enemy however retired in good order to their second line of defence based on the Seelow Heights. At this point his plans became particularly frustrated for even with two major attacks he failed to take the heights despite heavy losses in armour and men. Finally, on the morning of the 18th the 47th Shock Army managed to break through. Again the Germans managed to withdraw despite his exploitation with armour, and consolidated in their third and last line of defences. The Russian exploitation had in fact been slowed down by the determined resistance of an intermediate position manned by an SS detachment.

Zhukov was now under increasing pressure from Stalin to hasten the fall of Berlin. With his plan of frontal assault being so frustrated by stiff opposition he now changed his plan to one of envelopment. He directed Koniev to move his main force from the south, and, Rokossovsky to move from the north and converge on Berlin.

Zhukov now concentrated his main reserves on the enemy’s right (north) flank. After breaking through he channelled his advance to the north of Berlin from where they could commence their assault on the city. However the rest of his force was delayed by the German resistance, in particular, that of the SS Nederland Division, and did not close on the city until 21 Apr. Koniev’s advance was also being delayed by German resistance.

The German defence works in Berlin itself were at a high level of readiness. The underground railway afforded a great deal of internal mobility to the defenders. But on 25 Apr Koniev’s forces closed in on the city and it was wholly cut off. Zhukov now threw his 47th Army, 3rd Shock Army and two flank armies into the assault. He heavily committed his armour in the attack. The fighting was from house to house and street to street. The Russians were suffering heavy casualties particularly in their tank attacks. Stalin was convinced to leave the storming of the centre of the city for Zhukov.

On the 29th the Russians stormed the Moltke Bridge which was only 300m from the Reichstag. It still took them three more days of hard fighting to reach the Reichstag. At this stage Zhukov tried to hasten the enemy capitulation by swamping him with more and more attacks without any regard for casualties. It was not until the 2 May that the main enemy force surrendered.

In this battle Zhukov had lost 304,000 men, 2,156 tanks, 1,220 guns and 527 aircraft. In tanks alone he had lost over a third of his massive field army. In the press conference he gave after the battle he glorified his own role in the battle, failing to mention the other Generals involved and the casualties sustained. He described the battle as such “and in Berlin itself it was in fact just one immense mopping up operation” and he contended that the battle was already won prior to the arrival of Koniev’s forces.

In this battle he portrayed his best and worst traits as a field commander. He had concentrated a massive force. He had again achieved concentration on a narrow front and had used his armour en masse as the driving force of his assault. He displayed great determination and was prepared to achieve his goals at any cost. Finally he was prepared to use his most abundant asset, manpower and material, to swamp the enemy regardless of cost. Of this battle Young writes “Zhukov — believed military aims can only be achieved by sacrificing life on a massive scale. By means of these unattractive qualities he achieved success everywhere.”

Zhukov: After the War

Zhukov’s own popularity and success created problems for him with Stalin and this in part resulted in his fall from influence. He was posted
to the Odessa Military District and remained in obscurity until Stalin's death in Mar 1953.

Kruschev eagerly adopted him as an ally in his struggle for power and made him first Deputy Minister of Defence and then Defence Minister. He played a key role in propping up Kruschev when he was challenged by a majority of the Presidium in 1957. Zhukov made available military aircraft which allowed the Central Committee to be assembled overnight to back Kruschev. Zhukov was made a member of the Presidium as a reward.

During this period Zhukov was 'pushing' military reform and did much to improve the professional calibre of the Army, emphasising the importance of training and technology. However he also encouraged the Army's independence from political advisors and this soon brought him into conflict with the party. On 26 Oct 1957 he was dismissed as Defence Minister and a week later he was removed from all Party posts.

Zhukov led an obscure life until 1966 when he was rehabilitated as 'Hero of the Republic' and was allowed to publish his memoirs. At this time he was awarded the Order of Lenin. Marshal Zhukov died on 18 June in 1974.

Conclusion

The importance of Zhukov to the Red Army's victory in the East cannot be underestimated. By the age of 48 he had made a great impact as both a field commander and as a strategic planner. As a result of his personal influence with Stalin, his impact as Chief of the General Staff was far greater than it would otherwise have been and as a result he was able to have a significant influence on every major battle after 1941.

Zhukov cannot be described as a brilliant General. However he can be described as a sound commander who had a firm understanding of modern mass warfare. His success was based on his diligent staff work and detailed planning which in itself was based on sound intelligence. He fully understood the principle of concentration of force and the use of modern technology such as airpower and armour. Zhukov had also placed much emphasis on realistic battle training and prior to battle, detailed rehearsals. Perhaps the greatest reason for his success was determination to fulfill his plans regardless of the cost in lives. Young summed up this point well when he wrote ‘he was infinitely ruthless about his men in order to achieve overall success, however such Generals of WWII were termed butchers of men, not great Generals’. Whatever the criticism, his command style was infinitely suited to massive Red Army and his style of command helped save Russia from defeat.

Marshal Zhukov again came to play an important role in Soviet history in the 1953-57 period as a result of alliance with Kruschev. During this period he encouraged technological and structural reform within the Army.

In short Marshal Zhukov can be deemed to be a professional soldier who dedicated the better part of his life to improving the Soviet Army. His impact on the Soviet military was significant and can still be seen today. In particular his career gives an insight into the psychology and thinking of the Soviet Army. It also shows, in part, why it has developed a philosophy of hierarchical control and use of mass force regardless of cost and how this may best suit the nature of the Soviet Army and the USSR. As a result it may be argued that this aspect of the Soviet military may in some circumstances such as Europe, be seen not as a weakness but as an inherent strength of their system.

NOTES

2. Ibid Page 223.
3. Such was the situation with Warsaw, Pozan, Tarun, Konignisberg and Danzig.
4. Heinrici was an acknowledged expert in defence. German preparations under his guidance were excellent.
5. This was only some miles from Berlin.
6. Stalin was now convinced that the Allies might reach Berlin first. He was wary of the possibility of the Western Allies concluding a separate treaty with Germany.
7. Op cit Young Page 232
8. Ibid Page 237
9. Ibid Page 233
10. Ibid Page 236
11. Ibid Page 237

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Lesson Plan That Worked

By Major R. H. McAdams (RL)

Introduction

It all started with a pair of shoes.

It was 1978 and, in common with so many people, my horizons at the time were not large. Content with work, home and family, I was unprepared for what was to follow over the next few months.

The catalyst was the local insurance agent who having completed the business part of his visit, was sitting contentedly sipping his tea and chatting with the family. Leaning over to replenish his cup, I accidentally spilled the milk and some landed on his shoes. During the subsequent clean-up I asked him where he had obtained them. It turned out that they were army issue. Further questions brought the information that he was a member of his local Army Cadet unit. Knowing that I had an army background (Army Apprentice School and British Regular Army) he suggested that I might like to join. His exact words were ‘They are looking for people like you.’

Having recently looked in the mirror and seen a short, balding, rather plump chap the wrong side of 45, I wondered why but said I would visit the local unit and have a look at what they were up to. (Some lack of enthusiasm may be noted here).

It is probably well-known that a small incident in one’s life can change its whole course and I was about to experience just that.

On a warm Friday evening late in the year, I took myself off to Adelaide’s Hampstead Barracks where I was to meet an ARA officer who was in charge of Cadets in South Australia.

As I entered a barracks for the first time in years, the memories of other places and other climes came rushing back. So, with erect bearing (nearly) and arms swinging properly from rear (well — almost) I marched to meet what was to be my Fate. A quick question to a passing young soldier, the correct office pointed out, and, within minutes, I was being warmly welcomed by a voluble Infantry Major who was well aware of my former service (that insurance agent).

As we spoke I became aware of a strange feeling of ‘Being There Before’ and of ‘Coming Back’ — back to the mystique of the Service and yet it was subtly different. We were talking about the young, the thirteen year old and up who was looking for that elusive something in his life and of how the Army Cadet Scheme could cater to that need. I felt caught up in the officer’s enthusiasm and before long had agreed to accompany him on a tour of the Cadet Unit who were parading that night in the same location.

We visited a Platoon learning foot drill on the square (Thought ‘Come on, Corporal — Get those arms swinging properly’),

We looked in on a map-reading lecture (‘That is not the normal compass’),

We shared a cup of tea with them at their break time (‘Nice lot of lads, a few haircuts needed’),

And so on.

I talked to the Cadets, I chatted to their Officers and finally the Commander of 4 Cadet Group talked to me (For that was the appointment held by the Major) The pressure became too great and — I gave in, and so, in the fullness of time, was appointed an Officer of Cadets in the rank of Lieutenant and posted to a Recruit Platoon of Gilles Plains High School Cadet Unit as a Platoon Supervising Officer.

It was March 1979.

Body — Stage I

Over seven years have gone by since that first parade and in that time many changes have taken place in the unit and in the Australian Cadet Corps. The unit had been raised in 1977 as a combined Schools Unit shortly after the Cadet Scheme was reintroduced by the Government and attracted about 170-180 applicants for positions. It also attracted a number of Officers of Cadets from the previous scheme and a few OCTU Cadets. For about 18 months the unit appeared to flourish but in common with a number of others in the Adelaide area suffered a decline in numbers from then on; Officers resigning or retiring due to study or other commitments and the interests of the young people turning to pastimes. Those of us
who remained in the system could not find any specific reasons for this decline. Was the unit too disciplined/not disciplined enough? Was there too much emphasis on drill and not enough on other types of training? The truth, at least in retrospect, appeared to be that the unit as a whole lacked any positive direction or purpose. It was just there.

A conference was called of all OoC's and Senior Cadets where we thrashed out our problems and tried to put forward some solutions to them. For a time thereafter, nothing much seemed to happen. And yet — the atmosphere did change — fewer Cadets were seeking early discharge, more were attending Home Training Parades.

The structure of the unit changed as did the training. More emphasis was put on placing Officers and Cadet NCO's in a position and giving them the responsibility of that position. More responsibility was given to the Cadets themselves to run their Platoons and Sections and more use was made of their authority as Cadet supervisory ranks. The so called ‘kids’ began to assume a maturity that belied their tender years — The unit came alive.

Rumours of change had been circulating in the Cadet Corps not the least of which was the admittance of females into the scheme. And in they came. At the unit (of which, much to my surprise, I was appointed OC) we only accepted a certain number in the first year and they were already to have held positions of responsibility in other youth organisations. By this means we tried to ensure that we would have female NCO's pre-trained and ready to supervise the large numbers of female enlistees the following year. The girls settled down well and were soon indistinguishable from their male counterparts in standards of dress, bearing and training.

Another shock to the system came in 1983 when it was announced that 4 Cadet Group would close and units would no longer be fully supported if based on schools except in certain low socio-economic areas. That meant that GPHS Cadet Unit would have to disband and be reaised in another form.

By this time, the unit appeared to be on a sound footing and in order for it to continue in existence another Sponsor from a community based organisation had to be found to take over the role that the School and State Education Department had fulfilled up until that time. 4 Cadet Group acted quickly on our behalf and succeeded in persuading a committee from the local RSL Clubs in the area to sponsor the unit. Thus it was that in November 1983 that the Gilles Plains High School Cadet Unit was disbanded and in its stead Northern Districts (RSL) Open Cadet Unit rose like a phoenix from the ashes.

Body — Stage II

Looking back over those turbulent years, it seems a miracle that the unit did not fold through sheer bewilderment. But it did not and emerged relatively unscathed and with a heightened sense of purpose.

With the withdrawal and disbanding of 4 Cadet Group, the only ARA assistance available on a regular basis was from the Cadet component of HQ 4 MD which consisted of two ARA WO's. The units remaining in the Cadet Corps were thrown very much on to their own resources in order to provide those items of equipment previously and relatively easily obtained from the Army. CB radios were purchased in lieu of the 25 Set; Training stores were made by volunteer parents or begged and borrowed from friends who ‘knew the right people.’ One of the innovations at this time was the ‘ARES Fostering Unit’ which was introduced into the scheme. They were tasked with logistic support and assistance to Cadet units in addition to their normal ARES role. Experience has shown that there exists a vast reservoir of goodwill between Cadets and the Army Reserve but, as ever certain constraints continue to exist and one cannot always ‘ask and then receive.’

Not having the support of a full scale Cadet Group to rely on has had one distinct advantage. Cadet units have been forced to be more independent and responsible for their own well-being. NDCU has for many years had a committee of interested parents and friends whose major function has been fund raising and the running of the unit canteen. With the new policy of standing on our own two feet well and truly in place, the Parent's Committee are now tasked with provisioning of rations in ration packs, the supply of transport, searching out additional equipment sources and providing cooks on camps and bivouacs. This more active role than was previously the case has been taken up with great enthusiasm and dedication.

More direct relationships with local ARES Units have developed over the past few years.
The Cadet unit may provide assistance on Range Days and Bivouacs with the provision of Senior Cadets as sentries; an ARES unit may provide a location to hold Cadet Promotion Courses. On ARES Subject I Courses NDCU has been used as an example of how a Company Parade should be held; ARES help out where possible with the immediate loan of an item of camp kit that should have been indented for earlier — and wasn’t. ARES and ARA offer a continuing service career to the Cadet who is nearing the end of his or her cadet service; we are delighted if they wish to do so.

**Conclusion**

Cadets in Australia have a long and honourable history so it is hoped that the only 'conclusion' will be that the movement increases in strength and maturity.

If I may cite my own unit as an example, the future is already taking shape. Recruiting and the retention of Cadets after their first year have both increased since the unit was reformed as a community based organisation as the following figures show:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NO OF RECRUITS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>130 + (Projected figure)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In addition a detachment of the unit is to be raised at Elizabeth in February 1987 to cater for those who are unable to attend the unit a Hampstead Barracks. However to grow only larger in numbers and not in quality is not enough. In today’s society an increasing number of our young people seem to have lost their sense of direction and appear to see no purpose in life. It is my belief that through the Australian Cadet Corps and like organisations they can regain their self-respect if we, the adult members of the ACC, answer their 'cri-de-coeur' for strong leadership, firm discipline and wise guidance.

We can only do this however, if those with the experience that Service life has given them are willing to share their knowledge with the younger generation. My own unit has the proud distinction of having in excess of 150 years experience to call upon ranging from ex WO’s of twenty years or more to LCPL with less than five years in ARES. This has proved invaluable in both the training and the counselling areas dealing as we do with an age range from 13 to 18 years old. At the beginning of this article, I said that the young people of Australia were looking for that 'elusive something'; they had a need which service in Cadets could fulfil. Looking back over my service in the Corps it would appear as if I was seeking something also — In common with so many ex-Servicemen and women serving in the Australian Cadet Corps I have found it. So could you!!

**Postscript**

Incidentally, I have still got those shoes.
Book Review

ROUNDSHOT TO RAPIER ARTILLERY IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA 1840-1984. Editor — David Brook, Royal Australian Artillery Association of South Australia

Reviewed by — Brigadier D. Willett (RL)

This important history of artillery units raised in South Australia from the early days of European settlement is a rewritten and expanded edition of an earlier compilation which covered the period to 1966. The significant events of the additional period to 1984 have been the reorganisation of the Army Reserve field artillery component and the move to South Australia of air defence elements of the Regular Army.

Although the title suggests a technical work, this is not strictly the case. Naturally the book deals with the equipments used by the units of the various branches which have constituted the Royal Regiment of Australian Artillery over the years. But more importantly, it deals with the men, and women too, who made up the units. It tells of their endeavours and achievements, recording their contributions, in the face of many difficulties and dangers, to the defence of Australia at home and abroad.

Gunnery were proud that “Ubique” forms part of their regimental motto — South Australian gunners served wherever the Royal Australian Artillery served in both World Wars, although the number of units or sub-units which could claim to be “South Australian” were few. By the same token, many distinguished gunners from the rest of Australia served with units of the Regiment in South Australia.

Two chapters merit special mention. One deals with the Proof and Experimental Establishment at Port Wakefield — this details the concept for this unit and indicates the contribution it makes to the development of artillery equipment. The current controversy about the continued existence of the Establishment lends interest to this chapter. The contribution made by Royal Australian Artillery units and individual members to the successful operation of trial facilities at Woomera is briefly but adequately covered.

The Royal Australian Artillery Association and its Book Committee are to be commended for commissioning this comprehensive history and the South Australian Jubilee 150 Board must be thanked for their generous sponsorship. Both are indebted to Lieutenant Colonel David Brook for his attention to detail in compiling such a complete and wide-ranging record. The photographs are of great interest, particularly those of the early coastal batteries and of the field artillery equipment on Torrens Parade Ground prior to Federation. The appendices record particular detail on deployment of coastal batteries, artillery equipments, senior officer appointments, unit designations and aspects of regimental customs. A comprehensive bibliography is included.

This interesting history deserves to be read not only by those gunners who served or by those whose forbears served, but also by professional and amateur histories interested in yet another of the many facets of the development of South Australian history.


Reviewed by Maureen Isaacs.

For 25 years the superpowers have been developing satellites to the point where they are now essential to nearly every type of military operation. The projected deployment of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons systems capable of disabling an opponent’s satellites, is thus an inevitable consequence in the on-going militarisation of space.

The main purpose of this book by Paul Stares is to assess the range of implications which the deployment of an ASAT weapons system will have on US national security. To this end he
analyzes and compares the satellite systems of both superpowers in terms of relative efficiency and war fighting potential. In conclusion he examines the problems and feasibility of space arms control, which is the most difficult issue in this debate.

Besides being a comprehensive and informative study of the extent of superpower rivalry in satellite technology, the book reveals some disquieting features about ASAT weapons systems. Although they are reputed to have an ostensibly defensive role, they could be a potentially destabilizing ingredient in superpower relations.

For example, the use of ASAT weapons in a crisis could act as a catalyst to nuclear war. The author cites various instances in which this situation may arise. He describes these as: tactical, intimidatory, retaliatory, misattributed, preventive and preemptive. The most crucial elements here are uncertainty and misperception. They arise because of the difficulty of verifying whether the malfunction of a vital military satellite — orbiting hundreds of kilometres above the earth — is due to accidental causes or enemy interference.

In the highly charged atmosphere of a superpower crisis, military decision makers could not afford to give the opponent the benefit of the doubt. The loss of a military satellite would mean a reduction in strategic advantage (particularly in the case of an early warning satellite) and the inability to replace it reasonably quickly would make swift retaliatory action a distinct possibility. This could set off a chain reaction leading to vertical escalation and nuclear war.

In view of these dangerous possibilities plus the ever increasing expense, the author is dubious about the benefits of ASAT weapons to US national security. However, he believes that the ideal vision of space as a quasisanctuary free from conflict is no longer possible. It is therefore imperative that the issue of arms control in space be seriously addressed.

Negotiations which dealt with limiting ASAT weapons took place in the late 70s, but the prospect of further talks were stalled by the subsequent friction over the intervention in Afghanistan by the USSR. In the early 80s the launching of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) further undermined chances for limiting space weapons. This was because SDI emphasized the use of space based ballistic missile defences, laser, and particle beam technology, which was expressly prohibited by the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

At the moment there is little incentive for the US to consider limiting ASAT weapons since they provide a useful means of testing SDI technologies and components. In addition, the USSR has the only dedicated ASAT weapon system in existence and they also appear to have the edge in space research. These factors taken together with the setback caused by the space shuttle disaster make it unrealistic for the US to embark on arms control in space. The USSR will also be reluctant to limit ASAT weapons because they are a countermeasure to the SDI space based ballistic missile defence (BMD) system.

Besides these major obstacles, there remains the perennial problem of verification, made more formidable by the difficulty of ‘on site’ inspection in space. There is also the difficulty of determining — under the present state of the art — which satellites are carrying weapons, as some have a dual capability.

Nevertheless, the author is optimistic as regards the potential benefits of ASAT arms control. He emphasizes the value of cost savings, strategic stability, satellite survivability and future international space cooperation. In order to achieve this he suggests a range of options for negotiating ASAT arms control and discusses them in detail. He is well aware of the difficulties and is careful to present imaginative recommendations for possible alternatives and solutions. The book is meticulously researched and lucidly argued. It would without doubt be of great interest to those who wish to extend their knowledge and understanding of the subject.