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Contents

2 Letters to the Editor

7 Command Vs Committee
Captain G.P. Hogan, RAR

13 A Course Contrary to Training and Inclination
Colonel J.V. Johnson, RFD, ED

20 Preparing the Junior Officer for the Staff
Lieutenant Colonel M.S. Beckingham, RAEME

25 Landrover 110 — Initial Impressions
Sergeant C.I. Clapperton, RAEME

29 Education and Competence
Major W.J. Graco, AA Psych

37 The Training of Foreign Students
Major B.D. Copeland, RAAEC

41 Australia’s Defence Cooperation Programme with the South West Pacific
Lieutenant Colonel D.A.K. Urquhart

52 Review Article
Major Warren Perry, (RL)

56 Extending the Surface Navy Horizon
Lieutenant Commander R.D. Fisher, RAN

60 Book Review

Cover: Members of the Australian Light Horse Brigade in World War I — Part of the Heritage Collection by Defence Artist Jeff Isaacs.

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Letters to the Editor

The ARES Soldier

Dear Sir,

Your May/June issue of the Defence Force Journal carried an article which, in many people's minds, is going to strike of ill-informed opinion and, in some cases, total ignorance.

In the article "Train to Retain the ARES Soldier," Captain Caligari puts forward an argument based on a study carried out over 14 years ago (The Millar Report). I believe that, whilst the results of this study may have been true in 1973 (and we all know that surveys can be used to come up with any result we want them to), there are still some basic facts which were overlooked then, and are still being overlooked now.

These facts can be grouped under the same headings used by Captain Caligari:

a. Training,
b. Leadership/Man-Management,
c. Organisation, and
d. Social.

Training

The standard of training has not changed since 1973 — the system of Training by Objectives does not allow this. If anything, training standards have increased, particularly in Military Districts who lay greater emphasis on MIT (Methods of Instructional Training) training.

The major complaint ARES members have against any training (and this complaint is heard at all levels of the hierarchy) is the seeming overemphasis on what is, in their minds, those unnecessary aspects of soldiering — in short, those tasks in which they have little or no interest.

There are two points which must be borne in mind when carrying out serious discussion on the relationship between ARES training and retention:

a. Why do people join the ARES in the first place, and
b. What characteristics do these people bring with them.

The first point is a relatively simple question to answer. An ARES soldier joins a specific unit because he or she is under the assumption that the role of that unit is what he or she will be doing. For example, most soldiers join an infantry unit because he or she wants to crawl around the bush firing a rifle, getting dirty, and generally have a hell of a good time — not to be a clerk or a storeman. Similarly, the soldier joins an armoured unit to drive APCs — not to be a pseudo 'grunt' riding around in the back of one.

This is a generalisation, but a very accurate one in my experience. Members of the ARES have, in most cases (except, of course for isolated units), a choice of postings. In some instances there are members of the ARES who have extensive experience in more than one Corp, and these people are, in my opinion, invaluable members of any unit. So why should he or she be forced to do those things — things such as administrative support (so very necessary for the Service but not for the individual) — which he or she does not see as important enough to spend his or her spare time doing? This is the question being asked.

We all know the importance of the Q and Admin systems. We also know that the ratio of Admin to Field soldier is something in the order of 3:1, that is, it takes 3 Admin Support people (of various Corps) to keep 1 soldier in the field. It therefore goes without saying that, out of every four recruits, three should go to administrative or service corp postings. In the Regular Army the balance is automatically kept, but in the ARES, this is a luxury because no-one (and that word should be underlined) joins the ARES to carry out those tasks which he or she would ordinarily undertake as part of their civilian career.

Examples of this are found amongst the housewives who blanche at being given catering tasks, or clerical professionals who rebel against being put in the Orderly Room, or senior management personnel who refuse to attend courses for promotion.

The bottom line is that potential recruits believe the expensive advertising which promises adventure and the chance to 'do something different.' Doubters of this fact can be given proof by holding two voluntary unpaid activi-
ties, one an adventure activity (Escape and Evasion for example), and the other an administrative task (eg Stocktake), and then compare the numbers that actually turn up.

The second point worthy of discussion is the fact that we will always be in a position of training civilians to undertake military skills. The concept of ‘One-Army’ has long been an ideal amongst ranks of higher echelons. No one who has ever undertaken a close study of the ARES (or CMF as it was in 1973) will ever doubt that this is an ideal which may be out of reach. The fact of the matter is that we have, on the one hand, the professional soldier who is dedicated to a certain cause and beliefs (which is why he or she is a professional) trying to instil these beliefs and dedication to a certain cause onto a group of people who are not, and may never have any intention of ever becoming, professionals.

For 330 days of the year, the non-professional soldier goes through a whole range of experiences which are, at times, at odds with his or her military career. Many of these experiences would not be tolerated within a more structured military environment (on my OCTU course, for example, we had a cadet who, in civilian life was a topless dancer at a discotheque) yet, in the ARES, they are tolerated because, for the remaining 33 days, that person may well be a model soldier.

Members of the Regular Army spend 100% of their time doing what they do best, whilst the Reservist spends only 1% of his or her time doing what he or she does second best.

How then can a comparison be made between the two? How then can the Reserve soldier expect to be 100% professional when he or she only spends 1% of his or her time being a soldier?

Changing the standard of what is already recognised as being the pinnacle of training amongst training professionals, will not help to retain disgruntled and disappointed soldiers.

Will Raising the Standard Help?

I doubt it. The standard of training either given or reached is a values judgement imposed by a professional. This is true in both civilian and military professions.

As I have mentioned above, a soldier joins the ARES to ‘do’, not to ‘learn’. Granted, the learning phase is vitally important if the ‘doing’ phase is to be carried out correctly, but there are times in the ARES when we are forced to go overboard on this.

For example, ECN packages are written with the ‘One-Army’ concept in mind. Reservists are expected to reach a required standard, as are Regular soldiers, but what is forgotten is that neither the instructors, nor the soldiers, have the luxury of time to complete these packages before there are those who get fed up and leave the ARES and/or a new influx of recruits cause a restart to the training programme.

I would suggest that we would be better served by having a serious look at the requirements of fully trained ARES soldiers in comparison to his or her Regular counterpart. It might be found that measures could be taken to shorten the time required to achieve certain levels. For example, applicants for OCTU could be required to spend at least 12 months with their respective Corp (for female applicants) or with an infantry battalion before commencement of the course. This would cut six months off an 18-month course. Another example is having those specialist courses (such as Regimental signaller, APC Crew Commander etc) run only by Regular Army units over, say, a three-week continuous period with certain portions being carried out by correspondence either before commencement of the course or in the weeks following.

The notion that ex ARA SNCO/WO be taken on to unit establishments as training staff would not take away the fact that time is of the essence when it comes to ARES training. Regardless of who carries out the training, restrictions in man-days (and the time that the instructors can be away from both their civilian careers and personal lives) is always going to hinder any good intentions as regard to quality training. I believe that the answer to the question lays with an increased role of the ARA in the actual ARES unit, and the short-term posting of certain personnel to ARA units.

Leadership/Man-Management

As a professional consultant on Leadership and Staff Development skills, I can agree that there are times when the quality shown by both ARA and ARES leaders leaves a lot to be desired. However, I do not believe that in this day and age it is one of the prime reasons for a low retention rate of ARES soldiers.

The ARES, like any other organisation, is bonded by a sense of belonging felt by individ-
ual members. If this bond is not strong enough to hold all of the group members together, then some, naturally, will leave. In the end there will be a smaller group, but a much tighter bond will exist between them.

One of the great things about the ARES is that it brings together people who may not ordinarily mix in their private lives. These people have a variety of backgrounds and social conditioning which gives them a different outlook on leadership than, say, a Regular soldier who is conditioned to accept imposed leadership.

Another major difference between the Armed Services and civilian organisations, is that, with the former, it is assumed that every recruit wishes, one day, to become the commanding officer. Within most civilian organisations it is known that the reverse is most often the case, and this sometimes leads to clashes of beliefs when it comes to accepting leadership responsibilities. There have been examples of ARES officers and NCOs being in command of men and women who, in their civilian careers, are their superiors. This leads to delicate situations when it comes to such things as discipline.

It is alright to say that the Army concept of leadership through superior rank is right come what may. But it must be remembered that at all times we are dealing with human beings with all their frailties. Whether the leader is good or bad, right or wrong, the group will stick together — only, within the ARES, this bond is much tighter because, after all, they have the right to leave whenever they feel that they no longer belong.

It is not by accident that many of the great wartime leaders have come from Militia backgrounds. The essential quality that these men have shown is an understanding of the needs of civilians in uniform because they too experience the same needs.

There are some Reserve leaders, I will admit, who do try to lead by ‘divine right’. But these are few and far between and, as they are outside of the mainstream, they either become discontented and leave, or conform to the status quo.

Organisation

Neither myself, nor any of those people who I spoke to, agree that there is a great need, as identified by Captain Caligari, for an ARA commanding officer to hold alternate postings as ARES unit commander. If anything, we believe the ARES would be better served by an ARES senior officer being posted to an ARA unit to gain experience in command and control (if only shared) of a full strength unit on full-time duty.

Having served in both the ARA and the ARES, I am well aware of the frustrations which can be experienced by ARA officers and NCOs who are posted to ARES units. However, my experience has also shown that these same problems exist in the ARA — only the ARA have more people and more time to deal with them. A supposed influx of ‘professionalism’ will do little to change what is going to happen anyway.

Social

As mentioned earlier, people are drawn to the ARES at the prospect of ‘doing’ things, not learning. Captain Caligari’s assumption that the soldiers will parade voluntarily one night a week (and here one assumes that he meant every week) shows a lack of understanding of the needs of an ARES soldier, regardless of rank.

Members of the ARES have, in the main, only one thing in common — their membership of the ARES. Invariably this is not a strong enough bond to unite them outside of the ARES environment and for the other 99% of the year they go their separate ways. Not one of us has the right to order these men and women to socialise if they don’t want to.

Admittedly, there are some ARES units whose raison d’etre seems to revolve around mess functions, but these are in the minority. We can put on as many barbecues or free film nights as we want to, but you will have mess committees who feel obliged to attend (and therefore resentful) doing the arranging, and a handful of curious onlookers who had nothing better to do that night anyway.

The use of social activities to extend an ARES soldier’s learning is fraught with difficulties. The reason for this is, again, the matter of time. ARES activities (much to the chagrin of the professional soldier) rates a poor second or third behind professional and domestic requirements on a soldier’s time. He or she will always put the job first (meaning that if he or she has had a particularly tiring week, the weekend bivouac may have to be foregone) with the family requirements a very close second. If that member is required to devote more time (and unpaid time at that!) then he or she is prepared
to give, then, obviously the ARES must suffer — and there is nothing that any of us can do to change this.

Captain Caligari states that the “alternative to ARES service are ... social.” This is true in a lot of cases. So, what we should be doing, wherever possible, is to rearrange the ARES schedule where it clashes with social events of any importance. For example, how many units in NSW and QLD suffer poor attendance on the nights of the State or Origin football matches? From my experience, the ARES slips further down the list of priorities on these nights. If we can’t change the night of the football, why not change the night of the parade?

Mid-week social activities (and this includes late night meetings in the mess) are only well supported by those people who either do not have important things (such as work) to do the following day, or are (in the case of the ARA) in a position to be flexible enough to start later and/or have half of the following day off. (This is not to mention the time off in lieu for weekend work also enjoyed by the ARA.) This is not meant as a bitchy statement, it is just a reiteration of the state of play which must be remembered when demands are made of the ARES member’s time.

Summary

When it comes to making a decision on a career in the ARES, a soldier will very rarely look at either the standard of training he or she is receiving (after all, how is he or she to know what is good or bad?), nor the standard of leadership he or she is receiving. What the soldier looks at primarily is “am I enjoying this?” and, secondly, “do I belong to the group?”

The first question can be overcome by ensuring that the enjoyment is there. By not confining ARES members to the ‘boring and repetitive’ work such as clerical and administrative tasks for at least the first two years of their service, we can let them get the ‘cowboy’ out of their system. But not spending the first half of a training weekend drawing stores, loading trucks, and travelling to training areas, and the second half of the weekend returning from training areas and washing trucks, we will be increasing the ‘doing’ time. By accentuating those promises made in the glossy advertising and gradually easing the more career-minded members into their administrative roles, we will be preparing them for tasks which must be carried out in times of war, not ones which must be suffered in peacetime.

The second question, the sense of belonging, can be answered by asking those members of the ARES what is it that keeps them in the service. Most often you will find that it is the esprit de corps of that particular unit which is the focal point.

A little while back I attended a voluntary parade to farewell the commanding officer of a particular battalion. Whilst nearly every member of the rifle company was on parade, less than half of the Support, Admin and BHQ Companies (and only three of the officers) bothered to show up. In discussions I had later on with members of the rifle company, I learnt the reason for this. They saw this parade as an excuse to ‘dress up’. You see, this company is one of the new Highland companies remaining in the Australian Army, and any chance the men get to wear their distinctive uniform, they take it whether it is paid or voluntary. I have known officers and men who would rather resign than leave this company because they have immense pride in their heritage. To the rest of the battalion, having to dryclean their battle dress and spit polish their GPs for an unpaid parade was a nuisance they would rather forego. (We won’t even bother to mention why there were very few female members present — at worst the men were blase about their uniform, the females were embarrassed!)

Esprit de Corps is not built on barbeques and open nights in the canteen. Nor is it enhanced by film nights and free drinks. It is built on a pride in belonging to a unit which offers the chance to ‘show off’ to your workmates, to undergo physical (as opposed to mental) hardships and come out the far end smiling, and to feel that whatever you have to put up with is all worthwhile.

I can sympathise with people like Captain Caligari who see the ARES as what they would term as ‘amateurs in uniform.’ I know the frustration they must go through when the ARES do not meet their high ideals. But to these people I must point out that if a military life was as important to the members of the ARES as it is to the members of the ARA, then surely they would have joined the ARA in the first place. Trying to force these people to ac-
cept more of the responsibility of soldiering
then they are willing to accept will only cause
more harm than good.

P. D. Rutherford
Capt

PS.
For background information, I have been
involved with the ARES and Regular Army for
over 21 years now. Of this, 18 years have been
spent actually in uniform. I am currently on
full-time duty with the Pilbarra Regiment.

The Evolution of the Field Ambulance
Dear Sir,

In the interesting article of the evolution of
the field ambulance, the author is correct in
giving the parentage of the field ambulance as
the bearer company and the field hospital.

However, the company was not “drawn from
a battalion” nor did it consist of “one MO and
sixteen stretcher bearers”.

This latter group was the regimental medical
establishment common to battalions (except
Guards units which had two M.O.s — and,
presumably, better health).

The bearer company was created in 1876 with
an establishment of some eight M.O.s, three
Q.M.s, 30-odd N.C.O.s and men from the Army
Hospital Corps, about a hundred bearers and
a group from the Transport Corps. Each com-
pany was allotted 10 regulation ambulance wa-
gons, and a further 23 were to be “supplied
locally”. There was one bearer company to each
(three-battalion) brigade.

The “Movable” Field Hospital, 200 beds,
having four store wagons was, naturally enough,
identical with the “Stationary” Field Hospital.

These hospital units had 7 M.O.s., 1 Q.M.,
37 N.C.O.s and O.R.s from the Hospital Corps
and 29 drivers (what did they drive?)

It was, as the article states, the bearer com-
pany and the (Movable) Field Hospital which
were combined to form the Field Ambulance.

These two units, fortunately, modified by the
time of amalgamation to about half their origi-
nal strength, made up the new field ambulance.

The new unit was made possible by the fixed
allocation of unit transport, and by putting
control of casualty collection and administra-
tion into the hands of the new Medical Corps
(forming in 1898).

The result of the amalgamation was, essen-
tially, that the collection and evacuation of cas-
ualties by the bearer company was co-ordinated
with, and controlled by, the treatment (hospital)
element.

Subsequent evolution of the unit followed
improvements in casualty carriage on the one
hand, and anaesthetic and surgical techniques
on the other. But that is altogether another
story.

BRIAN CLEREHAN
Colonel (RL)
Command vs Committee: A Personal Perspective on Defence Structure and Processes

By Captain G.P. Hogan, RAR

“A defence organization will fail in its basic purpose unless in addition to its other important functions, it provides effectively for the direction, command and management of our armed forces . . .”
— General Sir John Wilton, 1967

Introduction

THE Department of Defence is at once the largest and the most complex department within Australia’s governmental machinery, its complexity deriving from the conjectural nature of the task with which it is charged. While its fundamental responsibility for “the security of Australia and the protection of Australia’s interests against armed attack” is clear, it is less clear when, how or by whom any threat to Australia might be expected. Consequently, the Department does not have the luxury of a relatively unambiguous aim such as conducting trade, co-ordinating education, allocating finances or distributing social welfare. The ultimate function of Defence is to organise, command, administer, equip, supply and support a defence force whose primary peacetime role is to train for war.

The Department is also the most unique among governmental departments, characterized by a diarchal structure drawn along civil and military lines. Responsibility for the efficient administration of the Department is assigned to the Secretary, the Public Service head of the Department and the Minister’s chief civilian adviser. The Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) is responsible for the operational aspects of Defence and is the principal military adviser to the Minister. As over-simplified as this depiction is, it nevertheless points to a distinct dichotomy of uniformed and non-uniformed factions within the Department, which can become at times a rather uneasy alliance.

The major process within Defence is that of decision-making and the structure of the Department is in train ostensibly to facilitate that process. However, two broad antithetical approaches to this process would seem to exist throughout the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Department—decision by command and decision by committee. A discussion of the manifestations, characteristics and effects of these two approaches may reveal something of the wider nature and issues of the Defence structure and processes.

A Word of Warning

It should be unequivocally stated from the outset that the views expressed are those of an Army captain whose lot it has been to call Russell Hill home for twelve months. Before that, the author’s concept of the Defence Higher Organisation extended little beyond the authority who approved his applications for leave. Any comment, then, on perceived strengths and weaknesses of the Defence structure and processes must of necessity be value laden. Indeed, one man’s idea of a strength may well be another’s idea of a shortcoming.

The views of a junior staff officer working close to the base of a large pyramid could be seen by some to be simplistic, verging on naïve. The complete absence of wire diagrams and flow charts probably reinforces this. However, it is hoped that the view from the bottom will provide some perspective on the Defence organisation, without looking to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic. Perhaps the following vagrant, if not vague, thoughts on dualism in Defence may aspire to the same status that Marshal Foch conferred upon his Principes de la Guerre: “Shepherd’s fires lit on a stormy coast to guide the uncertain seaman.”

Military Command

The exclusively military structure and processes which represent the operational arm of the Defence organisation are enshrined in a system known as “command and control”. Military doctrine describes this process as “An arrangement of personnel, facilities, and the means for information acquisition, processing, and dissemination employed by a commander in planning, directing, and controlling operations.”

Although often incorrectly considered to be a single term, command and control are separate concepts with differing meanings: "Command relates to making decisions. Control is concerned with putting the decision into effect and monitoring the progress and results." Of course, the concept of command involves much more than just decision making. The late Group Captain W.H. Talberg saw command as extending far beyond the exercise of leadership through legally endowed authority to attain authorised objectives, claiming that: "The commander is vested with a spiritual mantle, visible when properly assumed, with the insignia of the obligation of leading personnel under command to co-operate towards reaching the goals set. The commander projects drive and a will to win — by example and by precept, and by convincing all ranks that attaining the goals is desirable." The role of the military commander as decision maker, rather than leader, is of primary concern here. Suffice to say that military command seeks to combine the restrained detachment necessary for effective decision making with the dynamic leadership vital to the implementation of some decisions.

The basic tool used by the commander in analysing all relevant factors, assessing options open and formulating a plan is a systems approach known as the appreciation process. It is applicable at all levels of command and may be adjusted to suit all decision-making situations. The process requires both quantitative and qualitative judgement, with the commander relying heavily on his staff and advisers as the complexity of the decision increases. Nevertheless, the commander retains the decisive influence and final word in the appreciation.

This decision-making process, the central function of command, operates within a somewhat less easily defined command structure. Below the level of functional command headquarters, the structure consists mainly of what has been described as "that most revered and venerable instrument of military communication, the chain of command." Beyond the functional level of command, the military structure becomes more closely aligned with and tied to the civil bureaucracy of Defence and its natural bent towards the committee process. F.W. Speed has pointed to two inherent weaknesses in such an arrangement. He sees the Department of Defence as primarily a peacetime department, commenting that "When the present organisation of the Department of Defence was being devised, only limited consideration was given to the eventuality of transition from peacetime to a situation of major emergency or a state of hostilities approaching war." It would seem that, in the heady days of peace, "comparatively little has been done towards provision of a command structure capable, with minimum difficulty, of transition to a situation of major emergency, or war." Speed also points out that, in the operational sense, command is indivisible. The CDF is ultimately responsible for the conduct of operations and must be able, at short notice, to require action in both operational and administrative spheres. He must not be dependent on members of the Department who are responsible to the Secretary for the implementation of his decisions as commander of the ADF.

The decision-making process within the ADF, as the operational arm of Defence, is almost entirely a function of command, operating within a relatively unambiguous hierarchical structure. At the upper levels of the Defence organisation, however, decision by committee invariably supplants decision by command.

The Committee System

Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand once observed that "War is much too serious a thing to be left to military men." There are currently some 40 000 civilians in Defence, not only providing administration and support for the three Services, but also employed in policy and management areas and in such non-military bodies as the Defence Science and Technology Organisation. Much of the formulation and general application of unified Defence policy relating to the Defence Force and its requirements is carried out by committees.

The committee secretariat of the Department has described committees, which accommodate the expertise and the material interests of different areas of the Services and the Department, as "an integral part of the management processes of the Defence organisation. Committees perform an important consultative role in the development of policy, in the processes for decision-making and administration, and in the preparation of administrative procedures." This is seen as particularly important in an organisation in which the Secretary and the CDF, under the Minister, have in some cases
separate and in other cases joint authority over various aspects of the organisation's activities.

The underlying principle of the committee structure is that those responsible for carrying out approved policy are brought together to assist in formulating the nature of advice to the Minister and the Government. The major strength of the committee system is seen as the provision of a forum where the differing interests and objectives of the various divisions of the Department and of the Services are brought together, and acceptable solutions proposed. Higher level committees also aim to resolve the differences between various interests competing for resources or arguing particular requirements.

While the theory which underpins the process of decision by committee is sound and not entirely dissimilar to the military staff system, certain aspects of its execution are inconsistent with the essential role of the Department. That role, as Alan Hinge sees it, "should be to manage human and material resources so as to optimize the combat effectiveness and combat sustainability of the Department of Defence operational arm which is the Australian Defence Force."

While it may be fair to say that committees were never intended to make decisions in the same way or for the same purpose as the military commander, it is not their basic structure or processes which beg examination. Rather, the proliferation of committees within Defence is engendering a particular mindset which will not change immediately a threat of whatever level is identified. The labyrinth of committees, subordinate committees, advisory groups and working parties which make up the Department of Defence creates a "fog of peace" to rival Clausewitz's famous description of war. An intricate system of checks and balances is readily available as a bureaucratic tactic in what often amounts to a strategy of postponement. The beast feeds upon itself, spawning a structure which, in the opinion of Michael O'Connor, "actually hinders policy development and implementation." He points out that once an equipment proposal is launched, "it must progress through more than 100 distinct staffing stages, reference to innumerable committees and at least six references to the Minister before submission to Cabinet — if it is to cost more than $10 million or less than one-fifth of one per cent of the defence vote." Such "paralysis by analysis" leads to what a past chairperson of the Defence Project Management Sectional Committee of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts condemned as "generally slow Departmental decision-making processes."

There is great scope for the committee to become something of a Hydra, with a different view or vested interest for each head. It has been said that a camel is a horse designed by a committee. A. J. Molan has compared the committee with the military appreciation, "a process of operational decision making based on clearly stated aims, analysis of all available information, advice of experts and the ranking of alternatives for a final choice by the commander responsible." Molan finds it "ironic" that the Services are forced into using large numbers of essentially unmanageable committees rather than a process which has proved itself to be swift and effective: "In such committees each member interprets whatever guidance exists based on his own point of view... This means that in a committee, a 'good' policy is one that is finally agreed on."

**Defence Structure**

The current Defence structure within which the committee process thrives and grows is largely a legacy of the 1975 Defence Reorganisation Act, through which the Government of the day implemented the Tange Report. The Report termed its proposed reorganisation a "functional management system", which aimed to "provide for a more rational control of the military establishment and allow for appreciable economies in manpower and finance through the amalgamation of the various service departments."

The central feature of Sir Arthur Tange's reorganisation was the *anschluss* by the Defence Department of the other four Departments in the Defence Group — Navy, Army, Air and Supply. Tange himself maintained that the reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments into a single, integrated Department of Defence, would "give the Services a stronger, more effective voice in the formulation of policy for submission to the Minister and Government."

The effect of such a reorganisation on the decision — making process, however, had already been prophesized by Lieutenant Colonel M. M. van Gelder in 1970, who pointed out that: "The centralized larger machinery of
the integrated department could become clogged with detail, thus slowing down rather than speeding up the process of decision-making.”

Tange saw the system of committees as the “machinery of collective advice”, to operate particularly where military judgement on the training for and conduct of operations had to be reconciled with the requirements of government policies, financial regularity and correctness of expenditure. The reorganisation, said Tange, sought “to introduce a more direct relationship of operational users/managers (the Services higher Commands) with the policy analysis and advising process.”

This theory does not seem to have been carried over into practice. Strategic and International Policy Division of the Department currently boasts a grand total of four uniforms within its hallowed halls, while Force Development and Analysis Division, which provides policy advice on the force structure as a whole, also has a quota of four servicemen. Programs and Budgets Division, which contains the Resources Planning Branches of each of the three Services, does not contain a single uniform on its manning. Perhaps, as Dr G. L. Cheeseman has observed, the reorganisation “has simply imposed a predominantly civilian superstructure onto the existing single Service Departments.”

The Tange Report was by no means the only, nor even the first, exercise in placing the Defence structure and processes under a microscope. The last thirty years have seen other reports tabled by committees chaired by Morshead, Katter, Eltringham, Utz, Cross and Dibb. These major reviews are quite apart from the plethora of internal reorganisations, re-rationalisations and re-inventing of wheels which occur with monotonous regularity. One cannot help but be reminded of the words of Petronius, uttered in AD 66: “We trained hard — but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganised. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situations by reorganising, and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress.”

Civil-Military Relations

Geoffrey Hartnell has pointed out that “The armed services of a country normally comprise the most powerful concentration of physical force in the community.” A system of checks and balances on the use of the armed forces first began to appear in the Westminster system following abuse of that power by a man named Cromwell. The British Ministry of Defence is still aware of the dilemma whereby the armed forces “cannot be allowed to serve the purposes of a political party, yet must be subject to political control.”

The control of the military by civilians operates not only within the Department but also without, where the Department of Finance holds the purse strings. This relationship has led to the concept of the primacy of civil power, a concept which does not sit easily with the military. As Brigadier P. J. Greville once stated: “I have never heard an Australian Serviceman question the policy that ultimate control of the Defence Forces should reside in civilian authorities, but I have never heard one Serviceman who ever thought it should reside in a Public Servant.”

Civil-military relations within the Department are often characterized by a feeling of “us” and “them” based on mutual antipathy and suspicion — “dualism” frequently verges on the brink of “duellism”. One military commentator has claimed that “while war may be too costly an activity to be trusted to servicemen, it is also too serious an affair to be left to a kaleidoscope of academic speculators and corporation accountants.” Committees are largely an anathema to the military goal-oriented mindset. An exercise in reductio ad absurdum could conceive a situation where plans for a platoon-sized attack on an enemy squad would be made by the junior officer and his NCOs in committee. Brian Beddie nevertheless maintains that the tension between military and civilian officials within the Department, while sometimes deplored, “is in fact functionally necessary to the effective work of a defence organisation.” While civilians may regard the military as “inept at analytical and abstract policy work” and servicemen, in their turn, may see the civilians as being “remote from the practicalities of defence”, Allan Behm sees the joint role played by both groups in the Australian environment as “absolutely essential to the orderly management of defence policy.”

The tenuous nature of the links between the civilian and military staffs is neither unique to nor new in the Australian Defence organisation. A Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the British Ministry of Defence has stated that: “In almost all countries the relationship between
the military and civilians is complex and sensitive. It inevitably carries with it the possibility of disagreement and discord.”

T. B. Millar has described the perception by most academic writers, left-wingers and some public servants of every senior military officer as “a bone-headed warrior, a simple-minded and largely illiterate Blimp, but one in whose breast there beats the heart of a jack-booted dictator.”

While it is hoped that such a caricature is an exaggeration, the issue of civil-military relations nevertheless prompted Paul Dibb to step outside his Terms of Reference and comment on the “institutional barriers” to which the relationship sometimes gives rise. While Dibb considered that relationships between senior military and civilian staff had improved since the time of the Utz Committee (1982), he noted a persisting tendency “for a military and civilian advice to be developed separately” and looked forward to the time when “the adversarial situation between military and civilian staffs” would be reduced. The concept of the primacy of civil power does not, in theory, bestow any preeminence on the public servant bureaucracy within the Department, although the organisation could be seen to be structured to do just that.

**Bureaucrats in Uniform**

Over twenty years ago, T. B. Millar wrote on the situation within the Department where a civilian and a uniformed member worked at about the same level in the same branch: “The uniformed member will stay in his post for a customary two or maximum of three years, whereas the civilian member may be in his for ten years or more. This gives the latter a considerable advantage, both psychologically and in expertise.” There has been no change to this juxtaposition of military generalist and civilian specialist in the intervening years and Sir Henry Bland attributed managerial inadequacies within the military in part to deficiencies in their posting policies and a reluctance to allow a sufficient degree of specialism within the Services. N. A. Jans has identified that officer career development tends to “neglect the knowledge and skills needed for the Defence bureaucracy” and has described the lot of the serviceman working in Canberra as the “Russell Bogey.” It is clear that the military will need to become familiar with and adapt to the bureaucratic processes of Defence, among them the tactics of decision by committee. F. A. Mediansky noted this requirement a decade ago: “The number of military officers involved in policy work has greatly increased as have the levels and diversity of contact with public servants. This greater involvement in bureaucratic decision making has focused on the need for the military to effectively participate in a bureaucratic environment where attitudes and values differ markedly from the regimental environment and where the decision-making processes often differ substantially from those within the three Services.”

**Summary**

The major process within the Defence organisation is that of decision making. While that process is a function of command throughout most of the operational arm of the Department, it is a fact that “Almost all the important policy decisions that are made in Defence are made or recommended by committees.” The unwieldy and ponderous nature of the committee system is foreign and frustrating to most uniformed members of Defence. Nevertheless, committees enable effective civilian control of most areas nominally under the jurisdiction of the military and “virtually ensure that the military is tied to the routine of a civilian bureaucracy in peace and war.” The military, for their part, may need to accept, examine and understand the process of decision by committee in order to most effectively operate within its confines. Perhaps Count Metternich was right after all, in warning that “When the statesman is forced to yield to the soldier in peace or war, that nation is usually doomed.” In the meantime, it is hoped that threats approaching hostility will not arise to disrupt and disorganise the smooth running of our peacetime Defence structure and processes.

**NOTES**


Capt Hogan joined the Army in 1977 and was commissioned into the Australian Intelligence Corps from RMC in 1980. He has served with 5/7 RAR, 1 Div Int Unit and as S03 Pay DSC-A (Personnel Branch). He is a graduate of the RAAF School of Languages and the British Ministry of Defence Chinese Language School, Hong Kong. Capt Hogan has a BA (Hons), is a member of the London Institute of Linguists and is completing a Master of Defence Studies. He is currently S03 Int HQ 3 Bde.
"A Course Contrary to Training and Inclination"
— The Manifesto of the Four Colonels, 1938

By Colonel J.V. Johnson, RFD, ED.

At the start of the twentieth century the land defence of New Zealand was vested in a volunteer, territorial militia backed by a very small cadre of ‘regular’ soldiers in administrative and instructional capacities. In 1909 this was replaced by a compulsory military training scheme in which all young men in the Dominion were required to serve in the militia for a period of years. This scheme, introduced by Sir Joseph Ward and implemented by the determination of Sir James Allen and Major-General Sir Alexander Godley, was discontinued in 1930. Despite the growth of Fascism in Europe and the obvious spread of Japanese Imperialism in the East, little interest was shown by New Zealanders in the maintenance of their military forces after this date and the all-volunteer territorial army quickly withered.

When Major-General J. E. Duigan, CB, DSO, assumed office as General Officer Commanding the New Zealand Military Forces in May 1937 the condition of the army was a cause for much concern. The previous year’s Annual Report had revealed that, with few exceptions, attendances at annual camps had been “disappointing”, suggesting that this was partly due to seasonal harvests falling outside the anticipated period and the fact that rising prosperity in the towns had created staffing problems for many employers, making them loath to release employees to attend camps.

In his first report to Parliament, Duigan noted that the Mounted Rifle Regiments were barely as large as squadrons and that several of the Infantry Regiments were smaller than companies. In addition to this, overall numbers were decreasing. He considered that the reasons for this alarming situation lay in a lack of public recognition of the importance of the Territorial Army. “...The success of a voluntary system (he claimed) depends largely upon the support it receives from the Government, the employers and the general public”. He admitted that the introduction of the shorter working week had made it considerably more difficult for employers to release their staffs and that increased wages had widened the gap between the average man’s civilian pay and the remuneration he received for his service in the Territorial Army. He noted that the Territorial had “...little inducement except personal enthusiasm” to fulfill his service obligations, especially when the machinery which existed to enforce his contract of service was never used.

This concern was not Duigan’s alone. During the Supply Debate later that year an opposition member (the Hon. J. G. Cobbe — National, Oroua) sought to find out what steps were being taken to improve the position of the Territorials, stating that the present position was very unsatisfactory, particularly as in the newly constituted Army Board the Territorial Force had no representative, yet provided the greater proportion of the manpower. His concern remained, as the Defence Minister considered that present arrangements were “adequate”.

In September, General Duigan had rationalized the Territorial Army from its divisional structure into a brigade format, made of ‘composite’ units formed from the traditional regiments and battalions, making a more realistic establishment for the still-shrinking force. Not surprisingly, this cosmetic operation, together with the Government’s continuing disregard for the land forces did not go unnoticed in the community. The Christchurch Press produced a feature in March, 1938, entitled “The Volunteer Territorial System — A Force Below Strength” and produced re-runs in pamphlet form. Inspired by the remarks of the Hon. F. Jones, Minister for Defence, at a parade of the First Battalion, Canterbury Infantry Regiment, that “...we would welcome suitable men who desire to take an interest in military affairs” the article claimed that the Territorial Force was evidently a joke to a large proportion of the community and placed much of the blame on the Government, the Minister, the permanent military staff and the ‘carefree’ public.

The correspondent claimed that the Government had done nothing to improve the public opinion of the Force, pointing out that whilst...
a labourer received a minimum of eighteen shillings a day and public works employees £1 the private soldier was only paid “four shillings a day and army tucker”. With more pay, better uniforms (there had been no change since 1910) and by the generation of public enthusiasm the article argued that the Government could put the Territorials on to a satisfactory footing. Describing the Minister as “... sincere but handicapped both by his colleagues lack of interest in military training and his own lack of military experience” the writer claimed that he “... toils without inspiration” and was inevitably affected by his colleagues’ attitude of placing politics before pragmatism. Comparing the cadre staffs with those of General Godley’s day the correspondent found them wanting, describing them as clerks in empty barracks, stripped of their initial keenness by the burdens of routine and mundane administrative duties. Comparing the Territorials with the Citizen Air Force, with its glamour and smart uniforms, the article found the Army coming a sad second.

One could not, however, dismiss Mr Jones as hopeless. He had increased the naval vote and had initiated a programme of rapid and extensive expansion in the air arm, yet undeniably his approach to the land component of the defence forces was lacking any real drive or direction. The fact that, in addition to the Defence portfolio, he was also Minister of Telegraphs, Postmaster-General and the Minister in charge of War Pensions did not make his life any easier and reflected the low priority awarded to defence by the Savage Government.

The Christchurch Press article gave public prominence to a problem that was of obvious concern to a great many New Zealanders and especially to those directly involved with the Territorial Force — its own senior officers. A conference of senior officers was held at Trentham in early May 1938 at which five out of the seven colonels on the Active List were present. On Friday May 6th, these officers, together with General Duigan, met with the Minister in his office in Wellington. Uncertainty exists as to who suggested the meeting as the colonels that he could not convey such a message as they “... had no right to dictate to the Minister”. Duigan’s subsequent surprise when the colonels went ahead with their plan indicates that the underestimated their strength of intention on the issue, and one cannot help conjecturing that he did not mention the matter to Jones at the time, hoping that the colonels would feel bound by the traditions of the service and by the regulations to keep silent.

The Minister kept at least part of his side of the bargain, and took the opportunity of an invitation to speak at the North Island provincial town of Dargaville on 17th May to announce his defence policies. Although he claimed that he had made “... very full reference to the land forces ... (and had) ... asked all sections of the community” to assist the Government in its efforts to increase the strength of the Territorial Force and “... bring it up to the highest state of efficiency” there was unanimous criticism of his measures in Editorial columns on the following day. The Christchurch Press, in the most moderate opinion, stated that the scheme for the Territorial Force had “... already failed due to the shortage of recruits”; the New Zealand Herald described the land forces part of the policy as its “fatal weakness” and claimed that the Jones plan for building up the Territorial Force “... gave no promise of being worked out”; the Auckland Star claimed that the opportunity Mr Jones had been given to make a beginning had been “utterly ignored” and the Dominion warned Mr Jones that “... soothing assurances are not enough, it is evidence that counts”.12
The Minister had clearly tried to evade responsibility by claiming that much of the criticism of the Government's defence policy was "... political ... being indulged for the purposes of discrediting this government, but the Dominion reminded him that he could hardly accuse the New Zealand Returned Servicemen's Association or the National Defence League of being actuated by political motives, and both these organizations had expressed anxieties about his policies.

The popular press was not the only section of the community to have reservations about the Minister's statement. Four of the five channels considered it inadequate and decided that their duty to the country as citizen soldiers was "... solely for the purpose of ensuring that an efficient land force shall be available for the defence of New Zealand". The four officers responsible for taking this exceptional step were all men of long and distinguished service. Colonel C. R. Spragg, VD, was one of the Honorary Aides-de-Camp to the Governor General and had served in South Africa, Gallipoli and Palestine. He had been a captain at the same time as General Duigan and was probably the most experienced and certainly the most senior officer in the Territorial Force. Colonel A. S. Wilder, DSO, MC, VD, was also one of the Governor General's Aides-de-Camp, and a veteran of Gallipoli and Palestine. Like Colonel Spragg, he had commanded a Mounted Rifles Brigade until the 1937 reorganization. Both were North Island farmers. Colonel N. L. Macky, MC, had served with the New Zealand Rifle Brigade in Western Egypt and France, and had commanded an Infantry Brigade until the 1937 reorganization. He and the fourth colonel, R. F. Gambrill, VD, were both lawyers. Gambrill, like Spragg and Wilder, was a veteran of Gallipoli and had also commanded a Brigade before the reorganization.

Although conscious of the probable consequences of such action on their military careers the colonels believed that as the senior officers of the Territorial Force they had an obligation to put aside personal considerations and to acquaint the public with the true state of the nation's defences. To do this they issued what was to become known as the "Manifesto of the Four Colonels".

The Manifesto had five main contentions, claiming that the Territorial Force as currently organized was insufficient for the defence of New Zealand; that its strength was insufficient even to meet the reorganized Brigade structure; that in many cases the physique of the serving members was below an acceptable level for active service; that the morale of the Force faced with constant reductions and lack of public support was at breaking point; and finally that much of the blame for this situation rested with the lack of support rendered by successive governments since the inception of the volunteer system.

The Christchurch Press, whilst acknowledging that the colonels had adopted an unusual course of action, considered that it was the only one left open to them, and the Auckland Star described the Manifesto as a grave statement, commenting that "... the purity of motive which inspired it cannot be questioned", and remarking that the "lamentably small" section of the public which was sympathetically interested in the Territorial Force must have been "impressed and disturbed" by it. The Dominion, describing the Manifesto as "disquieting" remarked that the colonels would not have taken such an extreme step unless "... very strongly impelled by their sense of public duty" and reinforced its earlier comments on the Dargaville statement by demanding that the Government and the nation take the "most energetic measures" for defending the country.

The reactions of the Military authorities were, predictably, not so favourable. General Duigan promptly wrote to the military secretary to the Governor General (Major R. G. G. Byron, 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards) to apologize for the "unmilitary" actions of his officers, stating that the regulations were quite clear on this type of action and that he "could not allow" senior officers of the Territorial Force to set such a bad example. The Government, he claimed, was fully aware of the deficiencies of the Territorial Force. Duigan stated that he had "hidden nothing" from the Government and feared that there might have been "a political significance" to the statements, which he considered had come "at a very inopportune time". The Minister's statement (he continued) was received very well here, and a great deal of harm was done by the manifesto issued.

It would appear from this letter than Duigan had not taken the colonels seriously when they warned him that they were prepared to issue a manifesto of their own. For the Chief of the
General Staff to have so poor a knowledge of his senior Territorial officers, all of whom he had served with for many years is surprising. His inference that there may have been political motives involved in the issuing of the manifesto is also surprising, as the colonels were only stressing points that the nation's press had already made public. His remarks about his own conduct ("I have never hidden anything from the Government") have overtones of Pontius Pilate and his statement that "the Territorial Force is starting to build up" is contradicted by both the popular press and by his own report to Parliament, issued on June 30th. In this he stated that only 41% of the below-establishment Force had attended camps that year. One cannot help thinking that either Duigan or his staff, or both, had no real understanding of what was going on in the Territorial Force. Such an observation would be in keeping with the observation of the Christchurch Press in March which had claimed that the cadre staffs needed a "... higher standard of discipline and a closer association in a military capacity with the general public".

Duigan took the only course open to him, as it was now too late for him to further the colonels' cause — even had he wanted to — and informed Byron that he had recommended to the Minister that the officers concerned be placed on the Retired List and that he wished the Governor General to know how disturbed he had been by the officers "taking the law into their own hands".

Byron replied to Duigan the following day, stating that he, too was most surprised that four senior officers would take such a course of action whatever their views. He continued that the Governor General (Lieutenant-Colonel Viscount Galway, GCMG, DSO, OBE), although not wishing to be involved in any way, especially as two of the officers were his Aides-de-Camp, shared Duigan's views and expected that the officers concerned be placed on the Retired List.

Duigan then instructed the Assistant Quartermaster-General in Wellington to demand from the colonels their reasons for acting contrary to the regulations. Although the correspondence between the AQMG and Duigan does not seem to exist any more it would appear that this officer raised some possible problems that might make the removal of the colonels more difficult than the Chief of the General Staff had thought. Duigan forwarded Macky's reply to the AQMG to Byron with the observation that "... whilst there is no great hurry to have these officers gazetted to the Retired List, in my opinion unnecessary delay would show weakness". Byron was also having second thoughts and a letter from him crossed Duigan's, in which he attempted to withdraw his earlier letter expressing the Governor General's views. This letter, he claimed, was perhaps "a trifle misleading" and His Excellency had in fact only desired to express his support of his Chief of the General Staff in whatever action he saw fit to take in what was, "... to all outward appearances, a breach of regulations." Byron went on to mention that Viscount Galway was concerned that the colonels might not wish to quietly pass on to the Retired List, but might instead demand a court-martial before being convicted of a breach of regulations. Should such a situation arise, the Governor General could not confirm the proceedings of the court-martial if he was discovered to have expressed a previous opinion. Byron pointed out that in such circumstances the colonels would be entitled to refer their case to the King, which would "... greatly embarrass His Excellency's position".

Duigan replied on the following morning, assuring Byron that he fully understood the position of the Governor General. He warned Byron that there was "... a flaw in the wording of the Act (The Defence Act) that may make things difficult", and that he was consulting with the Judge Advocate General and was awaiting the written opinions of that officer. He further cautioned Byron that "things are not as easy as they look". As both Macky and Gambrill were lawyers it is reasonable to assume that they would also have been aware of such a flaw should they decide to contest the matter in a court-martial.

The colonels were gaining a degree of public support and a letter in the Christchurch Press stated that their "... courage to speak the truth, together with disregard of personal interest ... called forth the admiration of all those with the future of our land forces at heart". An inter-provincial meeting of the New Zealand Farmers Union on 24th May passed a motion calling on the Government to adopt a vigorous policy of national defence.

The Minister made his official reply to the Manifesto on 25th May when he declared that
the colonels’ action was “... regrettable and the reverse of helpful to the Territorial Force”. He went on to disclose that as the Manifesto was lodged with the press on the same day that he made his Dargaville statement and that he considered that the colonels had therefore “... prepared and signed it prior to my speech”. The colonels never made any attempt to deny this point, and the fact that a fifth colonel (Colonel S. D. Mason) had signed the original and subsequently requested that his name be deleted adds weight to the Minister’s claim. The Dominion approached Colonels Spragg and Macky, hoping for further comment, but were politely informed that as they had issued the Manifesto with a “full sense of responsibility” they had nothing further to add.

The Christchurch Press, in an Editorial entitled “The Problem of Land Forces” took the Defence Minister to task, pointing out that he had not questioned the sincerity of purpose which dictated the Manifesto, nor had he attempted to argue its content. The Manifesto, it claimed, had supplied the need to arouse public concern over the Dominion’s defence policies. The Auckland Star stated that all Mr Jones had achieved was to give added prominence to the main thrust of the Manifesto, namely the adequacy of otherwise of the Dominion’s defences. In its Editorial, headed “Minister and Officers” it suggested to Mr Jones that the questions of when and how the colonels came to issue the Manifesto were of small importance to the problem.

In response to the questions from the AQMG, Colonel Spragg replied claiming that the course that he had taken was “contrary to my training and inclinations”. However, he felt that he had acted in the best interests of the service, hoping that in so doing he might awaken the public to a sense of “their responsibility to support the Honourable the Minister for Defence and the Chief of the General Staff in their efforts to put our country into a proper state of defence.” This statement should have dispelled any fears of political interference held by either the Minister or General Duigan. Colonel Gambrill was somewhat blunter, simply regretting that dictates of conscience placed him in a position which made the action taken “inevitable”. Colonel Macky made no comment on his actions and simply requested (undoubtedly to the relief of Duigan and Byron) that his appointment as Aide-de-Camp to the Governor General be cancelled as he felt that it would be “... impolite for my present status to obtain”. This application, and a similar one from Colonel Wilder were met with approval by Byron who wrote to Duigan informing him that Viscount Galway had intimidated that he would accept their resignations “... before any disciplinary action is taken”. The resignations were gazetted on June 23rd and did not escape the attention of the press. The Dominion sought comment from the Prime Minister and the Minister for Defence and in each case was informed that the Minister concerned had “no statement” to make.

The four colonels subsequently saved the army — and the Governor-General — the embarrassment of a series of courts-martial by offering their resignations and were placed on the Retired List (and therefore permitted to retain their rank and wear uniform) on 13th June. There had never been any real alternative to them as they must have realized from the outset. To have fought the issue and to have sought public support would only have detracted from the sincerity of their motives and would have damaged their cause and they engaged in no further correspondence on the matter.

Though the military careers of the four had now ended it would appear that their stand had not been entirely in vain. Public awareness of the problems facing the Territorial force had been aroused and the Government had been made to realise that the issue was now an active one, in need of urgent attention. Letters to the Editor of the Dominion had already urged the establishment of an Officer Training Corps and a return to compulsory military training.

On 3rd June the New Zealand Defence league sent a deputation to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Defence in which it was suggested that if the voluntary system failed to produce the desired numbers, compulsory military training should be reintroduced.

On 1st July when the next session of Parliament opened, the subject was raised in the Address-in-Reply debate. The National President of the Returned Servicemens Association, the Hon. W. Perry, MLC (Wellington) stated that the blame for the inadequacies of the Territorial Force had to be shared by both the Government and the people, both of which
... for a long time past have not got behind the Territorial system". The Defence Ministry subsequently produced a recruiting pamphlet in which Mr Jones informed the public that "... a volunteer army is dependent on the spirit of service not only in the fit, keen men who join up, but in the community backing which they must have. Given a national appreciation of its importance, every unit will soon have a waiting list."

The Canterbury Chamber of Commerce, meanwhile, made its own investigation into the problems confronting the prospective volunteer and claimed that the two most formidable obstacles were "... fear of economic loss and prejudicing employment through asking for leave and interference with sport". To overcome the first problem the Chamber considered that the Government had to increase the serviceman's pay and the employer had to be prepared to make up any difference between the military and civilian pay for periods of compulsory training such as camps and courses.

The Chamber's statement drew several letters to the Editor. One correspondent noted that his son who had served for two years in the Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry Regiment whilst employed by a Christchurch firm had had "every obstacle" placed in his way when it came to attending camps and had been "curtly refused" leave to attend the 1938 annual camp.

In a subsequent editorial the Christchurch Press revealed that public servants attending annual camps only received military pay if they produced a certificate from their department stating that they were either on leave without pay or on their annual holidays. This revelation made a mockery of the Government's claim that it encouraged its employees to participate in Territorial training.

On 28th July Mr Jones, in a Ministerial Statement, introduced the first pay rise for the Territorial Force since 1910, raising all pay scales by three shillings a day. These rises gave a private soldier seven shillings, a lieutenant eleven shillings and a colonel £1.4.0.d a camp allowance of five shillings a day was instituted, as was a travelling allowance of "up to 1½d. a mile" to and from parades. These measures, he claimed, would result in the Territorial Force recruiting up to establishment and becoming a "... thoroughly efficient section of the Defence Forces of the Dominion". As the pay scales now placed all those below the rank of colonel on a pay rate below the minimum for a labourer or a public works employee it is rather difficult to accept the Minister's optimism.

Nevertheless, the new moves did meet with some success. In this 1939 Report to Parliament Duigan noted that camp attendances in the Territorial Force had risen from 41% to 77%. This increase, he suggested, could be attributed to a combination of increased public support, on appeal by the Prime Minister (which included his appreciation of the efforts made by the volunteers) and the international situation. Despite his public confidence, a few weeks earlier he had expressed some reservations in private. In a memorandum concerning the Pacific Defence conference he had noted that the Territorial Force still lacked modern equipment, had insufficient reserves of ammunition and was "... quite incapable of undertaking mobile operations".

It is reasonable to assume that the moves that were made to improve the standing of the Territorial Force were made as a result of the stand taken by the four colonels. That such a stand was necessary in New Zealand in 1938 is what gives the Manifesto its importance.

The Manifesto of the Four Colonels

Text of the Manifesto

"Conscious of the very poor measure of support accorded to the forces by the public, we find it necessary to inform them of our opinions in the hope that the country itself may decide whether or not it requires a Territorial Army.

If it decides that such a force is a necessity then it must assume the duty of supporting these volunteers who have been endeavouring loyally to preserve the nucleus of a Territorial Army for many years with little or no public assistance. This action is taken by us solely for the purpose of ensuring that an efficient land force shall be available for the defence of New Zealand.

We claim an intimate knowledge of the problem of our defence and the state of unpreparedness now existing. We realize that as the senior volunteer officers we have a duty to place on record what we believe to be the facts:

1. That the present organization and establishment of the force is insufficient for the defence of New Zealand.
2. That the number of volunteers trained and in training is insufficient to complete the establishment as at present laid down.

3. That the standard of physique and training of the serving volunteers in some cases is such as to render them unsuited for the purposes of expansion of the present organization in time of need.

4. That the morale of the existing volunteers is being sapped by the successive reductions in strength and lack of public support—that we fear a disintegration of our present skeleton unless a definite support is accorded by the government and the people and assurances are given that the force is desired and will be fostered.

5. That in our opinion the failure of the present volunteer system would not have occurred had the active support of successive governments been accorded our land forces since the inception of the volunteer system.

In conclusion, we hesitate to mention the effects of this statement on our personal positions as military officers. However, we would like the people of New Zealand to realize that the gravity of the present situation is such that we feel all personal considerations must be put aside if we are to carry out our duty to our country as citizen soldiers.''

C. R. SPAGG Late Commander, 1st Mounted Rifles Brigade
N. L. MACKY Late Commander, 1st Infantry Brigade
A.S. WILDER Late Commander, 2nd Mounted Rifles Brigade
R.F GAMBRILL Late Commander, 2nd Infantry Brigade

Deleted at his own request:
S.D. MASON Late Commander, 3rd Infantry Brigade

National Archives of New Zealand, Governors Series, G49/52/1.

NOTES
5. The sixth was in the United Kingdom, the seventh on leave.
7. Ibid., 25 May 1938
17. Duigan to Byron, 19 May 1938. NANZ, G49-52/1.
31. Spragg to AQMG, 2 June 1938. NANZ, G49/52/1.
32. Gambrill to AQMG, 2 June 1938. Ibid.
33. Macky to AQMG, 2 June 1938. Ibid.
34. Byron to Duigan, 10 June 1938. Ibid.
35. New Zealand Gazette 1938 No. 46 (June 23) p. 1513. Resignations took effect on 11th June.
38. Dominion, 21 May, 1938.
39. Ibid., 21 May, 1938. (two letters)
40. Auckland Star, 3 June, 1938.
43. Christchurch Press, 3 June, 1938.
44. Ibid., 8 June, 1938.
45. Ibid., 14 June, 1938.
48. N.A.N.Z., Army Department 1, MO 7/9/1.

Colonel Johnson is currently a member of the Reserve Staff Group and seconded to the Army Reserve Review Committee Implementation Team. He holds a MA (History) (Monash), Trained Teacher's Certificate and is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society. He is a Public Servant in the Attorney-General's Department and spent 14 months in Antarctica as Officer-in-Charge of Casey Station with the Department of Science.
Preparing the Junior Officer for the Staff —
The Junior Staff Course

By Lieutenant Colonel M.S. Beckingham, RA EME

ONE of the greatest defects of our Military system is a lack of a thoroughly instructed staff corps, from which should be furnished chiefs of staff (for armies, corps and divisions), adjutant generals, aides-de-camp and recruiting officers. Perhaps the greatest difficulty that I encountered in creating the work of the army in the Potomac arose from the scarcity of thoroughly instructed staff officers, and I must frankly state that everyday I myself felt the disadvantages under which I personally laboured in the want of that thorough, theoretical and practical education of the German General Staff . . .'

Major General George Binton MacLellan, 1861

MacLellan's sentiments are as relevant today as they were over a century ago. The German staff system is still admired by other armies in the world. This system is based on a thorough, specialized training of the German staff officer. He undertakes more intensive schooling and practical staff training than staff officers in other modern armies. He is trained to be an advisor who expresses his own views, offers alternatives and ensures that the best possible decisions are made. The German Army’s Auftragstaktik (directive control) requires him to display initiative and be quick thinking, and his staff work to be brief and accurate. He is also expected to have a uniformity of thinking and reliability of action attained through training and practical experience.

Military history confirms that thoroughly trained, efficient and effective staff officers are as important to the success of operations as good commanders. Commanders and staff must complement, and have complete confidence in, each other.

The modern Australian Army recognised this and realized that formal preparation for the staff must commence much earlier than Command and Staff College (by which time most officers had completed at least one staff appointment). Therefore, in 1981, the Junior Staff Course was introduced to prepare officers for staff appointments in the ranks of captain and major. Australia's major allies had also acknowledged the requirements and were conducting their own junior staff courses: the Junior Division of the Staff College in the United Kingdom, the Command and Services Staff School in the United States and the Junior Staff Course in Canada.

The Australian Army's Junior Staff Course (JSC) is conducted by a specialist wing at the Land Warfare Centre, Canungra. The Seven Week Course is attended by Junior captains, usually four to five years after graduation from the Royal Military College (RMC).

Training Philosophy

The fundamental philosophy around which the Course has been designed is that staff work is an art. That is, the staff officer must have more than just technical expertise. He must develop particular attitudes and qualities, and he must be able to make sound judgements based on fairly precise recollections of experience.

Neglect of aspects of the art is highlighted in the following quote by Victor Suvarov in his book Inside the Soviet Army:

'Staff officers are idealists, theoreticians who are remote from real life. They have forgotten, or perhaps have never known, the cost of human sweat. They expect soldiers to be able to answer questions about the principles of modern warfare, forgetting that some of them have never even heard the Russian language until they entered the army. They expect soldiers to be able to do fifty press-ups, unconcerned that some of them come from families that have suffered for generations from undernourishment. It may have taken me two years to teach someone from this sort of background to do ten press-
ups and both he and I may be proud of what we have achieved. But this would not satisfy a staff officer. Staff officers are used to moving armies across maps, like pawns on a chessboard, forgetting that a soldier may disobey an order, he may suddenly go mad, he may rebel against authority, oppose his superiors, or perhaps, driven to desperation, he may kill his unit commander. Do staff officers realise this? Like hell they do...

A lack of emphasis on the art of staff work was also evident in the British Army where staff officers were treated with disdain in World War I. Sir Phillip Gibbs said:

'... the high stupidities, the narrow imagination, the deep impregnable and intolerable ignorance of the staff college men, who with their red tabs and their general orders were the inquisitors and torturers of the new armies...'

Although there may have been some degree of misunderstanding about the workings of the staff on the part of the regimental officers, the staff were obviously being maligned for their poor attitudes and their inability to make sound judgements based on recollections of experience.

Officers are gaining experience and being trained on the job from the moment they graduate. But, because these experiences and jobs vary, each officer needs to return to formal schooling every few years to be trained in common doctrine and procedures, to be acquainted with common standards and to share experiences and training with others of his peer group. The Junior Staff Course is a vehicle for this formal schooling and for developing the common solid base from which careers on the staff can develop.

It is accepted that most of the art of staff work will be learnt on the job — seven weeks formal training is a relatively small part of an officer's career. Therefore, the philosophy of design for the Course is one of value for money. The Course includes five modules: Communication, Operational Staff Duties, Operations, Administration and Training. The modules interrelate as much as possible with most activities and exercises covering aspects from more than one module. Levels of training are 'job standard' for communication skills and 'below job standard' for the other modules.

Course Content

The Course comprises five modules: Communication, Operational Staff Duties, Operations, Administration and Training. The modules interrelate as much as possible with most activities and exercises covering aspects from more than one module. Levels of training are 'job standard' for communication skills and 'below job standard' for the other modules.

Communication

All staff officers must be able to communicate effectively. The Course covers written and oral communication skills with an emphasis on written and oral briefs. Much of the content of this module is conducted as revision of skills learnt as an officer cadet or on the job. There is no time to conduct remedial English training, so officers who have problems are expected to complete an effective writing programme under the auspices of their local Education Sections prior to attending the Course.

Operational Staff Duties

Using the brigade headquarters as a vehicle, the Operational Staff Duties module covers operational staff skills and workings of the staff. Students disseminate operational information and prepare supporting plans. They address the operation of formation headquarters, organization and responsibilities of the staff, staff systems of other armies, characteristics and qualities of the staff and relationships between commanders and the staff.

The module also includes a 48 hour telephone battle in which students are practised in many aspects of operational staff duties, operations and communication skills as staff officers on brigade headquarters.

Operations

The Operations module covers the planning and conduct of unit level operations. It fits into the progression of tactical training in the Army between RMC (sub-unit level) and the Intermediate Operations Course (brigade level).
Students learn to conduct an appreciation, plan unit operations and advise on administration in the area of operations. Much of the training is carried out in the field on tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs). Wherever possible, manoeuvre and directive control are emphasised, flair and imagination are encouraged and military history is used as an example. Stress in battle is addressed and students are encouraged to prepare mentally for the unusual and the unexpected.

Administration

Although peace administration is not consistent with the training for war emphasis of the Course, it is important that all officers are taught how to apply the Army’s multitude of administrative references to solve administrative problems. The Military Secretary, Central Army Records Office and the Australian Army Legal Corps generally provide visiting lecturers to assist in aspects of the instruction. This module includes a practical exercise (a day in the life of an S03 (PERS)) in which students are required to allocate priorities and solve administrative problems quickly and accurately.

Training

The aim of the Training Module is to prepare officers to contribute to the development of collective training activities. The emphasis is on the development and conduct of efficient and effective training through use of the Army Training System. Students learn to analyse requirements, design and develop training and produce exercise papers. They design and write an exercise as a practical activity.

Completed Staff Work

One major aspect of the art of staff work is the ability to produce completed staff work. Students on the course are inculcated with the doctrine of completed staff work as described in the following extract from Army Training Memorandum (War) No. 22, Part 2, Sect 33.

"Completed Staff Work" is the study of a problem, and presentation of a solution, by a staff officer, in such form that all that remains to be done on the part of the head of the staff division, or the commander, is to indicate his approval or disapproval of the completed action. The words "completed action" are emphasized because the more difficult the problem is, the more the tendency is to present the problem to the chief in piece-meal fashion. It is your duty as a staff officer to work out the details. You should not consult your chief in the determination of these details, no matter how perplexing they may be. You may and should consult other staff officers. The product, whether it involves the pronouncement of a new policy or affects an established one should, when presented to the chief for approval or disapproval, be worked out in finished form.

The impulse, which often comes to the inexperienced staff officer to ask the chief what to do, recurs more often when the problem is difficult. It is accompanied by a feeling of mental frustration. It is so easy to ask the chief what to do, and it appears so easy for him to answer. Resist that impulse. You will succumb to it only if you do not know your job. It is your job to advise your chief what he ought to do, not to ask him what you ought to do. He needs answers, not questions. Your job is to study, write, restudy and rewrite until you have evolved a single proposed action — the best one of all you have considered. Your chief merely approves or disapproves.

Do not worry your chief with long explanations and memoranda. Writing a memorandum to your chief does not constitute completed staff work, but writing a memorandum for your chief to send to someone else does. Your views should be placed before him in finished form so that he can make them his views simply by signing his name. In most instances, completed staff work results in a single document prepared for the signature of the chief, without accompanying comment. If the proper result is reached, the chief will usually recognize it at once. If he wants comment or explanation, he will ask for it.

The theory of completed staff work does not preclude a "rough draft", but the rough draft must not be a half-baked idea. It must be complete in every respect except that it lacks the requisite number of copies and need not be neat. But a rough draft must not be
used as an excuse for shifting to the chief the burden of formulating the action.

The “Completed Staff Work” theory may result in more work for the staff officer, but it results in more freedom for the chief. This is as it should be. Further, it accomplishes two things:

a. The chief is protected from half-baked ideas, voluminous memoranda, and immature oral presentations.

b. The staff officer who has a real idea to sell is enabled more readily to find a market.

When you have finished your “Completed Staff Work” the final test is this:

If you were the chief would you be willing to sign the paper you have prepared, and stake your professional reputation on its being right?

If the answer is in the negative, take it back and work it over, because it is not yet “Completed Staff Work.”

Wing Organization

The Course is conducted by Junior Staff Wing of Land Warfare Centre. The wing comprises a chief instructor (lieutenant colonel), ten instructors (majors), a co-ordination officer (captain), and three support staff. Instructors are drawn from as wide a range of Corps as possible and at least half of them have completed Command and Staff College.

Course Data

Depending on the Individual Training Requirements (as advised by the Military Secretary), either four or five courses are conducted each year. Each course has a panel of fifty students, mainly General Service Officers and a few Specialist Service Officers. In recent years, additional students have come from the Army Reserve, Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal Bruneian Armed Forces.

Student Assessment

Although the emphasis is on teaching, learning and improving student’s performance, the Course provides the opportunity to assess the students in an environment where they work on common activities with their peers — often under pressure. On completion of the Course, each student receives a detailed report designed to assist commanding officers, heads of Corps and the Military Secretary in career development and planning. The report includes a recommendation regarding suitability for staff appointments, a grade reflecting performance in the Course tests and exercises, and a description of the officer and his overall performance on the Course.

Course Spirit

The JSC provides the student with the opportunity to establish a rapport with approximately fifty other officers from a wide range of backgrounds and a wide range of Corps. This rapport is encouraged and Course Spirit is further developed through sport and other physical activities.

The Product

Generally, junior officers attending the Course have had little experience of the Army at large. Many of them have not served out of their own Corps or even dealt with other Corps. Certainly they are naive as to the workings and requirements of the staff.

After seven weeks training, they have practised the art of staff work, improved their communication skills, improved their ability to analyse and solve military problems and improved their understanding of Army organizations, procedures and operations. Most can determine the problem and analyse it, develop a recommended solution or course of action and effectively communicate and defend that solution or course of action. Importantly, they have been taught ‘how’ to think rather than ‘what’ to think.

The Future

There is no doubt that formal staff training has an important place in the overall scheme of officer training and development. This is reinforced by lessons from military history and by the emphasis placed on it by other armies of the world.

The JSC is at an appropriate point in an officer’s career and it appears to have a philosophy consistent with the requirements of a professional, educated and practical staff. Early feedback is positive, but its true worth will not be fully appreciated until its graduates have permeated the staff system — at least to the
majority of staff appointments at the major and lieutenant colonel level.

The Course needs stability for the future so that its traditions develop and its product becomes recognizable in the Army at large. Its graduates will then be in a position to assist in the development and improvement of the Army in general and its staff system in particular.

Lieutenant-Colonel Beckingham graduated from the Royal Military College in 1970 and served in a variety of regimental and instructional postings before commanding 18 Field Squadron in Townsville in 1979. He attended the British Army Staff College at Camberely and subsequently served as Brigade Major of the 1st Brigade in Holsworthy. He spent three years as the Chief Instructor of Junior Staff Wing at the Land Warfare Centre, Cantagada. He is currently Commander of the 2nd/3rd Field Engineer Regiment.

**CADRE BULLETIN**

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which they appear are available at the libraries on most Defence establishments.

Updating the Biological Weapons Ban. Rosenberg, Barbara Hatch. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Jan/Feb 87: 40-43 In September 1986, 67 nations, meeting in Geneva to try to correct shortcomings in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention made some progress in the areas of increasing openness and establishing forums for complaint resolution. They also made a commitment to define and establish greater legal power when breaches of the convention occur.

The Task for a New Peace Movement. Weisskopf, Victor F. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Jan/Feb 87: 26-32 The potential for nuclear catastrophe has been steadily increasing but it is still dimly perceived by the public. Argues that a determined effort to elect a more responsive administration in 1988 is necessary. This requires a revitalization of the peace movement with stronger counter arguments to nuclear war and a devotion to changing public opinion supporting confrontation attitudes on both sides.

A Soviet Official on Verification. Timerbaev, Roland M. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Jan/Feb 87: 8-10 An outline of the Soviet position on verification. With a moratorium on nuclear explosions in place, the Soviets argue that they are open to negotiations on this issue. They even believe that an effective solution can be found to the problem of how to verify the prevention of the spreading of the arms race to outer space.

Naval Air Reserve will add A-6Es as Part of Modernization Effort. North, David M. *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 2 Mar 87: 64 + (3p) The concept of horizontal integration, equipping the United States Naval Reserve with the same aircraft flown by active duty Navy squadrons was formulated in 1980. It has resulted in the upgrading of the Naval Air Reserve Forces to an effective combat force.

Exploiting the Soviet “threat” to Europe. Evangelista, Matthew. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Jan/Feb 87: 14 + (4p) Support for a European version of Star Wars is based on unreliable evaluations of the Soviet threat and should be abandoned in favour of reducing conventional and nuclear forces. Soviet proposals for reducing conventional forces may render unnecessary the costly and dangerous programs to develop ATMs (Anti Tank Missiles) and deep strike weapons.

South Asia, the “Arc of Crisis”: Finally Wins the World’s Attention. Wirsing, Robert G. *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, Feb 87: 32-37 South Asia has become a geopolitical focus between the superpowers. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan, American supply of arms to Pakistan, the support of Afghan rebels and racial unrest in India make this an area of potential global conflict.

Deep Strike in US and NATO Doctrine. Staudenmaier, William O. *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, Feb 87: 28-31 The superpower strategists have placed new emphasis on conventional warfare. The United States and NATO's deep strike tactics were promulgated largely by a new US Army doctrine, strategic nuclear parity with the Soviet Union and emerging technologies. Examines the emergence of the new strategy.

The Yugoslav People's Army. Milivojevic, Marko. *Armed Forces*, Jan 87: 15-19 Examines the political and military readiness of the emergent YPA (Yugoslav People's Army) to handle the considerable external and internal challenges it is likely to face in the future. These include Soviet invasion, and, due to internal political turmoil, a deterioration of domestic conditions.

Under Growing Threat. O'Connor, Michael. *Asian Defence Journal*, Jan 87: 58 + (5p) An examination of events at the Fourth SLOC (Sea Lanes Of Communication) conference revealed concern over a growing Soviet presence in the Western Pacific. The answer to this threat is an integrated command system and greater involvement of Australia in Pacific security.

Threat Containment in Singapore. Bilveer, S. *Asian Defence Journal*, Jan 87: 34-38 Outlines the internal and external security policies of Singapore after first setting the scene with its geography, demography, economy and leadership experience.
Landrover 110—Initial Impressions

By Sergeant C.I. Clapperton, RAEME.

From the day it arrived in North Queensland the Army Landrover 110 drew immense attention and interest wherever it was seen. The vehicle is the first Initial Production Vehicle (IPV) manufactured by JRA in Sydney. The purpose of the IPV’s are to reveal any enigmas in the military configuration that may require to be rectified prior to full production commencing.

At a glance it is a rugged slabsided style although a few fittings such as front guard traffic indicators, outside toolstorage bin lids and flexible flares look a little frail and may be at risk in the 'rough stuff'.

Some could be mistaken in thinking that it is just an updated Landrover but there could be no comparison made between the 110 and the old Series 3. They are as different as chalk and cheese.

The most significant feature is the Range Rover suspension system for which it is hard to find sufficient superlatives to describe. The best way to find out exactly how good the all coil suspension works is to drive down one of those Far North Queensland corrugated roads which would normally rattle any teeth fillings loose and compress your vertebra a few centimetres. All you get is a relatively smooth ride and a very sure-footed feel which could be aided by the constant four-wheel drive.

The driver sits on a quite comfortable vinyl covered seat, which is adjustable fore/aft as well as reclinable, and has ample leg room which is a pleasant change for anyone over the old six foot mark. On the instrument panel is a speedo with odometer and resetable trip meter, fuel gauge, temperature gauge, volts gauge and an array of warning lights. This collection includes, alternator warning, disc pads worn, hand brake, oil pressure, and even a low fuel warning light. There could be improvement in the lighting of the speedo or more contrast between the numbers and the background as it is very difficult to read at night even with the dimmer switch wound fully on.

Passenger safety has not been overlooked either. There are retractable seat belts in the
front with each of these having two shoulder point mounting positions. This allows the seat belts to be worn when the vehicle has been converted to a ‘flat top’ (aircraft load). In the rear there are two sturdy roll-over bars which are easily removed when converting to a ‘flat top’. Even the brush guard looks more solid and could almost be classed as a bull-bar.

The 3.9 litre four cylinder direct injected diesel engine has already been proven successful in civilian vehicles. It is an Isuzu 4BD1 which puts out 72KW of power at 3200 RPM. This is not an over abundance of power but is sufficient to allow a loaded vehicle towing an equally loaded trailer to travel at 100 KPH. The only time that more power would be an asset is when overtaking on the highway. Peak torque is 255 NM at a mere 1900 RPM which by the way is only 3NM less than the civilian VS version.

When you get off the beaten track the performance can only be described as excellent. Even without the central diff locking system engaged the long-travelling suspension allows the wheels to obtain positive forward traction in areas where other vehicles could find themselves in difficulty. Once the central diff is engaged by pulling a dash mounted knob, the vehicle gives the impression that if you are game it will take you there. Even mud does not appear to offer a challenge to the vehicle’s ability to gain access to places which where in the past almost inconceivable.

Getting started on any reasonable incline, particularly when fully loaded, is different to most vehicles as first gear is very tall indeed, which means you either have a lot of clutch slipping or have to select low range to get going. This could catch some people unawares when
driving the vehicle for the first time especially in unforgiving terrain.

It would be unfair to comment on the standard headlights as our vehicle was fitted with twin Super Oscar driving lights which are said to be good for barbecuing cows at 100 metres, (well they are very good anyway). Other accessories had also been fitted such as, freezer (for food samples), civilian HF radio (for Comms with VJY radio/telephone Darwin), dual battery (to run accessories), air-horns (so you do not leave barbecued cows everywhere), altimeter (navigational aid), Goodyear Extra-Grip tyres (so a single replacement of this commonly used tyre can be purchased in remote areas), and a few more.

The reason for these accessories is the fact that the vehicle is used by the Army’s survival expert Major L.J. Hiddins AM, who travels vast distances in remote areas of Northern Australia for extended periods of time.

Other standard fittings include such things as map pockets in doors, day/night rear vision mirror, manoeuvrable maplight, Interior Light, folding side rear vision mirrors and a well designed spare wheel storage system. Utilizing the standard vehicle wheel brace the spare wheel is lowered from under the rear of the vehicle by winding a recessed nut on the off road side of the vehicle. With the spare wheel tucked away beneath the vehicle this makes the bonnet available for the mounting of the pick, spade, and axe. Whilst the manoeuvrable map light is a good idea it is precariously secured and may not last too long.

As the new tyres were removed prior to testing it is impossible to comment on their performance except to say on bitumen they are extremely quiet. With 6.00 inch rims fitted, and Murphys Law being applied, it will only be matter of time before one of the old 5.50 inch rims finds its way onto one side of the front, which may or may not cause a steering problem. Although the turning circle is not exceptional it is definitely a vast improvement to what most of us have had to live with in the past. Even without the civilian power steering the wheel is turned with little effort but remains very definite and direct at the same time.

With the combination of a heavily galvanised solid looking chassis and an alloy body all corrosion problems should be alleviated. Overall it looks like the landrover 110 should be a good solid vehicle to serve for many years and giving
This particular vehicle is about to be put to the test over the next 14 months as it is to be used on Project 'TOP HALF'. During the project it will travel across the top of Australia several times encountering all types of terrain and conditions, from the almost destructive roads of Cape York, through the dry arid desert of Central Australia, to the rugged Kimberlies, and the harshness of Arnhem Land. Let’s just hope that the vehicle proves to be as reliable and as good as it seems from its initial impressions.

Sergeant Chris Clapperton was posted to the RAAF School of Technical Training at Wagga Wagga after completing an Army apprenticeship as a Fitter Machinist. Having completed further aircraft trade training at 5 Base Wksp Bn he then served as an Aircraft Fitter at 5 Base Wksp Bn, 173 Gen Spt Sqn, and 162 Recce Sqn. He is currently one of only two ARA members working in the field on Project 'TOP HALF'. This project involves the making of a television documentary series based on natural survival resources available in Northern Australia.

1988 RAAF MUSEUM CALENDAR

The RAAF Museum Calendar is the fourth in a continuing series of quality and unusual photographs of aircraft of the RAAF — historical and current. The 1988 Calendar represents a unique collection of photographs of aircraft ranging from the Hawker Demon and a formation of F111s, to a brilliant photograph of the F/A-18 near Katherine Gorge.

The Calendar, which will appeal to enthusiasts and collectors alike, is available from the RAAF Museum at a cost of only $10.00 per copy (plus $2.00 postage and handling), complete with a presentation envelope. All proceeds from the sale of these Calendars are dedicated to the development of displays at the RAAF Museum and the return to purchasers can be seen through latest developments such as the Medal and Vietnam Galleries, with the main Museum Gallery being upgraded late 1987, early 1988.

Prepaid mail orders can be addressed to Curator,
RAAF Museum, RAAF Base, Point Cook VIC 3029.
Education and Competence: Some Implications for Officer Development

Major W. J. Graco, AA Psych

In recent years a number of concerns have been expressed regarding the role and importance of education in society. Some of these include:


b. The issues of whether secondary schools are producing students who are sufficiently numerate and literate to take their places in the workforce, and whether they are teaching subjects which are relevant to the needs of society (eg see Abbott 1986, Middleton 1982, Naisbitt and Aburdene 1985: chap 4, Nevill 1986, Sheridan 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1987; Smith 1980, Sun Herald 1986).


d. The role of tertiary education in society and whether tertiary education institutions are producing graduates suited to the requirements of industry (eg see Burgess 1977, Hutchins 1968). Inherent in these arguments is the issue whether they should be concentrating on professional and technical training or they should be providing general education to students (eg see Australian 1986, Kissane 1986).

These concerns highlight the dynamic state of education and the fact that its traditional forms are being continually questioned and challenged.

Aims

The aims of this article are to highlight two other controversial aspects of education and to discuss their implications for officer development. These are:

a. The efficacy of education, and

b. The link between education and job competence.

Efficacy of Education

Many suppositions are made concerning the importance and value of education. In the author's opinion a number of benefits, which are posited as accruing from education, are either unproven or without substance. Some examples include:

a. The notion that 'liberal education' develops intellect and nurtures the powers of analysis, inquiry, judgement and creativity, and that its philosophy of education emphasizes discussion, reflection, reading and translation of thoughts from 'mind' to paper (Downes 1981: 35).

b. The idea that without the habits, dispositions and attitudes that are central to 'liberal education' people may be efficient technologists, engineers, doctors, lawyers and teachers but they will not be able to contribute creatively to their professions; and in times of change and challenge they will cling to a fixed and rigid support of the status quo, and so not be able to help their professions to modify themselves and to enlarge their perspectives (Kissane 1986).

c. The view that while fundamental knowledge and certain technical skills can be acquired through self-paced and machine-assisted courses, the development of more complex skills, insights and values is the product of an educational process which requires expert faculty, group seminar methods, or special facilities and conditions that can be best provided in an academic setting (Review of Education and Training of Officers 1978: III-16).

d. The belief that graduate education is an important, if not crucial, channel for the development of intellectual skills necessary to deal with the domestic and international environment (Sarkesian and Taylor 1975: 254).
These statements contain assertions which are questionable. To give two examples; firstly, does 'liberal education' nurture the powers of creativity and secondly, is it true that people who do not have ideals of a 'liberal education' will be rigid in their outlook and against change in their jobs? Where is the evidence to support these hypothesis? Similarly, where is the evidence to substantiate the other assertions made above? Though they contain desirable objectives, there is a danger that these statements could be misconstrued as facts. The basic problem is that little is known about the precise effects education have on the development and capabilities of human beings. Furthermore, it is not known which personalities benefit most from education and what particular educative activities are conducive to producing an 'educated mind'. The fundamental drawback is that there is a dearth of research which has evaluated and tested the efficacy of education, particularly in the tertiary sector.

In terms of officer development, if there is a salutary lesson to be learnt it is that the temptation to make vague and broad generalizations about what can be achieved in officer education, should be avoided. Rather what is needed for any programme of learning whether its aim be education, training or similar is the following:

a. A clear statement of objectives which specify what is intended by the learning, and
b. Validation of the programme in terms of comparing resources expended and results achieved against course objectives, to ensure the best possible solution is attained.

These steps are integral to performance-based training approaches such as the Army Training System (see Graco 1983) and they are being advocated for management development programmes (eg see Saul 1982).

A programme which followed the tenets of this ‘philosophy’ is the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) course (Farris 1984, Anderson 1984). The aim of CAS3 is to train regular and reserve officers as field staff officers. The training does not try to teach knowledge and understanding per se, but endeavours to teach a set of generic skills which are specified as course objectives. One of these is the ability to analyze and solve problems. To establish its effectiveness, the designers of the course carried out internal validation to determine if the course objectives were being realised. The strengths of this programme are threefold. Firstly, it is oriented towards teaching skills, which have important and broad applications in each officer’s career, rather than provide students with content (eg facts and figures). Secondly, the course has specific objectives rather than operating on the assumption that the training would provide a number of general benefits to those being trained. Lastly, validation was carried out to confirm that the objectives were being attained.

These comments about the efficacy of education point to the need for greater accountability. Not only must those involved in teaching demonstrate that they achieve academic excellence but that their programmes of learning are effective in accomplishing their aims and are efficient in their design and use of resources. For some time there has been a tendency to make claims about the advantages of education which are not supported by empirical evidence.

Education and Job Competence

Another consideration is amount of education required. This is a contentious issue. At present there is the problem of inflation in qualifications and the impetus for this is being partly provided by limited employment opportunities. (For a detailed discussion see Berg 1970 and Oxenham 1984). The relationship between education and performance is still under investigation but the results of various studies suggest that it is ‘S’ shaped (Little 1984: 99). This means that there is a minimum amount of education required to develop necessary competence but thereafter the ‘law of diminishing returns’ operates with smaller and smaller gains being achieved for additional investment of educational resources.

Berg (1970: chap 5) also demonstrated that education is not always the critical determinant of job performance. In fact he found instances where increasing levels of education were negatively correlated with job productivity and satisfaction, and positively correlated with job turnover. Berg’s analysis implied that these outcomes were probable in jobs where there was a mismatch between the employee’s education and his/her job requirements. In addition those with academic qualifications, who perceived that their work offered either slow or limited career progression, were inclined to leave their employment.
Ginzberg commenting on Berg's analysis said (Berg 1970: 13) that data from armed services and federal civil service in the USA revealed that the critical determinants of performance are not increased educational achievement but other personality characteristics and environmental conditions.

From a military perspective, Palmer and Tarr (1974) stated that a US Defence Manpower Commission found that an undergraduate degree should be sufficient preparation for a 'four-star' general or admiral assignment and that postgraduate education should be reoriented towards broad occupational specialties rather than individual jobs, eg Master of Business Administration degrees should be undertaken by those who are likely to fill a broad range of management jobs.9

These findings suggest that education is a necessary prerequisite for job competence but that only a minimum level is usually required.

**Obsolescence**

An allied consideration is the concept of professional obsolescence. The obsolescence of technical knowledge has been quantified in terms of 'half-life' in that like a piece of radium it decays over time. To give an example, the half-life of a 1955 engineering education was approximately eight years, ie half of what was learned in 1955 was no longer current eight years later (Kaufman 1978). The half-life for 1985 engineering education is considered to be five years (Leavy and Smith 1986: 15). The American Society for Training and Development predicts that job skills will become rapidly obsolete as workplaces are automated, and as knowledge continues its exponential growth (Leavy and Smith 1986: 14).

The concept that knowledge is being progressively superseded by new developments in science and technology is not disputed, but it does not mean that practising scientists, professionals, tradespersons and the like are becoming obsolete. This would be true if people ceased learning once they completed their formal education and training. Of course this not the case as people continue to learn on the job, through discourse with others, from reading professional journals, from attending conventions and seminars, from viewing television, from being exposed to associated media and similar. What is not known is the extent that these sources of informal learning contribute to professional competence.10

This issue is raised because of the increasing tendency to advocate recurrent, or 'life-long', learning in that people need to return periodically to university, college or another institution to undergo further development in their profession or trade (see Leavy and Smith 1986, Naisbitt and Aburdene 1985: chaps 4 and 5). There is no denying the need for continuing education for reasons such as remedial learning for individuals who did not complete their formal schooling, retraining those whose jobs have been displaced by new technology, extension training in terms of upgrading vocational knowledge and skills, and recreational training for people who want to learn arts such as pottery and cooking. The need for continuing education to overcome personnel obsolescence is less certain except, of course, for those who neglect their professional development.

**Individual Differences**

The above observations about education and job performance suggest that due cognizance needs to be made of individual differences in professional development. There will be those who, as a result of their formal studies and informal learning, will have a level of competence which partly meets or exceeds the terminal requirements of their intended course of study.11

That is, as a result of work experience, their own reading, their liaison with colleagues and their previous studies, they will have acquired the knowledge and skills to satisfy the course objectives. Unless they are given recognition for their achievements, they will have to complete their programme of study. This, of course, is a wasteful practice as unnecessary resources have to be expended to teach these individuals subject matter they have already mastered. One way of establishing people's knowledge and skill is to give them entrance tests before they commence their instruction. These tests help to eliminate unnecessary education and training by giving students advanced standing in those subjects where they have the required levels of achievement.

**Self-Directed Development**

This leads to the issue of self-directed development. The author found in a sample of competent military commanders (Graco 1984) that as a group they exhibited a high level of profes-
This referred to the steps they took to improve themselves, to become more expert or adept in their calling. They were deeply devoted to their profession and were students of warfare. Their development and mastery occurred on the job, on courses and from private study.

Subjects differed in the way they developed their professionalism. Some were intellectuals who were well read across a variety of fields such as poetry, history and architecture. They also had a broad and theoretical knowledge of the art and science of war. In contrast a number were practical in their orientation learning the rudiments of their ‘trade’ from experience on the job. This group were not noted for their intellectual gifts and received what was essentially a practical preparation for higher command. Few attended schools of higher military education. In the middle fell a third group who were neither exclusively intellectual nor practical in their approach. They learnt from experience on the job and benefited from attending schools of higher military education. Some also liaised or served under progressive military thinkers of their times. These findings show the ways these commanders developed their expertise. For all, their competence was partly due to their self-education.

Gibbons et al (1980) investigated the characteristics of a sample of prominent self-educated people such as Walt Disney, Frank Lloyd Wright and Harry Truman. The researchers found that subjects were largely self-taught and that formal schooling played an insignificant role in their becoming experts. When school was reported as being influential, it was often noted as a negative experience. The subjects demonstrated a singleminded pursuit of excellence and were self directed and self disciplined in their studies. They were active learners who concentrated on mastering one subject at a time. Their methods of learning included reading everything they could about the topic that interested them, conducting their own experiments, observing experts and receiving ‘lucky breaks’ which provided new insights and discoveries.

They also possessed:

a. Attractive personalities eg they had a sense of humour, pleasing appearance, optimism and/or sensitivity to others.

b. Unusual strength of character which enabled them to pursue their purposes against great odds, in the face of disapproval and in spite of failure.

c. Good physical and mental health.

Knowles (1978) has developed a well known model of self-directed learning called ‘Andragogy’. This model is based on the principles that individuals are capable of diagnosing their own learning requirements, identifying learning objectives, organizing their own resources for learning, choosing and implementing their own teaching methods and evaluating learning results. This approach differs from the traditional one where academics, teachers and trainers determine learning requirements and decide how they are delivered and evaluated. In Australia Knowles ‘philosophy’ has been applied with promising results in management education (Prideaux 1986) and in management development in terms of self-directed learning groups (Sinclair and Skerman 1982).

One of the assumptions made about education is that this type of learning is best fostered in an institutional environment. The research cited above demonstrates that this is not necessarily so and suggests that the efforts made by individuals to cater for their own self development can contribute significantly to their becoming skilled and adept in their field of employment.

Credentialism

This raises issue of credentialism or the qualifications that establish the authority of the bearer. Obviously, credentials are essential for indicating a person’s level of education and for certifying his/her competence to perform certain prescribed functions. In turn, they are a mechanism for protecting the public from imposters and swindlers. They are also used to make selection decisions for entry to courses, for employment and for membership of scientific, professional and trade associations. There are two dangers with the ‘blind’ application of credentials. Firstly, if higher qualifications are demanded it is not an assurance that those chosen will prove to be more professional in their outlook and more proficient in the provision of their skills. As has been shown, only minimal education is usually required to develop a satisfactory level of proficiency. Secondly, formal qualifications are not necessarily the best indicators of a person’s competence. For one they do not account for those self taught individuals who have acquired a level of
expertise which is comparable to those who have formal qualification, for another an individual's personal qualities, such as bedside manner if the practitioner is in a health profession, may have more to do with his/her competence than academic achievements. This leads to the conclusion that qualifications alone are no guarantee of competence and that those involved in selection should employ a number of criteria such as the applicant's 'track record', which formal qualifications are one component, and his/her aptitudes or special abilities.14

The comments made above about formal education emphasize:

a. That those who advocate increasing levels of education, need to demonstrate empirically that the additional learning contributes to the development of students in terms of improving their capabilities, outlook and more importantly their performance.

b. That those who subscribe to the concept of professional obsolescence need to realise that whereas knowledge may decay over time, it does not follow that people do.

c. Allowance must be made for individual differences. People learn in different ways and they also differ in the knowledge and skill they master. Too often, formal learning programmes do not acknowledge these differences. It was suggested that one way of accounting for these is to use entrance tests which establish an individual's prior knowledge and skills.

d. An adult approach to education, which recognizes that people are capable of determining their own learning requirements and are able to organize and direct their own development, appears to be an effective way of developing proficiency and expertise.

e. Credentials are one indicator of a person's capabilities. It was concluded that a variety of criteria should be applied by those who make selection decisions.

Implications

These observations have a number of implications for officer development. These include:

a. Since the evidence suggests that only a minimum amount of education is usually needed to develop competence, the challenge is to identify the level which provides a proper foundation to build a career in the service.15 To recap what was said earlier, a US Manpower Commission considered that an undergraduate degree was sufficient preparation for a four-star officer in the US forces. Research would be required to establish if this level is applicable to officers in the Australian Defence Force. Those who advocate education beyond the minimal level would need to show scientifically that the additional learning contributes to a higher degree of proficiency and expertise.

b. Though considerable effort is devoted to officer development in terms of attendance at prescribed courses and mandatory rotations between command and staff appointments, each individual's self education can play a prominent role in the development of his/her competence.

c. There is scope for an adult approach to officer development which allows officers greater latitude to determine their own development needs and programmes.

The final issue, if formal education is to make an effective contribution to officer development it must be subordinate to the processes of career planning and career development ie the latter must determine the former. This means the aims and contents of educational courses must dovetail in with the overall development and progression planned and validated in career development programmes. In particular the three key processes of education, training an on-the-job experience must complement and supplement one another. This means the education programme should be designed so that what is achieved by this process can be built upon and reinforced in follow-on training and on-the-job development. In addition, there will be times when one must take priority over the others eg while junior officers, it is imperative that members gain regimental or equivalent experience. This is essential while they still have youth on their side. Any shortcomings in their education can be addressed later when the demands for regimental or equivalent service are less.

Conclusion

Some comments made above may appear to be an 'attack' on the value of education. It is countered that the analysis has been aimed at questioning existing assumptions about the efficacy of this process and the role it plays in the development and performance of human beings. To date much of what has been claimed
about education has been taken for granted without any attempt to challenge their validity. This article has tried to redress this imbalance and, at the same time, has tried to identify some of the ways education can make an effective contribution to officer development. Q

NOTES
1. There are many definitions of education and training. In this article education refers to the general development of personality with particular emphasis on intellect, character and deportment. Training refers to acquisition of specific knowledge, skills or attributes. It is suggested that there are varying degrees of training in education just as there are varying degrees of education in training.

2. Officer development refers to the development of attributes and capabilities in officers to meet the demands of the Service and the individual (Regular Officer Career Guidance Handbook 1983: 1-1).

3. Considerable research has been devoted to establishing the effectiveness of various instructional methods such as the 'lecture', 'small group discussion' and 'case study' (eg see Gage and Berliner 1975). What has not been addressed adequately are the outcomes achieved by educational programmes. This is illustrated by the discrepancies between academic claims about education and what students report as their experiences. To give one example which is a precis from Burgess (1977: 124-125), academics typically assert that the experience they offer gives the students a body of knowledge, inculcates a critical attitude of mind and gives a grasp of underlying principles which transcends accumulation of facts and acquisition of technique. The end result is that students will have undergone a rigorous intellectual discipline which leaves them able to collect evidence for themselves and make a balanced judgement. They can think for themselves and resist preconceived opinion on the basis of reason. In contrast, according to Burgess, students typically report that everything in their courses tend toward accumulation of knowledge and the acquisition of skill. They find having the knowledge does not itself enable them to apply it. When theory and practice are integrated, students may not be able to either apply the theory or to describe or defend their practice. It is not intended to debate the validity of Burgess's observations; what is alluded to is the need for research to establish precisely what effects education have on people. In the author's opinion the field is lacking scientific rigour and scrutiny.

4. Extending the comments made in Note 3, all the studies and inquiries which the author has read concerning education (eg see Williams et al 1979), have all avoided the question of the efficacy of this process. In Note 5 a study which addressed this issue in terms of the perceived benefits to a sample of science graduates is cited.

5. It is significant that Powell (Carbin 1985) found in an investigation of science graduates that they retain skills, not facts. Powell ascertained that the graduates emphasized the importance of having the ability to seek information, as against the ability to recall a mass of detail. Most could identify the skills they learned at university such as critical thinking and questioning, rigour of approach and precision of method, laboratory techniques, experimental design, thorough preparation of material and reporting skills. The scientists also mentioned the development of 'scientific analysis' and linked it with values such as 'tolerance', 'integrity' and 'objectivity'. On the negative side they expressed concern about 'curriculum creep' which is the tendency to overcrowd curricula and to overassess rather than permit more time for reflection, which is necessary to develop understanding. Saul (1982: 15) found in an investigation of management training courses that trainees and their superiors agreed that approximately 60 percent of courses provided new knowledge or insights which only 20 percent of courses resulting in the development of a new skill or capability. Yet 'skills' training was rated as significantly more effective by trainees and their superiors. These investigations suggest that development programmes are likely to be more effective if they concentrate on teaching generic skills rather than 'textbook' knowledge.

6. The author (Graco 1986) voiced his reservations about inflation in qualifications in his profession, as distinct from science, of psychology. Instead of a four-year qualification, the Australian Psychological Society is now demanding a six-year one. The author's concern stemmed from the absence of empirical evidence demonstrating that six-year graduates are more professionally competent than four-year trained peers. This is relevant in a study by Campbell and Philip (reported in Williams et al 1979: 473) on primary teacher training in NSW and QLD, they found that raising the length of teacher training from two to three years did not make any apparent different to the effectiveness of teaching. From a broader perspective, Williams et al (1979) reviewed this issue and tended to support the move for higher qualifications whereas Niland (1979) tended to be more critical and warned of the dangers associated with this trend. To be fair to Williams et al (1979: 481-482), they did concede that action was necessary to prevent wasteful escalation in qualifications.

7. For those involved in research and development (R & D) the point of diminishing returns may be higher than for those who are trained as professionals. Kaufman (1978) found that the number of graduate courses taken early in the careers of R & D engineers was strongly related to job performance whereas engineers with poor performance records, regardless of whether they were in R & D or otherwise, had a greater likelihood of enrolling in more courses. It is suggested that this greater participation had no relationship with subsequent performance. Though this is an isolated study, it does point to the possibility that longer periods of development are required to educate and train scientists.

8. Wright and Hamilton (1979) also found that there is not a strong relationship between education level and productivity. Lawler (1973) said that there is little reason to expect a direct relationship between education level and performance in most situations. He added that it is only reasonable to expect a relationship where the job requires specialized skills, people are motivated to perform the work and the education teaches job relevant capabilities. Another reason used to justify the investment in education is the 'human capital' approach. The landmark study cited as evidence for investment in education is that of Denison (1962). Denison estimated that education accounted for 23 percent of the growth in total national income and 42 percent of the growth in per capita income in the US from 1929 to 1957. His results were supported by the findings of Schultz (1961). Though the notion of 'human capital' is widely accepted, critics have pointed out (eg see Berg 1970: chap 2, Burgess 1977: 202-212, Hutchins 1968: chap 3) that the notion education is the road to national growth is not supported by other evidence. Investments in education in countries like Uganda (Hutchins 1968: 47-48) and India (Burgess 1977: 203) have not resulted in corresponding rises in economic growth. In Britain the In-
10. The author's own research (Graco 1976) suggests that terminal requirements refer to the capabilities students are expected to have acquired by the end of the course of instruction.

11. Terminal requirements refer to the capabilities students are expected to have acquired by the end of the course of instruction.

12. O'Dell (1966) and Guglielmino (1977) have developed inventories for identifying self-directed learners. Tough's research (1967, 1971, 1982) is also relevant.

13. The author is of the opinion that one serious shortcoming with academic selection is the tendency to concentrate on academic results to the exclusion of other criteria. It is acknowledged that these are a valid predictor of future academic performance (see Baumgart 1984: 28-29) but it is argued that other factors need to be considered. To paraphrase Ashenden (1986) with regard to university entrance, he said that aggregating Year 12 scores give only a 'hazy' idea of difference in past academic achievement and are even a 'rougher' guide to future performance. He stressed that aggregate scores sort out those who would certainly succeed in higher education from those who certainly could not. Scores are no better than a lottery when it comes to choosing among the big group in the middle. Ashenden surmised that sooner or later someone is going to bring a legal action against a university using aggregate score selection on the ground that it constitutes negligence, incompetence, and discrimination. And then they will win. The 'moral' here is that it is incumbent upon tertiary institutions to take into account factors such as student motivation, maturity, experience, study habits and other personal qualities when arranging applicants in an order of merit for course selection. If more attention was given to these factors it could help reduce attrition in courses as well as assist applicants to make realistic career choices.

14. No matter what selection criteria are used and what method is applied to determine competence, the most important precaution against abuse in this area is the legal safeguard that those responsible for selection employ criteria which are valid and reliable and which provide adequate discrimination amongst candidates. In practice, this means that citizens can seek legal redress if they are victims of employment discrimination and the like.

15. It was shown in Note 5 that greater mileage is likely to be gained by teaching generic skills than by teaching knowledge in having courses which are competency-based than content-based. What is required for officer education is a list of these capabilities. A few examples are communication skills, decision-making and problem-solving skills, and research skills. This approach differs from the traditional one where the focus attention is on teaching subjects such as maths, English and geography.

REFERENCES
Successful Shock Testing for HMAS Shoalwater

The Royal Australian Navy has successfully shock tested its new minehunting catamaran, HMAS Shoalwater, in recent trials off the Queensland coast. The shock trials involved HMAS Shoalwater being subject to medium and large explosive charges, culminating in live mine firings, all exploded near the ship, to test design strength.

The trials, in which the hull remained undamaged, conformed to NATO standards for warship shock testing and were the first carried out in Australia on a ship designed and built in this country.

Launched last year, HMAS Shoalwater is the second of the Bay Class Minehunting Catamarans, built by Carrington Slipways Pty Ltd, in Newcastle, NSW. With her sister ship HMAS Rushcutter, the Shoalwater is undergoing extensive trials for the Royal Australian Navy. Dependent upon the results of these trials another four minehunting catamarans may be built.

Major Graco graduated from OTU Scheyville in 1971 and was allocated to AAPSYCH. He has served in a variety of corps and appointments and is currently posted to the Directorate of Command and Control Systems-Army.

The Training of Foreign Students

By Major Bruce Copeland BA. BEdSt. RAAEC.

Introduction

In the Australian Defence Force, personnel of all ranks come from nations in South East Asia and the South Pacific to attend service courses at numerous establishments throughout Australia.

If we are to give maximum support to these students, we must bring a high level of expertise to bear in course design, development and presentation.

In doing so, we need to appreciate the nature of the societies and cultures from which individuals and groups of students come.

There are basic rules of conduct that apply within particular societies and we Australians should take the trouble to acquaint ourselves with these. By taking this step we demonstrate basic respect. Respect and courtesy cross all cultural boundaries.

Aim

The aim of this article is to:

• identify aspects that Australians should consider in relating to foreign students, and
• establish strategies appropriate to training foreign students.

Background

This article has been written in conjunction with five (5) articles that have appeared in the Defence Force Journal. These are:

• "A Systems Approach to Mastery Learning" DFJ. No 44 Jan/Feb 84;
• "In Support of Our Friends the Foreign Instructor and Student" DFJ. No 50 Jan/Feb 85;
• "In Support of the Papua New Guinean Student in Australia. DFJ. No 54, Sept/Oct 85;
• In Support of More Effective Texts for Papua New Guinean Service Students in Australia" DFJ. No 58 May/Jun 86; and
• "Towards Effective Training of Foreign Students in English as a Second Language. DFJ. No 63 Mar/Apr 87.

These articles have not been cited as references but as supplementary texts for the reader who may wish to pursue the topic further.

The writer has had a background in support of foreign students from South East Asia and the South Pacific. Until 1979, familiarization of foreign students took place at the Army Languages School at Kapooka, New South Wales.

Support in Defence Schools

Defence schools will vary in the preparations made to accommodate foreign students. In the schools that train large numbers of junior Service members from foreign countries, sporting activities have long provided a social venue.

Transport provided on week-ends will overcome the problems of isolation that accompany Service bases situated in rural areas. Care needs to be taken so that such support for foreign students does not arouse resentment in Australian students.

For students on course, there may be the problems of access to a post office and to coins to be used for international telephone calls. Classrooms may be situated some distance from the post office. Hours of business may be inappropriate for students on course.

Foreign students need to be sponsored by an Australian Service member who has the responsibility to support them in their personal administration. This person should be selected on the basis of administrative skill and positive personal attitudes towards the people with whom he/she is involved.

Those foreign students from tropical countries may need provision of anti-malarial medication during their stay in Australia.

Textbooks

Foreign students may well find difficulty in reading and comprehension of texts used on technical courses in Australia. It may be that the texts had been written with Australian instructors and students in mind.

The following defects may exist in student texts:
• Emphasis may have been placed on theory with little regard for practical activities.
• There may have been limited/unskilled use of diagrams.
• No attempt may have been made to develop a language teaching component.
• Assumptions may have been made about the starting points in knowledge and skills based on the Australian rather than the foreign student.
• Textbooks may promote theory and skills that are not required on the job in country.

Combined or Separate Classes
The question arises as to whether or not foreign students should join the classes of Australian students or be trained as separate groups. There is the view that foreign students will gain from being drawn into the community of Australian students. There is much to be said for this.

Through such contact they will have more opportunities to socialize in off-duty hours with Australian class-mates and be given support in making their way in the Australian scene.

It may be that at times the foreign students will be, older, more experienced and better educated than the corresponding class of Australian students.

However, we should be aware that many foreign students will be unduly penalized if they are placed in classes with Australian students. The following problems are suggested:

• Textbooks may be pitched at an unacceptably complex level in relation to technical English and presentation of theory.
• The instructor may use the same starting point in knowledge and skills for both the Australian and foreign students.
• The instructor and Australian students may exclude the foreign students by speaking too quickly and by using the Australian sense of humour and idiom.
• For most Australian students the technical language is part of their first language.
• For most foreign students, English will be their second language with technical language as a third language.
• Some foreign students will not have had a background experience in ‘hands on’ technical skills, appropriate to a given course.

In all such discussion, we may not generalize too much. There will be Australian students who will find difficulty with technical English and technical descriptions. At the same time, there will be foreign students whose experience, knowledge of English and level of education, will enable them to complete Australian courses with ease.

Their Ways — Our Ways
There is the point of view put forward that if foreign students have come to Australia to train, then it is their task to learn our way. It is not our task to learn theirs. Such a view is only partly correct. Foreign students should certainly come to understand aspects of Australian culture and to recognize aspects of Australian ways. Even in this, there are diverse ways apparent in Australia.

We will find that most, if not all, foreign students who come to Australia will be characterized by a friendly, formal correctness. As is evident in many countries in S.E. Asia, the people will demonstrate respect for authority and know that authority figures will conduct themselves in dignified ways.

They may well find the ‘ocker’ approach to be somewhat puzzling and disconcerting. The following customs may cause alarm to a foreign student:

• aggressive sense of humour involving ‘taking the mickey’ out of another person,
• lack of acceptance by some Australians of people who react negatively to an aggressive Australian sense of humour, and
• the view that an Australian 'ocker' can say whatever he likes as long as it is done with a broad smile.

There will be many students from S.E. Asia who do not for religious reasons, take alcoholic drinks. The eating of pork may be totally unacceptable. Prayers and fasting will be part of daily routine for Moslems. The month of Ramadan should be considered on the School calendar and allowance made for the fact that during the month of Ramadan, Moslems will fast between sunrise and sunset. They may want to eat before sunrise. Fasting may need to be taken in account in course programmes involving strenuous activity.

**Respect for Authority**

Australians and people from S.E. Asia and the South Pacific will differ in their acceptance of authority. It is part of the Australian ethos that many Australians are egalitarian in that they bring one another down to a common level. There are those who challenge this view. Within this ethos, there is the view that Australians cut down 'tall poppies', prefer to call the boss 'mate' and criticize the government for all shortcomings of our society.

Within the South Pacific there are nations whose citizens have had some exposure to and understanding of the Australian view of life. However, within S.E. Asia, there are people who find this view to be quite unacceptable.

Australian students will find themselves to be quite willing to criticize the instructor, to ask questions, to challenge the instructor's opinion, and to interrupt the lesson for various reasons. For some students, the day of reckoning will come with the course critique which they will use to express just what they thought of the course.

The respect for authority of people of S.E. Asia and South Pacific will preclude them from such behaviour. Instructors are to be respected, and their views accepted without question. To challenge would be to give the view of knowing more than the instructor. Such behaviour would be highly unacceptable. To criticize would be to cause upset and this should be avoided at all costs.

However, criticism will undoubtedly be made on the student’s return to his/her country.

Within certain groups, response by students may need to be made in rank order. There will be a reluctance by most, if not all, personnel from S.E. Asia to make definitive assertions, as such behaviour may cause offence to members of the group. Instructors may want to challenge students to give their view and to criticize as part of the instructional strategy. There may not be the response from many foreign students that was desired by the Australian instructor.

Australian instructors should avoid practices that will cause outrage. The following are suggested:

- Custom dictates that Moslems use the right hand in polite physical contact.
- A Moslem's hair should not be touched.
- A Moslem does not eat pork.
- Offence will be given in a number of S.E. Asian nations if the soles of shoes are pointed at another person in the context of the wearer sitting with his feet on the desk.
- Offence will be given by an instructor who sits on a student's desk.
- Strict modesty may apply in relation to nudity either in magazines or in routine dressing after a sporting event.
- Name calling by instructors would be most inappropriate.
- Officers from some nations will be upset if the instructor is of lower rank.

Generally, the Australian instructor will find that his/her behaviour should be governed by common sense and normal courtesy. Whereas many Australians have the 'call me Fred, mate' approach, citizens in S.E. Asian nations are more formal in their courtesy addressing their neighbour with the honorific 'Mr, Mrs, Miss'. In some cultures, the mode of address will vary according to the relative positions in society of those involved.

**Points to consider**

In working with foreign students the following points should be considered:

- **DO** acquire knowledge of at least the friendly phrases in their native language.
- **DO** make the effort to understand aspects of culture appropriate to the students on course.
- **DO** show by your behaviour that you respect the people under your charge.
- **DO** anticipate the problems that foreign students may face on course away from home.
• DO arrange social contact that will increase friendship between foreign students and Australians.
• DO provide support for any religious observances.
• DO design and conduct courses with regard to language and practical difficulties of the students.
• DO demonstrate to foreign students aspects of Australian culture that do not give offence.

Familiarization Courses
There are three courses available at the RAAF School of Languages designed to familiarize Australian instructors and course managers with the language and culture of national groups of Service students who attend courses at Service Schools in Australia. These are:

- the Pidgin Familiarization Course for Instructors,
- the Indonesian Familiarization Course for Instructors, and
- the Malaysian Familiarization Course for Instructors.

REFERENCES:

Major Copeland has worked at the RAAF School of Languages for eight years. During that time, he has conducted courses to prepare Australian Defence Force and Foreign Affairs personnel for posting to Papua New Guinea. He is also involved with the Pidgin Familiarization Courses for Instructors. These courses prepare Australian Defence Force Instructors for the task of training service personnel of Papua New Guinea.

He was involved with preparation of personnel from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Pakistan and Thailand when the mandate was given to the Army Language School at Kapooka in 1978.

Major Copeland has demonstrated skill in Indonesian, Pidgin and Bislama languages.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence libraries:


Sperling, Goetz, German Perspectives of the Defence of Europe, Centre for International Relations, Queens University, Kingston, Canada, 1985.
Australia's Defence Cooperation Programme with the South West Pacific — Is it Effective?

By LtCol D. A. K. Urquhart, RAE

(This article is based on a paper submitted as part of the ADFA Master of Defence Studies Programme.)

Introduction

THE Defence Cooperation Programme (DCP) is now twenty-four years old, having commenced with assistance to Malaysia and Singapore in 1963. From modest beginnings the programme has steadily expanded. The expected DCP budget for financial year 1987/88 is $58.3 million and assistance has been extended to a variety of countries including the ASEAN states, Papua New Guinea and the small island nations of the South West Pacific.

Assistance under the DCP can take many forms, including:
• joint operations,
• joint projects,
• advisory and consultancy assistance,
• training,
• combined exercises,
• exchanges, and
• construction tasks undertaken by Australian Army Engineers.

The scope of the activities undertaken has also grown considerably in recent years.

Defence cooperation with the South West Pacific (SWP) began with assistance to Fiji in 1972; post-independence PNG followed in 1975; Tonga and the Solomons in 1977; Vanuatu in 1980 and Kiribati and Western Samoa in 1981. Funding to the SWP has also been considerably increased. In 1982/83 the allocation to the SWP was approximately $20 million, of which some 85% was allocated to PNG. The proposed 87/88 programme allocates $23.1 million to PNG and $15.9 million to the SWP.

The increase in funding to the SWP is indicative of the resurgence of Australian strategic interest in this region. It should not be forgotten, however, that even pre-federation, the SWP was of special strategic interest to the Australian colonies. Sir Thomas MacIlwraith's attempted annexation of New Guinea and the protestations to the British Colonial Office over the New Hebrides are two examples of the early interest in this region. Post federation, W.M. Hughes' insistence at Versailles that Australia should have full powers over the former German colonies in the SWP and the Australia-New Zealand agreement of 1944 that defined as vital to national security, "the arc of islands north and north-east of Australia to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands", are good examples of how a threat to our national security sharpened our focus on our Island neighbours.

From the end of the Second World War to the mid-1970s, Australia's interest in the SWP had tended to wane. Our involvement in conflicts in Korea, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam were indicative of the "forward defence" philosophy of the time and the Indo-China mainland was the focus of Australia's Defence interest. Even the demise of SEATO and the end of our involvement with Vietnam did not rekindle our interest in the SWP.

The "Russian Scare" in 1976 was the catalyst that regenerated Australia's interest in the SWP. A measurable reaction to the scare was that Australia increased its aid to the SWP fourfold. Since 1976 funding has steadily increased. Australia now spends 36% of her DCP budget in the SWP, but to what effect? This essay will examine the objectives of Australia's DCP and the actual content of the programmes in order to form an opinion on the effectiveness of the DCP with the SWP.

Scope

The SWP is not a precisely defined geographical area. Most definitions include PNG, however, as PNG is the largest single beneficiary of the DCP and as the importance of the bilateral relations tends to dominate any discussion on DCP, this essay will concentrate on DCP with the small island nations and exclude PNG.
The Importance of the SWP to Australia

The Defence “White Paper” presented to Parliament in March 1987 stated that Australia required “a force-in-being to defeat any challenge to our sovereignty and specific capabilities designed to respond effectively to attacks within our area of direct military interest”. It further defined the area of direct military interest as “Australia, its territories and proximate ocean areas, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and other nearby countries of the South-West Pacific”.

The SWP also is part of Australia’s region of primary strategic interest. This region is defined as “South-East Asia, the Eastern Indian Ocean and the South-West Pacific”. The region is strategically important as it covers two sea routes vital to Australia. The first of these is to the USA, our ANZUS partner and the likely source of any defence material (and reinforcements) required to fight a regional conflict. The second is to Japan, our major trading partner. While involved in a regional conflict we would still expect to finance our fight by trade with non-involved allies. The SWP countries also dominate the maritime approaches to the east coast “heart-land” of Australia.

Having established that the SWP is important to Australia and the reasons why it is so, it can be seen that it is in Australia’s interests to ensure a benign neighbourhood. “Major changes in regional relationships there (SWP) would effect Australia’s strategic considerations, even if such developments were not directly threatening to us.” While there have been recent changes in the status of regional relationships, the island countries are also undergoing varying degrees of internal change.

Internal Pressures in the SWP Countries

All the small island nations of the SWP are suffering adverse economic circumstances. All have virtually no natural resources nor any manufacturing industry of any kind. Most have some limited primary industry such as copra or sugar and receive some income from the sale of fishing rights. All have adverse trade balances and are becoming increasingly dependent on foreign aid.

Another common problem is that there is a population drift from the villages to the urban areas. Prominent in this drift is a generation of educated and semi-educated youth who are unable to find employment either in the villages or in the towns. This pool of unemployed is a breeding ground for discontent and radical approaches. The youth are generally better educated than their elders and are less likely to obey the traditional village leaders. This breakdown of the traditional authority has exacerbated the social problems being experienced by all nations in the SWP.

In spite of their internal problems, the SWP nations are developing their own foreign policies and are adopting a more independent stance in dealings with the outside world. There has also been an increasing trend towards regionalism on many issues. "Regionalism offers the island a means of moderating if not removing the threat posed by economic vulnerability; the primary aim being the achievement of economies of scale denied the small states individually."

Allied to this development is the fact that the region has begun to attract an increasing amount of international attention, particularly from the Soviet Union.

Security Concerns to Australia in the SWP

The NZ-US Dispute

The New Zealand Labour Government’s policy that all visiting vessels must be conventionally powered and demonstrably conventionally armed has caused the virtual collapse of the NZ-US leg of the ANZUS Treaty. The US, in response to the port visits policy, has withdrawn its security guarantee. Ostensibly this dispute should only affect the major players, however, the SWP nations with a security relationship with NZ have realised that a security treaty with NZ, without the ultimate “guarantee” of US backing is of little value. The Prime Minister of the Cook Islands stated in January 86 that he intended to declare his country neutral as a response to this development. It is of concern to Australia that the nations of the SWP may feel more vulnerable and more receptive to other security offers as a result of the New Zealand action.

The French

There are no indications that France will end its nuclear testing programme in the foreseeable future, despite widespread opposition and the establishment of the South Pacific nuclear-free zone. The French insensitivity towards the con-
cerns of the SWP countries and the seeming inability of Australia to gain any concessions from the French has had an effect on the South Pacific nations' relations with all western countries, including Australia.\textsuperscript{16}

The French desire to remain in the Pacific has also led them to take a hard line over the New Caledonian independence issue. The indigenous Melanesian minority, the Kanaks, want full independence from France. The recent referendum that achieved a turn-out of voters in the order of 55\% and the television coverage showing the French brutality are indications that the Kanaks must surely begin to show increasing frustration at being an indigenous minority and "outgunned" in every way by the French.

The danger for Australia is that, if the French continue their hard line towards the Kanak desire for independence, then the Kanaks may turn to external sources for support. It is believed that Libya and other radical elements have expressed interest in this struggle for independence.\textsuperscript{15} The other concern for Australia is that the other Melanesian countries in the SWP may also begin to materially support the Kanaks. This situation may lead to external interference in the affairs of New Caledonia and thereby promote violence and insecurity in a close neighbour.

The Soviet Influence

Mr Gorbachev, in his Vladivostock speech\textsuperscript{18} made it quite clear that the USSR considered it had legitimate interests in the SWP and would continue to attempt to further its diplomatic relations with the island countries. The USSR established non-resident diplomatic links with a number of SWP countries in the mid-1970s,\textsuperscript{19} however, as yet no embassies have been established. The USSR has had a fisheries agreement with Kiribati and it has recently (January 1987) concluded another one with Vanuatu. The agreement with Vanuatu goes further than the previous agreement with Kiribati in that it allows for port access to specified ports for refuelling and victualling. It has been predicted that the USSR will apply pressure for landing rights for Aeroflot (for ship crew rotation) during discussions later this year.\textsuperscript{20}

The small ailing economies of the SWP countries provide potential for the furthering of Soviet political and strategic aims for a very small investment. The increase in Soviet presence could lead to a situation where the regional strategic agreement that currently exists in the SWP could be weakened by the super powers buying influence. Both Kiribati and Vanuatu have stated it was economic factors that dominated their consideration of the Soviet offers.\textsuperscript{21} Despite the fact there is currently very little pro-Soviet feeling in the SWP, any increase in Soviet influence is of concern to Australia.

Fiji

The recent military coups in Fiji caused the Australian Government to suspend DCP assistance pending further political developments. The coups were unexpected as Fiji had always been regarded as the model for the democratic process in the SWP and the Fijian Governments have always been strongly pro-western. The Australian Government is caught in the dilemma of having to support the ideals of democracy, yet not forcing the now economically troubled Fiji to look beyond her traditional allies for aid and support.

Fiji's internal troubles have the potential to involve external players. To assist in overcoming her economic troubles Fiji may be tempted to negotiate on such matters as port access and landing rights. This, along with the destabilising effect of the coups on the SWP, is of great concern to Australia.

DCP Objectives

The White Paper defines one of the fundamental elements of the Government's approach to defence as "promoting strategic stability and security in our region".\textsuperscript{22} It further states that defence policy in our area of primary strategic interest is supported "... by maintenance of effective defence cooperation programmes ...".\textsuperscript{23} Thus the White Paper identifies the importance of DCP and the fact that it supports our defence policy but it does not define what is hoped to be achieved by the DCP.

In his ministerial statement on "Defence Initiatives in the South Pacific", delivered on 20 February, 1987, Mr Beazley stated:

"The Australian Government seeks to encourage the Island Countries to develop common views, attitudes and approaches to international issues, including strategic and defence issues."\textsuperscript{24}
He continued to state that Australia aims “to maintain our position as a natural defence partner”, and one mechanism for achieving this is “though practical, working, cooperative activities”. This statement identifies an aim of defence policy, however, it does not contain a clear statement of our objective for DCP.

The cold reality of finance has often forced government departments to closely examine their programmes and the change to programme budgeting has exacerbated this effect. In the 87/88 budget submission, the Department of Defence defined its objective for the expenditure of funds on DCP as:

“To promote a sense of strategic community between Australia and its neighbours and to further a favourable strategic situation in South-East Asia and the South West Pacific.”

It should be noted, however, that the Department of Defence at one time differentiated between its role in South-East Asia and in the SWP. A Departmental spokesman, when giving evidence before the Senate’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence Enquiry into Defence Cooperation, in 1984, stated:

“Our Defence Cooperation Programme, in particular is very much directed towards supporting and supplementing the much larger Australian Civil Aid programme in the [SWP] region. Our objective is to inject into the region those capabilities and resources available to the Australian Defence Force which will be able to assist regional countries in either developing security capabilities or achieving or aiming to achieve improved economic and social conditions in their countries.”

Mr Beazley’s statement on 20 Mar 87 would indicate that some of the previous emphasis on supporting and supplementing the civil aid programme has now declined and more emphasis is being placed on “defence” assistance. This change in emphasis could be expected as a response to the changes in the strategic circumstances in the SWP since 1984. The Government’s SWP strategy outlined in the ministerial statement acknowledges the dangers of the Soviet presence in the area and the advantages to be gained from our military presence.

If we accept the stated objective for DCP at face value and consider the prevailing strategic circumstances in the SWP, the question arises; “are there any implied conditions or unstated aims?” For instance, “to further a favourable strategic situation” it would be expected that the DCP would be used to exclude or severely limit the influence within the region of countries “with interests inimical to our own”. The DCP could be cynically regarded as an extension of the WHAM (Win Hearts and Minds) programmes of the Vietnam War. Perhaps this view does not represent the whole truth, however, the DCP is used to promote Australia’s image as “a friend, counsellor and equal partner”. It should also allow personal relationships between the defence professionals of the various countries to be established. Good personal relations are a good base on which to build a more extensive relationship. It should not be forgotten that such relationships are a potential source of useful information.

The DCP Programme

The effectiveness of the Pacific Patrol Boat project and of DCP assistance to Fiji, because of their significance, will be discussed under their separate headings within this section. The effectiveness of the total programme and the assistance to the other SWP countries will be discussed under the group heading of “Programme Effectiveness”.

Pacific Patrol Boat Project

The largest single project undertaken in DCP is the Pacific Patrol Boat Project (PPB). The total project cost is estimated to be in order of $62.0 million for 12 boats, and the project is designed to provide:

“... participating South Pacific countries with a multi-purpose vessel capable of undertaking surveillance and enforcement in 200nm EEZ’s, disaster relief, medical evacuation, search and rescue and police and VIP inter-island transport roles. The Project includes provision of two years spares support package, training and advisors.”

The Project plans to deliver four boats to PNG and Fiji, one boat to Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Solomon Islands and the Cook Islands. Kiribati and Tonga have refused the offer of a boat and Tuvalu has yet to make a decision.
Allied to this project is the construction of shore support facilities. Army Engineers from 1 Construction Regiment completed the construction of the support buildings and wharf upgrading for Western Samoa in late 1986. Further requests for the provision of shore facilities and the upgrading of wharf areas can be expected as the dates approach for the boats to be delivered to the small island nations.

How does this project meet the objective of "promoting a sense of strategic community . . . and to further a favourable strategic situation"? Prima facie, this project appears to meet the stated objective. By offering boats to all the SWP countries Australia has indeed promoted a sense of strategic community and gained, one would hope, a sense of community gratitude. Australia has also been careful to avoid any paternalistic overtones; the offer was made with no strings attached and has included a good follow-up package that has the potential to be extended.

Most importantly, the boats meet a real need in the SWP countries. Most of the smaller nations have no capability to enforce their most valuable potential trade resource, their EEZ. While this project does not purport to offer a complete surveillance network, it gives these nations an affordable start. One other aspect that is of real concern to these nations is not related to an external threat but to internal security. The nations consist of island groups of varying size and density and at present most have no means to quickly move their internal security forces between the islands to deal with matters ranging from civil unrest to natural disasters. These boats provide the means for the governments to enforce their laws internally.

It would also appear that some thought has gone into the design and selection of the boats. The boats are designed to commercial standards rather than military specifications. The tenderers were required to consider supportability within the region as a fundamental design concept. This has been manifested in the selection of commonly available commercial items for all plant. For example the engines and main generators are Caterpillar and the radars and satellite navigation equipment are Furuno. This commercial design has resulted in a simple robust boat that is better equipped for surveillance and has proved simpler to operate and maintain than the Fremantle class Patrol boats. Its running costs are approximately one third that of the Fremantle class and this also was a primary design concept.

The PPB programme is more than just the hardware. The national crews receive extensive training in Australia and Australian advisors are posted to the recipient countries to assist in the operation and maintenance of the boats. It must be stressed that the advisors are not part of the crew and do not normally sail with the boat.

The subject of the weapons fit to the PPBs has been widely discussed. The Australian Government policy is that the PPB programme will not include weapons. The recipient government may choose to fit weapons, however, it must bear the cost of the weapons, the fitting and the ammunition.

In terms of meeting the stated objective of the DCP programme, the PPB project should prove most effective.

**Fiji**

Until the coups, Fiji was a major recipient of DCP assistance. As could be expected in one of the more developed nations of the SWP, the DCP assistance given to Fiji since 1972/73 has been mainly military as opposed to developmental. Australia has assisted Fiji to survey and accurately map its 200nm EEZ, it has supplied rifles and ammunition to assist the Fiji peacekeeping force in Lebanon, upgraded the RFMF capability to communicate with its peacekeeping forces in Lebanon and the Sinai, provided satellite navigation receivers for fitting on RFMF Patrol boats, upgraded Mess halls and kitchens, and provided training for personnel in Australia.

Other assistance has included the construction of a boat landing and water reticulation system on Cikobia Island, aerial photography and other survey support, the provision of a construction plant supervisor to the Rural Development Unit and a survey advisor to the National Mapping Bureau.

How effective has our assistance to Fiji been? In terms of assisting Fiji to develop security capabilities, we appear to have been reasonably successful, particularly with the land component of the RFMF. Our provision of rifles and ammunition to outfit its peacekeeping force has allowed Fiji to build up a regular and reserve military force with much experience in peace-
keeping and internal policing. The overseas deployments have allowed its leaders to build confidence and gain active service experience. Fijian officers and soldiers have been awarded bravery and distinguished service decorations during their "peacekeeping" tours.

It is a matter of conjecture, just how significant was the fact that the army consisted of trained, experienced troops with confident leaders, in the decision by LtCol Rabuka (and others) to stage the military coups. On the face of it, it would appear it had at least some significance and it is perhaps a little ironic that our assistance, designed to improve security capabilities, was a factor in the overthrow of a democratically elected government.

Accepting that the coups have happened, has the fact that there have been close personal relationships between Australian and Fijian military professionals, established via the DCP, played a part in the maintenance of relations with Fiji? Would the military regime be actively hostile towards Australia if it had not been for the DCP inspired relationships? Those not at the centre of the affair can only guess.

Solomon Islands
The Solomon Islands does not have a military capability. Our DCP assistance is directed towards its police force and to developmental tasks. The DCP assistance to the Solomons is primarily developmental in nature. DCP assistance has included channel clearance operations, malaria research and control operations, provision of equipment and advice for an inshore hydrographic survey unit, upgrading of Henderson Airfield and the provision of hydrographic surveys in conjunction with AIDAB.

Assistance to the police force has included provision of equipment and consultants to upgrade the communications network, training to establish the police band, survey and mapping of the EEZ, provision of a 16m boat for fisheries surveillance, the provision of a boat under the PPB programme and the training of police personnel in Australia on a variety of courses.

Vanuatu
DCP assistance to Vanuatu commenced in 1980/81 following the short-lived Santo rebellion led by Jimmy Stevens. The defence capability is provided by the 300 man Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF). Australia supplied equipment, small arms and vehicles to establish the VMF. Aid designed to increase security capabilities has included; assistance in re-fitting the police patrol boat; equipment training and a technical consultant to expand and upgrade the police communications system; equipment training and a technical consultant to establish an armoutry and armouerer capability in the VMF and the police; assistance in establishing a self-supporting messing facility; training of VMF personnel in Australia and the provision of a PPB.

Australia has provided extensive other assistance under the DCP. Army engineers have erected a community centre on Epi Island, provided engineers and tradesmen to run the rural water-supply programme and establish a fire services capability in the VMF.

Tonga
Tonga has a small defence service (TDS) of 250 personnel and Australian DCP assistance began in 1977/78. Assistance has included providing equipment, training aids and instructors to the TDS Trade Training Unit; a refurbished ex-Army LCM8; an EEZ base point survey; the construction by Army engineers of a new barracks facility; provision of material to facilitate the re-engining of two TDS Patrol Boats; provision of micro-computers and training to establish a government computer training facility and the training of TDS personnel in Australia and other countries.

At this stage Tonga has declined to accept a PPB as the boat does not meet its requirements. Tonga has adopted the maritime surveillance concept of aerial surveillance and fast patrol boat interception. It is questionable if Tonga has the resources to adequately equip the TDS to enable it to fulfil such an ambitious concept. The cost effectiveness of this "high tech" surveillance concept for the Tongan economy also must be doubtful.

Western Samoa
Western Samoa was the first territory in the SWP to become independent in January 1962. It has no defence force and DCP assistance, started in 1981/82, is centered on the Western Samoa Police. One of the first DCP projects was the provision of catering assistance to the 1983 South Pacific Games. The McIntosh Report cites this as "an example of how defence assistance can cover all areas". In the midst of this self-congratulation it should be
pointed out that the Japanese built the Stadium and the sports field.

Assistance to the police force has included the provision of equipment and training to establish an integrated police communication system, equipment and training to establish a search and rescue capability in the police emergency operations squad, the provision of weapons ammunition and training, EEZ base points and hydrographic surveys, police band training and training of personnel in Australia. Western Samoa will receive its PPB in February 1988 and Army construction engineers during their annual deployment to the SWP, built the shore facilities and upgraded the wharf for the PPB.46

Kiribati

DCP with Kiribati started in 1978/79. Aid has included; channel clearance operations to remove hazards and facilitate inter-island shipping, EEZ base point survey, provision of explosive ordinance disposal teams and provision of accommodation for the Pacific Islands Forum meeting. Kiribati had declined to accept the offer of a PPB.47

Other Island Countries

Australia’s DCP has touched most countries in the SWP. In addition to the countries already mentioned an EEZ base point survey was conducted in Tuvalu in 1983/84 and the Cook Islands have accepted a PPB.48

Programme Effectiveness

Tailored Assistance

It can be seen from the diversity of assistance provided under the DCP that real efforts are made to tailor the cooperative activities to the specific requirements of the recipient country. The ability to deliver military, para-military assistance or assistance which has developmental benefits under the DCP umbrella allows great flexibility in the selection of projects. This tailoring of assistance does much to ‘promote the sense of strategic community’ as it addresses the needs of the country rather than arrogantly and paternalistically offering an unwanted solution to a situation that the local inhabitants do not regard as a problem.

DCP assistance to the internal security forces (normally the police) of the smaller nations is well received by the countries concerned. The rise in social and domestic law and order problems in these countries is of concern and the DCP provides a convenient vehicle for the delivery of Australian assistance that aid them to establish and maintain the rule of law. The assistance is widespread across the region which avoids the problem of any nation being singled out for law and order assistance. The fact that it contributes to the maintenance of the internal stability of the countries of the SWP is a measure of its effectiveness.

Cost Effectiveness

Another measure of programme effectiveness is cost. Australia and the recipient countries get extremely good value for each dollar spent. While the costs of the wages and on-costs for service personnel are included in the programme, it is not an additional cost to our government as the manpower is obtained from within the existing ceiling. Indeed vacancies are carried within the system to allow long-term DCP attachments to be filled.

A prime example of the cost-effectiveness of the DCP is the annual deployment of construction engineers to the SWP. A troop of approximately 30 personnel, commanded by a Lieutenant, who is a professionally qualified engineer and containing a range of qualified supervisors and tradesmen, is deployed to undertake a construction task/s of about three months duration. The only additional cost is an in-country living allowance of approximately $10 per day. The detachment works a ten hour day, a six day week, lives in tents and is practically self-sufficient.49

Comparison with AIDAB Aid

The McIntosh Report examined the question of defence personnel being involved with developmental aid. The committee determined that it:

“Has no objection to the provision of what amounts to civil aid to the Pacific Islands involving military personnel. It accepts that defence personnel may be the most appropriate to carry out particular projects of a civil nature at a project level.”50

The committee recognised what is a basic difference between assistance provided under the DCP and that provided by AIDAB; the professional expertise of the personnel providing the assistance.
AIDAB has been criticised, particularly in the Jackson Report\textsuperscript{51} for the lack of technical professionalism in its programme delivery systems. AIDAB has to depend on “consultants” to deliver its programmes and the quality of personnel on the free market who are available for duty in the less glamorous locations is often dubious.\textsuperscript{52} Defence, on the other hand, can select the most appropriate person who has the needed qualifications and experience. To date there has been no shortage of volunteers for long term detachments in the SWP. (Short term detachments are not voluntary). There is also no comparison between the fees paid to consultants and servicemen’s wages.

Comparison of DCP Aid to SWP Versus ASEAN

Although the importance of the SWP to Australia has been re-recognised, the DCP budget for assistance to the ASEAN states is still higher. \$18.65M, compared to \$15.86M.\textsuperscript{53} The DCP assistance to the ASEAN states, because of their increased military sophistication is generally more military as opposed to developmental. The military assistance is largely confined to consultancy assistance, (especially in technical fields) and training, both in-country and in Australia.\textsuperscript{54} Because of their larger size, economic strength and their ability to attract aid from a variety of sources, the ASEAN states are less reliant on Australian assistance and are more cynical towards offers of aid. It is doubtful whether Australia receives the same value for its DCP dollar spent in ASEAN as it does in the SWP.

When comparing relative amounts of aid it is interesting to also consider Australian civil aid. In this year’s budget, PNG and SWP programmes were allocated \$79.3M, whereas South East Asia was allocated \$118.03M.\textsuperscript{55} Thus, despite its increasing importance to Australia and the growth in interest from outside powers, the SWP is still regarded as less important than South East Asia in terms of civil aid as well. The question of value for money still applies to our total aid package.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Opinion

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in its submission to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence Enquiry into Australia’s Relations with the South Pacific stated that “Australia regards the Defence programme as an important and effective component of its policy towards the region” and that despite some funding difficulties “the programme is strongly supported by the Island Governments”.\textsuperscript{56}

An example of the Department’s opinion of the effectiveness of individual projects is found in the post deployment report of the Australian High Commissioner to Western Samoa.

“1986 Engineering construction project Operation Apia was an unqualified success from our perspective. In brief, the project contributed the most significant additions to the Western Samoan police assets and facilities since independence in 1962 and laid a very solid infrastructural foundation for Western Samoan participation in the Pacific Patrol Boat program. . . . The Western Samoan Prime Minister, Mr Vaai Kolone described the project as a ‘lasting reminder to us of the consideration the Australian Government [has] towards our people.’ . . . ”\textsuperscript{57}

Perhaps the most significant endorsement of the DCP to the SWP comes from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr Bill Hayden.

“ . . . The DCP program down to the South Pacific is extremely important. It seems to me for a moderate outlay a substantial advantage is gained for us in good will . . . . I’m reminded of my recent trip back in May, down to the South Pacific Islands. At most places there was a small detachment of military people and they were bloody impressive people. They conducted themselves very well, they look good types of Australians, the type of Australian that impresses you and leaves a good impression and I think that sort of thing is absolutely invaluable . . . . I think they [Defence] go to considerable trouble picking the people they send there . . . .”\textsuperscript{58}

Other Issues

Cooperation with AIDAB

The McIntosh Report\textsuperscript{59} criticised AIDAB and the Department of Defence for the lack of an effective programme of cooperation. In response to this criticism, a series of formal meetings of the Inter-Departmental Standing Committee on Civil and Military Assistance to the South Pacific have been organized at six monthly intervals. This committee includes representatives from Defence, Foreign Affairs and
Trade and AIDAB. This formal structure is in addition to the day-to-day, desk level cooperation that exists between Defence and AIDAB. While DCP assistance projects are selected in order to meet DCP objectives, every effort is made to fit into or at least not duplicate or interfere with the AIDAB civil aid programmes.

While every effort is made to cooperate with AIDAB, it should be stressed that the DCP is controlled and funded solely by the Department of Defence and is designed to achieve Defence aims. This concept is not embraced warmly by all AIDAB personnel. There is a clique that considers that Defence has no part to play in assistance programmes.

Cooperation with New Zealand

New Zealand has a modest defence mutual assistance programme consisting mainly of small developmental projects. Some joint cooperative projects have been undertaken, examples being the provision of a technical advisor to Western Samoa and military induction training for the crews of the PPB’s being provided to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands. Formal meetings with New Zealand are arranged annually to discuss each other’s defence cooperation programme and any avenue for joint ventures.

Human Rights

The McIntosh Report concluded that “explicit military support” for regimes with poor human rights records may “weaken our standing within the recipient countries and throughout the region”. Fortunately, the SWP countries, the current situation in Fiji notwithstanding, do not have poor human rights records. The previous criticisms have been aimed at ASEAN states, in particular Indonesia and the Philippines.

Conclusion

Australia’s DCP assistance to the SWP is effective in terms of the quantity and quality of aid delivered for the cost. In terms of the value Australia receives from the expenditure in the SWP, compared to the expenditure in the ASEAN states, it still remains an effective programme. DCP assistance to the SWP is delivered by highly trained and qualified personnel, a factor which contributes in a large way to its effectiveness and one which enhances its value when compared with civil aid delivered by consultants under the auspices of AIDAB.

Another factor that has a significant impact on the effectiveness of the DCP is that great care is taken to tailor the assistance to the recipient country’s needs. This includes careful consideration of the country’s ability to afford the maintenance commitment to any assistance. Under the DCP, assistance may be military, designed to introduce or enhance security capabilities (this may apply to both internal and external security) or it may be developmental, designed to enhance the civil infrastructure, complementing the aid provided by AIDAB. DCP assistance to the SWP is effective in terms of cost and in terms of meeting the recipient’s requirements.

If the sole criterion by which the effectiveness of the DCP is judged is how it meets its objective of promoting “a sense of strategic community between Australia and its neighbours, and to further a favourable strategic situation in South East Asia and the South West Pacific” then doubts must be raised about its effectiveness. The two military coups in Fiji, the Kanak independence issue, growing Soviet and Libyan influence and the general decline in economic and social standards have all contributed to the degradation of the favourable strategic circumstances for Australia in the SWP.

The question of would the strategic situation have been worse if Australia had not provided DCP assistance cannot be answered with complete certainty, however, on the balance of probabilities, it would appear that the DCP has contributed to the close bilateral relationships that Australia has built with the island states of the SWP. These relationships (with the obvious exception of Fiji) have continued to improve in spite of the additional pressures. Thus, even in terms of meeting its stated objectives, the DCP to the SWP would appear to be effective.

NOTES

5. loc cit.
7. loc cit.
8. ibid, p.10.
9. Australia’s Defence Relations with the South Pacific, DOD submission to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, p.2.
11. loc cit.
12. Ministerial Statement by Mr Kim Beazley on “Defence Initiatives in the South Pacific”, delivered on 20 Feb 87.
13. loc cit.
14. “Regionalism, Strategic Denial, and South Pacific Security”.
15. loc cit. p.172.
16. “Australia’s Defence Relations with the South Pacific” op cit, p.6.
17. Ibid, p.5.
19. Department of Foreign Affairs submission to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence Enquiry into Australia’s Relations with the South Pacific, p.37.
20. “Australia’s Defence relations with the South Pacific” op cit, p.4.
23. loc cit.
25. loc cit.
26. 87/88 Budget Explanatory Notes, Supplementary notes in program budgeting format, p.13.
28. This is a phrase extensively used by the Department of Foreign Affairs in their submission to the Joint Committee enquiring into Australia’s relations with the South Pacific, op cit.
30. Defence Submission to the JCFAD, Appendix 1 to Annex B.
31. loc cit.
32. Delivery of the boats to Fiji has been suspended.
33. Defence Submission to the JCFAD, op cit.
34. The author was actively involved in the administrative preparation of this task and visited Western Samoa as 2IC of 1 Construction Regiment during May 1986.
36. Briefing from PPB project officer on 21 Sep 87.
37. Defence Submission to the JCFAD op cit, Appendix 1 to Annex B.
38. loc cit.
39. loc cit.
40. loc cit.
41. loc cit.
42. loc cit.
43. Informal briefing by SIP staff on 21 Sep 87.
44. Australia’s Relations with the South Pacific, AIDAB submission to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, March 1987, p.127.
45. Australia’s Defence Cooperation with its Neighbours in the Asia-Pacific Region, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Chairman Senator McIntosh. AGPS, Canberra, 1984.
46. Operation APIA was mounted by 1 Construction Regiment during 1986. As 2IC, I was in charge of all the administrative arrangements for the operational deployment and 1 visited Samoa to confirm all the in-country arrangements and confirm the engineering design. The deployment began in early September and ended in late November. The detachment constructed the shore facility, upgraded the wharf, constructed an armory, a transmitter shed and a 100m rifle range for the Police as well as a range of minor “hearts and minds” jobs for the local population ranging from installing wheel chair ramps at a crippled children’s home to repairing the water supply at a high school.
47. Defence Submission to the JCFAD op cit, Appendix 1 to Annex B.
48. loc cit.
49. Ex APIA Completion Report dated 10 Dec 86.
50. McIntosh Report, p.59.
52. Currently the Rural Water Supply Programme in Vanuatu is supervised by an RAE officer. This became a DCP position after a civilian “consultant” had proved less than satisfactory.
54. Informal briefing by SIP op cit.
56. Australia’s Relations with the South Pacific, Department of Foreign Affairs Submission, op cit. p.23.
57. AUSTRAC APIA Telex 0.CE209920 of 1400 12.12.86.
58. Transcript of interview with Hon Mr Bill Hayden MP by Gwen Robinson, National Times journalist, dated 4 Nov 86.
60. Informal briefing by SIP personnel on 6 Oct 87.
61. Defence Submission to the JCFAD op cit.
62. Informal brief by SIP, op cit.
63. McIntosh Report, op cit, p.57.

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MOBILISATION: AN OUTLINE RECORD OF ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT IN RESPECT OF LAND FORCES.

By Colonel J. Wood

Published by the Department of Defence, Canberra provisionally in draft form, 1987. Not yet for sale in this provisional form. Pp.XIX + 344. and illustrations of documents + Appendixes A to M.

Reviewed by Major Warren Perry (RL)

This work is a unique contribution to Australia's military literature and it is indeed an outstanding contribution to the literature on Mobilisation in the English-speaking world.

The author, Colonel J. Wood is a serving officer of the Australian Army Reserve; he was awarded a Defence Fellowship to undertake 12 month’s full-time study in 1986 at Deakin University in Victoria in the subject of Mobilisation; and this work is the product of that study. It is not an official publication and so it is not an expression of official policy. It is based on published non-official information and on non-classified official information. So any views expressed in it are those of the author.

The subject of Mobilisation is one which has been almost entirely neglected by historians with the result that, while many people are familiar with the appearance and sound of the term Mobilisation, relatively few have any precise knowledge of substance of what is embodied in this concept.

Although opinions differ as to when and where systematic mobilisation schemes were first adopted by armies, a convenient starting point may be found in the Prussian Army in the first half of the 19th century. Although it is claimed that the Prussian Army had mobilisation schemes after the downfall of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, and even earlier in the time of Frederick the Great, it may be said that the first mobilisation of the Prussian Army in the modern sense took place in 1850.

This Prussian mobilisation, for what was a police operation to put down disturbances in southern and western Germany, showed that the training of the Prussian Army was below acceptable standards.

In March 1854 Great Britain declared war against Russia. The war was fought in the Crimea with France co-operating as a British Ally. The British Army left England for this campaign without mobilising in any modern sense of the term Mobilisation.

When the Prussian Army mobilised in 1866 for it six-weeks’ war against Austria its system of mobilisation had corrected all the deficiencies which its mobilisation in 1850 had revealed. Moreover, the Prussian mobilisation of 1866 clearly demonstrated its superiority over the Austrian system of mobilisation in that campaign.

Four years later, in July 1870, when the North German Confederation went to war against the French Empire of Napoleon III, the Prussian Army’s system of mobilisation demonstrated its efficiency by its performance in a still more spectacular way and on a vaster scale than it had done in 1866. The French system of mobilisation in the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71 was, on the other hand, a failure. The Prussian system of Mobilisation was a highly decentralised system. The French system was a highly centralised system. The Prussian system of Mobilisation in 1870 was based on careful and complete peacetime preparations for mobilisation. On the other hand the French system of mobilisation in 1870 had not been based on peacetime preparations that were comparable with those for the Prussian system of mobilisation.

Another difference between these two systems of mobilisation, and one disadvantageous to the French Army, resided in the higher command and staff machinery of these two armies. In the Prussian Army the higher command and staff machinery had been created and officers appointed to operate it in peacetime. These officers therefore had opportunities in peacetime at exercises and at other courses of training to become familiar with the duties they would
have to discharge in war. The French Army, on the other, had done relatively little in peace-time in this respect that was comparable with the preparations made and carefully tested by the Prussian Army. When war came, therefore, in July 1870 the French Army had to create field formations with headquarters above the regimental level and then create the necessary command and staff machinery for these formations. This pressing and meticulous work had to be done hastily and concurrently with many other urgent duties demanding instant attention also.

The command and staff machinery improvised in these circumstances did not produce desirable results and personality conflicts arose among men required by the exigencies of their situations to work in harmony.

A result of the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71 was the rich experience it provided for improving future mobilisation systems. Although the main beneficiaries of this inheritance were the French and German Armies foreign observers including military correspondence attached to these two armies were also beneficiaries but to a less extent.

The French and German systems of mobilisation which were put into operation in July 1870 still provide lessons for consideration in present day planning of mobilisation schemes. It could be said that the German system of Mobilisation put into operation in the Franco-Prussian War 1870-71 has remained to this day one of the standards for measuring the effectiveness of the German Army’s subsequent systems of mobilisation. Space forbids here a review of these subsequent systems of Mobilisation which have usually paid close attention to lessons which have emerged from past experience.

With regard to lessons distilled from experience for future application, the question should be asked “How are these lessons distilled from experience?” It does not mean filling up yards and yards of shelving, either in the nation’s war office or in its archives office, with registry files on the subject of Mobilisation and making them more or less readily available for use if and when the lessons of mobilisation experience are required to meet an emergency. The lessons of mobilisation experience are obtained in a different way.

Registry files are the “raw material” of experience and so are war diaries. The distilling of lessons from these and other primary and secondary sources is a product of rigorous and systematic intellectual labour. It is not normally a simple and almost mechanical process comparable with that of consulting a dictionary for the meaning of a word. The distilling of lessons from “raw material” is an intellectual process based on scientific methods of research. Some of the distinguishing features of this method are: its appeal to facts; its freedom from emotional bias; its use of means of objective measurement; its use of quantitative methods in the treatment of data; its application of the methods of analysis, classification, and evaluation; and others. Obviously these methods cannot be applied effectively to a quick inspection of a half-a-dozen files or war diaries before setting out the lessons of some particular piece of experience.

After the “raw material” has been adequately subjected to the normal methods of scientific research the next procedure is to write up this research into a suitably organised form. This narrative may take one of many forms depending on its size, its importance, and its required durability. Durability may range from a document of permanent value to one of ephemeral value.

This work, Mobilisation, which is here under review is one, because of the comprehensiveness of its coverage, the high standard of the research on which it is based, and skill with which it has been written, makes it a useful work to study in the course of an officer’s military education, one to consult in conducting mobilisation exercises in military training, one to refer to in administration when planning or drawing up mobilisation schemes.

Before leaving this aspect of the review, something should be said about skill in writing and its relationship to research work. The results of research work of the kind reflected in Colonel Wood’s Mobilisation has to be presented to the reader in the form of a narrative and this demands high standards of skill if the research is to be presented to the reader to the best advantage — skill which presents good sentence structure and a rich and comprehensive vocabulary appropriate to the task in hand. Now writing is, like observation of fire in Artillery training, it is learnt and progressively improved by continuous and purposesful practice.
The Old Royal Prussian Army recognised the truth of all this by providing means for training officers in the methods of scientific research and for acquiring a high standard of skill in writing for official purposes in the widest sense. It did this by creating a Military History Branch in its Great General Staff in Berlin. The functions of this Branch were to train officers posted to it to undertake research, to write up its results and to publish these results in the form of books, brochures, monographs, articles in journals etc. for official use within the German Army. In this way the German Army of the Hohenzollern Empire produced some of the skilled masters of prose writing of the time in the Empire. Instances were Field-Marshal Count von Schlieffen, General von Bernahardi, General von Kuhl and General Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven and others.

But to return to the main stream of this review, it may be said that after the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71, the British Army seems to have been unduly slow in making official use of the experience which became available in that war. Two earlier writers on the subject of Mobilisation in the mid-1870s in non-official journals were General Sir Patrick MacDougall and Captain Sir John Colomb. Colonel Wood has mentioned them in his Bibliography.

By the time of the South African War, 1899-1902, the British Army had made considerable progress in its Mobilisation schemes. But in that war, which was the first war in which British auxiliary forces were called on for active service duty, it was found that the War Office, London and drawn up its Mobilisation Plans to cover the British Regular Army only.

The mobilisation in 1914 of the British Army's first 100,000 all ranks for active service in Europe was a well conducted administrative operation. But again problems arose when the forming of the New or Kitchener Armies began.

It is perhaps surprising to learn to-day that the Australian colonies interested themselves in mobilisation schemes soon after the initiative was taken by the War Office, London. One of the earliest Australian mobilisation exercises on record was that undertaken in July 1889 in Victoria by Lieutenant-Colonel Tom Price with the Victorian Mounted Rifles. He had commanded this regiment since it was raised in May 1885 during a “Russian Scare” of the time. At the time of this trial mobilisation the unit was disposed as detachments, throughout Victoria.

After Federation the earliest work on Mobilisation Plans was probably undertaken by the Chief of Intelligence, Colonel (later Major-General Sir) W.T. Bridges who very properly laid down a definition of Mobilisation which is still a useful one to-day.

The inter-war period in Australia from 1919 to 1939 does not to-day provide a good model for future preparations for war insofar as Mobilisation Planning is concerned. Nothing on an adequate scale was done during this period, probably because of inadequate financial provision, until about 1936. From then on an “all out” effort was made by a small staff to attempt to overcome the neglect since 1919. But under “hot house” conditions of this kind the best results are not produced and in this instance war came in 1939. The author has dealt constructively and sympathetically with Mobilising Planning in the A.M.F. during this inter-war period.

In conclusion some observations will be made on the mobilisation of the A.I.F. in 1914 and again in 1939 — that is at the outbreak of the War of 1914-18 and at the outbreak of the War of 1939-45. But before making these observations something else should be made clear, as it has been by the author in his work Mobilisation. It is that mobilisation is not something which takes place at the outbreak of a war and is then finished with. Mobilisation is normally a continuous process throughout the duration of a war. As new units are raised and new field formations are formed during the course of a war then a time comes in the development of these units and formation when they have to be mobilised as part of the procedure for bringing them to a state of preparedness in all respects for duty on active service.

The A.I.F. in 1914, and again in 1939, provided on each occasion an excellent model to illustrate many things which should be avoided when planning present day mobilisation systems. The A.I.F. was an ad hoc force which did not come into existence officially until after the outbreak of war. It was brought into existence to be employed overseas on active service; it was legally a permanent and full-time force; and it was created and maintained by voluntary enlistments.

As the A.I.F. was not created in 1914 until after the outbreak of war and in 1939 re-created after the outbreak of war, it is probable that no “preparations for war” in respect of it had
been made either before August 1914 or before September 1939, except "on paper". Therefore, its preparations for war could only begin by "raiding" those preparations for war which had been made for the A.M.F.

Although commanders at all levels of the A.I.F. should have been concerned exclusively with the task of mobilising the A.I.F. rapidly for its forthcoming operational duties, these commanders had to involve themselves concurrently with that large variety of tasks involved in what is technically known as "Preparations for War". These tasks which should have been spread over the earlier years of peace had now, under wartime conditions, to be crammed into a few months at most. In these circumstances contingents had to sail from Australia ill-prepared for their operations tasks in matters of military training, W.Es were sometimes incomplete and W.E.Ts were also sometimes incomplete. Moreover, arrangements were not always satisfactory for drafts of reinforcements, complete in matters of training, arms and equipment, to come forward as and when required. These deficiencies had to be coped with, and as quickly as was practicable, by commanders at all levels in the A.I.F. The time used in this way should have been devoted exclusively to final or last minute preparations of units and formations in matters of personnel, training, weapons and equipment.

The reasons for these disastrous methods of preparing a nation's land forces for war should be studied to ensure that action can be taken in future by the appropriate authorities to prevent such repetitions.

The A.I.F. occupies a unique position in Australia's history because of its superb performance in the War of 1914-18 and again in the War of 1939-45, despite the disadvantages it had to overcome because of neglect of adequate peacetime preparations for war. Nevertheless, despite its superb performance as a fighting force, the A.I.F. does not provide an ideal model to follow to-day or in the future as far as the theory and practice of Mobilisation is concerned as it is expounded in this work.

This work has shown too that the processes involved in Mobilisation are inextricably linked with two other processes — one which precedes mobilisation and another which follows immediately after the completion of Mobilisation by each unit. These three procedures, the reader will have already seen, are: first, Preparations for War; second, Mobilisation; and third, the movement of units, by field formations, to areas of strategical concentration in order to begin tactical operations against the enemy.

An examination of the A.I.F., in 1914 and again in 1939, will show that these three distinct and different procedures had to be telescoped into one procedure and this necessity resulted in confusion, much ineffective hurry and bustle, much shouting where quietness born of efficiency should have resigned, and much mismanagement and inefficiency generally.

Readers are indebted to the author of this work for Australia's first comparative study on the origin and development of systems of mobilisation in some of the world's leading armies. As a contribution to Australia's military literature it is one of originality and substance, based on comprehensive research as the Bibliography indicates. Indeed, it is probable that no other publication in English exists comparable in scope and content, with Colonel Wood's Mobilisation. If published later as a hardback book, with an efficient and comprehensive Index, it should long remain an indispensable book of reference worthy of inclusion in Defence and University libraries.

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Extending the Surface Navy Horizon

SH-60B SEAHAWK (LAMPS MK III)
By Lieutenant Commander R. D. Fisher, RAN

LAMPS PROGRAM DESCRIPTION: The Light Airborne Multi-Purpose Systems (LAMPS) is a ship-air weapon system that has resulted from the requirement to extend and improve surface ship anti-submarine and anti-ship capabilities. LAMPS is a composite (Figure 1) system that melds and capitalizes on important operational strengths of both surface ships and helicopters; taking best advantage of the speed and flexibility of the helicopter and the range, stability and carrying capacity of a surface platform.

Background: The SH-60B Seahawk is now operational in three USN Classes. These are CG 49 (AEGIS) Cruiser, DD 963 Spruance Destroyer and the FFG 7 Oliver Hazard Perry Frigate. The SH-60B helicopter is a shipboard Weapon System that introduces new capabilities in the area of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Anti-Ship Surveillance and Targeting (ASST). The primary role of the LAMPS MK III SH-60B is ASW with a secondary role of ASST.

Overview: The LAMPS MK III SH-60B "Seahawk" helicopter is the U.S. Navy version of a Sikorsky helicopter first used by the U.S. Army under the name of UH-60A Black Hawk. However, except for general appearances and a shared airframe, the two aircraft are configured completely differently. The Navy changed and equipped the basic airframe to fulfill its mission requirements by providing larger engines and increased fuel capacity. These changes provide an increased payload lengthened time-on-station and operating range for ASW/ASST missions. Helicopter structural changes were also made to aid in the handling and storing onboard the three classes of ships to provide a secure arresting system for helicopter operations.

The U.S. Navy ordered several other airframe changes to modify the aircraft for its ASW role. Single starboard and port bomb racks were added, each capable of carrying a single MK 46 torpedo. Additionally, a starboard attachment point was added for the Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) gear. A twenty-five store, compressed air sonobuoy launcher was placed on the port side of the fuselage. The necessary avionics were embarked for ASW acoustic detection and processing. Finally the RAST (recovery assist, secure, and traverse) system was installed on the three classes of ships.

Weapon System: The LAMPS MK III Ship/Air Weapon System consists of the SH-60B Seahawk helicopter with its associated avionics, two-way unique directional data link and shipboard computer assets. Interoperability of the LAMPS MK III Weapon System between ship and aircraft was achieved by designing the LAMPS MK III system hardware to conform to existing space, weight, and power capabilities of each host ship class. Computer programs were designed to be compatible and interoperable with the Naval Tactical Data System and AN/SLQ-32 EW System.

To conduct either its primary or secondary role the Seahawk passes Acoustic, Navigational and Radar data to the parent platform via data link. The data link then generates a real-time plot of the current tactical situation in the Combat Direction System. However, the key to this Weapon System is the use of computers, computer-processed information and the highly sophisticated computer-controlled data link. Using this data the Command can assign the appropriate weapons or forces against the Threat.

LAMPS MK III Computer Programs:
Avionics Operational Program (AOP). The airborne AOP resides in the number one AN/AYK-14(V), Standard Airborne Computer. This computer is located in the helicopter and is responsible for directing tactical data received from the Seahawk's radar, ESM equipment, acoustic sensors and MAD gear.

This tactical data (Figure 2) can be routed to airborne or shipborne processors for filtering and display. In the ship control mode, the AOP directs data to and from the helicopter. In this mode Combat Direction System (CDS) controls the operational use of the SH-60B. In the helicopter control mode, the road is one-way and tactical data is passed from the helicopter to the ship only.
SH-60B ordnance stores (sonobuoy and torpedos) are also controlled by the AOP. The AOP is responsible for dispensing the stores at the proper time as well as keeping a current inventory of all stores.

Electronic Support Measures Operational Program (ESMOP): ESMOP resides in an AN/AYK-14 Standard Airborne Computer-2 onboard the SH-60B. It is from this computer that the ESMOP maintains an interface and controls the AN/ALQ 142 Electronic Counter Measures Receiver Set. The ESMOP controls the receiver frequency, search sequence and area of search for the desired signals. The ALQ-142 in turn sends intercepted data plus information such as angle of arrival (AOA) and time of arrival to the ESMOP. Upon receipt of this data the ESMOP starts an evaluation process of the received signals. An analysis is then conducted on the intercepted signals with those stored in the airborne library. This airborne library, which is a subset of the AN/SLQ-32 Library, is provided at time of program initialization. The library can be altered, by the airborne operator, to provide a capability to enter special interest signatures and to provide for aircraft autonomy.

The ESMOP, based on a comparison of the received signals, establishes an identification. This ID is then made available to the aircrew and downlinked to the AN/SLQ-32 for additional analysis.

Advanced Signal Processor Operational Program (ASPOP): This airborne program is housed in an Analyzer Detector Set (AN/UYS-1) computer called Proteus. This program is responsible for evaluating the received sonobuoy data as well as down linking the details to the parent ship via the AOP. This information is displayed graphically to the airborne and shipborne operators. The computer program works in harmony with the Shipborne Processor Operational Program (SPOP).

Ship Processor Operational Program (SPOP): The SPOP is the principal computer program of the Sonar Processing System, AN/SQQ-28. It is the surface end of the two-way secure data link from the Airborne Operational Program. The SPOP is loaded into the AN/UYK 20A (V) computer, located in the Sonar Control Room and is responsible for maintaining communication channels with other operational programs. The SPOP interfaces with the AOP through the AN/SRQ-4 data terminal set for radar or acoustic data, tactical message traffic and voice communication.

The SPOP location between CDS and AOP places it in a unique position. It is the sole point of entry/exit through which message traffic has to pass on its journey from the AOP to CDS or vice versa. The SPOP reviews all traffic to and from the CDS to determine its destination: SQQ-28 or SRQ-4/SH-60B. The SPOP manages the SQQ-28 acoustic processing and provides the necessary operator interface to the UYQ-21 console.

The SPOP also monitors the operational status of the SQQ-28 system equipment/modules.
Figure 2.
and assures they are operating the prescribed fashion. In addition the SPOP manages and maintains the interfaces between SPOP/AS-Pop and SPOP/CDS. The program controls traffic between the SPOP/AOP and is an integral part of the LAMPS MK III system. Without SPOP inputs the shipboard and airborne computers cannot communicate.

CDS: CDS monitors and controls the message traffic between the SH-60B and the AN/SLQ-32, provides the computer processing to point the directional data link antenna, and provides the functions necessary for ship control of the helicopter.

AN/SLQ-32: AN/SLQ-32 uplinks the airborne library at program initialization, evaluates the data downlinked from the helicopter and provides evaluated emitter mode back to the CDS for display.

**Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) Operations:** In 1986, FFG 45 (USS DE WERT) completed a successful LAMPS MK III deployment with a CVBG. This detachment provided many lessons learned both administratively and tactically. In the administrative area the ship became accustomed to dealing with overcrowding due to extra aircrew and maintenance personnel, round-the-clock flight operations and the various logistic problems faced with limited on-board space.

Tactical lessons learned during DE WERT's Central Med operations were with the use of the APS-124 search radar and the AN/SLQ-142 provided rapid injection of ESM information into the battle group via Link-11.

In addition to surface surveillance operations DE WERT was also tasked with ASW utilization. The LAMPS MK III system provided excellent results against various exercise submarines and proved to be a formidable adversary against the submarine threat.

**Battleship Battle Group (BBBG) Operations:** FFG 43 (USS THACH) successfully completed a WESTPAC Deployment with a Battleship Battle Group. This deployment was an important step in the continuing evolution of the LAMPS MK III Weapon System. FFG 43 deployed with one SH-60B and was the only organic air asset available within the battle group.

One of the tasks FFG 43 had to complete during this deployment was to define the optimum role for the LAMPS MK III Weapons System. In doing so THACH efforts crossed into the ASW, ASUW, EW, SSC and AAW.

In the ASW arena LAMPS MK III Weapon system coordinated the efforts of other ASW assets. This experience emphasized the need for expanded sonobuoy transmit, receive and display capabilities in the LAMPS MK III and shipborne systems. Expansion is particularly needed in the shipboard Link-11 system to increase the number of sonobuoys transmitted and received by participating units.

In the area of Tactical data gathering; the range of the SH-60B, the capabilities of its APS-124 radar and the Seahawk's ability to downlink radar video and tactical data became a valuable asset for the Battleship Battle Group. The LAMPS MK III Weapon System provided the Battle Group Commander with a comprehensive surface picture, enhancing anti-ship targeting for Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles. In support of ASST, THACH developed, wrote and tested a number of search, targeting and visual identification procedures.

An important part of the study conducted by THACH concerned the capabilities of the AN/ALQ-142, AN/SLQ-32 system and the APS-124 radar. The ability of the ship to provide this data, via Link-11 to other units in the Battle Group was also carefully monitored.

**Status/Future Intentions:** The LAMPS MK III Weapon System is now operational onboard 24 FFG 7 Class, 4 CG 47 Class and 1 DD 963 Class ship. The DDG 993 and the DDG 51 class will also get the LAMPS MK III Weapon System in the near future. A total of 78 SH-60B's have joined their various squadrons with an anticipated growth in excess of 200 SH-60B's being accepted by the USN. Development continues with the introduction of a 99-channel sonobuoy receiver, MK 50 light weight torpedo, Global Positioning System and Penguin missile.

In summary a brief overview of the LAMPS MK III Ship/Air Weapon System has been provided with a look at the capabilities which are making it a major asset in the USN inventory.

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**Book Review**


*Reviewed by Group Captain Keith Isaacs, AFC, (Retd).*

The idea of producing a publication devoted to "the first ever complete analysis of all the aircraft that have served with Australia's army, navy and air force" is commendable. Unfortunately, the aim has not been achieved. In fact, the terms "complete analysis" and "all the aircraft" are misnomers.

In the first instance the aircraft of the Central Flying School, 1914-19, and the Australian Air Corps, 1920, are dismissed in a cursory reference of five lines listing only two BE2as, a Boxkite, and two Deperdussins one of which had already been written-off by the date provided by the author, 17 August 1914. Consequently, some additional 54 aircraft of about 12 types used at Point Cook, 1914-20, are virtually ignored in the text, illustrations and appendices.

Progressing to the numerous WWI RFC/RAF-serialled aircraft that served with the Australian Flying Corps in Europe and the Middle East, only eight different types are pictorially presented in some questionable photographs. Questionable because one features a CFS trainer, another a RFC Bristol Scout C wrongly identified as a "D", a BE12 incorrectly credited with the RE8 serial number "A3223", and the 1919 civilian owned Perdriau Rubber Company's ex-RAF BE2e, C6986, which became G-AUBF and was Qantas' second aircraft. In view of the wealth of AFC aircraft photographs at the Australian War Memorial, this oversight is puzzling to say the least.

Another enigma is the omission of the RNAS/RAF aircraft that operated from RAN warships, 1917-18. Admittedly these aircraft were crewed by British personnel, but they "served with Australia's navy".

Also conspicuous by their absence are the many varied types of aircraft operated by the RAAF in WWII overseas theatres. Although these numerous machines retained their RAF serials — as did their WWI counterparts, which the author at least lists in an appendix — they played a major, and vital, role in Allied air operations, serving with Nos 3, 10 and the Article XV squadrons, RAAF, 1939-45. Their non-inclusion will be lamented, no doubt, by thousands of Australians who were under the impression they had "served with Australia's air force". They could well be wondering if WWII really happened, or was it just a horrific nightmare.

The next problem relates to the confusing compilation of the book. The author has chosen to group the aircraft together as fighters and fighter-bombers, bombers, etc, but these sections are arranged in a most haphazard manner. For example, the first aircraft is the 1943 A52 Mosquito, followed by the 1948 A83 Sea Hornet, 1950 A86 P1081, 1921 A2 SE5a, and then the 1970 A69 Phantom (which, incidently, is not included in the table of "Aircraft of the RAAF since 1921", p226) . . . and so on. There appears to be no rhyme or reason for this irrational selection. Had the aircraft appeared in order of their A and N series numbers — or squadron numbers for overseas aircraft — a pleasing chronological review would have eventuated. Failing this logical approach, surely an encyclopaedia format could have been considered, thus permitting ease of reference without having to constantly consult the index.

Text errors are too numerous to list, particularly in relation to aircraft of the earlier decades — although the present day Mirage II10 inexcusably emerges as the "1110", or one hundred and eleven O. pp22-23. Erroneous captions are also plentiful, and random selections include "Widgeon I" instead of Widgeon II, p18; the "Spitfires at Darwin"
are in reality a Spitfire and a captured Japanese fighter, P37; the Beaufort "over northern Australia" is operating from No 1 OTU, Victoria, as is evident by its enlarged yellow training number, p79; "DH9 A6-9" should read Avro Cadet A6-9, p84; the Southampton "amphibian" is a flying-boat; and Seagull V "A9-2" is A2-2, p111; the Fairey IID "being lifted aboard...Geranium" is being hoisted onto the Darwin wharf, p112; and Supermarine "Walrus", VH-ALB, is the Seagull V ex A2-2, p113.

It is difficult to understand how such an error as a Ventura's "nose rudder" (radar?) slipped through, p116; the Governor-General's crest" is actually a visiting RAF York VIP transport, p121; the two DC2s, pictured in military markings were not impressed from ANA in 1939 (as were four DC3s), but were a batch of ten imported from the USA, November 1940 - April 1941, p122; the two "Gannets" are Gannets, p130; and the "Gipsy Moth at Richmond" is a Cirrus Moth, p191.

The book contains much information purloined from a previously published aircraft history series — without acknowledgement, incidently, despite a byline — but some plagiarised statements have been distorted in transition. The original articles were presented in chronological order of A series numbers, and one caption stated "the Douglas Dolphin was the last of a long line of RAAF amphibians, which included the Wackett Widgeon, Mks I and II, and the Supermarine Seagull, Mks III and V" — which it was in 1940, when the Dolphin's A35 identification prefix was allotted. In the interim, however, the A24 prefix had been allocated to the Catalina flying-boat and, as from 1943, to the Catalina PBY-5a amphibian. Consequently, the Dolphin was not "the last amphibian to join the RAAF", p125 — in fact, several RAAF float-equipped helicopters, and the Boeing Vertol Chinook, have also operated in the amphibian role in recent decades. Another transition corruption relates to the Wackett Trainer. When the history series recorded that A3-1 was used three times, it was referring only to the second group of A series numbers, 1935-60. In Australia's Military Aircraft's overall presentation of aircraft, however, A3-1 had been allocated on four occasions by 1940, and so the CA-6 was not "the third aircraft to carry the number", p189; that is, 1921 Avro 504K, 1935 DH Dragon Rapide, 1939 Wackett Trainer (CA-2, resererialled A3-1001 as the CA2a), and the 1940 Wackett Trainer (CA-6).

The author is a prolific naval writer, but regrettably gets into deep water with some of his aeronautical observations. With the photograph of SE5a, A2-2, attention is drawn to "the fixed Lewis gun above the cowling", p15 — in fact, the SE5a had a fixed Vickers gun port of centre forward of the cockpit, and a sliding Lewis gun on a Foster mounting above the top wing centre section, fired by a Bowden cable. On occasions he also refers to "line abreast formations" when the aircraft are clearly flying in echelon right (starboard), and echelon left (port), pp28, 32. On p83, A8-265 is far from being "a comouflaged Beaufighter" with its conspicuous black and yellow target-towing colours — also, the photograph is out of place in the A19 Beaufighter section. Again, on p113, the reader is advised to "note the relaxed manner of the pilot!" who is, in fact, a relaxed elbow-protruding aircrew member — the pilot, of course, is flying from the left hand (port) seat.

In this day and age it is incomprehensible that Imperial, rather than Metric measurements are used in the specification tables — notwithstanding the questionable statement "Imperial measurements have been used as all aircraft were built and maintained in an era before metrification". I imagine this will be of no consolation to the present day generation — at whom, no doubt, the book has been aimed — as they will have to onerously carry out their own conversations.

On the credit side, the book is attractive in appearance, and contains some 427 black and white photographs, and 49 impressive colour plates. This wealth of pictorial content, however, cannot justify the publication being regarded as a serious reference work — which, perhaps, is just as well, as the review copy started to come apart at the seams even after limited use.

I know we all make mistakes — I have been making them all my life. However, one can only accept so many mistakes and, in this case, I have reluctantly criticised Australia's Military Aircraft knowing it will cause anguish, and concern to the author and the publisher — not to mention the reviewer. Nevertheless, enough is enough and, in view of other error-prone
publications foistered upon the public as authentic aviation histories, a stand must be taken.

Australia's aviation heritage is far too important to be marred by inadequate research, poor proof reading, and insufficient editorial surveillance. It is to be hoped that these shortcomings will be rectified in the forthcoming second book in this series, devoted to Australian naval aviation — and, please, no photographs of Fairey IIIIDs being catapulted from HMAS Australia.

Editors Note: Since the foregoing review was submitted for publication, a notice has appeared in RAAF News, December, 1987, stating that Aerospace Publications had 'recalled all copies of Edition One of this book, as it had not been printed to the high standards contracted for. 'Apparently the 'high standards' applied to production quality and defective binding only, and not to the content of the book, which is now available in its second edition.

CAPTIVES — AUSTRALIAN ARMY NURSES IN JAPANESE PRISON CAMPS, by Catherine Kenny, published by Queensland University Press, Price $12.95.

Reviewed by Colonel John Buckley, OBE, ED, (RL).

CATHERINE KENNY was born in Brisbane in 1962. She has an Arts/Law degree with honours in History and Law from the University of Queensland. Her thesis on the above subject was outstanding and following suggestions from the Academic Staff it has now been published.

"Captives" is a most dramatic and sad account of the treatment the Australian Nurses, captured by the Japanese, received during 1942-45. It records the degradation, starvation and the appalling lack of hygiene which they suffered at the hands of their tormentors.

The research was supplemented by oral interviews with some of the victims including Vivian Bullwinkel. It will be recalled that Vivian was the sole survivor of the callous and barbarous massacre on Banka Island when twenty-three Army nurses were ordered into the sea and when they were waist deep were shot. It was a miracle that Bullwinkel survived (although badly wounded). This is her story of the event!

"I was near the end of the line on the right. We waded into the surf and we were almost up to our waists in the water when they just fired on us from behind. I don't think anyone screamed. We weren't even frightened. There was no panic, no hysteria, no tears . . ."

During their period as prisoners, the nurses suffered from every possible tropical disease. Medical treatment and medicines were not available. Together, with near starvation; the primitive accommodation; the plague of tropical insects; the torments from their guards — it was hell on earth.

The nurses who were taken to Japan had to suffer the extreme cold without appropriate shelter or warm clothing or footwear. They also suffered disease including T.B. and were almost skeletons.

It is incredible how the bestial guards could treat women prisoners in such a brutal manner. It is also incredible how these brave women were able to live through those terrible times — a few died from disease. It's remarkable that the majority were able to return to Australia; but some had up to two years in hospital.

I remember reading about an incident when the Matron-in-Chief found some of the prisoners who were waiting to be rescued from a "hell camp". They saw the aircraft door open, some figures came down the steps — all in trousers — one was a woman. The nurses said "who are you"? "I am the mother of you all" said Matron Sage. "She held out her arms and we all flopped around her, everybody weeping copious tears of ecstasy (Prisoners of War — Australians Under Nippon by Hank Nelson).

After the surrender one of the Japanese guards turned to Sister Trotter and said "You may have won the war but we'll get Australia yet". Their main tormentor and torturer, Captain Seko was given fifteen years as a war criminal.

It is remarkable how many of the nurses were able to resume normal civilian employment. Bullwinkel, later to become Matron of the Fairfield Hospital in Melbourne and has the MBE, ARRC, ED and the highest award of the International Red Cross, the Florence Nightingale Medal. Later she married a distinguished Officer, Colonel Frank Stratham (who was a friend
of mine; we served together as Lieutenants before the War. Vivian is still closely associated with community activities — a remarkable and courageous woman.

This book makes very sad and emotional reading. One is filled with admiration for those extremely brave heroines. Their fortitude and courage, in spite of inhuman treatment was almost unbelievable.

God Bless the A.I.F. Nurses.

I hope Catherine Kenny keeps writing — the book is most impressive, especially for such a young person.


Reviewed by Brigadier F. W. Speed, (RL)

THE NATO strategy for the defence of Europe is perhaps of distant interest to Australia now committed almost entirely to defence in the southern Pacific and eastern Indian Oceans. Nevertheless there is a growing opinion that the USSR, finding Europe and the Atlantic too expensive as a potential theatre, is shifting its focus to the other two oceans.

A study of the NATO strategy of flexible response may therefore be instructive as a measure of effectiveness of the Australian—New Zealand strategy, if indeed there is one.

Sperling is (if not yet promoted) a lieutenant-colonel in the Army of the Federal Republic of Germany, described as the anchorman in NATO’s defence of Western Europe. After attending the Staff Colleges in Hamburg and Toronto, he served in the nuclear planning and policy branches of the Central Army group (Heidelberg) and at SHAPE, followed by duty in a German armoured divisional operations staff. He produced this study as a visiting defence fellow at the Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University.

This visiting fellow set out to analyse proposals put forward by German experts as alternatives to NATO’s present strategy. Yet his conclusions confirm some of the most fundamental elements of that defence posture. Increases in conventional forces will improve NATO’s power to hold the territory of West Germany that covers most of NATO’s frontline. But, he concludes, there is no substitute for the nuclear deterrent. Indeed ‘Denuclearization’ of any part of Western Europe would make NATO’s task impossible.

If this appraisement is tenable, it remains for the antipodean student to assess, in the light of the Soviet regional build-up, the form and degree of deterrent that might be appropriate to the Australian—New Zealand axis, with whatever backing might reasonably be expected from the USA.

Regrettably, the book is heavy going — several paragraphs, for example, average fifty lines — but the whole work is not unduly long, and the logic is credible.


Reviewed by Don Jender, Department of Defence.

THIS monograph deals with the conditions under which multinational forces can have a successful role in the cause of peace and stability, and is number 170 in the series Conflict Studies issued by the Institute for the Study of Conflict.

The public knowledge of multinational forces is based on a few well known examples, such as the UN force in the war in Korea, and, more recently, the Multinational Forces (MNF) in Lebanon. There are however many more examples of multinational forces, and a considerable part of this monograph is devoted to discussion of historical examples. These range from the Boxer rebellion in China, through Korea, Zimbabwe, the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (with Australian participation), Lebanon, and various interventions by the Soviet Union and its allies. The experience of Lebanon is particularly interesting, because it has had the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a multinational force to supervise the evacuation of Palestinian forces from Beirut, and another to assist the Lebanese Government to assert its authority. It was in connection with the last mentioned case that 241
US and 58 French troops were killed in terrorist bombings in the Beirut area.

The author concludes by discussing whether multinational forces not of the UN origin are preferable to UN peacekeeping forces, and concludes that the answer is probably no. He believes a UN force would be more acceptable and effective because of its perceived impartiality.

The monograph is most useful for its comprehensive discussion of the history of multinational forces in modern times. The political and military background to the more significant examples is well set out, and some of the complexity of efforts to keep the peace in areas such as the Middle East is revealed. In the course of the discussion the author identifies the factors which contributed to the success or failure of the multinational force in the situation under examination. The material is well researched and clearly written, and is a useful compact historical coverage of the subject of multinational forces.


Reviewed by Colonel John Buckley, OBE, ED, (RL)

GENERALLY, this book follows the same pattern as the excellent BBC series of television stories about “soldiers” in the history of warfare, which has been seen recently in Australia on ABC Television.

The book has been written by two well known British military historians. It must have been a daunting task to sift out and precis the huge mass of information available from the time when soldiers were armed with primitive weapons, until modern times when they are equipped with pieces of mass destruction, controlled by automated electronic masterpieces.

The evolution of the simple weapons over the centuries is dealt with clearly and in a most interesting progression. The dominance of the foot soldier was followed by the cavalry revolution, which in turn was succeeded by the invention of gunpowder which brought the gunners to the fore. By the First World War the power of trench fortification reached its zenith, until it was eventually broken by the use of the tank. The rise of military firepower had a great impact on the battlefield. Likewise, it was a devastating experience for civilians in the Second World War. All these aspects of war are covered with an excellent narrative.

The story gives a chapter to each of the main fighting arms and traces their progress, in some cases fully over the centuries. Eg Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Sappers, Armour etc. Some of the lesser Corps played a vital role in keeping the mobility of the fighting troops in the major battles. There were over 36,000 REME soldiers employed in 21 Army Group in 1945.

43% of the US Army overseas in the Second World War were in service units and this did not include those employed in divisions.

There is a good chapter about the Commanders including Caesar, Ghengis Khan, Alexander the Great, Marlborough, Wellington, Napoleon and many others too numerous to mention; but some commanders of the First and Second Wars miss out eg Harold Alexander, Bradley and MacArthur etc.

Whilst the development of the assault tanks for the 79th Armd. Division is well covered, as was its use in operations, I think mention could have been made of its GOC Major General Sir Percy Hobart, who not only was responsible for developing the special tanks, but raised, trained and commanded the Division in operations until the Elbe was reached. “Hobo” was a brother-in-law of Field Marshal Montgomery. It was my good fortune to serve attachments to the Division before, during and after the invasion — the last at Luneburg.

The chapter on the “gunners” gives details of the development of artillery weapons, which was accelerated by the First and Second World Wars. The authors seem to consider that the Germans had a slight edge on gun development. The Australian Gunners will be proud of the narrative. The importance and performance of the gunners is a highlight of the story.

The narrative is illustrated by excellent photographs, and sketches. It covers 10,000 years of battle about the soldier up to Vietnam. It is amazing how much detail has been included in one volume of under 300 pages.

I enjoyed the television series and this accompanying book. The authors deserve commendation for their first class story. I am sure it will appeal to all readers. I understand the book is available at ABC bookshops.