Defence Force Journal

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Soldiers of the 16th Battalion, Royal Western Australian Regiment.
Letters to the Editor

Weightload Walking
Dear Sir,

I read Captain Rudzki's article on Weightload Walking (DFJ No 63) with considerable interest. The author's findings coincide exactly with my own experience of training and service as a Territorial in The Parachute Regiment, British Army.

Captain Rudzki rightly cites the Falklands Conflict of 1982 as an illustration of his thesis. I would go further than him and suggest that in my own experience the best and fittest runners are not necessarily capable of carrying out feats of endurance such as 45 Commando's epic 'romp' across East Falkland or 3 PARA's lightning advance to contact from San Carlos to Douglas settlement. There is no denying the fitness of the Guardsmen who served in this conflict with 5 Infantry Brigade, or the physical toughness of the basic training regime at the Guards Depot in Pirbright (still a model for many arms in many armies and one for which I have the highest respect) but their lack of training in marching long distances with full war loads was, in the opinion of many present at the time, a significant constraint on the brigade's ability to deploy quickly on foot. Only the Ghurka component of 5 Bde was able to match the specialist 'Bergen soldiers' of 2 and 3 PARA and 3 Commando Bde in this respect.

It is equally significant, I believe, that the SAS Regiment's selection course centres largely around the candidate's ability to carry loads of 30-40kg a distance of some 40 miles in 24 hours. While not, perhaps, entirely representative of a typical infantryman's role it is surely significant that individual members of the British, Australian and New Zealand SAS Regiments have a reputation for endurance and mobility in adverse conditions which is the envy of the world. Surely this endurance march (of a kind advocated by Capt Rudzki) is a better model for the development of battle fitness — with emphasis on the word battle — than the physical 'short, sharp shock' which is more typical of most army's Battle Fitness Tests?

Gregor Ferguson
Assistant Editor
Defence Attaché
London

Auftragstaktik
Dear Sir,

LtCol P. Bergmann's article on auftragstaktik questioned the wisdom of translating that term as 'mission oriented tactics'. The Australian Army does not use that term and prefers that of 'directive control'. The latter was coined by the late Brigadier Richard Simpkin and is, we believe, closer to the intention of auftragstaktik — that is it reflects the principle of freedom of execution.

LtCol Bergmann wisely listed not only the strengths of this concept, but also its dangers. The latter become apparent with lazy or weak commanders who may be tempted to place the onus on their subordinates without ensuring that sufficient resources have been allocated, or by making unrealistic demands.

It is hoped that others will be tempted to write in you column about the subject, particularly about the leadership styles needed to exploit this concept. As a pointer in this regard the modern day German Army underlines the importance of:

- character (more important in war than intellect) so that there is mutual confidence between commanders and subordinates; and
- 'a higher quality of obedience' that is the intellectual and technical attributes which enable a subordinate commander to comprehend the key element of his superior's intentions, so that he can promptly act in the most appropriate fashion when the immediate situation (inevitably) changes.

Some unusual variations in the spelling of auftragstaktik were evident in you journal. Not once was it correctly spelt. If future writers accept the term directive control the going should be easier for all of us; well at least in respect to spelling!

R. Hennesey
Colonel
No Room for Complacency: Military Professionalism in the Australian Army

By Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Molan, BA, BECON, RAINF

'The professional military mind is by necessity an inferior and unimaginative mind; no man of high intellectual quality would willingly imprison his gifts in such a calling.'

H. G. Wells

'. . . a career as a Regular Army Officer in Australia today and in the future must be viewed as one of the most demanding and diverse pursuits in our national structure.'

P. W. Blyth

Introduction

On the 26th September 1915, 10,000 British soldiers in 12 battalions advanced up a gentle slope towards the German positions around Leichenfeld von Loos. The attack had been preceded by only 20 minutes of desultory shelling and a half hour had elapsed between the end of the shelling and the British troops leaving their trenches. The German position was well fortified with its wire obstacles still intact. For the first time in military history, the Germans had sited their heavy machine guns in depth and in great numbers. At about 1,500 yards the assaulting troops met with a storm of machine gun fire which, in roughly three and a half hours, killed 385 officers and 7861 men. As the remnants staggered away, the Germans stopped firing in compassion. Their casualties in the same period had been nil. Wells' comment on the quality of the military mind was made at a time when the memory of such slaughter was fresh. Society felt guilt for its inability to either prevent, or adequately prepare for war. Wells' attitude reflects society's attempt to transfer that guilt onto the backs of those responsible for the prosecution of a disastrous war. The professional military mind was found wanting on many occasions in World War One, but so too were the minds of the leaders of society. In this period, an historical coalition of technological, tactical and strategic factors meant that society had to adjust to change at an unprecedented rate. The military, as a reflection of society, was no different.

There have always been both superior and imaginative minds in the military. Blyth's comment on the challenge of a professional military career in Australia today indicates that the need for such minds is as great as ever. It will be an indictment of society if, by a deprecatory attitude towards the military profession, or by the allocation of inadequate resources to military activities, men of high intellectual quality choose not to follow the profession of arms.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Sixth Edition) defines a profession as a 'vocation of advanced learning or science', and cites as one of its examples the 'military profession'. Given Wells' comments on the 'professional military mind', it is interesting to note a change which has occurred in the meaning of the word 'profession' when used as an adjective in a military sense. In terms such as 'professional officer', 'professional infantryman' or 'professional non-commissioned officer', the term is used as a synonym for 'competent'. 'Profession' or 'professional' will be used in both these ways throughout the article.

The aim of this article is to review the level of military professionalism amongst officers in the Australian Army today. Unfortunately the scope of the article can only be extended to the regular component of the Army and can only be a brief review. The theme of the article is that the regular officer corps is professionally competent but that such a finding leaves no room for complacency.
of record. Australia has not had military forces on operations since 1972 and no identifiable threat to Australia’s security is said to exist. In the absence, then, of the ultimate test of combat, the military sociologist can assist in judging an adequate level of military professionalism. Samuel P. Huntington, in his book *The Soldier and the State*, identified three essential characteristics of the military profession. They are: corporateness, responsibility and expertise. Both corporateness and responsibility refer more to the formal definition of a profession as a vocation. Expertise, however, is the basis of professionalism, whether defined in the formal sense or in the sense of competence. Huntington’s three characteristics will be used as the basis of this review.

**Corporateness**

What remains distinctive to the Army is its basic orientation towards an image of the battlefield. The ethic generated by this orientation produces the characteristic of corporateness and emphasizes “... a community of interest, adherence to a set of values, moral or otherwise, and a frame of reference in the form of rules of conduct.” The existence of corporateness in the Australian Army officer corps has never been challenged. The test of military professionalism will be to maintain a balance between the ‘Army corporate’ and society. The military professional must not exhibit what Larson has described as ‘radical professionalism’. Should this occur, the Australian Army faces the possibility of sustaining values that could become socially and nationally irrelevant.

**Responsibility**

The Australian Army’s basic text on leadership states that ‘no other profession demands so much from its members... The officer is a professional leader of men’. The management of violence confers unique responsibilities on the professional in the army. The officer corps is, at the low end of the spectrum, responsible for the lives of men both in realistic training for war and in war itself. At the high end of the spectrum, the sovereignty, or even the existence of the nation, can be in their hands. The Australian Army realizes this and stresses the need for its officers to have highly developed personal and corporate senses of responsibility.

**Expertise**

In this review of professionalism, the characteristic of expertise appears to be the most contentious. This is because technical skills form the basis of any claim to professional competence. Bernard Brodie provides a useful framework for looking at military expertise. He maintains that the military profession is responsible for three areas: tactics, administration and strategy. The Australian Army has shown by its tactical success in battle that it has a level of tactical competence. If the Army has weaknesses in this regard they lie in two areas. The first concerns the lack of a dedicated organization to develop and evaluate tactics. The second lies in the doubtful capability of the fore-in-being to pass its tactical competence on to an expanded army in a realistic time period. The administration of the Army in its historical role as a junior alliance partner, in peacetime and even in low-level conflict, is adequate. Doctrine exists for the administrative support of an expanded army in higher levels of conflict, although it has never been tested. As such it is a suspect capability and must reflect on military professionalism.

It is in the third of Brodie’s areas of responsibility — strategy — where military professionalism in the Australian Army may be called into question. In the past the Australian Army has tended towards the Huntington-type model, but since the end of the Vietnam war it has been forced to move more towards the Janowitz-type model. The catalyst for this slow change has been the re-organization of the three single-service departments into the Department of Defence in 1976. The problems which the military professional faces in this increasingly bureaucratic world is well put by Blumenson:

‘To reach (high rank) and stay there, (the military professional) must be aggressive, bold ruthless and enterprising — in short, he has to possess all the military virtues. He is then told to do a job that requires tact, tolerance, forebearance with patience — qualities that had little to do with his previous advancement’. That the Australian Army is doing something to remedy the inadequacy of military professionals to be fully effective in this bureaucratic environment, is praiseworthy. Increased emphasis is being placed on identifying officers at an early
stage for service in strategic policy areas in both Army Office and in Defence (Central). Opportunities are being given to suitable officers for post-graduate studies in establishments such as the Royal Military College and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University.

Conclusion
Based on Huntington's criteria of corporate-ness, responsibility and expertise, the regular Australian Army officer corps today is militarily professional. Where it has been indicated that there are shortfalls, an argument can be made that either resource constraints imposed by society are a significant factor, or, in the case of strategic policy, steps (albeit slow ones) are being taken to remedy the situation.

This finding, however, leaves no room for complacency. The longer the Army remains without an operational commitment the greater will be the need for strong vocational dedication by the military professional. At the corporate level the need to adapt to change will not diminish. Unless the profession as a whole can develop ways to test and challenge contemporary methods and beliefs, as society is being forced to, the military profession may find itself the repository of, as Wells says, "inferior and unimaginative minds".

NOTES
4. 'No reasonable man can be expected to pursue a profession of questionable utility in an environment of diminishing esteem'. Dollar, W. M. 'Prescriptions for Professionalism', Air University Review, Mar 1976, p. 77.
9. Larson, A. D. 'Military Professionalism and Civil Control', Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1974, p. 56. Larson describes radical professionalism as an unhealthy state where ... military professionalism (is) shaped by abstract theories and obsolete ideals of military purpose and efficiency, unrelated to the social and political realities of the larger society, and emphasizing such characteristics as functional specificity, political neutrality and efficiency'.
12. This assertion acknowledges that there are any number of organizations dedicated to recording doctrine, but none dedicated to developing and evaluating tactics.
13. The term 'administration' is used in the sense of being the provision of the means (that is: men, material, facilities and services) for the conduct of military activities'. Stein, J. N. 'The Administrative Support Concept for Land Operations in the Defence of Australia', paper presented to Infrastructure Conference, SOSC, ANU, 1983, p. 1.
14. Brigadier Stein maintains that given access to the civil infrastructure, the concept of operations for low level conflict is realizable. Stein, J. N. 'The Administrative Support Concept ...'
15. The essential element of the Huntington-type model is a shunning of all matters non-military (see Huntington, S. P. 'The Soldier and the State').
17. 'It is said to take 20 years for a defence force to adapt to major changes in direction'. Alldred, C. 'Strategy in the Missile Age', General D'Arme France, 'Directed Defence', translation from Revue de Defense National, February 1968.
19. Funnell, R. G. 'The Professional Military Officer in Australia'. Defence Force Journal No. 23, July/Aug 1980, p. 24. Funnell believes that this is a source of 'deep dissatisfaction of many military officers'.

Lt Col Molan joined the Army in 1968 and was allocated to Infantry in 1971. Since that time he has served in the normal range of Infantry postings in IIPR, 9RQR and 3RAR, as well as a posting to the Infantry Centre as Senior Instructor, Careers Wing. His other postings have been as a helicopter pilot with 1 Air Regt., a student of Indonesian at RAAF School of Languages, a staff officer in the Directorate of Combat Development (Operations Branch) and Command and Staff College. He holds Bachelor degrees in Arts (Univ. NSW) and Economics (QLD Uni). Lt Col Molan is currently SO1 Pay and Allowances DSC-A (Personnel Branch).
Targeting for Nuclear Deterrence

By Lieutenant Colonel J. D. McCausland, RA Inf, BA(Hons), psc

Introduction

The question of targeting policies is central to any discussion on nuclear strategy. Although the precise relationship between national policy and targeting is complex, the former is generally perceived to determine the nature of the latter. Accordingly, the nature of targeting is determined in large part by the nature and objectives of national nuclear deterrence strategy, be it through assured destruction, flexible response or escalation control (or a mix of these). Each scenario, together with an appreciation of the capabilities of a nation's nuclear arsenal as well as associated command, control and communication (C3) systems and delivery capabilities, will influence the rational selection of targets. Each choice will also involve realistic consideration of the many uncertainties which accompany the distribution of different weapon systems to particular target bases. Targets may embrace any portion of an opponent's society — his government, armed forces, communication and administrative centres, industry or population centres. Such targeting policies are usually articulated in Western strategies as "counter-force", "counter-value" or a mix of both.

Counter-Force

Counter-force strategies target an opponent's military (principally nuclear) forces so that they may be destroyed or at least rendered ineffective before they can be used against one's own target base — what is traditionally seen as the "destruction of the enemy on the ground".1 Extrapolating this concept to the nuclear environment counter-force strategies seek to render impotent an opponent's retaliatory (or assured destruction) capability before it can be used. Hermann Kahn extended this notion to one of "counter-force with insurance" which embraced any measure (active or passive) which counters the use of effectiveness of an opponent's nuclear forces. He also distinguished between the types of counter-force attack — be they "local" (over one's own territory), "limited" (striking at only a portion of enemy forces) or a "controlled but all out counter-force mission".2 Counter-force targeting, in seeking to disarm a threatening adversary, is not a notion peculiar to nuclear strategy. Historically it has been considered to be probably the most effective and reliable method of weakening his potential to wage war. It has been proven to be a particularly effective strategy when a nation strikes from a position of military inferiority (as did Israel on 5 June 1967). Also, limited and selective counter-force strikes have significant demonstration potential — whilst leaving an adversary with a viable retaliatory capability an attacking nation may choose to merely demonstrate intention, resolve and capabilities. Counter-force strategies do not accord priority to strikes at urban or industrial centres but hold them "hostage" as the final deterrent — to persuade an adversary to withhold any retaliatory capability not destroyed by the counter-force attacks and to enforce a termination of hostilities favourable to the attacker. The rational opponent will thus be restrained from any suicidal response through anger or to seek revenge.

Despite the traditional attractions of counter-force strategies, they possess certain weaknesses which are particularly relevant in the nuclear environment. Firstly, counter-force targets are of a more infinite nature than other societal assets and are difficult to define with precision. Military forces are of a varied nature and operational status, often small, dispersed, hardened and mobile and subject to short term fluctuations.

Secondly, counter-force strategies are difficult to reconcile with "no first strike" national policies. As discussed above, counter-force strikes are most effective on military forces before they are employed by an adversary. Kahn argued in this vein when he wrote that "there is no such thing as retaliation against military targets after nuclear attack." Keith Payne similarly argued that "if you are going to shoot at missiles you are talking about first strike". To escape this dilemma, whilst simultaneously protecting the credibility of their deterrent pos-
tures, the NATO allies have adopted the *de facto* strategy of "no early first use".

Thirdly, counter-force targeting is based on the premise that land-based forces (missiles and bomber forces) are the most vulnerable to neutralising strikes. However this vulnerability can be reduced significantly by basing techniques which are specifically designed to improve the survivability of retaliatory forces — such as improved early warning systems, alert and operational states, hardened missile silos, rapid reaction missiles and the greater dispersion and concealment of forces. The status of the strategic forces may also have an effect on the impact of counter-force missions — for example, the status of submarine bases influences the location of submarines at sea, the status of communications and attack orders. Similarly, the degree of alert and early warning available to bomber bases determines the speed at which aircraft are able to get airborne and disperse. However, whilst these measures may decrease the vulnerability of these forces, they also increase the chances of inadvertent exchange and escalation. They also encourage the search for technology necessary to circumvent these techniques (such as improvements in speed, accuracy and effect and the multiplication of warheads).

Fourthly, counter-force strategies, by degrading the survivability of an opponent's deterrent (that is, his retaliatory capability) in circumstances of mutually assured destruction (MAD), are irrational and non-credible. In order to preserve the credibility of the nuclear deterrent of both opponents it "is necessary for both to possess invulnerable retaliatory forces" in circumstances of MAD. In such conditions, should deterrence collapse, the side which receives a counter force strike has lost the tactical and timing initiative (that is, surprise) and is forced to retaliate with damaged and possibly uncoordinated forces against his opponent who is likely to have augmented his own forces. Accordingly, such scenarios prompt damage-limitation measures (such as ballistic missile defence) as well as the tendency to pre-empt any attack perceived imminent or to launch-on-warning. Both of these options are themselves provocative and potentially destabilising, more likely to precipitate an exchange in times of crisis rather than avoiding such an occurrence. It will also render any strategy predicated upon "escalation control" less credible. Therefore the reciprocal fear of surprise (pre-emptive) attack ("each side imputing to the other aggressive intentions and misreading defensive preparations as offensive") renders counter-force strategies more likely to induce the conflict which nuclear deterrence deliberately seeks to avoid.

Fifthly, counter-force strategies are "incredible" if they are based on the presumption that an opponent's forces and weapons systems may be separated from other societal assets, particularly population centres. In practice, such separation does not occur and large scale civilian casualties and collateral "counter-value" destruction would be inevitably inflicted in counter-force strikes — destruction which counter-force strategies purport to avoid. This is particularly so in the Soviet Union where strategic forces are located close to, or within, urban and industrial areas (for example, there are 3-4 ICBM fields within the Moscow area). Conversely, the US endeavours to reduce the likelihood of collateral damage by concentrating ICBM fields in areas of low population and industrial density. Finally, to emphasise the illusory nature of the targeting distinctions addressed in this paper, recent evidence of the effects of "nuclear winter" arising from a large scale nuclear exchange suggest strongly that no element of human society as we know it will survive unaffected despite targeting policies employed.

Sixthly, counter-force strategies tend to fuel the arms race. As weapon systems proliferate, so too does an opponent's capability to render them impotent by counter-force strikes. This often means a qualitative and quantitative growth in nuclear arsenals of both sides in a technological arms action-reaction cycle. For example, the US acknowledged in the mid-1970s that the Soviet Union would establish an effective counter-force arsenal against the Minuteman ICBM by the early 1980s and as a consequence sought ways to reduce their vulnerability and redress their "inferiority". The US arms buildup and the subsequent Soviet modernisation programmes and the search by both powers to deploy space based systems are the subject of an ongoing, well publicised and complex debate. One's stance in this debate will depend on the relevance they attach to force "inferiority" and counter-force "victory". For instance, US wargaming of "counter-force run-downs" concentrate on worst case force scen-
arios and reject consideration of the massive synergistic strengths of the US and Soviet triads (that is, the strategic bomber forces, ICBM forces and missile carrying nuclear submarine fleets). Rejection of these capabilities and the concentrations on "who is ahead" in specific weapons systems will only continue to fuel the destabilising race for technological advantage. In these circumstances technology determines strategy.

A final difficulty with counter-force targeting is that it is a pre-war (that is, deterrence) strategy which renders inevitable a degree of mutual destruction should deterrence fail. Whilst not the subject of this article, a major weakness of deterrence theory is that it fails to provide for the prosecution of conflict should it (that is, deterrence) fail. Accordingly, Kahn argued for "counter-force as insurance" targeting strategies which are "designed to insure against unreliability . . (by) . . picking up the pieces when deterrence fails". He stressed the need to think through the war to be fought, to fight and survive it and to achieve the best possible outcome. Counter-force targeting is opposed to such a strategy.

Counter-Value

As distinct from counter-force targeting, counter-value (or counter-city) targeting focuses on the entire spectrum of an opponent's societal structure — his population centres, environment, public order and urban/industrial complexes. These are the assets he prizes most regardless of their military value. Despite the proven effect of the "indirect approach" using conventional weapons, these targets are so selected because of their "value" to an opponent. Accordingly, threatening these targets can reasonably be expected to weaken his resolve or deter him from aggressive actions in the first instance.

Counter-value theories evolved as part of classical (that is, pre-thermonuclear) deterrence. Counter-value targeting had played an important role in the Allied successes in Europe and Japan in both World Wars. Strategic targeting of an adversary's urban/industrial base in particular was extrapolated into the nuclear environment by many analysts. Regrettably, the hysteria surrounding the proven destructiveness and the many uncertainties associated with a thermonuclear exchange has subsumed a more rational debate on the process of counter-value targeting.

Implicit in the above discussion is the deterrent value of counter-value targeting. A nuclear exchange against counter-value targets posits casualties and destruction on an unprecedented scale. In a bipolar relationship (such as that between the USA and the Soviet Union) it gives rise to a "balance of terror" and the self deterrence phenomenon. To escape the credibility dilemma thus created (the incredibility of MAD) counter-value targets are therefore usually held "hostage" within a flexible targeting framework. For example, "US missiles are required for blowing up Soviet cities. If we can hold these hostages we can deter Soviet leaders from attacking us . . objects of value must be held hostage for the purpose of deterring". Yet, as discussed above, in the circumstances of MAD nuclear conflict is irrational. However, regrettably, a nuclear attack initiated through irrationality or insanity cannot be ruled out.

The terrifying consequences of a counter-value exchange accord such targeting strategies significant deterrent effect. Although they suffer from a credibility difficulty, limited counter-value exchanges are not entirely incredible (and indeed may be made more credible by complementary damage-limitation policies, such as plans for the evacuation of major population centres).

Accordingly, counter-value strategies possess significant bargaining and negotiating potential.

Counter-value targeting is more simple and economical than those of counter-force orientation. Urban/industrial targets are generally large, soft, easy to identify, relatively hard to defend and immobile. Relatively fewer weapons are required to inflict (or threaten) unacceptable retaliation (for example, the destruction of the largest 50 Soviet cities would also destroy 20% of the nation's total population and 35% of her industry. Smaller nuclear powers would thus be able to improve their own power base relative to stronger opponents.

Despite the deterrence potential of counter-value targeting, these strategies do possess serious deficiencies, what Keith Payne observed as "serious limitations for the purpose of deterrence and for the conduct of general war". Firstly, not only are such notions morally repugnant (by positing mass destruction and the
slaughter of disinterested populations), but they assume an "irrationally inexorable commitment" to execute such threats. If deterrence should falter it would indeed be irrational (in circumstances of MAD) to pursue such a commitment; what Kahn observed was the "rationality of irrationality". Therefore, counter-value strategies lead to the creation of scenarios in which the collapse of deterrence would see both adversaries yielding to the rational argument of protecting its "values" through pre-emptive nuclear attack. However, it is likely that, once a limited counter-value exchange commenced (in what Kahn observed would be either "controlled reprisals" or a show of force), restraint and escalation control would prove difficult and the temptation to risk an all out "spasm" war would increase. Such an exchange in an era of nuclear "overkill" would be likely to end in mutual annihilation. Accordingly, a deterrence strategy based upon such a scenario lacks the plausibility and credibility of an enduring national security strategy of any society, be it democratic or totalitarian.

Secondly, the practicalities associated with counter-value targeting render it deficient. For example, within the relatively short timeframe of a nuclear exchange it is unlikely that urban/industrial centres will be able to influence the outcome of the conflict in any significant way. Accordingly these targets will become irrelevant as military targets. Furthermore, as already seen, the effects of such exchanges are uncertain and escalation control will be difficult to achieve.

A final deficiency in counter-value theory is its inference that a "rational" nation possesses war fighting and survival capabilities as well as the capability to destroy an opponent's retaliatory forces. It is thus difficult to divorce, in theory and practice, counter-value strategies from those of a counter-force nature.

Away from Pure Counter-Force or Counter-Value

Strategists often advocate targeting an opponents leadership and government structures to paralyse his conflict management systems and render him susceptible to bargaining and negotiation on terms unfavourable to him. Such targeting strategies seek to achieve early and economical conflict termination should deterrence have collapsed. Yet definition and identification of these targets may prove difficult. For example, whilst the USA has identified certain key Soviet command and control personnel, facilities and communications as potential targets, their locations, relocation shelters (mostly hardened) and duplication arrangements are difficult to identify. Furthermore, as such targets are often located in or near urban and industrial centres nuclear strikes on them will more than likely inflict significant collateral damage and casualties on them — as Keith Payne argued, "attacks on Soviet leadership would be virtually indistinguishable from counter-city attacks". Attacks against political leadership and command targets would also render escalation control and conflict termination negotiations difficult.

As alluded to above, targeting strategies are not necessarily strictly counter-force or counter-value in orientation. In effect, most strategies combine the two approaches, acknowledging the practical difficulties in clearly defining and separating the two. Accepting these practical difficulties, Kahn advocated the adoption of "counter-force plus bonus" or "counter-force plus avoidance" strategies as the most useful alternatives. The former approach acknowledges the desirability of destroying counter-value targets, but not to the exclusion of counter-force. He suggested a reordering of priorities in favour of counter-force because the "principal objective (of strategy) should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not his civilian population . . (and) . . retain sufficient striking power to destroy the enemy's society if driven to it". Kahn's latter approach endeavours to minimise counter-value destruction at the cost of discarding co-located counter-force targets. Only these two approaches "make sense".

A Conceptual Problem

Both counter-force and counter-value targeting highlight the value bias of Western analysis. The distinction between the two concepts is one of essentially Western origin, not shared by the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Soviet planners provide for the immediate and simultaneous striking of all military, government, administrative and population centres. They make no distinction between military and civilian targets. However, Western perceptions of what the Soviets "value" determine targeting distinctions. Furthermore, there is no basis to automatically accepts that Western values and perspectives as mirroring those of the Soviet Union, as they
are often assumed to do. For example, as Keith Payne observed, “it is not impossible to find . . . leaders who are willing to sacrifice very large numbers on their citizenry and economic productivity for political purposes . . . or simply out of neglect or insensitivity”. 17

Practical Application

Having analysed the nature and difficulties associated with counter-force and counter-value targeting concepts, it is useful to briefly examine how the distinction has operated in practice. As these concepts are primarily of a Western origin, it is of assistance to examine their applications in the context of the evolution of US strategic targeting policies.

After the Second World War the US continued (pre-nuclear) counter-value strategies with little attention given to counter-force alternatives. Planners sought to destroy the Soviet capability to “make and sustain land warfare by wrecking her industrial and research and development centres”.17 Under Plan Charioteer (1947) targeting would have destroyed forty square miles of Moscow, thirty-five square miles of Leningrad and killed almost seven million workers.18 During the 1950s, in the context of improved missile capabilities and ever increasing intelligence available on Soviet forces, targeting policies reflected an emerging counter-force orientation. Urban/industrial centres remained targeted but emphasis now shifted to Soviet air forces and nuclear targets.

The US strategic Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) was initially developed in 1960 in an effort to co-ordinate the rapidly multiplying nuclear arsenals of the three services. It provided a Comprehensive Target List, an “optimum” mix of counter-force and counter-value targets, with a bias towards the former. All targets were to be attacked simultaneously with all available weapons. This notion of “massive retaliation” was rejected in 1962 when the SIOP was revised with a view to providing options for more flexible and graduated responses. It detailed five options — Soviet nuclear forces, other armed forces and resources distant from cities, armed forces close to cities, command and control centres and, finally, urban/industrial targets. US strategy then reflected a version of “no cities” counter-force targeting. In his now famous Ann Arbour speech, Defence Secretary McNamara stated that the US was committed to the “destruction of the enemy’s military forces, not of his civilian population . . . we are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our cities”. 19 Declaratory policy quickly de-emphasised this aspect of the reorientation as it gave rise to potentially destabilising first strike scenarios. The gap between US declaratory (counter-value) and substantive (counter-force) policies now widened.

Despite declaratory reorientations, the 1962 SIOP was not revised significantly until President Nixon called for greater counter-force emphasis and the provision of a greater number of targeting options. However, this shift again proved to be largely declaratory. The emphasis was now defined as being on the “destruction of the political, economic and military resources critical to the enemy’s post war power, influence and ability to recover . . . as a major power.”20 It included the notion of escalation control and of holding some vital enemy targets (that is, counter-value) hostage for subsequent destruction.21 It also introduced the notion of “withholds” and “non-targets” which included population perse, political leadership (for the purpose of intra-war deterrence and termination bargaining) and the enemy’s retaliatory reserve. It planned for the destruction of 70% of Soviet industry yet was unclear as to how this was to be achieved.

As did his predecessors, President Carter also endeavoured to circumvent the rationality difficulties posed by deterrence in circumstances of MAD by the creation of greater flexibility in his targeting options. Accordingly, whilst maintaining the counter-force emphasis in the SIOP, he added new political and psychological targets (such as Soviet food supplies, leadership and facilities in the Far East). This approach gave rise to Presidential Directive 59, a complex system of targeting packaging which could be “tailored” to suit particular scenarios. It de-emphasised economic recovery targets and placed new emphasis on war supporting economic targets, second echelon military forces and command-and-control centres. More recently, in the early days of President Reagan’s administration, new currency was accorded to the strategy of fighting and prevailing in a limited nuclear exchange. Accordingly, the target list was further extended to 40,000 potential targets which included Soviet military forces, conventional forces, political and leadership centres and urban/industrial targets, with sub-
options and withholds. Despite its largely counter-force emphasis, it still extended to 200 Soviet cities — "it is essential that we retain the capacity at all times to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on the Soviet Union, including the destruction of a minimum of 200 major Soviet cities".22

Conclusion
Offensive targeting policies form a central element of national security strategy. Whereas Soviet targeting is oriented towards those targets which serve to secure a "quick victory", Western analysts have developed more flexible, controlled and complicated scenarios (deterrence itself being primarily a Western strategy). Accordingly, their strategies distinguish between counter-force and counter-value targeting. The former is particularly attractive and credible as surveillance and weapon capabilities are developed and offer (at least theoretically) the possibility of avoiding civilian and collateral destruction. Yet counter-force policies and postures infer first strike capabilities, encourage pre-emption and are thus potentially destabilising in times of tension or crisis. In reality, their co-location with urban/industrial assets guarantees that such areas, although not the primary target, will suffer collateral nuclear destruction. However, counter-value strategies offer a more plausible deterrent and a cheaper and less complex force posture. Despite these advantages counter-value threats are essentially "incredible", resting on the "irrationality of rationality", they offer little flexibility and little incentive for restraint or escalation control. However, in the final analysis, the separation of these two targeting categories in both declaratory and substantive policies is illusory. They are a function of a democratic society wrestling with the strategic dilemmas created by nuclear technology and the search for targeting practices which are palatable for domestic digestion. Should deterrence collapse their separation will become meaningless.

NOTES
2. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
8. The effect of such strikes will depend primarily upon intelligence available and realistic models of an opponent's economy.
10. Ibid, p 35.
12. Ibid, p 76.
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid, p 54.
16. Ibid.
18. Ibid.

Lieutenant Colonel J. D. McCausland has contributed to the Defence Force Journal on previous occasions.
A Soldier’s Salute to Archbishop, Sir Frank Woods, KBE

By John Buckley, OBE.

It gives me considerable pleasure to commend this ‘salute’ to Archbishop Frank Woods for readers of Defence Force Journal.

John Buckley OBE is an honorary war historian and a book reviewer for several national and state journals including the Defence Force Journal and publications of the RSL. He has written short biographies on Sir Edmund Herring, Sir Vernon Sturdee, Sir Frank Shedden and Prime Minister John Curtin. In addition he had war service in the Middle East, New Guinea, France, Holland, Belgium and Germany.

John Buckley is a member of St John’s Anglican Church, Toorak.

This article is important for its links with Anzac Day and the tremendous sacrifice that so many gave to protect the freedoms and principles that undergird our personal and national life. It is important for it brings together church and nation in the painful and tragic context of war. It will help us not to forget, lessen or diminish our gratitude for the contribution of men like Frank Woods and those with whom he served.

My own father served so well, suffered so much and died so soon. I am amongst those who knew the cost and bear the scars.

(This introduction was prepared by the present Archbishop of Melbourne, Dr David Penman, whose close friendship with John Buckley has developed over the past five years, since his appointment to Melbourne.)

On Anzac Day each year I watch for the Dunkirk veterans marching along St Kilda Road.

In the middle of the rear rank limps a distinguished figure getting a little stooped now — but obviously he is someone special. He would not care to draw attention to himself, that is why he is always in the rear rank — he is a very modest man.

Yes! It’s Sir Frank Woods, who likes to be in the company of his famous Dunkirk veterans on Anzac Day, as he was again this year on April 25.

All the ex-service community relate to this man. Like the rest of the marchers he is not there to glorify war nor is he a war-monger — he’s there to remember and to pay homage to those men and women who made the supreme sacrifice for their country. He’s there also to honour and to pray for those friends he knew in his unit who were killed and to join in a close, enduring friendship with those who survived and who are now living in Melbourne. Something very precious as all old soldiers know.

Anzac Day is a day for remembrance and for prayer for the fallen. It’s also a day for old soldiers to get together in fellowship.

Perhaps Sir Frank will recall what his friend, General, Sir Edmund Herring had to say when addressing a huge crowd in 1970 at the Shrine service: “The greatest peace lovers are those who suffered the horrors of war at first hand.” Sir Edmund was Chancellor of the Anglican Church in Victoria for over 40 years.

General Sir Harry Chauvel, the brilliant Australian Cavalry leader, expressed the same thoughts many times. He was a lay canon at St Paul’s Cathedral for more than 25 years and church warden at Christ Church, South Yarra, for several decades. His sword hangs on the southern wall.

Frank Woods experienced the horrors of war during his service as chaplain in 1939-46 in the Middle East, in France and on the horrible beaches at Dunkirk.

In 1951, Sir Frank was appointed one of the chaplains to His Majesty King George VI. This fine prelate could walk with kings and not lose the common touch. Then in 1952 he was appointed as Bishop of Middleton, where he served until 1957. In that year he was appointed Archbishop of Melbourne. He was destined to become one of our greatest archbishops and to become Anglican Primate of Australia (1971-77).

I became a firm admirer of Sir Frank Woods in the last few years of the life of the late
General, Sir Edmund Herring. While in their company at the hospital where Sir Edmund was a long-term patient, it was clear to me that there was a strong brotherly love and bond between these two Christian leaders. They have done so much work together over a long period for the good of the Anglican Church and the community. The Herring family were most supportive and loving of their father, but when Sir Edmund needed spiritual comfort, love and loyalty from outside, he got these in abundance from Frank Woods.

It was an inspiring experience to be in the presence of Herring the great soldier and great Christian, and the outstanding Anglican prelate when they talked about old times, good and bad. These were very important visits to Sir Edmund — he was a most religious man and he got much comfort from the presence of Sir Frank. The late Reverend Donald Longfield described Sir Edmund as the most Christian man he knew. When I was writing my short biography about Sir Edmund I discussed the narrative and the title with Sir Frank because I used much of his information. We agreed Great Soldier — Great Christian was the best title.

I shall always remember the state funeral service for Sir Edmund Herring, held in St Paul’s Cathedral in January 1982, as much because of the brilliant and sincere tribute from


Archbishop Woods. I heard an ex-premier say that it was one of the most outstanding orations ever heard at St Paul’s.

Even after his bad accident a few years ago, Sir Frank still insisted on marching on Anzac Day. He told me he was going to join the march. I helped him through the crowd to join his Dunkirk veterans. He was greeted with joy as they opened ranks to make a place for him. I watched him limping up the rise to the Shrine and I thought: “There goes a true man of God.”

The chaplains of World War I would have admired Sir Frank for he has the qualities and talents which they had exhibited to a marked degree. Here are a few among many:

• The Revd William Dexter (Anglican) served his ministry at Wonthaggi before the war. He finished with DSO, MC and DCM. Not bad for a chaplain!

• The Revd Gerard Tucker (Anglican) emerged from his war service as a deeply committed practical Christian. In 1930 he founded the Brotherhood of St Laurence, and exerted profound influence for good and was dedicated to the poor, the homeless and the handicapped. His ministry was very special. He never forgot the fallen and his mates in the Army and was very proud of his war service. He had every right to be!

• The Revd John Fahey (Catholic) who disobeyed orders by going ashore with his bat-
talion on Anzac Day, said "The soldiers will need me if they are wounded or if they are killed." He received the DSO for outstanding bravery in action over a long period. Returning to Australia towards the end of the war he became the first president of the RSL in Western Australia.

- John Joseph Booth (Anglican) must be mentioned. He won the Military Cross in 1917. He served again in World War II. In 1942 he was appointed Archbishop of Melbourne and served until he was succeeded by Sir Frank Woods. Booth was renowned for his help and advice to returned soldiers. He was a most compassionate man, as I can affirm from personal experience.

Countless others could be added to the list, for example, 'Fighting Mac' McKenzie (Salvation Army), Ernest Merrington (Presbyterian) and Jacob Danglow (Jewish), who was a fine chaplain and served in both wars, receiving affection and respect from many.

World War II brought forth another group of outstanding chaplains. I have mentioned Booth and Danglow. I knew two well:
- Tom Riley, who became Bishop of Bendigo, was a legend in the AMF where he was a chaplain-general for many years. He was senior vice-president of the WA branch of the RSL 1925-38.
- John David McKie who was chaplain of the 6th Division, and later senior chaplain in the Middle East. He was also assistant chaplain-general for the First Army and the New Guinea Force. After the war he became Bishop of Geelong and later Assistant Bishop of Coventry in England. John was highly esteemed by the soldiers and gave much help to those who needed it. I can vouch for that both in war and peace.

Other ex-service men and women will remember other distinguished chaplains. Hopefully someone will write the history of these World War II chaplains. At age 74, I am too old to do so. Dr Michael McKernan wrote an excellent book _Padre_ of those chaplains who served in World War I. Young clergymen should read it!

It will surprise the modest Sir Frank Woods to know of the sincere personal esteem, respect and admiration with which he is held by the Anzac Day marchers and the onlookers. He was a model chaplain. Likewise his most distinguished service to Victorians as Archbishop of Melbourne and to Australians as Primate of

Australia will be remembered with affection and gratitude by everyone.

Always smiling, beaming good fellowship, often with a characteristic chuckle, Sir Frank is always a very modest man and happy in any company. A very popular man!

As a preacher, Frank Woods has the highest reputation — the recently published book _Frank Woods Forward in Depth_ gives selected sermons and addresses which will excite and impress the reader. It was published by his friends for his friends.

It is not generally known that Sir Frank could be regarded as one of the practical founders of the ecumenical movement in Melbourne. He made a start by calling on Archbishop Daniel Mannix very soon after his arrival in Melbourne. The aged Mannix was astounded but pleased and grateful.

Woods found a ready disciple in Sir Edmund Herring who did so much to nurture the ecumenical movement in the state. Woods and Herring worked together in close harmony and made a substantial contribution to the welfare and the prestige of the Anglican Church in Victoria. Two excellent and inspired leaders.

The close friendship and respect between the two Franks (Woods and Little) has set a splendid example of brotherly co-operation, with valued dividends to the prestige of their churches. During the recent visit of Pope John
Paul II to Melbourne, Sir Frank Little introduced Sir Frank Woods as "our Abraham".

This old soldier had great pleasure and satisfaction in writing this story on Good Friday 1987 of one of the finest Archbishops that the Anglican Church has had in Melbourne or Australia. He looked after and was interested in his whole flock and that included the ex-service community which is not insignificant. According to Veterans' Affairs, there are 580,000 surviving war veterans and 600,000 surviving wives and mothers in Australia. Children of the dead and surviving veterans total 3 million. In addition to all this the RSL membership is 300,000.

I salute Sir Frank Woods. I am sure my story will be supported by the community. We are glad to honour his 80th year and wish him good health in the years to come. Old soldiers thank him for his dedication, compassion and example as an outstanding Christian leader, in peace and war. We honor him as one of us.

Sir Frank should be invited to lead the 1988 Anzac Day march in Melbourne. In my opinion no-one deserves the honor more.

Colonel John Buckley has contributed to the Defence Force Journal on many occasions. This article first appeared in SEE in May 1987.

A pre-fabricated hull section of Australian Frigate No. 05 is lowered into position on the building slipway at Williamstown Dockyard. The Dockyard is building the final two new FFG-7 Guided Missile Frigates for the RAN.
The appointment of Major-General Alexander Godley as Commandant of the New Zealand Defence Force in 1910 marked a turning point in New Zealand's military development. Probably no other officer has had the same influence on the nation's defence planning in peacetime, and under his command the manpower provided by the Defence Act of 1909 was built into a reasonable force and prepared to undertake the dual role of local defence and participation in greater schemes of imperial defence.

Godley commenced his military service as a subaltern in the Royal Dublin Fusiliers and was subsequently sent to the Mounted Infantry School and thence to the colonies to see active service with the mounted infantry in Rhodesia in 1886. He commenced his Staff College training in 1899 but did not complete the course owing to the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War. He served with Baden-Powell at Mafeking in 1900 and was subsequently invalided back to Britain in 1901, where he became a foundation member of the Irish Guards. In 1902 he returned to the Mounted Infantry School as the Officer Commanding, a post he held until 1906 when he was posted Assistant Adjutant-General of the Second Division at Aldershot with the rank of colonel. Like many of his countrymen he was an excellent horseman and in 1908 he was selected for the British Army Equestrian Team to compete at the Concours Hippique, Argentina.

When offered the New Zealand appointment, his initial reaction was cautious and he considered turning it down, claiming that "... in the Antipodes one would be out of sight and out of mind." The conditions of service were not particularly attractive — £1000, a house and £200 local allowance — half the salary the Australian Government had offered to Major-General Sir Edward Hutton some eight years earlier, and this might also have caused him to think twice. Balanced against this was the temporary rank of major-general which, to a junior colonel with a relatively mundane service career and few immediate prospects must have been very attractive. Godley was finally persuaded by General Sir Henry Rawlinson who suggested that the appointment provided a chance for "great imperial work".

On arrival in New Zealand, Godley threw himself into the task of organizing the New Zealand Defence Forces along the lines recommended in the 1909 Defence Act and by Lord Kitchener, who had inspected the forces at the invitation of Sir Joseph Ward in 1909.

The colonial parliament, he claimed, had "little idea" about how to implement their new compulsory military service scheme, although he was later to admit that Ward's successor as Defence Minister, Colonel James Allen — a militia officer — went about his duties in "... an enthusiastic and wholehearted" manner. Privately, Godley considered that Allen had "... the great demerit of being an amateur soldier ... thinking that he knows as much about soldiering as anybody whose profession it is." Godley adopted a rather patronising attitude to his minister, always addressing him as "Colonel" — a situation which Allen apparently accepted. He adopted a similar attitude to New Zealand society, noting that his official residence — "a charming little bungalow on Oriental Terrace made (him) ... from the social point of view the pioneer of this particular locality".

Despite his pomposity and snobbishness Godley was hard working and dedicated to making the new army effective. Finding a deficit in staff training in the Dominion, he appointed himself as chief of the local section of the Imperial General Staff and imported two British staff college graduates to fill the positions of Director of Military Training and Staff Duties and Director of Military Operations and Intelligence. He then applied for four more officers to fill the postings of general staff officers, grade three in the military district headquarters. This mass importation did not go un-noticed and the Christchurch Press noted a "murmur
of complaint” but remarked that until the Citizen Army could be staffed by trained New Zealanders the importation was “absolutely necessary”.

Underlying Godley’s desire to improve the command and staff functions of the New Zealand Defence Forces was his appreciation of the dual character of the Dominion’s defence policy in which, although the need for local defence was seen as being paramount, there was a simultaneous commitment to provide a portion of the military forces as an “imperial reserve”. This concept had already been explored by Sir Joseph Ward, who had sought the advice of the Chief of the (British) General Staff, General, Sir William Nicholson and had in fact been incorporated into the 1909 Defence Act. In his desire to keep the “imperial reserve/expeditionary force” theme viable, Godley had the wholehearted support of Allen, who had already spoken to this theme during the debates on the Act.

Although there was general acceptance in New Zealand of the principle of an imperial reserve or expeditionary force component of the new defence force the concept’s practicality foun­dered on the fact that the New Zealand Military Forces were manned through a compulsory training scheme and the concept of an expeditionary force composed of anything but willing volunteers was repugnant to many — if not most — New Zealanders.

II

Fundamental to the provision of a large enough pool of trained manpower to meet these dual aims was the compulsory training scheme which involved every young New Zealander between the ages of twelve and thirty in some form of military service. Between twelve and fourteen service was in the Junior Cadets, from fifteen to seventeen in the Senior Cadets, from eighteen to twenty-one in the General Training Section and from twenty-two to thirty in the Reserve. The scheme was the subject of intense criticism from a vociferous minority on a wide spectrum of moral issues, and against claims that boys were being “... thrown into the corrupting society of vicious minded youths... (in) military camps under conditions which render them objectionable schools of vice” Godley responded that service in the Senior Cadets would endow the boys with “... patriotism, sobriety, self respect and self control... (and that the) camps were no more dangerous from the moral point of view than a football match.”

It was probably the penal clauses of the 1909 Defence Act that drew most criticism, as they applied to the Senior Cadets as well as to the General Training Section. The responsibility of detaining offenders rested with the army and not with the police, and this presented a dilemma to Godley. A firm believer in universal training, he noted in March 1912 that “... the present government are very reluctant to enforce the compulsory clauses of the Act and the whole scheme is in danger”, yet he acknowledged that in the case of youths who refused to serve there was no alternative but “... to make criminals of them and put them in prison” which, he considered, as “quite wrong”. Despite these reservations he was determined to enforce the Act and four months later directed his senior officers to “... get busy with the Territorials and prosecute cadets”. That he nevertheless continued to have reservations on the matter is evidenced in a letter from Allen, in which the Minister assured the General that he realized that the Act imposed upon the military what was essentially a civil duty in regard to detention and assured him that he was considering the question of alternative service for those who objected on religious and conscientious grounds. This problem was partially solved in 1914 when regulations were introduced to exempt conscientious objectors from service and to apply the machinery of the civil law rather than the military to breaches of the Defence Act by Territorials.

III

In the training of the new defence force, Godley continued to pursue the dual aims discussed above and displayed considerable ingenuity in so doing. His first major military exercise was conducted near Wellington and was designed to consider “... certain strategical and tactical problems that might actually occur in the event of a hostile landing in the North Island and to emphasize the strategic weakness of the direct communications by road and rail between Wellington and the North.”

This aim was completely in keeping with the primary, public purpose of the defence force,
namely to maintain the territorial integrity of New Zealand. However, the exercise was "two sided" and the "enemy" force was a division and a mounted brigade — a much larger invading force than current strategic appreciations predicted, and a force in fact very similar in composition to Godley's ideal expeditionary force as will be discussed later. What he had managed to achieve was an exercise in which his officers would not only gain experience in local defence skills in a potentially real area of operations but would also have practice in commanding an expeditionary force composed of units identical to those currently being raised. The exercise therefore had given prominence to local defence problems whilst at the same time had permitted considerations implicit to the lodgement of an expeditionary force into hostile terrain with naval support.

This exercise was followed in 1913 by a rather similar one in the South Island. Once again Godley used the exercise to further his dual aims. The scenario was again an invasion by a maritime power and its subsequent expulsion by the local forces. However, in this exercise there was a comprehensive logistic problem, involving large scale troop movements by rail, casualty evacuation and billeting a large force in a small town (Geraldine) in addition to the tactical problem of mounting a successful major attack in open country (on the Canterbury Plains near Timaru) against a large, well equipped enemy force.17 (The enemy force was again much larger than the current appreciations predicted). Once again Godley had provided sound tactical training in an area which was a probable site of conflict in an invasion situation and had also provided training in the maintenance, movement and administration of a large force in a conventional warfare situation, which had obvious relevance to an expeditionary force role.

By 1913, Godley and Allen were both strongly committed to the expeditionary force concept and in fact saw it as the real function of the New Zealand army. In October 1912 Godley wrote to Allen stating "... though it is fully realized that there is no definite obligation on the part of New Zealand to co-operate with the forces of the Mother Country in the defence of the Empire by means of an overseas expeditionary force it is felt that the ties of kinship and sentiment of patriotism are so strong that in the hour of danger a large number of the people would be desirous of volunteering to assist actively in the defence of the Empire ... it is therefore necessary to have the complete plans of an expeditionary force worked out in peacetime."18

By a fortunate coincidence, only a fortnight later Godley obtained further impetus for his cause, this time from across the Tasman. The Australian Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, acting on the advice of his Defence Minister, Senator G. F. Pearce, wrote to his New Zealand counterpart, W. Massey, noting that as Godley would be in Australia during November to visit the Royal Military College at Duntroon and to discuss the progress of the New Zealand Cadets enrolled there it would be an appropriate time to discuss "... any proposed schemes of mutual assistance and co-operation" for defence purposes between the Commonwealth and the Dominion.19 Massey agreed to this and a conference duly took place at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, from 18 to 20 November, chaired by Senator Pearce, between Godley and the Australian Chief of the General Staff, Brigadier-General J. M. Gordon.

In his opening remarks, Senator Pearce observed that even if it proved to be unable to recommend any co-operative measures as being immediately practicable, the conference marked the beginning in the co-operation of "... the outlying parts of the empire, and showed that the Dominion and the Commonwealth governments recognized their common interests and realized the necessity of joint action".20 Despite this rather pessimistic introduction, the conference swiftly settled down to discuss the respective contributions which might be made for imperial purposes in accordance with the principles agreed upon at the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909. During these discussions it was decided that the value of such contributions would be enhanced if the Commonwealth and the Dominion acted in unison and offered a complete "Australasian" unit. The form that such a contribution should take was further discussed and was eventually chosen to be either a complete division of three infantry and three artillery brigades, a light horse regiment, signals, supplies and transport elements and field ambulances, or if the size of the conflict did not warrant such a large force, an "Australasian Mounted Force" of four light horse bri-
government the services of an Australasian Di-

Godley wrote to Allen in which he reported an expeditionary force for use in the furtherance of British imperial policy is revealed in a letter to which it was observed that such a scheme would only be acceptable if all the men involved were volunteers. Godley hastily assured the public that "... the Minister's reference was to volunteers and the position was set out perfectly clearly in the Defence Act, and that there was never a suggestion that any member of the Defence Force should go abroad except as a volunteer". Allen had, in fact, foreseen possible opposition to his statement and had written to Godley from Melbourne, reminding him that "... Rhodes (acting defence minister) knows, and so do you, perfectly well, that I know the men must volunteer". Despite these assurances, Massey called Allen, requesting "... the exact words used by you with regard to expeditionary force" and received a rather evasive reply that the offer had included the proviso "... when the men volunteer under our Act, everything would be ready for them to go".

Allen subsequently produced a memorandum for Massey in which he stated that in his discussions with the "War Authorities" in London, including Generals Sir John French (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), Sir Henry Wilson (Director of Military Operations) and Sir Lancelot Kiggell (Director of Staff Duties) he
had stated that the Territorials and Reservists making up the expeditionary force would all be invited to volunteer and that the War Office "understood the position quite clearly". Godley reinforced this position in his Annual Report to Parliament four months later, observing that a greater interest was being shown by all classes of the community in their citizen army and stating that whilst plans were in hand for an expeditionary force it would consist entirely of volunteers who wished to "... assist the Mother Country and to preserve the integrity of the British Empire in time of great emergency."

IV

Godley had already commented to Allen about the potential "great emergency" and had communicated his opinions as to its possible nature. Germany, he claimed, was the "probable opponent" and he suggested that the expeditionary force would be best employed to seize German overseas territories in China, the West Pacific or East Africa, or to act as "first reinforcements" to the British Expeditionary Force in Europe or for operations in Egypt. He personally considered that the New Zealand force should be "given the opportunity" of fighting with the British Expeditionary Force and that on the outbreak of a European war should proceed to Egypt as soon as such a passage was safe and from there be sent to the front with the imperial forces. In the preparation of an updated defence scheme for the Dominion Godley noted the Admiralty considered that the largest threat to New Zealand was either a raid by a small landing force or an attack by "one or two hostile cruisers" on shipping in harbours and that it was his opinion that "... with our present harbour defences and the Australian Fleet in being it is not considered that the risk ... would be commensurate with the object to be achieved and ... (neither) France nor Germany could bring against New Zealand any military landing force that the present defences could not deal with". He accepted the War Office faith in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as "... relieving us from the necessity of considering the scale of attack Japan could bring to bear on British possessions in the Pacific".

To further the preparedness of the New Zealand forces for participation in a campaign with the Home Army, Godley encouraged the exchange of officers between New Zealand and the United Kingdom. His predecessor, Brigadier-General Davies, was appointed Brigadier-General, General Staff, at Aldershot and in 1913 four junior officers were receiving training in Britain. One was sent to the Mounted Infantry School, another was sent on a linguists course to learn French, another was attached to an infantry battalion at Aldershot and underwent training in trench warfare, machine gunnery and billeting and the fourth, a specialist in harbour defence and submarine mining found himself, much to his surprise, attached to a mountain artillery unit. With the possible exception of the officer at the Mounted Infantry School, all of these New Zealanders were being trained in military skills of little use in the defence of their own country, the emphasis being on tactics and weapons suited to participation in an expeditionary force role, as part of a greater British army in Europe.

This aspect received further reinforcement when Godley visited the United Kingdom in 1913. In company with General Sir Lancelot Kiggell he attended manoeuvres at Aldershot where the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Henry Wilson) impressed upon him that it would not be long before he would be called upon to produce "... an expeditionary force from New Zealand for service in Europe". He also had an interview with General, Sir John French, who was reported to be both interested in and pleased with the progress of the expeditionary force concept and very appreciative of the encouragement it received from Allen. Considerable interest was also shown in the compulsory training scheme with Godley noting that both King George V and the Duke of Connaught asked him about its progress.

Despite his apparent confidence in the New Zealand Defence Force, Godley entertained definite misgivings about its efficiency and communicated his feelings to Allen in a secret memorandum on 11 July 1913, stating that "... the military forces of the Dominion are at present not in a position to take the field for warlike operations". One of the major factors contributing to this state of affairs was the difficulty of concentrating the dispersed rural platoon and company sized units for their annual camps, and the reluctance of employers in the urban areas to release their employees for
periods of continuous training. The subject was
debated at the New Zealand Farmers’ Union
Annual Conference at Wellington in 1913 and
the Territorial system was eventually ‘approved’
by that body as being, in its opinion, “... the
best way to maintain peace . . . (and) to defend
the Empire”. 46

Nevertheless, the compulsory training scheme
did not, as has been noted earlier, meet with
the undivided approval of the populace. Its
most vocal opponents remained the pacifists
who were to be found mainly in these organi­
zations: the ‘National Peace Council’ in the
South Island, and the ‘New Zealand Freedom
League (Anti-Conscript)’ and the Auckland
Branch of the ‘International Arbitration and
Peace Association’ in the North Island. 47 In­
ternational criticism was voiced at the 8th Na­
tional Peace Congress in England in June 1912
where a resolution was passed which described
the Defence Act as “... a grave menace to
civil and religious freedom”. 48

In Christchurch the National Peace Council
backed the actions of a group of youths who
refused to attend the drills and were subse­
sequently detained in the artillery barracks on
Ripa Island in Lyttelton Harbour in accordance
with the Defence Act. In London their cause
was taken up by the Society of Friends who
described them as “... a handful of lads —
mostly working class lads, daring, enduring,
suffering in order that English boys may still
be free”. 49 In contrast, Allen described them in
a letter to Godley, then in London, as “... regular young anarchists, . . . encouraged by
their parents to break the law.” 50 Four days
earlier, the Lyttelton Times reported that a de­
putation representing 70,000 workers and 250
organizations claimed to be ready to assure the
Prime Minister that organized labour was going
to support the cause of the detainees, but a
subsequent and unsuccessful attempt to blow
up the King Edward VII Barracks at Christchurch on 11 July led to a swing away of
sympathy for the detainees, and by the 18th
the same newspaper which had previously shown
some support for their plight described them as “... only a band of bad boys”. 51 By 8
August Allen was able to write to Godley in­
forming him that “... the attacks by the La­
bour people and by some of the Peace Orga­
nization people have, I think, completely
failed”. 52

The Ripa Island incident did, however, serve
to focus attention on the implementation of the
penal clauses of the Act, the burden of en­
forcement of which fell upon the military au­
torities; a matter with which Godley, as noted
earlier, was not in agreement. Allen admitted
that the matter was “... too much of a burden
for the Defence Department . . . and I am
hoping to get rid of it somehow” 53 and in early
1914 the Act was amended to substitute civil
courts for courts-martial in the case of breaches
of the Defence Act by Territorials and to detail
procedures for conscientious and religious ob­
jections to the undertaking of military service.

V

Reservations as to the efficiency of Godley’s
Army were also expressed by General, Sir Ian
Hamilton when, in his capacity as Inspector­
General of the Oversea Forces, he inspected the
Defence Forces in April 1914. He described
them as “... not perfect or anywhere near
perfect”, observing that the time devoted to
training was too limited. Although personally
disinclined to both militia systems and conscrip­
tion — even of the New Zealand variety — he
admitted that the progress of the forces since
the 1909 Defence Act had been “singularly
rapid” and remarked that he had not heard
“one single adverse opinion from the mouth of
a live New Zealander” about cadet training,
although he did confess to having received
“numbers of disapproving letters” from what
he considered to be a very vocal but small
minority. 54 His visit, however, would always be
remembered by one cadet’s parents, whose son
dropped dead at an inspection parade held for
Hamilton at Dunedin. 55 Hamilton, in his pub­
lished report, summarized his feelings by ob­
serving that the success or failure of the scheme
would rest on whether or not “... a fighting
standard of efficiency can be obtained without
even withdrawing the adult citizen from his civil
employment for more than a few days in the
year”. 56

It was on the issue of taking these ‘few days’
that the compulsory training scheme received
some of its sharpest criticism during 1914. In
what is probably the most comprehensive cri­
tique to which the scheme was subjected, the
The Otago Daily Times pointed out that it put the employers to a very great deal of expense and inconvenience and thus did not make the hapless Territorial popular with his employer. The article also stated that the scheme was inefficient insofar as the recruit would forget much of what he had been taught between parades and camps which, it observed, extended over eleven years of the man's life. The author concluded "...it would be much better if were to adopt a scheme which would train our young men more efficiently, which would be less inconvenient to both Territorials and employers and which would not be so ruinously expensive." The article concluded by suggesting a three months' continuous training course in barracks in suitable parts of the country, a system remarkably similar to that in use today by the current volunteer territorial reserve.

The debate on the issue of the relationship between the proposed expeditionary force and the universal training scheme continued right up to the eve of the Great War. In the parliament's debates on Godley's 1914 Annual Report it was stated by Mr J. H. Escott (Pahiatua) that the expeditionary force must be voluntary in nature, but he believed that there would be no difficulty in finding the number of volunteers required. A month later this view was vindicated as thousands of New Zealanders rushed to the colours, in many cases whole Territorial regiments volunteering to the man.

On 6th October 1914 the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, commanded by Godley, left Wellington for the "foreign" war. In a farewell oration Godley was assured that the "...splendid development of our scheme of universal training is due to a very great extent to your wide experience, marked ability and unerring tact". He had laid the foundations of a modern and efficient army, capable of both local and imperial defence roles and had dispelled the indifference and apathy of defence that had existed in New Zealand before his arrival. He had been fortunate in Ward and Allen to have sympathetic support on both sides of the dominion parliament and to have allies in the cause of greater imperial defence in the provision of an expeditionary force. It was the creation of such a force that he saw as probably the most important objective of his period of command and it was the one that he most successfully achieved.

NOTES
2. Ibid., p. 138.
13. Minutes of a Conference of Senior Officers of the Permanent.
18. Letter, Godley to Allen, 9 October 1912. *A.D. 10, 16/6*. (Note that Godley had already raised the matter with Allen on 2 August 1912 in a secret memorandum referred to by Allen in a letter to Massey in June 1913 (AD 10, 16/6) Unfortunately this memorandum could not be located in the National Archives.)
21. Ibid., p. 4.
22. Ibid., p. 12, recommendation iii.
23. Ibid., recommendation iv(a).
27. No minutes were taken by direction of Pearce, *Council of Defence Meetings* Australian Archives, Melbourne, CPSA 2028
28. ???
29. *Dominion*, 12 December 1912
32. Evening Post, 5 February 1913.
34. Cable, Massey to Allen, 10 February 1913. *Allen Papers*, MZ/12.
35. ??
36. Memorandum, Allen to Massey, 7 June 1913, *A.D. 10, 16/6*.
40. Ibid., p. 15.
41. 'Reports from New Zealand Officers attached to the Imperial Forces, 1913,' A.D. 1, 68/105-8.
43. Letter, Godley to Allen, 14 August 1913, Allen Papers 2, Ml/15.
44. Letter, Godley to Allen, 28 September 1913, Ibid.
45. Memorandum, (Secret) Godley to Allen, 11 July 1913, A.D. 12, 21.
46. Dominion, 18 July 1913.
51. Lyttelton Times, 18 July 1913.
52. Letter, Allen to Godley, 8 August 1913, Loc. Cit.
53. Letter, Allen to Godley, 25 September 1913. Ibid.
55. Letter, Allen to the Earl of Liverpool (Governor General of New Zealand) 29 April 1914, A.D. 1, 107/8.

Colonel Johnson is currently a member of the Reserve Staff Group and seconded to the Army Reserve Review Committee Implementation Team. He holds an MA (History) (Monash), Trained Teacher's Certificate and is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society. He is a Public Servant in the Attorney-General's Department and spent 14 months in Antarctica as Officer-in-Charge of Casey Station with the Department of Science.

Allenby — Liberator of Palestine

By Major V.L.J. Gregson, RACT

Of all my reasons for going to Israel — as a Christian pilgrim, as an amateur student of all the history that has taken place there, and merely as a curious visitor — my special interest was to learn and understand how it was that, in 1917, General Sir Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby chucked out the Turkish Empire and liberated Palestine after 400 years of Ottoman rule. My father and my uncle had lent a hand in this exploit; they were Light Horsemen of the Australian 4th Light Horse Regiment. Beersheba seemed a good place to start so, equipped with Field Marshal Earl Wavell's commentary on the Palestine Campaigns, I set off from Jerusalem for the drive south, through Bethlehem and Hebron, to this city on the edge of the Negev Desert.

The place has changed a bit since the day the Australian Light Horse hit town. Then it was a straggling village of about ten streets criss-crossing each other. It was, as it had always been, merely a watering-place for the Bedouin's flocks of sheep and goats and a place for them to hold their markets. (They still do, in fact. Every Thursday at 6 am, the tribes move in to sell and buy.) More developments have occurred since the Israelis ejected the Egyptians in 1948. Beersheba now has a population of 100,000 and Ben-Gurion University is a major function of the place. But, even the Israelis admit that there is still a sort of Wild West flavour to the town. Everything looks as if it was only unpacked last week.

But there is one little spot in Beersheba that does not have a sense of permanence and calm about it. The little British War Cemetery is just on the outskirts of the Old Town and holds about 1,000 dead, of whom perhaps one third are Australians and New Zealanders. As I approached the place, I was delighted to see that lots of gum trees and a few peppercorns have been planted right around it, by the fence. Then, as if to provide a touch of English landscape in this very Antipodean environment, there is a classic English park bench where one can rest in the shade. And one needed to! If it is so hot and sticky in Beersheba in May, what on earth is it like in August!?

Just down the road from the Cemetery is 'The Museum of the Negev', which had been the Great Mosque until 1948. In Gullett's Australian Official War History account of the charge of the Light Horse, he speaks of 'the mosque, shining white in the setting sun'. But, it's not white! It's the same soft tan colour of all the other stone buildings throughout the country. Perhaps it was white — 70 years ago.

A little further on from the Museum is a small park with a big, solid monument to Allenby. It is a plain stone pillar perhaps ten feet high with the simple inscription, 'Allenby. 1917-1918.' Just that! What an accolade to the man! It assumes that all who see it will know who he was and what he did. (Back in the Museum, there is a photograph circa 1923 of the original monument to Allenby. It was probably the same stone base, but with a rather fussy head and shoulders likeness on top. The Israelis probably wanted the bronze for more practical purposes, and they did art a favour too, by removing the ugly thing!).

Standing on the highest point in the Old Town, I looked out to the south east — whence had come the horsemen! Road W on the map (the regiments had lined up on either side of this road) is now the highway to Eilat, the big port and tourist centre on the Red Sea. Factories and quarries now line the road for 2 or 3 kilometres out of the city. The hills marked on the map now bristle with big communications towers and antennas. But the topography hasn't changed. It's still great cavalry country and, if it weren't for the roar of the big trucks rumbling in and out of the factories, and the noise of the city behind, one could perhaps imagine the late afternoon of Wednesday, 31st October, 1917 when just a couple of thousand men on their big, strong, fast, brave horses fell on this place and opened the way for the liberation of Palestine.

The next day, I pressed on to Gaza. All through the town, there is plenty of evidence of Gaza's continuing role as a battlefield. Everyone has had a go at poor old Gaza — the Egyptians (both ancient and modern), the Ro-
I wanted to visit Deir el Balah, a village a few miles south of Gaza. Before I left Jerusalem, my driver had expressed some anxious uncertainty that we would be able to travel there at all. He couldn't remember which side of the Egypt/Israel border it had ended up on after the last war! We checked a recent map and yes, it is in Israel — just.

Driving south with the Mediterranean on our right hand, I was reminded of Allenby's plan to take this area. One of his major problems was the wide belts of impenetrable cactus which the Arab farmers used for fences and, no doubt, as their own cheap, effective security systems. Some of these fences are still in place around the date plantations outside the town. They are made of mud walls piled up about four feet and dried brick-hard by the sun. Growing on top is another four or five feet of cactus — the kind with large, flat 'plates' of tough vegetation with great spikes all over. It was quite impenetrable to horses, and to infantry. It was even an effective barrier to rifle and machine gun fire. This situation led Allenby to move his troops against the town by bringing them up from the south along the beach, then moving across a mile or two of large, soft sand dunes. These dunes are still there of course, and would have been very heavy going for infantry, and still out of the question for horses. He planned the action for night-time, which at least gave the foot soldiers a better chance at the place.

I had a special reason for wanting to go to Deir el Balah. When my father returned from the War to the little Victorian town where he had grown up, he married, bought a house and started a family. He named this house 'Belah' — after this little village in Palestine which he said was the prettiest town he had ever seen. And so, it was with some sense of relief that I found that it is still, after all these years, a charming little place. It is not a prosperous town, but its streets are wide and there is a sense of spaciousness about the place.

Deir el Balah was a big rest camp from Allenby's Egyptian Expeditionary Force. (My father always pronounced it 'BEE-LAH', but the correct Arabic pronunciation is 'Bal-AAHH' with that throaty, gargling sound on the 'AAHH'. The word means, incidentally, 'date palm'; the same kind of tree that one so often sees in little Australian country towns — around
Can anyone throw any light on this wonderfully evocative photograph? It is one of a collection of over 100 photographs which my father brought home from the War. Most of them were, I believe, taken by himself and depict his Regiment, the 4th Light Horse, at work and play.

Now, the puzzle is this. H. S. Gullett, in his 'Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Volume VII, Sinai and Palestine' describes the capture by Australian troops of only three enemy aeroplanes. One was found still packed in its crate, and the other two were captured near Jenin. But, Gullett speaks only of the 9th and 10th Light Horse Regiments being involved in the Jenin affair. Is this a photograph of the 9th, the 10th or the 4th Light Horse? Did the 4th manage to bag a handsome prize of their own? Or, what was my father doing galloping about the countryside with the wrong Regiment?

All opinions, theories, guesses and conjecture will be very welcome.

the war memorial.) Belah, as the place was known before its name was returned to its proper Arabic form, was also the location for the film that was made in 1918 re-enacting the charge at Beersheba. So, as well as being a nice spot for a bit of leave, there was also the fun of making an instant-replay movie for the Mums and Dads at home! What a lark!

We drove down to the beach, and I think I now know why my father and no doubt, thousands of soldiers like him, and the horses, would have loved the place. What a perfect spot for a swim! It was not difficult for me to imagine (please forgive an old spinster!) thousands of naked, fit, tanned young bodies flinging themselves into the surf roaring with laughter and chucking sand at each other. And the horses, in their more genteel way, stepping gracefully through the shallows and then breasting the big waves of the cooling, refreshing, soothing Mediterranean. How wise was old Allenby! After the strain and the fright and the blood of battle, to bring men to a place like this and to give them their heads in wholesome fun would have soon brought them back to life and rearing to go again.

Heading back to Jerusalem up the Plain of Philistia, I travelled through more territory conquered by Allenby. Later, I travelled up the Jordan Valley (which Lord Wavell described as ‘a sweltering trench’, but is now a garden thanks to the genius of Israeli agriculture) and through the Valley of Jezreel where, at Megiddo, Allenby broke the last of the Turkish strongholds in Palestine.

Allenby’s name is famous in Israel. There are streets and squares named for him all over the country. He is one of the few Englishmen whom the Israelis choose to remember with any sense of historical acclaim.

Allenby, The Man

Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby was born on St George’s Day (23rd April) 1861. He was commissioned from Sandhurst into the Inniskilling Dragoons and served several times in South Africa, ending as a column leader in 1902. But it was in France in the Great War that he made his name. He first commanded a Cavalry Division, then the 3rd Army, whose work was mainly in the broken, bloodied zones of Ypres and the Somme.
In 1917, he took over from Murray in Palestine and swiftly reanimated the whole front, where stalemate had supervened. As he moved from Egypt up the classic invasion route to Gaza, Allenby threw out his cavalry to execute the capture of Beersheba. The British had been stymied for a while despite two costly assaults on Gaza’s defences, but the shock waves from their defeat at Beersheba eventually loosened the Turks’ grip on Gaza. From then on, Allenby always held the initiative and the campaign became a purely offensive operation.

But, it takes good leadership and firm command to make the most of even a continuous string of victories. For example, Allenby knew the risks inherent in failing to pursue a fleeing enemy. He knew the temptation of soldiers (and their commanders) to down tools and rest a while after a job well done — to rest the men and the horses, to make and mend and let the logistics catch up. But, this temptation must be resisted. The enemy, meanwhile, is falling back onto his reserves, is reorganising, reinforcing and regaining his strength. The attack must be pressed on into pursuit to break the enemy’s retreat and turn it into a rout. It takes a special kind of commander to lead men in this way beyond the ‘usual’ objective of victory in battle. Allenby had mastered that special craft. He pursued; he persevered. He never failed to ensure that his Army collected some interest earned by their own hard work and sacrifice.

What the well-dressed Light Horseman was wearing in 1917. 2663 Trooper Robert William Gregson of the 4th Light Horse Regiment.
Like many high commanders, Allenby had one or two bees in his bonnet about apparently little things. He was often on the move, out in the desert, inspecting formations and units. These unexpected visitations struck terror into the hearts of his subordinate commanders. Allenby was known as “The Bull”, for his thick-set, firm-footed stance and his way of looking at people with his forehead. Whenever he left his Headquarters, someone would always send a message out to all and sundry, ‘The Bull’s loose!’.

One of his favourite targets for attack in these inspections invariably involved Australians and New Zealanders. He disapproved most strongly of the wearing of shorts. He held that a man wearing shorts while riding a horse was very likely to chafe his legs, which would then become infected and would be very difficult to cure. He was absolutely right of course, as he was with so many other concerns about the health of his men. So, the Australians and the Kiwis were frequently on the receiving end of ‘The Bull’s’ roar on the subject of shorts.

The simplicity of Allenby’s ethics was superbly illustrated by his entry into Jerusalem in December, 1917. Kaiser Wilhelm II had visited the city some years before the War and had demanded all the pomp and ceremony due a German Emperor. They even knocked out a couple of feet of stone above one of the ancient gates entering the Old City so that Kaiser Willy could ride through in all his majesty without knocking his spiked helmet off. Allenby was aware of this, and when his turn came to enter the Holy City — as its liberator after 400 years of Turkish occupation — he dismounted, and walked in. He said that he did so because, ‘A greater man than I had walked into Jerusalem.’ He was referring to Christ.

T. E. Lawrence, with his unsurpassed gift of describing people, said of Allenby, ‘His mind is like the prow of the Mauretania. It has so much weight behind it, it doesn’t need to be razor sharp.’

After the War, Allenby was appointed High Commissioner to Egypt where, with a little more leisure, he was able to indulge his pleasures of studying birds and flowers. He kept a pet crane, which followed him about like a dog. In his work as High Commissioner, he continued his policy of exploiting success, of collecting the interest on the hard work of the past. He tried, in that troubled land, in those troubled times, to keep the name of Great Britain an honoured title, while at the same time acknowledging the proper ambitions of the people he ruled.

Major Victoria Gregson was commissioned in 1968 and has served with the RACT since 1973. Her present appointment is S02 Movements and Transport at HQ 3MD, Melbourne. She has previously contributed to ‘Ich Dien’, the magazine of 4/19th Prince of Wales’ Light Horse Regiment on the subject of the Australian Light Horse in Palestine.
ARES Retention Planning at the Unit Level

By Lt Col Darryl Low Choy, MBE

Abstract

This article rejects the premise that problems of retention in the Army Reserve can be solved simply by allocating more resources or solely by some agency external to the unit. Many of the factors which influence a Reservist’s willingness to serve are within the direct control of the unit and consequently, it is at this level, where retention planning will be most relevant and effective. Unit Commanders must have their own specific-to-unit Retention Plans, capable both of operating within whatever constraints prevail at the time and in association with external to unit retention initiatives.

Retention is a function of command and consequently a unit’s retention plan must be understood and vigorously implemented by all of the leaders in the unit from the Commanding Officer to the Section Commander. An ad hoc approach to retention will not work because of the complex and interrelated nature of the factors which influence a Reservist’s willingness to serve. This article examines these factors and draws information from a number of internal and external sources in order to analyse the full dimensions of the retention question within an ARES unit context. It looks particularly at the 5th Fd Engr Regt retention statistics for the previous 5 years (Jan 80 to Dec 84).

Finally, a comprehensive Retention Plan for this unit is advanced as an example. This plan adopts a “Management by Objectives” approach and comprises a series of Unit Retention Objectives together with accompanying sets of related Policy Statements and Action Priorities for the forthcoming training year.

This plan does not offer any magical cures for the retention problem. Instead it offers an approach which facilitates the delineation of the full dimensions of the problem, thus allowing a comprehensive appreciation to be undertaken and then a means whereby most existing and some new unit undertakings can be reevaluated and redirected to achieve what should be the unit’s prime goal of RETENTION.

Introduction

THIS year sees the Australian Army Reserve at the crossroads. It is emerging from an era of indifference that was characterised by an absence of a sense of real purpose and direction. More recently, there are encouraging signs that it is also emerging from a period of declining numbers. Ahead lie a number of brighter prospects for the Army Reserve, whose attainment will depend upon many factors, not the least of which will include the initiative of the Reserve to help themselves. All of this is occurring at a time when the Australian community itself is evolving through a fluid phase of changing priorities.

The Army Reserve of the future will have to improve and maintain its efficiency in an environment of finite resources. This will have to be achieved in a community that will be characterised by changing attitudes to many economic and social issues and patterns of employment, one that in general, will have more disposable income and more available leisure time.

Against this background, the Army Reserve and indeed, the Army and the Defence planners, must address the single most pressing and immediate issue currently facing the Reserve — RETENTION. This does not represent a new problem to the Reserve, nor was it unknown to the earlier CMF and Militia Forces of this country. What is different is the context in which it now occurs, the dimensions of the total problem and the degree to which the influencing factors now operate.

Whilst there are many facets to the Retention problem, there are clearly those which are the sole domain of Reserve responsibility. Many of these in turn, can best be addressed at the unit level. To this end, the 5th Field Engineer Regiment earlier this year undertook its own Retention Study covering the 5 year period from January 1980 to December 1984. As a consequence of this study, the unit has developed its own specific-to-unit Retention Plan for the forthcoming 1985/86 training year.
Retention Study

Unit Retention Planning — A Methodology

Study Objective
The objective of the unit's Retention Study was:

To identify the dimensions and the contributing factors behind the loss of unit members, specifically Other Ranks, and in the light of these results, to formulate a plan to counter these influences and to improve Other Ranks retention within unit means.

Methodology
The methodology employed to undertake the retention study and to arrive at the Retention Plan is outlined in Figure 1.

Step 1 involved the identification of the nature of the loss of unit Other Ranks. This was done in terms of establishing:

(i) the average annual loss;
(ii) the average annual turnover; and
(iii) the average annual retention rate.

Additionally, the geographic distribution of the loss, in terms of the unit's depot locations and the male/female components of the loss, were also examined.

Step 2 required the analysis of the main characteristics of the loss, specifically in terms of:

(i) the average length of service of the Other Ranks discharged during the 5 year period;
(ii) the temporal distribution of the loss; and
(iii) the training standards achieved prior to discharge (including the average time taken to complete Basic Recruit Training and Initial Employment Training).

Step 3 involved the identification and the analysis of the reasons for the loss, which could range from those outside the direct control of the unit to those within the influence of the unit.

Step 4 was then undertaken in the light of the results from Steps 1, 2 and 3. This entailed the development and evaluation of a range of feasible remedial measures to address the unit’s specific retention problems.

Step 5 was then the formulation of the specific-to-unit Retention Plan for the forthcoming 1985/86 training year.

Step 6 involved the implementation of the Plan with execution being the responsibility of all levels of command throughout the unit, from Section Commanders to Commanding Officer.

Step 7 is crucial to the success of the Plan in the longer term, because the Plan is not a static document, there is an ongoing requirement to continually monitor the Plan and to revise it in the light of various feedback and experience and in response to changing circumstances.

5 FER Retention Study — A Summary

The full report detailing the results of the 5 FER Retention Survey has been published separately (5 FER, 1985).

Nature of Other Ranks Loss

The main features regarding the nature of the unit’s loss of Other Ranks for the 5 year period from Jan 1980 to Dec 1984 are set out below:

(i) Other Ranks lost through discharge 345
(ii) Average Annual Loss 69
(iii) Average Annual Turnover 27.5% (35.8%)
(iv) Average Annual Retention Rate 73.5% (64.2%)

Characteristics of the Loss

The average period of service for Other Ranks discharged during the 5 year period in question were 16 months (15 months for male OR). Over one half (53% of the OR) lost were discharged within 12 months of enlistment and 83% within 24 months. Almost all of the OR lost, had completed their Basic Recruit Course, on average within 6 months of enlistment. On the other hand, the average time that was taken to complete IET for field engineers was lengthy (i.e. to ECN 140-1 standard which involved 90% of all unit establishment trades). This ranged from 19 months from the completion of Recruit Course for Brisbane-based OR to 26 months for Mt Isa OR, giving an average of 21 months for the Regiment as a whole. Needless to say, some 93% of all male OR discharged in the Field Engineer stream had not completed their IET. Clearly, the redress of this hiatus is one of the central keys to the whole issue of ARES retention at the unit level.

Reasons of the Loss

Using information from the Unit’s Retention Study together with information from other sources, a comprehensive (though not exhaustive) list of principal reasons why Reservists become non-effective and/or are discharged has been compiled, refer Table 1.

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Clearly there are those reasons (as illustrated) which are beyond the direct influence of the unit. Equally however, there is another group of reasons which are within the unit’s control and it is this group that requires redress by a Unit Retention Plan.

Also of significance here is the prime reason why Reservists join the Army Reserve. Another unit study (5 FER, 1983), demonstrated that nearly one half (48%) of the unit’s Other Ranks joined initially to learn new skills. When this does not occur, they will more than likely seek discharge and this appears to be borne out by the conclusions reached in the previous study step.

**FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS**

The Unit Retention Study also estimated the costs to train a Recruit to ECN Level 1 standard, (i.e. Basic Recruit and Initial Employment training). This was conservatively estimated at some $5,500 per recruit. It was further estimated that for each Sapper retained past the ECN Level 1 standard and up to the full 3yr enlistment period, then the cost saving could be between $2,000 and $2,500. In the light of recent turn-over rates in the Reserve, this figure represents a significant financial resource which could be redirected towards other areas in the Reserve.

**Other Issues Behind Retention Planning**

Many of the basic issues behind Retention Planning at the unit level in the Army Reserve are illustrated by the “HIGHS and LOWS” concept. This concept provides a good theoretical basis for retention planning. It was advanced by the Bennett Study (1983).

This study identified a number of factors which POSITIVELY affected retention, what they called the emotional “HIGH” and for the individual Reservists these included:

- The realisation that they are an important part of a team.
- The comradeship of Reserve mates.
- A sense of pride in themselves at their own achievements, both individually and as part of the team.
- Personal development such as an increase in self confidence, greater ability to “handle authority” and an increased sense of responsibility.
- Learning, in both a formal sense as well as that which results in less tangible benefits.

- Positive recognition from the public.
- Improved relationships with other family members, particularly fathers.
- An improvement in civilian job.

The “LOW” factors identified, which negatively affected retention, were of two basic groups. The first group included those factors commonly associated with the occurrence of particular events and which tended to occur early in Reserve service, especially in the first 12 months.

These factors included:

- A lengthy time lag from initial enquiry to active involvement.
- Embarrassment by an early lack of knowledge of the basics, such as how to put on the uniform, the rank badges, terminology etc.
- Recruit Courses can also be a monumental “low” for some.
- Recruits can experience a low point on re-joining a unit because of slackening in the pace of activity and a dissipation or lack of the team.
- Failure to be given a full uniform means recruits cannot “feel” like a soldier.
- Lack of knowledge on available courses (goals).
- Boring and non-active camps.

The Bennett study further suggested that over time, other groups of negative factors assume greater importance. The main ones were:

- Poorer communications involving:
  - organisational “stuff-ups” which are rarely explained.
  - organisational problems leading to complaints of poor leadership.
  - lower moral which lessens enthusiasm to deal with available equipment.
  - the erosion of the emotional value of courses and camps.
  - a lack of recognition of the importance of support work and lead up training for the “exciting parts”

- Lack of recognition including:
  - that by superiors of a member’s potential to contribute, even if he is not obviously suitable for promotion.
  - that by the general public and Regular Army members of the importance of the Army Reserve and the hard work put in by individual Reservists.
This "HIGHS & LOWS" concept sees the Army Reservist's period of service as a continual stream of "high" and "low" points (i.e. satisfactions and disappointments), all being generated by both major and minor events. Throughout a Reservist's period of service, this continual stream of "highs" and "lows" affect him and his willingness to remain in the Reserve. The "highs" keep him going and "lows" erode his attitude towards the Reserve. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 2.

Clearly, the overall objective of a unit's Retention Plan is to create as many "highs" as possible, particularly "notable highs", sufficient to override and make the "lows" easier to live with, whilst endeavouring to minimise
or eliminate the “lows”. This concept also suggests that Retention Planning must take cognizance of the sequence of Reserve Service.

5th FD Engr Regt Retention Plan 1985/86

The Unit’s Retention Plan is a comprehensive strategy which adopts a “Management by Objectives” approach. Each of the main issues or areas identified by the Retention Study are addressed by a series of Unit Retention OBJECTIVES for the 1985/86 year (i.e. What is to be achieved). For each objective, a number of broad POLICY STATEMENTS have been developed (i.e. How it is to be achieved).

These statements in turn, have an accompanying set of specific ACTION PRIORITIES for the 1985/86 year (i.e. The Means and Responsibility for achieving the Objective.).

Framework of the Plan

The Objectives/Policies/Priorities Statements are contained within a framework comprising three basic groups and in a manner which is consistent with the above discussion. This framework comprises:

EXTERNAL STATEMENTS

Group 1 Those statements directed to external aspects which are not directly associated with the unit’s role nor its normal functions;

INTERNAL STATEMENTS

Group 2 Those statements relating mainly to the individual in terms of the temporal service sequence of the Reservist; and

Group 3 Those of a general unit management nature.

The outline framework of the Retention Plan is illustrated in Figure 3.

Contents of the Plan

The basic contents of the Retention Plan are a set of 7 Objectives and 19 related Policy Statements. The full Retention Plan for the unit is set out in Annex A. The basic contents are:

OBJECTIVE 1 — this deals with the Potential Negative Factors external to the unit. The objective here is:

To minimize and reverse the external factors which negatively influence a Reservist’s willingness to serve in 5 FER.

This objective gives rise to 3 Policy Statements which deal with the issues of:

Policy 1 — Wife/Girlfriend and Family
Policy 2 — Employers
Policy 3 — Competing Interests

OBJECTIVE 2 — this is the commencement of the Group 2 series of statements which deal with the sequence of a Reservist’s service. This Objective specifically covers the Service Foundations and it is:

To establish efficient mechanisms which will provide the Recruit with solid attitudinal foundations for ARES service and allow him to become an effective soldier in the most expeditious manner.

The two Policies that have been set to achieve this objective deal with:

Policy 4 — Application and Enlistment Phase
Policy 5 — Pre-Recruit Course Phase

OBJECTIVE 3 — addresses Retention Improvement and is:

To improve the IET progression rate and to increase and establish the unit’s average retention rate for OR at the Minimum service enlistment period of 3 years.

This Objective will be achieved by 3 Policies covering:

Policy 6 — Recruit Course Phase
Policy 7 — Post Recruit Course Phase
Policy 8 — IET Phase

OBJECTIVE 4 — covers the issue of Ongoing Goals and is:

To provide a series of ongoing goals conducive to the continued service of individual Reservists in the unit and to provide incentives for their re-engagement, thus maximising the return to the Army and to the unit for the initial investment in their recruit and initial employment training.

This Objective has two associated Policy Statements covering:

Policy 9 — Advanced Training Phase
Policy 10 — Initial Promotion Phase

OBJECTIVE 5 — this is the first of 3 objectives in Group 3 dealing with issues of a general unit management nature. Specifically it covers Unit Management and is:
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**FIGURE 3**

OUTLINE FRAMEWORK OF 5 FER RETENTION PLAN
To ensure that a high standard of unit management is maintained to meet the needs of the unit and the individual.

There are 4 Policies which result from this Objective dealing with:
- Policy 11 — Administration
- Policy 12 — Leadership
- Policy 13 — Communications
- Policy 14 — Organisation

**OBJECTIVE 6** — deals with resources and is:
To ensure that adequate resources are available to the unit so that members, individually or collectively can train, do their job and socialize.

There are 3 Policies relevant in the case of this Objective and they are:
- Policy 15 — Physical Resources
- Policy 16 — Support Staff
- Policy 17 — Depots

**OBJECTIVE 7** — encompasses the area of Recognition and is:
To ensure that adequate opportunities exist and that these are maximised for the recognition of the individual and team achievements of unit members.

The 2 Policies which have been set for the achievement of this Objective are:
- Policy 18 — Unit Affairs
- Policy 19 — Public Relations

The Action Priorities which stem from these Objectives and Policies are many and varied. A good deal of these are NOT new initiatives many are in fact currently being implemented in some form or another and some have been for a long time now. What is advocated however, is the re-evaluation and re-orientation of many unit programmes and activities, coupled with some new initiatives under the one umbrella of the Retention Plan, to achieve what should be the prime goal of an ARES unit — that of RETENTION.

**Implementation and Monitoring**

**Implementation**

As the execution of the Retention Plan is the responsibility of all levels of command throughout the unit, the first step in its implementation required the full briefing and detailed explanation of the plan to all Regimental NCO’s and Officers. All have been issued with their personal copy of the Retention Plan together with a Matrix which details their specific responsibilities for individual Action Priorities in terms of their:

- (a) Command Responsibilities (eg Section Commander)
- (b) Employment or Training Functions (eg IET Training)
- (c) Other Unit Organisational Role (eg OR Canteen Committee Member)

Whilst the Overall responsibility for the Retention Plan rests with the Commanding officer, the responsibility for the co-ordination of its implementation (and monitoring) has been delegated to the Operations Officer, (Extra-regimental Appointment), who is supported by the Regiment’s Ops/Trg Cell.

The Retention Plan has also been framed and mounted in prominent positions in the unit’s depots so that all unit members have access to it.

**Monitoring**

This aspect is crucial to the entire retention exercise at the unit level, as has previously been mentioned. The monitoring system employed should be so designed as to provide relevant feedback by both formal and informal means. The formal means should be such that they do not impose any additional procedures and workloads upon an already overburdened unit administrative system. To meet these requirements there are many existing mechanisms within the unit and also in the Retention Plan itself which can be employed. examples of these mechanisms include:

- (a) Statistics contained in the Unit’s Annual Training Reports and Periodic Tech Reports;
- (b) Counselling of Non-Effectives and Applicants for Discharge by commanders at all levels in the unit;
- (c) Specific Action Priorities in the Retention Plan, namely:
  - Serial E of Policy 1
  - Serial B of Policy 2
  - Serials E & G of Policy 8
  - Serial C of Policy 11
  - Serial E of Policy 12
  - Serials A, C & E of Policy 13

Individual unit members have also been encouraged to submit their own suggestions regarding retention.
Conclusion

There are no magical cures for a unit’s retention problems and this article and indeed, the 5 FER Retention Plan, does not claim to present any such solutions. In fact, as previously mentioned, most of the Action Priorities listed in the Plan are not new. What this approach does advocate however is:

(i) the acceptance that retention is a command responsibility;
(ii) the need for a comprehensive and holistic view to be taken of the retention problem and its interrelated issues;
(iii) the maximum use of existing resources currently available within the system and others available to the unit commander, to achieve and retention objectives; and
(iv) a re-orientation of many existing unit programmes to achieve the prime unit goal of retention.

In the development of a unit retention plan, it will be helpful to apply the main tactical principals of the ATTACK, after all, that is how the retention problems should be approached. The principals in question include:

— Firm Base
— Maintenance of the Momentum
— Maximum use of Resources
— Concentration of Forces
— Organisation in Depth

Additionally, the implementation of a Retention Plan at the unit level requires adherence to the following principles of retention; leadership, training, administration, morale, resources, social aspects, (Macdonald, 1976). On the question of retention, there is no escape from the fact that the initiative rests with the Reserve to help themselves.

NOTES

1 The 5th Fd Engr Regt is a Queensland Army Reserve engineer unit with metropolitan and country sub-units located in Mt Isa, Ipswich and Brisbane Cities.
2 Other Ranks include Corporals, Lance Corporals, Sappers/Privates and Recruits.
3 Army Reserve as a whole for period 1970 to 1980, see Oates (1984)

REFERENCES

2. 5th Fd Engr Regt, 1985: “Junior Leader’s Reference Handbook”.
4. 5th Fd Engr Regt, latest edition: “New Member’s Handbook”.
8. 5th Fd Engr Regt, 1985 (Jan: “Retention Survey — Jan 80 to Dec 84”).
Tactical Air Support To The Ground Forces

By Captain W. E. Farmer, RAInf.

"To the pilot the battlefield looks entirely different to what the infantryman sees. A landmark obvious and easily distinguishable to the soldiers, may well be invisible to the pilot and the direction of the soldier under fire may well be incomprehensible. The secret of successful ground to air tasking lies in fast efficient radio communication, constant briefing of the air arm on the battlefield situation, and clear accurate instructions from the ground troops."

Introduction

There has been considerable discussion on the ownership and tasking of air assets on the battlefield. This has been further enlivened of late by comments contained in the Dibb Report. Much of this discussion has been centred on topics varying from the Army's ability to handle ownership to suitability of aircraft type or even the role of the aircraft. However, little discussion has been directed towards how best the user units requirements can be met. The user units are, of course, the principal arms corps of armour, artillery and infantry. The tasking that these corps envisage aircraft being employed on are:

- Surveillance;
- Reconnaissance;
- Target acquisition and indication;
- Control of indirect fire;
- Delivery of fire support;
- Provision of command and liaison facilities;
- Casualty evacuation;
- Radio retransmission;
- Resupply, and
- Operational movement be it para drop air-mobile or airland.

From the range of possible tasks it can be seen that the spectrum of aircraft types is considerable from Light Observation Helicopters (LOH) to Medium Lift Helicopters (MLH) to Rotary Wing (RW) to Short Medium Range Transport (SRT — MRT) and fighter — ground attack fixed wing assets. It can also be seen that the necessary assets are currently drawn from both the Royal Australian Air Force and the Army Aviation Corps.

It is stressed that this discussion is at unit level, and then principally from an infantry viewpoint. Tactical air support involves that air support required for the land force only and does not include strategic assets required to gain air superiority etc.

Aim

The aim of this article is to examine how best air support can be provided to the ground soldier.

Basis Contention

Air support, as with all support, is of two aspects. They are:

- Men — Materials — The Organization; and
- Its Effect on the ground

The ground effect is the required item in the soldiers eyes.

Historical Perspective

As the use of aircraft on the battlefield is a relatively new concept, historically speaking, it behoves us to examine the nature and record of aircraft usage to date.

In WWI both sides employed aircraft in a limited manner. It was generally tasked at corps level or higher and used in a purely tactical manner.

In WWII the Soviet, German and Japanese air forces were organized and trained to act in direct support of the army. Each German Panzer Division was usually allocated its own reconnaissance squadron. The Japanese went a stage further by tying the support of their air divisions exclusively to the army to which they were allocated. Both air forces, German and Japanese, paid particular attention to the provision of close cover, and aggressive ground attack fire support.

The Germans attached particular importance to improving communications between the forward troops and the air arm to ensure quick and accurate results. Highly mobile Luftwaffe
Liaison Officers were attached to each division, and the Luftwaffe representative at an army HQ had his own light aircraft, as well as a transport aircraft equipped as a special mobile command post. A network of line, radio and teleprinter ensured that squadrons were kept informed of the latest situation. The troops themselves were efficiently trained in constantly reporting both their exact locations and in air-ground identification by marker panels, lights or smoke. Consequently, in 1940, the Germans had air support available at unit level within 15 to 20 minutes. The Japanese, however, failed to develop effective procedures for ground-to-air control of aircraft in the battle area and were slow to equip their aircraft with radio.

The Allies developed and formulated a system which is essentially the same today. Principally the system comprised of an air support control at corps HQ with a joint Army-Air Force staff. Mobile communications were provided to forward formations and provided a direct link for passing back target information and requests for air support. These requests were filtered at the joint HQ and passed to the appropriate squadrons by the RAF representatives who had direct links with the airfields and who were also able to listen in to reports from aircraft actually over the battle area. It also incorporated use of Ground Liaison Officers (GLO) with the actual squadrons. Prearranged air support was decided overnight at a joint staff conference. Requests for immediate support were filtered as already mentioned and given suitable priority. A later refinement an air force officer with suitable communications. This system was designed, primarily for offensive tactical support only. It was also for large scale operations i.e. at the five star level.

Vietnam, being a different type of war fought under different conditions, gave us new ideas. These new ideas were not greatly at variance to the Allied system of WWII previously described. They were a reflection of the ready availability of aircraft, a low-level tempo of operations and good inter service liaison. Two points that were made with regard to the employment of Air Assets were that:

- The response of Air assets must not be delayed by the controlling agency, and
- Communications between ground and air was a particular problem when a lot of information had to be passed in a short time, using command, administration and sub-unit nets.

A good insight into the problem in Vietnam is given in the book *Long Tan* by Lex McAuley.

The Falklands conflict produced the now familiar command and control problems. Again the same system applied as outlined for the Allies in WWII and in use since. Indeed, the comment was made: "Helo control worked well in Borneo where Units/Sub-Units were kept informed the previous night of the following days Tasks, the same should have applied in The Falklands — 20 years later."1 The following points from The Falklands post-war debriefs bear noting. They are:

- A dedicated, competent Air Cell is required at Brigade/Battalion level;
- The lack of Helo co-ordination had a major effect on morale at all levels in all units;
- Dedicated aircraft for specific periods on a daily basis would have obviated much of the confusion over Tasking;
- Ground briefing was rarely possible, but when achieved worked excellently;
- Good communications is essential; and
- Greater training in the use, and tasking, of air assets is required at all levels.3

It can be seen that the system on control has remained essentially unchanged for the last 50 years. Those minor modifications that have been made were generally during the nature of the conflict, Aircraft Technology, Happenstance, Vested Interest, Maintenance of the Status Quo and Single Service Politicing. At the individual level, performance is satisfactory, however they are all too often frustrated by a poor system. As a corollary of this the acquisition of more aircraft and retention of the current system will only further complicate the problem. The problem has never had an answer designed from the required ground effect up. This approach is required to redress the situation.

At this stage, it is pertinent to review the principles of command and control of air power at the unit/formation level. They are as listed below:

- Good Communications (Radio, Line, Liaison);
- Quick Reaction Times;
- Simplicity of Control;
- Flexibility; and
Most effective utilization of resources by centralized control.

To my way of thinking a solution should incorporate the following features:

- A unit capable of forward operations;
- Compatible with supported unit in structure, SOP and equipment;
- Capable of independent operations down to unit (BN) level;
- Compatible in the Logistics Sphere; and
- Have centralized control at all levels aided by rapid passage of information.

From these features one can see similarities in the structuring of our artillery units and their chain of command.

Combining the aim of achieving the ground effect with the features outlined above it can be seen that the Force/Unit required should be "heavy" in Observation/Liaison troops and adopt a command structure consistent with artillery. This gives command by status i.e. in direct support etc and thereby control of the effect on the ground.

Taking the line of thought one step further one would see a need for this organization to be structured on two levels. A divisional aviation asset and corps unit or units dependent on the structure developed. The divisional asset would require the following components. They are:

- Headquarters (Air Head Comd/Control);
- Air Support Liaison Dets (Equate with FO/BC parties);
- General Support Flight (LOH, FW-Porter, Casevac);
- Fire Support Flight (Gunship or FW FGA i.e. Pucara Type);
- Recon Flight;
- Tactical Transport Flight (Utility, MLH, SRT);
- Admin flight (FARP, rigging teams etc);
- WKSP Flight; and
- Defence Flights (Air/Ground).

The corps units would hold such things as further SRT MLH, MRT etc:

This structure would allow a centralized command system regardless of the status of command or size of the force to which it was allocated. This is particularly relevant in the ODF/Low-Level Ops Scenario.

Whether this ‘unit’ is RAAF, Army or both is not in the scope of this discussion, however regardless of its service composition the ranks must be Army equivalent. Similarly all personnel must be fully trained in the modus operandi of the army units they support, particularly the observation/liaison levels and pilots. It is envisaged that the size and complexity of the unit itself would equate to an armoured regiment or similar.

For effective control of these assets, both the ASLD and the Asset would require an Air Net. In the case of a battalion with artillery and air support there would be a requirement to operate four nets i.e. Command, Artillery, Air and Administrative. The Air Net would be provided by the supporting unit as is the Artillery Net.

As air support encompasses both the operational and administrative spheres as opposed to other support being purely operational or administrative. It is vitally necessary that this be taken into account. For control purposes it is imperative that ASLD be attached to units such as Battalions ‘A’ Echelons as well as Rifle Companies. This would allow administrative action such as Casevac and Resupply to be handled over the Battalion Administrative Net whilst a rifle company ASLD directs an FGA strike on the Air Net.

Conclusion

“Fools learn by experience; I prefer to learn from other peoples experience” Bismarck

In 50 years of using Air Assets on the battlefield we have evolved command and control very little. Indeed all our current problems are old ones. They are linked in no small part to peacetime constraints, home basing, bureaucracy and inter service rivalry. They can be alleviated by applying the principles of flexibility, simplicity, maintenance of the aim and econ-
omy of effort to restructure our forces to bring fully integrated tactical air units into the army system of command where they can more effectively support the combat arms in the fulfilment of their roles.

NOTES

(1) Purnell's History of the Second World War, 'Defensive Air Support' by LTCOL Anderson (British)
(2)(3) Op Corporate 1/7 Gurkha Rifles Debrief Points. All Op Corporate Debrief Points read voiced similar concerns.

At the 'Ready'.
A Letter to a Friend — An Enemy in Our Midst?

By Colonel Jim Wood, RFD ED

My dear friend,

I apologise for my lack of diligence of late. Somehow I allowed myself to get bogged down in the trough of uncertainty that seeks to drown an Army between campaigns; looking back with a failing memory and occasionally puzzling over the likely shape of the future conflict. Ironically, when the immediacies of conflict are lifted, we find ourselves trapped by indiscipline.

Some little time ago I was pressed to seek refuge in a book! You will wonder at this lapse of course but cheerfully I admit to it. You will recall that I am of the generation obliged to study military history and despite the strategems used in those days to dismiss our obligations the impact remains with me. As I have passed the barriers where such prescribed knowledge is a requirement for progress it is now a simple matter for me to press for a restoration of this valuable aid to training the next generation.

However, I will leave that matter to the experts and merely seek to catch your attention by some brief references.

You will be aware that recent travels and circumstances took me to the lands of a former enemy, now a valued friend. Wherever I turned I was confronted by history as encompassed in the present and as it stands as the guide to the future. Repeatedly I heard the echoes of marching feet and the muted question — “What really is new?” We are distracted, I suggest, by the form that today takes and fail to recognise the reality of what has been with us all along.

In this case I was attracted by the similarities that occur in the great wheel of events. Should we continue to be surprised, as one generation was, and another has been since, that the fundamental principle of war, ie. surprise, was so amply demonstrated in December 1941? Yet it had all happened before. Less than 40 years before the same people, with the same imagination, determination, farsightedness, preparation, courage, and deception delivered a great power a powerful blow. Was there really much difference between those who disguised themselves as priests or successfully suborned the keepers of the keys at the dawn of the 20th century and those who almost 40 years later mapped the tracks in Malaya and thereby provided the basic intelligence so essential to success in battle? I commend to you the book by Dennis and Peggy Warner on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.

By way of some relief I moved on in space and time to an entirely different campaign. My imagination was fired by the early account in Cornelius Ryan’s book, A Bridge too Far, of a bold plan made possible by an intelligence picture that shouted “Here is an opportunity, seize it”. Alas my enthusiasm turned to dismay as the account revealed the inflexibility that carried with it a horrible penalty. How is it, I wondered, that with the sheer volume and complexity of our resources we are prone to see only that which suits our present purposes?

Yet even in peace we are structured to that end. If we could take the time to work through this point, I foreshadow a recognition that we consciously and subconsciously, play down what is important.

We know, that in the serious business of war, we must PIERCE the MIST or, as it was in Wellington’s time, uncover what is on “the far side of the hill”. To this end we have created an intelligence bureaucracy but in so doing we have bound it hand and foot. Not only do the techniques used by the intelligence profession impose restriction upon the propagation of the results of their work, but we make the practitioners prisoners of our command system. Usually they have neither the rank nor the direct access to commanders to match the significance of their purpose. Neither do we give much priority to the practical training of these commanders in intelligence matters. Before you tear me completely to shreds please read again the earlier mentioned references or recall when it was you really gave intelligence a place other than suited your purposes.

I saw a similar situation, although with added complications, in David Irving’s book The Trail of the Fox. Not only did Rommel refuse to believe information at variance with his own preconceptions; the intelligence system itself was
caught up in a bizarre game of disinformation. I imagine that those who served in Indochina, especially in 1954, and again in 1968, faced similar frustrations. How is it possible that the minutea of the emerging evidence of change should be allowed to develop, in spite of the crushing weight of conventional wisdom? You will say that the Army has an intelligence structure of its own, well tried and tested and with access to the national resources. I do not contest this but merely query whether this structure has a sufficiently high profile or its produce adequate distribution. Do we, as the implementers of the military art, really have our metal tested? Let me explain. In times of peace we are obliged to pit ourselves against an enemy whose organisation is finite and doctrine immutable. Regrettably the guidance available to us on this organisation and doctrine has become fossilised, presumably for reasons of economy, over a period when there has been a revolution in technology; a breathtaking transition in the prospects for future war. Should we dare to move into the twilight world of the "real politick" of our strategic environment the actual organisations and tactics of those we are most likely to oppose, become progressively more obscure. Some might argue that despite this revolution in technology actually little has changed tactically. It would be reassuring to hear that this is the case but frankly I would need to be convinced, nor do I believe that those who have access to more recent studies of the enemy's doctrine would support such a comfortable belief. Yet again we come up against one of the limitations placed upon the intelligence people, that is, the distribution of material; another being that of having sufficient resources to interpret the intelligence that is available. Nevertheless, there must be ways and means by which this essential information can be got quickly to those responsible for bringing on the next generation of tacticians, indeed even more so when so much of it appears promptly in an almost overwhelming battery of publicly available magazines and journals. Repeatedly the professional standing of our Army in the community has been tarnished by the long held belief that the Army invariably looks backward for the inspiration of its tactical doctrine; a belief caused more validly by the propensity of the decision makers of the day to draw only upon their own experience, itself dated.

We would do well to heed the advice given in 1912 to a previous military generation so soon to face the Great War, not only to read but to think. If we are ever to take this profession seriously and think seriously about future war we will need to blend thoroughly the skills of the military historian with the elasticity of mind and courage of the prophet. One such signpost in the present day can be found in the two volumes by the British General, Hackett, on the Third World War. What a stir his works caused at the time and yet how quickly the interest in his work subsided. Yet Hackett comes from a long line of prophets who have sought to strengthen the competence of the military practitioners of their day. For example, Antonia Fraser, in her masterly work on Oliver Cromwell, makes reference to the literature available at the time, and in English, on the teachings of the great Swedish military thinker of the day, Gustavus Adolphus. You will probably remember how long it took us to recognise the works of the enemy's thinkers during the war in Indochina. My main concern is that unfortunately we do not learn well enough the lessons of history nor the value of a good intelligence system and that therefore we will be caught flat-footed again, whatever the integrity of our early warning systems. For a future enemy to succeed against us initially, and to survive subsequently, he will be obliged to act with boldness, imagination and without warning. This will give him not only the initiative as to how, when and where but surprise generates momentum and, incidentally, security. There will be no time to refresh ourselves as to his tactics or probably even to ascertain what they were on that occasion.

We will be committed to redress a situation, already grievously to our disadvantage, with whatever we have by way of personnel and resources. Two other factors will be crucial. Firstly, the quality of our intelligence collection at the point/s where the attacker struck and along his support lines. Secondly, the excellence of the tactical flexibility of our local commanders, at every level, will be crucial.

What could be done? Maybe we could give the enemy the status he should be afforded and his methods more publicity. Maybe we could select our best officers for this role and say to them play the game boldly and imaginatively so that we might be tested to our limits. We
also should seek to take the usual battle the next step on and give more attention to the problems of coping with the unexpected and the seemingly unmanageable. Perhaps then the importance of military history, the crucial role of our intelligence people and our absolute need to hone the sharp edge of our commanders will be realised.

What do you think?

Your old friend.
The Origins of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971: Towards a Reassessment

By Dr Ed Duyker.

It is now more than a decade since India and Pakistan fought a short but bloody war which resulted in East Pakistan (East Bengal) emerging as the independent state of Bangladesh. In this article an attempt is made to analyse the major social and political developments which led to military conflict. In particular, I have attempted to establish the extent to which insurgency, in both East and West Bengal, affected the perceived national interests of both India and Pakistan.

I in no way wish to diminish the significance of Indian sympathy for the Bengali nationalist struggle and their abhorrence of the rape and carnage wrought by the Pakistani military, but a more realistic assessment of the origins of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 merits reference to Indian opportunism — when faced with the possibility of emasculating Pakistan — and India's fears of instability in her eastern states and on her eastern borders. In considering Pakistan's "national" interests and perceptions of the crisis in East Bengal, one has little alternative but to define them in terms of the interests of her ruling elite. For example, in united Pakistan, 84% of the nation's civil servants and 95% of the army were from West Pakistan; massive discrepancies in per-capita income and intra-zonal trade between the two wings of the country also existed. One can assume, therefore, that any factor which threatened West Pakistan's captive markets and crucial sources of raw materials in the east, constituted a threat to "national" interests.

When General Yahya Khan called the elections of December 1970, it would seem that he felt confident of dealing with any impending internal threat from East Pakistan to the balance of power in the State of Pakistan. Prior to the elections, Yahya Khan had hoped that the issue of "regional autonomy" for the two wings of the state could be settled without compromising the integrity of his nation. There has always remained the possibility that an (Bengali) Awami League electoral majority might precipitate a crisis. It was obvious that uneven treatment since Pakistan's independence, combined with the strategic isolation of East Bengal, provided the Bengali political leadership with sufficient cause to truncate the state or overturn its established balance of power. According to Rehman Sobhan, a close confidant and adviser of Mujibur Rahaman, the army had begun working out a "contingency battle plan" over "two years" once it had been "given a glimpse of the true force of Bengali nationalism during the movement against Ayub Khan".

When the elections were finally held, the Awami League emerged as the largest single party in Pakistan and began to take steps towards the formation of a government and the drafting of a new constitution. As would be expected, Yahya Khan wanted to know what changes Mujibur Rahaman had in mind. However, on January 12, 1971, he found the leader of the Awami League emphatic in his refusal to reveal the first draft of his proposed constitution "on the grounds that as leader of the majority party, he and he alone was responsible for the new constitution". In response, the President and Pakistan's senior military leadership decided to develop existing contingency plans into more definite form should Mujibur Rahaman persist in his recalcitrance. According to G. W. Choudhury, a former Pakistani Minister for Communications:

After the fateful Larkana talks, the army junta met formally at Rawalpindi in mid-February to discuss the political situation. It was at this meeting that the junta decided to challenge Mujib if he persisted in his uncompromising attitude, but significantly it ignored Bhutto's provocative speeches. Bhutto was now regarded by the hawkish generals like Hamid, Omar and Gul Hasan, as well as by his trusted friend Peerzada, as the defender of "the national interests" of Pakistan as interpreted by the ruling elite.

The Awami league leader remained intransigent. Consequently Yahya postponed the National Assembly Session on March 1 and appointed military officers to replace
civilian governors in the provinces on March 2. Mujibur responded to these moves by launching a noncooperation movement in East Bengal and refusing Yahya Khan's invitation to an all-party conference to resolve constitutional issues. The tactical success and proficiency of Mujib's civil disobedience movement was probably recognised as a determination to undermine the West's writ in the East and to initiate the dismemberment of the State. On March 23 and 25, this threat was further evidenced when hundreds of Government offices, schools and private homes hauled down the Pakistan national flag (on Republic day) and replaced it with a new Bangladesh flag.

Mujib's determination to secede became even more obvious when he directed foreign enterprises to carry out all export negotiations by way of two major East Bengali banks, and to re-route international communication links via Manila and London. By this time the Awami league had been able to organize an effective parallel administration throughout East Pakistan. The East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles, the Armed Reserve Police and the civil police pledged to support Mujib's administration.

Faced with an imminent upheaval in the administration of the nation, Yayha Khan determined upon emasculating the Bengali intelligentsia and political leadership. On March 25, 1971, Yahya Khan accused Sheikh Mujibur of "treason", banned his party, and commanded the Pakistan armed forces "to do their duty and fully restore the authority of the Government".

In the last week of March, Pakistan's attempt to annihilate the Bengali intellectual and political leadership, plunged East Bengal into civil war.

By April, Bengali nationalist guerrillas such as the "Mukti Bahini", together with scattered remnants of the East Bengal Rifles and other Bengali para-military units were operating from both sides of the Indo-East Pakistan frontier. Surprised by these developments, India began to show concern over the ideological orientation of these irregular military bands. In fact, the Indian Government responded to the general instability in the region by deploying troops to assist the civilian administration during the West Bengal state elections in March 1971. According to Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora "three divisions (approximately 40-50,000 men) were moved to West Bengal for the elections but were retained to help the civilian authorities combat Naxalite violence". There was no suggestion at this time that such forces were to invade East Pakistan, as they lacked all heavy equipment and were
configured for counter-insurgency operations. Their mission was to stabilize the internal situation in West Bengal. Maj. Gen. Lachhman Singh, who commanded a division on the eastern front, summarised the situation in the following terms:

"The Indian Government had apparently been taken by surprise at the suddenness and magnitude of the uprising in East Pakistan... The Government was occupied with the Naxalite movement, particularly in Bengal and the neighbouring states, and so intelligence reports on East Pakistan were not perhaps given due attention in New Delhi... Nevertheless, it would appear that intelligence failed to forecast the scope and dimension of the popular struggle in East Pakistan."  

As millions of refugees poured across the Indian border from East Bengal, India realised that Pakistan was intent on dealing with its domestic problems regardless of the socio-economic implications to India; this constituted a grave threat to India's national interests. On May 24, 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi went so far as to state,

"What was claimed to be an internal problem of Pakistan, has also become an internal problem for India. We are, therefore, entitled to ask Pakistan to desist immediately from all actions which it is taking in the name of domestic jurisdiction, and which vitally affect the peace and well-being of millions of our own citizens. Pakistan cannot be allowed to seek a solution of its political or other problems at the expense of India and on Indian soil".

In order to understand how events in East Bengal were vitally affecting India's national interests, we must view Bengal wholistically. Although partitioned and divided among India and Pakistan in 1948, the people of East and West Bengal share a common language and culture — despite their religious differences. While the Indian Government had snuffed out "Naxalite (Maoist) guerrilla activity in Midnapore district of West Bengal by early 1970, it soon found itself combating urban guerrillas in Calcutta and a renewed rural insurgency in the district of Birbhum by mid-1971. The last thing India wanted was porous borders which might facilitate an influx of foreign arms into West Bengal and increase the possibility of an explosive combination of Bengali nationalism with political extremism.

For the Indian Government the Naxalite problem was compounded by the dislocation and instability generated by the refugees, who had been driven into India by the Pakistan army. The situation threatened the industrial heartland of Calcutta. One can gain some understanding of the significance of this area to the Indian Military-
Industrial complex when it is realised that at the time, “Over half of India’s joint stock companies engaged in manufacturing, tea plantations and coal-mining industries were located in Bengal, and they accounted for over 55 per cent of the total paid-up capital in large-scale industries of the country.”

Further, within a radius of 300 miles from Calcutta, almost “the whole of India’s iron and steel industry” was concentrated. It was into this area, containing “India’s greatest single concentration of productive capability” already destabilised by insurgency, that millions of refugees poured. As Maj-Gen D. K. Palit put it:

“The presence of these millions of refugees aside from imposing an intolerable economic burden, would create unbearable tensions in West Bengal and Tripura — states in which accentuated social disparities had already caused a near break-down of the administration and where there already existed the danger of revolutionary strife . . . The mass eviction of refugees was a deliberate act of demographic aggression. It constituted a clear threat to India’s national security.”

On July 4, the situation in the Birbhum region of West Bengal had become so aggravated that a Battalion was sent to the district solely for counter-insurgency purposes. While no formal alliance existed between Maoists in East and West Bengal, the Naxalites had sufficient men under arms to render much of the area a revolutionary hinterland. Combined with other Chinese supported insurgencies in the area — particularly the protracted Naga and Mizo guerrilla movements — the Eastern wing of the sub-continent faced an axis of rebellion from the plains of Bengal to the Himalayas. Maj-Gen D. K. Palit has written that at the time it, “. . . was becoming increasingly evident that if there was to be no political and military reaction from India to support the uprising in Bangladesh, the nature of the insurgency which had so far been entirely nationalistic, would become more and more extremist oriented — and thus have long-term repercussions on the situation in West Bengal and elsewhere”.

It would seem that this growing instability generated by a continued inflow of refugees and a growing insurgency, pushed India into a tight corner. Unable to settle the Bangladesh issue militarily (because of the threat of a Chinese invasion), India could only step up counter-insurgency in West Bengal, seek international assistance for the refugees, and attempt to bolster the Awami league’s fortunes in East Bengal with arms and training.

Palit’s account indicates that, during this period India was only prepared to take appropriate defensive measures and “help build the Mukti Bahini up to a pitch at which it could conduct regular operations.” However, while the claims that there was “no indication” at this stage “that India would invade Bangladesh” the “self-defence” border policy with “imposed limits on the degree of penetration” would suggest that India was doing everything short of invading, in order to support the Mukti Bahini.

There was always the danger, during this period, that Pakistan and her ally China would choose to interpret Indian border operations taken in self defence, as acts of aggression — and attack India from the northern and western frontiers. India had little international support for her actions, and even less understanding for her problems with Pakistan. In this climate a Sino-Pakistani assault could not be dismissed. India chose to neutralise this threat to her national survival by accepting a long standing offer from the USSR to sign a “Friendship” treaty in August. The removal of the Chinese threat allowed the Indian Government to concentrate on the threat to national interests in West Bengal and Assam, caused by Pakistani actions in East Bengal.

Although the “Naxalites” saw Beijing as their political Vatican and thus condemned India’s assistance to the Mukti Bahini — as China did — many could not ignore the popular upsurge in East Bengal for long. By August-September 1971, in fact, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) had split into two factions over the issue. While both factions “supported China’s denunciation of Indian intervention in East Bengal, and condemned the Awami league,” they differed bitterly in their attitudes to Yahya Khan. One group, led by Asim Chatterjee, held that communist revolutionaries in both East and West Bengal should support Yahya Khan as a representative of an “anti-imperialist national Bourgeoisie” the other, led by Charu Mazumdar, refrained from supporting the Bengali nationalists but castigated Yahya Khan as a “brutal reactionary.” Because
Chatterjee was captured before he could convert the West Bengal-Bihar Border Region Committee of the C.P.I. (M-L) into a separately functioning party, the Indian Government still had reason to fear that Mazumdar’s group might, without offending China, eventually find common ground with a number of Maoist leaning Mukti Bahini groups. By November, in fact, it became clear that the Awami League had been unable to crush or curtail the influence of these radical factions and that they had become extremely powerful. On November 20, for example, it was reported that,

“... the biggest anxiety the Mukti Bahini fighters have is caused by the attempts of local Maoist extremists to assume the leadership of the liberation movement. Such a struggle within the struggle had been forecast by many observers even in the early stages of the crisis. Now it appears that the ‘Naxalites’ have become influential in some districts; in Noakhali near Chittagong they are said to be in command. Eye witnesses say the fight between the Naxalites and the Awami League elements in the Mukti Bahini is even more fierce than that between the Bengalis and the West Pakistanis. The Naxalites denounce the Awami League in ideological terms. While the Awami League is bent simply on driving the West Pakistanis out of Bangladesh, the Naxalites seem to be looking further ahead to an ideological dawn over East Bengal.”

26 alim Siddiqui has argued similarly: “The longer the struggle went on the stronger would grow the Muktis (Naxalites) and the weaker would become the Awami League. Mrs Gandhi of course could not organise an election as Yahya had done. She was having trouble enough with her own revolutionaries who had managed to commit 400 political murders in West Bengal inside six months. The situation had never been so bad even in East Pakistan before March. The only way to stop the revolutionaries from taking control of Bangladesh in exile and eventually in East Pakistan was for the Indian Army to transplant the Awami League Government from Calcutta to Dacca. And that meant War.”

27 Thus, even if the C.P.I. (M-L) maintained its support for Chinese foreign policy and forestalled an alliance with the radical East Bengali left, India could only gain by stabilising the region through the dismemberment of Pakistan and the installation of an Awami League government. As Maj-Gen Lachhman Singh succinctly put it:

“The sudden strife in East Pakistan posed serious problems as well as gainful opportunities to India. It imposed a heavy burden on the Indian economy but also promised to permanently weaken Pakistan militarily. Separation of East Pakistan from the west wing would give India pre-eminence in the subcontinent and also seemed to offer an end to the periodic armed confrontations if
Pakistan could be cut to size. It also offered the possibility of reducing interference by outside powers, who might abandon their policy of arming a weaker Pakistan to achieve borrowed military parity with India. A friendly government in Dacca could be an asset to New Delhi which could then set itself the task of solving the counter-insurgency problems in the eastern region without the insurgents getting aid from and sanctuary in East Pakistan.  

India continued to aid Bengali irregulars battling Yahya Khan’s forces in East Pakistan, by providing them with bases, small arms and training. By the end of the monsoon (October/November) Indian armour was completely mobile and the Chinese were neutralised by Himalayan snow, and a possible reluctance to jeopardise the delicate gains of “ping-pong” diplomacy. The signing in August of the Indo-Soviet Friendship agreement also substantially reduced the threat of Chinese intervention in any ensuing conflict; India now had its own military counter-weight.

Although it seems unlikely that the “Mukti Bahini” would have been able to expel the Pakistan army on its own, Pakistan must have realised that Indian training and weaponry had rendered them an effective auxiliary partisan force, capable of cutting their lines of communication and harassing them at India’s beckoning. On November 21, the Mukti Bahini stepped up operations in the Khulna, Sylhet, Rangpur, Dinajpur and Jessore Sectors with Indian support. In one day 13 Pakistani tanks were destroyed, and on the following day India downed 2 Pakistani “Sabre” jets which had intruded into West Bengal. For Pakistan, these incursions represented a clear indication that India was prepared to continue and expand its support, training, supply and protection of irregular forces operating in East Bengal. The presence of 9 Indian divisions on East Pakistan’s border indicated to Pakistan that India also had the military capability to repulse retaliatory raids or “hot pursuit”, and a 2:1 superiority over Pakistan’s 4½ divisions in the East in the advent of an invasion.

Pakistan, therefore, declared a State of Emergency on November 24, 1971, and began to mobilise its reservists. Of the numerical superiority of the Indians, General Yahya Khan desperately attempted to have U.N. observers stationed between the opposing Indian and Pakistani positions, yet continued to refuse any political compromise. Concurrently, Lieut-General Niazi (Pakistan’s Commander in the East) formulated a defensive strategy aimed at delaying any Indian invasion for as long as possible. Niazi’s plan featured the establishment of strongly defended positions on major routes of entry into East Pakistan and relied heavily on the topographical security of the Bengali deltaic region. Niazi’s border defence strategy was also aimed at preventing the establishment of any forward bases inside East Bengal by the Mukti Bahini. If his border defences were smashed, Niazi hoped to fall back on Dacca and rely on the Meghna and Jamuna rivers as major defensive obstacles to India’s capture of the capital. Ultimately, however, Pakistan must have known that in the event of an Indian invasion of East Bengal, its defeat (in the East) was only a matter of time. By December 3, Pakistan realised that China had been neutralised, by diplomatic means and by Himalayan snows on strategic passes, and that it was thus without a protective ally.

By launching (on December 3), a pre-emptive air attack in the West, Yahya Khan appeared to have written off East Pakistan, and sought consolation in the possibility of a surprise grab for disputed territory in Kashmir and the Punjab. Since India had four divisions in Kashmir — just as Pakistan had in East Bengal — there remained the possibility of Pakistan capturing what Kalim Siddiqui has called a “major bargaining counter” with which to extract its besieged forces in the East. As the ensuring conflict demonstrated however, India effectively held Kashmir and the Punjab and ultimately breeched Pakistan’s “soft belly” along the Rajasthan border, capturing large areas of Sind; while in the eastern theatre Indian forces smashed their way to Dacca. Thus this short but bloody war resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan and the birth of the new State of Bangladesh.

NOTES

In West Bengal the 60,000 man state police force, the Tribal Guerillas (op cit., 17). Palit, D. K., 'The Disinherited State: A Study of West Bengal's San- tal and the Naxalite Movement', Indian Political Science Review, No. 1, 1980, pp. 55-64.


12. 'Statement made by The Shram Ur Punarvas Mantri (Labour and Rehabilitation Minister) on May 24, 1971, in the Rajya Sabha in response to the Calling Attention Notice, by Sri D. D. Puri and others regarding the grave situation arising out of the heavy influx of refugees from East Bengal into India'.

REFUGEES

Week ending 17-4-1971 — 119,556 persons
Week ending 24-4-1971 — 536,308 persons
Week ending 1-5-1971 — 1,251,544 persons
Week ending 7-5-1971 — 1,572,220 persons
Week ending 14-5-1971 — 2,669,226 persons
Week ending 21-5-1971 — 3,435,243 persons

Prime Minister's Statement in Lok Sabha on Situation in Bangladesh, on May 24, 1971, in Bangladesh: Documents, op cit., pp. 675-676.

13. Pakistan War of 1971, p. 46.


16. Ibid., pp. 3-4.


19. 'In August 1971, India had gained through its "friendship" treaty with the Soviet Union, a major counter-weight to China. See Siddiqui, K., op cit., p. 177.'
The Evolution of the Field Ambulance 1906 to 1918

By Captain G.A. Law, B.Sc., RAAMC

Introduction

Many articles have been written about the classical battles of our time. Most deal with the generalship exhibited or the contribution of a particular regiment or arms grouping. Few deal with, in any detail, the contribution of the service elements to the success of that battle; perhaps because it is much more exciting to write about hand to hand combat rather than detail ammunition supply to a field regiment, or the casualty evacuation of a brigade group. Exciting or otherwise such things are worthy of examination for without them the battle cannot succeed.

This article will examine the evolution of the field ambulance, an organization that has proven to be one of the most flexible of all Military Units. To this organization much of the fighting soldier’s morale may be attributed, as he knew that should he fall in battle he was not far from definitive medical attention.

Formation and Pre-History

The first official field ambulance was formed on 1st March 1906, as a direct response to problems of casualty evacuation experienced during the Boer War. It was the idea of SSGT Stapleton of the R.A.M.C. Volunteers. Stapleton first presented his case before the Royal United Service Institution in London on 26th February 1902. His case was considered by a War Office Committee, which accepted the idea in principle, but rejected its immediate application, due to the problems that would be caused by a reorganization in the midst of operations. Eventually a field ambulance was trialled in the final month of the war by Indian elements.

The Boer War System

In order to understand why the field ambulance concept was adopted it is necessary to examine the casualty evacuation system of the Boer War. The casualty evacuation system was based on the Prussian model of Napoleonic times, and essentially unchanged since the Sudan War. The whole system hinged on the ‘bearer company’ and the field hospital. The bearer company was drawn from a battalion or equivalent unit, and consisted of one MO and sixteen stretcher bearers. Its role was to collect all wounded of every branch on the battlefield and convey them to the field hospital. Generally the stretcher bearers had little medical training and were often called upon to fight. The essential problem brought to light during the Boer War was the lack of co-operation between the bearer company and the field hospital. The bearer company after collecting the wounded and delivering them to the field hospital marched off with their unit, regardless of the work load of the field hospital. On the other hand, during the course of the battle, the field hospital remained idle at the rear leaving the bearer companies to cope as best they could. Clearly an organization was required between the bearer company and the field hospital.

Structure and Function

So evolved the field ambulance. Essentially it was an amalgamation of the bearer company and the field hospital. Characteristics from them were retained; for example, the role remained of collecting the wounded, but to it was added the treatment and dressing of wounds. The field ambulance was divided into a bearer division and a tent division. The bearer division’s role was primarily collection, whilst the tent division’s was that of dressing and administration.

The whole concept was still based on horse transport and hand carriage, and in the opening weeks of the Great War was to cause immense problems. At the outbreak of the war the field ambulance was equipped to temporarily treat and hold one hundred and fifty (150) casualties, but held sufficient dressings for about One Thousand (1,000) wounds. Horse transport and hand carriage were so slow that the field ambulances soon became clogged. The problem was of a result of the field ambulance having to clear the RAP by hand and then clear the ‘ambulance’ itself by horse drawn carriage back
to the casualty clearing station. This situation arose because in 1911 the Army Council had decided that an unwieldy amount of motor transport was employed in the field, and therefore in order to reduce it, casualties would be evacuated from the field ambulance by utilizing empty ammunition and supply vehicles. This system did not work, as it slowed down the process of resupply, and hence the field ambulance was left to fend for itself. The magnitude of the problem is not appreciated until it is realized that each field ambulance at Mons in 1914 was treating between one thousand five hundred (1,500) and three thousand (3,000) patients each twenty-four hours! The problem was solved by November 1914 when each field ambulance was given a complement of motorized vehicles, and a new organization called the motor ambulance convoy was established. (The motor ambulance convoy consisted of fifty (50) vehicles and its role was to evacuate casualties from the field ambulance to the casualty clearing station).

By 1915 the field ambulance had evolved to the point where it would remain unchanged until the conclusion of the Great War. The field ambulances of the dominion forces were identical, with occasional minor variations. By 1915, however, two types of field ambulances had evolved. The first was the Infantry Division Field Ambulance, allocated on the basis of three (3) per division, and the second was the Cavalry Field Ambulance, allocated on the basis of two to a division. The latter field ambulance was smaller.

The Infantry Division Field Ambulance

The Infantry Division Field Ambulance consisted of thirteen (13) Officers and two hundred and twenty-five (225) other ranks. Of the officers nine (9) were doctors, one was a dental officer, one was a chaplain, and the other two were administrative. At the other rank level one hundred and sixty-five (165) belonged to medical corps and the rest belonged to service corps. The field ambulance consisted of a headquarters unit and two companies. The headquarters unit was one hundred and twenty-six (126) personnel strong, comprised of seven (7) Officers and one hundred and nineteen (119) other ranks. Each company had three (3) Officers and fifty-three (53) other ranks. All the officers of the companies were doctors and thirty-eight (38) of the other ranks were stretcher bearers, therefore giving each company nine (9) squads of stretcher bearers. Within the headquarters unit only six (6) other ranks were designated to stretcher bearer duties. In 1915 each field ambulance had three (3) horse drawn carriages, seven (7) motor ambulance lorries and two (2) light ambulance cars dedicated to casualty evacuation. By 1918 the only change that had occurred was the substitution of the horse drawn carriages for two motor ambulance lorries. Previously it was mentioned that the field ambulance was divided into the bearer division and the tent division. The tent division equates to the headquarters unit and the bearer division equates to the two companies.

The Cavalry Field Ambulance

The Cavalry Field Ambulance differed from the Infantry Division Field Ambulance in that it was much smaller. Its all up strength was one hundred and seventy-seven (177) consisting of ten (10) officers and one hundred and sixty-seven (167) other ranks. Eight (8) officers were doctors and one hundred and eight (108) other ranks were medical corps. Typically the field ambulance was organized around a headquarters unit of six (6) officers and one hundred and twenty-seven (127) other ranks, and four (4) sections of one (1) officer and ten (10) other ranks. By 1918 this type of field ambulance had thirteen (13) motor ambulance lorries and two (2) light ambulance cars dedicated to casualty evacuation.

Employment and Tactics

During the Great War it was most unusual for a field ambulance to work as a single entity. Field Ambulances worked in conjunction with one another as part of the total medical plan. They were called upon to do a variety of tasks, which are discussed later. Diagram one details the chain of evacuation as it existed in 1915.

Before proceeding further it is necessary to define the roles of the posts established, and their composition. From there the tactical employment can be considered. Medical evacuation from the FEBA to the RAP was (and still is) the responsibility of the regimental stretcher bearers. It is considered no further in this article.

The Advanced Dressing Station (ADS)

Typically one ADS was established per brigade front, although it was not uncommon for two to be established, and occasionally three.
Diagram One

THE CHAIN OF EVACUATION 1915

Collecting Zone

Evacuation & Distribution Zone

GENERAL HOSPITAL
The ADS was established by one of the companies of a field ambulance and was usually about two thousand (2,000) metres behind the front line. Normally the casualty was carried by stretcher bearer to the ADS. Evacuation therefore was most arduous, both on the casualty and the bearer squad. The ADS was the most forward post where the wounded man was taken over by the medical services. Its primary role was that of a collecting post. It was here that first detailed sorting of the casualty occurred, and only the most urgent treatments were done, such as arresting haemorrhage. The ADS usually had the capability to shelter and hold fifty (50) casualties whilst they awaited further evacuation.

The Main Dressing Station (MDS)

One MDS was established per divisional front. Where several divisions were operating on a narrow front it was normal to establish a corps MDS. The MDS was established by the headquarters unit of the field ambulance, and was from two thousand (2,000) to seven thousand (7,000) metres behind the front line. Often it was established at a rail head. The means of evacuation from the ADS to the MDS was typically by field ambulance motor transport. It was at the MDS that definitive care first took place. Operations of an urgent nature were undertaken and all wounds redressed. Often the MDS had a holding policy, and had the capability to shelter up to five hundred (500) casualties. The MDS remained the controlling element in the evacuation chain forward of its position. Typically the MDS consisted of a receiving section, recording section, resuscitation section, dressing station, gas casualty section, evacuation section, mortuary and administrative section.

The Walking Wounded Collecting Post

The Walking Wounded Collecting Post was staffed by a company of the field ambulance, and provided for on the basis of one per division. Typically it was established between the ADS and the MDS, but off the main evacuation route. It was capable of treating between five hundred (500) and one thousand (1000) men, although many would require further evacuation to the MDS. Walking Wounded Collecting Posts were established to keep the ADS from becoming clogged with casualties of a less urgent nature.

The Bearer Collecting Post

It was not unusual for this informal organization to be provided on an ad hoc basis. It was placed between the RAP and ADS. The bearer collecting post, also known as the casualty collecting post, was where teams of stretcher bearers changed. Its simple purpose was to relieve the distance over which one team would have to carry its casualty. Little or no treatment was done here.

Where bearer collecting posts were established they were usually provided for on the basis of one (1) between two (2) RAP’s. The danger in having these posts was the possibility of the first team moving almost parallel to the front line.

The Motor Ambulance Post

Motor ambulance posts were established where it was safe to collect the casualty forward of the ADS by motor ambulance. In this case many casualties would bypass the ADS altogether.

Tactical Employment

The posts described above were those established by the three field ambulances of the division. At the divisional level the Assistant Director of Medical Services (ADMS) was responsible for the medical plan. As such he would site the MDS and walking wounded collecting post, leaving the siting of the ADS and any other posts to his field ambulance commanders. He would however detail the responsibilities of each field ambulance, typically keeping one in reserve, establishing one as responsible for the MDS and the other for the ADS’s. The reserve field ambulance would provide the company for the walking wounded collecting post. Responsibilities would break down as follows:

1 Fd Amb—establish ADS’,
2 Fd Amb—establish MDS from entire fd amb, but place bearers at the disposal of 1 Fd Amb, and
3 Fd Amb—reserve fd amb, but use one coy to establish the walking wounded collecting post.

The ADMS would also establish other posts as necessary: for example the medical dispositions of the 1st and 4th Australian Divisions on the Hindenburg Line in September 1918 were as follows,
THE EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD AMBULANCE 1906-1918

1 Aust Div: 1 Fd Amb — MDS, Walking Wounded Collecting Post and Gas Centre,
2 Fd Amb — in reserve,
3 Fd Amb — evacuation from divisional front, and therefore responsible for ADS’s.

4 Aust Div: 4 Fd Amb OMDS
12 Fd Amb—ADS
13 Fd Amb—Gas centre and in reserve.

At this point in the war the battles were more fluid than those of 1916. Motor ambulance posts were used in large numbers, often operating from the RAP’s. The CO 3Fd Amb however found it necessary to establish bearer collecting posts due to heavy shelling.

Considerations
The following considerations would have to be taken into account by the respective commanders:

a. the distance which the stretcher bearers would be required to carry (at the Somme in places, was seven thousand (7,000) metres over deep mud),
b. the proximity to roads, and the conditions of same,
c. the probability of shelling, and hence the maximum range of enemy artillery,
d. the availability of solid structures for shelter purposes,
e. the line of march likely to be taken by walking wounded,
f. the responsibilities for inter and intra unit liaison.

These were in addition to the normal considerations such as casualty estimates and conformity to the battle plan.

Conclusion
The field ambulance evolved from an identified deficiency in the casualty evacuation plan of the Boer War. At first it proved to be a disastrous concept due to stagnant thinking, especially concerning the adoption of motor transport. The needs of the Great War casualty however were met by the field ambulance. It is clear that the old bearer company and field hospital could not have coped, especially when it is realized that in the first twenty-four hours of the 1916 Somme offensive twenty-six thousand and six hundred and seventy-five (26,675) casualties were collected from the front. Over the total Somme offensive three hundred and sixteen thousand (316,000) casualties were admitted to field ambulances. The British Army alone raised two hundred and thirty-five (235) field ambulances for its expeditionary forces. The field ambulance experiment proved to be a success.

NOTES
1: Bearer companies were essentially retained at unit level, but lost the title. In fact the standard British battalion’s medical platoon was 1 MO and 16 stretcher bearers. The field hospital was replaced altogether by the casualty clearing hospital, later renamed the casualty clearing station.

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Nicholls, T.B. — Organization, Strategy and Tactics of the Army Medical Services in War, Bailliere Tindall and Cox, London 1941.
Book Review


Reviewed by Brigadier F. W. Speed, (Ret).

THIS is a massive volume that comes soon after the release of the Dibb Review. It comprises twenty-four chapters contributed by eight military officers, numerous senior officials of Commonwealth and State governments, two leading Australian industrialists, and academics of the Research School of Pacific Studies (ANU), and the RAN College.

Most of the material was written before the Dibb Review began, and parts of it work to a different strategic concept. However much of it is in general agreement with Dibb's report, in particular its emphasis on northern and north western Australia.

Perhaps the keynote of the volume can be stated as 'against the contingencies (that face us) we need much more than military reserves. We need to be able to take advantage of all defence-related resources in our country': '... in which preparedness to maintain our external security is an important to every citizen as preparedness to maintain our internal security (ie police, ambulances, fire brigades, civil defence, or natural disaster organizations, etc').

One contributor puts forward the proposition that, for the current and future defence of Australia and its offshore interests, the civil community will need to be involved much more intimately than it has been in the past. This implies that, in the planning of defence initiatives, attention should be given to national and local regional development considerations: and conversely that, in national and local regional development, attention should be given to defence factors.

This major proposal has been made more easily digestible by the suggestion that the difficulty of determining the threats to Australia's security should be side-stepped — by taking as a first step a likely contingency of low-level harassment, and dealing more specifically with the northern sector of the continent from the Pilbara to North Queensland both inclusive.

Another contributor makes a point of the unique character of Australia, which stems from its geographical vastness. He recalls an idea put forward some years ago in the Australian Journal of Defence that Australia might be likened not so much to a continent, as to an archipelago — a grouping of islands of population and chunks of natural resources, separated by vast empty spaces of land rather than water. Hence he proposes we should develop an archipelagic, more than a continental, approach to the defence planning process.

In examining the civil infrastructure and resources, the book goes both wide and deep. Examples of chapters at Random are: Weipa — Regional Development and National Security in Far North Queensland; the Kimberley Region; Security of the North West Shelf Gas Project. Other directions include Transport: Capabilities and Constraints; Aviation Infrastructure in National emergencies; Communications Infrastructure; Capacity for Medical Support in Northern Australia; Industry's Role in the Defence of Australia; Legal Aspects of Defence Force Planning. In all, these show a breadth of research that could only be encompassed by a committed group of writers working to a well laid out plan.

A curious aspect of the references to national infrastructure, however, is the absence of mention of trade union influence. In the past, there have been well publicised instances of disruption caused by militant union intervention: and in a lower key, there have been problems arising through overtime, week-end penalty pay, and a 'danger money' that are in conflict with the armed service twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, commitment. While one appreciates the attitude of the transport industry leader who said 'Tell us what you want and we'll get on with the job', there are difficulties to be overcome when civil transport is engaged in support of armed forces in contact with the enemy.

This is a valuable book that might well become a 'bible' for planners military and civil,
at all levels from national to local authority. It should find a place at post-tertiary stages in Service schools and colleges, and with university researchers in political and related sciences. It is also most interesting for other military officers and leaders of industry at executive levels. Above all, it should form a bridge for communication and consultation between related defence and civil communities—an essential component in Australia's defence.

INDEPENDENT COMPANY, by Bernard Callinan, republished by William Heinemann, price:

Reviewed by J. P. Buckley, O.B.E.

THE story of the Australian guerillas in Timor, in World War 2, is a classic example of the fortitude and adaptability of the Australian soldier.

Whilst most of the adjacent countries to the north and west of Timor were being overrun and surrendered to the Japanese invader, the A.I.F. guerillas in Timor were on the offensive. They were playing havoc with the enemy, and helped by the loyal natives, they continued to harass the enemy until they were evacuated back to the Australian mainland. By that time they had killed an estimated 1500 Japanese against their own loss of 40 killed.

Approximately 500 Australian troops had kept 15,000 or more enemy pinned down at a most critical stage of the War. Callinan tells a fascinating story of the campaign.

Sir Vernon Sturdee, who was Chief of the General Staff at the time had been involved in the setting up of the Independent Companies, wrote the foreword to the book. He was always very proud of the magnificent performance of the units in Timor. An admirer of Callinan, he forecast in 1953 that he would become a distinguished citizen and a brilliant engineer. He watched Callinan's progress with interest and pleasure. Unfortunately, he did not live to see Callinan's main achievements:

President, Institute of Engineers, Australia
President, Melbourne Cricket Club
Commissioner, Australian Broadcasting Commission
Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission of Victoria
Commissioner, Australian Post Office Commission of Inquiry
Chairman, New Parliament House Building Authority
Dep. Chairman, Westgate Bridge Authority
First Deputy Chancellor, La Trobe University

The above organisations are only a few with which Bernard Callinan has been associated.

The introductory chapter by a world class author, Neville Shute, is very interesting. Obviously Shute relished the task of preparing the chapter. He liked Callinan's straightforward style—it had a rough freshness about it. Shute made no suggested alterations to the narrative or the presentation—it was a great compliment to the young engineer writing his first book.

The reprinting of the Independent Company shows first rate timing. Timor is still a controversial subject. My advice to anyone interested in reading this excellent story, is to get your copy now. I am certain it will be sold out quickly (just as its previous editions).

The author and the publisher have combined to produce a first class book. Hopefully they will combine again to write and publish an autobiography of Bernard Callinan. His achievements in so many varied fields of endeavour deserve a permanent record.


Reviewed by Noel Tanswell, DPR.

SCORES of books have been written about that war in the Pacific over 40 years ago. And many more have yet to be written if the revelations contained in John Costello's The Pacific War are acted upon.

Costello, who established a reputation as a war historian in his shared writing of D Day with Warren Tute and The Battle of the Atlantic and Jutland 1916 with Terry Hughes, casts new light on the origins and conduct of the war in the Pacific. He does this by drawing on new material obtained from nearly 200,000 pages of recently declassified information from American and British archives.
Costello says that the sheer volume and breadth of the new intelligence material is sufficient indication that it must inevitably provide a fresh insight into such 'hot' topics as Pearl Harbor which have been given over 40 years to cool off. He says that the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States in recent years began releasing what has become a veritable mountain of intelligence intercepts, summaries and analyses. The tightly bound Xerox copies and original microfilm records contain the day-to-day records of the secret intelligence battles that were being won and lost by American code-breakers and agents years before the first shell was fired or the first bomb dropped in World War II.

The Japanese, he says, were able to make their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor because of a breakdown in communications within the service organisations in Washington, and the US failure to transmit the complete intelligence situation to their Hawaiian command. Also, a series of Japanese messages, captured copies of which are now available in the archives, reveal that they contain last minute indications of an attack developing against Hawaii.

Costello also makes the point that the fall of the Philippines proved to be a catastrophe of incalculably greater magnitude that Pearl Harbor — the mortal blow to the strategic defence of the Far East. Yet, he writes, there was never any inquiry to establish why the battle for the Philippines had effectively been lost on the first day of the Pacific War. Since August 1941 the focus of US military attention and reinforcements had shifted to the Philippines, and this had weakened Hawaiian air defenses.

Expounding on his revelations of the secret electronic war after Pearl Harbor, Costello says that the bombing of Tokyo had stirred the Japanese Imperial Navy to over-react and send out nearly every warship in the Combined Fleet. This generated a vast amount of radio signal traffic which gave the US Navy the chance to win an unexpected yet crucial secret victory. Although the US Navy lacked the naval strength to match Japan's, they enjoyed an enormous advantage in the clandestine electronic war — the key to tactical supremacy in the vast reaches of the Pacific.

This intelligence, he says, provided the vital clues that would reveal how the 'victory disease' was impelling the Japanese to disperse their overwhelming superiority in support of too many operations across too great a distance. The same Japanese 'victory disease' had earlier influenced Japanese thinking in another area. Japanese Navy staff at first put forward an ambitious proposal for their Second Operational Phase that called for the occupation of New Guinea as a springboard for the eventual invasion of Australia. The Japanese Army staff was horrified, as they had not yet won their campaign in China. They rejected it on the grounds that they did not have the one hundred divisions or the sea transports available to supply such a massive land campaign. Later, Japanese Navy staff got Army support for occupation of New Guinea and garrisoning of the Solomon Islands.

Examples of the little known or forgotten highlights of the Pacific War, as revealed in Costello's book, include:

- A RAAF Hudson pilot may have been the first 'casualty' of the Allied war against Japan. The day before Pearl Harbor (6 December 1941) a RAAF Hudson, patrolling from Kota Bharu on the northern Malayan coast, sighted a Japanese convoy of transports and warships. The pilot just had time to radio the information before he was shot down. A few hours later the invaders had pushed back the defenders at Kota Bharu to secure the first invasion beachhead of Japan's new empire.

- It was the RAF which argued that bombers and fighters were a cheaper and surer alternative for protecting Singapore than battleships. By 1940 airfields were being hurriedly constructed to protect ports and possible invasion beaches along the Malay Peninsula. But they were laid down so close to the coast that they were quickly overrun in successful seaborne assaults.

- Japanese resistance on the island of Guam was still going on in 1945, and the last enemy soldier did not give himself up until 1972. While it might be argued that *The Pacific War* is just another war book that itemises events leading up to and during Pearl Harbor it is, in my judgement, much more. The 1985 revised and updated edition provides a comprehensive and accurate background of the complexity of wartime events, including the intense diplomatic manoeuvres, at that time.

For the many thousands of ex-servicemen such as myself who served in the Pacific
during World War II the book provides at least some of the answers to questions on the conduct of the war.
Perhaps because many older generation Australians identify the Pacific War as being ‘their war’ as distinct from the more remote, to them, war in Europe and the Middle East, the book should be read by ‘the oldies’.
But it should also be read by the younger generation, including the 1986 and thereafter intakes of the Australian Defence Force Academy.


Reviewed by Brigadier F W Speed, RL

Anyone who has lived in Victoria and been associated with the Victoria Police will find interest in the origins and history of the force. This began as a PhD thesis of a serving Inspector, which was converted to a popular history for general publication.
The first recorded police were three men, untrained and without uniform who in 1836 began a crude form of law and order. These were soon fired for drunkenness. They were followed by a miscellaneous collection of seven autonomous bodies, again largely untrained, that included the Melbourne City Police, Geelong Police, Gold Fields Police, Rural Constabulary, Mounted Police, and Gold Escort. All operated separately and there was no attempt at co-operation.
The first really trained policemen were a group of 50 constables under an inspector and three sergeants who were brought from London in 1853. Parallel with that recruitment, a committee of concerned citizens set about the organization of several of the autonomous bodies into a single force, under a chief commissioner. The first incumbent was W.H.F. Mitchell who lived on a station near Kyneton where he had come from the Van Diemen’s Land public administration. He was followed, for forty-six years, by a series of prominent public figures who had not previously served in police. Some had been army officers, and gave the corps a military character somewhat contrary to that of a preventive force.

Over the succeeding years the Victoria Police were involved in a variety of traumatic occurrences such as the Eureka rebellion, the Ned Kelly affair, the influence of the Irish Constabulary, the Police Strike of 1923 and the Special Constabulary Force, the wartime Police Auxiliary Forces (male and female), the violent confrontations in 1968, and the ‘moratoria’ of 1970-71. In that time the Force had a series of chief commissioners including the notable Major General Sir John Gellibrand, Brigadier General T. A. Blamey, A. M. Duncan (from Scotland Yard), and Major General S. H. Porter.
One hesitates to refer to happenings of the recent decade to 1984, but the author does not: he narrates events and organizational changes with a commendably high degree of objectivity that makes a convincing ending to a worthwhile history.


Reviewed by Lt Col Guy Boileau, (Ret)

I was wrong. The first thing which caught my eye was an indication in the Introduction that this book was “To act as an early warning about weapons systems that could be . . . destabilizing . . .” Here, I thought, comes a polemic against the reasonable measures taken by the people of the United States to protect themselves against the possibility of strategic assault by the Soviet Union. It’s not. It seems a sensible and informative book which is, as the authors set out to compile it, “accessible to the interested reader, with or without a scientific background”. Buy it.

“Star Wars” has become part of the dialectic of the trendy, of the iconoclast, of the fellow traveller; the mere whisper of these something/nothing words sets tribes of fat cat academics twittering like a mango tree full of fruit bats. Mention “Star Wars” on the claret and brie circuit and they’ll immediately know you’re a strategist coming out of the closet. Amazing what two words in inverted commas will do for you, but don’t forget the inverted commas or they will know you frequent amusement parlors. This book has twenty fascinating pages on defence against ballistic missiles, well written
and sensible, for those who are interested in the nuts and bolts of the subject. This segment, alone, is worth the price of the publication. If you stayed awake during Gen Sci at school, you will benefit from the thirty-three pages of ballistic missile re-entry vehicles. This is a little heavier, but nonetheless useful reading.

There's more, of course. There are papers on the operations of U.S. military research and development structures, on anti-submarine warfare, on anti-satellite weapons and on the development of integrated circuits. The papers are all readable and informative. And accessible. There is no mention of the role played in research and development by technical evaluation of captured Soviet equipment (Tech Int), but this is because even an open society has some secrets. This is a very small quibble.

The title contains the tetragram "1984". This does not mean the book is out of date already. In my opinion, it is not perishable and will be a useful research tool for years. On second thoughts, buy two; if you are serious about hi-tech soldiering, you may wear the first one out — or a trendy may borrow one and not return it.

I CARRIED MY SKETCHBOOK by Ken Lovell, published by John Sissons 1984

Reviewed by LT COL A. A. Pope, RL

THE 2/23 Infantry Battalion is one of the most honoured units Australia has produced. The battalion saw its first series of actions in Greece, Syria and North Africa, including among its battles El Alamein and Tel-el-Eisa, with the latter battle resulting in over 350 battalion casualties. That should have been enough for most men and most units, especially when we consider the hundreds of thousands of men enlisted by Australia in WWII.

However, after the Australian involvement in the Middle East ended Australian troops were withdrawn for home defence. No doubt a unit with a record like that of the 2/23 battalion expected to be given the task of defending Sydney Harbour or Port Phillip Bay. But no, the perceived need for experienced troops meant that after a brief rest in Australia these veterans first went to Queensland, to learn the techniques of jungle warfare and then on to New Guinea to new battles, new honours and, inevitably more casualties among the core members of the unit. With the change of theatre came a change of insignia from the blue bordered black over red 'Mud and Blood' diamond to the black and blue 'T' signifying the Tripoli, Tel-el-Eisa, Tobruk, Tewfick and Tel Aviv actions.

In New Guinea 2/23 battalion assaulted Red Beach at Lae then took part in further landings at Langamak Bay and Finschafen before beginning the hard slog through the mud and mountains along the inaptly named 'Easy Street' to Satelberg and Wareo. Finally, the battalion took part in two more amphibious assaults at Morotai on 17 April 45, in which it saw little action and then at Tarakan in in Borneo on 1 May 45.

The serious side of this wide ranging experience has been recorded in the unit history called appropriately Mud and Blood in the Field and compiled by Dick Fancke. A fictionalised account of a battalion from the 6th, 7th or 9th Division, which could easily be the 2/23 battalion is given in Eric Lambert's classic — tril- ogy Twenty Thousand Thieves, The Veterans and Glory Thrown In.

Both Dick Fanckes and Eric Lamberts books serve a different purpose from Ken Lovell's by describing and recounting the serious side of war. Ken Lovell's cartoon's are a record of these same events but are much more light hearted in their approach as their purpose was to relieve tension, raise morale and give some expression to the feelings of those involved. No doubt in some dark moments in a beleaguered Middle Eastern outpost morale would be boosted by the arrival of the newsheet with a cartoon of how tough life was back at base — perhaps in lieu of desperately needed rations or ammunition!

To my surprise I also found that little has changed in 40 years. Characters described by Ken Lovell in the Middle East are still serving today, behaving the same way and doing the same things. The clothing store still only stocks sizes too big and too small and red tape is still choking the system (but much faster now that it is computer assisted)! If soldiers and the Army have not changed in 40 years it should be no surprise that public attitudes to defence and the social structure of Australia have not changed either. Even during the greatest threat to Australia's national survival yet experienced Ken Lovell saw and caricatured the complacency of
a public getting what they could out of Government war contracts and the labour shortage while complained of the 'deprivations' they must suffer back home with little concern for those at the front. Unfortunately, today the divisions between the serviceman and the community appear to be widening despite even greater and uncensored media coverage of service matters.

Ken Lovell's book is a faithful record of his and the 2/23 Battalion's war. It covers many aspects of Army life recognisable today with typical digger humour and insight. I am sure that any members of 6, 7 or 9 Divisions will have recalled to mind incidents they had long thought forgotten. But this book is not just for WW11 veterans as the cartoons can be enjoyed by soldiers today. As this book demonstrates, there is a bond between servicemen which transcends each age and war and which is just as strong today as it was forty years ago. It is this bonding together which makes service life so worthwhile. More's the pity the Army has never learned to pass this spirit on to the civilian community to which we belong. An enjoyable soldier's book.

CATALOGUE OF THE ENFIELD PATTERN ROOM BRITISH RIFLES LONDON HMSO 1981

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel D. N. Brook, RRA

THERE are many collections of weapons and equipment in Ministry of Defence establishments in the United Kingdom. Most of them have been collected for research, technical evaluation or educational purposes. The small arms collection at the Royal Military College of Science at Shrivenham is an example of this type of collection.

Unfortunately, for security reasons, most of these collections are not open for general exhibition and the enthusiast often has to engage in a tortuous security clearance exercise.

The collection at Enfield, the old Royal Small Arms Factory is no exception. However, for the true and dedicated weapons collector or one interested in the historical development of small arms, this collection must rate as one of the most interesting in the world.

The title Pattern Room is derived from the ancient system of military arms production whereby a perfectly correct example of every adopted weapon was selected to act as the ultimate reference for subsequent manufacture. These sample arms, which bore official red wax seals, were dubbed Sealed Patterns. Of critical importance in the age of handbuilt firearms, surviving examples of Sealed Pattern guns can be dated as early as 1720. It was not until the 1920s that the act of physically sealing newly adopted firearms ceased. Even now the Sealed Pattern system is not dead as the manufacture of decorative ceremonial weapons is still governed by a complete series of approved patterns held in the Quality Assurance Directorate (Ordnance) Pattern Room at Enfield.

Originally all Sealed Patterns were housed in the Small Arms Department at the Tower of London. Following a disastrous fire there in 1841, when many of the pattern arms were destroyed, the Enfield factory assumed responsibility for the construction and retention of small arms patterns. In 1853 the first weapon to be officially named after Enfield was adopted and about this time a central Pattern Room was established within the factory.

The policy of acquiring and retaining examples of foreign small arms in the Pattern Room commenced after the South African War when a variety of captured Boer weapons was added to the collection. From that time every effort has been made to keep abreast of foreign developments and today the Pattern Room is recognized as the most comprehensive reference collection of modern military firearms in the world.

The catalogue describes one section of the Pattern Room collection, British and Commonwealth manually operated shoulder arms. Included are certain foreign designs which have identifiable British connections, such as arms which have been adapted for trials in the United Kingdom.

It is divided into seventeen separate sections which range from Muzzle loading arms to Small calibre training arms. All told there are 402 separate weapons listed with 90 photographs identifying selected weapons. There is also a short list of interesting abbreviations.

This catalogue will not satisfy all those interested in small arms because of its specialised nature, and indeed some would complain that the amount of information in its pages is sparse.
However to the dedicated enthusiast who has specialised in British Rifles, he would certainly derive a good deal of satisfaction from knowing the subtle differences between the ‘Carbine, Garrison Artillery, Martini Henry, .577/450”, MK 1’ and, ‘Carbine, Artillery, Martini Henry, 577/450”, MK 1’ — the latter carried sling swivels!

The author, Mr Herbert Woodend who is Custodian of the Pattern Room, will be well known to those who have either visited the collection or corresponded with him.

To sum up — an interesting catalogue which will be of interest to the specialist but not the general reader.

EISENHOWER THE SOLDIER 1890-1952 by Stephen Ambrose, published by George Allen and Unwin, price $32.00

Reviewed by J. P. Buckley, OBE

Stephen Ambrose is Professor of History at the University of New Orleans, he has spent at least two decades studying and researching the life and deeds of General of the Army, Eisenhower.

It would be true to say that he probably knows as much about Eisenhower as any historian. Ambrose’s style of writing will appeal to the reader. It is a sympathetic account of the great soldier whose talents are told in a straightforward way; but Ambrose does not overlook his weaknesses and mistakes. He does not unashamedly hero-workship Eisenhower.

Eisenhower is taken to task over the battles in the Mediterranean and the problems which arose there, not only in the fighting, but also with the French leaders. Later the author criticises Eisenhower for the failure of operation Market-Garden (plan for crossing the lower Rhine at Arnhem).

Fighting the Germans was only one of Eisenhower’s worries, the clashes with Patton and Montgomery would have sorely tried the patience of a less strong and determined leader. From time to time Churchill, de Gaulle, Brooke and others did not make the task of the Supreme Commander easy. Brooke in particular was always ready to criticise Eisenhower’s performance.

Probably Eisenhower was the only Allied leader who could have welded the Prima Donnas into a workable team. His tact, patience and diplomatic approach to problems was superb. He had a most definite ‘aura’ of command.

The Supreme Commander would also be most decisive when it became necessary. The prime example was his final order on the invasion of Europe. Eisenhower alone could make the final decision to invade Normandy. After listening to the opinions of the experts, which were not unanimous, Eisenhower thought for a moment then quietly said “O.K., let’s go”.

The book covers the North African, Italian and North West Europe campaigns, together with the build-up and preparation for the landings. Whilst critical at times of some of the Allied generals (mostly they deserved it), Ambrose impresses as a fair-minded, objective historian who gives credit where it is deserved. His recently published book on the Pegasus Bridge illustrates this comment.

I was in North West Europe for the last two years of the war and I could not help but observe the great popularity and affection and admiration for Eisenhower, particularly in the United Kingdom. Ambrose tells it all in this excellent story.

I have no hesitation in recommending this book, it’s a great story about a great soldier.
Defence Force Journal

Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should be typed double spaced, on one side of the paper, and submitted in duplicate.

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