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Contents

3 Personnel Policy and Computer Professionals in the Services
WO1 Peter Jesser AAPsyCh

8 Officer Management in the Army
Major D. A. Benge, RAE

13 A Letter to a Friend — What Happened to Mobilization?
Colonel J. Wood, RFD, ED

17 Train to Retain the ARES Soldier
Captain J. G. Caligari, ARES

22 The Colonel’s Lady
Judy Thomson

30 Sky Watch — The VAOC 1941-1946
David Wilson, Department of Defence

33 Prime Minister Curtin’s Appeals to United States
J. P. Buckley, OBE, RL.

40 Some Reasons for the Failure at Gallipoli
Major Warwick Graco, AA Psych

43 Morale: A Conversation
K. R. Smith and J. C. M. Baynes

47 Regulating Civilians in Uniform
Peter O’Keeffe

53 Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee and It’s Importance to New Zealand’s Army
Captain G. J. Clayton, RNZAEC

57 Book Review

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On Surveillance during Biological and Chemical Training
Personnel Policy and Computer Professionals in the Services

By WO1 Peter Jesser AAPSYCH

Introduction

The administrative face of Australian Defence is changing dramatically under the impact of computer technology. Throughout the services, individuals and groups are engaged in the planning and development of integrated computer-based information systems similar to those in place in the larger organizations within the civilian community, and the services are confronting the same difficulties faced by those other organizations in developing computer systems.

Among the major problems arising from computerization is that of developing and maintaining the pool of experts who will design, implement and operate the new information systems — the problem of managing computer professionals. For the services, the unfamiliar task of managing these personnel has been made no less difficult by the general shortage of specialist computing skills in the wider community. This shortage has resulted in a very competitive market for computer professionals and many organizations now pay close attention to the management of computing personnel, in order to protect their long-term investment.

The question of how the services should approach the management of computing personnel has posed a particular problem because of the lack of a specific career structure of computer professionals in uniform. Indeed, it is only recently that service perspectives on the employment of computer professionals have firmed, allowing personnel policies to emerge.

Aim

The aim of this article is to examine service perspectives on the employment of computer professionals and to consider the implications that these perspectives have in current employment contexts for the development of a computing career stream for non-commissioned ranks in the Army. A recently proposed military career structure covering employment in computer systems operation, systems analysis and programming, will be evaluated in the light of opportunities and career structures available to computer professionals elsewhere, in public and private enterprise.

Sources

Comparative data for this article was gathered from advertisements for computing positions during November 1986, and from current reviews of the data processing industry. It is supplemented by information obtained from individuals employed in computing in the public and private sectors.

Computing and Defence Employment

Current thinking in the services is that a broad spectrum of computer expertise will be required in the future, ranging from specialists at the hands-on system management and programming level, through to generalists who can contribute to the analysis and development of user applications. The computer systems manager emerges from this as a facilitator — acting as the buffer between specialist and generalist, defining the task and maintaining appropriate standards while remaining above the detail of analysis and programming. While this is essentially a best-of-all-worlds perspective, which does not necessarily reflect the existing state of play in service computing, recent policies formulated for the management of computing personnel in the Army have the attainment of this situation as a general objective.

To some extent, the envisaged requirement for generalist applications developers and users can be met by the services now. Although the quality is not evenly distributed, a relatively large proportion of service personnel already possess some degree of computer literacy. Further, it is assumed that the inclusion of a computing component in the curriculum of service training facilities, such as the Australian Defence Force Academy, will assure the necessary knowledge required of service officers in the future.

This strategy of opting for a wide distribution of general computing skills among officers pro-
vides some insurance against the loss of generalist expertise and, to a degree, obviates the need for a specialist officer career stream in the computing field. In part, the strategy draws on an assumption that the specialist hands-on computer operation and programming skills are inappropriate fields of concentration for service officers, and are best left to people who have a “lifetime interest” in that area. This, in conjunction with the preference for a wider distribution of general skills among service officers, appears to have prompted the identification of the area of specialist skills as more appropriate for the employment of non-commissioned officers.

It is against this background that the Army has moved to meet its need for specialists at the hands-on level by revising the military trade of “operator computer” to establish a career structure from the rank of Corporal up to Warrant Officer Class I, covering duties from the operation and administration of computing equipment, to systems programming and analysis. The wide range of duties covered by the military descriptor of “operator computer” distinguishes it from the civilian classification of “computer operator” which is generally restricted to hardware operation and administration functions. The pay rate for operator computer, on the seven point military scale, has been set at level five.

The minimum rank of Corporal indicates that a certain level of maturity, as well as a general appreciation of some area of Army administration or employment, is necessary for entry into the trade. The mode of “access by experience” to operator computer positions is indicated in the structure of the job market for similar positions outside the services. In contrast, the upper end of the operator computer trade in the Army, covering programming and systems analysis activities, parallels a range of occupations for which other employers commonly specify tertiary qualifications as a requirement. This suggests more commonality with officer career streams, and points to a possible problem in managing the trade of operator computer in the future, if advancement from the other rank level is restricted.

The level five pay rate is a legacy of the original operator computer trade which, in retrospect, appears to have been less demanding technically than the duties envisaged under the revised trade structure. Even if there is some comparability between the hands-on operation duties of the old and new trade structures, the computer programming and analyst duties open up entirely new fields which demand separate evaluation for pay purposes.

Consideration of the career structures for comparable computer professionals outside the Army brings this situation into perspective.

**Comparative Data**

Data was collected from advertisements for private enterprise computing positions during November 1986. Positions were separated on the basis of job descriptions into two classifications — computer operation and programmer/analyst duties. Only advertisements which clearly indicated salary level and desirable periods of qualifying experience were included in the samples. Advertisements were checked to eliminate repetition of positions appearing in successive weeks, resulting in sample sizes of 55 computer operator and 56 programmer/analyst positions.

An examination of the advertisements indicated quite different sets of selection criteria for the two groups of positions. Operator positions invariably specified the type of computing equipment involved and the job experience required; tertiary qualifications were rarely called for. Positions at the upper end of the salary scale for operators ($28,000+) usually called for “supervisory skills” and offered opportunities to advance to management levels. In contrast, tertiary qualifications were deemed desirable (and frequently necessary) for programmer/analyst positions, but job experience was not a major consideration at entry level. Positions at the upper end of the programmer/analyst salary scale ($32,000+) specified “team leadership” rather than the “supervisory skills” required of senior operators, indicating qualitative differences between the work environments of programmer/analysts and computer operators. While many programmer/analyst positions also offered opportunities to advance to management levels, there were indications that some jobs could lead to greater personal development in relatively autonomous roles.

With both groups of positions, there were fewer references to periods of experience in advertisements for senior positions. At these levels (and the next level of lower management positions) it was evident that the type and quality of the work experience obtained was a more
important consideration than the duration of that experience.

Although the advertisements examined indicated quite different employment criteria for the computer operator and programmer/analyst positions, a scatter plot of salary against years of experience suggested a considerable degree of overlap between the two classifications. A full/reduced model F-test was run to determine whether the two job samples would be considered jointly in a regression of salary against years of experience. The test was significant (F(2,107) = 11.9, p < .001), indicating that it was reasonable to consider the two samples as representative of different populations.

The two groups of job samples (computer operator and programmer/analyst) were then subjected to separate regression analyses. For both samples the fitted regression line indicated a significant, positive relationship between salary and years of experience (for computer operator, F(1,53) = 114.9, p < .001; for programmer/analyst, F(1,54) = 29.1, p < .001). The regression lines are plotted in Figure 1. A further full/reduced model F-test was run to check whether the two regression lines could be regarded as parallel. The result of this test (F(1,107) = 1.46, not significant) indicated that the lines could be regarded as parallel for the purpose of comparing the two groups.

Although this study was based on relatively small samples, the results tended to confirm expectations. The strong positive relationship between salary and years of experience, and the slope of the regression lines, reflect the shortage of specialist skills in computing and the recognition that, for both operators and programmers/analysts, experience greatly enhances those skills. Further, while the regression lines are indicative of the salaries offered to attract computer professionals, rather than average paid salaries, available data suggests that paid salaries average only slightly lower. A recent survey of the data processing industry reported a private sector salary range for programmers and analysts of $23,500 to $37,000. The survey data and the sample data presented in this paper both suggest relatively rapid increases in salary with years of experience; this may be attributable in part to private sector employer preferences for recruiting ready-trained computer professionals. Slightly lower than the private sector salary range is the on-appointment salary range for Computer Systems Officer (CSO) 1 to CSO 3 in the Australian Public Service at $22,000 to $33,000, with a reasonable probability of advancement to CSO 3 within a five-year span. CSO appointments up to level 3 cover a range of duties similar to those envisaged for the military computing personnel. The comparable military operator computer salary range would be from Corporal Level 5 at $23,000 to Warrant Officer Class One on appointment at $32,000. Comparable career opportunity, however, would have to allow the possibility of military computing personnel moving through this salary range within a five year span of experience. This points to another area of potential difficulty in managing the trade of operator computer.

The differential between the two regression lines may be a measure of the premium that employers are prepared to pay for tertiary qualifications; these qualifications are more in evidence as a selection criterion for programmer/analysts than they are for operators. However, the tendency for advertisements for senior positions to place more emphasis on the quality of experience than on quantifiable criteria, such as qualifications or period of employment, suggests that value of tertiary qualifications diminishes as relevant work experience accrues. This type of experience (job-specific skills obtained on the job, or through employer-provided training) is widely acknowledged as being of greater value than formal educational qualifications to the organization in the long term, and is a reflection of both the value of familiarity with the employer's hardware or software, and the generally high achievement orientation of computer professionals, which leads to rapid development through experience.

Discussion

From the perspective of the Army, the logic of maintaining computer programming and systems analysis skills within a military trade structure is reasonably compelling. These specialist skills are difficult, and often costly, to maintain; they are closely tied to the performance of computing tasks and they may require constant renewal to retain their currency in the face of advancing technology. If, as is expected, instruction for all levels of the Army's operator computer trade, from basic operation to programming and analysis, can be conducted at military training establishments, then training costs may be reduced. At the same time, the
establishment of an in-service training cell should help to consolidate the pool of expertise in the specialist area within the Army. However, from the perspective of the individual the logic of this career structure is less compelling. Personnel policy for the management of Army computer professionals needs to take into account the three types of equity — external, internal, and individual — which must be satisfied for successful human resource management.

While the trade qualification of operator computer will be limited in scope within the Army, the individuals employed in that trade will not necessarily be similarly limited in their personal objectives. These individuals may be expected to look to their counterparts in other organizations to assess the relative standings of their jobs and themselves within their professions. External equity demands that an employer pay a wage rate that corresponds to rates prevailing in external markets for the employee’s occupation. But the individual's evaluation of external job opportunities is likely to extend beyond wage comparisons. If the Army attracts the high achievers it requires for the trade of operator computer, it must expect many to be motivated to study for the tertiary qualifications which confer initial career advantages elsewhere. It must also expect them to develop career expectations commensurate with opportunities attaching to positions in those other organizations. External equity requires that Army policy on computing employment take the situation in other organizations into account if the service is to accommodate the legitimate aspirations of its computing personnel.

The expectations which individuals develop as a result of external comparisons based on their qualifications will probably lead to internal comparisons with other service employments. The roots of internal equity are more difficult to identify than are those of external equity, but comparisons are likely to be made on the basis of the amount of training that the job requires, the amount of effort expended on the job, and the value, to the employer, of the work performed. Difficulties will almost certainly arise if the demands of the operator computer trade, and the qualifications required (es-
specially at the programmer/analyst level), are perceived as exceeding those of comparably paid trades. Comparisons are also likely to be made with commissioned ranks wherever a non-commissioned officer has obtained tertiary qualifications which are subsequently applied in the performance of his or her duties. Such considerations have a bearing on the individual's perception of recognition for the duties performed, and have a direct impact on the individual's experienced job satisfaction. If the trade of operator computer is not structured to allow for these considerations, then it is likely that the trade will come to be viewed as simply a convenient avenue of experience and a stepping-stone to a career elsewhere, to the detriment of the objective of maintaining a pool of specialist expertise within the Army.

The requirement for individual equity can, to some extent, be managed to counter shortcomings in other areas arising from the constraints of service employment. Individual equity is concerned with the level of payment of the individual rather than the level of payment for the job. In the case of the trade of operator computer, individual equity might demand policies on promotion with go some way towards rewarding formal qualifications and experience on a basis comparable to the rewards offered by other employers, as well as rewarding differences in merit between individuals within the trade of operator computer. A flexible approach to commissioning those obtaining tertiary qualifications might be part of such a policy. This development would assist in overcoming the problems of comparisons with officer streams on the basis of qualifications, and of trying to provide adequate rewards within the other rank structure. However, it would also assume the establishment of a specialist officer career stream in computing.

**Conclusion**

The potential for differences between the organization and the individual in their perspectives on the proposed military trade of operator computer points towards difficulties in the management of personnel employed in the trade in the future, and while discussion in this article has been limited to an examination of the situation within the Army, the issues involved may be generalized to the employment of computer professionals in the other services.

The services are currently suffering high rates of personnel wastage, attributed largely to perceptions of better employment opportunities elsewhere. For computer professionals, the differences between the opportunities unfolding for them in the services, and those offering in other organizations, may be uncomfortably clear. For the services then, attention to the management of computing personnel becomes a critical function. The vast changes that computers are bringing to Defence administration will only be successful if the development and retention of service computer professionals is facilitated by the implementation of appropriate personnel policies.

**NOTES**

2. Ibid., p. 6.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
4. Ibid., p. 6.
10. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

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Officer Management in the Army
Where Are We?

By Major D. A. Benge, RAE.

‘For an officer, it is particularly galling to be endowed with exceptional talent. The Army will gladly pay tribute to a brilliantly gifted person — but only when his hand is already grasping a Field Marshal’s baton. Till then, while he is still reaching for it, the Army’s system will subject his outstretched arm to a rain of blows. Discipline, which holds an Army together is inevitably hostile to a man of thrusting ability, and everything that is dynamic and heretical in his talent is bound to be shackled, suppressed and made to conform. Those in authority find it intolerable to have a subordinate who has a mind of his own . . . ’

Alexander Solzhenitsyn
August 1914

Introduction

It is fundamental when considering the requirements of officer management, that one realises that the sole purpose of maintaining a military force is to fight, or at least to be prepared to fight. All aspects of the military profession, especially in the non combatant area, are not ends in themselves but are simply necessary functions to support our war fighting capability. It is probably true to say that these support functions have assumed increased importance in recent years as a reflection of the increased sophistication of the military profession. The sheer number and complexity of skills required for today’s military suggests a requirement for specialists.

Aim

The aim of this paper is to examine the traditional notions of officer management currently employed in the Army.

Requirements of Today’s Military

In recent years, the military profession has been accused of not keeping up with the changing environment. Sir Henry Bland, a former Secretary for Defence, for example, is reported to be unimpressed with the calibre of professional military officers in Australia. He sees them as being inadequately prepared for high office within the Department of Defence and without specialist background or skills required of many of the policy making areas within the Department. Sir Arthur Tange also questioned whether the existing career progression system was adequate to prepare our higher echelons for Canberra policy making. The Technical Director of Hawker de Havilland, Mr Stan Schaetzel is also critical of the system in which highly experienced industry representatives have to deal with military officers who spend only two or three years in a particular posting before they are posted to another job — but who can veto technical and other decisions.

When the matter of technology change together with the increased diversity of military tasks are considered, the demands for expert skills become even more noticeable. One important requirement of the military is to keep abreast of technology developments. One can hardly expect an officer to be an expert in the full range of military skills, general military knowledge and technical knowledge: it is difficult to maintain expertise on a part time basis. Technology is changing so rapidly that the subject matter taught to students at university in the high technology disciplines is likely to be obsolescent five years after they graduate. It is suggested here that sufficient expertise can be maintained only by specialising officers early in their careers. The traditional generalist system of professional development is no longer capable of developing and maintaining officers with sufficient depth of knowledge in all requisite specialist skills.

The Need for Increased Specialisation

Specialisation does not necessarily imply ‘narrowness’ or introversion. It is unfortunate that in the Army, the term ‘specialist’ has connotations of a boffin far removed from the realities of the battlefield. Specialisation can be as broad or as narrow as required by the Service. ‘Computers’ or ‘strategic analysis’, for example, may be fairly narrow streams whereas ‘combat soldiering’ may be a fairly broad stream.
This need for increased specialisation was recognised by the United States Army when, in 1974, it adopted a professional development model based on dual career streaming. COL Hanne, US Army states, “We developed and accepted OPMS (Officer Personnel Management System) because, in the late 1960s, it was rapidly becoming apparent to many that the ‘ticket-punching’ syndrome, then rampant within the Army, was creating an array of generalists who, as they advanced in rank, literally had no real position to fill or any true skills to use”. Similarly the Regular Officer Development Committee (RODC) (1975) recommended a system of dual career streaming for the Australian Army wherein officers were required to “specialise” in one regimental stream and one staff stream. The main advantages of specialisation as seen by the RODC were:

- Officers would be more effective in their appointments in less time, and the need for job rotation would be diminished.
- Personnel in staff appointments would have a greater sense of commitment and increased job satisfaction.
- Confidence, ability to innovate and liaise with civilian professional groups would be improved.

The main disadvantages seen were:

- There would be a conflict of interest between the specialist role and the profession of arms.
- Officers would lack breadth of experience.
- Posting flexibility would be diminished and the Army’s expansion capability would be reduced.

Specialist versus Generalist

It is important that the advantages and disadvantages of specialisation be considered in the context of the future environment. It is often assumed that a generalist professional development system accustoms an officer to change and gives him the capacity and appetite for new challenges. There is some evidence, however, which supports the opposite view.

Generalist job rotation can be ineffective where the individual’s tenure in the job does not allow him to become proficient in the specialist skills required to perform the job effectively. In addition, it has been found that officers with short tenure have a lower perception of their ability to make changes at work. Moreover it has been found that high job rotation can create a plethora of rules and regulations designed to cover all contingencies for the inexperienced. Since officers are not in the job long enough to develop sufficient expertise to refine the rules, the rules may become institutionalised in themselves. Dependence on rules and regulations can become part of a code of behaviour and norm for the individual. Ability to innovate and react to changes in the environment is inhibited rather than enhanced. The rules may ultimately become a crutch, without which the individual is unable or unwilling to function. Thus the generalist development system may very well have the opposite effect to that for which it was designed.

Another problem area in the generalist model which is related to the ‘rules and regulations’ syndrome is the necessity, because of the officer’s inexpertise, of relying on unsophisticated or commonsense methods of analysis. With the increased sophistication of today’s Army, there is an increased need for technical expertise to make objective and valid decisions. Such expertise cannot be obtained from the general knowledge acquired in a generalist professional development system. In any case, one should at least be sceptical of the value of the job specific experience gained from generalist officers. How can a generalist officer filling a staff appointment outside his corps and who is himself a ‘non expert’ in that job, train and nurture his subordinate in their specialist jobs? The generalist policy fails in the correct application of the apprenticeship philosophy. Subordinates must be supervised by experts in their speciality if they are themselves to develop expertise through on-the-job training.

One of the philosophies often espoused in relation to career management is that ‘the needs of the Services come first’. If one accepts this proposition, then, in line with the arguments already presented, career management should be aiming at more specialisation. However, career management is also concerned with the professional development of the individual and it can be argued that the best way of meeting the needs of the Service is to meet the needs of the individual. Behavioural researchers currently believe that an individual will usually perform better in an area which matches his needs, aspirations and self image.

The Army of today is pluralistic: even in a very general sense, one can appreciate the difference in organizational culture between the
'field' environment and the 'staff' environment, let alone the differences between the various employment areas. Specialists in the various employment areas are likely to possess quite different norms and values. Different employment areas attract different types of people in the first place, and also individual's self-images are shaped by their different background experiences.

Career development should aim at developing not only actual ability but also self-perceived ability. The development of self-perceived ability is important because of its contribution to performance, confidence in decision making and willingness to undertake and learn from new experiences. Development of both actual and perceived abilities is enhanced by a system which develops increasing expertise.

Current Army Policy

At the moment the Army continues to persist with a generalist career structure despite the recommendations of the RODC. Moreover the Army maintains an egalitarian system which attempts to give all GSO officers the opportunity of reaching the top. Obviously though, officers have different abilities. Some officers make good logisticians, others make good divisional commanders. Some officers have the potential for high office, others have not. These points were recognised by the RODC in their recommendation for career streaming and for accelerated promotion, yet the Military Secretary persists with the requirement of a broad range of employments (‘Tick in the right box' syndrome, ‘Must do a regimental/staff/etc posting to ensure eligibility for CandSC'; etc).

The current generalist career policy seems to be predicated on the unsubstantiated assumption that 'the man at the top' needs to have a broad range of employments on his way to the top. I suggest that the primary skills required of senior officers are managerial (and I include 'leadership' and 'command' under managerial skills for want of a more appropriate generic term). This, however, does not imply a broad range of employment. Indeed, how advantageous it would be if CPERS had a personnel background, if CLOG was an expert logistician, etc. But proponents of the generalist system argue that a CLOG who has had primarily logistics postings would not have the breadth of experience to appreciate how his own narrow world of logistics fits into the Army (or indeed the Defence Force) as a whole. I suggest that this is incorrect. We have at the moment the structure of an excellent generalist training system ranging from JSC, CandSC, and JSSC to Senior Officer Study Periods, LOGEX, CGS Exercises, etc. This generalist training system provides the breadth of vision which is progressively required as an officer rises through the career structure. The streamed career structure provides the depth of experience which is necessary for an officer to be effective in his job at all levels. How can a senior officer be effective in executing the tasks given him if he does not have the depth of experience in the field? Does he rely on the expertise of those officers below him? Unfortunately they are often in the same situation as he is — pursuing a generalist career stream in order to broaden their vision! How can such officers be effective in training those under them?

Another primary consideration is the need for the Defence Force to maintain an expansion base. It has been shown both historically and theoretically, that at a time of mobilisation, officers will be expected to jump one or perhaps two steps in rank. If any credence can be given to the argument outlined in the paragraph above, how much more ineffective will an officer be when he is pushed one or two steps in rank? To maintain an expansion base, the Defence Force must have a personnel capacity beyond that required for the force-in-being ie the Defence Force must have a personnel “redundancy” but the redundancy that is required is vertical redundancy (ie, overtraining within the officer’s career stream so that he has the expertise to handle the responsibility at one or two ranks higher). At present we are striving for lateral redundancy (ie, giving a COL, for example, the training to do any COL's job — which, I believe, is not possible).

The ramifications of adopting a streaming approach to career management are great, extending as far down as the initial officer selection procedure.

Selection Procedures

Because the Defence Force requires a broad spectrum of ability and expertise, the selection procedure should be designed to select personnel to meet that broad spectrum. It has been established that individuals have different potentials and motivation: some have the potential and the motivation to be combat com-
manders, others would prefer to be in the support function. The Army needs both types to function effectively, however, the danger in Service selection procedures is that too much emphasis is given to the assessment of regimental qualities. Some of the problems identified with selection procedures are the tendency on the part of the assessor to stereotype people and to give extra weight to qualities which he (the assessor) personally admires rather than what the job requires, and the “halo effect” caused by a personality like/dislike between the assessor and the selectee. If the Selection Board consists primarily of officers with high regimental traits, then the tendency to select candidates with the same traits is reinforced. Hence it is reasonable to ask ‘Are we selecting too many officers with regimental traits to the exclusion of officers with abilities to perform in areas other than the regimental environment?’ The apparent reluctance of officers to accept postings to Canberra, HQ Log Comd, etc, may well be a consequence of our selection procedures.

Civilian management is becoming increasingly aware that forcing people into spaces in which they do not fit, or forcing them to change shape to fit the job, is simply not good practice. Civilian management is now not only concerned with getting a match between the skills possessed by the individual and the skills required for the job, but also in obtaining a match between the personality of the individual and the trait requirements of the job. Various psychometric techniques are currently being used to determine job description envelopes of the psychological requirements for the job to complement the scientific management techniques which determine skills requirements, knowledge etc. Psychometric tests are also applied to the individual, from which a personality profile is developed. Much research has been done to identify those personality traits which provide the best indicators for use in human development and management application. One such system uses a hand-held computer to develop a profile based on the following factors: Dominance, extroversion, patience, conformity, logic, stress level, morale and energy reserves. The test takes only about 20 minutes to produce the profile. Managers are finding that matching the man to the job in psychological factors as well as in skills, knowledge etc is paying dividends.

Confidential Reporting

Currently the PR19 reflects the generalist promotion philosophy, with no scope given to weighting the various officer attributes required of the job. Indeed, in the study which developed the current PR19, there was no validation done to establish what attributes an officer requires, either under a generalist policy or a career streaming policy. One would expect that the attributes required of a battalion commander would be quite different to those required of an SO1 in computers for example. Yet this is not provided for in the confidential reporting system. The generalist promotion system requires an officer to be a good allrounder. We may well find however, that in the next conflict we need an expert battalion commander backed up by an expert SO1 in computers. Moreover in a time of rapid expansion we may well need the expert battalion commander to rise quickly to brigade commander and the SO1 in computing to become the colonel in charge of computer support, for example.

The current generalist confidential reporting system does little to enhance the effectiveness of the Army. I have suggested in this paper that officers have insufficient opportunity to develop expertise within any one field. However, given the importance placed on the confidential report, an officer is almost obliged to strive for a good report as an end in itself. This ‘getting the ticks in the right box’ may be at the expense of actually contributing to the job. The fact that an officer usually spends only two or three years in any one appointment before moving to another which may be completely unrelated, is conducive to the ‘tick in the right box’ syndrome. It is quite possible for an officer, especially if he is in an appointment not to his liking, to regard contribution to the job and acquisition of knowledge/expertise as secondary to getting a good report.

This view is supported by the research of Dr Norman Dixon, a prominent British psychologist and former Royal Engineer. Dixon has examined more than 100 years of incompetent military leadership and has hypothesised a paradox whereby individuals most suited to military life may actually be least suited for it. He argues that the military system attracts individuals with personality needs which are gratified by military life. These personality traits — fear of failure, need for approval, obedience and rigidity are encouraged by the military system,
yet, lead to over control and inflexibility, and poor judgement of the enemy. Hence the very features which are encouraged by the military system may prove incapacitating.¹⁴

Conclusion
The military profession in Australia must be able to react to the combined effects of strategic, technological and social change. The military’s primary and predominant function remains as combat, however, it has been argued that in order to optimise the combat effectiveness of the military profession, greater specialisation is necessary. In this way the expertise required of today’s Services can be developed. Specialisation ensures that the needs of the Services are met; it enables a greater level of expertise to be developed in all fields; it provides a greater degree of career satisfaction to more officers at all rank levels; and it provides a degree of vertical redundancy which will allow for rapid expansion in war. If professional military advice is to receive due consideration in Defence decision making at all levels and across all fields, then experts who possess the political, technical, managerial and bureaucratic skills needed to operate effectively in a changing environment, must be trained and employed in the multitude of specialist areas.

In optimising the effectiveness of a large generalist organisation, the synergetic effect of combining the efforts of personnel expert in their own areas, is greater than aggregating the efforts of generalist-trained personnel. What do we really need — a generalist Army or an Army of generalists?

Notes
6. Regular Officer Development Committee Study One, 1978, para 755-756.
11. See for example the findings of Cattell, Thurstone, Guilford, Fiske, Daniels, Horst, Eysych and Jung.
13. Personal Dynamics Profile marketed by Integra, PO Box 240, World Trade Centre, Melbourne.

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Major Benge completed a thesis on Confidential Reporting in the British Army as part of an M.Sc (Admin Sc) degree in 1978, followed by two years as SO2(Officer Strength Management), DPP. Since then he has pursued a generalist career consisting of OC 24 Spt Sqn, OC 7 Fd Sqn, C and SC, SO2(Systems) HQ Log Comd and SO2(Operations) HG 6 Engr Gp (ARES). He is currently Training Officer, RCSC, 3 Trg Gp.
Major Benge has previously contributed to the DFJ with joint authorship of the article “Commanding Above the Stress of Battle” (May/June 85).
A Letter to a Friend —
What Happened to Mobilization?

By Colonel J. Wood, RFD, ED

My Dear Friend,

I have had the opportunity over recent times to consider how it is that an Army might move from the barracks to the battlefield. It might surprise you that anyone should seriously examine a process likely to cause a fundamental upheaval to the established routines of peace. I recognize your possible incredulity but remind you that such is the long established practice of professional armies.

Why is it, you may well ask, that so little is known about this process commonly called mobilization? Even the word itself is a cause for concern. Apparently it comes from the German noun *die Mobilmachung* which translates literally into English as “making mobile”. The French adopted the German term *Mobilmachung* in the form mobilization and presumably the English adopted the French form.

What does the word mean? Well there are many definitions, including some very complicated official ones. I prefer that used by LTCOL W. T. Bridges, which he introduced to the Australian Military forces in 1908. According to Bridges, mobilization is “the process by which an Armed force passed from a Peace to a War Footing. The Mobilization of a unit means its completion for war in personnel, animals and material”. Bridges, who had had some time in the United Kingdom studying the subject, probably benefitted from the writing of General Sir Patrick MacDougall who drew attention to this idea as early as 1876, at a time when the first British Mobilization scheme was about to go into recess. The concept was not revived until 1886 by the then Head of Intelligence in the British War Office, Maj Gen Sir Henry Brackenbury.

You will appreciate that mobilization is not a thing in itself. The procedure which precedes mobilization may be described as Preparations for War and the procedure which follows it may be described as Strategic Concentration.

The British were slow learners as many valuable lessons were available from the experience of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. The Prussians, who took the profession of arms seriously, were students who profited from history. The Prussian victory in the Seven Weeks War of 1866 was due in part to a careful examination of the War of 1859 when the Austrians failed to mobilize sufficient strength in the war against France and Sardinia. The Prussian General Staff, under the direction of the later Field Marshal Count von Moltke, prepared detailed plans which allowed the call out of reserves and horses, the creation of staffs and the systems of supply and transport and no Prussian regiment was to leave its peace station until complete in every detail for war. Between the 3rd and 14th May 1866 some 360,000 men, organized in nine corps were mobilized. France also profited by studying the war of 1866 and undertook the reorganization of its military forces.

The French and German Armies were to test their plans in the Mobilization for the war of 1870-71. The German system of mobilization had two important features. Firstly, decentralization of authority, with the detail of the plan and its implementation so well understood and practised at the subordinate level as to leave the higher echelons of the Army free to concentrate on other matters once the order to mobilize had been issued. Secondly, detailed arrangements and organization provided up to date administrative machinery whereby the necessary men, horses, vehicles and supplies could be assembled and equipped within days of the issue of the order to mobilize.

The French plan, on the other hand, was flawed fundamentally in that the highly centralized War Office in Paris which worked well in peace, failed utterly in war. The Standing Army was despatched immediately to the frontier where it was then organized, and then reorganized, there being generally in peace no existing internal structure to command the corps and divisions, let alone the provision of staffs practised in manning this hastily devised field Army. Further the French stores depots were large and few in number and could not cope
with the flood of individual demands made upon them. Finally, the organization of the French Army could not cope with the flexible conditions which mobilization made necessary.

Following this war there was yet another review which set in place schemes that were so interlocked by 1914 that conflict was inevitable once the actual process of mobilization was set in train. Military strength rested, not on the actual strength of a nation's Standing Army but upon the capacity of that Army to mobilize and deploy in execution of the Strategic plan. Germany, could in the space of 16 days, expand from a peace time force of 880,000 men to 4½ million men, execute the Schlieffen Plan and thus overwhelm the French before they could match the Germans. So well had the German Army learned the lessons of history that the Schlieffen Plan was based on the deployment of almost the total strength of the German Army including the highly trained reserve divisions which were available from the first day of Mobilization.

On this occasion French plans for mobilization proceeded smoothly but then the French Army almost bled to death because French strategy and tactics failed to complement the excellence of these administrative preparations. You will notice the importance placed on the use of well trained and equipped reserves, a factor not appreciated sufficiently by the French in their assessment of the Schlieffen Plan. There had been a similar view in the British Army prior to the South Africa War 1899-1902 that "No Government could call out the Reserves to fight Zulus", a view which discredited the professional qualities of the forces the British were called upon to fight. Within two months of the order to mobilize in October 1899 it had become obvious that the situation in South Africa was beyond the capacity of the Regular Army and that extraordinary measures, outside those provided for under the mobilization, would have to be improvised. Within two months also the alarming deficiencies in war reserves revealed by the despatch of forces to South Africa were such as to be 'full of peril to the Empire'.

What relevance did all this have to the Australian Army of the day? The Australian experience of mobilization goes back over a 100 years and the early schemes in Australia, which drew upon the experience in Europe, were simple yet efficient. They were also taken seriously. The most refreshing example of this is to be found in the order to mobilize issued by Lt Col Tom Price of the Victorian Mounted Rifles. On Friday 6 July 1889 Lt Col Price sent a telegram to the 60 Detachment Commanders of the VMR scattered throughout Victoria. As a consequence some 1000 men assembled in accordance with the instructions laid down in the mobilization orders for the VMR. It was subsequently reported that the Minister for Defence did not regard favourably the experiment conducted by the Commanding Officer of the VMR of calling out his troops suddenly to test their readiness for mobilization. The Minister's opinion was that Lt. Col Price should have, before taking such a responsible step, obtained the approval of either the Military Commandant or the Minister for Defence.

Following Federation the work of organizing Mobilization as a Commonwealth responsibility, was in large measure initiated by Lt Col W. T. Bridges. Despite the sound work that had been done at Military District level, with the outbreak of World War I, planning was ignored in the scramble to cull the Military districts of the best available men in order to assemble the 1st AIF contingent commanded by then Maj Gen W. T. Bridges. Why is it that every time we are faced with a fresh situation we feel obliged to start a new page? Why must we reinvent the wheel?

The Australian experience of Mobilization between the two World Wars is a lode from which many riches can be drawn. One matter which was to vex the organization of the Army and therefore its mobilization, was the size of the force it would be required to oppose. The Government and the RAN clung tenaciously to the view that the RN, supplemented by the RAN, would be able to reinforce the British Naval presence in the Far East in time to thwart any Japanese invasion. The Army therefore was only required to be able to deal with raids, in the early stages of this debate, of not more than 200 men, but later increased to a 1000.

The Army assessment, as early as 1920, was that Japan posed the most likely invasion threat to Australia and in the absence of any specific Defence Policy on this matter during the 1920s, arranged its mobilization plans on the assumption that it would be opposing an invasion. However from 1932 the Government confirmed that the Army should accord with the "Raid Policy". By the mid-1930s assessment of the
Australian Army, confirmed by information available to the British, was that Japan could mount an invasion of Australia with an initial landing force of at least three divisions. As the 1930's progressed so the Army became more convinced that its assessment was correct and continued to argue that the traditional policy of Japan was to declare war without warning and that in any event Britain could well be preoccupied by events in Europe. It was not until 1940 that this Raid Policy was allowed to lapse and the Army able to organize itself accordingly.

Another major assumption that seriously affected Army mobilization planning was that the nation would have ample warning of a threat to its shores and sufficient time to organize itself to meet this threat. By the mid-1930s the British Government had abandoned its assessment of "No Threat for Ten Years" and in private correspondence with the Australian CGS, the British CIGS questioned the wisdom of Australian mobilization plans based as they were at the time on 7-10 weeks warning time in which to mobilize. By 1939 Australian Mobilization Orders for Training included the assumption that units would have a maximum of 14 days training from receipt of the Order to Mobilize before going into action. Of this 14 days, ten were to be devoted to individual training and four to collective training. No provision was made for cooperation with other Arms during this period of training.

The third factor that was to influence mobilization planning was the plan to despatch an Expeditionary Force, to be known as the second AIF. Existence of this plan was kept a closely held secret although in the event of mobilization this force was to be accorded priority over the rest of the Army in matters of personnel, equipment and training facilities. This decision was to cause fundamental schisms in the preparation of the Australian Army for World War II.

Despite these severe limitations and many others, a major effort was made on Mobilization planning at AHQ and in the period 1936-1938 as many as 53 officers, clerks and typists were engaged full time on this essential work. The magnitudes and complexity of mobilization is often quoted as a deterrent to any action at all but this view has to be considered alongside an understanding of the magnitude and complexity of the administrative operation involved when an Army moves from a peace to a war footing. To illustrate this point it is appropriate to recall that in September 1935 the AMF comprised a Militia of 26,854 and a Permanent Force of 1806. In September 1938 the strength of the Militia was 35,000 but by September 1939 this figure had grown to 80,000 Militia and approximately 3000 Permanent Force personnel. Fifteen months later, in December 1940, the Australian Army had over 300,000 under Arms.

Although there were many exceptions and amendments to the agreed mobilization plans and orders and the fact of the actual mobilization and expansion following the outbreak of war, these plans and orders provided the necessary framework that made this possible. Regrettably the wherewithal to give these plans substance was lacking. Thus, for example, the various plans provided the detail of say Officers required on mobilization. In the event the known resources were sharply reduced by the effects of medical unfitness, age, unsuitability. The most usual shortage was for younger, experienced officers. Further, despite the many official warnings as to the requirements for accommodation, clothing, equipment, weapons, medical and engineer stores, vehicles, the bulk of the essential equipment required by the Australian Field Army was not available at the outbreak of war, nor was it available even 12-19 months later.

The value of this earlier mobilization planning was not lost on post war planners however it was not until 1950 that the deterioration in the international situation resulted in the first serious efforts to reorder Australia's defence preparedness. There are two aspects of these efforts that warrant particular comment, firstly manpower and secondly, equipment. Under a new establishment for the Army, approved in March 1951, a force of 27,000 ARA, 30,000 CMF and 67,500 National Servicemen were to be trained by 31 December 1953. This approved peace establishment of 124,500 was to be raised on mobilization and was to rise to 240,000 within 12 months and 366,000 by M. Day, plus two years. As the existing arrangements made it unlikely that this figure for trained national servicemen would be reached until 1956, and therefore delay the achievement of the mobilization objective, the Cabinet overruled Service advice and increased the call up rate in order that the manpower target would be achieved.
The situation with regard to equipment was not as readily solved. At the conclusion of World War II the AMF held sufficient stocks to equip five divisions but by 1950 these stocks had been depleted and serious deficiencies existed. These deficiencies had been caused by an earlier Government decisions to declare for disposal all equipment and stores with a possible civil market. Secondly, some items had become obsolete or had been used since. Many items were in need of repair or modification. Thirdly, no provision had been made in post war budgets for mobilization purposes and generally the situation had been further aggravated by the failure of the AMF, due to a shortage of funding and skilled personnel, to implement a policy of inspection and maintenance of mobilization stocks.

A detailed review of the equipment position in 1950 revealed that without significant additional budget provision, the Army was incapable of meeting even its initial obligations under the mobilization plan. In 1954 the actual requirements for mobilization stocks were still pending because those officers preparing the submissions were unable to obtain the basic data required, and the appropriate administrative plans had yet to be prepared. This was not to occur until 1956. Nevertheless Mobilization Plans had been prepared and issued in 1953. However with a gradual easing of the international situation the interest in Mobilization waned and the National Service Scheme was curtailed and then abandoned.

Equally corrosive of the Army’s preparedness for war was that the operational plans for the mobilization of the Australian Army envisaged the early despatch of agreed levels of forces to be equipped and maintained by the British Government. There was implicit in this continuing dependence upon the UK, considerable financial advantage but equally there were concerns at senior levels in the Australian Army that such dependence was not in the best interests of the Australian Army or Australia’s national interest generally. It was not until 1978 that the first staffing arrangements were put in place to rekindle the Australian interest in Mobilization planning.

As mentioned earlier much of the initial impetus on mobilization was generated in Europe over 100 years ago. Even a casual review of the practice there today confirms the importance of this subject as the key building block in a nation’s preparedness for war. There are those in our own ranks who will not accept that there is merit in the study of the professional experience of others, or even of our own traditions and experience. We tend to ignore the cost of those earlier times when we were unprepared for war. We scattered unprepared forces to protect distant vital points to the north and sacrificed those sent to defend Malaya, Ambon, Rabaul and the rest. Today professional European and Asian armies have repaired and practiced mobilization plans based on the speedy availability of trained reserves and the necessary stores and equipment. They take the prospect of war seriously and recall, with bitter memories, the penalties imposed on those who fail to prepare for it.

As the Director of Mobilization in 1936 was to sum up the Australian situation some three years before the outbreak of a catastrophic war:

We deceive ourselves, and incidentally the Government and the general public, if we regard our Field Army as in any way complete for war in the sense of being prepared to fight the regular Army of a first class power (the only type at all likely to attack us) until every unit is possessed of adequate equipment and officers and men fully trained to use it . . . There is little justification for maintaining an Army at all, unless it can be made capable of opposing an enemy attack when and where required.

Your Old Friend.

 Colonel Wood is a regular contributor to the DFJ, usually through his “Letter to a Friend” series. During 1986 he was a Defence Fellow at Deakin University where he prepared a study entitled “Mobilization: An Outline Record of its Origin and Development in Respect of Land Forces.” This study is presently under consideration for wider publication.

 Colonel Wood, the first Reserve Officer to be awarded a Defence Fellowship, is Colonel Plans HQ 3rd Division. He enlisted in 1956 in 1CD Coy, where he was commissioned in 1960. His subsequent regimental and staff appointments include overseas secondments with the Royal Hong Kong Regiment and the US Army Reserve in Japan. He was Commanding Officer, Melbourne University Regiment, 1979-1981 and holds a BA, BEd, MA and has recently submitted a PhD Dissertation on Australian Defence Policy.
Train to Retain the ARES Soldier

By Captain J. G. Caligari, ARES

Introduction

The role of the Australian Army Reserve (ARES) is to provide an expansion base on general mobilisation and to augment the Australian Regular Army (ARA) in time of defence emergency or war. In order to realise this role personnel must be recruited, trained and then retained in sufficient numbers and for an appropriate length of time to maintain the level of training.

These three elements to fulfilling the role of the ARES are arguably of equal importance in ensuring an effective Reserve, and are most certainly linked. Which of them requires the priority of effort and more specifically, what needs to be done about it is the subject of this article.

Retain and Recruit by Effective Training

The ARES has experienced an average annual resignation or discharge rate of approximately 35% over the past 12 years. Unless the objective is to put as many civilians as possible through some Army training (if only recruit training), the level of retention in the ARES must be increased in order to maintain a level of training sufficiently high to enable the ARES to fulfil its role with only a minimum of additional training.

Retention is the key, but how do recruiting and training affect retention? Recruiting itself will increase the numbers of the Reserve, but will not directly affect retention. "Good training however, will undoubtedly alleviate the wastage of personnel in the Reserve".

Training in fact also has a beneficial effect on recruiting. From a census commissioned by the Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) in 1973, Dr. T. B. Millar commented that "formal advertising contributed very little" to the recruiting effort. The census showed that "of officers 59%, and 64.6% of OR, gained their first idea of the Citizen Military Forces from friends or other members of the Citizen Military Forces. Another 11.2% of officers and 14.1% of OR got this idea from family members." If it is people in contact with the ARES who serve as the best recruiters, then a soldier who is satisfied with the training he is receiving, could be expected to be a better advertisement. With better training the level of retention will increase and recruiting will look after itself. This is not to say that training on its own will solve the problem but it is half the battle.


In a census type survey of a random sample of people who had left the CMF within the 12 months prior to the survey (conducted by the Australian Army Psychology Corps in 1973) Dr. T. B. Millar endeavoured to ascertain the reasons people left the CMF. The results of the study, with respect to voluntary members of the CMF, showed the major areas for concern were:

* Training,
* Leadership/Man Management,
* Organisation, and
* Social Restrictions.

This result is most certainly still relevant in 1987, as are many of the comments and deductions made by Dr. Millar's Committee of Inquiry.

Training

In 1974, ex-CMF members surveyed indicated that they found training "boring and repetitive". Respondents felt that concentrated training would produce better results than piecemeal training throughout the year. And when home training was compared to field training, Millar noted that "there were few negative comments about field training and bivouacs", while most of the criticism was levelled at home training. Boredom was rated the worst aspect of CMF life by 20.3% of the sample, with comments from respondents varying from "training was unnecessarily repetitious" to "much of the training time was taken up with purely administrative and maintenance duties".

These remarks from the Millar Report, although selective, indicate that the dissatisfac-
tation with training was in the majority of cases dissatisfaction with non-continuous, home training rather than the camps of continuous training.

Leadership/Man Management/Organisation

Another major problem that caused CMF soldiers to take discharge or cause themselves to be discharged was the quality of leadership and man management received. Dr. Millar commented that “much of the dissatisfaction with the training and organisation could be directly attributed to the quality of the man management”.

54% of those surveyed were either non-committal or dissatisfied with the leadership received.

As mentioned above, the organisation and administration of activities, mainly home training activities, was a major source of dissatisfaction. The shortcomings in training activities and the organisation of such activities has been attributed to the fact that there are “bound to be gaps in their (ARES officers) experience” due to the nature of part-time soldiering.

Dr. Millar also stated that leaders could not be trained in a unit which was really not more than a skeleton of what it should be, despite legitimate claims that priority must be placed on the training of leaders.

Social Restriction

And lastly, but most importantly for the ARES soldier, is the social restriction. “The restraints placed upon social activities by CMF membership” was rated as the ‘worst’ aspect of serving in the CMF. This should be considered however, alongside the fact that “almost half the respondents made positive comment on the social benefits of CMF service”.

It is important to note the obvious emphasis members of the Reserve place on the ‘Social Aspect’ of Reserve life. Service in the ARES must compete with many other activities (most of which are social) that bid for the spare time of potential ARES soldiers.

Old Report, Old Data

The above statistics and comments were published in 1974, and although now 13 years old, from my experience, are still relevant today in the ARES. The plethora of quotes serves only to confirm my impressions of the shortcomings in the effectiveness of the ARES, (if only those units I have seen) and demonstrates that it is not my imagination, a biased view or even anything new, regarding the problems encountered by soldiers serving in the ARES. I have used Dr. Millar’s comments on his findings, as they apply today.

Training is Most Important

“The best form of ‘Welfare’ for the troops is first class training.”

General Erwin Rommel.

From the conclusions drawn by Dr. Millar’s Committee of Inquiry the following associations between training and retention can be made.

“Training is the key to the success or failure of the Army Reserve”. Poor and inadequate training leads to manpower wastage from the ARES. This in turn reduces the level of training and experience gained by officers and non commissioned officers (NCO) in exercising leadership, command, man management and organisational skills due to understrength sub units. What develops is “an imbalance between officers, non commissioned officers and private soldiers, resulting in unsatisfactory command and leadership experience and a general state of frustration at all levels.” Consequently, their inability to organise effective and interesting training and lack of man management skills leads to a further decline in training standards and further wastage. The relationship of Training and Poor Leadership to Wastage can best be seen in the diagram page 19.

Improving Training

If it is accepted that “all training is expensive, but good training is more cost effective than bad training” then in order to break the cycle described above, measures must be taken to ensure that:

* a specific standard of training is set,
* effective training is more easily achieved, and
* greater control is exercised over the standard of training at a higher level.

Although not exhaustive, I believe the following to be some of the measures that could be implemented which would require little or no change to policy, and could improve the preparedness of the ARES to fulfil it’s role.
Poor, inadequate training

Poor man management, leadership and organisation.

Wastage (lack of retention)

Lack of command and leadership experience

Raising the Standard of Training

If TIB 57 describes the required standard then the standard of sub unit training should be easily assessed. However in many cases the number of training staff required places a strain on manpower resources, to a level of having to draw on personnel who have reached an acceptable personal standard of training, although are not yet sufficiently competent to train others. This is especially the case in units below strength.

What is required is closer supervision of, and more detailed assistance with, training conducted by units. To this end ex-ARA officers and senior NCO could be utilised in assisting with training and quality control. This is not to ‘police’ units and sub units, but rather to render assistance in organising training and providing additional advisors when required to both train and assess.

An appropriate organisation at a military district headquarters or on the staff of a command headquarters would be well placed to coordinate and liaise for the use of facilities and resources that would stimulate training. Even to the point of conducting adventure type training that has the express aim of cultivating leadership and teamwork in an interesting setting. This adventure training could be an incentive award for a good performance in tests of elementary training.

At unit level, ex-ARA SNCO/WO in particular could be taken on surplus to unit establishment as training staff to assist when additional advisors/assessors are required, similar to those already used by the SASR, for the conduct of exercises and courses. In this regard the Regular Army Emergency Reserve (RAER) could be put to better use by:

* Increasing the strength and ceiling of the RAER with experienced SNCO/WO (current strength approximately 140),
* Placing a more strict selection criteria than that described in Army Office Staff Instruction 3/81,
* Improving the conditions of service (eg. increasing the annual bounty), and
* Centralising control at MD and/or functional command level to facilitate pool use of this valuable asset, as described above.

ARES units would find this even more attractive as no mandays are used by members of the RAER. The proposed use of ex-ARA SNCO/WO would no doubt also please ARES WOs/SNCOs who often feel they have had promotion prospects diminished due to ARA soldiers transferring to ARES units on retirement, on occasions taking the senior promotion postings away from the ARES soldier’s career incentive. Another possibility for improving the standard of training and making it more relevant to the role could be the staggered posting of ARA commanders at sub-unit level. “The primary aim should be to establish these sub units on a sound basis, with satisfactory strengths and high standards of leadership and training”.19 If every alternate posting to the command of an ARES sub unit were filled by an ARA officer the passing on of his experience
would benefit subordinates and ARES peers. Similarly however, ARES officers must maintain their command experience and would have the experience of taking over a unit recently commanded by a regular officer and at the same time have peers commanding other sub unit’s who are regular officers. There is already a permanent ARA commanding officer for the three northern Australia regional forces; why not extend the practice, for which there has already been identified a need. The obvious limitation to this suggestion however is the rapid wastage of personnel in the ARA and current manpower ceilings.

If the standard of training is to improve and the level of experience gained by ARES officers is also to increase and so further improve the training standard, a greater ARA and/or ex-ARA involvement is required, especially considering the Total Force concept.

Social Attraction

For a soldier to serve in an ARES unit he must make a decision to forego some other activity that makes demands on his spare time. Most of the alternatives to ARES service are, to a greater or lesser extent, social, and therefore indicates the importance ARES soldiers place on ‘mateship’ and the social aspect of ARES life.

As already discussed much of the discontent over training was and still is, primarily discontent with the non-continuous, home training, not the periods of continuous training or annual camps. The one weeknight training period as it is currently utilised epitomises the negative comments made by ex-CMF soldiers who took discharge from the CMF in 1973. On the whole it is ‘boring, repetitive, piecemeal and largely consists of maintenance and administrative duties.’

Weeknight training should remain, it is the lack of an acceptable standard of training that must go. A weeknight is rarely sufficient time to teach or learn anything, and for people who are not soldiers full time, it is too short a time to ‘switch-on’ in order to properly revise soldier skills. If the one night a week were made a fixed one hour of voluntary unpaid, interest training with a guaranteed ‘social’ period after the activity, part time soldiers would be more inclined to remain in the Reserve. Soldier attendance then would be more tangible evidence of a commanders ability to enthuse his subordinates to attend a parade. If soldiers don’t think they are being taught and the period of training is presented as being of interest value only, soldiers will tend to learn more. An example of this training could be any one of the hundreds of training films available, a guest lecturer or even the odd sports competition.

By making the week night parade compulsory an ARES soldier at times must decide which he will attend if a clash arises. If he chooses the alternative, and specific training is required, he will miss that training and may not have the opportunity to catch it up for a long time. Even the most well organised training on any weeknight must suffer from this. The soldier is then either backsquaded or looses interest altogether.

This suggested format for weeknight training identifies that there is little real cost effective benefit in training, for, at most, three hours on one night per week. It provides for a greater incentive for soldiers to remain in the Reserve, by making the night training interesting. Making the training voluntary, obligates commanders at all levels to exercise their leadership skill, a skill that is said to be on the decline in the Australian Army due to the lack of retention.

Similarly, weekend training should be strictly training that will benefit and interest the soldier. To merely have every second weekend devoted to ARES training for the sake of continuity is a waste of time and money. In conjunction with a suggestion made earlier, assistance should be sought from a central cadre of experienced ex-ARA officers and SNCO to assist in the planning and coordinating of interesting and demanding activities. Many of these could also be voluntary unpaid depending on their relevance to the training objective, relying on the reputation of similar previously ‘organised’ activities.

Ultimately however, effective training must be carried out in order to achieve a standard that requires only six months of additional training to attain unit efficiency. There is no special legislation for the present ‘special conditions’ situation of many soldiers in achieving two 16-day camps per year. Other ARES units could utilise the two camps per-year even if some of the soldiers could, by nature of their employment only attend one camp per year.

If the standard of training were lifted and consequently retention and the standard of leadership improved, there would be a greater incentive for soldiers to use two weeks of their
annual leave for a second camp, as many soldiers in special conditions units already do.

Conclusion

The value of training on a non-continuous basis is, in the most part, not as important as the non-continuous function of retaining the ARES soldier, an entirely new outlook must be taken on effective ARES training. Weeknight training should concentrate on providing the social outlet, at no expense to the Army, that today's youth need if they are to choose the Army Reserve over the local indoor cricket club. The leadership task for commanders, at all levels, to enthuse soldiers to attend rather than accept the retention problem as 'inevitable', would commence the improvement of the standard of leadership.

By centralising the resource, as yet untapped, of ex-ARA Warrant Officers and SNCOs in the organisation of the RAER, and assisting ARES units in the organising of effective and demanding training, the retention problem could be vastly reduced. And if more soldiers remained in the unit, problems of poor leadership, man management and organisation would gradually improve as would training, thus breaking the cycle.

Some of the recommended changes to the training of the ARES soldier, outlined in this article, could be made at unit level by a commander, without any necessary changes occurring in Army policy or government legislation.

The improvements would require a concerted effort, and significant change to the present unit training ideas, of a magnitude many consider today's Army Reserve not capable. The results could affect the currently evolving strength management processes and mechanisms for the Australian Army Reserve.

If the Army is seriously interested in the improvement of the standard of training of the other half of our Total Force, it must take a greater responsibility for the standards to be achieved. In the present economic climate this could be best achieved through the more full employment of the Regular Army Emergency Reserve, in the role for which it was designed.

NOTES

1. 'Rethinking ARES Retention', Paul Oates, DFJ No. 45, March/April '84
2. Report by the Committee of Inquiry into the CMF, (Millar Report 1974), page 85
3. Ibid Annex C page 20
4. Ibid
5. Ibid Annex D page 12
6. Ibid page 13
7. Ibid page 11
8. Ibid
10. Ibid
11. Ibid page 8 (39)
12. Ibid para 4.3
13. Ibid para 4.1
15. Ibid page 10
16. Ibid para 7.33
17. Ibid para 5.12
18. Ibid para 6.15
19. Ibid para 5.13
20. Ibid para 2.27
The Colonel’s Lady

By Judy Thomson

’T’HE Colonel’s Lady and Judy O’Grady are sisters under their skins,’ I knew the lines, but not the verse. Wavell hadn’t included the poem in his anthology, “Other Men’s Flowers”. I finally guessed why at a dinner party, when David, my husband, primed with port and urged on by our host, the bishop, declaimed ‘The Ladies’ (despite the shocked protestations of the housekeeper). You see Kipling’s soldier had learned about women from ‘er and ‘er — black, brown, yellow and white. This colonel’s lady had naively compared herself with Judy O’Grady until then.

In South Australia however I discovered that privates’ wives and the colonel’s lady shared similar problems, from absentee husbands to ten square boxes, those temporary prefabs called homes.

Inverbrackie Camp near Woodside, is twenty miles over the hills from Adelaide. Famous units had lived and trained there during World War 2. Twenty years later the camp was little altered, but alongside were temporary married quarters for one hundred families. Lucknow Avenue was allotted to the officers, with the CO’s house on the corner of the road to Nairne, facing a rolling green paddock with several large gum trees, a farm house and sheds. As we unpacked at No 96, in that end-of-January heatwave, I realised it was hotter inside our prefab than out and tempers flared when the first crates we opened contained all the items for storage in Canberra.

A cool change came and with it my parents and our boys in time for Saturday 1st February 1964 when with a host of VIPs the 4th Battalion was declared officially raised at the service of dedication followed by a gala champagne luncheon in the officers mess and parties at the sergeant’s and other ranks messes. Then it was on with the serious business of training for anti-insurgent warfare in Malaysia where 4RAR was expected to replace the 3rd Battalion stationed in Malacca.

Although Indonesia had never officially declared war against what President Soekarno called the neo-colonialist Malaysia, Indonesia guerillas continued to raid across the Borneo border into Sawawak. And Australia, while maintaining full diplomatic ties with Indonesia, had soldiers forming part of the Commonwealth Brigade at Malacca, ready to take on those insurgents in ‘Konfrontasi’.

On the homefront I innocently confronted other situations. Of the 700 battalion soldiers almost 300 were married and two thirds lived at a new housing trust estate on the outskirts of Adelaide. David suggested that the Padre and I visit them at Athol Park. I imagined myself like the Queen popping in for a chat over the best china. But we barely sat down all morning. Instead we listened to a litany of complaints. No hot water in the kitchen or laundry, old-fashioned gas heaters in the bathroom, wives who hadn’t received their allotments, families with no warm clothes, unmade roads and paths and no shops. I didn’t dare complain about Inverbrackie but promised that we would organise a wives get-together shortly. I hadn’t even been Queen for an hour.

Our army families averaged two children and at the Woodside Primary School the army ‘brats’ now outnumbered the locals, who were mostly descended from German Lutheran families. The school was stretched way beyond its capacity. Mr Schiller, the headmaster, sat quietly during that first School Mothers’ Meeting. An hour’s debate ensured concerning their 19th annual birthday. Should they have a mystery bus ride or a party and who would make the cake, light the candles, fan them out and wasn’t Mrs Brown too old to blow the candles out standing up? Finally the restless newcomers from Inverbrackie dared to ask what they planned to do with the money in hand after the Headmaster explained the lack of books and equipment. An army wife proposed we spend all the money as he suggested. We used our numbers to pass the motion, despite the consternation over spending all their carefully hoarded savings.

We needed a kindergarten at Inverbrackie. David said we could have an empty hut in the camp, if we could equip and run it ourselves. I called a meeting of enthusiastic mothers and came home Madame President with the list of
ideas for making money. Within two weeks, I was standing on our corner with Alistair waiting for the army bus to pick him up for his morning at kinder, going along as one of the extra pairs of hands to scrub and clean, while I paid a soldier's wife to sweep through my own house to make it ready for yet another dinner party.

We could just fit eight at our round dropside table and once they were seated, they had to stay put. We gradually had all the other officers and their wives for dinner and introduced them to the grazier families of the district who had already welcomed us to their splendidly spacious homes and generously loaned us livestock. Sammy the lamb, Trixie an escapologist pony and guinea pigs who miraculously failed to multiply. 'If we only had a tractor, we'd be a farm,' said Andrew hopefully. But as I tried to teach them to ride in the paddock behind our house in the ensuing cold wet winter I was thankful we were not living there forever. Even indoors, the wind whistled through the cracks in the floorboards like a child blowing a Cole's tin whistle.

The camp had been chosen because it could support a battalion but training for tropical warfare required imagination, trips to the Jungle Training Centre at Canungra or exercises in Far North Queensland. David had realised that much of his year would be spent away from home and bought us a television set to compensate. While the boys cried over Lassie, scorned the visiting Beatles and we all swam in the Olympics with Dawn Fraser, David wrote:

I am sitting with my back to a tree — a hive of activity around me. Radios, maps and staff. The battalion is on the move and waiting for helicopters to pick us up. B Coy is cutting a landing site in the bush so that we can move forward. We've had quite a night. At 10pm I was awakened by the Intelligence Officer with new information on the enemy which meant a complete redeployment of the battalion which was spread out over 100 sq miles. We made a new plan and then had to work out how to get orders out with companies on the move and out of communication. A message was dropped to A Company by aircraft. It has been a rather exciting exercise . . . trying out new ideas . . . our rations have been good. We invented them and have packed 20,000 individual ration packs. As I write an aircraft is dropping our rations for the next three days by parachute.

Campbell went to school and received full marks for his news story about Daddy receiving a birthday cake parachuted to him in the 'jungle' and the enemy sending him a bottle of wine. He didn't tell them how Daddy used Tineafax for toothpaste in the dark.

David assured me that a battalion Wives Club would relieve him of many domestic problems and act as a kind of safety valve for worried wives. The battalion helped by bringing the Athol Park wives and small children by bus for lunch with the rest of us at Inverbrackie. It was a start but while we lived so far apart, the two groups would have to act separately. At Inver-
brackie we decided to meet on Wednesdays and play tennis, have a cup of tea and share our problems. Once again I felt rather like the Head Prefect, steering a friendly but uncertain course as President, having to be on my dignity, ‘Mrs Thomson’ to everyone except the officers’ wives. Some of the men told their wives to stay away, probably thinking the officers’ wives would pull rank. But mostly we muddled along and enjoyed our beauty counsellor visitor or Tupperware display, fancy dress party or cake stall to raise money for the every needy kindergarten.

I was younger than many of them but undaunted I handed out helpful hints on child-rearing and gave copies of Dr Spock to the mothers or dummies to the new babies in our street (after David had told me that their fathers were arriving exhausted for work). And the battalion Medical Officer promoted a new miracle, the Pill. I thought it wonderful. No more messy contraceptives. Just a question of remembering my daily dose. Two months later I was not so sure. The MO’s wife was pregnant again.

Brief leave periods were spent as a family exploring Victor Harbour and the Flinders Ranges. The Battalion 2IC ‘volunteered’ to mind Sammy for us and to stop him baaing so early in the morning decided to give him an extra bottle of milk at midnight. But Sammy believed in Demand Feeding no matter what the hour. On our return I overheard it said that next time the CO could take his lamb with him. The headless daisies in the 2IC’s garden had been the last straw.

When Campbell and Andrew arrived home from school there just time for an hour of war before tea. They’d adopted a stray Alsatian who became the tracker dog — worth two guns and a knife — and there was no lack of chiefs or Indians to defend the large hollow log hideout in the paddock.

The Governor, Sir Edric Bastyan and Lady Bastyan took a great interest in us and came to visit. Lady Bastyan deplored our simple, makeshift kindergarten and later tried hard to obtain official funding for us. She insisted on seeing my ‘flimsy quarter’, and tapped on the thin walls disparagingly. ‘Not good enough.’ Quite right but it wasn’t forever. Shortly afterwards they were amongst the guests for the battalion’s big day — The Presentation of Colours by the Governor-General at the Adelaide Oval.

As I proudly watched David lead the 4th Battalion through the intricate Parade, it was great to feel we knew so many of those marching with him and that their wives and children belonged. We’d become friends, part of a family, which is what a battalion really is.

Despite tentative peace proposals in June 1964, Confrontation continued with incursions
on the Malayan coastline. By December, Soekarno boasted he would crush Malaysia by New Year. Twenty thousand Malaysian troops were on stand-by in Borneo and along the west coast of Malaya. From Woodside we went on leave, camping at Lilli Pilli on 24 hour stand-by. The world scene was little better. Kruschev had resigned and Brezhnev seemed more aggressive. President Johnson was re-elected with a record poll but the situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating. The US Base at Bien Hoa had been badly hit. In Australia, Prime Minister Menzies had announced in November that the Government was introducing National Service for twenty year olds who would undertake two years’ full-time service and an additional battle group was to be established in North Queensland, perhaps at Townsville. Foreign Affairs Minister Hasluck appealed to members of the United Nations to honour their obligations as peace-keepers. Australia committed itself to sending a fighting force to South Vietnam and although the wives did not know it, the choice of battalions was between 4RAR and 1RAR. Both were told to be ready. Meantime we prepared inventories for our move to Malacca and took out Powers of Attorney for our husbands. From now on I would have to be able to handle all our affairs and I’ve always been grateful that the situation forced this on me.

But our minds were far from war as the members of the 4th Battalion and their families left Adelaide by charter flights in September 1965. We were off to join the 28 Commonwealth Infantry Brigade at Bukit Terendak, the camp on a hill shaped like a coolie hat, sixteen miles from Malacca. A fine house and willing staff awaited me — a life of tropical luxury with nothing more arduous to do than arranging the flowers.

Space on the rough, pot-holed road from Malacca to the camp was competed for by crazy taxi drivers, timber-laden Malaccan carts pulled by zebu and water buffalo straying from the grassy fringes. On the coconut-lined seashore to our right, fishermen threw nets and the sails of junks were silhouetted romantically before we passed from lush green rice paddy fields to Malay kampongs with their thatched houses decorated with colourful pot plants and shrubs and raised on stilts or Chinese houses planted firmly on the ground.

Tarendak Garrison, equipped for twelve thousand men, was the size of a small town with a large shopping complex, cinema, swimming pool, three chapels and hospital. Families were accommodated both within the camp and in villages along the way to Malacca. Commonwealth House, home of the Brigade Commander, Brigadier Terence McMeekin, domi-
nated Hull Avenue where the six commanders of the various battalions or regiments lived. Here was our next home, a two-storey house with orange-pink bougainvillea creeping over the carport, and green lawns interspersed with pink and yellow sweetly perfumed frangipani, white gardenias and vari-coloured crotons and bananas and pawpaws ripening for picking by either boys or wild gibbon monkeys. Inside, tiled floors, cane furniture, gently swishing fans and all doors open to the breezes. And standing waiting to receive us were Ah Fook, the cook, Yong the Wash Amah and a very shy Malay Kebun, our gardener.

I had scarcely unpacked and despatched the boys to their new school when a note arrived from Anne McMeekin, inviting me to coffee. How kind I thought little realising that it was more of a summons.

Ann was the kindest, most thoughtful and friendly person but she was also the perfect model of a brigade commander’s wife. While Terence ran the Brigade, she saw to the welfare of all the families. She listed the meetings I must attend such as the Brigade Garrison Welfare Committee for the airing of complaints and SSAFA, the Soldiers, Sailors & Airmens Family Association which ran the baby health clinic and school medical examinations. I was handed earlier copies of Minutes of Meetings so that I would be completely au fait and asked about my Wives’ Club. If the wives were happy the men’s morale would not suffer.

Within weeks I knew I could have stood as city councillor. I was handling petitions for a rat catcher, removal of rubbish from drains, the need for amahs to have x-rays and the inadequacy of bus services — apart from regular hospital visits whenever one of our wives had a baby or was ill.

The heat was oppressive and each day after school I would take the boys swimming at the Officers Beach Club to cool off. Would it never rain? Our Officers Mess had a formal dining in night and after the CO’s obligatory waltz, the younger men were trying to teach us to dance The Slop when a fierce beam of lightning shot across the sky followed by an ear-shattering clap of thunder. Within seconds, the rain came pelting down so that not even the louvres could keep it out and we huddled together in the centre of the room, unable to hear anything but the music of a Niagara falling on the roof. In a lull, we leapt the flowing monsoon drains and raced to our car to go home to the boys. But Ah Fook had closed every window and curtain in anticipation and they slept soundly covered only by a sheet and mosquito nets firmly tucked in.

Two good-luck gecko lizards chased up a wall, chittering like woodpeckers, as they pursued a tiny insect in the over-heated room.
Soon it was Christmas and David and the officers served the men with their Christmas dinner whilst I helped judge the best decorations in the hospital wards. And Chinese New Year when Ah Fook visited his family in Penang and replaced himself with an Indian cook with one word, 'Very well mam' and very strange results. My parents visited and we roamed Malacca with a camera to record scenes for my mother to paint: ramshackle wooden houses hanging over the waterway; junk at rest in the harbour; the orange painted Dutch stadthouse and old clock tower; the remains of a Portuguese fort and Frances Xavier's church; Chinese shopfronts and old men peddling trishaws; washing hanging out on long poles from windows.

Not long after, David and I lunched at Seri Melaka, Government House perched on the hill above the city. I found myself sitting on the left hand of the Gabnor of Melaka, Tuan Yang Terutama or Tun Haji, a very charming small man with a twinkle in the eye who insisted I try all the curries and then have steam pudding and custard. I spoke my few words of Malay with his wife Tuan Poh Fatimah as she showed us the orchids in their garden.

That night we had our Australian High Commissioner staying and a dinner party for twelve. While David sat peacefully reflecting on our guppies and neon tetra fish in their large lamp fish bowl, Ah Fook and I checked the menu: Pate, Vichysoise, Ikan Selangin (stuffed and baked fish) and Cuban Bananas. 'I am very pleased Madam is teaching me new recipes. Next I am getting job with more VIP person.' I was just pondering this when he shrieked out 'buffaloes' and rushed to the kitchen, grabbed a broom and raced outside wielding it like a dervish. Boys in pyjamas, David in dinner jacket and me in long dress all joined the chase. Several buffaloes had broken through the barbwire fence and were chewing the new shoots on our trees. Astonished guests arrived to find a deserted house with only the fish swimming serenely round and round.

Early next morning, The Governor, in national costume, honoured us by taking the Battalion Birthday Parade. Morning tea, followed by an Australian Rules Demonstration match, a sumptuous buffet lunch under a large marquee and you may be forgiven for thinking my mind dwelt on food but I was not allowed to write about the battalion's military training — that was censored as remains the story of their activities in Borneo.

In April 1966 the Battalion relieved a Gurkha battalion at Bau, about 20 miles from Kuching. A few days later, Prime Minister Holt met the Australian wives for coffee at Battalion headquarters before going to Borneo to visit 4RAR. I wrote:
He was introduced by Brigadier McMeekin and then spoke for almost ten minutes — and must have had his most peaceful audience for many months. It was the perfect, smooth political speech. How proud Australia was of its soldiers serving abroad, what a good job they were doing, the wives were doing an even better job, etc. What a beautiful sight for him, so many attractive wives after nothing but soldiers on his trip, in such beautiful surroundings! The eulogy ended, he walked round shaking many hands and patting many babies and asking suitable questions. In the end mothers were bringing their children up to be photographed with him. This was almost too much for me. At last he paused for a drink, 'well now I'm amongst Australians, you should be able to give me a good cup of tea!' Black mark for someone, there was only coffee.

Sitting next to him at lunch with the McMeekins he regretted his world image of sun-tanned spear fisherman and seemed unconcerned about the few protesting over conscription. I was primed to ask for Australian teachers at the Mountbatten Primary School. Our children had to accept British education and teachers with no knowledge of our different state systems and the difficulties these children already suffered from interstate moves. The Prime Minister replied that Australia recruited teachers for New Guinea and perhaps . . . but I don't think he was really listening. He had more important things to consider.

The President of the Malacca Club invited me to join the McMeekins as his guests at the St George's Society Annual Dinner. Somerset Maugham wrote:

The Club faces the sea; it is a spacious but shabby building; it has an air of neglect and when you enter you feel that you intrude. It gives you the impression that it is closed really, for alterations and repairs, and that you have taken indiscreet advantage of an open door to go where you are not wanted. But that night, figures of guardsmen lined the rooms and red and white roses bedecked the walls — tired decorations from earlier, grander days. The band played Rule Britannia and as we sat for dinner, the roast beef was carried in on high. The President asked, 'Is this Aberdeen Angus?' and the reply came, 'No sir. 'Tis the Beef of Merrie England.' What did Tunku Ahmad, the Kedah prince who worked for Dunlop rubber, sitting opposite think of this? He was too polite to say. The Lancers and the Waltz Cotillion were attempted. Terence McMeekin and I tried the stately St Bernard's Waltz and as we whirled around I imagined myself to be like some memsahib or colonel's lady of yesteryear. But our men patrolling in the Borneo jungle were never really out of my mind.

In June the entire battalion was involved in a successful attack against Communist terrorists, but two wounded men had to be carried for six hours through the jungle to an emergency helipad carved out of a jungle ridge. Just when we'd been told that peace was mooted. It was more necessary than ever to keep the waiting wives busy. Earlier, two of our 'ladies' had played up with soldiers from other regiments. But they and their husbands were promptly despatched to Australia and we had no more obvious incidents. A journalist traveling with the Prime Minister described us as the pampered wives of South East Asia!

Yet our Wives Club raised money for a television set in the Malacca Hospital TB ward, food for their families and a typewriter for a girl's home. We held games mornings, an Any Questions Panel, a Funtastic Swimming Carnival and our piece de resistance — the 'Hellow Borneo' Revue.

Before a packed hall of wives, I parodied an over-bearing and affected commanding officers' wife welcoming everyone (too well — some thought I was real) and then conducted our chorus in its rousing theme song, to the tune of 'I'll join the Legion'.

We're wives and mothers,
We do our best,
To raise our sons in the footsteps
Of dad who's not here but away half the year
And who's praises we're singing with zest.

Why join the army?
That's what we think,
But with true spartan upbringing
They too will go to Borneo
And we will cry anew with Woe . . .

Our wives donned men's singlets and footy gear to dance Swan Lake or jungle greens for marching. They sang about the Do's and Don'ts of an army camp. Four of us played guitars and to the tune of Botany Bay lamented the delays at the Family Medical Clinic where 'you waited
on the conveyor belt, numbered like socks in a row but why worry if during the long wait, your symptoms boil over and go. For monsoonal blisters are nothing. Your coughs and your splutters and naught. Your chills and your ills are so transient, what you catch, of course, can't be caught.'

Our Revue was an enormous success. Outwardly we were excessively cheerful but alone at night I wrote a poem of the loneliness and sense of desolation shared by all, whether newly weds or seasoned mothers.

I mean to write to him of love and lostness The things I felt, but found so hard to say.
And now the pages fill with daily happenings Life muddles on, relentless, day by day.

And then Peace was declared. Confrontation ended and the Battalion returned after six months away, but three had died, making safe the ground in a war that few Australians really understood or cared about.

We'd had three years with our beloved 4th Battalion and it was time for us to leave, for another CO to take over. Another traumatic period of frenzied farewell parties and a final parade to formalise the whole departure. David wrote that I was looking forward to a peaceful life of domesticity in Canberra. Perhaps I was but I'd enjoyed my role as Colonel's Lady, doing what was expected of me. I'd discovered we army wives really were sisters under the skin. I'd learnt about women from them.

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The Colonel's Lady' is a chapter from an autobiography tentatively entitled PITY SHE's NOT A BOY, which the author, Judy Thomson has just completed.

Judy Thomson graduated in Arts from Melbourne University and went abroad to see the world. She returned to Australia 'to settle down' and instead married Major David Thomson and travelled as a bride to the Staff College, Quetta on the north-west frontier of Pakistan.

She describes herself as one of that generation who accepted that her husband's career in the army and politics came first. She is now enjoying doing something just for herself as part-time Editor of Pergamon/ANUPress while finishing an Associated Diploma in Professional Writing at the CCAE.

She is the wife of Brigadier The Hon David Thomson, MC, RL.

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CADRE BULLETIN

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The Journals in which they appear are available through the Defence Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District Libraries.

Who is Disrupting the Settlement of the Central American Conflict? Montedonico, Ruben International Affairs (Moscow),; Oct 86: 140+(5p) The text of a letter from Ruben Montedonico of the Mexican newspaper El Dia in which he condemns the US Administration's course of action in the region. Also discusses the present situation in the five Latin American countries of Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica.

More Rational Approach Needed for Threat Assessment and Counterterrorist Policy. Wardlaw, Grant Pacific Defence Reporter,; Dec/Jan 86/87: 82-84 The author states that the world must accept that terrorism will be part of the international scene for the foreseeable future. This fact should be a basis for rational threat assessment and the development of counterterrorist policies. Discusses the US retaliatory raids on Libya, terrorist attacks in France, airport security, and briefly, the Australian situation.

Weapons. No. 2 — Coping with Dwindling Funds and Rising Costs. Western, Desmond Pacific Defence Reporter,; Dec/Jan 86/87: 70-72 In order to cope with shrinking funds and rising costs British defence industries are turning to both national and international collaboration. Discusses with regard to ship building and naval procurement in the Royal Navy.

Will NATO Choose Goose Bay or Konya for NTFWC base? Hobson, Sharon: Emre, Selcuk K. Jane's Defence Weekly,; 22 Nov 86: 1244-1246 NATO is expected shortly to decide whether Goose Bay in Canada or Konya in Turkey will be selected as the new NATO Tactical Fighter and Weapons Training Centre. The Turkish site may be favoured but, either way, both venues could still have multi-national interest and usage. Looks at the benefits of both sites.

A Survey of the Italian Defence Industry. Severo, Michele Armata Internazionale,; 7/86: 36+(10p) Discusses Italy's need for sophisticated military and logistic systems to face fronts on land and the Mediterranean. Examines the CATRIN program, anti-aircraft weapons, guardian 40L70 guns, the C1 tricolor battle tank, antitank weapons, the future of the Italian Navy and naval industry, international aeronautical programs and the electronic components industry.


Sky Watch — The VAOC 1941-1946

By David Wilson, Department of Defence.

Ensconced in camouflaged seashore caves, forestry firespotting towers and other appropriate vantage points, thousands of Australians served in the front line of the Volunteer Air Observers Corps (VAOC) during World War Two.

The VAOC concept was devised by the RAAF Directorate of Intelligence during the latter months of 1941. The Air Board, in a signal to Southern Area Headquarters dated 22 December 1941, ordered that the VAOC be organized immediately. The observation post at Bairnsdale, Victoria, became operational on the 25th.

Formal War Cabinet approval for the establishment of the VAOC, for the purpose of sighting and reporting enemy aircraft over Australian territory, was given on 31 December 1941.

Geographically, the organization covered a 150 mile band inland, ranging from Port Douglas, Queensland to Port Lincoln, South Australia, and from Albany to Northampton, Western Australia. Tasmania was covered by observation posts for a 50 to 100 mile radius around industrial centres. The organisation was later extended to Daru Island (south of New Guinea), Darwin, Geraldton in the west, and an air raid warning system established around Charleville, North Queensland.

Observation posts, manned by Observers under the control of a Chief Observer, were linked to Control Posts under a civilian Commandant. Control posts used existing Civil Defence and Volunteer Defence Force facilities where ever possible. These, in turn, fed data direct to the Main Control Posts in the state capital cities. The original site for the Sydney facility was below the stands at the Cricket Ground.

Communications were by the "Airflash" priority system through the normal telephone system, backed up by B-3 radios between the Control and Main Centres. Using "Airflash", a sighting could be transmitted to the Control Post within 1 to 3 minutes. The system placed demands on the staff of the Postmaster Generals Department, and it is to their great credit that such a short time delay should be achieved.

Of course, fire, flood and technical problems did cause longer delays, but these problems were overcome. Even the radio link was not without initial teething problems; that between Sydney and Newcastle exhibited reception difficulties during daylight hours. Some 150 pedal radios supplemented this system in Northern Australia.

Controlled by the RAAF, VAOC members were enrolled from local areas. Those eligible to join were those not required for military service, of good repute, who passed the hearing and eyesight test and were of British Nationality by birth. This latter prerequisite could be waived by the Air Board. Members were entitled to wear an armband and were issued with "Observer" or "Chief Observer" badges after undergoing the required aircraft recognition training courses. Aborigines were also employed in Northern Australia, where their highly developed senses were invaluable.

As in any large organisation, there were initial procedural problems. Considerable confusion existed at posts as to their responsibility for the reporting of aircraft movements. Number 2 VAOC Unit in Sydney complained in writing to Southern Area Headquarters on 10 February 1942 about the lack of information on aircraft movements, both Australian and US. These problems were resolved, and reporting arrangements promulgated.

Not all the problems were procedural. Members of the Wollongong Observation Post threatened mass resignation on 25 August 1942, claiming that the RAAF had not shown sufficient interest in their problems. A visit by a responsible officer from Sydney two days later resulted in a new Commandant being appointed and £20 being donated by the members to improve the post.

Despite these problems, the organisation was proving its worth. On 17 July 1942, the Goulburn, NSW, Control Post tracked an aircraft which had been unable to land at Canberra. Landing at Goulburn, the passengers were met by officers of the local Control Post and transported to their destination. By this means, Air Vice Marshal G Jones, Admiral Sir Guy Rolfe, Lieutenant General Vernon Sturdee, "other
generals and cabinet ministers" were able to meet with General Macarthur, who flew into Canberra that day for talks with the Prime Minister, Mr Curtin.

By mid-August 1942, 13 Control Posts had been established. One of these was that at Moruya on the southern NSW coast. Established on 9 January, it was soon to be the centre of considerable activity. With the midget submarine attack on Sydney Harbour, much submarine activity was apparent in the general NSW south coast area. Unusual sounds were heard at sea during the night, twinkling lights reported, (which, on investigation proved to emanate from a fishing dinghy) shipping movements monitored and aircraft plotted. On 22 July, the William Dawes was torpedoed off Tathra Heads. Four boat loads of survivors were sighted leaving the burnt out vessel, and a 60 foot launch was despatched from Moruya to assist the two trawlers succouring them. Later, on 3 August, the SS Durrandee was shelled off Moruya Heads. The Control Post organised the survivors’ rescue, and four wounded crew members were admitted to Moruya hospital.

Approval for Control Posts to come under direct RAAF control was given by the Air Board on 28 March 1942. This action was deemed necessary for security reasons and to facilitate liaison with Fighter Sector Stations and Main Control Posts, which were to be manned by RAAF/WAAAF personnel on a twenty four hour basis.

Not that this stultified the Observers’ initiative. It was overcast, with a 500 foot ceiling at Millaa Millaa, North Queensland, on 28 December 1942. A lone B17 Flying Fortress appeared above the observation post, obviously unsure of its position. The Chief Observer, using his electric torch, signalled the town name to the circling aircraft and then gave directions by which it later landed safely at Mareeba.

By August 1945, 340 Observation Posts had been issued with Lucas Signalling Lamps to meet such an eventuality.

The year 1943 saw increasing pressure on the enemy, and the VAOC function reflected the lower probability of incursions by enemy aircraft over most of Australia. It had taken over the coast watching role from the Army, a role it had undertaken in many areas from its inception. The Air Board, on 12 October, 1943, increased the organisations involvement in air defence mechanics when it agreed to VAOC members being employed in all Zone Filter Stations and state Fighter Sectors south of the Tropic of Capricorn during the hours of darkness. The estimated number of volunteers required to implement this decision were supervised by experienced RAAF personnel, thus releasing many servicemen for duty in the north. By August 1944, some 600 volunteers had been suitably trained.

At the grass roots level, the tradition of assisting those that flew was not neglected. On 9 March 1943, Sergeant George Gear flew Beaufort A9-41 away from 1 Operational Training Unit (1 OTU), East Sale, to undertake low flying training. Flying solo, Gear was unfamiliar with the aircraft type, which had a reputation as being “tricky” for an inexperienced pilot. This, coupled with a probable misjudgement of his height, resulted in the aircraft crashing into Lake Victoria at 5.45 pm. The aircraft had been sighted and reported to the VAOC observation post at Paynesville, three miles north. 1 OTU and Air Sector were immediately advised. Mrs P. James, who made the original report, and her husband, rowed to the wreck. On arrival, they assisted Messrs W. Robinson and L. Greer, who had been fishing from a launch nearby, to extricate the unconscious pilot from the aircraft and bring him ashore. Here first aid was administered by VAOC members before the seriously injured Gear was transferred to Bairnsdale hospital.

The VAOC reached its manpower peak in 1944, with approximately 24,000 members manning 2,656 observation posts and 39 control posts. From this time forward, the members actively involved in the organisation dropped, reflecting the course of the war away from Australia’s shores. 3 VAOC unit (Queensland), 4 (North Queensland) and 6 (South Australia) lost their unit status on 21 January 1944, becoming sections of the relevant Air Defence Headquarters. These developments caused morale problems, as it became difficult to maintain enthusiasm in localities when sightings were non existent — and likely to remain so.

Even so, the work went on. On 17 September 1944 a De Havilland DH 89 Dragon Rapide, VH-UXZ, bound from Rockhampton to Kingaroy, Queensland, met severe weather conditions enroute. At 7 pm it was sighted by an
observation post near Gympie with landing lights illuminated and intimating that a forced landing was imminent. The observer, Mr R. Behmer, organised for the local showground to be lit by car headlights and used as an emergency landing ground. Short of fuel, the aircraft landed, sustaining only minor damage and without injury to the passengers or crew.

Another noteworthy incident occurred in the early afternoon of 30 May, when the observers at Lakes Entrance, Victoria, reported Anson W. 1580, with a crew comprising FSgt R. H. Stinton, FSgt K. J. Horn, F/LT H. Gowing and P/O J. K. Goodwood of the General Reconnaissance School, Bairnsdale, having crashed 18 miles west of Lakes Entrance and 12 miles offshore. Despite the bitterly cold strong westerly wind, which had closed the port for the previous twelve days due to perilous conditions at the bar, the crew of the “Lily G” decided to attempt a rescue. Within thirty minutes, John, Norman and Graeme Gray, with Harold Broome, were at sea. Battling the fierce headwinds and in bad visibility, it took five hours to reach the position of the aircraft. Half an hours anxious searching resulted in the dinghy borne airmen being pulled aboard, suffering from exposure, but otherwise unhurt. The “Lily G” arrived back at Lakes Entrance at midnight. The gallant crew probably had a greater, but more pleasant, ordeal three months later when they were invested with the Bronze Medallion of the Royal Humane Society at Government House, Melbourne.

Several units and sections (5 VAOC (Western Australia)) and 4 VAOC (North Queensland) were disbanded on 21 January 1945. Even so, at 31 August, 2,521 Observation Posts still existed, linked to 36 Control Posts. Although only 14,310 volunteers remained active, no one can doubt the organisations achievements. In its primary role the VAOC had, from January 1943 to August 1945, definitely saved 78 aircraft, aided another 710 substantially and given assistance to a further 1,098. Assistance given ranged from supplying tea and biscuits to downed airmen, advising their bases of their whereabouts and guarding the aircraft, if necessary, to the more spectacular already mentioned in the text. Some 304 forced landing grounds were established throughout Australia, which could be marked in the centre with a thirty-foot triangle by VAOC members. When one cites the ship spotting, weather reporting and naval cooperation carried out, the VAOC has an honorable record.

In many ways an organisation of necessity, the run down of the VAOC was formalised when, on 11 December 1945 the Secretary, Department of Air (Mr M. C. Langslow) recommended that the organisation be placed on a nucleus basis. Two months earlier, the RAAF involvement was being curtailed, with only eleven service personnel involved and only aircraft in distress being reported.

On 10 April 1946 it was recommended that the actively supervised organisation of the VAOC be disbanded forthwith.
Prime Minister Curtin’s Appeals to United States: (27 December 1941 and 14 March 1942).

By Colonel J. P. Buckley, OBE, (RL)

Introduction

Since my story about John Curtin appeared in the Defence Force Journal July/August 1985 (No. 53), many requests have been made about the terms of his newspaper article in the Melbourne Herald of 27 December 1941 and the radio broadcast to the American people on 14 March 1942.

In a preliminary comment on the “Task Ahead” which appeared in the Herald it was forecast that “The year that begins next Thursday (1942) will be the most critical in the history of Australia” and so it turned out to be. In spite of Churchill’s insistence that the 7th Division & Corps Troops be sent to Burma, John Curtin played the vital role in saving Australia from invasion by his determination that the Force would return to Australia.

At this time Curtin was under very great pressure because Roosevelt sided with Churchill about the deployment of the Stepsister Force (Code name for the AIF 7 Div. & Corps Troops). It is only fair to mention that the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee made strong recommendations to John Curtin that the Stepsister Force must be returned to Australia to defend an almost defenceless country and threatened to resign if this was not accepted by the Government.

In passing it will be remembered that the 6th, 7th and 9th AIF Divisions were still overseas, as were Corps Troops, (with a strength of almost another division). 8th Division had been lost in Singapore, so over 100,000 trained troops were away from Australia. The majority of the trained RAAF were based in the United Kingdom and fighting over Europe. The RAN were scattered over the high seas mostly thousands of miles from Australia. Only a few trained troops were available in Australia and the equipment position was deplorable. Let there be no doubt about it — Australia was facing the most critical period in its history, and with meagre forces and facilities to face the invader rushing through the Northern chain of islands. Already Darwin had been bombed.

It was most fortunate that I met Mrs. Macleod, daughter of Curtin, at the John Curtin Centenary functions held at Creswick, Victoria, in January 1985, where I had decided to write “A Soldier’s Tribute to John Curtin.”

Since that meeting, Mrs. Macleod has given me most valuable assistance in undertaking my research about the great Australian Prime Minister. Likewise, she has readily given help to any other historian writing about her father’s prime ministership. Recently we have discussed the need to bring to notice the terms of Prime Minister Curtin’s appeals to the United States, which are not readily available for the younger generation, and most of the older generation have forgotten.

The general terms of the appeals are as follows:

THE TASK AHEAD

By John Curtin.

(Herald 27th Dec., 1941).

“That reddish veil which o’er the face of night-hug East is drawn . . .

Flames new disaster for the race? Or can it be the Dawn?”

“So wrote Bernard O’Dowd. I see 1942 as a year in which we shall know the answer.

I would, however, that we provide the answer. We can and we will. Therefore, I see 1942 as a year of immense change in Australian life.

The Australian Government’s policy has been grounded on two facts. One is that the war with Japan is not a phase of the struggle with the Axis powers, but is a new war.

The second is that Australia must go on to a war footing.

Those two facts involve two lines of action — one in the direction of external policy as to our dealings with Britain, the United States, Russia, the Netherlands East Indies and China.
in the higher direction of the war in the Pacific.

The second is the reshaping, in fact, the revolutionising of the Australian way of life until a war footing is attained quickly, efficiently and without question.

As the Australian Government enters 1942, it has behind it a record of realism in respect of foreign affairs. I point to the forthright declaration in respect of Finland, Hungary and Rumania which was followed with little delay by a declaration of war against those countries by the Democracies.

We felt that there could be no half-measures in our dealings with the Soviet when that nation was being assailed by the three countries mentioned.

Similarly, we put forward that a reciprocal agreement between Russia and Britain should be negotiated to meet an event of aggression by Japan. Our suggestion was then regarded, wrongly as time has proved, as premature.

Now with equal realism we take the view that while the determination of military policy is the Soviet's business, we should be able to look forward with reason to aid from Russia against Japan.

We look for a solid and impregnable barrier of the democracies against the three Axis powers and we refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict. By that, it is not meant that anyone of the other theatres of war is of less importance than the Pacific, but that Australia asks for a concerted plan evoking the greatest strength at the Democracies' disposal, determined upon hurling Japan back.

The Australian Government therefore regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the Democracies' fighting plan.

Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.

We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat of invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength. But we know too that Australia can go, and Britain can still hold on.

We are therefore determined that Australian shall not go, and we shall exert all our energies toward the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy.

Summed up, Australian external policy will be shaped toward obtaining Russian aid, and working out, with the United States, as the major factor, a plan of Pacific strategy, along with British, Chinese and Dutch forces.

"Australian internal policy has undergone striking changes in the past few weeks. These, and those that will inevitably come before 1942 is far advanced, have been prompted by several reasons.

'In the first place the Commonwealth Government found it exceedingly difficult to bring the Australian people to a realisation of what, after two years of war, our position had become. Even the entry of Japan, bringing a direct threat in our own waters, was met with a subconscious view that the Americans would deal with the short-sighted underfed and fanatical Japanese.

The announcement that no further appeals would be made to the Australian people, and the decisions that followed, were motivated by psychological factors. They had an arresting effect. They awakened in the somewhat lackadaisical Australian mind the attitude that was imperative if we were to save ourselves, to enter in all-in effort in the only possible manner.

That experiment in psychology was eminently successful, and we commence 1942 with a better realisation, by a greater number of Australians, of what the war means than in the whole preceding two years.

The decisions were prompted by other reasons, all related to the necessity of getting on to a war footing and the results so far achieved have been most heartening, especially in respect of production and conservation of stocks.

I make it clear that the experiment undertaken was never intended as one to awaken Australian patriotism or sense of duty. Those qualities have been ever-present: but the response to leadership and direction had never been requested of the people, and desirable talents and untapped resources had lain dormant.
Our task for 1942 is stern, the Government is under no illusions as to ‘something cropping up’ in the future.

The nadir of our fortunes in this struggle, as compared with 1914-1918 has yet to be reached.

Let there be no mistake about that. The position Australia faces internally far exceeds in potential and sweeping dangers anything that confronted us in 1914-1918.

The year 1942 will impose supreme tests. These range from resistance to invasion by deprivation of more and more amenities not only the amenities of peace time but those enjoyed in time of war.

Australians must realise that to place the nation on a war footing every citizen must place himself, his private and business affairs, his entire mode of living, on a war footing. The civilian way of life cannot be any less rigorous, can contribute no less than that which the fighting men have to follow.

I demand that Australians everywhere realise that Australia is now inside the fighting lines.

Australian governmental policy will be directed strictly on those lines. We have to regard our country and its 7,000,000 people as though we were a nation and a people with the enemy hammering at our frontier.

Australians must be perpetually on guard; on guard against the possibility, at any hour without warning, of raid or invasion; on guard against spending money, or doing anything that cannot be justified; on guard against hampering by disputation or idle, irresponsible chatter, the decisions of the Government taken for the welfare of all.

All Australia is the stake in this war. All Australia must stand together to hold that state. We face a powerful, ably led and unbelievably courageous foe.”

On the great waters of the Pacific Ocean, war now breathes its bloody steam. From the skies of the Pacific pour down a deathly hail on the countless islands of the Pacific. The tide of war flows badly for you in America. For us in Australia it is flowing badly.

Let me then address you as comrades in this war and tell you a little of Australia and Australians. I am not speaking to your Government. We have long been admirers of Mr. Roosevelt and have the greatest confidence that he understands fully the critical situation in the Pacific, and that America will go right out to meet it. For all that America has done, both before and after entering the war, we have the greatest admiration and gratitude.

It is to the people of America I am now speaking, to you who are or will be fighting, to you who are sweating in factories and workshops to turn out the vital munitions of war, to all of you who are making sacrifices in one way or another to provide the enormous resources required for our great task. I speak to you at a time when the loss of Java and the splendid resistance of the gallant Dutch together give us a feeling of both sadness and pride. Japan has gone one step farther in her speedy march south, but the fight of the Dutch and Indonesian in Java has shown that a brave and freedom-loving people are more than a match for the yellow aggressor given even a shade below equality in striking and fighting weapons.

But facts are stern things. We, the Allied nations, were unready and Japan, behind her wall of secrecy, had prepared for war on a scale of which neither we nor you had any knowledge. It was therefore but natural that within twenty days after Japan’s first treacherous blow I said on behalf of the Australian Government that we looked to America as the paramount factor on the democracies’ side in the Pacific.”

“There is no belittling of the Old Country in this outlook. Britain has fought and won in the tremendous Battle of Britain. Britain has fought and with your strong help has won the equally vital Battle of the Atlantic. She had a paramount obligation to supply all possible help to Russia. She cannot, at the same time, go all out in the Pacific. We, with New Zealand, represent Great Britain here in the Pacific — we are her sons — and

Radio Broadcast to the People of the United States — 14th March 1942.

“Men and women of the United States, I speak to you from Australia. I speak from a united people to a united people, and my speech is aimed to serve all the people of the nations united in the struggle to save mankind.
on us the responsibility falls. I pledge you my word: We will not fail. We will pull knee to knee with you every ounce of our weight.

We have all made mistakes. We have all been too slow. We have all shown weakness, all the Allied nations. This is not the time to wrangle about who has been most to blame. Now our eyes are open. The Australian Government has fought for its people. We never regarded the Pacific as a segment of the great struggle. We did not insist that it was the primary theatre of war. But we did say, and events have unhappily proved us right, that the loss of the Pacific can be disastrous.

Who among us, contemplating the future on that day in December last when Japan struck like an assassin at Pearl Harbor, at Manila, at Wake and Guam, would have hazarded a guess that by March the enemy would be astride all the south-west Pacific except General MacArthur’s gallant men and Australia and New Zealand? But that is the case, and realizing very swiftly that it would be the case, the Australian Government sought a full and proper recognition of the part the Pacific was playing in the general strategic disposition of the world’s warring forces.

We looked to America, among other things, for counsel and advice, and therefore it was our wish that the Pacific War Council should be located in Washington. It is a matter of some regret to us that even now, after ninety five days of Japan’s staggering advance south—ever south—that we have not obtained first-hand contact with America.

Therefore we propose sending to you our Minister for External Affairs, Dr. H. V. Evatt, who is no stranger to your country, so that we may benefit from his discussions with your authorities. Dr. Evatt’s wife, who will accompany him, was born in the United States.

Dr. Evatt will not go to you as a mendicant. He will go to you as the representative of a people as firmly determined to hold and hit back at the enemy as courageously as those people from whose loins we spring, those people who withstood the disaster of Dunkirk, the fury of Goering’s blitz, the shattering blows of the Battle of the Atlantic. He will go to tell you that we are fighting mad, that our people have a Government that is governing with orders and not with weak-kneed suggestions; that we Australians are a people who, whilst somewhat inexperienced and uncertain as to what war on their own soil may mean, are nevertheless ready for anything, and will trade punches, giving odds if need be, until we rock the enemy back on his heels.

We are, then, committed heart and soul to total warfare. How far, you may ask me, have we progressed along that road?

I may answer you this way. Out of every ten men in Australia four are now wholly engaged in war, as members of the fighting forces or making the munitions and equipment needed to fight. The other six, besides feeding and clothing the whole ten and their families, have to provide the food and wool and metals which Britain needs for her very existence.

We are not, of course, stopping at four out of ten. We had over three when Japan challenged our life and liberty. The proportion is growing every day. On the one hand, we are ruthlessly cutting out unessential expenditure so as to free men and women for war work, and on the other, mobilizing woman-power to the utmost to supplement the men. Four out of ten devoted to war, we shall pass to five and six out of ten. We have no limits.

We have no qualms here. There is no fifth column in this country. We are all the one race, the English-speaking race. We will not yield easily a yard of our soil. We have great space here, and tree by tree, village by village and town by town, we will fall back if we must. That will occur only when we lack the means of meeting the enemy with parity in materials and machines."

"For remember, we are the Anzac breed. Our men stormed Gallipoli. They swept through the Libyan desert, they were the "rats" of Tobruk, they were the men who fought under “bitter, sarcastic, pugnacious Gordon Bennett” down Malaya and were still fighting when the surrender of Singapore came.

These men gave of their best in Greece and Crete. They will give more than their best on their own soil, where their hearths and homes lie under enemy threat.
Nelson Johnson (USA, Ambassador to Australia), Lady Gowrie, Prime Minister John Curtin, General Douglas MacArthur, Lord Gowrie, The Hon. Frank Forde (Minister for the Army) and Sir Frederick Shedden in Sydney 1943. (Photo: Elsie MacLeod)

General Blamey with Mr & Mrs Curtin leaving for US and UK — April 1944. (Photo: Elsie MacLeod)
Our air force is in the Kingsford Smith tradition. You have no doubt met quite a lot of them in Canada. The Nazis have come to know them at Hamburg and Berlin, and in paratroop landings in France. Our naval forces silently do their share on the seven seas.

I am not boasting to you. But were I to say less, I would not be paying proper due to a band of men who have been tested in the crucible of world wars and hall-marked as pure metal.

Our fighting forces are born attackers. We will hit the enemy wherever we can, as often as we can and the extent of it will be measured only by the weapons to our hands.

Dr. Evatt will tell you that Australia is a nation stripped for war. Our minds are set on attack rather than defence. We believe, in fact, that attack is the best defence. Here, in the Pacific, it is the only defence. We know it means risks, but “safety first” is the devil’s catchword today.

Business interests in Australia are submitting with a good grace to iron control and drastic elimination of profits. Our great labor unions are accepting the suspension of rights and privileges which have been sacred for two generations, and are submitting to an equally iron control of the activities of their members. It is now “work or fight” for everyone in Australia.

The Australian Government has so shaped its policy that there will be a place for every citizen in the country. There are three means of service— in the fighting forces, in the labor forces and in the essential industries. For the first time in the history of this country, a complete call-up or draft, as you refer to it in America, and has been made.

I say to you, as a comfort to our friends and a stiff warning to our enemies, that only the infirm remain outside the compass of our war plans.

Australia is the last bastion between the west coast of America and the Japanese. If Australia goes, the Americas are wide open.

It is said that the Japanese will by-pass Australia and that they can be met and routed in India. I say to you that the saving of Australia is the saving of America’s west coast. If you believe anything to the contrary, then you delude yourselves.

Be assured of the calibre of our national character. This war may see the end of much that we have painfully and slowly built up in our one hundred and fifty years of existence. But even though all of it go, there will still be Australians fighting on Australian soil until the turning point be reached, and we will advance over blackened ruins, through blasted and fire-swept cities, across scorched plains, until we drive the enemy into the sea.

I give you the pledge of my country. There will always be an Australian Government and there will always be an Australian people. We are too strong in our hearts, our spirit is too high, the justice of our cause throbs too deeply in our being, for that high purpose to be overcome.

I may be looking down a vista of weary months and soul-shaking reverses, of grim struggles, of back-breaking work. But as surely as I sit here, talking to you across the war-tossed Pacific Ocean, I see our flag. I see Old Glory, I see the proud banner of the heroic Chinese, I see the standard of the valiant Dutch. And I see them flying high in the wind of liberty over a Pacific from which aggression has been wiped out; over people’s restored to freedom; and flying triumphant, as the glorified symbols of united nations strong in will and in power, to achieve decency and dignity, unyielding to evil in any form.”

(Digest of Decision, No. 22, 1942, pages 9-13).

Comment

The address to the people of the United States was a master diplomatic triumph which was also relayed to the United Kingdom, Canada and many other countries. It was printed in major American newspapers.

It was Prime Minister Curtin who started, forged and nurtured the close relationship with the United States in war which still continues today.

In my “Soldier’s Tribute to John Curtin” which appeared in the Defence Force Journal in July/August 1985; I did not include the two appeals by the Prime Minister to the U.S. because of the limitations of space. However, I believe it is important to publish them in the Defence Force Journal now.
In the final months of his life, John Curtin told his close adviser and friend, Sir Frederick Shedden, that he (Curtin) was proud of his work in insisting that Australian sovereignty was acknowledged, without reservation by the major powers. Proudly he asked Shedden to ensure that he (Curtin) would be remembered for this achievement. (Sir Frederick Shedden was my informant).

In conclusion, it will be noted that Mr. Curtin in his radio appeal to the U.S. addressed his comments direct to “Men and Women of the United States.” Likewise, John Curtin addressed his major speeches in Australia to “Men and Women of Australia.” This mode of address has been also used by a more recent Prime Minister (Whitlam), no doubt following the example of our greatest Prime Minister, John Curtin.

The author served in the Regular Army until 1949, when he resigned to become an Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defence. Later served as First Assistant Secretary, senior civilian officer of the Department in Melbourne until he retired in 1974.
His previous contributions to the Defence Force Journal include articles on Sir Edmund Herring, Sir Vernon Sturdee, Sir Frederick Shedden and Prime Minister John Curtin.

The Right Honourable John Curtin, PC, MP.
Some Reasons for the Failure at Gallipoli

By Major Warwick Graco, AA Psych

I
T is over 70 years since the Gallipoli campaign was launched at the Gallipoli Peninsula in Turkey. The Campaign commenced on 19 February 1915 with the naval attack on the outer defences of the Dardanelles Straits. Later it was widened to become a military-naval campaign with the landing on 25 April of Allied troops on the peninsula and on the asiatic side of the straits. It finished in the early hours of 9 January 1916 with the final evacuation of the few remaining troops from the peninsula. The campaign was a fiasco.

The commander of the expeditionary force was General Sir Ian Hamilton. Hamilton was tasked with launching an amphibious operation aimed at storming the Gallipoli Peninsula, thus providing a safe passage through the Dardanelles for Allied shipping heading for Russia. From the outset Hamilton faced a number of strategic, operational and logistic hardships — handicaps which ultimately sealed his fate at the peninsula. The aim of this article is to outline some of the oversights and blunders which Hamilton had to contend with and which marred the conception and preparation of the expedition. Because of space limitations, only the bare essentials are provided in this article. For those who want a comprehensive explanation of this campaign, they should consult James' Seminal Study.¹

From the very beginning Hamilton was handicapped. He was given less than two months to prepare the operation. He was provided with inadequate intelligence and the General Staff in London had not carried out a proper appreciation. There was also a communication breakdown where Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, not only provided Hamilton with an incomplete brief but failed to tell his colleagues in the War Council and the Admiralty of his intentions. To add to Hamilton’s difficulties he was given inadequate forces which were inferior in numbers to the enemy and which left him with no strategic reserve.²

There were many logistic problems. The staging area for the operation was at Mudros Harbour on Lemnos Island in the Aegean Sea. It lacked adequate port facilities and there was insufficient accommodation and fresh water. There were shortages of all kinds and units and stores were separated. Equipment necessary for the operation such as artillery and ammunition, grenades, landing craft and carrying animals, were either in short supply or were unsuitable for the purpose for which they had to be used. The Navy had at its disposal armoured landing craft but refused to make them available for the operation. Eight floating piers were constructed and they had fresh water as ballast. They could thus serve the dual purpose of providing the forces ashore with landing stages and of providing them with fresh water. Only one of these reached Mudros Harbour, the rest being cast off by merchant ships in the Mediterranean.³

There was a number of diplomatic blunders.⁴ Greece was willing to support the assault in exchange for Smyrna. However, Grey, the Foreign Secretary, could not guarantee Greece’s northern frontiers. The British Government was obsessed by the possibility that Bulgaria would side with the Centralist powers and to appease her, were willing to sacrifice both Greek and Serbian Macedonia. Furthermore, the British opposed a Russian proposal to seize the Bulgarian port of Burgas. This would have given the Russian Black Sea Fleet a basis for launching operations against Turkey. The bungling did not stop here.⁵ The British Government had been conducting secret negotiations with the Turks for a peace treaty. The British emissaries had their hands tied in that they could not give an undertaking that Constantinople would remain in Turkish hands. Unknown to the emissaries the British Government had promised the Turkish capital to the Russians. Negotiations fell through when British Naval Intelligence found out that the Turkish forts guarding the Dardanelles were short of ammunition.

Another headache for Hamilton was lack of secrecy.⁶ Security was non-existent. The Egyptian press openly printed the Allies’ intentions and troops dispositions. Letters to the troops from home were often addressed care of the
‘Constantinople Expeditionary Force’. Hamilton protested to the Egyptian High Commissioner about these indiscretions but was overruled. He hoped the frankness of such communications would mislead the Turks into thinking the real objectives were elsewhere.

Though Hamilton was given little in the way of intelligence, valuable information was available. Since 1911 successive military attaches at Constantinople and vice-consuls at Chanak had prepared reports on the Dardanelles defences. These laid in the War Office and were not seen by Hamilton’s staff. Furthermore one of the attaches who had been stationed in Turkey before the war, later served at Gallipoli. At no stage in the preparation was he consulted.

Hamilton was handicapped in terms of his staff. It was a scratch crew with none having served with him before. He was given a new Chief-of-Staff named Braithwaite instead of retaining the one he had worked closely with for the last four years. Braithwaite had the unfortunate habit of upsetting people thus creating friction. Hamilton’s and Braithwaite’s disdain for administrative staff created further problems. The administrative staff were left behind in Alexandria until a week before the operation, consequently they were unable to contribute to the planning and more importantly, to prevent some of the major oversights made in the logistic preparations such as the handling of wounded. By keeping his operational staff lean, Hamilton left too much to individual initiative and in turn important administrative details were bungled.

Hamilton did not have the command, control and communications systems which were so necessary for an amphibious undertaking of this size. An adequate system of fire-control and identification from shore to ship was not established. Telephone communications were of insufficient capacity. Wireless communications were primitive and unreliable. The one problem which bedevilled Hamilton from the time the expedition was conceived was that not only was his staff hampered in their planning and preparation by poor communications, but after the landings began, he was frequently out of touch with his subordinate commanders ashore and therefore was not able to impose his will and co-ordinate the movement of his forces.

Despite problems with communications, operational planning and preparation were mismanaged for other reasons. Vital intelligence gained by reconnaissance aircraft on the beach defences at Gallipoli went missing. Troops were denied opportunities to practice ship-to-shore landings because of poor weather and lack of small boats. Army planning was done in isolation from senior naval staff who were to provide amphibious support. As a result there was a misunderstanding and a lack of coordinated effort between the two services.

What should have been a combined operation with the Army storming the Peninsula and the Navy forcing the Straits at the same time, degenerated into an Army operation with the Navy providing gunfire. This occurred after the Navy had failed to reduce Turkish forts guarding the Straits and after losing a number of ships to mines. The tragedy was that one more attempt by the Navy would probably have succeeded as the Turks were down to their last reserves of ammunition.

Lastly, the expedition was mismanaged at the strategic level. Strategic surprise was lost when the Turks were given two months warning by the Navy’s attempts to gain safe passage through the Dardenelles. Another fatal flaw was that the operation was not co-ordinated with those on the Western Front and this led to what has become the famous shell shortage of 1915. The demands of both fronts far exceeded the then capacity of British industry to manufacture and supply ammunition. All this arose because at no stage had two critical questions been addressed by the War Cabinet. Firstly, what were the objectives of the expedition and what resources were needed to achieve them. Secondly, the relative importance of the Western and Gallipoli Fronts and the priority they should be given. It was this muddled thinking which more than anything else sealed Hamilton’s fate. He commenced the campaign on the wrong foot and was never able to get back in step.

It is significant that a pre-war staff study had concluded that only a combined sea and land assault could hope to defeat the forts that commanded the Dardenelles from each shore. Such an amphibious operation demanded well-trained and well-equipped troops with experienced task force headquarters and all the specialized equipment and communications necessary to put an Army on the hostile coast and maintain it there. It required a thoroughly rehearsed assault force with plenty of reserves for
a break-out and exploitation. Above all it needed preparation in secrecy and a sudden descent on an unalerted enemy. Few if any of these requirements were satisfied with the Gallipoli Campaign and it proved a costly failure.

In conclusion Barnett (19) considered that the campaign failed because it was neither large enough, nor well enough equipped, trained and organized to fulfill the strategic ambition. Guinn (20) stated that it was in the Dardanelles that Britain could most profitably strike in 1914, and success there could have been ensured without endangering the security of the Home Fleet or the Western Front. But for victory two conditions were indispensable. First, Ministers required the ability and the will to assess and control the claims of the nation’s competing military and naval commands. Second, they needed to regard the Gallipoli expedition as a complex and major combined operation demanding well co-ordinated and continuous military, naval and diplomatic action. Finally, Bliss (21) wrote that with success on the Western Front, all peripheral objectives such as the Dardanelles, Mesopotamia and Palestine, would have fallen like ripe apples from the trees. Nevertheless, Britain had not the ships for such expeditions on a large scale, to make even the Gallipoli campaign successful.

NOTES
1. James (1965)
4. Guinn (1965: 72)
5. James (1965: 48-51)
7. James (1965: 41, 53-54)
10. James (1965: 87-93)
14. James (1965: 69, 84)
17. James (1965: 69-70, 94)
18. Barnett (1979: 57)
20. Guinn (1965: 116)

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Major Graco graduated from OTU Scheyville in 1971 and was allocated to AAPSCH. He has served in a variety of corps and appointments and is currently posted to the Directorate of Command and Control Systems-Army.
Morale: A Conversation

By K. R. Smith and J. C. M. Baynes

KRS:

Your book Morale, published in 1967, seems to me to be an excellent case study, perhaps the most sustained case study ever written about morale. It is also a regimental history, of course. There is tremendous detail with constant focus upon morale. I find myself wondering what led you to write it?

JCMB:

I remember learning at Sandhurst the principles of war, one of which was “Maintenance of Morale”. A major task for any successful commander is to ensure that the men he leads have high morale. Yet, this aspect of command is less discussed in the Army than are the other, more tangible aspects.

At the end of 1961 I had passed out of the Staff College, where I had been a very ordinary student. However, I had written one essay while at Camberley which was quite well marked, and that was on battlefield morale. I also took part in a good team project on military history based on a study of Lawrence’s campaign in the Arabian deserts in the First World War. These two pieces of work kindled my interest in the subject. The book is based on the battle of Neuve Chapelle and we always celebrated its anniversary in my Regiment. The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), on the 10th March. Like so many occasions well-remembered in tradition, it was an occasion of dreadful slaughter as well as heroism. I found myself wondering what had enabled these men in 1915 to hold on, to carry on in the face of such a terrible ordeal. I contacted lots of old soldiers of the Scottish Rifles for their recollections, including Sergeant Noble who was living in Australia by then. The book grew out of their recollections.

It generated considerable interest. General Sir Richard O’Connor, who had served in the Scottish Rifles prior to 1915 wrote a particularly encouraging letter when the book was published. O’Connor had been posted out of his battalion not long before the battle. You may read his letter:

“— I missed Neuve Chapelle and so probably saved my life — After Neuve Chapelle I did my very utmost to get back to the battalion but they definitely turned it down. But I have always felt terrible about it all the same. — I really think your book is excellent, and your own conclusions and opinions so sound.”

The book was actually begun in 1963 while I was commanding our Regimental Depot at Lanark in Scotland. My whole life was bound up in this Regiment. My father had served earlier as a Commanding Officer. I was a professional soldier. What interests me, Kevin, is your own deep involvement, investigating morale in the military.

KRS:

Well, I believe that morale warrants a place in courses on management generally. It is a topic that takes in an array of such things as enthusiasm of effort, tenacious striving in the face of adversity, confident sense of purpose and cohesiveness in the group. The military attach great importance to these attributes, rightly so. Some of the best comments I have read on morale are those written by soldiers. I try to learn from writers such as yourself and pass that on in management or executive development courses. I am currently writing a book on morale, covering all sorts of organisations in several countries. Morale in the military takes up a large part of the draft manuscript.

If morale is as important as so many military commanders have indicated over the years, then I would venture to suggest that more attention should be given to it in our defence forces. You seem to have made this very point yourself a few minutes ago.

As one who has made an intensive study of morale in various organisations over quite a few years, I think I have something to offer. It’s a way to serve one’s country, after all. I have welcomed recent opportunities to be of some service to the Australian Army Field Force and the RAN Submarine Squadron.

Perhaps a civilian with the present status to speak readily with senior officers, yet a memory
of days gone by sufficient to have reasonable rapport with troopers, fit enough to work with soldiers in the field and free of any constraints of rank is in the best of all possible positions to investigate and report upon existing morale in the military. The findings of such work can then be integrated into future training programmes for senior NCOs and for officers.

Might I add that I am delighted to know that you are publishing Morale in a second edition soon. It has influenced the military education of many young officers. Personally, I believe it should be read by every truly professional soldier. Yet, twenty years after its first publication, do you think its message is still relevant? What do you think about morale in the Army in this present day and age?

JCMB:

Well, my immediate knowledge of the Army nowadays is somewhat limited. However, let me say that morale must always be consciously fostered at the higher levels of command, while it is largely created at the regimental or battalion level. I describe the essence of morale in my final chapter:

"Regimental loyalty; the pride in belonging to a good battalion, in knowing other people well and being known by them; in having strong roots in a well-loved community."

So for me it was a sad day in 1968 when The Cameronians were disbanded from the British Regular Army, 321 years to the day after the Regiment was first raised. This distressing loss of a living tradition was a loss for the whole British Regular Army, although we still have two Territorial companies to carry the regimental name.

Morale remains remarkably high, I gather from my contacts, among our soldiers in Northern Ireland. This seems to be because most tours of duty are fairly short and there is, consequently, no chance of battle fatigue. Despite astonishingly incessant abuse from people of their own tongue, the soldiers believe there is a proper job to be done. Many of the younger soldiers relish the excitement and the professional challenge in a situation of some real danger.

On the other hand, purely peacetime soldiering, as in Germany, is fairly dull and routine, with limitations on realistic training because of restrictions on petrol. Also, the feeling of insufficient money in the pocket affects morale, and this can be countered only by absolutely inspiring leaders. Things are probably not too bright among some of the younger officers, apart from those with Northern Ireland experience or other similar service. Perhaps the toughness of the younger officers is not what it should be! Perhaps university training prevents clear thinking in relation to military necessity or sense of military purpose. In The Falklands, it was our NCOs and more senior officers by and large who did more noticeably well.

My advice to young officers is to remember always why they are soldiers and to follow the traditional military virtues. Be ready at all times for a sudden cessation of prolonged and accustomed peaceful periods. Be tough in outlook and in training. You may actually have a happier bunch of soldiers when you emphasise the serious importance of their duties. They will generally respond better to a demanding officer than to an easier one, so long as he is a competent officer. That's what you learn from practical experience.

Once there was a time during my career when I took some delight in social science surveys and reports. Now I am more cynical. It seems to me that prolonged personal contact, rather than academic study, is the best basis for useful comment on morale in any organisation. Nevertheless, your own approach enables you to make obviously valid comment. It is evidently successful and I would like to know more about it. It does appear to have a distinct theoretical basis, would you not agree? Also could you work in a little bit about your practical experience, especially with the submarine squadron?

KRS:

You had a year as Defence Fellow at Edinburgh University, John, so you'll understand that good theory is based on practical experience, and should then have useful practical applications. The theory I have developed is consistent with military understanding of morale. A great mass of writing about morale was analysed, much of it deriving from the practical experiences of soldiers; British, Canadian, German, Israeli, Russian, American, Australian. As a result we can propose nine practical aspects of morale, and this quite simply constitutes a basic theory:

Cohesive Pride: Attraction to the unit. Unity of purpose. Quality of teamwork.
Leadership: Task competence of leaders. Relationships and man-management. Inspirational leadership.


This is quite consistent with Israeli findings on the Golan Heights during the recent Lebanon intervention. Reuven Gal drew attention to the group, leadership and individual soldier aspects of morale. Nothing could be much more practical for a soldier than that sort of survey conducted in the front-line. I understand and share your concern for academic theorists. A fellow named Corelli Barnett once addressed your Royal United Services Institute in the most scathing terms about the regrettable influence of such outsiders upon the military ethos. In America there’s a thesis on morale in the Vietnam years. It drew attention to the fact that the importance of purpose and sense of mission has not been properly recognised by some social scientists who worked with the military. My approach, on the other hand, places sense of purpose squarely in the centre foreground of the morale picture.

In Australia the soldier is part of a proud citizen tradition, where the purpose of soldiering is to guarantee the security of our homeland, to defend the towns and cities and, if necessary, to give their lives in saving our families from an aggressor. That basic purpose is the same for all soldiers.

While I have some varied peacetime military experience many years ago, what I am doing these days involves being a participant. For example, when I was working with 2 Cav. Regt. I went out on an exercise with them. To them I became “Starlight Morale”. My work with the Navy has involved going to sea first of all in a skimmer of the grey Navy to see whether they could put up with me. The value of morale research depends greatly upon sharing in the daily lives of those involved, measuring up to their expectations if I possibly can. In this regard, if the RSM gives the thumbs down, a researcher may as well march out of the unit without delay. A sailor once said to me — if I can find the page in this report — actually he was commenting about politicians at the time: “They’re given the VIP treatment. We’re in our best uniforms. They get a special meal. Why don’t they come out like you do and see us on a cruise — no showers all week — and find out what our morale is really like by talking to us for a while, the ordinary submariners?”

I’m no ivory tower theorist, John, but I do have a theory of practical value. It permits a systematic and confident approach to the use of questionnaires. It provides a clear structure for the planning of training courses about morale. Experience in several different organisations has shown how executive development training can be improved when the results of a research survey are known.

NATO in recent years have been seeking a comprehensive theory of morale and a usefully valid questionnaire. I think that we in Australia are moving strongly in that same direction.

There can be many useful outcomes from a survey of morale. The involvement of an appropriate outsider shows to members of an organisation that management is interested in their opinions and attitudes in a setting of “no names no pack drill”. The very process of being enabled to express an opinion usually has value simply in getting something off one’s chest.

The really significant usefulness of a survey is the way in which data feedback then sensitises management to the realities of morale in the organisation. In the Israeli Defence Force the Combat Readiness Morale Questionnaire is widely used and the results are keenly sought by unit commanders. Such surveys as the Military Morale Questionnaire or the Naval Morale Questionnaire, as used in Australia, give a pattern of response to questionnaire items that can be compared with the average response patterns across an aggregated grouping of units. Too often high or low morale has been attributed to a group or within a group without reference to other similar groups. It is only by comparison, using the same criteria across a number of units, that we can really distinguish high or low morale.

Conclusion:

The conversation continued intermittently over the course of the day and a half at Lake Vyrnwy in Wales, looking out on the heather-covered moors above the dark green mass of fir forests. Occasionally the peaceful quietness of the lakes was shattered by the sound of low-flying jet aircraft. We did not cover as many aspects of morale as we might wish, but we reached agreement on several salient points:
1. Sense of purpose or mission, of a job to be done, is basic to any consideration of morale.

2. However sincere, lip-service about the importance of morale is just not good enough in any part of a nation’s defence force. There is value in occasional comparative analysis with confidential feedback to unit commanders. There is need for a more thorough coverage of the topic in courses and academies.

3. There is a necessary place for a simple, practical theory of morale that will guide future surveys and that will give structure to future instruction about morale.

4. The regiment or battalion plays a vital role in fostering cohesive pride, giving soldiers a distinct sense of belonging and a deeply-ingrained awareness of unit tradition.

Finally, we both liked what Petronius Arbiter is reputed to have said more than two thousand years ago:

“We trained hard but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be re-organised - - - and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress, while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralisation”.

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Lt. Colonel (Ret) Sir John Baynes Bt, was commissioned into the Scottish Rifles. He served in Malaya 1950-53 (Mentioned in despatches) and Aden 1966. Prior to his retirement in 1972 he commanded the 52nd Lowland Volunteers. He is widely known as author of the books Morale (1967) and The Modern Soldier (1972). Since retirement and until recently he has been co-proprietor of the Lake Vyrnwy Hotel in Wales.
Regulating Civilians in Uniform — The Role of a Senate Scrutiny Committee

By Peter O'Keeffe,

Introduction

DICEY observed that a soldier is, for most purposes, "a civilian in uniform". An important aspect of the "civilian in uniform" tradition is the role of Parliament in scrutinising military matters. Section 51(vi) of the Constitution confers on the Parliament power to make laws for the defence of Australia. Parliament is this the source of those two most indispensible attributes of any standing army — money and legal discipline. It provides for accountability but it can also protect individuals. The intention of this article is to review the work of one of the less well-known Senate Committees which directly and sometimes quite significantly affects the rules governing discipline. The Senate Regulations and Ordinances Committee scrutinises defence regulations and determinations which provide for the payment and discipline of the service, to ensure that they are in accord with the letter and spirit of the enabling Act, that they do not trespass unduly on personal freedoms and rights of appeal, and that they do not contain matter so important that it should be in an Act of Parliament rather than a ministerial decree.

Senate Regulations and Ordinances Committee

The Committee was established in 1932 midst parliamentary concern about the nature and extent of bureaucratic law-making and its effect on parliamentary supremacy, ministerial accountability and personal rights and liberties. In 1929, the British Chief Justice, Lord Hewart, in "The New Despotism" had vociferously condemned backdoor departmental legislation, and called for parliamentary scrutiny. In 1932, Lord Donoughmore’s Committee on Ministers’ Powers echoed this suggestion and glossed it with recommendations that regulations should be subject to prior consultation, official publication with explanatory notes and parliamentary tabling. The Senate Select Committee on the Standing Committee system urged the appointment of a Committee and the traditionally bipartisan Regulations and Ordinances Committee was appointed. The Committee examines delegated legislation with reference to parliamentary propriety and legal principle but without passing judgment on substantive merits or policy, though as Professor Sawer has pointed out, scrutiny committees cannot avoid addressing matters of policy to some extent in order to police their principles.¹

A statutory scheme for parliamentary disallowance of regulations has existed in the Acts Interpretation Act since 1904. It confers on each House a power to dissent from a Minister’s regulation which is the corollary of the larger power to dissent from the passage of a Minister’s Bill. Regulations must be published in the Gazette, from which date they usually take effect; are void if not tabled within 15 sitting days of being made; and are void if expressed to be retrospective in a way which prejudices individuals. A notice of disallowance may be given in either house within 15 sitting days of tabling and if passed, the regulations will be disallowed. However, if, within 15 sitting days, the motion has not been called or defeated in debate, the regulations will be deemed disallowed. Thus, a disallowance notice is a serious matter and it cannot be ignored by a Minister. Legally disallowance has the same effect as a repeal, so that prior rights or liabilities are preserved. Also disallowance of a regulation which repealed an earlier regulation will revive that earlier regulation.

In 54 years the Committee has tabled 80 reports, many of which refer to defence legislation. The Committee’s concerns have included discretionary decision-making without criteria; absence of rights of appeal; unequal treatment; national security; administrative convenience affecting parliamentary control; and retrospection.

Discretionary Decisions

The Senate Committee has had, on a number of occasions, to stay the legislative drafter’s sharp pen which sought to slice through the
reasonable rights of service personnel. Thus, for example, in 1956 the Committee opposed Air Force Regulations which gave the Air Board an unfettered discretionary power to make virtually unlimited deductions from a serviceman’s pay for deficiencies in stores and material, and for third party claims. There was no independent appeal, nor any procedure for a hearing. In 1970 the Committee criticised Naval Financial Regulations which gave the Naval Board unlimited discretionary power to determine, without reference to objective criteria, the circumstances in which allowances would be paid for children’s education. The Regulations also conferred on the Board a remarkable discretion, when kit was not returned, to impose a pecuniary penalty “in circumstances determined by the Board to be circumstances to which the regulations apply”. In 1971, relevant Ministers undertook to amend Naval Forces and Military Financial Regulations to eliminate potential for discrimination by ensuring that the Naval and Army Boards’ discretions would be subject to objective criteria in determining navy leave and army apprentices’ pay.

In 1972 an air force officer could exercise an unfettered discretion to determine payment in lieu of leave, without reference to any criteria, without explanation and against the wishes of the member concerned. This is an interesting example of how an oppressive provision could have been avoided by more care. Potential for unfairness was removed by amendments which provided for applications to commute leave to payments in lieu and made express reference to exigencies of the service which would prevent a member from taking leave. Earlier that year, the Committee criticised a regulation which was “an unnecessarily complicated and untidy piece of drafting” the wording of which was such that a navy member “would have the greatest difficulty in discovering exactly what he was entitled to”. Again in 1972, Islanders Regulations, while drafted with beneficial intent, gave the Pensions Board an unappellable and subjectively phrased discretion to grant pensions to children not otherwise being maintained. Although a virtually identical provision appeared in the Repatriation Act, the Committee considered that the regulations should have expressly precluded the possibility of discriminatory treatment by stating the conditions of entitlement objectively. Matters agreed to by Parliament in an Act were not necessarily appropriate to subordinate legislation. The Committee described as “excessive” a discretion granted to the Minister for Defence to determine defence allowances under 1978 Naval Financial and Air Force Regulations. The Minister agreed to remove the discretion and make the operation of the regulations objective.

In 1980, Australian Military Regulations did not provide citizens with a right of appeal against decisions of military boards established under the Defence Act to quantify compensation for damage to private property used for defence purposes. The Minister for Defence undertook to provide a right of appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In a similar vein, in 1981, the Committee said that it “Viewed with grave concern” delay by the Defence and Attorney-General’s Departments in meeting the request that a right of appeal be made available against discretionary decisions of the Minister to pay compensation to the real owner of property that had been sold on the assumption that it was unclaimed. Eventually the Committee was informed that, unless it insisted on a right of appeal to the AAT, the proposed Defence Force Ombudsman might offer an effective avenue of redress for problems of this nature. The Committee accepted this though it suspended final judgment on the efficacy of an ombudsman as against the AAT procedure.

Fair Treatment and Non-discrimination

In assisting military lawyers to be alert to the destabilising effects of unfair or discriminatory treatment the Committee drew attention to 1973 regulations which gave instructors and officers of the Naval Reserve a right to show cause why they should not be discharged for alleged misconduct while cadets were not given a similar right. The Committee has also argued that important powers should be exercised at an appropriately senior level where seniority, maturity and experience will underpin important judgments. In 1976, the Committee criticised Defence Force Regulations that empowered the Minister for Defence “virtually to confiscate” private land for the purpose of testing war material. There was a right of compensation but the regulations remained objectionable because they enabled the Minister to delegate this virtual confiscation power to “any commissioned officer of the Defence Force or any public servant of the third division”.

The Min-
ister was persuaded that the delegation of far-reaching military powers affecting rights should be restricted by legislation to officers of high rank.\textsuperscript{11}

In 1978, a remarkable set of Defence Force (Salaries) Regulations provided, in true Gilbert and Sullivan fashion, that when, on promotion to a higher rank, a medical officer became entitled to a lower rate of salary, the officer would continue to receive the higher salary of the previous rank, including any further pay increases that might accrue to it. Medical officers’ salaries were fixed by reference to certain public service salaries which had risen while ranks above colonel were aligned to other public service classifications which had not increased. Thus, the salary of a medical colonel had overtaken that of a major-general! In addition, depending on their previous rank, two officers of currently equal rank and position could be paid different salaries. The Committee recommended disallowance of the regulations notably to remove this arbitrary discrimination, but also to eliminate the “potentially disruptive new principle of remuneration: that an officer is entitled to any advantage accruing to any position he formerly held”.\textsuperscript{12}

In attempting to eliminate subjective discretions, and replace them with objectively framed provisions based on stated criteria, the Committee was not casting any reflection on the integrity or good faith of the former Boards. However, the Committee has always considered that law is more reliable than discretion. The Committee may well have taken its cue from Lord Sankey who pointed out in his Mansion House speech in 1924 that “amid the cross-currents and shifting sands of public life, the Law (not the Minister’s opinion) is like a great rock upon which a man may set his feet and be safe”. In the same year Lord Justice Scrutton in \textit{R v Roberts} also cautioned that “Good faith is . . . not sufficient in itself; some of the most honest people are the most unreasonable, and some excesses may be sincerely believed in, quite beyond the limits of reasonableness”.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{National Security Regulations}

During the War, the committee considered that the sheer volume and inherent trespass on personal rights, of National Security Regulations precluded it from an effective scrutiny role. By then, almost 8,000 regulations and orders had been tabled in the Senate. The Government, while offering the Committee the assistance of a legal officer from the Attorney-General’s Department, rejected the Committee’s request for funds to employ an independent lawyer to scrutinise this huge volume of new laws. In any event the Committee already doubted the applicability of its peace-time Principles to war time regulations. The National Security Act gave the Executive extremely wide powers to make laws beyond the confines of mere administrative detail and thus, the legality of the Orders could seldom be questioned. Interference with personal rights was inevitable and an examination of the policy or merits of the Orders was beyond the Committee’s remit. The Committee felt that “no useful or practical purpose” would be served by its scrutiny of this legislation. The Attorney-General eventually appointed a Regulations Advisory Committee to review National Security Regulations.

It is interesting to note however, that at the end of the War, apparently for the first time ever, no Senator who was also a lawyer was available to Chair the Committee and the Government eventually agreed to include in the Estimates an amount to pay for a legal adviser. Since that time the committee has been served by a series of eminent practising or academic lawyers whose knowledge and skills have become an indispensible asset to the Committee in the face of ever increasing subordinate law-making.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Administrative Convenience and Parliamentary Control}

There is a tension between the expediency of delegated legislation and the requirements of a Westminster-style parliamentary government. It is occasionally thought that parliamentary control is a barrier to innovation, and parliamentary accountability is an obstacle to decisive action of the kind associated with command. In 1946, however, the British broadcaster Edward Murrow offered a telling counsel to those wavering on the brink of this heresy when he mused “... Dunkirk or the Battle of Britain, El Alamein or Stalingrad... the landings in Normandy or the great blows struck by British and American bombers. Historians may decide that any one of these events was decisive, but I am persuaded that the most important thing that happened in Britain was that this nation chose to win or lose this war under the established rules of parliamentary procedure. It
feared Nazism, but did not choose to imitate it. The Government was given dictatorial power but it was used with restraint, and the House of Commons was ever vigilant . . . [W]hile London was being bombed . . . the House devoted two days to discussing conditions under which enemy aliens were detained on the Isle of Man . . . there were to be no concentration camps here. 15

A balance has to be struck between expediency and accountability. Thus, as early as 1933 the committee objected to the “extremely undesirable” presence in Air Force Regulations of rules relating to the unlawful disposal of arms, a matter which for the Navy and Army was expressly governed by the Defence Act itself. Indeed, in contrast to the other forces, the Air Defence Forces were then governed almost entirely by substantive regulations, far beyond the limits of the administrative detail usually associated with subordinate legislation. The committee called for parliamentary enactment of an adequate statute. 16 In 1949, the Committee drew attention to Defence Force Retirement Regulations lawfully made in pursuance of so-called “Henry VIII clauses” in the parent statute which delegated power to amend or override the Act. The Committee’s view was that such extraordinary powers “should not be availed of except in cases of extreme urgency”. 17

The Defence Preparations Act 1951 was passed because, in the opinion of the Parliament, there existed a state of international emergency making defence preparations urgently necessary. Under uncommonly general powers, emergency regulations could be made for defence preparations but once again, as during the War, the Committee, while agreeing to review the operations of the regulations, adopted the role of observer only. 18 In 1969, Financial Regulations were made to provide annual allowances for Chiefs of Staff. The rule-making power in the Act referred only to regulations for the “fixing of rates of pay.” The Committee queried the validity of the proposal. Since it was also an important remuneration innovation for the military, the Committee doubted the parliamentary propriety of its appearance in a subordinate instrument. Similar allowances for public servants had been introduced by an Act. 19 Finally, a 1982 Defence Determination to compensate Air Force members undergoing officer and flying training had a drafting error causing the unintended consequence of equally entitling other training officers. To remove these unintended payments retrospectively would have infringed protective sections in the Defence Act designed to prevent prejudicial retrospectivity. Military strategy to remedy the problem was ingenious. The Determination was deliberately not tabled in Parliament. At the expiration of 15 sitting days after it was made it therefore became void and of no effect ab initio and a fresh and accurate Determination was then made. 20

Retrospectivity

Retrospectivity has always concerned the Committee because of its inherent artificiality. However, retrospective defence legislation has been a frequent problem for the Committee since often new allowances and adjustments are an eventual flow-on from public service allowances themselves involving retrospectivity. In 1968 the Committee stated that “Delay in the promulgation of regulations providing for the payment of moneys denies Parliament the right to approve or disapprove of expenditure at the time of the expenditure” . 21 While some administrative and drafting delays, of not more than a few months, might be inevitable, the Committee resolved that more than 2 years of retrospectivity in regulations authorising payment of moneys would, in the absence of quite exceptional circumstances, be the subject of a report to the Senate recommending disallowance.

In 1972 the Committee investigated administrative delays of over 12 months by the Department of Defence in approving a proposed allowance which was to be paid 18 months retrospectively. When drafting time was included, a period of over 3 years had elapsed between initial consideration of the allowance and gazettal of the regulations. 22 The Committee expressed concern that in spite of its known views and the past action of the Senate in support of those views the decision to act beyond retrospectivity of two years was maintained. The regulations concerned a special allowance called “Command money”. Although reluctant to cause financial disadvantage to service personnel the Committee recommended that the instrument be disallowed. It feared that its acceptance would be a precedent to be relied upon for increasing periods of retrospectivity, involving larger sums and resulting in an undermining of parliamentary control over expendi-
In 1976 the Committee attributed retrospec-
tivity to departmental inefficiency noting that
in one case 16 months of a 26 month period
of retrospectivity was due to a misunder-
standing between the Defence Department and the
Attorney-General's drafters who had not real-
ised that the instrument was to be retrospective
and its drafting therefore a matter of some
priority. In 1979 an examination of retro-
spective Defence Force Financial Regulations
revealed further administrative delays, misun-
derstanding in the Attorney-General's Depart-
ment and mistabbling of regulations. However,
furlough regulations involving 6 years retros-
pectivity arose in exceptional circumstances
where much of the delay from initial proposal
to gazettal of regulations was due to Common-
wealth/State consultations on a national long
service scheme. Over the years the Committee
has held a number of in camera hearings of
evidence, the majority of which have been with
Defence Department officials in connection with
retrospective regulations. The Minister has now
adopted the helpful practice of explaining in
advance the reasons for retrospectivity, though
administrative delays remain a problem.

Eightieth Report — 1985/86

The Committee's latest Report reflects its
continued interest in ensuring that defence legis-
lation does not trespass unduly on the rights
of Parliament, service personnel or citizens. For
example, in its scrutiny of a Defence Deter-
nation the Committee queried the practice of
providing sometimes significantly different uni-
form allowances for male and female officers
of equal rank. Gender obviously has an effect
on the cost of clothing but the Committee was
concerned that payment of different gender
based rates of allowance could in practice have
resulted in sex discrimination. Since the full
allowance was expended on uniforms no mon-
etary advantage accrued to any male or female
officer. The Committee however, retained "a
residual concern that significantly different al-
lowances should not reflect or be seen to reflect
significant differences in the quality of uni-
forms, accoutrements and insignia, and by im-
plication, a lack of equality between the male
and female officers who wear them". Such
differences "could reflect or be seen to reflect
an out-moded gender based distinction between
the perceived status of officers described as
being of equal rank and responsibility".

In Defence Force Discipline Regulations the
Committee obtained the Minister's undertaking
to amend regulation 13 to impose an obligation
rather than a mere discretion on an authorised
officer to appoint visiting officers to inspect
detention centres to oversee the fair and proper
treatment of detainees. The Committee also
noted that under regulation 17 a detainee could
be required to perform reasonable work except
on Sunday, Christmas Day, or Good Friday
when only work necessary for the continued
operation of the centre was required. Although
a beneficial provision it discriminated against
non-Christian detainees whose bona fide day of
religious observance was not protected. Civilian
prison regulations made provision for genuine
denominational religious observance and the
Minister readily agreed to make an appropriate
amendment.

Defence Force Regulations provided for dec-
larations of defence practice areas for training
by Australian and foreign military personnel.
Although a declaration of private land would
be tabled in Parliament and subject to disal-
lowance, a declaration of Commonwealth land
was not subject to parliamentary oversight. The
Committee was concerned to determine whether
the Minister could declare Commonwealth land
in the A.C.T. and the Federal Territories, or
Commonwealth airports, offices or buildings,
without any form of parliamentary supervision. There was even some concern that, theoreti-
cally, Parliament House itself could be declared
a defence practice area. Parliamentary memo-
ries are long. They had not forgotten the con-
troversy surrounding the use of Parliament
House during the twenty-fourth conference of
SEATO military advisers in 1966 when 70 armed
soldiers from the Ist Cavalry Regiment mounted
a 24 hour security screen around and within
the national legislature. The Minister assured
the Committee that declarations of defence prac-
tice areas invariably related to large, rela-
tively remote locations. The Minister also agreed
to remedy a drafting flaw in the Regulations
which provided for the payment of reasonable
compensation for damage arising from a def-
ence practice operation but failed to provide
claiming procedures or a right of appeal to the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal against an allegedly unfair assessment.

Finally, Defence (Inquiry) Regulations contained two flaws. Firstly, it was not legally possible for civilian members of Courts or Boards of Inquiry to resign. Secondly, the Regulations conferred on Courts of Inquiry powers of contempt beyond those of a Royal Commission by seemingly making it a serious contempt to report true statements concerning the bona fides or fitness for office of members of a Court of Inquiry. The Committee considered that the use of delegated legislation to proscribe such reporting had implications for freedom of expression by both individuals and the media.

Conclusions

Although the individual defects discussed here are not generally of major significance, their uninhibited accumulation in delegated legislating has the effect of corroding standards of fair treatment and equality. Disciplined service personnel, confronted by the powers of a large military bureaucracy, are no less entitled to the protection of law than are the civilians who place an ultimate dependence on their professional skills. Modern military lawyers recognise this, the high standard of fairness embodied in the recent discipline codes reflects it and the existence of an office of Defence Force Ombudsman makes it a reality. However, not even the High Court can overlook the letter of the law when it is a harsh law. The Senate Committee can however, call for the repeal or amendment of rules whose operation could cause injustice to individuals. Its value is measured therefore, not merely by the negative criterion of the unfair provisions to which it objects but also by the positive criterion of deterrence which its very existence has on over-enthusiastic drafters who might seek to win the battle and lose the war.

Notes

13 R v Roberts, 1924, 2 KB 695 at 719. Both quotations are taken from the Committee’s Eleventh Report, pp. 188/1969, page 120.
14 Fifth and Sixth Reports, pp. 188/1969.
18 Eighth Report, pp. 188/1969, para. 11.
Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee and its Importance to New Zealand’s Army

By Captain G.J. Clayton, RNZAEC.

FOR New Zealand, the indeed the whole of the British Empire, 1897 was without doubt ‘The Diamond Jubilee Year’. A year marked by celebrations and monuments to Victoria, who at seventy-eight had been Queen of England, Defender of the Faith, Empress of India and ruler of the British Dominions beyond the seas for a record sixty years. To ensure that the record reign would not be forgotten the Imperial authorities invited the colonies to send military contingents to the planned public commemorations ceremonies in London in mid-June. In response to this invitation New Zealand sent a fifty-four strong contingent; the first Colonially raised military contingent to leave its shores. The importance of the contingent to New Zealand’s Army was out of all proportion to its size. Not only did it assist in raising public awareness of New Zealand’s Volunteer Force, it also provided a model for mobilization, training, selection and despatch of military contingents, a model that was to be well used over the following five years.

While the Imperial authorities had made the invitation to send contingents as enticing as possible for colonial governments (offering to provide free of charge barrack accommodation, rations and horses) New Zealand’s politicians seem to have been swayed by the decision of the Australian colonies to participate. Carefully noting that the colony of Victoria, which had decided to send a contingent of twenty-four men, was to provide return passage, five pounds for a new outfit, and a bonus of twenty pounds for NCOs and ten pounds for the men, New Zealand’s Cabinet decided to go one better. At a meeting on the 27 February 1897, Cabinet agreed in principle to send a contingent of seventy-three men. Thirty were to be Europeans from the Mounted Corps of the Volunteer Force, twenty were to be Maoris and the remaining twenty-three were to be selected from the Permanent Militia. Each man selected was to receive a free outfit, return passage to England his keep in Britain and a bonus of forty pounds for officers and twenty pounds for the men.

Implementing Cabinet’s decision was the responsibility of the Colony’s newly appointed Commandant, Colonel Pole Penton. He immediately made arrangements for concentrating in Wellington potential contingent members. Mounted Corps were asked through their district commanders to nominate one NCO and three privates, preferably ‘smart and good men’ who could provide their own horse and harness. Those nominated were to assemble in Wellington where they were to be put through a six week course of riding instruction by Captain Coleman. After this short course a selection was to be made of those who were to go as the Colony’s European Volunteer Force representatives.

The Maori section of the contingent were, at first, totally separate from the Defence Forces of the Colony. Its members appear to have been nominated by the Native Affairs Department, with whom Penton was in contact over their health and welfare. To overcome legal difficulties, and possibly disciplinary problems, the Maoris were enrolled in the Heretaunga Mounted Rifles with H.P. Tunuiarangi, the Rangatira (Chief) of the party being gazetted Captain.

The other senior officers for the contingent were selected in a more orthodox manner. Lieutenant-Colonel A. Pitt, the most senior district commander in the Colony, was placed in overall command. While Captain A.W. Robin (later Major-General) of the Otago Hussars, was given the honour of commanding European Volunteers as he was considered the ‘smartest commanding officer in the Colony’.

By the 24 March 1897 the first stage of the selection for the European Volunteers had been completed. From the one hundred and seventy interested volunteers, forty had been assembled in Wellington to undergo further training. After a week of intensive training these European Volunteers were joined by Captain Robin and twenty-two Maoris. The end of
the month saw only the Permanent Militiamen not assembled for training and final selection.

For the next two weeks while the European and Maori Volunteers were being outfitted in new khaki uniforms, as well as continuing with their training, Colonel Penton was endeavouring to arrange for advanced training in Britain for the whole force. He wished to see the permanent Militia undergo an artillery course at the School of Gunnery at Shoeburyness and the Volunteers undergo a Mounted Infantry course at Aldershot. For New Zealand’s politicians the whole exercise was becoming extremely complicated. Cabinet authorised Seddon, the Premier, to decide whether the contingent should undergo training in Britain on the completion of the Jubilee celebrations. Then, in what must have been a cost cutting exercise, they decided that no Permanent Militia section would be sent with the contingent.

Penton and Cabinet were not the only ones busy dealing with the depatch of the contingent. Staff of the Defence Department were arranging for the supply and issue of uniforms, arms and accoutrements. Most importantly transport to and from Britain had to be finalised to ensure the contingent arrived in sufficient time to prepare for the celebrations in London. These preparations though unspectacular were as important as the assembling and selection of the contingent. Without such attention to detail the contingent would have been unable to fulfil its purpose. The uniform decided upon was almost identical to that used by Imperial troops on active service. It consisted of a Norfolk jacket of khaki cloth, breeches of khaki cord, brown gaiters, black lace boots, jack spurs, brown belts and a wide brimmed felt hat. As Mounted Infantry the men of the contingent were to be armed with the Martini-Henry rifle and bayonet while the officers were to be issued with sword and revolver. For transport the department arranged passage on HMS Ruahine departing Lyttelton on the 20 April with the contingent proceeding to Lyttelton from Wellington on board the SS Tutanekai on the 27 April.

The following evening (28 April) the NCOs of the Canterbury Volunteers organized a large smoke concert in the Chamber of Commerce. Most of New Zealand’s leading military men joined the local citizenry in what was described at the time as a ‘great reception’. The next day the usually quiet and sedate town of Lyttelton was aflame with excitement with all the local volunteer corps turning out to give the contingent a marvellous military send off. Though the contingent had to endure three hours of posing for photographs before being allowed to board ship.

From the 29 April until the 11 June, when they landed in Britain, the member of the Jubilee Contingent had their time taken up with a planned programme of morning and afternoon drill, military lectures and shipboard games. This routine was only broken at Montevideo where the contingent witnessed at first hand the military coup taking place in Uruguay. On arrival in Great Britain, apart from the want of horses, the contingent was ready. Indeed immediately it arrived at Chelsea Barracks it was turned out to be reviewed by the Duke of Connaught. The next day the contingent was reviewed again, this time by Lord Roberts. From then until the 22 June 1897, the New Zealanders along with the other Colonials prepared for the ‘Pageant without a Parallel’.

On the 22 June 1897 Queen Victoria headed a procession of world leaders and dignitaries as well as soldiers from throughout the Empire through the streets of London to the immense delight of thousands upon thousands of her subjects. Included in her bodyguard that day were four men of the New Zealand Contingent who joined representatives from other colonies to make it one of the most colourful bodyguards given any Monarch. The rest of the contingent was not forgotten. Immense crowds enthusiastically cheered the Colonial troops with none being given a better reception than the New Zealanders.
The contingent impressed all by their soldier-like bearing and appearance with the result that the British public lavishly entertained them at every opportunity. A major spin-off from the contingent's presence in Britain was the heightening of awareness of New Zealand. Lt Col Pitt believed it was an 'excellent advertisement for the Colony' and one all could be proud of. His only regret was the lost opportunity of advanced training. This was due not to cost cutting but to the wish of the Maori members to return to New Zealand as soon as possible. While the contingent was unable to undertake any advanced training Pitt was gladdened somewhat by the fact that a colonial unit that did have the opportunity, the New South Wales Mounted Rifles, were disappointed in the training they undertook.

Paralleling events in Britain, New Zealand went mad with Jubilee fever from the 20 until the 27 June 1987. Commencing on the 20 June, with church services throughout the colony offering thanksgiving for the unique event, the next week was spent in spectacular secular reviews and processions. Every town and sizeable settlement had its main street thronged with spectators catching glimpses of colourful processions. In Dunedin a mass choir of 5000 children sang the National Anthem. In Wellington the local artillery volunteers fired two sixty gun salutes with rifle volunteers adding to the din with a feu de joie. In Auckland and Christchurch local volunteers organised military tournaments to entertain the multitudes. To ensure none would forget the proceedings numerous medallions and medals were struck and portraits of the Queen were produced by the score.

For a month after the London Jubilee procession the New Zealand contingent was busy seeing the sights, meeting the queen and having generally 'a right royal time'. Subsequently fourteen members decided to stay on in Britain to enjoy an extended holiday, while the remainder commenced the long sea journey home arriving back in New Zealand on the 8 September 1897. Whereas Captain Robin had been unhappy with Wellington's send off he could have found little to complain about with its reception of their return. Not only did they receive a warm welcome at the wharves but they were also entertained to a banquet for good measure. Three days later the contingent was disbanded with the individual members returning to their home towns where they were received as returning heroes and treated as such. Prior to their departure from Wellington the contingent was given one further bonus from the government. The uniforms, arms and accoutrements were gifted to them for services rendered.

The involvement of the Volunteer Force in all the local celebrations, in addition to its supplying of men for the ‘Jubilee Contingent’, was to have a profound effect. Interest in defence and the Volunteer Force was revived after years of public indifference. The Defence department was inundated with offers of new corps from throughout the Colony with names, which reflected Jubilee fever, ‘Queens Rifles’, ‘Victoria Rifles’ and ‘Imperial Rifles’ to name but three. Historians in the past have overlooked this revival as it was quickly overshadowed by the developments, and outbreak of hostilities, in South Africa. Yet it can be argued that the ‘Jubilee’ revival with its overtly Imperialistic overtones was an essential precursor to New Zealand’s involvement in South Africa. The Jubilee celebrations helped bind the ties of Empire even closer, which resulted in a readiness, indeed a willingness, to assist Britain militarily wherever and whenever possible.

New Zealand’s ability to assist Britain militarily was enhanced by both the Volunteer revival and its participation in the Jubilee celebrations. With a revival in public interest of volunteering much needed additional manpower came forward for the force. The mobilization, assembling, selection, equipping and despatch of the 1897 Jubilee Contingent was extremely important for the Defence department. Its significance did not lie in the number of men involved, nor in the speed and precision with which the operation was carried out. Its importance lay in the fact that it provided the department with practice in the management of contingents for overseas service. This practice had special significance from 1898 until 1902 when a further thirteen contingents numbering nearly seven thousand men were raised and despatched. Ten were sent to take part in the South African War, another one went to Great Britain for the coronation of the new King in 1902, while a further two were sent to the Australian mainland to take part in the Commonwealth celebrations.
NOTES

2. *Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives* (AJHR) 1897 Al pp 1-2.
3. *ibid*.
4. *National Archives* ADI 97/2699 Seddon to McKenzie (telegram) 19 February 1897.
5. *ibid*. Seddon to McKenzie (telegram) 24 February 1897. Cabinet to Seddon (telegram) nd (27 February 1897?). Cabinet Memorandum 27 February 1897.
8. *National Archives* ADI 97/2699 Teare to Penton 22 April 1897. Penton to Minister of Native Affairs 24 April 1897.
10. *ibid*. Pitt to Commander Forces 26 February 1897.
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17. *ibid*. Penton to Minister for Defence 15 April 1897.
18. *ibid*. McKenzie to Seddon 27 April 1897.
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27. 'Slinn, T.W. Diary' 29 April 1897. Copy held Alexander Turnbull Library MS Papers 1943.
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29. 'Slinn, T.W. Diary' 29 April 1897.
30. 'Slinn Diary' 29 April — 11 June 1897 *The Weekly Press*. 5 May 1897.
33. *AJHR* 1897 H14 p2.
34. *AJHR* 1897 H14 p2.
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Captain Clayton is the Assistant Director of Educational Services in the New Zealand Ministry of Defence. Prior to taking up this appointment he was the Curator at the Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum. He is currently working towards a Doctorate in History at the University of Waikato.
BRETT Lodge is one of a group of young historians, who having graduated from Duntroon, turned their attention to writing military history.

Lodge is now a member of the history staff of the Australian Defence Force Academy. He has spent six years researching the life of Lieutenant General Gordon Bennett.

General Bennett had a meteoric rise in World War I. In 1916 he became the youngest Brigadier General in the British Army. His courage was legendary, both on Gallipoli and in France. By the end of the War, at age 31, his decorations included Companion of the Order of the Bath, a Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George, and the Distinguished Service Order. He was mentioned in despatches 8 times by Douglas Haig and Ian Hamilton.

No one will dispute that Gordon Bennett was an outstanding front-line leader. He remained in the militia after the war, finally becoming GOC of the 2nd Division (NSW) in 1926. Unfortunately, Bennett had a most intense dislike of Blarney, and a similar attitude towards the Staff Corps. This became an obsession which he found difficult to control. He did not improve the relationship by his attacks on the Staff Corps in between the wars.

After much disappointment in the first year of World War II, Bennett was appointed GOC 8th Australia Division and commanded the Division in Malaya. Much has been written about his escape from Singapore in 1942 and his subsequent career in the Australian Army.

Lodge has traced the events leading up to the problems in Malaya and Bennett’s escape with understanding and fairness. He has researched this part of the Bennett story with accuracy and without prejudice. It was well known that Gordon Bennett believed that he was destined to wear the mantle of Sir John Monash. He regarded himself as the only soldier who could save Australia from invasion or worse. He told Blamey and Sturdee that he (Bennett) should be Commander-in-Chief! — not a way to influence them.

General Bennett was vehemently defended by some of his officers and most of his troops. Bill Kent Hughes, “Black Jack” Galleghan and Frank Legge to mention a few, were ever ready to spring to his defence.

I served under General Bennett from October 1940, to March 1941 when I left to take up a posting on HQ 1 Aust Corps ME. I had admiration for General Bennett as a commander, who was preparing his Division for operations overseas. He set about this task with ability and enthusiasm. He went out of his way to seek out and encourage the younger officers. He was a “pace setter” in the importance of caring for and maintaining the fighting equipment. We all admired his outstanding record in World War I.

I was not Staff Corps but it was clear to me that, already there was some conflict with a few Staff Corps officers; even before the Division left for Malaya. Later there was also conflict with an AIF Brigadier Commander and the British Army Chiefs in Malaya.

Well may it be asked! Did Bennett fall — or was he pushed? Was he destroyed by professional jealousy? Was he a victim of Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blarney? or did his own temperament play the greatest part in his downfall?

Lodge discusses these questions, intelligently and with diligence. He concludes ‘There is no doubt that the dreams of a courageous and patriotic man, who had deservedly enjoyed an outstanding First World War reputation at the Unit and Brigade level, had indeed been reduced to ashes. They had been devoured, however by the fiery elements of his own character; bitterness, prejudice and ambition’.

Whilst many will agree with Lodge’s conclusions, likewise, many of the 8th Australian Division soldiers still regard Gordon Bennett as a great and brave soldier and one to always remember.

Lodge has made an important contribution to military history. I enjoyed reading the book.
— it is easy to read. I hope Lodge continues his writing, there are still stories to be written about Sturdee, Shedden, Berryman and Northcott. The lack of writing about the first two is a significant gap in our military history.

As usual the quality of the publication is what one expects from Allen & Unwin — high class. I recommend this book — it’s good!

THE PEGASUS BRIDGE by Stephen E. Ambrose, published by George Allen and Unwin Australia, price $19.95

Reviewed by J. P. Buckley, OBE, ED

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) knew that the bridges over the Orne River and the adjacent canal were a vital key to the success of D-Day. It was of the greatest importance that the bridges be captured intact.

The task was given to Major John Howard of D Company Ox and Bucks and 181 soldiers, under his command, to land gliders almost on top of the bridges.

Stephen Ambrose has interviewed Howard and many participants in the battle, including key German soldiers and local civilians. The result is a masterpiece. Ambrose is well known for his classic biography of Eisenhower which took him 20 years to complete. He is Professor of History at New Orleans University.

In all, Ambrose interviewed 24 persons who were involved in the Pegasus Bridge battle. In the final chapter D-Day to D-Day plus forty years, the author gives details of the post-war activities of his principal heroes.

On 8th October 1944 on my way to see the Mulberry Harbour in operation I passed over the Pegasus bridge — already at that time, it was an historical place. Ambrose tells that forty years later, tourists and veterans come in increasing numbers to visit the bridge, the markers designating the landing sites of the gliders, and Madame Gondree’s cafe which played a significant part in the battle. The Gondrees were responsible for passing accurate intelligence about the defences of the area back to London.

On September 5th 1944 after three months of combat, D Company of the Ox and Bucks returned to England. Howard was the only officer still with them. All of the sergeants and most of the corporals were gone. D Company had fallen from its D-Day strength from 181 to 40.

That an American top historian should single out this battle and D Company for this study reflects great credit on both the author and D Company, especially following his biography of the Allied Supreme Commander.

Colonel Von Luck, the German Commander at the time of the Pegasus battle has developed a close friendship with John Howard — they see each other at the Royal Swedish Military Academy annually when they are guest lecturers on the Normandy battles.

Ten years after the battle John Howard was awarded the French Croix de Guerre avec Palme. The area between the road bridge and the landing zone is named “Esplanade John Howard”. The book does not tell whether Howard was ever awarded any British decoration.

I found this book most exciting and found it hard to put down. The heroism and dedication of Howard and his team deserves an important place in British Military history. It retained my interest from cover to cover. It’s the best book I have reviewed this year.

LAST STOP NAGASAKI, by Hugh Clarke, published by George Allen and Unwin, price $14.95.

Reviewed by J. P. Buckley, OBE, ED

This is Hugh Clarke’s story about his group of Australian prisoners of war who survived the atomic bombing of Nagasaki.

There were 24 Australian prisoners in a camp less than two kilometres from the epicentre of the explosion.

The introduction to the book sets the scene for what follows in Nagasaki — the surrender of Singapore, the incarceration in Changi, the infamous Burma-Thailand railway, the inhuman treatment and torture of the prisoners.

The research involved in writing this book has taken years and has involved personal discussions with surviving prisoners and a lengthy
BOOK REVIEW

59

visit to Nagasaki during 1983. The story is very well supported by some excellent photographs.

Clarke tells that more than one third of the Australian soldiers who were prisoners of the Japanese died in captivity (13,872 were recovered and 7,777 died). He also mentions that all of the prisoners — Australian, British, Dutch, American and others — would have been killed at the outset of any invasion of the Japanese homeland by the Allied Forces. Preparations were being made by the Japanese for this contingency. This statement was also supported by Sir Edward Dunlop when launching the book in Melbourne in October 1984.

Having met the author during P.O.W. Week in Melbourne, I can appreciate the energy, drive and dedication which has gone into the preparation of this book. Like some of his ex-P.O.W.s present, it is amazing how these men survived their horrific experiences.

It is inevitable that the book is interspersed with soldier humour — the Japanese were often the recipients, but retribution could be a severe bashing.

*Last Stop Nagasaki* is a most readable and interesting book. Although at times one is horrified by the treatment of the prisoners, Clarke tells of the outstanding bravery and self sacrifice of some of the P.O.W.s in the interests of their comrades.

As mentioned earlier, the book was launched by the legendary Sir Edward Dunlop who remains a hero to the P.O.W.s. This great surgeon continues to devote so much of his life to the service of his P.O.W. ‘family’.

A very interesting book, and I commend it, but it would be greatly improved by an Index.

THE BRIDGE WITH THREE MEN by Anthony Hewitt, published by Jonathan Cape, price $25.95

Reviewed by John Buckley, OBE, ED

The author, then a captain in the Middlesex Regiment was captured when the Japanese Forces took Hong Kong (on Christmas Day 1941). Together with a New Zealand Air Force pilot and a monocled English doctor, he escaped from Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland.

Their object was to reach Chungking, the wartime capital of Nationalist China. In the process they had to journey through Japanese, Nationalist and Communist Chinese Army areas, all fighting for control. Not the least problem was the local bandits. The three officers displayed outstanding courage and sense of adventure which puts this story into the class of great wartime escapes. Many times they faced capture or death.

The most help they received in the epic “long march” was from a band of Communist guerrillas, who took them to their camp in the mountains. In return for medical aid and military training the escapees were well looked after. Later they were escorted by night on dangerous cross country marches to the Chinese Nationalist lines.

For a time their journey continued by slow river boat on which conditions were most primitive. Finally they were taken on a derelict, producer gas fired truck to KuKong where they were welcomed by the British Military Mission.

From KuKong they went their separate ways, the New Zealander to the Middle East and a distinguished service for the remainder of the war. The doctor was soon in battle again commanding a Field Ambulance in Burma and being promoted to full Colonel. He is now in private practice in Hong Kong. Hewitt served in India and Germany, Canberra and Singapore before returning to live at Buderim in Queensland.

Each received the Military Cross for their escape and subsequent adventures in China.

It is a most adventurous story, full of interest and excitement, told in a modest manner. I thoroughly enjoyed the book.

CATALOGUE OF THE ENFIELD PATTERN ROOM BRITISH RIFLES LONDON HMSO 1981

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel D. N. Brook RAA

There are many collections of weapons and equipment in Ministry of Defence establishments in the United Kingdom. Most of them have been collected for research, technical evaluation or educational purposes. The small arms collection at the Royal Military College of Science at Shrivenham is an example of this type of collection.
Unfortunately, for security reasons, most of these collections are not open for general exhibition and the enthusiast often has to engage in a tortuous security clearance exercise.

The collection at Enfield, the old Royal Small Arms Factory is no exception. However, for the true and dedicated weapons collector or one interested in the historical development of small arms, this collection must rate as one of the most interesting in the world.

The title Pattern Room is derived from the ancient system of military arms production whereby a perfectly correct example of every adopted weapon was selected to act as the ultimate reference for subsequent manufacture. These sample arms, which bore official red wax seals, were dubbed Sealed Patterns. Of critical importance in the age of handbuilt firearms, surviving examples of Sealed Pattern guns can be dated as early as 1720. It was not until the 1920s that the act of physically sealing newly adopted firearms ceased. Even now the Sealed Pattern system is not dead as the manufacture of decorative ceremonial weapons is still governed by a complete series of approved patterns held in the Quality Assurance Directorate (Ordnance) Pattern Room at Enfield.

Originally all Sealed Patterns were housed in the Small Arms Department at the Tower of London. Following a disastrous fire there in 1841, when many of the pattern arms were destroyed, the Enfield factory assumed responsibility for the construction and retention of small arms patterns. In 1853 the first weapon to be officially named after Enfield was adopted and about this time a central Pattern Room was established within the factory.

The policy of acquiring and retaining examples of foreign small arms in the Pattern Room commenced after the South African War when a variety of captured Boer weapons was added to the collection. From that time every effort has been made to keep abreast of foreign developments and today the Pattern Room is recognized as the most comprehensive reference collection of modern military firearms in the world.

The catalogue describes one section of the Pattern Room collection, British and Commonwealth manually operated shoulder arms. Included are certain foreign designs which have identifiable British connections, such as arms which have been adapted for trials in the United Kingdom.

It is divided into seventeen separate sections which range from Muzzle loading arms to Small calibre training arms. All told there are 402 separate weapons listed with 90 photographs identifying selected weapons. There is also a short list of interesting abbreviations.

This catalogue will not satisfy all those interested in small arms because of its specialised nature, and indeed some would complain that the amount of information in its pages is sparse. However to the dedicated enthusiast who has specialised in British Rifles, he would certainly derive a good deal of satisfaction from knowing the subtle differences between the ‘Carbine, Garrison Artillery, Martini Henry, .577/450”, MK 1’ and, ‘Carbine, Artillery, Martini Henry, 577/450”, MK 1’ — the latter carried sling swivels!

The author, Mr Herbert Woodend who is Custodian of the Pattern Room, will be well known to those who have either visited the collection or corresponded with him.

To sum up — an interesting catalogue which will be of interest to the specialist but not the general reader.

SOE — AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE 1940-46 by Mr D. Foot, BBC London 1984

Reviewed by LT COL Guy Boileau, (Ret)

WHEN, after years of rustication from political office, Winston Churchill was asked to lead his country through the dark days of World War II, he set out to prosecute the war with extraordinary vigour and with the resources at this command. Had he not, through his personal qualities, encouraged others, including the United States President, to oppose the Axis Powers with no holds barred, Australians might today eat less meat and more vegetables. This book is about some of the extraordinary civilian resources this charismatic, yet enigmatic man brought in to play. Published by the BBC in London in 1984, the book can be seen to be both source for and companion volume to the BBC-TV series “SOE”. SOE was a secret organisation designed to work with, or develop, civilian resistance to the Axis Powers. Churchill had an enormous grasp of the broad sweep of military and political strategy (though,
like Hitler, he occasionally dabbled in the business of colonies). He gave strategic guidance to others and, generally, let them get on with it. Having given the Special Operations Executive his seal of approval, he gave them their initial strategic guidance - "set Europe ablaze". It took them a while to achieve more than a fitful sputter of flame and smoke, but SOE and its men and women gave it a damned good incendiary try. As they became more involved in the fighting behind the Axis lines, as they encountered indigenous groups of resisters sponsored by forces outside the UK, they entered another area in which strategic guidance was necessary. Should SOE, whose leadership and rank and file were, in general, Christian and democratic in orientation, oppose the Axis totalitarians by collaborating with resisters and partisans of equally distasteful extreme views and guidance: apocryphally, he is said to have put it that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." This was apparently not enough for Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean M.P. whom Churchill sent to effect liaison with Tito in Yugoslavia. Maclean knew that Tito was Communist, at that time strongly drawn to the USSR, and likely to bring about violent political change in his country as soon as the Germans withdrew or were defeated.

When Maclean quibbled with Churchill about the niceties of resistance in Yugoslavia, the Prime Minister's reply removed (his) doubts. "Do you intend", he asked, "to make Yugoslavia your home after the war?"

"No, Sir," (Maclean) replied.

"Neither do I", he said, 'And that being so, the less you and I worry about (that) the better . . . What interests us is, which of them (i.e., Communist and anti-Communist resisters in Yugoslavia) is doing most harm to the Germans?'

Churchill's system of priorities was right in the short term but now 40 years later we still have to live with a Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland, Burma and Malaysia in which long-term results of Churchill's guidance to SOE created by that policy and are still discernible.

The author has excellent qualifications to write the book. He was professor of modern history at Manchester University for six years, he wrote the Official History of SOE in France, he fought with the SAS in France in support of SOE and has much experience as an editor and writer. Despite his qualifications (or perhaps because of them) he has had trouble with the book. It seems to have been written or edited in a hurry. It is prodigal with colons and semi-colons where commas are indicated. The Index occasionally lets you down by directing you to the wrong page. Most of all, much official technical and political material on SOE has been destroyed, was not recorded, or is (as of 1984) still sensitive or too classified to be incorporated in this book. It is therefore, a little odd that Professor Foot has not used United States declassified material, nor E. M. Cookridge's _Set Europe Ablaze_. I would be interested to know why? He has used other secondary sources which give the lie to current TV advertising that "now it can be told" as SOE officers have been publishing their experiences voluminously for 20 years. Criticisms aside, I am delighted with this book. It is a useful guide to those who know nothing of special operations and a useful companion volume to those who know much.

It is a chronicle of great individual heroism and a little treachery, of heroic death and needless death, of prodigies of organizational skill and a little squalid infighting, for example the Old Etonians and Wykenhamists. This is a book for the strategist, the informed or incurious non-strategic reader. It is an ungrudging tribute to the noble men and women of SOE and their sacrifices. But as the author acknowledges, it is incomplete because the story is so wide in scope and some sources are still locked away.

I CARRIED MY SKETCHBOOK by Ken Lovell, published by John Sissons 1984

Reviewed by LT COL A. A. Pope

THE 2/23 Infantry Battalion is one of the most honoured units Australia has produced. The battalion saw its first series of actions in Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland, Burma and Malaysia in which long-term results of Churchill's guidance to SOE created by that policy and are still discernible.

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THE 2/23 Infantry Battalion is one of the most honoured units Australia has produced. The battalion saw its first series of actions in Greece, Syria and North Africa, including among its battles El Alamein and Tel-el-Eisa, with the latter battle resulting in over 350 battalion casualties. That should have been enough for most men and most units, especially when we consider the hundreds of thousands of men enlisted by Australia in WW11.

However, after the Australian involvement in the Middle East ended Australian troops were withdrawn for home defence. No doubt a unit with a record like that of the 2/23 battalion expected to be given the task of defending Syd-
ney Harbour or Port Phillip Bay. But no, the perceived need for experienced troops meant that after a brief rest in Australia these veterans first went to Queensland, to learn the techniques of jungle warfare and then on to New Guinea to new battles, new honours and, inevitably more casualties among the core members of the unit. With the change of theatre came a change of insignia from the blue bordered black over red ‘Mud and Blood’ diamond to the black and blue ‘T’ signifying the Tripoli, Tel-el-Eisa, Tobruk, Tewfick and Tel Aviv actions.

In New Guinea 2/23 battalion assaulted Red Beach at Lae then took part in further landings at Langamak Bay and Finschafen before beginning the hard slog through the mud and mountains along the inaptly named ‘Easy Street’ to Satelberg and Wareo. Finally, the battalion took part in two more amphibious assaults at Morotai on 17 April 45, in which it saw little action and then at Tarakan in in Borneo on 1 May 45.

The serious side of this wide ranging experience has been recorded in the unit history called appropriately Mud and Blood in the Field and compiled by Dick Fancke. A fictionalised account of a battalion from the 6th, 7th or 9th Division, which could easily be the 2/23 battalion is given in Eric Lambert’s classic — trilogy Twenty Thousand Thieves, The Veterans and Glory Thrown In.

Both Dick Fanckes and Eric Lamberts books serve a different purpose from Ken Lovell’s by describing and recounting the serious side of war. Ken Lovell’s cartoon’s are a record of these same events but are much more light hearted in their approach as their purpose was to relieve tension, raise morale and give some expression to the feelings of those involved. No doubt in some dark moments in a beleagured Middle Eastern outpost morale would be boosted by the arrival of the newsheet with a cartoon of how tough life was back at base — perhaps in lieu of desperately needed rations or ammunition!

To my surprise I also found that little has changed in 40 years. Characters described by Ken Lovell in the Middle East are still serving today, behaving the same way and doing the same things. The clothing store still only stocks sizes too big and too small and red tape is still choking the system (but much faster now that it is computer assisted)! If soldiers and the Army have not changed in 40 years it should be no surprise that public attitudes to defence and the social structure of Australia have not changed either. Even during the greatest threat to Australia’s national survival yet experienced Ken Lovell saw and caricatured the complacency of a public getting what they could out of Government war contracts and the labour shortage while complaining of the ‘deprivations’ they must suffer back home with little concern for those at the front. Unfortunately, today the divisions between the serviceman and the community appear to be widening despite even greater and uncensored media coverage of service matters.

Ken Lovell’s book is a faithful record of his and the 2/23 Battalion’s war. It covers many aspects of Army life recognisable today with typical digger humour and insight. I am sure that any members of 6, 7 or 9 Divisions will have recalled to mind incidents they had long thought forgotten. But this book is not just for WW11 veterans as the cartoons can be enjoyed by soldiers today. As this book demonstrates, there is a bond between servicemen which transcends each age and war and which is just as strong today as it was forty years ago. It is this bonding together which makes service life so worthwhile. More’s the pity the Army has never learned to pass this spirit on to the civilian community to which we belong. An enjoyable soldier’s book.

REVIEW OF U.S. MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT — 1984, by Pergamon-Brassey’s 1984

Reviewed by Lt Col Guy Boileau, (Ret)

I was wrong. The first thing which caught my eye was an indication in the Introduction that this book was “To act as an early warning about weapons systems that could be . . . destabilizing . . . ” Here, I thought, comes a polemic against the reasonable measures taken by the people of the United States to protect themselves against the possibility of strategic assault by the Soviet Union. It’s not. It seems a sensible and informative book which is, as the authors set out to compile it, “accessible to the interested reader, with or without a scientific background”. Buy it.
“Star Wars” has become part of the dialectic of the trendy, of the iconoclast, of the fellow traveller; the mere whisper of these something/nothing words sets tribes of fat cat academics twittering like a mango tree full of fruit bats. Mention “Star Wars” on the claret and brie circuit and they’ll immediately know you’re a strategist coming out of the closet. Amazing what two words in inverted commas will do for you, but don’t forget the inverted commas or they will know you frequent amusement parlors. This book has twenty fascinating pages on defence against ballistic missiles, well written and sensible, for those who are interested in the nuts and bolts of the subject. This segment, alone, is worth the price of the publication. If you stayed awake during Gen Sci at school, you will benefit from the thirty-three pages of ballistic missile re-entry vehicles. This is a little heavier, but nonetheless useful reading.

There’s more, of course. There are papers on the operations of U.S. military research and development structures, on anti-submarine warfare, on anti-satellite weapons and on the development of integrated circuits. The papers are all readable and informative. And accessible. There is no mention of the role played in research and development by technical evaluation of captured Soviet equipment (Tech Int), but this is because even an open society has some secrets. This is a very small quibble.

The title contains the tetragram “1984”. This does not mean the book is out of date already. In my opinion, it is not perishable and will be a useful research tool for years. On second thoughts, buy two; if you are serious about hi-tech soldiering, you may wear the first one out — or a trendy may borrow one and not return it.

P.O.W. — PRISONERS OF WAR AUSTRALIANS UNDER NIPPON, by Hank Nelson, published by Australian Broadcasting Commission

Reviewed by J. P. Buckley, OBE, ED

The author Hank Nelson is an Australian born in Boort, Victoria in 1937. He is a Senior Fellow at the Australian National University. During the War in the Pacific some 22,000 Australian service personnel, including 71 Australian Army Nurses were prisoners of war. These unfortunate people were held under ghastly conditions in terrible camps and gaols in Timor, Java, Sumatra, New Guinea, Ambon, Hainan, Borneo, Singapore, Malay, Thailand, Burma, Japan and several other places.

After experiencing torture, starvation, tropical diseases and inhuman neglect, only 14,000 survived to return to Australia (this included 30 nurses) after 40 years 8,000 are still alive.

Hank Nelson has thoroughly researched his subject. He has talked to hundreds of prisoners to get their story of the horrific conditions under which they spent 3½ years as captives of the Japanese. He has talked with many famous personalities including, Sir Edward Dunlop, Rod Wells, Adrian Curlewis, Glyn White, Stan Arneil, Russell Braddon, Vivian Bullwinkel, Ian Duncan, Betty Jeffrey to mention only a few.

The Chapter describing the experiences of our courageous nurses, such as Vivian Bullwinkel, makes even a hardened reader quail. The treatment these brave women received from their gaolers is beyond human understanding. Vivian returned to a very successful nursing career and later married Frank Statham a well known A.I.F. officer.

This is the third P.O.W. story I have reviewed in the last six months, Nelson’s story is much more stark in his continuous description of the dreadful cruelty, in so many places, for all of the 3½ years. I forced myself to read and to reread many of the chapters including the details of the railway, the death march, and Outram Road. Hell could not be worse than those places.

Hank Nelson has described the home coming of the near skeletons, the maimed and the sick with great sensitivity and skill. There are some wonderful descriptions of tragic reunions. For example when a group of P.O.W. nurses were awaiting to be picked up from the hell camp, they saw the DC3 arrive, the door opened and some figures come out of the door, all in trousers. They recognised one was a women. “Who are you?” “I am the mother of you all” replied Matron-in-Chief, Sage. She held out her arms and we all flopped around her, everybody weeping copious tears.

Some ex-service men found that they had much to complain about their treatment by
Repatriation. On page 217 Geoff O’Connor states:

“My main war was with the young doctors in Repatriation, they know nothing about us, and they don’t want to know. They go by the text books and there’s nothing in text books that says what happens to the human body when you’re three and a half years working at full pace, starved and suffering from one thing or other. Unfortunately the ones that were battling for us are getting older and they are not in Repat now. We are getting all the young Smartarses”.

Unfortunately, this is not an isolated story, yet as Dr. Ian Duncan states, when he asked many of the prisoners in his camp what diseases they suffered when in captivity, their answer was “Oh nothing much Doc”. Subsequently he found they had had malaria, beri beri, dysentry, pellagra and other tropical diseases! The prisoners accepted these as being normal and were not seeking or expecting any compensation from Repatriation.

This book should be compulsory reading for all Veterans Affairs medical Officers dealing with P.O.W.s. It is hard to read the book without becoming saddened and upset by the barbaric treatment these young Australians received during those dreadful years in captivity.

Many of those mentioned in the book were friends I had made when I served on H.Q. 8th Australian Division before they went to Singapore – I left on the next ship for the Middle East.

Hank Nelson has written a classic story.

EISENHOWER THE SOLDIER 1890-1952 by Stephen Ambrose, published by George Allen and Unwin, price $32.00

Reviewed by J. P. Buckley, OBE, ED

STEPHEN Ambrose is Professor of History at the University of New Orleans, he has spent at least two decades studying and researching the life and deeds of General of the Army, Eisenhower.

It would be true to say that he probably knows as much about Eisenhower as any historian. Ambrose’s style of writing will appeal to the reader. It is a sympathetic account of the great soldier whose talents are told in a straight forward way; but Ambrose does not overlook his weaknesses and mistakes. He does not unashamedly hero-workship Eisenhower.

Eisenhower is taken to task over the battles in the Mediterranean and the problems which arose there, not only in the fighting, but also with the French leaders. Later the author criticises Eisenhower for the failure of operation Market-Garden (plan for crossing the lower Rhine at Arnhem).

Fighting the Germans was only one of Eisenhower’s worries, the clashes with Patton and Montgomery would have sorely tried the patience of a less strong and determined leader. From time to time Churchill, de Gaulle, Brooke and others did not make the task of the Supreme Commander easy. Brooke in particular was always ready to criticise Eisenhower’s performance.

Probably Eisenhower was the only Allied leader who could have welded the prima donnas into a workable team. His tact, patience and diplomatic approach to problems was superb. He had a most definite ‘aura’ of command.

The Supreme Commander would also be most decisive when it became necessary. The prime example was his final order on the invasion of Europe. Eisenhower alone could make the final decision to invade Normandy. After listening to the opinions of the experts, which were not unanimous, Eisenhower thought for a moment then quietly said “O.K., let’s go”.

The book covers the North African, Italian and North West Europe campaigns, together with the build-up and preparation for the landings. Whilst critical at times of some of the Allied generals (mostly they deserved it), Ambrose impresses as a fair-minded, objective historian who gives credit where it is deserved. His recently published book on the Pegasus Bridge illustrates this comment.

I was in North West Europe for the last two years of the war and I could not help but observe the great popularity and affection and admiration for Eisenhower, particularly in the United Kingdom. Ambrose tells it all in this excellent story.

I have no hesitation in recommending this book, it’s a great story about a great soldier.