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Returning Home
Command, Control, Leadership and Management

Dear Sir,

Over many years I have followed the articles and debate on command, control, leadership and management. As any library will illustrate, there have been many thousands of words written on these subjects. Indeed, weighty tomes have been published on even only one of the headings. Being a less erudite soul, I have looked for the simplest definitions to better understand the basic issues and provide guidance for other mere mortals. At the risk of widespread condemnation, I offer my thoughts on the subject in the following few paragraphs.

Command is conferred by legal authority. Anyone can be a commander if appointed by a legal instrument. In the RAAF, under the Governor-General and CDF, those in command are CAS, AOC's, OC's, CO's and Detachment Commanders.

Control is the machinery by which command is exercised. Subordinates are given power of control to carry out the requirements of a commander. Rank provides a structure for the degree of power delegated.

Leadership is the ability to acquire followers. There are no bounds imposed by time, numbers, rank or organization. Nor is there any need for formal recognition.

Management is the manipulation of men, money and materiel. Managers can have a particular or general role, depending upon the resources at their disposal. All commanders are managers.

So there you are. A homespun philosophy that has served me well in understanding these often misused terms.

J. MacNaughton, AM
Group Captain, RAAF

"Been There, Done That"

Dear Sir,

In the issue No. 58 of May/June 1986 you published an article I wrote entitled "Been There, Done That" and Got the T-Shirt.

I would like to draw your attention to an error on Page 52, 8 lines from the bottom of the left column.

It reads:

"Some of the later battalions to arrive in Gallipoli were immediately stopped by the latter process."

for "stopped" read "staffed"

The error puts a completely different meaning to passage.

A.T. Parker
MAJOR RL
The matrix system is one which grew out of the unique management problems of the American space effort of the 1960s. It comes to us consequently with a strong caveat: 'If you do not really need it, leave it alone there are easier ways to manage organizations'.

By: Wing Commander N.P. May., RAAF

Introduction

An apparent solution to complex organizational requirements is a Matrix or cross functional arrangement of relationships whereby a compromise may be found for conflicting organizational needs. Organizational executives who are contemplating the adoption of a matrix structure should be aware that many of the apparent advantages of such an arrangement are not generally applicable and that the result may prove to be dysfunctional. The matrix concept is modern, it has been successfully demonstrated and it appears to be a ready answer to many complex organizational problems. It enables resources to be concentrated and it permits a degree of flexibility that is not normally seen in independently structured functional hierarchies. However, in spite of some notably successful experiences with matrix management, there is ample reason to be wary of abandoning the traditional hierarchical arrangement in favour of this newer cross functional approach. Not all experiences with matrices have proved successful, and often where they have there has been unique circumstances to foster the success, and in every case there is a price to pay.

What is Matrix Organization?

The term matrix is used to describe an arrangement whereby an organization which is primarily structured into specialist departments with a conventional subordinate/super-ordinate hierarchy and vertical control/authority structure, has also, an established horizontal arrangement of inter-disciplinary groupings set up for specific tasks. The concept of matrix organization varies somewhat and according to one view any organization that has lateral groupings or relationships in addition to the vertical authority structure qualifies to be called matrix. This rather broad definition would allow many conventional organizations that have 'dotted-line' relationships between different divisions to be considered as having a matrix structure and would even border on accepting the 'informal organizations' which accompany and complement all formal organizations as a type of de facto matrix. This broad definition does not emphasise the essential characteristic of the matrix which is established for a particular task and arranged so that resources and activities are managed by the cross functional organization with executive responsibilities being shared with the functional hierarchies. A definition proposed by Corey and Star also has wide application: "A business organized by both resources and programs which are integrated by means of co-ordination functions is said to have a matrix organization." Most studies of the matrix organisation seem to concentrate on the issue of dual, or multiple authority and make it clear that there must be a deliberately established dual structure of management before the arrangement can be considered a matrix. One significant characteristic of a matrix is that individuals are placed in the position of having two bosses.

The Evolution of the Matrix Concept

The emergence of the matrix as an organizational phenomenon, is closely related to the development of the project management systems that were inspired by the American aerospace industry during the late 1960s and 1970s. At that time the US was under the pressure of competition from the USSR to enter the space age. The rapid Soviet advances in the development of missiles and nuclear weapons brought Americans together in support of large scale
Matrix Organization

development programs. Significantly, funding was readily available and time was considered to be critical. In order to bring the efforts of government and private enterprise together in the most effective way major projects were organized so that direct working relationships were established between all elements of the projects regardless of, and in addition to, the structure of the specialist departments. Government project managers often insisted that contractors develop special internal management systems that were compatible with, and responsive to, the project authority. In this manner cohesive project teams were formed from the resources of multi-disciplined and bureaucratic elements of private and government organizations. The teams could then be dedicated to the particular task for which they were established. One such project was initiated by the US Department of Navy to develop the Polaris submarine missile system. This agency, which was known as the Special Project Office (SPO), gained an international reputation for managerial innovation including the matrix relationship which was established to control and coordinate activities. The SPO was required to bring together a wide range of technology which was, within each field of technology, in a constant state of rapid evolution and from this to develop a fleet of ballistic missile firing nuclear submarines. This task cut across many specialized fields and involved many private contractors and other government agencies.

From these uniquely complex project organizations came the matrix concept. It came from the need to manage very large organizations with very complex interdependencies and rapidly changing technology. These factors place heavy demands on the system for processing, distributing and using information and usually overload normal management communications channels. A study by J.R. Galbraith shows that organizations are able to respond to such an information overload by accepting higher operating costs and slower progress. According to Galbraith organizations may tend to decentralize to shed some of the complexity and may need to invest heavily in information systems such as on-line computing to enable decisions to be made from a more comprehensive data base or, alternatively, they may multiply lateral, relationships that cut across vertical lines of authority, creating additional horizontal communication channels relieving vertical overload and allowing direct response at all levels to new data and changing circumstances. It is significant that Galbraith sees this matrix arrangement as the most difficult and expensive solution. In the case of the Polaris system program the SPO, as evidence of its highly regarded managerial innovation, developed a special computerized R and D planning, scheduling and control technique which became known as “Program Evaluation and Review Technique” or PERT. The PERT system was reputed to be one of the reasons for the program’s success (and hence a factor in the success of the matrix organization). Although a more recent study shows that this was somewhat of a myth because the technique was not actually used on a significant scale until late in the program and in many cases it did not work or it worked, but for a different purpose than intended. The study concluded that the special contribution made by PERT was that it created an illusion of sound management which was used by the project director to allay critics and to avoid inordinate interference and investigation by other agencies. Much of the success of this program can be attributed to its overwhelming acceptance by the government and people of the US, a huge budget (over 10 billion dollars) and the fact that all the participating agencies were willing to adopt the unique organizational arrangements.

Some Matrix Applications

The application of the matrix form is not restricted to multibillion dollar, high-tech industries that are contending with R and D problems. Indeed some analysts point to matrix systems being used decades before they were adopted by the American aerospace industry. This form of organization occurred spontaneously in many small firms where multiple roles, two or more bosses and flexible use of resources across functional boundaries were common practice. Matrix organizations are often accepted as autonomous work groups, comprising interfuctional elements, such as project teams, advertising account groups or business area teams; these relationships are supposed to be non-hierarchical and based on knowledge rather than formal authority. The notion of laterally related teams and work groups has been practised by health service organizations for many years. Generally the professions and disciplines involved in health services have been organized in discrete hier-
archies. For example doctors, nurses, social workers, pharmacists, psychologists and so on belong to differentiated hierarchies and are accountable to different governing bodies. The need to link the various management bodies and to coordinate activities has led to the development of cross functional relationships in many community health services. The 1974 reorganization of the British National Health Service was a comprehensive attempt to relate roles laterally rather than vertically.

Resolving Differences in Matrix Organizations

Some social analysts see the matrix as a more democratic form of organization where the tendency is to increase discretion and participation in decision making and to widen the range of collaboration within the workforce. The egalitarian nature of the lateral work group is constantly stressed and is given as a major motivation for the development of matrix relationships within such organizations as the community health service. The advantages of bringing the various authorities together and coordinating their efforts is seen as providing a more reliable and complete service for the community. It is assumed that such a team is essentially egalitarian and is freed from the restraints of hierarchy and that all team members relate to one another as equals. The difficulty with this arrangement occurs when there is a different view within the team; how can differences be resolved? In practice, and especially under pressure of crisis, there is generally a return to hierarchical authority and to emphasis on individual, rather than team, accountability.

Matrix vs Classical Management Principles

It would seem that conflict resolution is easier to achieve in the classical hierarchical system, as exemplified in the bureaucratic organization, than it is in the matrix non-hierarchy. That should not be surprising because such rationalization is fundamental to the principles of bureaucracy. Max Weber, the German sociologist who developed the theory of bureaucracy around the turn of the century, described bureaucracy as a social machine; it was thought that in the bureaucratic system social roles were institutionalized and reinforced by legal tradition rather than by the ‘cult of personality’; rationality and predictability were sought in order to eliminate chaos and unanticipated consequence. There is a general acceptance of the following characteristics of bureaucracy:

- That the division of labour is based on functional specialization.
- That there is a well-defined hierarchy of authority.
- That a system of rules cover the rights and duties of employees and that procedures exist to deal with work situations.
- There is impersonality of interpersonal relations and that promotion, within a career structure, is possible and is based on merit or seniority.

Matrix management abandons these principles. Elements of the matrix organization are drawn from different functional areas, control and authority is difficult to define (two or more bosses), responsibility and accountability is not clear and many serious problems in managing personnel can be attributed to the individual’s uncertainty of his role and future in the organization. Ironically, these problems are brought about in the matrix organization at higher cost and in need of greater administrative support.

Organizational Conflict

Conflict is one of the greatest problems of matrix organizations. A common source of conflict is the competition among the project or special group managers competing against one another for resources in the functional structure. Problems also occur where the two axis of the matrix overlap (e.g., conflict between project managers and department heads whose responsibilities overlap). Conflict is not necessarily damaging, Cleland describes matrix management as a system involving ‘purposeful or deliberate conflict’ in which the integration of the contrasting functional and project interests is achieved by negotiation. Conflict becomes dysfunctional when it delays decision making, blocks communication channels and subjects individuals to inordinate stress.

When processes cut across lines of authority in organizations there is a likelihood of obscuring who is responsible for what. The classical management principle of unity of command is disregarded in the matrix organization and the lack of single, clear-cut lines of authority creates role conflict which can be particularly difficult for individuals when two authority figures are in conflict and loyalties are...
divided. In the traditional hierarchy conflict is resolved by passing the problem up the 'chain of command' until it reaches a point where an individual, within the authority of his role in the organization, is able to decide on a solution to the problem. Resolution of problems in the matrix structure requires a process of negotiation and problem solving between the roles and to this extent places emphasis on team work. Success often depends on the project team's single minded concern with the problem and its dedication to the organizational goal. Where this cohesive motivation can be readily observed in a football team, for the short duration of a game, it is more difficult to sustain in an organization where goals are less easily defined and where individuals are subjected to a wide range of distractions. Difficulty in resolving conflict is a common criticism of matrix organization.

Another factor which presents problems to the matrix organization is in clarifying responsibilities. Organizations are established to enable work to be carried out to achieve certain objectives. The individual is employed into the organization to be accountable for duties attached to a particular position or role. In a classical bureaucracy individual responsibility and accountability is apparent; the hierarchy and the duties are well defined. In the lateral work group, however, there is commonly conflicting assumptions about the team's accountability. An individual may reject being held accountable for an action which he regards as a team responsibility. Conversely, if the whole team is to be held responsible for something, the members must decide how to share responsibility and which of them is accountable for what aspects. The result is that it becomes difficult for the organization to hold anybody accountable for anything.

Personal Management Problems

Individuals are often adversely affected by the insecurity and ambiguity of their situation within the matrix arrangement. The confusion left in the absence of clear authority, the complexity of interrelationships and the uncertainty of their future in the organization causes a great deal of stress for many members and greater administrative costs and problems for personnel managers. Humans differ considerably in their relative tolerance of ambiguity and not all will suffer because of the demands placed on them and the anxiety caused by the matrix relationships. Indeed some people, the more entrepreneurial characters, often seek out undefined and ambiguous situations which can be moulded to suit their personal requirements. For such people the matrix may provide opportunities for personal development and advancement. Nevertheless, management analysts rate the occurrence of personnel problems as a very significant disadvantage of matrix organization.\(^4\)

An investigation carried out in the US reported that the problem of insecurity, stress or dissatisfaction, related to uncertain reporting relationships caused serious concern in about half the organizations which did not specify role relationships in writing (an established hierarchy) as against only a quarter of those that did.\(^5\) The problems are manifested in different ways; among them are:

- **Project Phase Out.** The matrix style is frequently used to manage projects which are established to solve a particular problem or produce a new, unique product. Once the result has been achieved the project is ended or phased out. This causes feelings of insecurity and anxiety on the part of project members. Many members are less effective because of their concern for their next job. The result is decreased productivity and lower performance.

- **Turnover.** Dissatisfaction causes many employees to resign, particularly during project phase out, and besides incurring the usual turnover costs analysis shows that the organization stands to lose the most competent employees because they are most likely to find new jobs the easiest.

- **Skill Degradation.** The level of project activity is usually not constant and, where manpower requirements decline and personnel have to be given up, project managers tend to hold on to their best staff even if they are only used in 'make-work' assignments working below their capability. Also the skill levels required are not always constant throughout the life of a project and for much of the time many members are employed at work which is below their skill level.

- **Personnel Development.** A common shortfall of matrix organizations is that insufficient attention is paid to developing the skills and potential of personnel. In
contrast, the purely functional organizations foster the "upward" career of individuals capitalizing on experience and promoting people within the hierarchy in some rational systematic way; in short, a career stream. Whereas in the project oriented matrix arrangement management's concern is with short-run results and the project; the personal development of employees is of long term value and is not of immediate concern."16

Administrative Problems and Cost

The administrative problems and costs of matrix management are, in a large part, attributable to the need for a larger volume of communications and additional support measures. Information and control systems need to be developed and modified to fit the structure (PERT for example). Small organizations with limited resources may find that some of these systems are too complex and costly for adaptation. The creation of additional coordination or managerial roles also costs money. One aerospace company compared its organization and management structure before and after adopting a matrix system and found that the number of departments had increased from 65 to 106. It found that it had 11 more vice-presidents and directors, 35 more managers, and 56 more second-level supervisors. The effect of the new organization was the creation of 60 more managerial positions. 17

Conclusion

Superficially matrix organization is flexible, organic and informal as well as fast moving and efficient. Some unique applications of cross functional management have gained reputations for success, particularly where they have been instituted to deal with areas of uncertainty, new technology and rapid change and where time is all-important and money readily available. Most types of matrix organizations depend for their success on the willingness of their members to co-operate and to engage in unprogrammed informal interaction. However, the creation of a matrix will not automatically ensure success; it is not a panacea for overcoming all functional organization weaknesses. The matrix organization can be costly and harmful. In forsaking the classic principles of management and adopting plurality and ambiguity of control and authority the matrix concept is likely to result in an ill-defined and confused structure with conflict, diffused accountability, and individual stress. Unless the need for flexibility and innovation is great, and more conventional organization is definitely unable to cope, and unless sufficient resources are available, and the organization has the acumen to exploit its strengths, then executives should be cautious when contemplating the adoption of a matrix management arrangement.

NOTES AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

5. Galbraith J.R. 'Designing Complex Organizations' Addison — Wesley, 1973
7. Knight op cit p 45.
8. Knight op cit p 133.
9. Knight op cit p 82.
11. Knight op cit p 85
16. Galbraith op cit p 139.

Wing Commander May has previously contributed to the Defence Force Journal. Since joining the RAAF in 1959 he has served with several flying units as a Signaller, an Air Electronics officer and as a Navigator. He is a graduate of the U.S. Armed Forces Staff College and is presently studying for the Graduate Diploma in Administration at the Canberra College of Advanced Education. His recent postings include a tour of duty in Washington with the USAF and Air Force Material Division as project manager for the new P3C Orion aircraft. He is currently working in Project Development — Air Warfare in Force Development and Analysis Division.
Introduction

In recent times, conditions of service in the Defence Force have been sharply eroded by Government direction and policy. Taxation on long service leave payments started the decline. Many members of the Services feel hard done by over the issue of the wage pause as a rise was promised then cancelled. The next blow was the tax on superannuation lump sum payments which especially disadvantages the ‘combat’ members of the Services who are mandatorily retired before the age of 55. The increase in commutation period from 4 years to 5 is viewed by many members as payment out of their own entitlement. More recently, rents were increased at about 3 times the rate of pay increase. Added to that, the Defence Service Homes Loan system has been effectively terminated and resettlement entitlements have been eliminated.

Recent history shows that conditions of service are at least mutable, and at times ephemeral. There seems to be no firm criteria for establishment or removal of a condition of service. It would seem that when a defence emergency arises or Service morale drops and wastage rates rise, conditions of service are improved. When the economy is in decline and costs must be cut, conditions of service are reduced. Defence Force members do not have any industrial power and thus are completely at the mercy of the Government of the day. Members of the Services do not have the right to strike, and even if they did, the effect would be minimal unless the nation is unfortunate enough to be at war. Their only way of demonstrating their dissatisfaction is to ‘vote with their feet’ by leaving the Service. Given the expensive training required for most Service positions such action can cost far more than the ‘savings’ won through a reduction in conditions of service.

One could conclude that conditions of service are a tool used by the Government to manipulate Service manpower in order to meet Defence Force and other goals. The ideal situation for the Government is to have conditions of service that actually reduce Defence Force costs. This article proposes the introduction of such a condition of Service.

ELECTIVE IN-SERVICE COMMUTATION:
AN IMPROVEMENT IN CONDITIONS OF SERVICE THAT REDUCES MANPOWER COSTS

The Proposal: Elective In-Service Commutation of Retirement Benefits

Before proceeding, the term ‘commutation’ should be explained. After a qualifying number of years of service members of the Defence Force become eligible for a pension. They may elect to ‘commute’ part of that pension into a lump sum payment, with the commutation entitlement being based on current pay, life expectancy at the time of commutation and the number of years of pension being commuted. The election of commutation reduces the pension payments — the terms ‘residual pension’ is usually used to describe the remaining pension entitlement. Under the present legislation, a member eligible for a pension may elect commutation within 12 months of resigning or retiring from the Service.

The proposal is called ‘elective in-service commutation’ and in summary is:

— When members of the Defence Force are entitled to a retirement benefit, they may elect to receive their commutation lump sum while still serving in the Defence Force.
— Members may elect to exercise all or part of their commutation rights in stages while in service.
— When the member eventually leaves the Service retirement benefits would be cal-
culated as if the member had already commuted the pension.

— No changes to the present arrangements of taxation of lump sum benefits are proposed, but a more equitable method of assessing the income value of a lump-sum benefit is suggested.

Let us see how these proposals work in practice. At Table 1 is a representation of the commutation rights of a fictitious but typical serving officer. The dates have been chosen to straddle the current taxation on commutation rights, and to represent a probable promotion path. This Table shows the commutation entitlements for each year of service and for each promotion, excluding the effects of taxation. Note that the WGCDR rank extends to 55. For 'combat' officers, retirement at age 50 is mandatory.

Arguments presented here do not include allowances for inflation. The assumption is that Service salaries will be maintained at the same 'real' value as at present, as will taxation rates. With this assumption, the use of 'now year' dollars allows a direct comparison of options extending over many years.

Returning to the example, suppose the member decides to 'cash in' the commutation right at 20 years of service as a WGCDR. The payout as shown in the Table would be $42,524. Now suppose the member served on until age retirement at 55 years of age as an AIRCDRE. No further commutation payments would be made and the Government would save $165,557 — $42,524; ie $123,033. Table 2 shows the savings. Alternatively suppose the WGCDR elected to only commute one third of the entitlement at 20 years of service ie $14,174. Now on retirement the commutation entitlement would be the remaining two thirds or $110,371. The savings in this case would be $165,557 — $110,371 — $14,174, ie $41,012.

**Advantage to Serving Members of Elective In-Service Commutation**

Given that the elective in-Service commutation has the potential to save the Government money, why would any serving member elect to exercise such a right? There are several reasons: time preference for money, insurance against changes in commutation rights and insurance against loss of benefits by next of kin in the event of death of a member. Each of these cases is discussed in the following paragraphs.

**Time Preference for Money.** When is money most useful? Clearly when the expenditure demands are highest. Most members of the Services are part of a normal family group where marriage occurs at the age of low to mid 20s which generally means that children become most expensive when the parents are aged in the late 30s to late 40s. Houses are purchased and mortgages must be paid. This is the age at which most Service members achieve 20 years of service. By retirement age, most children are either independent or are finishing University studies. Mortgages have often been paid off. The demand for expenditure falls. If the demand for expenditure could be plotted, it would probably take the shape of an inverted parabola. Many members would prefer to have a moderate amount of additional income when expenditure demand is highest, rather than a large amount of additional income later in life when expenditure demands are lower. This effect is called a 'time preference for money'. If the schedule of commutation rights is examined, it can be seen that most members qualify for commutation rights when their expenditure demand is at its peak.

**Changes in Commutation Rights.** Rumours about cessation or the withdrawal of commu-
tation rights circulate only slightly less slowly than rumours of a pay rise, and both circulate faster than the speed of light. When a rumour is about, those with commutation rights feel threatened and a significant number of them resign rather than take the risk of losing the right. The loss to the Service can be immense as shown later. If a member feels threatened by such a rumour, they could preserve their right. The loss to the Service can be immense, those with commutation rights feel faster than the speed of light. When a rumour circulates only slightly less slowly to the family, electing to commute while in service.

Insurance against Loss of Benefits by Death of a Member. One of the shortcomings of the DFR&DB Act is that if a member dies in Service the surviving spouse cannot commute the pension. (Note that all long service leave and recreation credits ‘owned’ by the member are also forfeited to the public purse). If a member does not wish to take this risk of loss of benefits to the family, electing to commute while in service would preserve the benefit.

Benefits to the Government

While the preceding comments indicate that there are clear benefits for some serving members, in the present financial environment elective in-service commutation is unlikely to be introduced unless the benefit to cost ratio is favourable to the Government. This section discusses benefits and the next section costs, in order to make a benefit to cost evaluation.

The most obvious benefit is that through elective in-service commutation, the Government ‘buys off’ some or all of a member’s subsequent commutation rights. Both Table 1 and Table 2 show this quite clearly. To estimate the savings, use Table 1 and start at any rank and years of service, then determine the savings by subtracting that value from the value of commutation at the retiring or resigning rank and years of service point. Table 2 completes this process for the single case of a WGCDDR electing commutation rights at 20 years of service. Savings are made in almost every case. The single exception to this rule is the case when a member elects to commute as a WGCDDR immediately before promotion and then resigns within a year after promotion to GPCAPT. As can be seen from Table 2 the savings can be quite substantial.

The secondary benefits are more obscure, but may be much larger than the primary savings described above. Wastage reduction is the key. Take a fairly extreme but illustrative case. Suppose the member has undertaken some expensive training such as a pilot’s course. The cost of the course, (say) $1M, could be amortised over (say) 25 years of service giving an annual cost of $40,000. If the elective in-service commutation defers a resignation by (say) 5 years from 20 to 25 years of service, the ‘savings’ would be 5 x $40,000 or $200,000. If other expensive courses are undertaken during the member’s service, these also have to be amortised over the time between the time of the course and the eventual retirement or resignation. The value of such amortisation calculations should be added to savings made by avoiding expensive training. Extension of years of service through this elective commutation right can substantially reduce manpower and other costs in a Service. While not all training costs as high as this example, there will always be some savings to be made through resignation deferment.

Another benefit to the Government is closely linked to the wastage reduction argument. At present, a member who has elected to commute a pension after resignation is barred from re-entering the Service on the grounds that the receipt of commutation places the returning member at a considerable financial advantage in comparison with more loyal peers who have unbroken service. The reason for the advantage are too complex to discuss here as it results from a quirk in the DFR&DB legislation, but the advantage is substantial. If members are allowed to elect to take their commutation rights regardless of whether they are in or out of the

### Table 2: Commutation Payment Savings Based on a 20 Yos WGCDDR

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Service the bar to employment could be lifted. This would allow the Services to recruit personnel who have recently left, but who still have valuable and relevant skills to offer. A re-employment program allows recruitment without the normally high training cost associated with new members of the Service. Thus, elective in-service commutation offers tertiary benefits in addition to cost and wastage reduction.

In summary, elective in-service commutation offers several benefits to the Government. The direct costs of the DFR&DB scheme would be reduced through a reduction in commutation payouts. The indirect costs of manpower would be reduced by a reduction in wastage and reduced costs associated with the re-employment of members who have resigned.

Cost to the Government

Just as there are benefits, there are costs. This section considers cashflow, surviving spouse’s benefits, ‘double dipping’ and administration. Comments on implementation of the proposal are also made in this section.

Cashflow. At present, about 20% of the RAAF Officer Corps and 10% of the Airman Corps have more than 20 years of service. In the RAAF alone, this amounts to 2,500 people who would become eligible for commutation if the proposal were to be accepted. The number who would actually make the election is unknown, but the potential exists for a very high cashflow in the short term. A simple implementation rule would smooth the initially high cashflow: in the first year allow in-service commutation only for those with more than 30 years of service, then lower the eligibility years of service by two years for each subsequent year; ie 28 years of service in the second year, 26 in the next and so on until the 20 years of service point is reached. Once the system stabilises, the potential would still exist for unbudgetted expenditure. If the Government threatened the commutation rights, a large number of people would be likely to elect to commute while they still have the chance. However, this would be an equitable system as the Government would be discouraged from making adverse changes by the constraint of a possible high short term cashflow.

Surviving Spouse’s Benefits. At present, the Government makes a DFR&DB profit from a member’s death while in service if they are eligible for a pension at the time of death. The surviving spouse does not have access to commutation rights and in any case, the death benefit pension is reduced in comparison with that payable to a living member after resignation or retirement from the Defence Force. Many serving members think that this is a disgraceful state of affairs and consider that benefits of the member should be preserved as a family asset. If in-service commutation were allowed, then in the case of a member who elects to commute and subsequently dies, the Government would make a loss in comparison with the current arrangements. Such a chain of circumstances is rare and the financial losses would be far smaller than the financial gains mentioned earlier. Given that most employers would not deliberately seek to profit from the death of its employees, the Government could easily decide to forgo the small costs associated with death of those members who have commuted while in service.

‘Double Dipping’. ‘Double dipping’ occurs where a person receives a cash payment in lieu of a pension, then claims a social security pension in addition to the cash payment. Since this practice is not available to all members of the community, it must be seen as an unfair and antisocial practice. The Government cited ‘double dipping’ as the raison d’etre for the taxation on lump sum superannuation payments. However, the criteria for exemption from the taxation excludes many servicemen, especially ‘combat’ personnel who must retire before age 55 and is seen as unfairly discriminatory to members of the Defence Forces. This article does not propose to solve this difficult problem but a suggestion will be made. In an inflationary era, it is in the Government’s long term interest to pay superannuation by means of a lump sum rather than through indexed pensions. Indeed, the NSW State Government has recently elected to do just this. The problem of ‘double dipping’ could be overcome by administrative means.

To take a rather complex case as an example, suppose a member elected a commutation schedule as follows: 1/5 as a WGCDR with 20
years of service, 1/2 as a GPCAP with 30 years of service and the residue of 3/10 on retiring as an AIRCDRE at 37 years of service. Incremental payments would be $8,505, $46,746 and $49,667. Total payments would be $104,918 (and the savings $60,639). Now, if the Government Bond rate were 11% PA, the ‘notional’ income would be $11,541. This would be added to the commuted pension to determine whether the member has any further social security rights. Clearly, in most cases, no additional payments would be required and ‘double dipping’ would be eliminated. Some exemptions could be given from the recording of capital payments; an example could be payments against the mortgage on the family home.

**Administration.** At present, the DFR&DB Board keeps records on all members of the Service who make contributions. A small extension to this database would cover the administrative requirements. Two data items would be required: the fraction of a person’s total commutation right electively taken and the amount paid. To take the case above as an example, the minimum data required would be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commutation Fraction</th>
<th>Payment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>$8,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>$46,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>$49,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals:</strong></td>
<td><strong>$104,918</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This additional data is trivial in comparison with the data already held on each member. Assuming the implementation defines the minimum amount a member may commute, (say) a fractional of 0.1 of entitlements, the consequent number of transactions would not place any significant administrative load on the DFR&DB Board.

To summarise the expected costs, cashflow could be high at the introduction of the scheme, but could be managed by a schedule of eligibility or in-service commutation. Additional costs would be occasioned when a member has elected to commute and subsequently dies in-service; however, the number of cases would be small and the Government may elect not to seek to profit from such cases. ‘Double dipping’ could be minimised by recording the assets received and crediting these towards income on retirement. Administrative costs would be minimal since the data requirements are insignificant in comparison with other DFR&DB data already held.

The conclusion is that the cost to the Government of an elective in-service commutation scheme would be minimal.

**Benefit vs Cost Conclusions**

The foregoing shows that the introduction of elective in-service commutation would improve conditions of service while at the same time providing the Government with a net saving on direct and indirect Defence Force and DFR&DB costs.

At a time when a substantial reduction in conditions of service has taken place, the introduction of elective in-service commutation would provide some degree of redress. Since the proposal is for an ‘elective’ option, no member could be disadvantaged in comparison with the current DFR&DB scheme; however, the proposal extends a member’s options and thus constitutes an improvement in conditions of service. Those members with a ‘time preference’ for money who elect in-service commutation would receive an advantage, and in electing to commute all or part of their entitlement, would save the Government expenditure in the long term. Additional substantial savings would accrue from wastage reductions flowing from the proposal.

The recommendation is that the Government introduce elective in-service commutation forthwith.

_Wing Commander Christopher Laurie Mills joined the RAAF in 1964 and graduated from the RAAF Academy in 1968 with a BSc. Following pilot training, he completed tours on transport and fighter aircraft. After a tour in Butterworth, Malaysia as a member of the Air Base air staff, he returned to an operational research position in Defence Central. His first experience in manpower came in 1979 in the Directorate of Personnel Officers—Air Force where he introduced a system of strength management and completed the systems analysis for the Air Force Personnel and Establishment Management System (AFPEMS) computer. In 1981 he completed an MSc in Systems Management at the USAF Institute of Technology at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. He is currently employed in the Directorate of Organization and Establishments—Air Force on the design and implementation of the RAAF Integrated Manpower Systems (RAAFIMS)._
By Noel Selway, NSW Military Historical Society

This Regiment was raised from a purely overseas element resident in the British Isles. Its formation was initiated by a Mr George Hamilton, who was a member of the Committee of the Colonial Club in London. He had the imagination to foresee a future for a military unit developed on a basis somewhat similar to the Club.¹

At the time, the then Secretary of State for War, the Hon. St. John Broderick was engaged in a scheme which would have expanded the British Army to six Army Corps with the provision for 25 specially selected battalions of Volunteers to be attached to the Corps.² It was in this scheme that Mr Hamilton’s suggestion was to develop.

The British public had been attracted by the great services of the Australian, New Zealand and Canadian contingents which served in Lord Robert’s Army in the South African War, and stimulated military feeling in the Empire generally. In February 1900, the War Office pointed out the course to be adopted in offering the service of a New Volunteer unit.³

During the summer of 1900 an appeal was made in the London newspapers to test the quality of the response that was likely to meet a call for recruits. There were no less than seventy and nearly every British overseas territory was represented. This response was enough for the Colonial Club to send a deputation off to the War Office.⁴

Present to receive this deputation were the Secretary of State for War, the Commander in Chief, Lord Roberts; the Director of Auxiliary Forces, Major-General Sir Alfred Turner; and the Permanent Under Secretary, Colonel Sir Edward Ward. The deputation consisted of two members of the Committee of the Colonial Club, Mr Hamilton and Lt. Col N. Willoughby-Wallace accompanied by Sir John Cockburn.⁵

The results of the meeting saw the proposition accepted and the following announcement was made:

“On the recommendation of the Secretary of State for War and of the Commander-in-
Chief, His Majesty the King has graciously consented to and approved of the formation of a mounted corps with machine gun battery, ambulance and signallers attached, to be composed of Colonials resident in and near London. His Majesty has also greatly honoured the Corps by conferring on it the title of 'The King’s Colonials'.

The Duke of Fife as Lord Lieutenant of the County of London was wholeheartedly interested in the proposed overseas’ unit to be raised in his county, and approached the King and the Prince of Wales with a view to the latter graciously associating himself with the new unit by consenting to be its Colonel-in-Chief. This suggestion met with the Royal approval and the Gazette of December 6th, 1901, contained the appointment of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales and Duke of Cornwall and York, K.G., to the Honorary Coloneley of the Regiment. King George was the first officer gazetted to the Regiment and from the day of this first appointment His Majesty showed a sustained interest in this the one Colonial unit ever administered from Whitehall.

The first Headquarters of the Regiment were at 30, Charing Cross, and a Drill Hall and Recreation Rooms were secured at 304 King's Road Chelsea.

Late in 1901 Lieutenant-Colonel Nesbit WIllooughby-Wallace, late of the King's Royal Rifles, was appointed to command, and early in 1902 Captain and Adjutant R.R. Thompson, late of the Australian Horse, Sir Robert Baillie, Bart. (Australia) and Mr John Howard (Canada) were gazetted Captains, while Mr George Hamilton (South Africa and Chile) and Mr A.G. Berry (Australia) as Lieutenants. At the outset the Regiment recruited briskly and its first muster at its Drill Hall occurred on 11th February, 1902. Of those on parade only two remained to serve with the Regiment during the Great War.

The first few years of the Regiment’s life were very difficult, particularly as the part the Colonies had played in the war in South Africa faded from memory. During this period two successive Secretaries of State for War endeavoured to make the Volunteer Force smaller; an endeavour which, despite their considerable efforts, failed. A change of Government occurred, and in December 1905 R.B. Haldane became Secretary of State for War. Whereas his predecessors had wanted more efficiency and fewer numbers in the Volunteer Force so that it was able on embodiment to meet any invasion, Haldane wanted more numbers and if necessary less training for a Force (later to be called the Territorial Force) which would be available for training as a Reserve after the outbreak of war. A result of this change of attitude, resulted in the Volunteers, who had for years told that they must become more efficient if necessary at the expense of numbers, were now given the impression that increased numbers with less training might be required. They felt 'more secure', but a little bemused.

Had not the King sustained his patronage, the Regiment would never have survived at all. Had he not believed that the Regiment served a purpose in the scheme of Empire solidarity, there is no doubt that War Office opposition would have eradicated it.

By 1908, the Regiment could muster 23 Officers and 313 Other Ranks and had shifted HQ to Grove House, Holywood Road, Fulham and had a Squadron at Liverpool which was administered by the County of London Association. During this year the number in camp for training numbered 393, a number which compared well with other County of London Yeomanry Regiments at the time.

On the death of the King, the Regiment became King Edward's Horse (The King's Overseas Dominions Regiment), in 1910.

The following is a brief summary of general information about the Regiment.

**Uniform:** The uniform was distinctive. It consisted of a khaki serge tunic with double collar, two narrow scarlet stripes round the collar, and four vertical scarlet stripes with gilt button on the cuff, khaki cord breeches with double scarlet stripes down the seam, brown boots and leather equipment to match. The khaki colour serge selected was not the dust-coloured brown used by British troops in India or South Africa, but a greenish-brown mixture subsequently selected as the Army Field Service dress and which was universally worn by British troops during the Great War. The collars had silver badges in the loops at the front ends; five loops of graduated length on the pointed badges, with buttons at the upper ends. The stripes on the breeches were about an inch wide, and the shoulder-strapshad scarlet piping.
The slouch hat was replaced in 1907 by a round forage cap, which at first was very high in the crown, resembling that of the Austrian Kaiser-Jager, which had a plume of black cock feathers.

**Badges:** Each Squadron was provided with a Squadron badge, that differed from the Regimental Badge, and was indicative of the Squadron’s nomenclature. The division was as follows: 1st, or British Asian Squadron which had an Elephant; 2nd, or Canadian Squadron, a beaver and a maple leaf; 3rd, or Australasian Squadron, a Kangaroo and a Tree-fern*; 4th, or South African Squadron, an Ostrich before the rising sun. In 1903, the 5th Squadron, New Zealand was formed, but was disbanded the following year. This Squadron had a Tree-fern leaf as its badge. At the time of the forming of this Squadron, the 4th Squadron badge was changed to a plain stamped-out Kangaroo.

The Squadron badges were highly prized by the men as emblematic of their particular origin, and they remained uniform until 1911.

The Regimental Badge showed the title letters “K.C.”, entwined under the Prince of Wales feathers with the Regimental motto underneath. A new Regimental Badge was introduced when the title of the Regiment was changed.

**Regimental March:** Elgar’s “Land of Hope and Glory”.

**Regimental Motto:** “Regi adsumus coloni”.

**Affiliated Regiments:** to a number of Canadian Regiments and, Australia: The Australian Horse
South Africa: The Cape Light Horse

In 1908, King Edward’s Horse was brigaded with the Middlesex Yeomanry and The Roughriders in the London Mounted Brigade, which also included The City of London Artillery (H.A.C.), The London Mounted Brigade Transport and Supply Column, A.S.C., and a London Field Ambulance. The Regiment left the brigade in 1913 to become a Cavalry Special Reserve Regiment.

**War Service**

**1st King Edward’s Horse.**

4th August 1914 found the Regiment at Chelsea attached to the 4th Cavalry Brigade. On mobilisation, the Regiment went to Watford and then in March, 1915 to Bishops Stortford. In April of that year, it was split up and the Squadrons were then employed as Divisional Cavalry:

RHQ and “C” Squadron landed at Le Havre on 22nd April, 1915 and went to the 47th Division, while “B” Squadron went to the 48th Division. “A” Squadron went to 12th Division at Aldershot and it landed at Le Havre on the 2nd June, 1915.

The Regiment was concentrationed as the IV Corps Cavalry Regiment at Valhuon on the 1st June, 1916. In July, 1917 it went to XVIII Corps but returned to IV Corps in November. On 15th December, 1917 the Regiment was sent to Italy where it joined XI Corps. It returned to France with the Corps in March, 1918.

The XI Corps was a part of First Army, commanded by General Haking. Both he and the First Army commander, General Horne, being well aware of a not too far distant German offensive, were anxious that the Portuguese Corps which formed part of its strength should be relieved, as they were seen to be “bait” to the Germans. It was expected that the 50th Division, which had just arrived in their rear area would relieve them and this was fixed to occur on the night of April 9th.

Both General Horne and General Haking had seen the condition of the Portuguese troops go from bad to worse. They were well over 6000 men short of their proper numbers because their Government had kept them short of reinforcements, and in addition to that one of the battalion’s had recently mutinied. During the early months of 1918 British engineers had vastly improved the drainage in their area which rendered what was previously watery low lying meadows into ground capable to attack over.

The Portuguese were conscious of no particular grievance against the Germans, and after weathering a four and a half hours bombardment were attacked by four German divisions. The result of this was a complete failure to resist, and in rapid time the Germans had advanced about three miles when it was suddenly checked.

In December, 1917, when the German offensive was foreshadowed, General Horne had shortened the Portuguese line and devised a defence scheme which encompassed the line of the Rivers Lawe and Lys some miles behind them, and consisted of a series of fortified villages immediately east of the River Lawe.
According to a plan which had been practised, the 1st King Edward’s Horse and the XI Corps Cyclist Battalion, were rushed to these villages to hold them until the two divisions Haig was relying on to hold the line of the Lawe-Lys, could get into position.

All accounts of the defence put up by these two Corps units show that they were magnificent, and at nightfall on the 9th April, on the first day of the offensive, they were still fighting desperately. Both of the divisions which were intended to hold the line, the 50th and 51st, had managed to deploy. However, there was much hard fighting ahead. By April 12th, the British divisions holding the Germans on or near the Lys, could do so no longer although not without stubborn resistance. The line in front of Merville was penetrated, while further to the south the front was broken. This part of the front, which was held by the 51st (Highland) Division and the King Edward’s Horse, was to have been taken over by a reinforcing division, but while the relief was being undertaken, the Germans, assisted by fog, attacked and drove the defenders back through the guns, which included those of the 12th (Army) Brigade of Australian Field Artillery. By now, the situation was starting to stabilise with the bringing up of four more British divisions and the 1st Australian and the rest of this battle, the Battle of the Lys, is history.

In May, the Regiment was again divided among Corps of the First Army. “A” Squadron remained with XI Corps, while “B” Squadron went to 1 Corps and “C” Squadron to XIII Corps and in the following October to III Corps.

2nd King Edward’s Horse.

Formed in London on 10th August, 1914 and replaced the Essex Yeomanry in the Eastern Mounted Brigade, 1st Mounted Brigade in Essex. On the 1st May, 1915 it went to the Canadian Cavalry Brigade at Maresfield and, dismounted, moved to France as Seely’s Detachment and attached to the 1st Canadian Division until September, when it again become the Canadian Cavalry Brigade.

The Regiment was reorganised and re-mounted on 27th January, 1916 and formed into a two squadron cavalry regiment with GHQ Troops. RHQ and “A” Squadron stayed with GHQ Troops, while “B” Squadron went to 56th Division as Divisional Cavalry from 23rd March to 30th May, 1916.

In June 1916, the Regiment was joined by a service squadron of the 21st (Empress of India’s) Lancers and formed the XIV Corps Cavalry Regiment. In this Corps the Regiment supported three divisions, 6th, Guards and the 20th, in the Reserve Army at Pozieres. Lord Cavan had the unhappy experience during the September fighting there, of the failure of the tanks and reported that his Corps “has been singularly unfortunate in their use”.

This amalgamated unit was broken up during August, 1917 after the Corps followed up the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line. During this follow-up, the Corps cavalry patrols were very weak.

2nd King Edward’s Horse was absorbed by the Tank Corps after it left France early in August. The Squadron of the 21st Lancers went to No 5 Base Depot and was broken up.

Reserve Squadrons.

1st King Edward’s Horse.

Formed in August, 1914 at Chelsea and went to Bishops Stortford in May, 1915. In July, 1915 the Squadron crossed to Ireland and was attached to the 8th Reserve Cavalry Regiment at the Curragh. In April it went to Longford and then to Dublin in February 1917. While it was stationed in Dublin the Squadron was expanded to a Reserve Regiment.

2nd King Edward’s Horse.

The Squadron of this unit also crossed to Ireland in July, 1915 and it also later expanded into a Regiment and was stationed at Kilkenny in 1917 and 1918.

There seems to be little information about the Regiment thereafter, and on 31st March, 1924, the 4th County of London (The King’s Colonials) Yeomanry, or King Edward’s Horse, disbanded.

BATTLE HONOURS

FRANCE and FLANDERS, 1915-17, 1918
ITALY, 1917-18

*The contributor has in his possession a copy of this badge.
NOTES

1. Lt. Colonel L. James — *The History of King Edward's Horse*, London, 1921, p 1
4. James, *ibid.*, p 2
5. James, *op.cit.*, p 3
6. James, *op.cit.*, p 3
7. James, *op.cit.*, p 3
8. James, *op.cit.*, pp 3-4
9. James, *op.cit.*, p 4 and p 7
12. *The Territorial Yearbook*, 1908, p 256
15. Lt. Colonel L. James — *The History of King Edward's Horse*, London, 1921, pp 5-6
18. Money Barnes, *ibid.*, p 274
19. *Historical Records of British Cavalry and Yeomanry Regiments in the Great War*, Brigadier James — p 15
22. James, *ibid.*, p 15
24. Brigadier James — *Historical Records of British Cavalry and Yeomanry in the Great War, 1914-18*, p 15
25. James, *ibid.*, p 15
26. James, *op.cit.*, p 15

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Noel Selway is Historian for Springwood RSL Sub-Branch and a member of NSW Military Historical Society.

He has served with OCTU 2 Military District and 1st/19th RNSWR. He is presently researching for a series of books on the Battle Honours of the Australian Armed Forces for which he failed to get an Australian War Memorial Assistance Grant for 1985.

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COPIES WANTED

The Editor urgently requires back copies of *Army Journal* and *Defence Force Journal*. 
ARMS CONTROL:
TRYING TO
UNDERSTAND THE
SOVIET POSITION

By Alan Stephens, Australian National University

ARMS control remains one of the most urgent questions on the international agenda. Despite thirty or so years of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, little progress seems to have been made. Some agreements have been reached, the most significant being the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the SALT I Agreements of 1972 and the SALT II Treaty of 1979. However, while those agreements impose specific limitations on the testing and deployment of weapons, they have not halted the arms competition: for example, during the 1970s the SALT Agreements did little more than ratify the numbers of delivery systems and warheads both sides either already possessed or intended constructing; while in the 1980s there has been a disturbing shift towards qualitative improvements. Many observers accordingly view the whole process with deep pessimism.

The concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) on which strategic stability rests is intensely psychological. Once an acceptable level of nuclear parity was established, one of the major determinants in maintaining stability became the superpowers’ respective perceptions of each other’s actions. Arms control is ineluctably linked to those perceptions, which, regrettably, seem to have functioned at a lowest common denominator of fear and mistrust. It follows that, if that denominator is to be raised, perceptions should if possible be accurate; at the least, attitudes must be understood.

This article attempts to explain Soviet attitudes towards arms control by reviewing the USSR’s involvement in the process. Because the article is primarily concerned with Soviet perceptions, such issues as, for example, whether Moscow is ‘cheating’ on agreements are not examined. The concern here is to try to understand why the Soviets act as they do and the strategic position they seek. Recent statements from the White House that the US is likely to abandon the limitations imposed by SALT II before the end of 1986 support the contention that such an understanding is essential if genuine arms control is to be achieved.

* * *

Before looking at the arms control process, a review of the events and forces which have shaped the Soviet view of the West is necessary, for any position taken by the USSR at the international level must start from that perception.

In separate statements on arms control and strategic stability, US Government advisers Colin Gray and Paul Nitze have both acknowledged the need to ‘... understand the roots
of international conflict and the political and strategic cultures of the superpowers. The two main influences on the Soviet Union's political culture have been Marxism-Leninism and the apparent implacable hostility of the West. It often seems that, while acknowledging the need for cultural understanding, Gray, Nitze and other 'hardliners' in the West do not fully appreciate the impact that the perceived Western animosity has had on Soviet attitudes and, consequently, strategies. Any failure by contemporary Western decision makers to understand the position and objectives of the USSR would not, of course, be a new phenomenon; for example, at the end of World War II, the Mos­cow-based George Kennan despaired of Wash­ington's policies regarding European spheres of influence.

Soviet analysts have little difficulty in finding tangible evidence of Marx's thesis that capitalism is innately hostile to socialism. Starting with the war of intervention in 1919, they are able to point to such aggressive acts as: severe eco­nomic discrimination; capitalist encirclement (a condition which the USSR saw in the Locarno treaties of 1925, the formation of NATO, CENTO and SEATO after World War II, and, recently, the perceived US-China-Japan axis); the invasion by Germany in 1941; the powerful anti-communist sentiments of the West's leaders (Churchill and Truman) during and after World War II; the bombing of Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and, more recently, the char­acterisation by the US Administration of the USSR as an 'evil empire'. In addition, any analysis of Soviet attitudes to national defence must recognise the appalling losses the USSR sustained in World War II, especially as the country responsible is now a member of the anti-Soviet alliance, NATO. It is also worth noting that the USSR has since its earliest years been painfully aware of the West's technolog­ical superiority; that awareness has been de­scribed by some commentators as amounting to 'awe', and exacerbates Soviet fears about their prestige and safety.

As a final observation on the political con­ditioning of the USSR, it should not come as a surprise if a fair degree of defensiveness were apparent in the Kremlin's approach to arms control. Examples of this are in fact readily available. The first Soviet statement on arms control was contained in Lenin's 'Decree on Peace' of November 1917, which included a call for total disarmament. That Decree reflected the Bolshevik's relative military weak­ness vis à vis the interventionist powers, and represented an attempt to buy time and min­imise the risks of aggression. From that time on, it is possible to identify the elements of an action-reaction phenomenon in Soviet-Amer­i­can weapons competition, with the USSR gen­erally being less innovative and therefore more reactive than the US.

Evidence of the reactive element in the So­viets' decision making can be seen in the way in which they have responded to key American policies or actions, such as: the use of atomic bombs in 1945; the development of thermo­nuclear weapons; the structuring of strategic forces in the 1960s; and decisions regarding ABM systems and strategic missiles before the SALT Agreements were concluded. In each of those crucial steps the Americans led and the Soviets followed. Presently the US again seems to be the instigator, at least at the psychological level, of a renewed arms race through the cat­alyst of the Strategic Defence Initiative. There also is little doubt that the USSR will seek to redress the emerging, highly destabilising threat it sees presented by the new generation of cruise missiles.

A former Secretary of the Australian De­partment of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador

for some years. Within that historical experi­ence, the fear, suspicion and paranoia that are often said to typify Soviet attitudes would not appear entirely unjustified.

Perhaps it should be stressed at this stage that the intention here is not to act as an apol­ogist for the Soviets; on the contrary, they have much to answer for. The point is that the Soviet leaders consider that the West in general and the US in particular have been, and remain, implacably hostile to their existence. That may or may not be the case: what is important, though, is that the Soviet leaders believe it to be so.
to the US, Mr Alan Renouf, recently supported
the assertion that the Soviet Union essentially
is a reactive actor in the arms race. Arguing
that it was up to the US to try to break the
impasse, he suggested that if the Americans
were to make a gradual, unilateral reduction, ‘
... the USSR would sooner or later follow
suit; it is the US, not the USSR, which has
consistently been the initiator in the nuclear
arms race."

The extent to which the USSR is likely to
respond constructively to genuine arms control
initiatives must remain somewhat problemati-
cal, for as long as Western researchers are de-
nied access to Soviet source material, the fun-
damental intentions of the Kremlin’s policies
can never be determined with complete confi-
dence. It would of course be simplistic to speak
of Soviet policy only in terms of reaction: the
USSR’s leaders obviously have their own short-
and long-term objectives; and they have a clear
appreciation of the military power needed to
project their national aims. As the Soviet Union
is a one-dimensional superpower whose au-
thority rests almost solely on its capacity to
project force, that military power is especially
important. At the same time, there is nothing
in the State ideology which advocates massive
armament, mass destruction or mass suicide in
the pursuit of national objectives. On the con-
trary, the Soviets can be expected to act in their
own interests, and those interests are not served
by a dangerous arms race.

It must be acknowledged that there is no
shortage of rejected arms control proposals
which hardliners on both sides can cite as proof
of the other’s disinterest in worthwhile, nego-
tiated force reductions. Many of those propos-
als have, however, simply not been genuine,
representing little more than another tedious
shot in a propaganda war from which neither
side emerges with credit.

Notwithstanding those crude salvos, indica-
tions that self-interest can include arms control
do exist. Some commentators point to the mu-
tual reduction of conventional forces in the mid-
1950s as an early instance of Soviet willingness
to react to genuine, constructive initiatives. A
confluence of favourable factors promoted that
initiative: the retirement in the US of the bel-
ligerent Truman; the election of a President
who, as a former distinguished military officer,
understood fully the processes of military equip-
ment acquisition, and so was not easily led; the

emergence of the USSR from almost three de-
ades of Stalin’s domination; and the end of the
Korean War. The Soviets also had successfully
tested atomic and thermonuclear weapons and
were gradually acquiring effective delivery sys-
tems.\(^1\) The end result was that the Kremlin felt
less threatened than probably at any other time
in the USSR’s history. Accordingly, when Eis-
enhower effected significant reductions in the
American armed forces after the Korean War,
the USSR quickly followed suit. From 1954 to
1958 cuts in manpower levels totalling 2,140,000
were announced, the production of fighter air-
craft dropped from 5,000 per year to less than
500, and significantly declining rates of pro-
duction were evident in many other conven-
tional weapons.\(^2\) In all, army manpower was
reduced by about one half as resources were
diverted to ‘quality of life’ enterprises which
previously had been neglected because of the
economic demands of defence. Even more
noteworthy in the context of long-term arms
control was the implementation in 1958 of a
moratorium on nuclear tests.

Of central significance to understanding So-
viet attitudes is the fact that those force reduc-
tions — that is, disarmament measures — were
directly related to their perception of global
stability, and that ‘... the extent to which
cuts in defence [were considered] feasible de-
pended on what Western intentions were
thought to be’.\(^3\)

Notwithstanding the significance and promise
of what might be called the Khrushchev-Eisen-
hower ‘accord’, the Democrat Kennedy Adminis-
tration was elected in 1960 partly because of
allegations that under the Republican Eisen-
hower, the US had been allowed to slide into
a state of conventional and nuclear inferiority
and that a dangerous ‘missile gap’ had been
allowed to develop. This ‘gap’ did not in fact
exist, as the new Administration admitted soon
after assuming office.\(^4\) Nevertheless, the Ken-
nedy Government embarked on an extensive
arms buildup, increasing nuclear weapons
stockpiles in Western Europe by 60 per cent.
It was inevitable that the Kremlin would even-
tually respond to this perceived threat to Soviet
security, and such actions as breaching the mor-
atorium on nuclear testing in 1961 and trying
to site missiles in Cuba in 1962 could be viewed
within that context.

An interesting parallel can be drawn here
between Kennedy’s non-existent ‘missile gap’
and the supposed opening of a ‘window of opportunity’ which, according to some US analysts, presented itself to the Soviet ICBM force as a consequence of American strategic complacency in the 1970s. This ‘window’ also was shown by objective commentators to be a myth, but it still was used, first, in President Reagan’s initial election campaign, and, second, as justification for his Administration’s subsequent arms buildup. Indeed, as J.H. Kahan has noted, over the past 20 years the US has consistently over-reacted to possible Soviet threats that either never existed or failed to materialise.

In a recent interview Mr Gorbachev articulated the USSR’s basic strategic perception in terms of mutual assured destruction: ‘I think it is the immutable fact that whether we like one another or not, we can survive or perish only together’. Even though many analysts point out that the doctrine of MAD is something of a myth because both superpowers have always emphasised counterforce rather than countervalue targeting strategies, the distinction seems semantic given the mutual vulnerability which has prevailed for many years, and the high probability that, regardless of basic strategies, any nuclear exchange would rapidly escalate into one of massive mutual destruction. This appears to be the context within which, having concluded that the atomic bomb does not obey the class principle and there is unlikely to be a winner in nuclear war, the Soviets have defined MAD.

The central arms control issue in MAD is that of strategic parity. Parity is a matter of fundamental significance to the Soviets. In the first instance it alone ensures that they are accorded superpower status by the Americans; while, secondly, a minimum level of nuclear equivalence obviously provides the basis of their national defence. For those reasons, it is certain that the USSR will take whatever steps are necessary to preserve parity. With the Reagan Administration now embarked upon an enormous rearmament programme, the Soviets will, in Raymond Garthoff’s opinion, feel they have no choice other than ‘. . . to catch up and then keep up’ by matching the buildup of Minuteman III, Poseidon, B1 Bomber and Trident strategic forces.

Soviet perceptions of parity also are reactive to strategic doctrine. Thus, a further threat is seen to have emerged in recent years through the attention paid by some US analysts to concepts of controlling and winning nuclear war, for those concepts are viewed in the Soviet Union as evidence of an American effort to ‘break out of the relationship of parity’. For a nuclear war to be controlled, qualitative improvements would be necessary across the range of existing weapons systems (especially C3I — Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), so the concept promotes rather than discourages arms production. In any case, the proposition is psychologically dubious. Accordingly, it has rightly been dismissed as ‘incredible’. It is relevant to note that there is ‘nothing in Soviet military thinking or weapons deployment to suggest that a nuclear war can be controlled, and much to suggest that it could not’.

As far as nuclear ‘war winning’ is concerned, the American proponents of the doctrine argue that the unrestrained development and production of weapons systems would make it clear to the Soviets that they could not win a nuclear war, and that this realisation would ultimately curtail the arms race and produce enduring stability. If one of the superpowers were to enjoy significant strategic superiority, then a war winning doctrine might possess some logic. However, as it seems improbable that either side would allow such a situation to arise, attempts to promote the concept — especially by official Government representatives — are only likely to provoke tension and fuel the arms race.

** *** * **

The main forum for promoting arms control during the past 15 years has been the series of bilateral negotiations incorporating SALT I and SALT II, and currently the START and INF discussions. Many observers consider the process to have been a dismal failure. Whatever opinion may be held of existing arms control agreements, the process has been instructive in terms of attitudes and perceptions.

Proposals for limiting strategic arms were raised by the US in late 1966, when in private discussions they suggested that the development of ABM systems should be constrained. Soviet reactions initially were cautious, partly because of their traditional security fears, but also because at that time the US held a substantial
advantage in each of the triad systems. However, as the Soviets began to achieve a degree of parity, and the US continued to express interest in some kind of limitation, the Kremlin gradually overcame its suspicions, and accepted that the Americans were serious and mutually beneficial controls might be possible. Under those encouraging circumstances the Soviets in 1970 unilaterally stopped the buildup of ICBM launchers, having overtaken the US in numbers of those systems. Furthermore, once the SAL talks began, the USSR ceased construction of new ICBM silos for a year and abandoned the partially-completed construction of three groups of SS-9 missiles with 18 launchers. Those actions have been interpreted by some analysts as constituting a signal to the West which was either not received or understood, or was ignored, for no reciprocal gesture was made; accordingly, the USSR recommenced building ICBM systems. However, once SALT negotiations began to produce firm undertakings, the Soviets again unilaterally restrained ICBM launcher construction until agreement on specific numbers was reached.

Unilateral action by the USSR during the period of SALT I restricted its ICBM buildup to 80 additional launchers, in contrast to the 300-350 built in each of the preceding three years. In that particular instance, the Soviet actions were those of a power seeking parity, not superiority, while a willingness to respond positively once basic suspicions were allayed seems to have been evident.

The central issue in the SALT negotiations has been each side’s interpretation of nuclear equivalence. Complicating that question has been the linkage between the central balance and the European Theatre, that is, the medium or intermediate range nuclear weapons of the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. It is interesting to note that just before the SAL talks started the USSR had sought to establish a theatre ‘encirclement’ of ‘nuclear free zones’ for itself, similar to that which, for mainly geographic reasons, the US enjoys. That objective was not, of course, realised. Also of significance is the fact that in the early 1970s about 300 of the Soviets’ ICBMs were deployed primarily for ‘peripheral continental’ rather than intercontinental targets in order to counter NATO’s nuclear forces, but the USSR nevertheless agreed to have those launchers included in the SALT negotiations, appreciating that the US could not ignore any strategic capability. Now, however, the USSR is not so accommodating regarding the European Theatre.

Moscow’s change of attitude is essentially attributable to NATO’s December 1979 decision to deploy 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and 108 Pershing II missiles in Europe, apparently in retaliation against the Soviet deployment of intermediate range SS-20 missiles. In the Kremlin’s opinion these new systems are, in effect, not so much an addition to NATO’s theatre forces, but rather an augmentation of America’s strategic forces, and thus upset the central balance ratified by the SALT Agreements. From the USSR’s perspective it is simply semantics to argue whether or not the Pershing IIs and GLCMs are ‘ strategic’ or ‘tactical’: the reality is that they are extremely accurate and could strike strategic targets in the Soviet Union within four to six minutes of being launched. By contrast, the SS-20 may have multiple warheads, but it could not strike the US homeland if launched from the Western USSR, and takes one hour to prepare for launching. The Soviets therefore believe that the US is acquiring a first-strike capability.

Not surprisingly, negotiations over Theatre-INF forces have been acrimonious and unproductive. The official US position, articulated by the senior Administration official Paul Nitze, has been to start from a position of ‘unmistakable strength’. Yet as has been noted in this essay, historically the USSR has sought arms control most seriously when an acceptable state of parity has existed. In this instance, before the deployment of the Pershing IIs and GLCMs, the Soviets had in October 1979 made an offer to reduce the number of its intermediate range systems in the Western USSR, contingent upon NATO curtailment of its new weapons. It was only after Washington had rejected the USSR’s proposal that the Soviets walked out of the INF talks: before that they had negotiated seriously. In Jane Sharp’s assessment, between 1982 and 1983 the Soviets offered a ‘series of compromises [on INF] that might have appealed to an administration seriously interested in reaching an agreement’. As a final observation on perceptions and attitudes in relation to the Theatre arms control negotiations, it is interesting to compare the European and American approach to the USSR. Colin Gray, in commenting on the considerable pressure the US had to exert on some of its
NATO allies to get them to accept GLCMs and Pershing IIs, noted that the Europeans are far more relaxed than the US regarding the military balance, seeking instead to achieve security more through political understandings. The reason perhaps lies in a realistic, historically-derived appreciation of Soviet vital interests, the experience of war on one's homeland, and a neighbourly interest in maintaining a sensible 'live and let live' relationship. For example, one notable European-Soviet practical political arrangement was the agreement reached — during talks which were initially kept secret from the US — between Churchill and Stalin in 1944 regarding post-war spheres of influence in Europe. By contrast, this was a subject which the Roosevelt Administration consistently refused to address, cleaving instead to the patently unrealistic attitude that the shape of post-War Europe should be decided solely by national self-determination. That kind of blinkered approach to the USSR's attitudes, objectives and perceived vital interests not only seemed inconsistent with such US policies as the Monroe doctrine, but also played no small part in subsequent Cold War tensions. More recently, Washington's unsuccessful attempt to stop some West European states from buying natural gas from the Soviet Union was perhaps indicative of a limited understanding of realities.

Mention was made above that the SALT process is widely considered to have done little more than formalise the superpowers' strategic dominance. One measure which SALT has not addressed adequately and which many analysts believe could make a genuine contribution to arms control is that of a comprehensive test ban (CTB) on nuclear weapons. Proponents of a CTB argue that it would slow down the qualitative improvement of weapons, inhibit nuclear proliferation and, over time, reduce the confidence of decision makers in the reliability of their stockpiles, and hence their capability to launch a successful first strike. A comprehensive test ban is considered to be 'an essential preliminary to any realistic effort to achieve genuine disarmament in the modern world'.

The Soviet Union has been strongly, and possibly justifiably, criticised for breaking the moratorium on nuclear tests which obtained from 1958 to 1961 although, as discussed on p.7 above, the Kremlin may have been reacting to the commencement of the Kennedy Admin-
Washington's forceful rejection of the recent Soviet CTB initiative brings into question the current Administration's attitude towards the USSR and the central balance, how that attitude is likely to be interpreted in Moscow, and the implications of that interpretation. Based on the Reagan Administration's performance so far, the Kremlin probably holds serious doubts about the US's commitment to arms control.

Since 1974 the US has refused to ratify three bilateral arms control treaties, while since 1981 American defence spending has increased dramatically. Despite the findings of a report commissioned by President Carter that, by and large, the USSR has observed the provisions of SALT (to that stage), the Soviets find themselves attacked for 'cheating' on arms agreements and characterised by the President as an 'evil empire'. Together with Mr Reagan's crude faux pas about 'outlawing' and 'bombing' the Soviet Union, those kinds of denunciations are likely to cut deeply into the sensitive Soviet psyche, which already is resentful of American assumed moral superiority and frequent, patronising lectures on that theme.

Washington's approach to the START/INF talks seems to have been less than wholehearted. The emphasis the US placed in the START negotiations on reducing numbers of land-based missiles was always going to be unacceptable, for those missiles constitute the USSR's greatest strength. Similarly, the Americans furnished no convincing reasons for rejecting the INF 'walk in the woods' compromise proposal, even though it had been negotiated by the hardliner Nitze and included a Soviet commitment to substantial reductions in the numbers of SS-20s within range of Europe. The perception that the US is not serious about current negotiations is reinforced by the anti-Soviet reputations of the main arms control negotiators appointed in recent years: Rostow, Perle, Nitze and Burt are all recognised either as hardliners, or even oppositionists to arms control; Adelman is possibly the least experienced and least qualified individual ever appointed to a senior negotiating position; and the US's chief START official, General E.L. Rowny, actively campaigned against SALT II. Colin Gray's revelation that for the first year of its incumbency the Reagan Administration did not have an arms control policy (indeed, not to have a policy was its policy) perhaps says more than was intended.

Given the attention currently being paid to war winning doctrines and rearmament, Mr Nitze's commitment to approaching arms control from 'a position of strength' is likely to be interpreted as an attempt to achieve a position of superiority.

No American decision of the past 10 or so years has, apparently, from the Soviet viewpoint, presented such a threat to the USSR as the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). To some extent SDI epitomises the Soviet-American relationship. The programme seems to threaten the USSR, physically and psychologically, with the US's awesome technological superiority; and it also seems to encompass doctrines of strategic superiority. It may well provoke a most dangerous reaction.

A limitation on anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM) was one of the key components of SALT I. While both sides have air defence systems, by and large the letter of SALT I has been preserved: neither defensive system presents a serious barrier to attacking forces (much is sometimes made of the ABM system around Moscow, but it has been in place since 1964, would be largely ineffectual against a massive attack, and is inconsequential to the strategic balance). A credible defensive system would, however, challenge the existing level of mutual vulnerability. If, for example, it became apparent that the SDI were technologically feasible and its deployment imminent then the incentives for a pre-emptive strike could increase dramatically. The same imperative might still apply even if the SDI did not make the US invulnerable, but still significantly decreased vulnerability.

Proponents of defensive systems argue that, as technology advances, the doctrine of MAD of necessity requires the escalation of more-modern offensive weapons if deterrence is to remain credible. The increasing difficulty imposed by technology on arms control procedures is seen as another reason for turning towards defensive systems. Against this, former US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara has pointed out that the pairing of offensive and defensive systems inevitably fosters an aggressive strategic policy. The basic problem is that a leakproof nuclear defence system is not technically possible in the foreseeable future (an assessment which is shared by the head of the SDI programme). Therefore, in order to plug
defensive leaks, destabilising, offensive supplementary measures are necessary.

The US in fact is currently planning a partial defence system, called 'Star Wars II' by McNamara, which will protect 'hardened targets like missile silos or command centres or even [provide] partial protection for the US population. This partial defence will be complemented with US offensive weapons'. The likely consequences of this strategy are, first, that the Americans will be perceived to be acquiring a first-strike capability; and, second, that the Soviets will no longer know the level of defence which they must penetrate to maintain deterrence. In this context it is significant to recall that one of the most dangerous developments of recent years, the MIRV warhead system, originated as a new offensive weapon supposedly to counter Soviet defensive plans. There is already evidence that the USSR is now escalating its arms development programmes to meet the technological and doctrinal challenge presented by SDI.

* * * *

No discussion of Soviet strategic attitudes and perceptions can conclude without reference to the State ideology. Regarding arms control, two main points need to be made. The first is that in international relations as elsewhere, the deterministic element of Marxism retains its vigour, and Soviet theorists continue to believe that, through their much beloved 'objective forces of history', the balance of power ('correlation of forces') will inevitably act in their favour. However, the Soviets accept that the atomic bomb does not obey the class principle, so since the Khrushchev years the Marxist-Leninist thesis regarding the certainty of war between imperialism (capitalism) and socialism has not been presented dogmatically; instead, it has been argued that victory over capitalism can be achieved under conditions of 'peaceful competition'. In the short term at least, therefore, Soviet foreign policy continues to stress the need for peaceful coexistence and the prevention of world war. It thus remains ideologically acceptable for the Soviets to pursue arms control objectives which include achieving political and strategic parity with the US, maintaining an assured destruction capability, minimising the risks of nuclear war, preventing nuclear proliferation and stabilising the strategic environ-

ment. There is nothing in those objectives antipathetic to the acceptance of mutually beneficial controls.

Summary

The historical experience of the Soviet Union has been marked by invasion, horrific losses in world war, and the seemingly implacable hostility of the West; while the country has been confronted with the nuclear threat more openly than perhaps any other except Japan. Feelings of insecurity have been exacerbated by the immense technological and material superiority of the US. Given those circumstances it should not be surprising if the Soviets' world perspective tended to be fearful and defensive, and their strategic decision-making process largely reactive.

Western strategic analysts often acknowledge the importance of allowing for social and historical forces during the decision-making process, but whether in fact sufficient allowance is made sometimes seems doubtful. Currently, the Reagan Administration's forceful pursuit of dramatic, qualitative strategic arms improvements, and its apparent interest in war-winning doctrines and disinterest in arms control procedures are combining to fuel deep-rooted Soviet fears. Those fears may be compounded by economic pressures if the USSR feels it has to match such perceived threats to the prevailing strategic stability as, for example, that presented by the SDI. The danger here lies in the intensely psychological nature of the strategy of MAD, in which perceptions are likely to be just as important as realities.

There should be no misapprehension regarding Soviet will: the technological and economic pressure currently being applied by Washington could provoke a most dangerous reaction. At the same time, Soviet ideologues have been able to accommodate the notion of peaceful coexistence within the Marxism-Leninism, while in the past the Kremlin has responded positively to constructive arms control initiatives. It is important to note that the Soviets have negotiated most seriously when they believed strategic parity obtained and would continue to do so; that is, when their security and prestige were not threatened.

Given the Soviet's basic position and the forces which shape it, if worthwhile arms con-
trol is to be achieved then the US must take the lead by recognising and accepting that position and developing its policies accordingly.

**NOTES**

1. SALT II has not been ratified by the US, but its provisions have been generally observed. Reports that the US is preparing to abandon SALT II appeared in *The Canberra Times*, 31 May 1986, p.4 and 1 June 1986, p.1; *q.v. The Australian*, 2 June 1986, p.1.


4. Churchill's role in the War of Intervention against the Bolsheviks outweighed the support he gave to the USSR during World War II, while his 'iron curtain' speech at Fulton in 1946 is notorious in the USSR. Truman made aggressive anti-communist speeches as a Senator in 1941, and considered invading France at the end of World War II to circumvent the possibility of the French Communist Party seizing power.

5. Soviet historians argue that none of those bombings was necessary, but rather all were carried out as warnings to the USSR of American military superiority. *The Canberra Times*, 6 August 1985, p.2 and p.7; G. Jukes, 'The Development of Soviet Strategic Thinking since 1945', *Canberra Papers*, No.14, Canberra, 1972, p.7, makes the point that Stalin... knew better than anyone else that Japan had been on the verge of capitulation before the atomic bombs were dropped.' The devastating fire-bomb attack on Dresden took place in February 1945; the war was almost over and the target was of no military significance — but the Red Army was only about 60 miles away.


7. The US had sited Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy, and Thor missiles in England, for some years before February 1945: the war was almost over and the target was of no military significance — but the Red Army was only about 60 miles away.


9. 'Tomahawk missile opens Pacific to nuclear threat', *National Times*, 21-27 June 1985, pp.18-20. When the superpowers first attempted negotiations over [cruise] missiles back in 1972, US technology was greatly superior to the Soviets... The Soviets in a 1983 draft START Treaty... again called for a ban on the deployment of cruise missiles with a range of over 600 KM, but the US was not satisfied a ban could be verified... The US now faces a counter to the Tomahawk, the SS-NX-21.'


22. Politically, any intended use of nuclear weapons would probably take place only after a period of tension so that the impetus to escalate would already exist. Further, as it seems likely that once bombs began falling and public fear, horror and anger became manifest, pressures on politicians for retaliation and massive revenge could become overwhelming.


25. Holloway, *op. cit.*, pp.136-137. In January 1967 when SALT was proposed, the USA had on line 1054 ICBMs, 656 SLBMs and 650 B-52s; while the USSR had only 500 ICBMs, 100 short-range SLBMs and 155 inferior heavy bombers.


31. After reaching agreement with Stalin, Churchill sarcastically warned him to express the deal 'in diplomatic terms and not... to use the phrase "dividing into spheres", because the Americans might be shocked'. When Roosevelt learned of the agreement, he was, in fact, shocked.


one thing: If we in the Soviet Union are setting ourselves such truly grandiose plans in the domestic sphere, then what are the external conditions that we need to fulfill those domestic plans? I leave the answer to that question with you'. *Time*, 9 September 1985, p.21.


38. Pravda, 1 August 1985; Mack, op. cit., p.10; M. Hedlin, 'Moscow's Line on Arms Control', *Problems of Communism*, May/June 1984, p.27.


42. loc. cit.

43. loc. cit.

44. Pravda, 27 May 1985 and 1 August 1985.


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**CHURCHILL FELLOWSHIPS IN BICENTENARY YEAR**

In addition to the fellowships offered by the churchill Trust in 1988, three additional fellowships have been sponsored for study in particular fields:

a. the pastoral industry;
b. an aspect of Museology;
c. the Australian Cotton Industry.

The foregoing are included for information, recognizing that probably few Departmental officers would qualify for one of these particular awards.

The Churchill Trust is seeking applicants for Churchill Fellowships in any field as well as these sponsored fellowships. Applications close on 28 February 1987, selections are made in June and Fellowships would be taken up in 1988.

Further information and nomination forms can be obtained by contacting the Winston Churchill Memorial Trust Centre on telephone (062) 47 8333.
PROBLEMS OF AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE—FIRST BATTALION, THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT IN 1965

By Major R. J. Breen, RA INF.

“The Australian Government is now in receipt of a request from the Government of South Vietnam for further military assistance. We have decided — and this has been after close consultation with the Government of the United States — to provide an infantry battalion for service in South Vietnam.”

R. G. Menzies
29 April 1965
House of Representatives

Introduction

On 25 April 1965 three Australian Army officers stood near the Australian War Memorial in Canberra dressed in traditional slouch hats, battle dress and Sam Browne belts. Their unit had just completed a parade to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the landings at Gallipoli. First Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR) had conducted the parade with veterans of two of Australia’s most famous expeditionary forces, the First and Second Australian Imperial Forces. Several hundred veterans of these two expeditionary forces, including men who had fought at Gallipoli, had marched along Anzac Parade to the War Memorial. The soldiers of 1 RAR had joined with contingents from the Navy and Air Force to provide a guard of honour. Only a few people in attendance appreciated the added significance of this occasion. The soldiers who had stood on parade were to constitute Australia’s next expeditionary force.

The three officers standing near the Memorial were Lieutenant Colonel ‘Lou’ Brumfield, the Commanding Officer of 1 RAR, the Battalion’s Second-In-Command, Major ‘Mal’ Lander and Major John Essex-Clark, the Officer Commanding Support Company. In the midst of the nostalgia of past foreign wars, they knew that 1 RAR was to be deployed to Bien Hoa Airbase, South Vietnam, in four weeks time to come under the operational control of the United States 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) (173 Abn Bde (Sep)).

Aim

The aim of this article is to examine some of the problems faced by 1 RAR during their deployment 21 years ago and the implications for contemporary Australian operational deployment forces.

Scope

The period examined is before and a few months after 1 RAR was deployed to Vietnam. The problems examined are:
— Reorganization,
— Training Resources,
— Secrecy,
— Training for Contingencies,
— Pre-Deployment Training,
— Training and Commanding Attached Sub-Units,
— Inferior Weapons, Equipment and Clothing,
— Logistic Support,
— Incorporating New Weapons,
— Medical Training, and
— Differences in Operational Methods.
Reorganization

In March 1965, 1 RAR had been reorganized from a large pentropic establishment to a lighter-scaled tropical warfare organization. This involved the re-posting of hundreds of men within the unit and many from the unit. Many of the Battalion's vehicles, major items of equipment and heavy weapons were re-allocated elsewhere.

During this reorganization, Lieutenant Colonel Brumfield had assumed command, and four new rifle company commanders had taken up their appointments. Eight of the 12 rifle platoons were commanded by subalterns who had graduated less than 12 months before from the Officer Cadet School, Portsea. The shedding of hundreds of men and scores of heavy weapons and vehicles, coupled with the arrival of the new commanders, meant that the unit was in transition and not well prepared to go to war in South East Asia.

1 RAR was unlucky to have had such a reorganization five weeks before deployment on active service. However, a "mini" reorganization occurs each year in the Australian Army with the December-January posting cycle. This means that there is about a three month period each year where operational deployment forces are not ready for rapid deployment. Therefore, postings should be staggered to offset the effects of this exodus and influx of personnel each year. This would enable forces earmarked for rapid deployment to maintain optimum training standards and high levels of preparedness continuously.

Training Resources

The only field exercise conducted by the new commanders of 1 RAR with the new battalion organization had occurred during the period 4-14 April 1965 in the Gospers area north of Sydney. The exercise had been hampered by lack of ammunition and air support. Live ammunition was not available for sub-unit tactical exercises and blank ammunition was in such short supply that machine gunners had used World War I gas rattles to simulate the firing of their weapons. Only four UHIB utility helicopters had been available to familiarize soldiers in heliborne operations. Most officers, especially the platoon commanders, had no recent experience in calling for artillery and air support. In just over two months the Battalion was on sophisticated airmobile operations in Vietnam involving hundred of helicopters, and the employment of the fire power of artillery, helicopter gunships and fighter ground attack aircraft.

The effects of limited training resources were significant. The most serious effect was that the Battalion was not practised in live firing in a tactical setting before it deployed on active service. With these fundamental infantry skills not practised, it was not surprising that the standard of shooting for the first few operations in Vietnam was not high. Fortunately, the enemy did not fully test the marksmanship of the Australians in the early months by attacking in force. Circumstances may not be as fortunate for contemporary operational deployment forces.

Imagination and initiative will overcome some shortages of training resources. However, resources such as ammunition and aircraft support must not be in short supply to operational deployment forces. It would seem to be self defeating to have a formation or unit warned for rapid deployment, and then not give it the means to reach the levels of training required.

Secrecy

Lieutenant Colonel Brumfield had been briefed by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major General Frank Hassett in February 1965 that once 1 RAR was reorganized, the unit was likely to be deployed to Vietnam. Brumfield was allowed to tell his new Second-In-Command, Major 'Mal' Lander, his Adjutant, Captain Ron Ducie, and his Quartermaster, Captain Tom Buckley to make preparations. However, each man was sworn to secrecy and was briefed not tell anyone within or outside the Battalion of the forthcoming deployment.

The imposition of this level of secrecy seriously hampered logistic, administrative and training preparations for active service. Captain Buckley was unable to demand priorities for the replacement and repair of weapons and equipment. The 2nd Base Ordnance Depot did not know of the Battalion's pending deployment and continued to enforce peacetime constraints. Furthermore, Buckley had to conduct a scheduled 100 percent stocktake which was supervised by a Department of Army Audit team during this busy and frustrating period.

Administrative preparations were severely restricted. Major Lander and Captain Ducie
worked as normal through the day and then returned to their offices at night to plan for the deployment and write instructions. They could not issue instructions to the Battalion until the official announcement of the deployment was made on 29 April 1965, just four weeks before the first troops embarked.8

The deficiencies in training resources for the field training before deployment have already been discussed. The secrecy imposed on Lieutenant Colonel Brumfield contributed to the scarcity of training resources. The Second-In-Command could not demand that the Battalion be reinforced to its war-time complement of men, weapons and equipment for the exercise; the Quartermaster could not demand priorities for the issue of adequate quantities of ammunition and the Operations staff could not insist that more helicopters be made available for longer periods.

Secrecy will be necessary before the commitment of operational deployment forces. However, the force must be allowed to proceed with the appropriate preparations. Selected personnel in supporting units need be briefed on the commitment as soon as possible and a deception plan developed at the highest level to ensure that security is maintained without hampering vital preparations.

Training for Contingencies

1 RAR’s last field exercise before deployment was called Exercise ‘SKY HIGH II’, and had been conducted in conformity to a South East Asian Treaty Organization’s (SEATO) Plan ‘AMBROSE’.9 This plan was a contingency for the deployment of the Battalion as part of a multi-national force to a defensive position on the Mekong River in Thailand to prevent invasion by Vietnamese forces, should Vietnam become a predatory Communist power. The tactics and techniques for this scenario were quite different to occupying a defensive position at Bien Hoa Airbase, South Vietnam, and conducting air mobile search and destroy operations as the third battalion of a US airborne brigade.

It is difficult for operational deployment forces to train for the correct contingency. The Defence Department always has a number of contingencies for the deployment of Australian military forces identified, but they are often classified. Training for a specific contingency may warn an enemy of how and where the force will be deployed or have diplomatic repercussions. However, it would be far more practical to train operational deployment forces for several most likely contingencies than rely on general conventional military training as a means of preparation. Indeed, training for likely contingencies may be a useful deterrent to an enemy contemplating acts of aggression against Australia or its interests.

Pre-Deployment Training

With only four weeks for full preparation after the official announcement on 29 April 1986, the Battalion’s time was spent almost exclusively on administration and the taking of pre-embarkation leave.10 There was no time for pre-deployment training. The packing of stores and preparation of vehicles was time consuming. All personnel were put through medical and dental checks. Those found to be unsuitable were posted out. Scores of newly-trained infantrymen arrived to take the unit to its war strength. Husbands had to assist families who opted to be located with relatives for the period of the Battalion’s tour of duty. Also, the Battalion was further hamstrung in preparing for war by rehearsals and the 50th Anniversary of Anzac Day Parade in Canberra and preparing and presenting to the Australian Staff College
a battalion attack demonstration using the organization of the recently discarded pentropic Battle Group. Contemporary operational deployment forces will have to complete similar administrative procedures before embarkation except when they have been put on a specific notice to move. When this occurs, administrative procedures should have been completed to bring the force to its nominated state of readiness. However, the situation 1 RAR found itself in is more likely. Any politically sensitive considerations by an Australian Government to deploy a military force for active service will be kept secret. It is likely that even the commander of the force will have little information so unusual signs of preparation by the force will not trigger a premature exposure of the Government's plans. Therefore, time may not be available for pre-deployment training.

The implications are significant if the force has not been trained for specific contingencies. The possible lack of time for pre-deployment training once again emphasizes this need to focus training on foreseen contingencies. The problems are compounded when sub-units from other corps are allocated to the force at short notice, as was the case with 1 RAR.

Training and Commanding Attached Sub-Units

1 RAR was deployed with armour, artillery, signals and logistic elements. There was no time to concentrate with these sub-units and conduct collective training before embarkation. Furthermore, like 1 RAR, these sub-units had no time to train before deployment. For example, 1 Armoured Personnel Carrier Troop from the 4/19th Prince of Wales Light Horse Regiment (1 APC Tp PWLH) had to be transported at short notice from Melbourne to Sydney to load their vehicles onto HMAS SYDNEY. This unit had just completed trials on their newly-issued diesel powered M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) a few weeks before they were moved. They had to wait for the voyage on HMAS SYDNEY to learn how to fire the .50 and .30 calibre machine guns that were fitted to their vehicles. The soldiers from 1 RAR had never trained with APCs.

161 Field Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery (161 Fd Bty RNZA) joined 1 RAR at Bien Hoa a few weeks after the Battalion's arrival at Bien Hoa. The Battery had been raised at short notice, half its complement was made up of volunteers from other corps besides Artillery. The Battery had just completed training in the snows of Waioru, New Zealand, before embarkation for the jungles of Vietnam. Operations started three weeks after arrival, so there was little time to train with these sub-units at Bien Hoa. Furthermore, within four months of deployment, the headquarters of 1 RAR was to command seven attached sub-units. No additional personnel were provided to augment the Battalion headquarters staff.

Contemporary operational deployment forces should be made up of units and sub-units from different corps in the Army. It is important that these units and sub-units train together. Like 1 RAR, there may be little time to conduct collective training before and after deployment. Equally, the attachment of a number of sub-units may require the augmentation of the senior headquarters of the force.

Inferior Weapons, Equipment and Clothing

1 RAR was deployed with inferior weapons, equipment and clothing. For example, Owen Machine Carbines which were carried by forward scouts, officers and signallers were more than 20 years old. Radio equipment was old, unreliable and lacked range. Boots, which had been issued from World War II stocks, came apart after a few days on operations. The coarse material of the jungle green uniforms caused skin disorders in the wet, humid climate. Shirts and trousers ripped easily on the jagged undergrowth of secondary jungle.

Contemporary operational deployment forces should be issued the most modern and most serviceable weapons, equipment and clothing. Despite 1 RAR's status as a unit earmarked for overseas service, the unit was not accorded a priority for the issue of new weapons, equipment and clothing until after it was announced that it was to be deployed. Even then it took the exposure in the media of the deficiencies in clothing to cause the Minister for the Army to hasten the development and issue of new boots and uniforms.
Logistic Support

After deployment, the 1 RAR Group had to rely heavily on the logistic support of the Americans. This became an urgent requirement when most of the Group’s stores and equipment, which had been packed carefully into marked crates, were stolen or pilfered after being left to Vietnamese contractors to transport from Vung Tau in Phuoc Tuy Province to Bien Airbase in Bien Hoa Province. In June 1965, there were no American or Australian logistic facilities available for this task. Fortunately, essential military supplies and all heavy weapons had been moved in the unit’s vehicles.

Like generations of Australian soldiers before them, 1 RAR made good these deficiencies from the existing logistic system of their nearest ally. Australian canvas shower buckets and other stores were swapped for American combat tropical boots and other items of clothing and equipment. New American AN/PRC 25 radio sets were issued as replacements for the old 10 Sets. In addition, there were forays by logistic personnel in unit vehicles to the ever-increasing logistic bases and supply dumps of the Bien Hoa Airbase. These expeditions netted substantial quantities of building materials, defence stores and kitchen equipment. This made the Battalion appear like military beggars and thieves.

Under the current strategic posture of self-reliant continental defence, it is unlikely that contemporary operational deployment forces will be deployed in conjunction with a logistically well-endowed ally. Logistic facilities may have to be established on deployment and support may have to come from local sources. Should the deployment be to a wilderness or under-developed area, then the logistic requirement will increase significantly. 1 RAR’s dependence on the American logistic system shows that contemporary operational deployment forces must be logistically independent if they are to operate effectively after deployment.

Incorporating New Weapons

Just before deployment, and within a few months after arrival at Bien Hoa, 1 RAR had to incorporate five new weapons into its inventory. These weapons included two new small arms — the 5.56 mm M16 Rifle and the M79 Grenade Launcher; a light anti-armour ‘throw-away’ missile — the 66 mm LAW, called the M72; a new hand grenade — the M26 and the Claymore anti-personnel mine.

Training on these weapons was conducted at short notice and, with the benefit of hindsight, under circumstances that were not safe. Indeed, there was one serious grenade accident soon after deployment and there were a number of dangerous incidents with the M79 Grenade Launcher, the LAW and Claymore mine. The
incorporation of these weapons affected the infantry minor tactics of the Battalion, but there was little time to develop new tactical techniques until the test of combat.

It is likely that contemporary operational deployment forces will be issued a number of the latest weapons and equipment just before and soon after they have been committed. Peace-time constraints will not apply and items, due to come into service, will be given priority of issue. Other items, previously assessed as too expensive, will be purchased quickly and issued immediately. Furthermore, it is likely that the Australian Government will authorize the immediate purchase of weapons and equipment directly from the inventories of allies for issue to the force.

It has been discussed earlier that there will be little time to train before embarkation because of short notice and the requirement to complete administrative procedures. Unless time is available on arrival in the area of operations, training on newly-issued weapons will either not occur, or be hasty and unsafe. This situation emphasizes the earlier point about the priorities which must exist for operational deployment forces to be ready for rapid deployment. Special purchases should be made to ensure that these forces have the latest weapons and have had time to incorporate them successfully.

Medical Training

On 26 June 1965 there was a grenade accident in 1 RAR's defensive position at Bien Hoa Airbase. Three soldiers were killed and seven seriously wounded. These first casualties exposed serious deficiencies in medical training. The Battalion's stretcher bearers came from the Band and lacked even an elementary proficiency in First Aid on arrival at Bien Hoa on 2 June 1965. They had been allowed to devote too much time before deployment to their role as members of the 1 RAR Regimental Band. The bandsmen could not cope with the severe injuries sustained by those involved in this accident. Other soldiers at the scene had received no formal training in First Aid. Fortunately, qualified American medical orderlies were available with medical evacuation helicopters. After this salutary lesson, a St John's Ambulance First Aid Course was conducted for 14 days under the supervision of the Regimental Medical Officer and all members of the Band became certified St John's ambulancemen. They went on to serve the Battalion in an exemplary and courageous manner.

Medical training for contemporary operational deployment forces is of paramount importance. In peacetime, when casualties are not being incurred and medical facilities are taken for granted, there is a tendency to overlook the need for thorough medical training. 1 RAR was able to rely on the proximity of the American medical support system to overcome initial problems. This may not be the case for contemporary operational deployment forces if they are committed to independent small unit-sized operations in wilderness or under-developed areas. Medical assistants, stretcher bearers and soldiers in operational deployment forces must receive the correct level of medical training and be tested frequently for their proficiency in these skills.

Differences In Operational Methods

By far the most significant problem encountered by 1 RAR on deployment was adjusting to the operational methods of the 173 Abn Bde (Sep). Very few of the Australian commanders had experienced working under the operational control of the American Army. None had worked with an airborne brigade. The Brigade Commander was Brigadier General Ellis "Butch" Williamson. Like the paratroopers of his formation, he was lean and fit, had close cropped hair and wore tailored, starched combat fatigues and highly-polished combat tropical boots. The Australians were dressed in floppy hats, baggy green uniforms, large World War II Tropical Stud boots and carried long barrelled semi-automatic rifles. Williamson thought the Australian attire was more appropriate for going on safari than participating in modern airmobile operations.

This contrast in dress paralleled a sharp contrast in operational methods. The 173 Abn Bde (Sep) was an elite strategic operational deployment force for the South East Asian area. Their tactics were based on rapid deployment and the use of massive fire power. Essentially, they were a unit trained for limited conventional warfare and not unconventional counter-insurgency operations. The Brigade's mission was to fix and destroy large Viet Cong military units and they planned to do this using the tactics of fire power and airmobile manoeuvre.
1 RAR was steeped in the tactics of the Malayan Emergency. Their operational methods were based on stealthy patrolling by day and night. The Americans were to operate in a manner which said to the Viet Cong, 'You will know where we are, take us on and pay the price.' In turn, the Australians said to the enemy, 'You will not know exactly where we are, but we will find you and kill you.'

Lieutenant Colonel Brumfield and Major Essex-Clark had to be most forthright in demanding that 1 RAR would achieve its missions using Australian, and not American operational methods. Brigadier General Williamson had established a strong personal leadership style within the Brigade and found the assertiveness of Brumfield and Essex-Clark disconcerting.

The Australians refused to accept regular daily resupply of ammunition, water and rations. Indeed, they even suggested that they did not want to be inserted by helicopter and would have preferred to deceive the enemy on the timing, strength and direction of their entry into their assigned areas of operations. On one occasion, Essex-Clark refused to allow the Battalion to be inserted into a particular landing zone because his own reconnaissance revealed that it was covered by fortifications.

Brumfield's and Essex-Clark's assertiveness allowed the Australians to fight as they had been trained. The Americans took heavy casualties using their operational methods to achieve the results they sought and were more successful than the Australians in causing casualties to the enemy. In one battle alone, an American battalion took 61 killed and 114 wounded. However, a major victory was claimed because 392 Viet Cong had been killed. The Australians caused fewer casualties to the enemy and lost fewer men.

Contemporary operational deployment forces will face problems if they are deployed under the operational control of, or in conjunction with the military forces of other countries. Operational methods will be different. There will be difficult attitudes to tactics and how operations should be developed. Indeed, there will be different attitudes to incurring casualties between big armies, like the American Army, and small armies like the Australian Army.

If Australian operational deployment forces are to fight alongside allies they should train with them, particularly understanding tactical techniques and command and control systems. This does not mean Australian forces should join the rapid deployment forces of allied countries formally, but should exercise with allied forces whenever possible and maintain an adequate knowledge of their operational methods.
Even the current posture of self-reliant continental defence does not preclude the timely assistance of allied forces if Australia or its interests were threatened.

Conclusion

The problems faced by 1 RAR 20 years ago have implications for Australian operational deployment forces today. Because Government planning will almost always be shrouded in secrecy, it is likely that forces will be deployed on short notice. Those forces will have had to train in a climate of peacetime constraints and may be equipped with inferior weapons, equipment and clothing. It is possible that they will not have trained for the correct contingency and there will be little time to train before deployment because of the requirement of complete final administrative procedures.

On, or soon after deployment, new weapons and equipment may be issued and have an impact on tactics. Time for tactical training may be limited. If a number of sub-units from different corps are incorporated in the force, there will be a need for further collective training. Also, depending on the number of attached sub-units, there may be a need to augment the headquarters of the commander of the operational deployment force. Medical training, which may be overlooked in peacetime, will become of critical importance once operations start. The operational methods of Australia’s allies are different than those of the Australian Army. Knowledge of those methods will be important should the operational deployment force be deployed with, or be assisted by allied forces.

It is essential that resources be made available to operational deployment forces for realistic and rigorous training with state-of-the-art weapons and equipment. It is equally important that these forces train for the most likely contingencies with the sub-units of other corps allocated to meet those contingencies. Logistic support will be critical to the effectiveness of the operational deployment force once it is committed.

Often the lessons of history remain unlearned. The problems faced by 1 RAR 20 years ago may face contemporary operational deployment forces in the future. The First and the Second Australian Imperial Forces were raised and had to embark at short notice. However, both forces had several months to train and acclimatize before they were committed to full-scale operations. This time was not available to 1 RAR and may not be available to contemporary operational deployment forces. 1 RAR overcame all the problems set before it and completed a successful tour of duty 20 years ago. The problems they faced should not be forgotten.
NOTES

1. Essex-Clark, J. Interviews with author of 22 Dec 84 and 26 Jan 86.
3. 1 RAR Officer Manning List dated 30 May 65.
5. Ibid. Paragraph 16.
7. Buckley, T. Interview with author of 6 Jan 86.
11. Essex-Clarke, J. Interviews with author 22 Dec 84.
14. Several veterans interviewed by the author verified that this was the case.
15. Newman, S.D. Paper entitled "161 Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery" dated 4 Mar 85". Newman is the regimental historian for the RNZA and the details of their organizations and deployment to Vietnam were supplied at the author's request.
16. Essex-Clarke, J. Interview with the author of 22 Dec 84. 1 RAR. Letter request augmentation of the staff of their headquarters to assist with the additional requirements of commanding and administering the sub-units of the Group.
17. The Battalion was issued with the 10 Set as the main radio of 117 Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery. The Group's marked crates, and equipment from HMAS SYDNEY to the beaches of Tan Son Nhat and docks of Vung Tau. The Group's marked crates, full of heavy items of equipment and stores, were secured at Vung Tau under American arrangements. Preece, who was later to command the 1RAR Group, could do nothing about this situation and unfortunately much of the crates did not arrive at Bien Hoa and those that did had been pilfered.
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20. Preece, A.V. Interview with the author of 22 Dec 84. As the Deputy Commander of Australian Army Force — Vietnam, Preece had been sent to Vung Tau to organize the disembarkation of elements of the 1RAR Group from HMAS SYDNEY, anchored off Cape St Jacques, to Vung Tau and on to Bien Hoa. He had no staff and had to rely on the Americans to supply the landing craft for the movement of men, vehicles and equipment from HMAS SYDNEY to the beaches and docks of Vung Tau. The Group's marked crates, full of heavy items of equipment and stores, were secured at Vung Tau under American arrangements. Preece, who was later to command the 1RAR Group, could do nothing about this situation and unfortunately much of the crates did not arrive at Bien Hoa and those that did had been pilfered.
21. Ibid.
22. Essex-Clark, J. Personal Diary entry of 6 Jun 65. Interview with author of 22 Dec 84.
24. Essex-Clarke, J. Interview with author of 22 Dec 84.
27. 1 RAR War Diary entry of 26 Jun 65. 1 RAR Record of Casualties entry of 26 and 29 Jun 65. (Private A. Van Valen died from his wounds in this accident three days later.)
28. Haslau, P. Summary of Health Problems Encountered by 1 RAR During Their Tour of Duty in Vietnam of August 1966. Paragraph 21. Naughton, M. Letter to the author of 21 Jul 85. Both Haslau and Naughton were Regimental Medical Officers for 1 RAR during the early days after deployment. Naughton acted in this capacity for a short time when the Regimental Medical Officer who arrived with 1 RAR returned to Australia. Haslau joined the 1 RAR in July 65 and remained with them for the remainder of the tour. Both described the 1 RAR Bandmen as lacking even an elementary knowledge of First Aid on arrival at Bien Hoa. It should be added that the service of the Band in their role as medical assistants was exemplary for the remainder of the tour. Indeed, two members of the Band gave their lives whilst assisting wounded men under fire on 8 Jan 66.
31. Comment attributed to Brigadier General Williamson.
32. Channon, J.B. and Russell, G.A. The First Three Years — A Pictorial History of the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate), Brigade Information Office, 1966. Section III, Section IV, Section V and Section VII.
34. Essex-Clarke, J. Interview with the author of 22 Dec 84.
35. Williamson, E.W. Interviews with author 29 Apr 86.
36. Essex-Clarke, J. Interview with the author of 22 Dec 84. This incident occurred before Operation "CRIMP" which commenced on 8 Jun 66. The landing zone was changed and the Battalion was inserted without casualties being taken into an alternative location. Soon after the insertion, a platoon cleared the area of the proposed landing zone and were involved in an engagement with an enemy force well concealed in bunkers, and firing from small slits. 1 RAR War Diary entry of 8 Jan 66.
38. 1 RAR suffered 23 killed and 106 wounded for the 12 month tour of duty. A tally by the author from the 1 RAR War Diary shows that the unit killed 128 enemy and wounded 16 enemy (confirmed) and captured 364 enemy soldiers/Viet Cong agents (many of whom were wounded). It is probable that a further 130 enemy were killed (bodies were not recovered) and 192 wounded as indicated by blood trails but not eye witness confirmation that an enemy soldier had been wounded.
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Major Breen graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1973 and was allotted to the Australian Infantry Corps. He has served in a number of regimental and training appointments including 5/7 RAR, Monash University Regiment, 8/9 RAR and the Officer Cadet School, Portsea. In 1982 he graduated with a Master of Science in Instructional Systems from the Florida State University. He completed the Australian Command and Staff College, Queenscliff in 1985. Major Breen has drafted a book on the first tour of 1 RAR in Vietnam 1965-66 entitled “The Quiet Professionals”. Publication is planned for 1987. He is serving currently at the Infantry Centre, at Singleton, NSW.

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IN its short 200 year history of European settlement, Australia has only once come close to being invaded. This was in 1942 when Japan occupied the island chain to our immediate north. While subsequent evidence has shown that Japan had rejected the idea of invading Australia, for the people of Australia at that time the threat of invasion was very real indeed.

Fears of a possible Japanese invasion had been of concern in Australia since the early 1920s. As Japan took on a more aggressive stance, leading eventually to its entry into the Second World War in December 1941, so the likelihood of Japanese aggression against Australia increased in both public and official government perception. In the defence debate of the period Japan as the possible aggressor was the central theme. Few disagreed as to the threat; what was at issue was how best to deal with it.

The issues of the debate on the defence of Australia during the period from the early 1920s up until the turning of the tide of Japanese aggression in the latter part 1942, are fascinating, not only as a feature of the history of our nation, but also for the parallels they have with the contemporary debate on the defence of Australia.

The central issue of the pre Second World War debate on the defence of Australia was that between the advocates of Empire, or Imperial, defence and those of self reliance, an issue not dissimilar to that of today between “reliance on great and powerful friends” and self-reliance.

Australia in the 1920s and 1930s was politically and emotionally still very much tied to Britain and the Empire. The defence of Australia was seen as being but a part of the defence of the (British) Empire, an Empire which in those days included India, Burma, Malaya, Hong Kong and parts of China as well as Australia and New Zealand within the ambit of the area that might be threatened by Japan. For its part Britain was very conscious of its responsibility for the overall defence of the Empire, while at the same time expecting each of the self governing members to both contribute to Imperial defence and provide for their own local defence.

The strategy of Imperial defence against possible Japanese aggression was of the use of seapower based on the British Fleet and a major naval base at Singapore. Britain believed that Japan as an island nation would not attempt to challenge her in the southern Asia region or beyond. Any large scale aggression by Japan against any part of the Empire, except Hong Kong which was considered to be indefensible, would involve Japan in having to challenge British seapower.

As far as the defence of Australia was concerned, while Britain had its fleet and the use of the Singapore naval base Australia would be secure, at least from invasion. For such threats as Japan might be able to pose to Australia’s sea communications and for protection against raids, Australia would have to provide for its own defence.

The opponents of the Imperial defence strategy pointed out, somewhat prophetically, that the base at Singapore had no resident fleet and
that Japan might well strike when Britain was occupied in a war in Europe. Thus, in time of defence crisis Britain may not have been in a position to honour its pledge to come to the aid of the Empire in the Far East should Japan attempt to subjugate any part of it. As the threat of Japanese aggression heightened, especially after the outbreak of war with Germany, there were also increasing doubts expressed as to the defendability of Singapore itself.

For the supporters of Imperial defence, the defence needs of Australia were a contribution to Imperial defence, and local defence against raids. On the other hand, opponents of Imperial defence urged self-reliance and a capability to deal with invasion. Then, as now, the debate over raids versus invasion raged hot and strong. As it turned out the supporters of Imperial defence won the day, right up to the fall of Singapore in February 1942. It was against the concept of Imperial defence, or “forward defence” as it was then called, that Australia sent troops and aircraft to Malaya in 1941.

When war with Germany broke out in September 1939 Australia at first hesitated before sending forces to support Britain as had been done in 1914. Before making any commitment to send forces overseas Australia wanted to be sure that Japan would not then join her ally Germany by attacking British interests in the Far East. When Japan did not immediately join Germany the Australian Government of the day decided to take a calculated risk by giving direct support to Britain in its struggle against Germany. Thus, the war in Australia up until 1941 was directed to the war that was raging in Europe and the Middle East, rather than to the home defence of Australia. Three divisions of the Second AIF were sent to the Middle East along with air and naval units, while in Australia much effort was devoted to providing aircrew for the war in Europe through the Empire Air Training Scheme.

Australia’s “calculated risk” of 1939 and 1940 was backed by assurances from Britain of naval support to the Far East should Japan enter the war, even at the expense of other British interests, and the belief that should Japan enter the war there would be time to bring Australian forces home from overseas. In the event, Australia had great difficulty in persuading Britain to release Australian troops from the Middle East during 1941. This in turn led to the, at the time, momentous decision by Australia in December 1941 to turn to the United States for protection against Japan.

In retrospect, the strategy of Imperial defence as it evolved during the years leading up to the Second World War as a strategy for the defence of Australia failed with the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse in December 1941 and the fall of Singapore in February 1942. However, was this failure due to some basic flaw in the strategy itself, or was it a failure in execution? Would Singapore have fallen had adequate air power been made available to defend Malaya in 1941? Furthermore, what was the alternative to Imperial defence based essentially on sea power? Would Australia have been better protected in 1942 had it earlier adopted a strategy of continental defence and the retention of all of its forces in Australia? What would today’s strategists have done, even with the value of hindsight.

During the early 1940s, as the threat of a Japanese invasion of Australia increased and faith in the “Singapore Strategy” declined, more and more attention was given to the defence of the Australian homeland. A concept for the defence of Australia itself had been evolving over the years of the debate over raids versus invasion and the failings of Imperial defence. The basis for this concept is well expressed in the following quotation from Australia’s official history of the Second World War:

“Military thinking had long been based on the premises that ‘an invading force . . . will endeavour to bring our main forces to battle and defeat them. The most certain way to do this will be to attack us at a point which we must defend. The objective of an invading force therefore will probably be some locality in which our interests are such that the enemy will feel sure that we will be particularly sensitive to attack. Thus the geographical objective of land invasion would be some compact, vulnerable area, the resources of which are necessary to the economic life of Australia’. So the problems of the defence of the Newcastle — Sydney — Port Kembla area to which the above conditions plainly applied, became the paramount ones in Australian defence thinking”.

From the idea of an enemy attack on the vital area came the concept of concentration, of “concentration of the main force to deal with the enemy’s main attack as soon as pos-
sible.” Thus the strategy for the defence of Australia was to provide for:

- “the initial defence of the Sydney — Newcastle areas”;
- “the concentration as quickly as possible of the main army to deal with the enemy’s main attack”; and
- “the defence of other areas regarded as sufficiently important”.

When Lieutenant General Sir Iven Mackay was appointed GOC-in-C Home Forces in September 1941 he took this strategy as the basis of his plan for the disposition of forces to meet the expected Japanese invasion. Mackay submitted his plan to the Government in February 1942. His plan emphasised the defence of the major areas of population in the south east, with Brisbane and Melbourne being seen as flanks for the defence of Sydney. In doing so Mackay pointed out that he had only five divisions to defend an area that ran over a 1,000 miles from north to south. On the advice of the then Minister for the Army, whose electorate was in North Queensland, Cabinet rejected Mackay’s plan in favour of the idea that the whole of the populated area of Australia should be defended. Just how this was to be done with the meagre forces available in Australia at that time was never revealed!

The general philosophy behind the Mackay plan, although not his plan per se, was later to become the subject of a great deal of political controversy in Australia over what became known as the Brisbane Line. This controversy arose when, in October 1942, a minister in the then Labor Government, Mr Eddie Ward, claimed that the previous government, who had lost office to Labor in October 1941, had endorsed a plan for the defence of Australia that would have meant “the abandonment of an important section of northern Australia without firing a single shot”. Later this came to be seen as a line north of Brisbane behind which the military forces would withdraw in the event of invasion — the Brisbane Line. A subsequent Royal Commission established that there was no such endorsed plan, although it is clear that “the Brisbane Line” philosophy had been part of military thinking in Australia for some years.

In addition, in March 1943 General McArthur publically criticised the defeatist attitude that he claimed had existed when he arrived in Australia in March 1942. On arrival he said that he had been presented with a “defence plan for the the safety of the continent (that) involved North Australia being taken by the enemy. This was based on the Brisbane Line of defence . . . somewhere near the Tropic Of Capricorn.” McArthur had immediately rejected this plan for a more offensive one of defending Australia from the line of the Owen Stanley Ranges in New Guinea. Critics of McArthur claimed that he was merely taking credit, with the advantages of hindsight, for the successes that were by then being achieved in driving the Japanese back in New Guinea.

The political sensitivity of the idea that any part of Australia might be abandoned in order to more effectively defend the remainder, or that, from a defence point of view, any part of the country is more important than any other, is well illustrated by the controversy of the 1940s over the Brisbane Line, and a similar, although less intense, political flutter in December 1985 when it was revealed that the Australian Army Development Guide contained a suggestion that some parts of Australia may be of greater defence importance than others.

The political sensitivity involved in the suggestion that in a defence crises some part of the country might be deliberately abandoned is also easy to understand. Yet, for a country the size of Australia, with its relatively small population and economic base, and its large tracts of sparcely inhabited countryside, some ordering of defence priorities makes eminent military sense. Concentration of force at the decisive time and place is a well established principle of war. Likewise, as Churchill is quoted as having said, “to try to defend everywhere is to be weak everywhere”. Clearly, in February 1942 when the Government rejected General Mackay’s troop disposition plan it did so in response to political considerations. What was not done was to recast the proposed troop dispositions to meet the requirement of defending, with equal effort and determination, the whole of the continent of Australia.

Perhaps some modern day strategists, both political and military, might care to offer an alternative to the Brisbane Line strategy. They might also like to consider the alternative situation for Australia that would have pertained had Japan not attacked Pearl Harbour in December 1941 and had bypassed the Philippines in its drive south towards Australia. In 1941 it was by no means certain that the United States
would enter the war. Many have criticised the wisdom of Japan’s action in provoking the United States, and clearly in December 1941 the United States itself was not expecting such a move.

While in retrospect it was found that Japan had in 1942 rejected the idea of invading Australia, it did seriously consider doing so. Just how Japan would have deployed the 12 divisions assessed as being necessary for invasion and how it might have gone about the invasion has not been revealed. Again, perhaps there are some modern day strategists who might like to contemplate how Japan might have carried out an invasion of Australia in 1942.

While the personalities and the players may change there have been a number of issues in the debate on the defence of Australia that have endured over the years. The arguments of “reliance on great and powerful friends” versus self-reliance; of the prime threat being raids or invasion; of forward defence versus continental defence; and the political versus military issues behind the Brisbane Line are all as much in vogue today as there were when Australia was threatened by Japan in the early 1940’s.

With hindsight one can look back at the defence of Australia circa 1942 and criticise the decision taken by the political and military leaders of the day. With hindsight, criticism is easy; what is not so easy is to come up with alternative strategies. However, the effort of trying to do so may help to better understand contemporary issues related to the defence of Australia.

NOTES

2. op. cit.
3. op. cit.
5. McCarthy op. cit.
In recruit training, Australia has struck out in a line of her own . . . Australia may yet be able to boast that she has shown the way to great military powers (including Switzerland and the Mother Country) of raising powerful armies for home defence with a minimum tax on the priceless time of the adult male worker.¹

Introduction

THE optimistic remarks above were made by Lieutenant General Sir Ian Hamilton, then Inspector General of British Overseas Forces, during his review of Australian military forces in 1914. By that time, Australia had developed a unique scheme of compulsory military training (CMT) amidst a growing belief in Australia’s vulnerability. The scheme was directed at training Australia’s youth, and resembled the Swiss system of universal military training.

CMT began in Australia in July 1911 and lasted until the escalation of war in 1915, although it was not officially ceased until 1929. Based on the 1909 Defence Bill prepared by the Federal Government of Alfred Deakin, CMT required that “. . . all male inhabitants residing therein for six months shall be trained”.² Youths aged between 12 to 14 years were termed junior cadets and those from 14 to 18 years were senior cadets. Each of these groups was required to undertake 90 hours training per year. Those from 18 to 26 years, termed the citizen forces, were required to complete 16 days duty per year, with no less than eight days in an annual camp.³

Australia’s Threat

Why did Australians support the introduction and practice of CMT for boys? Firstly, many people believed that the new nation of Australia was a target for the expanding Germany and Japan. The military growth by these nations after 1900 cast . . . ‘the shadow of a mighty hand over Australia.⁴ The threat was intensified by Australia’s commitment to the White Australia policy, and because of the instability in the Pacific area. Further, the doubts over reliable support from Great Britain’s Navy added to a sense of vulnerability, which in turn led to increased support for an Australian home defence scheme.

Public Acceptance

The Australian public went along with the scheme, which at the time seemed good for the new nation. Once underway CMT was not overwhelmingly popular, but was certainly overwhelmingly accepted by the vast majority.⁵ Australians supported CMT for home defence, and the scheme was moulded to avoid the evils of militarism and conscription seen in Europe before 1900. The memories of Eureka remained strong in Australia until the 1930s, and so CMT the new nation had to be seen as training for
defence and not as provision of forces to control civil unrest. 

The major factor behind the introduction of CMT was the perception of threats to the new nation. In the mid-nineteenth century the colonies had been relatively insulated from world troubles. After 1870, the fever of Imperialism in Europe reached the Pacific. The colonies became wary of Russian cruisers searching for warm water ports. Queensland unsuccessfully annexed New Guinea in 1883 rather than allowing Germany to hold a potential base to Australia’s north. Similarly France’s negative response to a joint Anglo/French protectorate in New Caledonia after 1905 alarmed many. Prime Minister Deakin had pressed Great Britain over Australia’s unstable position in the Pacific but to no avail.

The Fear of Japan

Since the gold rushes in the 1860s Australians had feared the Asians, but after 1895 Japan replaced China as the major threat and added to the new sense of strategic vulnerability. After Federation, Japan’s military expansion and a string of incidents began to indicate possible future confrontation. Australia made explicit her concern for purity in the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act, which excluded Japanese people as other non-Europeans. Japan complained to Prime Minister Barton in 1901 against the legislation.

Australia at that time was unaware of British negotiations with Japan which resulted in the 1902 Anglo/Japanese alliance. Australia’s immigration stance, though embarrassing to the British, remained unchanged after the agreement. The alliance was renewed in 1905, again without any consultation with Australia by the British. By 1911, British attitudes changed and Australia and other Dominions were invited to discuss the alliance before a further renewal. The British dilemma was now whether to abandon the alliance, thus leaving the dominions undefended unless her Navy could be further increased; or to rely on Japanese support in the Pacific in the event of European war. Though Japan was officially an Australian ally, many remained suspicious despite the agreements.

The Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905 at the Battle of Tsushima has been described as akin to Trafalgar. The world was now aware of the Japanese military strength, and in Australia public concern was aroused. Further unrest with the 1906/7 California segregation cases worried Australians. This minor US/Japanese conflict on the US west coast was a factor in the deployment of the US Great White Fleet to the Pacific. Urgent calls for improvements in Australia’s defences prompted articles such as the one below from the Sydney Morning Herald in 1905.

The Yellow man has taught the White man a lesson that Australia can only neglect at their own peril.

The White Australia Policy

The Australian fear of conquest was magnified by the racial prejudice in the White Australia Policy. Though also the first plank in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) platform, the bulk of the first Parliament after Federation regarded the checking of non-European immigration as a matter of the first national importance. Prominent statesmen such as Barton, Griffith, Deakin and Forrest associated in embodying an Australian Monroe Doctrine into Legislative form with the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act. With Japanese expansion, Australia’s anxiety as a possible target was described by W.M. Hughes.

We have arrogantly declared to the world that this is to be a white man’s country. There are 4.2 million of us; 21,000 of whom bear arms. To the 400 million Chinese, to the 44 million Japanese flushed with success over Russia; we have said you must not come in.

THE GLAMOUR OF THE UNIFORM

CITIZEN (bitterly): “Oonst I was her only love; but a pore bloke’s got no show with the women when these military’s about.”
Australia's Relationship with Great Britain

After Federation, Australia's relationship with the Mother Country, Great Britain, began to change. In 1899, the colonies contained 3.75 million people, of whom 95 percent were from British stock. Australia was strongly attached to the Empire. Strong patriotism is evident by Australian commitments to the Sudan, Boer and Great wars. During the new imperialism period, between 1870 to 1900, most colonials enjoyed a sense of superiority as a result of their connection with the British Empire. This superiority complex was linked to a belief in white supremacy. The anonymous Edwardian group publishing the Round Table claimed that Australian sentiment to the Empire grew continually between the Boer and Great wars, due to the sense of isolation and threats from Germany and Japan.

The Pacific

Differences did arise between Australia and the British over issues such as naval defence and Pacific islands policy. This leads to Meaney's description of the great incongruity in Federal policies, a combination of patriotism to the empire yet an insistence on exclusive political control of Australia's affairs. Australia was worried over the possibility of close potential military bases in the Pacific, and for many years sought to annex islands under British hegemony. Instead many islands were used as pawns for British foreign policy deals.

Australian Defence Agreements

The reliance on the Royal Navy after 1905 was another source of discontent to Australians. As a Victorian delegate at the 1887 Naval Agreement, Deakin had foreseen the need for an Australian Navy rather than continuing the British support commitments. Delegates at the Conference however established the precedent of maintaining an additional Royal Naval Auxiliary Squadron in Sydney with colonial subsidies.

This agreement was renewed in 1902 for a further 10 years. Deakin's judgement was verified by the British decision in 1905 to deploy the subsidised squadron away from Sydney to match German forces in the European theatre. At the 1909 Imperial Conference the decision to build an Australian Navy was undertaken and establishment of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) occurred in 1911 based on plans from Deakin and Creswell.

In 1905 Australia's land forces were meagre. After the withdrawal of British military forces in 1870 each colony maintained units of unpaid citizen soldiers with a small imperial cadre staff. In 1880 militia units were raised. School cadets had also been introduced in most states, as early as 1860 in NSW. At Federation Australia's militia based land forces totalled 29,000, all of whom were volunteers.

Building Australian Forces

Frustrated by negotiations with the British and aware of the need for action, Prime Minister Deakin had drafted plans by 1905 to build a Navy, improve coastal defences and to raise a citizen Army. He directed the Chief of Military Intelligence, Colonel Bridges, to visit Switzerland in 1906 and report on their military training arrangements. Bridges' report was the basis for Deakin's 1907 defence policy statement announcing CMT for 18 to 20 year olds. The Swiss system had been favoured by Deakin because unlike major powers they had adopted a true militia, a part-time citizen Army raised solely for home defence. The Swiss, like Australia, were also a small democratic nation.
The Vanishment of the Kilt

It is alleged that petticoated regiments are to be abolished in Australia.

McTavish: ‘‘Tak’ off ma kilts! An’ mak’ mesel’ reedic’lus? Dinna fash yersel’, Muster Pearce. I wull na’ dae it!’’

Development of CMT

The early Parliament favoured a part-time or citizen Army for Australia rather than a standing Army after colonial success in the unconventional Boer War. Australia’s Commander-in-Chief from 1902 to 1904, Lieutenant General, Edward Hutton, agreed that the citizen militia could produce fighting troops of a high calibre such as the 16,000 colonials sent to South Africa. A citizen Army concept had been included in Forrest’s 1901 Defence Bill, and Hughes’ amendments to the 1903 bill. Both of these were unsuccessful.

The ANDL

1905 was a significant year in the development of the CMT scheme. In September the Australian National Defence Leave (ANDL) was formed and began strong support of CMT. The NSW branch, founded by Lieutenant Colonel G.R. Campbell on a non-party basis, advocated a military scheme similar to the Swiss’ system and a Naval reserve akin to the British. The ANDL attracted the solid following of influential people amidst the growing climate of vulnerability.

Typical members were W.M. Hughes (Secretary) and J.C. Watson (Vice President). Hughes took a major role in the ANDL growth, and persuaded Deakin to also join. The ANDL insisted on the immediacy of a part-time Army, and building a reserve force of 250,000 over 25 years. The League’s paper, The Call, was edited by Hughes and aided by racist cartoons from Norman Lindsay. A typical editorial from The Call shows the ANDL influence on the public to commence a CMT scheme.

The only effective society for peace is that which keeps an up to date gun with which to threaten a disturber of the peace.

ALP Support

Public influence from the ANDL members was especially important because key foundation personnel were also prominent ALP members. J.C. Watson, the ALP leader from 1901 to 1907 and Prime Minister in 1904 led the conversion, (though he was to be expelled from the ALP in 1916 because of his pro-conscription stance). At the 1908 ALP conference, CMT was carried as an ALP policy by 24 votes to seven with only slight opposition from a small socialist element. Moderate ALP delegates had therefore accepted the yellow peril concept.

The ALP decision is significant when considering that since 1919 the ALP has vehemently opposed any form of conscription. The 1908 decision was of course directed towards a home defence militia rather than a standing Army for overseas service as with the 1916 and 1917 referendums. Tanner explains the 1908 decision as an embrace of overall ALP policy towards centralised collective action, in this case against the common threat.

CMT thus aligned to the ALP ideals of people acting out their role as citizens. Tanner notes the concept of compulsory democracy, compelling people to fully exercise their privileges. This was linked to the egalitarian plan of levelling society. This included the White Australia Policy to cultivate an Australian sentiment. CMT could therefore align to ALP ideals, given the accepted requirement after Federation to strengthen Australia’s defences.

The 1909 dreadnought scare cast more doubts on assistance to Australia from the Royal Navy. Statistics were revealed showing that Britannia no longer ruled the waves, instead Germany was numerically superior. Prime Minister Fisher did not initially follow the New Zealand precedent of offering the British a dreadnought, instead he kept to his policy of building Aus-
tralian forces despite his strong personal ideals for Imperial unity.

Deakin's crucial 1907 defence policy statement, introducing CMT, received public support amidst the successful 1908 visit of the US Great White Fleet. An estimated one-quarter of the Australian population viewed the 16 battleships crewed by 14,500 men. In 1908 a bill for CMT was introduced to Parliament. Shortly afterwards ALP support to Mr Deakin was removed and Andrew Fisher became Prime Minister. Yet the new government pushed through Deakin's defence plans as evidenced by Defence Minister Cook's support when reintroducing the Defence Bill in September 1909.

We propose to create the militia as the first striking lane, equipped and ready for war ... to train young men compulsorily up to 20 years of age, and these will provide for future militia numbers.

Passage of the Defence Act

The Defence Act was passed in December of 1909 compelling males aged from 12 to 20 years to train as of July 1911. Jauncey has claimed that in the 15 months between the bills first reading (by Defence Minister Ewing) and the first passage under the Fisher government, opposition from the public was feeble.

Jauncey claimed that most papers favoured CMT and gave the scheme minimal adverse coverage. Minor opposition, such as in the Barrier Truth newspaper, was overshadowed by an ongoing coal dispute and also because the new laws were aimed more at the younger generation than adults. The Barrier Truth opposed CMT because of the bad consequences of militarism, the waste of working time and the idealization of war.

The ALP won the 1910 Federal elections, the first with a labour/non-labour distinction. The ALP set about consolidating Deakin's defence plans. The new Defence Minister Pearce attended the 1911 Colonial Conference, and left London convinced that war was inevitable. The deadline for CMT enrolment was January 31st, 1911, and the new government set about administering the practice of CMT in the uneasy climate 10 years after the initial plans for a citizen Army had been raised in Forrest's 1901 Defence Bill.

Implementing CMT

Minor problems were encountered in the practice of CMT. These included complaints to Mr Pearce over shortages of drill halls and covered areas, dangerous lantern marches on roads and unhappiness over missing Saturday afternoon sports. More serious problems also occurred. Working youths, forced to drill in their own time unlike schoolboys, aggravated grievances in the community over the working class distinction. The requirement for senior cadets to undertake an oath of allegiance was successfully disputed because of implications for keeping the peace.

Prosecutions

The scheme was not immediately universal, with only 59 percent of Australia's eligible youth registering in 1911. Prosecutions began in 1912, and by July 1915 they totalled 27,749. Punishments included fines (often for parents) and short gaol sentences for 5,732 people by July 1915. The notorious detentions of Quakers Tom Roberts and Walter Krygger at Fort Queenscliff in 1913 attracted public interest. Barrett notes that despite the prosecutions overall public support was widespread, and at the worst boys grew to accept and like the scheme.
The AFL

The Quaker influence, especially vocal in South Australia, led to the formation of the Australian Freedom League (AFL) in 1911. Organized by Englishman John Fletcher, the AFL (like the ANDL) was non-political and non-sectarian. By the end of 1912 the AFL numbered 7,000 members, who argued that CMT was an infringement on civil liberties and that Australia had no imminent threat. The group faded with the advent of the Great War and in 1915 suspended operations.

Defence Minister Pearce gave the AFL wide scope and allowed conscientious objectors (mainly Quakers) to be given non-combatant duties. Exemptions were high. In 1911 there were 57,949 exemptions from the 155,132 males registered. With various reasons for exemption (previous service, handicap, etc) the scheme was only effective for able bodied men in the closely settled regions.

The Question of the Scheme’s Success

The measure of the CMT success is arguable. Tanner notes that... "rising tensions may have increased the no vote in 1916 and 1917." Jauncey claimed that... "the cost of CMT would have become an important discussion point if the war had not intervened." Barrett’s 1978 survey of surviving trainees is significant with the vast majority replying that the scheme was well accepted and similarly the majority served in some sphere in the Great War. Barrett found that the low percentage who opposed CMT would not have had the numbers to force the scheme to collapse.

The scheme appears to have had some success on the social problem of that era, larrikkism. The training of youth in the urban areas reduced larrikkism, with some of the best trainees in 1913 coming from Sydney’s Waterloo area. The scheme also gave many Australians a taste of the military lifestyle. From the five Australian Divisions raised for service in the Great War, sufficient men were trained to fill one complete division during 1911 to 1915.

Conclusion

Australia’s decision to undertake CMT was significant. Australia was the first English speaking nation to adopt a law compelling CMT in peacetime. The Australian initiative was based on an awareness of strategic vulnerability after Federation. The main factor behind this was the significant military expansion of Germany and Japan coupled with the decline in reliable support from the Royal Navy in the Pacific. The Australian fear of conquest was intensified by the White Australia Policy, which demonstrated to the world the Australian public’s unwillingness to open up the new nation to non-Europeans.

In the decade after Federation the majority of the Australian public readily accepted the need for a strengthening of home defences. Aided by influential groups such as the vocal ANDL, the need for a CMT scheme was directed at Australia’s youth, though based on the Swiss model, and seemed to best fit the ideals of a democracy.

Once underway the CMT scheme had minor problems with prosecutions and exemptions, but the scheme was generally accepted by the vast majority as good for Australia. The scheme’s overall success cannot be gauged because of the overriding influence of the Great War escalation after 1915. The controversial conscription referendums in 1916 and 1917 have since overshadowed the motives underlying the introduction and practice of CMT up to 1914. Conscription has ultimately become one of the very few themes that bitterly divides the nation. Yet from 1901 Australians supported the need for a home defence scheme and CMT was instituted as the best available system in Australia between 1911 and 1915.
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PREPARING TO DEFEAT
THE LOW-LEVEL
THREAT

By Major W.A. JUCHA, RA Inf

Introduction
AUSTRALIA'S defence preparedness has long been the butt of unkind jokes by the media and the general public. Successive governments blame each other for neglecting the defence of the nation. Sometimes, defence appears to be forgotten altogether. Perhaps the priority and attitude accorded defence is understandable as there is no major threat readily apparent. And anyway, a major threat would take some time to develop thus allowing Australia a period of grace in which to prepare, or so the oft heard argument goes. The time for serious defence consideration has, however, already arrived. A recent Parliamentary Committee has assessed that Australia's defence forces may not be able to meet even low-level threats. While the nature of low-level threats was not specified it was suggested that they could occur with little or no warning.

If a threat was to eventuate tomorrow, Australia's vaunted preparation time would have been eroded. Australia would be faced with an invitation to war — ready or not! Could the military, and specifically the Army, cope? There should be absolutely no doubt at all that it could. However, it would assist if today's preparations were more directly geared to this more likely of the credible threats.

Army Structure and Capabilities
Given the present day non-specific threat indicators, the Army is not unrealistically structured on the core force concept, capable of expanding to meet a wide range of credible threats. Again, very prudently, a significant part of the Army is trained and prepared for short notice low-level operations. With the recent training experiences of the Operational Deployment Force (ODF), there is no doubt that it can deploy extremely quickly to any area of Australian interest. Admittedly, it is a force on 'light scales' and therefore its sustainability could be suspect in some situations. Moreover, follow up forces, if required, are at a lesser state of readiness. However, this is unnecessarily accentuating the negative at this stage.

Within the present threat assessment, Australia's north and north-west are seen as vulnerable. In recent exercises of ODF elements in those areas, it was evident that the timely placement of troops, even on light scales, constituted significant combat power, far beyond that which might appear on a theorist's chart. The positive force of even a small number of troops in the right place, at the right time far outweighed any negative criticisms that could be levelled. Why then is there pessimism in the air?

Army Doctrine and Training for Low-Level Threat
Present exercise scenarios are usually based upon the Musorian and generally elicit an Aus-
tralian response at medium to high level conflict; beyond the ODF capability and purpose. This produces an ideal training environment for all officers in the art of war on the modern battlefield. The organizations in such exercises are doctrinally perfect. Division and corps commanders abound, and infantry, mechanised and armoured formations are wheeled across the continent. Logisticians gnash their teeth over Australia's inadequate port, rail and road facilities but in the end manage to support the combat zone. On paper at least, the war is won.

The value of training for high level conflict is not questioned as it is essential if Australia is to have any chance of succeeding as an independent nation. There does, however, seem to be a strange arrangement of priorities or at least an odd allocation of training time. For if Australia is truly at more risk from a low threat situation, why is not more training emphasis placed in that direction? It is not enough to simply task the ODF with developing capabilities for low level operations without pursuing the same studies at formal training institutions. After all, the format of military studies is well developed with new organizations and concepts being jointly proved in the classroom and the field. Without allowing Australia's concepts of low-level operations to be tested in the same fashion, two major mistakes are committed. Firstly, the potentially introverted nature of the development of the ODF could allow errors to remain undiscovered and therefore uncriticised. Secondly, the Army at large would remain ignorant of the ODF and more importantly unfamiliar with the nature of low-level operations in Australia. This is especially damming as it is from the rest of the Army that any follow up forces would come to support the ODF.

With the recent Exercise Kangaroo 83 in the north-west of Australia in a low-level threat scenario, the usual long list of lessons learned was produced. Undoubtedly it will be circulated for comment and development will occur. But how long will it take and how correct will the lessons be if not widely tested? What impact will the lessons have on minds only formally trained in tactics and war administration at division and higher level in a conventional limited war setting? The suspicion is that the impact and the value will be reduced.

The north-west of Australia demands a fresh look at organizations and tactics on the two grounds of harsh environment and the nature of assets located there. The environment could well be a more dominant consideration than the enemy in some cases. Understanding and domination of the Australian environment will be paramount in coping with an enemy threat; the basis of Russian success on their own soil over the Germans in World War II is testimony to this need for special understanding. The assets of the north-west are widely dispersed and supported by only a meagre infrastructure. Large scale military operations in the area to control designated assets could only be supported with a huge logistic effort. Alternatively, a smaller number of troops carefully deployed at critical points, such as the few road and railheads, ports, airfields and most importantly, water supplies could control vast areas. The smaller number of troops and their greater dispersion is foreign to the usual train of tactical and logistic thought developed and practised against the conventional Musorian aggressor.

As already discussed, it is the ODF which has been earmarked as the first and rapid response to a low-level threat in an area such as the north-west. The present arguments as to its lack of staying or hitting power because of its light scales may not be relevant. Indeed, it could well be the ODF lightness and manoeuvrability that will ensure its success. A usual response from officers studying low-level operations is that once the ODF has been deployed, follow up forces must be dispatched to boost firepower and mobility. Often the response is simply a knee-jerk reaction to build up accepted (conventional) combat ratios without much thought given to the environment and the effect on the campaign to be fought. Again, the additional forces may well be required, and this provides a useful logistic exercise in itself. But knowing what sort of forces are needed and how to employ them on arrival is another matter entirely. The criticism here is that there seems to be but one operational mode and it is applied to all situations.

While the present military concepts are probably correct for medium to high levels of conflict, they are not easily scaled down for low-level operations. The principles of war will remain unchanged but their application will be shaped by the situation of the day. Army will need to work from the basis of its standard infantry division as at present, but the special
requirements of a light scaled force must be understood so that it is not encumbered with inapplicable conventional doctrine and even worse, too much rigid logistic support. The inherent advantages of light scales would then be lost as conventionalism again becomes supreme.

Understanding and the application of light scales should not be a difficult task to achieve. It could be argued that with present manpower and equipment levels, the Army is already on light scales. The only conflict to be overcome is the organizational and intellectual leap into the concept of low level operations, which it must again be stressed, is Australia's most likely threat scenario.

Positive Results from Training

As suggested at the outset of this article, there is a notable but misplaced despondency at Australia's defence efforts. Within the ranks of the professionals the author has noticed disenchantment among some junior and middle ranking officers that their units bear little resemblance to the organizational charts shown in the training pamphlets. A related theme is that officers do not feel especially confident about Army's chances in facing the Musorian at the medium to high level threat. A common solution to this challenge among those same officers is that the Army must be increased, with greater emphasis placed on mobility and firepower; the suggested shopping list is costly and in the short term unattainable. This realization then causes more despondency, but supposedly, a more rationalized one.

Generally a mature appreciation by officers will provide the rationale for the restrictions to the present day Army. The same appreciation might also suggest why a high state of readiness against the Musorian or his allies is not appropriate at the present time. A mature outlook cannot, however, be expected of all interested parties in the defence debate. This has significance because of their possible unfavourable impact upon public opinion and in time, upon national morale. In the view of many, either Australia is not spending enough on its defence or not enough value is being eked out of the defence dollar, if it is still believed that Australia is unable to defend itself against even a low level threat. The level of confidence of all parties must be raised.

The ODF gives Army an operational capability today. This is in itself a significant achievement. Yet how much is known about this even within Army? Not a great deal because the ODF is a peculiar organization of the 'deep north' which has a priority allocation of assets to the apparent detriment and resentment of the Army of the 'south'. Low-level operations where studied are reserved for senior officers only. Are the less senior unable to grasp the essentials? Moreover, low-level operations where studied are often grouped in the miscellaneous section of military knowledge alongside counter-insurgency, which itself is now unfashionable. It is plain that if the priority for studying low-level operations is both reduced and restricted, little gains in the subject will be made. The lack of confidence should not therefore surprise.

If more emphasis was placed on the study of low-level threat operations in Australia's vulnerable areas, the ability to defend Australia tomorrow would naturally increase, and not only against the low-level threat. Having reached the stage of being confident of dealing with the low scale, it would be not unexpected that higher level operations could be faced with more confidence. It is that confidence, translated into public opinion and morale that will be an essential ingredient in any conflict that Australia may be involved.

Conclusion

Australia's poor opinion of its ability to defend itself against low level threat is misplaced. It is a view based on a faulty appreciation of Australia's environment and the advantages that accrue to the defender who understands it. The argument, therefore, to simply have a bigger Army or more equipment is not sound if based on concepts and tactics that take little note of Australia's environment. The organizations and doctrine studied in Army today are based on perceptions of conventional limited war at medium to high levels. Preparing for such a war is essential, but it must be appreciated that no matter how much is done to prepare, there can always be the nagging feeling of inadequacy, especially against Musoria and her allies. There is no reason for this feeling to spill over into the low-level threat area. Even though such threat can be at very short notice it will be fought on ground that the Army should know
far better than any attacker. Moreover, mastery of the low-level threat will eventually lead to advantages in coping with higher conflict. While preparations for all contingencies must be concurrent, it seems evident that Australia must be confident against the smaller dangers first, for if defeated at that level, the higher dangers may well be rendered irrelevant.

**CADRE BULLETIN**

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which they appear are available at the libraries on most Defence establishments.

**Target, Target, Burning Bright: A night Vision Survey.** Harvey, David *Defense and Foreign Affairs*; Feb 86: 19-21 notes the night vision goggles and night vision equipment of various countries, notable in the sphere of aviation usage. Contains inserted article entitled Israeli night vision by Michael Dunn.

**Antennas on Warships.** Fischer, Karl *Naval Forces*; 6/85: 104+(8p) Antennas on warships include — radio antennas in different versions; radar antennas for omnidirectional and fire control tasks; and EW antennas whose arrangement must be compatible with the requirements of ship construction and weapons systems.

**Landing on Microwaves.** Glines, C.V. *Air Force Magazine*; Jan 86: 92-95 The MLS (Microwave Landing System) will replace the ILS (Instrument Landing System) as the primary runway approach system in the 1990s. Its main advantage is that it provides many paths to a single runway from different azimuth angles and varied glide slope angles.

**Powerful Capabilities and Plain Speaking at MILCOMP 85.** Reed, John *Armada International*; 8/85: 172+(2p) This conference held at London's Wembley Conference Centre between October 1-3, 1985 was essentially an event for the specialist and is said to be the first unclassified conference and exhibition of computers, graphics and computer software developed for the military environment.

**Development of Computer Interactive Tests for Assigning Helicopter Pilots to Different Training Missions.** Myers, David C.; Schenmer, F. Mark; Fleishman, Edwin A. *Vertiflite*; Sept/Oct 85: 48-51 These research scientists with ARRO (Advanced Research Resources Organization) have developed an MTAB (Mission Track Assignment Battery).

**Texas Instruments Nears Completion of LISP Language Microprocessor.** *Aviation Week and Space Technology*; 17 Feb 86: 57+(3p) The LISP microprocessor chip, being developed under DARPA sponsorship as part of its Strategic Computing Initiative, is designed to replace multiple chips that are in LISP machines now. The LISP chip is a very large scale integrated circuit processor.

**Aircraft Accident Investigation — a potential applications area for artificial intelligence concepts.** Roberts, C.A. *Flight Safety Digest*; Jan 86: 6-16 Describes sources of numerical data used to assess the causes of aviation accidents; describes the current laboratory capabilities for computer analysis; addresses techniques used in performing aircraft-related accident investigation; outlines plans for software enhancement and development; and postulates potential areas for the application of artificial intelligence to aircraft accident investigation. Contains a list of worldwide airline fatal accidents, turbine-powered hull losses for 1985.
ONCE upon a time, in the land of Oz, there lived five wise men who each looked after a separate area south of latitude 30°. They had to be very wise men indeed because they were able to decide when it was either hot or cold.

The Grand Wizard of Oz, like most Grand Wizards had an army who worked loyally for him. They were, for the most part reasonably content with their lot. The part however that was discontented lived south of latitude 30° so the Grand Wizard sent his Chief of Persons and Problems to see what the matter was.

After many many years (things moved slowly in Oz) the Grand Wizard called his Chief of Persons and Problems to the Grand Hall to tell the court what the problems were.

"Well, your Grand Wizardship" began the Chief of Persons and Problems; "I, —

"Call me Gee Wiz," said the Grand Wizard, "I'm feeling in a good mood today!!"

"Well Gee Wiz," said the chief, "this has not been an easy task. First of all I spoke to the five wise men who said they were not aware of any problems. One even offered to form a committee to sort them out but I dissuaded him from that.

"Then I spoke to the soldiers who explained their problem like this:

"For years," they said, "we have asked for a uniform which is flexible enough to cope with the variety of climatic conditions which prevail throughout this great land. Committees to advise committees were set up, many submissions were written and much agreeing and nodding of heads was seen however nothing has been done. Each year we change from a heavy uniform to a light one then back again. The remainder of the population does it when they are either hot or cold but we have to wait until it is declared either hot or cold by the five wise men and they always get it wrong. When the weather turns hot we always boil until the light dawns and the word is spoken and light uniforms are donned. Similarly we wear our light uniforms until long after the cold has arrived and we freeze until the "light dawns" and the word is spoken. If we had a flexible uniform, they said, we could be comfortable like everybody else for the whole year."

"So, Sire I then went back to the five wise men who said they were never wrong and that even though they worked in offices they didn't feel any discomfort. They also suggested I talk
to the Chief Manipulator of the Purse, which I did."

"Oh!!" said the Wiz, "why ask him any questions? What has this to do with money?"

"Well," said the Chief of Persons and Problems, who by this time was looking a little flustered, "it seems that nobody in your Army can do anything unless he approves it."

"Even me?"

"Even you, Sire."

"We'll see about that later," said the Wiz, "now get on with this ridiculous story."

"Yes, Sire. The Purse Manipulator told me that 'Yes, they had received many requests about uniforms, with lots of photographs and drawings, but there wasn't enough money in The Purse to get them'."

"How long have they had these uniforms?"

"The winter one, Sire, goes back to the last, or was it the first, great war and the summer one some two and one half decades."

"Well, why do they want to change them then?"

"It would appear, Sire, that apart from the climate issue the other factor is the changing styles of dress of the general population.

"Humm!! that does seem reasonable. Even I don't wear my grandfather's clothes now," said the Wiz, who by now was no longer in a jovial mood.

"Fetch the Grand Manipulator of the Purse," he cried.

The crowd rippled, parted and out stepped a tall, slim, impeccably dressed courtier with black hair and hawkish features. In one hand he held a small cigar whilst the other nonchalantly fingered the chain of his watch which nestled snuggly in his waistcoat.

"Yes, Sire."

"Where is the money, you Filcher of the Public Purse?"

"Sire," cried the courtier, aghast at being so described, "did you not forget the new planes you have just bought."

"But," said the Grand Wizard, furiously, "the problem of the uniforms has been going on for years."

"Yes, Sire," said the Grand Manipulator, "but it was before my time. However, he suggested shyly, "why don't I get a committee together with some of my staff and a representative of the Chief Dresser for the Services and I'm sure we'll get something organised. Perhaps we could even design a uniform for all the services, Sire. The cost savings could be astronomical. However a project that size would take a lot of studies and consultations and we might even need a new department — just a small one mind you to run the study but I'm sure it will pay for itself in the long term."

"But what about the soldiers?"

"Oh, they've managed for this long a few more years won't make much difference."

"Fine, Grand Manipulator of the Purse we'll do that, at least they can't say we aren't doing anything."

Summer that year came early to the lands south of latitude 30° and again the five wise men were wrong.

Captain Snuggs joined the ARA in 1962 and served in the Infantry, until late 1971 when he transferred to RA Signals as a Sergeant, under the ATT Scheme. During these ten years he served overseas in Malaysia/Borneo with 3 RAR, in PNG with 1 PIR and in SVN with Pay Ops.

In 1976 Captain Snuggs was commissioned and served the next six years with Cadets and Recruiting in SA and finally Tas. He was then posted in Jan 82 to the School of Signals as an Instructor, where he is still.
Introduction

The proud tradition of serving in the Profession of Arms is a uniquely-strong and time-honored custom of the British Army. Indeed, this strong sense of duty is often inculcated from father to son, with many families taking great pride in reciting the many generations of direct ancestors who have also served in the army, often times in the same regiment. These soldiers, and especially the officers, usually consider it an entirely noble and sacred duty and responsibility in serving Queen and country. This “duty concept” has manifested itself on a multitude of occasions in unmitigated gallantry in action.

Many of these deserving and exceptional acts of “conspicuous bravery or devotion to the country in the presence of the enemy” have been recognized by the award of the Victoria Cross, the foremost British and Commonwealth gallantry decoration. Since its institution by Queen Victoria on 29 January 1856, to recognize individual deeds of heroism during the Crimean War, 1,351 Victoria Crosses and three bars have been awarded. During its revered history, the Victoria Cross has been bestowed upon father and son in three cases, and upon brothers four times. These examples of recognized intrepidity on active service among family members are enthralling threads that have been woven into the larger tapestry of the history, lineage, honors, customs, and traditions of the British Army.

Roberts — Father and Son

Field-Marshal Earl Frederick Sleigh Roberts was a young subaltern when he won the Victoria Cross during the Indian Mutiny. Roberts was stationed at Peshawar when the mutiny broke out in May 1857, and initially served in the Delhi Field Force, serving with distinction at the relief of Delhi, Lucknow, and Cawnpore. Up to the end of 1857 Roberts had had two horses killed under him, and three badly wounded, while he survived, which was no small feat. After Cawnpore was relieved by the Delhi Field Force, the objectives became more related to activities of a police nature, with the primary purpose being to restore communications between the Punjab and Bengal. With the insurrection still in progress and mutineers lurking about throughout the countryside and in the cities, there were numerous small-unit engagements and individual actions, the outcomes of which were often decided by the heroism and initiative of a solitary soldier. Such an action occurred on 2 January 1858, when the Delhi Field Force attacked a rebel mass near Khudaganj, which broke upon being charged. Roberts and other horsemen pursued the fleeing enemy, and was involved in two incidents which earned him the Victoria Cross. Officially, these acts were:

Lieutenant Roberts’ gallantry has on every occasion been most marked. On following up the retreating enemy on the 2nd of January, 1858, at Khodagnaj, he saw in the distance two sepoys going away with a standard. Lieutenant Roberts put spurs to his horse, and overtook them just as they were
about to enter a village. The immediately turned round and presented their muskets at him, and one of the men pulled the trigger, but fortunately the cap snapped, and the standard-bearer was cut down by the gallant young officer, and the standard taken possession of by him. He also, on the same day, cut down another sepoy who was standing at bay, with musket and bayonet, keeping off a sowar. Lieutenant Roberts rode to the assistance of the horseman, and rushing at the sepoy, with one blow of his sword cut him across the face, killing him on the spot.

Roberts modestly mentions these acts of heroism casually with a footnote in his autobiography: “For these two acts I was awarded the Victoria Cross.”

More than four decades later the British Empire was embroiled in a conflict with the Boers in South Africa. As a result of the British reverses during the “Black Week” of December 1899 (so called because of the defeats of Gatacre at Stormberg in Cape Colony on 10 December, of Metheun at Magersfontein the following day, and of Buller at Colenso on 15 December), Field-Marshal Roberts was appointed to replace General Sir Redvers Buller, V.C., as Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. But a personal tragedy greatly over-shadowed the success of his appointment.

Field-Marshal Roberts’ son, Lieutenant the Hon. F.H.S. Roberts, then acting as extra side-de-camp to Lieutenant-General Sir C.F. Clery, was killed “in a gallant attempt to bring back the field guns, abandoned when their detachments were overwhelmed by fire from invisible riflemen,” during the Battle of Colenso, 15 December 1899. Lieutenant Roberts was awarded, for his conspicuous gallantry, the first Victoria Cross ever to be given posthumously. One of the guns for which Lieutenant Roberts gave his life attempting to save was later presented to his father. It was a poor exchange.

The worthy son of a noble father.

Congreve — Father and Son

Captain Walter Congreve of the Rifle Brigade was serving as the Press Censor to Lieutenant-General Clery at the Battle of Colenso, 15 December 1899, when he volunteered along with Lieutenant Roberts and Captain H.N. Schofield to recover the aforementioned abandoned field-guns. The ride to the guns was a short one for Roberts and Congreve, the former being mortally wounded in the stomach and two other places, and Congreve being shot in the leg. For his undaunted heroism that day, Congreve was also awarded the Victoria Cross, later describing that day as “the most beastly day I ever spent.”

Walter Congreve later became a knighted lieutenant-general and commanded the Thirteenth Corps during the Battle of the Somme, July 1916. It was during that same battle that his son, Brevet Major William La Touche Congreve, Brigade-Major of the 76th Brigade, was also awarded the Victoria Cross — posthumously for heroism when “he pushed forward alone to find out what had become of the missing Suffolks, and so met his end from some lurking sniper.” The younger Congreve was described as “one of the most promising younger officers of the British army, a man who would have attained the very highest had he lived.”

Gough — Father and Son

Major Charles Gough, of the 5th Bengal European Cavalry, was awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallantry on four occasions between August 1857 and February 1858. His son, Captain (Brevet Major) John E. Gough, of the Rifle Brigade, was awarded the highly-coveted decoration for gallantry in a brilliant action in Somaliland on 22 April 1903.

The elder Gough retired as a successful and knighted full general, whereas his son was killed in France in 1915. Brigadier-General John Edmund Gough, V.C., C.M.G., C.B., A.D.C. to the King, had been serving as Chief of Staff of First Army under the command of General Sir Douglas Haig. Gough had been offered command of one of the new divisions, and was on orders to return to England, when he made a farewell visit to his old battalion, 2nd Rifle Brigade, in the trenches. There he was mortally wounded by a German sniper on 20 February 1915, and died the following morning.

“When he was alive, he exerted a tremendous influence over peers and subordinates, and was considered by senior officers as “one of the finest soldiers of his age.” One of the many tributes to Gough stated:

In radium there is said to be a virtue which enables it to affect adjacent objects with its own properties, and to turn them, for a time, and for certain purposes, into things of the same nature as itself. Certain rare human
characters possess a similar virtue; but although I have met with several of these in my life, there is none of them all who seemed to me to possess this quality in quite so high a degree as Gough. He was an alchemist who made fine soldiers out of all sorts and conditions of men, and whose spirit turned despondency out of doors. 22
That is what military leadership, especially in combat, is all about.

Brothers Gough

Major Charles Gough has already been mentioned, and his brother, Lieutenant H.H. Gough, 1st Bengal European Light Cavalry, was awarded the Victoria Cross for gallantry in November 1857 and February 1858 during the Indian Mutiny. 23 Lieutenant Gough later became General Sir Hugh Gough.

The Gough family is distinctively unique in the history of the Victoria Cross — three awards in two successive generations: uncle, father, and son. In addition to these three distinguished soldiers, the son of General Sir Charles Gough, V.C., newphew of General Sir Hugh Gough, V.C., and brother of Brigadier-General John Gough, V.C., was General Sir Hubert Gough, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., who commanded the British Fifth Army during World War I. Also, they were all directly related to Field-Marshal Sir Hugh (1st Viscount) Gough, hero of the Sikh Wars.

Now one cannot do better than that.

Brothers Sartorius

Captain Reginald William Sartorius, 6th Bengal Cavalry, was awarded his Victoria Cross for bravery during the Ashanti Expedition, 1873-1874, officially “For having, during the attack on Abogoo, on the 17th January last (1874), removed from under a heavy fire Sergeant-Major Baimah Doctor, a Houssa non-commissioned officer, who was mortally wounded, and placed him under cover.” 24 He later took part in the Afghan campaigns of 1879 and 1880, and retired in 1897 as a major-general.

His brother, Major Euston Sartorius, won the Victoria Cross for his gallantry and intrepidity in action Afghanistan in 1879, 25 and also retired as a major-general.

It is interesting to note that their father was Admiral of the Fleet Sir George Rose Sartorius, G.C.B. 26 One of the Sartorius brothers had a son who “thrice won the Distinguished Service Order in the 1st World War. He was very disappointed that he did not receive a Victoria Cross.” 27

Brothers Turner

Second Lieutenant A.B. Turner of the Berkshire Regiment won his Victoria Cross for bravery in France in 1915, and his brother, Major V.B. Turner, Rifle Brigade, earned his Victoria Cross in the Western Desert in 1942. 28

Brothers Bradford

Lieutenant (Temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) Roland Boys Bradford, M.C., of the 9th Battalion Durham Light Infantry was a twenty-four year-old battalion commander when he won his Victoria Cross on 1 October 1916 at Eaucourt d’Abbaye, France. During the British attack on that day, Bradford’s battalion was in support of the main assault, and after the commander of one of the lead battalions was seriously wounded, Bradford took over, at the urgent request of the wounded battalion commander, command of that battalion as well as his own. By “his fearless energy and skilful leadership of both battalions, Bradford succeeded in rallying the attack and they captured their objectives.” 29 Before being killed in action in 1917 he had become a brigadier-general — at twenty-five years of age.

His brother, Lieutenant G.N. Bradford, R.N., of H.M.S. Iris, won one of the eight Victoria Crosses awarded for the Royal Navy’s audacious raid to block the entrance of the important canal at Zeebrugge, Belgium, 22/23 April 1918. Though this mission was not totally successful, one admiral commented “it’s done more for the honour (sic) and reputation of the Navy than anything in the war.” 30

There was a third Bradford brother, Captain T.A. Bradford, who won the Distinguished Service Order during World War I. 31

Conclusion

From the Crimean War to The Falklands Islands War, there have been countless examples of bravery in battle and gallantry in combat in the British Army. Many of these outstanding acts of sheer heroism have been recognized by the award of the Victoria Cross, the most coveted and premier decoration in the United Kingdom and British Commonwealth for courage and intrepidity against an enemy.
Each of these recognized acts of heroism has been uniquely spectacular, but nothing is more phenomenal than the fact that out of the 1,351 Victoria Crosses awarded to date, there have been three cases of the decoration being awarded to a father and son, and four cases of the award being bestowed upon brothers. The demonstrated courage and valor of these warriors is a manifestation of nothing less than what all leaders and soldiers aspire to: "a rising of the human spirit over doubt, despair, fear, hardship, strain and fatigue and great danger to life itself, man's most precious possession."\(^1\)

**NOTES**


3. Edward C. Joslin, *British Awards and Medals* (London: Frederick Warne, 1974), p.30, states "To date 1,349 Crosses and three bars have been awarded." To this number have been added the two Victoria Crosses awarded posthumously as a result of The Falklands Islands War, 1982. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), p.366.


10. de Watteville, p.125.


19. Farrar-Hockley, p.73, and Dorling, p.47.


22. Oliver, p.xxxiii.

23. Dorling, p.47.


27. Wm. M. Lummis, postscript to Hebden.


32. Smyth, p.182.
CANBERRA STUDIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS NO 13: ‘PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY’, by John Knight and W. J. Hudson

Reviewed by: Captain W. B. Coates — RAAOC Centre.

It is necessary to understand that the original author of this book, Senator John Knight died prior to the completion of his work, and it was then that Mr Hudson, the eventual co-author was approached to edit the manuscript for publication. The fact that the authors were obviously unable to consult on the broad approach to the subject, nor of the resultant details to be considered is a serious problem that has been adequately overcome by Mr Hudson. The result is a highly informative work of interest to those readers wishing to improve their background knowledge of the area.

As the title suggests, this book examines the relationship between Parliament and Foreign Policy, dealing initially with the bodies responsible for the implementation of foreign policy, that is the Parliamentary Executive and the Legislators, and goes on to examine the role played by other groups in influencing policy.

The authors go into some detail in examining the background to the development of Commonwealth powers in relation to Foreign Policy, from Federation to the 1980s. This is in fact one of the most interesting sections of this work. It covers the development of our foreign policy from its beginnings as the disjointed views of the separate states, through to a period of apparent domination by British foreign policy, and finally to the present day where Australia expresses its own independent voice in world affairs (This of course may be debated strongly by those who support the view that Australian Foreign Policy is directly based upon that of the USA).

A very pleasing aspect of this book is that despite it being co-authored (and in fact originally commenced) by a Senator from one side of the political scene, the Liberal Party, there is no apparent bias for or against the views of individuals associated with Australia's Foreign Policy over the years. The examination of the effects of various groups within the community on the subject of recognition of the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States by the Labor Government of Mr Whitlam in 1974 is dealt with in very clear, unemotional terms. Conclusions drawn by the authors are based upon facts which are clearly detailed, and no attempt is made to assess the moral justification for the act itself. The same method is applied when examining the subject of the recognition of the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea during the latter part of the 1970s.

The major criticism of this book is not in its content, but instead in its presentation. The initial chapters prove to be very hard going, due to the great amount of information being detailed, as well as the style of writing employed. It does in fact become very longwinded at times, and is difficult to understand.

The overall assessment of this book is that it is an excellent background work on this subject which is unfortunately marred by its presentation.

LITTLE STICKS — THE STORY OF TWO BROTHERS, by Alan Dunlop. Printed by Acacia Press Pty Ltd. Price Hardback $12.00 Softback $8.00.

Reviewed by J P Buckley.

This is the story of the childhood days of the two Dunlop boys who lived in the bush at Sheepwash Creek and Stewarton near Benalla.

One of the boys was to become a legend in his lifetime — Sir Edward Dunlop who achieved fame as a surgeon, soldier, defender of the rights of ex servicemen and women, helper of those suffering from drug addiction, fighter against the ravages of cancer and a leader in Australia Asian friendship and culture.

These two boys did not grow up with a silver spoon. Life was hard and simple. Everything
depended on the horse — they rode to a tiny bush school but only after their duties at home were finished — there was always plenty of work after school and at weekends. They had to make their own fun and entertainment.

I can vouch for the wonderful simplicity of life in the bush at that time. I spent my early years in the Mallee, something I am ever grateful for. I knew Weary Dunlop thinks likewise. Even the drought, heat, dust storms, fires, floods and at times plagues of rabbits, mice, grasshoppers, flies, mosquitoes and other unpleasant insects could not destroy my simple affection for the bush.

After completing primary school Alan was to go to the Benalla High School and the younger brother (Weary) was to be a farmer. However a far seeing young female school mistress had other ideas. She convinced the family that Edward should also go to High School at Benalla.

Then followed a brilliant school performance, followed by training as a pharmacist and later as a medical student at Ormond College Melbourne University. I think the author could have given more details of the outstanding career of his younger brother and his honours, awards and distinctions. Here are some of them known to me:

President Australian Asian Association, Ex POW Relatives Association, Victorian Foundation on Alcohol and Drug Dependency, Ex POW Association, Victoria.
Chairman Commonwealth Government POW Trust Fund, Advisory Committee on Drug Education, Anti Cancer Council of Victoria.
Vice President Melbourne Scots Society.
Knight of St John 1982.
Australian of the Year 1977.
Hon Life Member of the RSL 1979.
Hon Fellow AMA 1973.

In his profession Sir Edward holds a most distinguished record, here and abroad, but above all else he is remembered for his brilliant surgery in the "hellhouses" of prison camps in Asia. Dunlop fought for the soldiers lives then and has since continued to fight their battles with Veterans' Affairs, to ensure that they get justice. Any ex POW can always turn to "Weary" for help, advice and action. He will take on the Minister if needs be.

Indeed that one man could hold so many high offices in his lifetime seems incredible, at the same time, it is amazing that he can do so much to help the sick, the maimed and the disabled soldiers. Weary is regarded as a hero by all ex servicemen and women and by most of the population at large. The books main interest is to tell the story of the early years of Edward Dunlop and briefly record some of his achievements. I have added a few more to the story but not all.

It’s an excellent little story — Alan Dunlop had a good career, but died just after the book was published.


Reviewed by Brig F. W. Speed

JAPAN is emerging as a significant power in the Pacific, extending down particularly to South East Asia and Oceania.

A Westerner seeking to discover Japan’s answers to its ‘defence’ problems, and its attitude to war, will find clues in Beyond War. Australian concerned by the stance of the United States in its global efforts to retain nuclear parity and thoughtful of the USSR’s growing interest in the southern Pacific region, may also see useful guidelines in the Japanese attitude.

In some Japanese circumstances, the term ‘National Security’ is coming to be regarded as better than ‘Defence’. In this book, the addition of ‘Comprehensive’ extends the meaning to areas beyond Japan’s national boundaries.

The author has taken as his base a Report on Comprehensive National Security (July 1980) edited by a former president of Japan’s Defence Academy, Masamichi Inoki. From this base he proceeded to interview some fifty distinguished individuals, Japanese, American, East Asian, and members of five influential groups, similarly diverse. They included leaders in government, universities, research organizations, industry, and the media. The interviews took the form of unstructured conversations: to all he listened respectfully and at length, apparently without bias towards or against radically different views. Thus a notable depth of understanding was achieved. The author then re-
corded the substance of these interviews in a series of precis, and further synthesized them into his own short, initial outline.

At first sight, a reader wonders whether there is a need to take in the fifty-five precis that make up so much of the book. Of course one can concentrate on the initial summary of the report, the author's outline of Japan's concept, and the final tests of the concept, made three years later. However, the precis do display the real thoughts of the interviewees in a way that is not possible in the author's brief outline, and are therefore most valuable. Moreover, at a time when super-powers are locked in a kind of cold war, a way out of which seems almost unobtainable, the precis uncover a wide variety of opinions, Japanese and non-Japanese, that actively stimulate thought.

The great breadth of views and conclusions cannot be reduced to the space of a book review, but a listening of a few will give a taste of the book's value — at the risk of quoting out of context:

.. The Soviet Union is, for the United States, an enemy; but for Japan, Russia is a vulnerable adversary with which continued talk is essential.

.. The US looks to Japan — and others — to share the task of coping effectively with a global enemy, but to the Japanese it is not obvious that Washington should assign to Japan and the others even the specific regional burdens to be borne by them.

.. For the US, lack of articulated common purpose among friends is deplorable; but for Japan there is as often safety as danger in diversities of national intention and behaviour among neighbours, both friends and adversaries. This Japanese view extends even to such relationships as the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

.. Japan challenges the proposition that great economic power necessitates possession of great military power.

.. Comprehensive national security does not prescribe priorities. The budget process has defined and still defines those priorities.

.. By the 1990s, Japan will have exceeded by at least twice, the effort all other East Asian countries will have invested in nuclear generating power and the technology of reprocessing. Nevertheless Japan will adhere to its official commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

.. To Japan, Australia and South East Asia are essential sources of supply.

.. One highly important aspect of Japan's national security structure is an intention to develop an elaborately comprehensive high-technology intelligence capability — airborne-early-warning-and-control (AWAC), radar, electronic, acoustic, photographic — for gathering exhaustive and swiftly retrievable military information strictly for defensive purpose. This will have a significant deterrent influence: and would, coincidentally, be an answer to the US charge that Japan still wants a 'free-ride'.

A question arises: what can Australia do to tune in to Japan's philosophy for survival, and to move closer to Japan's intelligence array?

ANZAC DAY — SEVENTY YEARS ON, by McKernan and Stanley. Published by William Collins. Price $24.95

Reviewed by J. P. Buckley.

THE book is prepared by Dr Michael McKernan and Peter Stanley, who both serve on the staff of the Australian War Memorial. They co-edited Australians at War 1885-1972.

McKernan has earlier written such excellent stories as Australian Churches at War, The Australian People in the Great War, All In, Australians in the Second World War.

This book presents a pictorial record of Anzac Day seventy years after the invasion of Gallipoli. It commences with the Dawn Services in the cities and towns scattered throughout Australia. It emphasises the reactions of people, the children, the soldiers, the old onlookers.

In the country towns and villages every one participates from the Dawn Service through to the refreshments at the end of the day. I like the way every person in the country villages is brought into the march, the remembrance, the party. My own son John — not a returned soldier — is pressed to join the marchers at tiny METUNG in Victoria — his three children are also very much involved — so are all the other people in the town. That's how Anzac Day should be remembered.
The photographs are excellent and very well and tastefully selected. They were sent from all over Australia. Supporting the photographs are five short essays written by a clergyman, a member of the second AIF, who was a prisoner of war, a reader in history, a senior lecturer in education and a lady academic.

I have only one criticism. The so called Light Horse Veteran on page 52 is not a Light Horse Veteran. The light horse group played a part in the Melbourne March, obviously did not serve in the Light Horse Regiments — indeed one was a sapper, one was a gunner in the second world war and one had no war service. Never the less they perform an inspiring task each year, under Colonel Harry Burton.

Anzac Day is one of Australia’s national days — many think it should be our “National Day” It’s a day which the great majority of Australians identify with — even though the old diggers are slowly fading away.

This book is inspiring — I read it on Anzac Day after the march. It captures the importance and spirit of Anzac throughout Australia. Well done McKernan and Stanley.

THE WHITE MOUSE THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NANCY WAKE. Published by MacMillan, Australia. Price $19.95.

Reviewed by John Buckley OBE.

NANCY Wake was born in New Zealand, but whilst still a baby her parents moved to Australia. Nancy left Australia in her early twenties and settled in Paris where she worked as a journalist and enjoyed life there.

The experience which she gained in France during that period was to prepare her for the magnificent service which followed the outbreak of the war. She became a legened for her performance behind the enemy lines, firstly for organising of the escape of Allied service personel; then her work in administration and organisation of the French Resistance from February 1944 (when she parachuted back into France) could only be described as hair raising adventures and courage of the highest possible order against the bestial Nazis.

Her service was such that the Nazis were determined that she should be captured and executed. Many times she was almost caught, but by sheer guts and brains, Nancy was able to hoodwink the Gestapo and escape time after time. They called her “The White Mouse”.

On one occasion Nancy was one of the main leaders in an attack on a Gestapo headquarters; she threw a grenade into a dining room filled with Officers.

Not only were the Nazis the enemy, but one rival Resistance leader attempted to murder her. After that, her troops insisted that she always had a bodyguard of her own devoted comrades.

Nancy played a significant part in the guerilla battle when 7,000 Maquis were surrounded and outnumbered by three times the number of S S troops. The Maquis won the battle leaving over 1400 dead S S lying on the plateau.

The narrative is written in simple, clear and concise language — it has its moments of humour in periods of great danger and hardship. I could only describe it as a thrilling story written by an extremely brave and dedicated herione.

Nancy Wake (now Mrs John Forward) deserved all the awards for bravery which were given to her for her meritorious service — probably she deserved more.

Here are some of the awards:—

George Medal
The Croix de Guerre with Palm and Bar
The Croix de Guerre with Star
The Medaille de la Resistance
The American Medal of Freedom with Bronze Palm
Chevalier de la Legion d’Honneur

Nancy did not hear of her first husband’s death until after the war. He had been captured by the Gestapo and died in captivity. Her post war experiences in Europe were full of adventure and interest. Returning to Australia, for a time she flirted with politics in New South Wales, contesting the Barton seat occupied by Dr Evatt. She did not enjoy her political experience. Later she continued her overseas travels and adventures.

There is not a dull moment in reading this excellent book. As stated earlier Nancy Wake is a legend in her own life time — an accolade she richly deserves. She now lives in Sydney.

I should like to congratulate MACMILLAN Australia on the very high standard of the publication.
MILITARY History as one aid to professional development has been under a cloud for some years. This book makes a different approach to the subject that is quite refreshing.

The author, a relatively young but experienced military historian with an army background, takes, as a central theme, a single operation in the first world war, and brings out for today’s potential leaders the mistakes made in that and related engagements of seventy years ago. The book’s value lies not so much in the narrative of the battle itself as in the author’s analysis of the events leading up to it — the complexities of a major campaign which he terms a ‘coalition war’.

This is not to imply that the events have not been properly dealt with by other and more eminent historians; but rather that his researcher has uncovered material not previously given prominence in a military sense. Moreover the writer presents his analysis clearly and very readably.

The generals involved — Haig, the Commander-in-Chief, in particular — were not incompetent in the simplistic sense of that word, as has been asserted by others. In the main, they were well trained and competent in the warfare to which they were accustomed — the Boer Wars, the small wars of the Asian continent, and in exercises at the Staff College of the time. However their minds had a certain professional rigidity that prevented them from taking in the devastating power of the new machine-gun and massed artillery tactics that had preceded this battle of the Somme. Such an attitude of mind was epitomized by Kitchener when he exclaimed ‘I don’t know what is to be done — this isn’t war’.

Most of the Australian generals were non-regulars, and they did question some of the orders given. However the pervading rigidity of the professionals usually caused the objections to be disregarded, by those more senior.

Even Joffre, the Supreme Commander, a professional, though experienced and capable in some aspects of modern warfare, had ‘read little on military theory’, ‘his experience in handling infantry soldiers was limited, he knew little of tactics and even less of strategy’.

Accordingly, the lessons for members of government and potential senior commanders are cogent. In particular, there were the lack of understanding of new developments in weaponry, the terrible effect of international, and national, ‘politics’ on the conduct of large scale warfare, and beyond all, the disastrous consequences of the waste of human lives that resulted.

Certainly substantial corrections were made in World War 2, but even in that there were individual instances of inordinate sacrifice of life. The Allied campaign in Italy in 1944 was one, and the Australian offensive in New Guinea in the latter stages of the Pacific War, were another.

Charlton is forthright. In the battle of the Somme, Pozieres was, according to General Rawlinson, Commander Fourth Army, the key to the area. It was one of the objectives in the major battle that began on 1 July 1916, and it was not until 4 August that it was taken at awesome cost. As the book’s dustjacket reveals, ‘some deserted; others shot themselves; more went mad’. Yet the fact remains that the AIF re-emerged as a superior fighting body, with extraordinary capacity to adapt to the appalling conditions of trench warfare in the European winter.

While the tactics of the operation itself are not particularly relevant to the present day — though there are some lessons to be uncovered therein — one of its main features lies in the illustration it gives of human behaviour in war. The story examines the tractability of the fighting man of the period and, while that underwent change in subsequent wars, it provides a sound basis for understanding the motivation of the serviceman likely to obtain in a future engagement. This alone can have a significant influence in Australia — a large country with a relatively small population.

Moreover, in the present and future situation of the Australian Defence Force, its Commander may come from any one of the three armed services: hence the importance of a study of military theory can be readily seen. The book presents, from the viewpoint of an historian, useful illustrations of the problems: and may perhaps persuade perspective force commanders to read of more.
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