Defence Force Journal

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Managing Editor
Mr M. P. Tracey

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Coming ashore.
Nomadic Children
Dear Sir,
I read with great interest Lieutenant Commander Rahmani's article entitled 'The Education of Nomadic Children'. (DFJ No. 56 Jan/Feb 86).

Being a serving member with school age children, I share the same concerns as many others in my situation for my children's education. I endeavoured to inject some uniformity into my eldest son's education by enrolling him into a Catholic school, believing the Catholic school system to be approximately parallel from state to state. Subsequent experience has proved otherwise.

From a purely personal point of view, Lieutenant Commander Rahmani's recommendations seem most appropriate and worthy of careful consideration. It seems that the recommendations would at least solve some of the problems inherent to service life without being too expensive to operate.

C. R. Hubble
Sergeant

Military Aid to Civil Power
Dear Sir,
I refer to the Journal of March/April, 1986 and to the article by Brigadier M.J. Ewing C.B.E. on Military Aid to the Civil Power. Might I correct one matter in an otherwise excellent article.

Brigadier Ewing stated that

"In Australia, no State has called upon the Commonwealth to protect it from domestic violence by specific reference to Section 119 of the constitution and Section 51 of the Defence Act."

In the Colonial Office Archives in Kew in London, is a series of telegrams and despatches between the Governor of Queensland and the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs referring to the Brisbane tramways strike of 1912. This strike was consequent on the refusal of a tramway manager to allow an employee to wear a union badge on duty. According to the Governor's secret despatch on 24 February, 1912, 43 unions went on strike on 1 February. The police were powerless and "firearms had been used against them". The request was then made by the State Governor on the advice of his Ministers to apply to the Governor General for assistance. Lest it be thought that no specific reference was made to Section 119 of the Constitution, I will quote the paraphrased telegram from the Governor to the Secretary of State dated 1 February, 1912.

"The Police Force is unable to preserve order in the general strike at Brisbane and under Section 119 of the Constitution the Government has asked the Governor General of Australia to protect the State against domestic violence. MACGREGOR."

This request was conveyed to the Governor General on 1 February, 1912, and his reply was received on 3 February. The Governor General, apparently on the advice of his Ministers, replied that matters were not so serious as to justify compliance. The Governor commented in his despatch

"It seems hardly possible to believe that the Federal Prime Minister understood the gravity of the position in Brisbane. The state of tumult and disorder that prevailed for two days when, in local parlance, Brisbane 'was held up' by the strike committee, apparently in permanent session, under the Red Flag, in the Trades Hall, is told in Mr. Denham's letters without exaggeration."

The Governor went on to say that food and labour was only procurable with permits from the strike committee in a "Reign of intimidation and terror".

The Governor, Sir William MacGregor, believed that the Federal Labour Prime Minister, Fisher, was in direct communication with the strikers who were encouraged by his decision not to send in the Army.

On 3 February, 1912, the Governor telegraphed the Secretary of State that "... the Government of the State is gaining control of the situation with its own forces. ..."

The Queensland Government had called in on horseback the police from all over the State and had sworn in large numbers of special...
constables. By 6 February, 1912, the Governor was able to telegraph that

"Order in Brisbane has been restored".

However, the strike was now spreading to the coast and inland towns of Queensland, and police were being sent from Brisbane to deal with this. Military support had been firmly refused by the Federal Government.

The Governor added

"... it is much desired by Ministers that you should procure them as soon as possible the moral support of one of H.B.M.'s Ships of War on the Coast of Queensland."

Very wisely the officials in the Colonial Office advised against any such step as being likely to be construed as "... interference in a purely Australian matter." Accordingly the Secretary of State politely declined.

By March the strike was over and work resumed. The general election in Queensland in April, 1912 was fought solely on the issue of the strike and resulted in a landslide win for the non-Labour Government.

I suggest that this incident illustrates two things. Firstly that there has in fact been a specific request under Section 119 of the Constitution, by a State for assistance against domestic violence. Secondly, a Governor General is likely in such a situation to accept the advice of his Ministers and there is a very real possibility that a Government may subordinate constitutional duty to political self-interest. I remain, your obedient servant,

Andrew Morrison
Major ARES

If members of the Defence Force regard their field of work as being professional, then it is saddening to find those who try to downgrade the value of our own journal.

If indeed, no one reads the publication put out for the benefit of our profession, then this is more a black mark against the serving personnel than against the Defence Force Journal.

As it is, I have never found that the journal is not read. On the contrary, I have found the opposite to be the case.

B.D. Copeland
Major RAAEC

The Korean War

Dear Sir,

Your January-February issue contained a review article by Colonel F.S.B. Peach concerning my book on the Korean War. I regret that the review was not brought to my attention earlier, and therefore my reply is a little belated.

I do hope that you will allow me a right of reply, however. The issues are of considerable importance, and it is probably fair to say that Australians know less about this war than any other.
I am sending a copy of my comments directly to Colonel Peach also, in case he should wish to add further comment. Yours sincerely, (Dr) Gavan McCormack.

The Korean War: Commets on ‘Review Article’

The review of my book, Cold War Hot War: An Australian Perspective on the Korean War, by Colonel F.S.B. Peach (Defence Force Journal, No. 56 January-February 1986) has just been brought to my attention, and I would appreciate it if you would allow me to make some comments in reply. For students of the Korean War, Colonel Peach is that rare and invaluable resource, eye witness of some of the most crucial moments. The document which he co-authored in June 1950 (and which you have now reproduced) has been described as central to the United Nations case in going to war. My book was the first to essay a close analysis of the Report, and Colonel Peach’s rejoinder opens an important debate.

A small point first: my cartographer’s mistake in drawing Kaesong on the wrong side of the 38th parallel is one I should have picked up before publication. This error, along with some others, was long ago listed among necessary amendments for the book’s second printing. Such mistakes do happen (as indeed in the heading to the review in question Colonel Peach has inadvertently mis-spelt my name).

I would like to comment briefly on six points raised in Colonel Peach’s review: the general question of ‘cause’ of the Korean War, the South Korean elections of May 1950, the UN Observer mission of June 1950 in which Colonel Peach participated, the Haeju ‘mystery’, refugees, and atrocities.

Historical interpretation of the Korean War has moved through several distinct phases. For long the outbreak of the War in June 1950 was seen as an expression of a worldwide strategy of Communist aggression engineered by Stalin, and Stalin’s hand, directly or indirectly, was assumed to be manipulating the Korean events. Few now believe this. In November 1950 even General MacArthur said (to Australian diplomat James, later Sir James, Plimsoll) that he had found ‘no evidence of any close connection between the Soviet Union and the North Korean aggression.’ Though the charge was always assumed rather than proven, its influence was strong and lasting, only gradually giving way to a new consensus — that the ‘Koreanness’ of the conflict was central. Secondly, analysis of the War used focus very narrowly on the events of 25 June 1950; recent researches, however, have had the effect of shifting that focus gradually back from 1950 to the division of the country in 1945 by US and Soviet intervention; the war has come to be seen not only as a civil war but as a revolutionary civil war. June 1950 is important, not so much as origin, but as a moment of drastic escalation and internationalization. The 100,000 people who were victims of the violence of this pre-1950 phase were casualties of the same Korean national and social revolutionary struggle which continued in a different form after June 1950. Colonel Peach, who arrived in Korea in May 1950 naturally concentrates the remarks in his review on events which followed his involvement; yet in my view the die was already cast by then. The perspective I share has been most eloquently stated by the American scholar, Bruce Cummings, in his prize-winning study, The Origins of the Korean War, whose first volume covers only the period 1945-1947. My book concentrates a good deal of attention on the involvement of Australia in the Korean problem between 1945 and 1950. Just as scholarly research on World War One has long moved beyond the simple question of who assassinated the Archduke, so the understanding of the Korean War was moved to broader questions than the firing of the first shot.

Colonel Peach was a (UN) observer of the South Korean elections of May 1950. He considered them to have been ‘carried out fairly’, despite some candidates being in gaol at the time and some ‘terrorist activity’. It is true that the elections were a major defeat for the Rhee government, so they cannot have been entirely rigged; however, from 1949 the UNCOK reports had documented the crushing of the press, the arrest of journalists and of politicians opposed to Rhee, and the assassination of the most prominent opponents. After the elections, UNCOK’s report of 8 September 1950 recorded the campaign arrests of 200 agents of the South Korean Labour Party (a party with strong connections with the North), the arrest of many other candidates, their managers and supporters, common police beatings and intimidation, and significant withdrawals. Interference was...
directed (in the UNCOK Report words), 'not only against those suspected of belonging to or sympathising with subversive elements, but also against those who opposed Government policies'. What was left of the election was conducted with decorum, as Colonel Peach observed, and despite all the efforts by Rhee to secure victory he lost anyway. The 'fairness' of such an election is clearly relative. (This is in no way to cast doubt on the veracity of what Colonel Peach observed, only to insist on placing those observations in context, in this case the context of other observations by the very organisation he was working for.)

Turning to the Report by Colonel Peach and Squadron Leader Rankin on their tour of the 38th Parallel in the weeks prior to the outbreak of full-scale war, one might first note that this Observer mission was established with some reluctance because, as the Australian Government put it, the creation of such a body confirmed UNCOK 'in a primarily inactive role', which meant that the 1947 UN commitment to unify the country was in effect abandoned. In their visits to several positions on the Parallel, completed less than two days before the War began, and in their discussions with ROK and US intelligence, Peach and Rankin found no indication of any unusual military activity, or indeed any suspicion of such, either South or North of the parallel. The Report in itself can not be used as evidence of aggression from the North any more than it can be used as evidence of aggression from the South. What is interesting, however, is the way it was manipulated to become the principal evidence used to secure and legitimize UN intervention. Whether the North launched an (unprovoked) invasion or not on 25 June 1950 must be judged on other evidence. Colonel Peach makes clear in his review that his own assessment to that effect was based on a range of factors, in which he lists first US and South Korean military and intelligence sources. I make three points about the Report: its neutrality on the question of who might have started the fighting of 25 June; its manipulation by various interested parties to suggest that it provided conclusive evidence of Northern aggression; and the fact that the text of the Report did not even reach UN Headquarters till after the crucial resolutions on Korea had been passed by the Security Council.

The rapid advances made by the North Korean forces once they crossed the Parallel are not in dispute; in whatever context it happened the South was clearly 'invaded' by forces from the North. However there is evidence, far from conclusive but enough for Colonel Peach to agree that it amounts still to 'a bit of a mystery', that in the Haeju area the south Korean forces launched either a prior attack or a counter-attack on the morning of 25 June advancing northwards on the Ongjin Peninsula. This information was relayed to Canberra by Australian diplomatic sources; it was widely reported in the media, and has later been confirmed by (former) senior military men from South Korea. For reasons given in the book a retaliatory counter-attack seems most unlikely. I am not arguing that South Korea attempted to launch an invasion of the North via the Ongjin Peninsula, although neither am I convinced by Colonel Peach's view that Haeju was 'probably the last place the South would use to start an attack on the North'. The concentration of Southern attacks on this area in the summer of 1949 is well-known, and the military significance of the Haeju-Pyongyang rail connection cannot be dismissed. At all events, whatever happened there needs to be explained, and I postulate that a local attack by Southern forces in this region, of a kind such as had become almost endemic along the Parallel and which were commonly initiated from the South (as American and South Korean sources make clear) might have triggered the full-scale invasion from the North (for which the North had made some preparations, though it was far from being fully mobilized).

The division of the country in 1945, followed the massive counter-revolutionary intervention by the United States in the south of the country, the creation of a separate South Korean regime (against the bitter opposition of all Australians involved) which the Australian diplomatic observers described as a 'police state' under Syngman Rhee, made inevitable that the issue would eventually have to be settled by arms. A 'trigger' was all that was needed to ignite the peninsula. Like the Six Day War of 1967, in which virtually no-one attaches decisive significance to Israel's initiation of hostilities on 5 June, the idea that the Korean War simply and suddenly began on 25 June is just too simplistic. Referring to my discussion of the communications between UNCOK and UN headquarters in New York, Colonel Peach says that 'I cannot understand McCormack's reconstruc-
tion" of it, and that 'UNCOK had a better appreciation of the situation of the situation than indicated in the book'. If I may reiterate (minus the evidence) my argument about this, it is that the decision in New York to brand North Korea the aggressor was reached on the basis of information from South Korean sources, i.e. from one belligerent Party, relayed via the US ambassador and UNCOK. (The Peach-Rankin Report was not received in New York till several days later, and however it was in fact used it did not prove Northern aggression.) No attempt was made to investigate the contradictory reports from Haeju or to call an explanation from North Korea. Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General mocked the neutrality of his office by pressurizing neutral countries to support the US resolution, and even by propagating a blatant untruth — that Russian troops and tanks were fighting on the Northern side. The point was of obvious importance since the UN Charter forbade involvement in 'civil' disputes. The UN involvement in Korea was strictly speaking, an act of illegal intervention; the UN forces committed aggression. If somewhere the evidence or the argument of this section of my book is flawed I would be glad to know.

As to refugees, Colonel Peach draws attention to the unquestionable fact that the flow of refugees, once hostilities began in June, was from North to South, implying that the flow of people out of the Northern jurisdiction was itself a popular political judgement between the two regimes. I have two comments on this: there is also a good deal of evidence (some of it quoted in my book) of the popularity of the Northern regime and welcome of it as a liberating force in the South in the early phases of the War, i.e. before Inchon, the retreat of the Northern forces, and the involvement of the Chinese. Such evidence may not be conclusive, but neither can it be ignored. Secondly, given the overwhelming technical superiority of the UN/US forces, and their reliance on aerial and naval bombardment, Artillery, and napalm, and in the context of a widespread (and, as we now know very well, a very well-founded) fear of a US nuclear attack, in analysing the Southward flight of so many people it is impossible to disaggregate the element of fear of the Americans and desperation to survive their onslaught from that of disaffection with the Pyongyang regime. (Civilian casualties in World War II were on about a par with military casualties; in Korea they were at least three times as great, most of them the result of the overwhelming UN superiority in firepower).

Finally, let me comment on the question of atrocities. The gist of my discussion of this matter in the book is that neither side had any monopoly of virtue, and horror was widespread; but the technical superiority of the UN forces and the political character of the war were such that far more were victims of UN atrocities than of North Korean (or Chinese).

The destruction of dykes, dams, and power stations, and the bombing, strafing, and napalming of civilian centres were in my view atrocities, even if 'remote control' atrocities, for which history will yet hold the UN forces accountable. The 'face-to-face atrocities of the War were also all too common. My book documents the summary execution of prisoners by the Northern forces during the retreat north in July-September 1950 and the summary 'justice' meted out by the 'revolutionary tribunals' set up by the North when it recaptured Seoul in 1951. But the southern regime was at least as bad, if not worse, on this scale of brutality. Reports to that effect were common in diplomatic exchanges before and during the War. The Australian Embassy reported 'about 100 Communists' executed summarily in Seoul just before that city fell; the massacre of 600 men, women and children by a South Korean army unit at Koch'ang in February 1951 is well attested; and a US diplomatic source reckoned that 'probably over 100,000' people were killed without trial by ROK forces after the recapture of Seoul which followed the Inchon landings. I make no attempt to draw any exhaustive balance-sheet on this gloomy subject, and of course it would be absurd to suggest that X numbers of people murdered on one side is somehow more to be condemned than Y number of people on the other.

Colonel Peach is sceptical of the story of a 'Taejon Massacre' involving up to 7000 people, such as reported by the English Daily Worker correspondent, Alan Winnington. Peach says 'Nothing has since been found of 7,000 bodies as far as I am aware, and I doubt that any large-scale executions of this magnitude could have been conducted in the few days before Taejon was evacuated and without coming to notice.'

Well, there is no doubt that there was a massacre in the Taejon vicinity in 1950 and that
it did involve about 7,000 people. Not only did Winnington first utter this charge in his paper on 9 August in 1950 (and repeat it in his post-humously published autobiography, Breakfast with Mao, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1986), but on 29 October 1953, the US Army's report on atrocities in the Korean War listed Taejon as the site of a massacre of ‘between 5000 and 7000 people’, on a scale worthy of being recorded ‘in the annals of history along with the rape of Nanking, the Warsaw ghetto and similar mass executions.’ The US Army differed from Winnington only in attributing the massacre to the Communist side.

So far as I can ascertain, Winnington’s allegations were ignored. But when the US Army’s October 1953 Report was released the ‘Taejon Massacre’ was the most serious charge it levelled at the other side. Assuming there were not two massacres at Taejon, one of these accounts is false. It is not only the timing of Winnington’s report which suggests his may be the truthful one; there is other corroboration, and some of the things Peach himself (and his colleague, Wing Commander Rankin) saw and heard also are consistent with Winnington’s version.

On 9 July 1950, Peach and Rankin were on the ‘road from Taejon to Konju, . . . along the Kum River, a few miles short of Konju.’ (Here I must point out that I am quoting, not from my 1982 interview with Peach, but from his own 1950 report, as conveyed in a diplomatic despatch from Tokyo to Canberra and now preserved in Australian Archives file 3123/5 part 4). Peach and Rankin saw trucks loaded with prisoners by the side of the road and noted that the prisoners were being bashed. In his Review Article, Peach writes that

‘I do not know where the gaol was from which the prisoners were being moved; I certainly did not visit it. Dr McCormack credits me with locating it at Konju, but I can only surmise that he has mistaken . . .’

However, he goes on, ‘it could well have been at Konju.

Of course the events occurred a long time ago, but Colonel Peach’s immediate recollection, in 1950, can presumably be relied on. In it he goes on to say that, later in Konju ‘we were informed through some press correspondents that inmates of the Konju jail were being taken out to be shot’.

Squadron-Leader Rankin, checking against his diary, reported this same story to me in 1982. While visiting Konju 34th Battalion area, on 9 July [1950] he saw ‘20-30 prisoners on their way to be shot. We could not interfere.’

Four days later, on 13 July, the Northern army crossed the Kum River, and on 20 July captured Taejon. Winnington travelled with it, and published in his paper on 9 August an account of mass graves which he inspected at the village of Rangwul, seven kilometres south-east of Taejon, while Taejon was still burning. He estimated that approximately 7000 people were buried there in six death pits, ‘the largest being about 200 yards long, varying between four and two yards wide, and of a uniform depth of two yards.’ He was told by villagers that ‘prisoners from local jails’ had been brought there for execution, and that executions began on 4 July, before the southern retreat from the area.

When I wrote my book I merely raised the question as to whether Peach and Winnington may have been witnesses of different stages of the same event, realizing that the evidence of a British communist journalist travelling with North Korean forces might be suspect. Since then, however, I have discovered another account of these events which is difficult to dismiss. Philip Deane, correspondent of the London Observer, wrote a book Captive in Korea (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1953) in which he recounts a story told to him by the French missionary, Father Cadars. Deane wrote as follows:

Father Cadars had been in Taejon when the Communists captured the town. He told me that just before the Americans retreated from the town, South Korean police had brought into a forest clearing near his church 1,700 men, loaded layer upon layer into trucks. These prisoners were taken out and ordered to dig long trenches. Father Cadars watched. Some American officers, Cadars said were also watching. When a certain amount of digging was complete, South Korean policemen shot half the prisoners in the back of the neck. The other half were then ordered to bury the dead.

After Father Cadars’ protest was dismissed, the remainder were likewise killed. He was told they were ‘Communist guerrillas who rebelled in the Taejon gaol’. Deane said he had heard the same story before, from Winnington, and
disbelieved it; hearing it from Cadars he came to believe.

The story is second-hand, but both these 'hands' are highly trustworthy; it still seems to me possible that Peach, Cadars and Winnington may have witnessed different phases of one same terrible event, and that the South, not the North, may have been responsible for it.

Colonel Peach adds an extensive comment on the Yanpyong massacre. I have nothing to add to this, except to say that it is discussed in detail also in my book, and readers of the Review Article only might be surprised to learn that, after considering the possibility that what Peach and his colleagues witnessed may have been a massacre by the other side, I conclude (p 142):

Still, the circumstantial evidence of the attitudes of the local people they observed, and of the accounts they obtained on the spot, makes this unlikely.

Furthermore, I am aware of the testimony of Father Phillip Crosbie, which also I believe is a truthful and very moving document. Colonel Peach must realize, however, that while Father Crosbie reports cases of privation, ill-treatment, one murder (which he witnessed), and the probable murder of up to 100 people on a 'death march', for all of which Northern forces were responsible, he reports only two cases of mass murder, both of them relating to acts of Southern forces (p. 16, p. 194). In the latter case, 600 people had been massacred, 'all relatives of Communists, sealed up in an air-raid shelter'. Crosbie did not witness the events himself, but he learned of them under circumstances which convinced him they were true. A historian cannot include every item of information gathered in the process of writing a book, and our general rule is to seek corroboration in case of contentious acts. On balance I chose not to include reference to these allegations by Father Crosbie of atrocities: the privations of prisoners during the winter of 1950-51 were already well known and needed no further confirmation: and atrocities by the Southern forces were better based on the evidence of direct witnesses.

The Korean War is in almost every sense a dark episode. My attempt to further understanding of it, in particular of Australian involvement in events leading up to it, is undoubtedly inadequate and only a beginning. I am pleased that a military journal should have taken up the issues in a serious and objective way, and I welcome further investigations.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The following books reviewed in this issue of the Defence Force Journal are available in various Defence libraries.

Bledowska, Selina, War and Order, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1983.
Geraghty, Tony, This is the SAS, A Pictorial history of the Special Air Service Regiment.
The Department of Defence, acting on behalf of the Commonwealth Government, invites submissions from individuals, acting singly or jointly who are interested in the design of a series of new medals for Defence Force personnel. Entries from companies will not be accepted.

Design of New Awards for the Defence Force

A two stage design competition is to be held to select designs for new awards for the Australian Defence Force.

STAGE ONE
An invitation is issued to all Australian residents and Australian citizens abroad to submit design sketches for eleven new awards for Defence Force personnel. The Judging Panel will consider all sketches submitted and will select three entries for which prizes of $1000 each will be awarded. At the same time, suitably qualified Australian residents and Australian citizens abroad (eg. Graphic Designers, Architects, Sculptors, Medal and Coin Designers and Students in those fields) are invited to register interest in participating in Stage One and Stage Two of the Competition. The Judging Panel will review the submissions made in response to this invitation and will select up to 10 entrants who will be invited to submit a detailed design proposal for one medal. A fee of $500 will be paid to each of those entrants who submit design proposals in accordance with the Competition Conditions.

STAGE TWO
From those who are invited by the judges to submit detailed design proposals, up to 3 entrants will be selected by the Judging Panel to submit detailed design proposals for eleven awards. Each of those selected will be paid a further fee of $5500. The Judges will submit their recommendations for the winning designs to the Minister for Defence for approval.

It is intended that the winning entrant/s would then be commissioned to produce master colour drawings and plaster models of the medal designs.

JUDGES — the following persons have been appointed as Judges:
- Chairman — Brigadier R.S. Buchan, Department of Defence
- Mr Michael Bryce, Design Consultant, representing the Australia Council
- Mr Warwick Cary, Design Consultant representing the Returned Services League of Australia
- Mr Clifton Pugh, Artist, representing the Council of the Australian War Memorial
- Mr H.E. Keen, Assistant Secretary, Awards and National Symbols Unit, Department of the Special Minister of State.

ADVISERS — six members of the Defence Force will provide advice to the judges.

AWARDS — the new awards have been established to enable recognition of outstanding service by members of the Defence Force in operational and non-operational service. Each award is described in the Brochure mentioned below.

SUBMISSIONS — Brochures containing the official entry forms and competition details can be obtained by writing to the Registrar, Defence Force Awards Design Competition, C/- Department of Defence, PO Box E33, Queen Victoria Terrace, CANBERRA ACT 2600. Submissions must be lodged with the Registrar at the above address before 12 noon on 30 September 1986. Submissions without an appropriate entry form will be disqualified. The judges may extend the closing date. Any extension will be widely advertised.
The Bourke and Naylor and the ETASC Projects

By Eileen P. Duffy, Housing Officer
Department of Defence

Introduction

Lately there has been a resurgence of interest in the educational problems of servicemen's children caused by the turbulence of their postings, with its consequent disruption to school, social and domestic life. A joint news release on 7 February 1986 by the Ministers for Education and Defence announced that a research project, funded by the Commonwealth Schools Commission, would investigate these problems in selected schools in Western Australia. This announcement, and recent articles by Lieutenant Commander Z. Rahmani in the Defence Force Journal, show that the issue of educational turbulence has never really been put to rest, despite a massive research project commissioned by the Australian Government in 1973, and subsequent reassurances that the problems were not as great as had been imagined.

Reports of the 1973 investigation by Mackay and Spicer, and earlier related research by Bourke and Naylor, had only a very limited circulation, so that few people today are able to discuss the issues from a well-informed position. The full reports are not held in many Defence, University or Public Libraries, and, as far as can be ascertained, no summaries or critiques of them have appeared in any major publication. This is unfortunate because they were pioneering and quite extensive Australian studies, not only in the area of Service children's education, but also in the education of mobile children generally. Now that discussion of educational turbulence has again become very topical in the Australian Defence Forces, it is important to understand what research has already been undertaken, what issues were examined and what conclusions were reached.

Major S. F. Bourke and Sergeant D. R. Naylor investigated the effects of changing schools on the academic achievement, attitudes and other characteristics of Army dependent children in a research project for the Australian Army School of Education. They commenced their study in June 1970 and reported their findings in July 1971. Their sample comprised 3586 children of Army Personnel—2489 primary and 1097 secondary—attending 103 schools throughout Australia and the Territory of Papua-New Guinea. At the same time, a general review of pay and conditions of service in the Armed Forces was being conducted by a committee headed by Mr Justice (now Sir John) Kerr. In June 1971 this committee recommended that a joint study be conducted "with the three Service Education Directorates on the effects of turbulence on Service school children at both primary and secondary levels" because it felt that insufficient information was available about the problem.

Following the Kerr Committee's recommendation, the Australian Departments of Defence and Education commissioned a research project early in 1973 to "investigate the effects which postings of servicemen have on the educational achievement of their children". The ETASC* project (as it came to be known) was directed jointly by Dr L. D. Mackay and Mr B. J. Spicer of Monash University; its steering committee included representatives from the Departments of Defence and Education and the Navy, Army and Air Force educational units. The terms of reference were extended by the steering committee beyond the bounds of mere achievement, to explore attitudes to school, home and study, as well as psychological effects of turbulence. Mackay and Spicer's sample comprised 13,891 Servicemen's children from grades three to twelve in 2,402 schools throughout Australia, Papua-New Guinea, Malaysia and Singapore. The final report of the ETASC project was published in two volumes; the first (in 1975) contained a summary of the meth-

* Educational Turbulence among Australian Servicemen's Children.
odology, major findings and recommendations, while the second (in 1977) contained more detailed accounts of the tests, data, questionnaires, analyses and results.

In this article I shall attempt to describe how each project was conducted, summarise and compare their main conclusions, and discuss some perceived shortcomings. A comprehensive review of all the literature concerned with the educational and psycho-social problems of mobile children is beyond the scope of this paper, which is concerned with the two major Australian Defence Force studies only. Detailed summaries of relevant overseas literature have been produced separately by Bourke and Rahmani; their theses are listed in the bibliography at the end. Apart from the two Defence Force projects by Bourke and Naylor and Mackay and Spicer, and follow-up work by Rahmani, almost no research of any magnitude and importance has been conducted in Australia to date. A few reports of studies based on children of defence personnel in Great Britain and the United States are included in the bibliography but the list is far from exhaustive.

The Bourke and Naylor Study

Description of Project and Variables

Bourke and Naylor obtained their data from school records and by questionnaire from parents and teachers; secondary (but not primary) school students were also given a questionnaire. In addition to seeking essential factual information, the questionnaires were designed to elicit attitudes and opinions regarding changing schools, moving generally, social relationships, behaviour and overall development. Questionnaire items were scored on a five-point scale, thus enabling means and correlation coefficients to be calculated for particular variables in areas of major interest. An example of such an interest mentioned by Bourke and Naylor was parental attitude to moving, which was found in a United States Army study to be important for the academic achievement of high school students.

As their criterion measure of academic achievement, Bourke and Naylor decided to use school marks or assessments in preference to standardised tests, because school marks were the criteria most commonly used (then) to qualify a student for promotion to the next class at school, employment or admission to a higher course of study. Their rationale was that academic achievement as measured by school marks or assessments was “the variable on which parents, teachers and the student himself assess success or failure”, regardless of whatever value might be derived from a variety of other important experiences at school. Although this approach presented problems of measurement because of wide differences between States, and to a less extent between schools within States, Bourke and Naylor persevered with it because of their express conviction that “it is school achievement as measured by the school which is important for a child’s educational progress” (Emphasis is Bourke and Naylor’s.)

Three levels of student mobility between schools were distinguished, namely frequently mobile, moderately mobile and static, according to number of schools attended and average length of stay at each school. The principal focus of the investigation was the effect of mobility—or ‘turbulence’ as it is now more commonly referred to in the Armed Services—on academic achievement, but mobility and achievement were also considered in relation to some attitudinal, social and behavioural characteristics identifiable from the questionnaire data. Other factors of particular interest in the investigation were general intelligence, socio-economic status and sex, because these are well-known to correlate with educational and social development and could be expected to account for much of the differential achievement observed between children at school.

Method of Analysis

Results were analysed initially using inter-correlations between variables of major interest, and t-tests for the significance of differences. Correlations involving school achievement—both overall and in particular subjects—were calculated for each State separately and all States combined at primary school level, but only for each State separately at the secondary level because of differences between State educational systems. No distinction was made between grade, years or forms, each student being assigned to either a primary or secondary composite grouping within a State as appropriate.

Finally, analysis of variance was used to investigate more closely the relationship between

* Bourke and Naylor preferred to use the term 'mobility' or 'movement'.
mobility and school achievement at primary and secondary levels within each State, while controlling for the effects of intelligence (three levels), socio-economic status (three levels—determined by rank of father) and sex (two levels). Lack of data and paucity of cases limited the number of analyses of variance that could be performed. Intelligence test scores were unavailable for the whole of Victoria and were missing from the records of some students in other States. In no State were sample sizes large enough to permit intelligence, socio-economic status and sex to be controlled simultaneously, and only in Queensland and New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory, in the analysis for overall primary achievement, were dual controls possible for intelligence and socio-economic status. Analyses involving particular subjects were even further restricted.

Findings
(1) Academic Achievement and Mobility
Bourke and Naylor found very few significant correlations between change of school and academic achievement. At the primary school level the only significant correlation found between mobility and overall school achievement was 0.27 for the South Australia/Northern Territory sample, where static students generally performed better than the mobiles. At the secondary school level significant correlations between mobility and overall achievement were reported only for Western Australia and New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory, the most frequently mobile students performing best in both samples. (The size of these two correlations is not mentioned in the report.)

Actual differences found in mean overall school achievement marks between the static and the two mobile groups are shown in Table 1 following. Generally these were quite small, usually no more than two or three percentage points, except in those few cases where significant effects were found or sample sizes were too small to permit conclusive inferences to be drawn. Sample sizes in Western Australia (secondary) and Tasmania were too small for the quite large differences in those States to be shown as significant on their own. Over all of the States together at primary school level, Bourke and Naylor noted that there was a consistent tendency, which was not statistically significant, for statics to achieve marginally better than mobile students. Although the order of achievement for the two mobile groups was not consistent, Bourke and Naylor considered that the most frequently mobile students at primary school had suffered academically. This conclusion was apparently based on other evidence besides that shown in Table 1.

At secondary school the trend was much more erratic, with no consistency at all in the order of the three groups. In South Australia/Northern Territory the statics were best, and in Victoria and Western Australia the worst. The frequently mobile secondary students were best in New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory, Western Australia and Tasmania, and moderately mobile best in Queensland and Victoria. Again it is necessary to point out that very small sample sizes do not permit conclusive inferences to be drawn in the case of Western Australia, Tasmania and Papua-New Guinea.

Altogether 335 analyses of variance were completed for the effect of mobility on achievement overall and in particular subjects, controlled where possible for intelligence, socio-economic status and sex. Of this number only seventeen analyses yielded statistically significant findings at the 5% level. This is almost precisely the proportion one would expect to find, allowing that one in every twenty analyses might yield significant findings by chance alone, which is, after all, what the 5% level implies. The seventeen significant findings indicated, in the main, that static students performed better than mobiles in overall achievement, English and Mathematics, and worse than mobiles in Social Studies.

A summary of significant correlations reported by Bourke and Naylor between selected variables of major interest is given in the following discussion. Not every correlation found in their investigation was mentioned in the report—some would be of trivial interest anyway. Even where correlations were statistically significant, many are too small to be of much practical importance, and do no more than indicate minor trends or tendencies in the underlying data. They should therefore be interpreted with caution.

(2) Intelligence, Socio-Economic Status and Sex
As expected, the highest correlations were those between achievement and intelligence, ranging from 0.32 to 0.69 depending on which State and whether at primary or secondary
TABLE 1:  
MEAN OVERALL SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT MARKS FOR DIFFERENT MOBILITY GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIMARY</th>
<th>FREQUENTLY MOBILE</th>
<th>MODERATELY MOBILE</th>
<th>STATIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales/</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
<td>(193)</td>
<td>(372)</td>
<td>(245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(104)</td>
<td>(190)</td>
<td>(131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(205)</td>
<td>(318)</td>
<td>(108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia/</td>
<td>67.9*</td>
<td>73.0*</td>
<td>78.1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(54)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua-New Guinea</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers of cases are shown in brackets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECONDARY</th>
<th>FREQUENTLY MOBILE</th>
<th>MODERATELY MOBILE</th>
<th>STATIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales/</td>
<td>73.9*</td>
<td>67.7*</td>
<td>68.7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
<td>(85)</td>
<td>(136)</td>
<td>(73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia/</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua-New Guinea</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Variation between these mobility groups is significant at the 5% level.

level. For all States and Territories combined* at the primary level the correlation between achievement and intelligence was 0.61. Other correlations included primary achievement with socio-economic status (0.19), primary achievement with sex (0.05), and intelligence with socio-economic status (0.24). Similar patterns were noted at the secondary level. The direction of these correlations was such that commissioned officers' children tended to achieve more highly than others, and girls marginally more than boys.

(3) Children's Attitude to School (Including Schoolwork)

Attitude to school, and student motivation, were positively related to academic achievement, which is hardly surprising. For primary students parental opinion of the child's attitude to school was considered, and for secondary students motivation and attitude to school were also measured from the student self-report questionnaire. Student motivation, as distinct from attitude to school, was estimated from the student's stated intentions of continuing education as long as possible or leaving school earlier. Correlations of the order of 0.2 to 0.4 between these variables and school achievement were reported by Bourke and Naylor. Generally speaking, parents tended to say that girls had more favourable attitudes to school than did boys. Over the entire sample the correlation between sex and children's attitude as reported by parents was 0.11 for 3564 cases.

There was no relationship between socio-economic status and children's attitude to school, nor between mobility and attitude to school, no matter whether attitude was assessed from either the parent or student questionnaire. This suggests that whatever influences determined children's attitudes to school, as far as Bourke and Naylor could discover, had nothing to do with the rank of their fathers or the frequency of movement.

(4) Opinions and Attitudes About Changing Schools

Opinions about the effects of school change on achievement, and attitudes towards changing schools, were gauged from a selection of items on each of the parent, student and teacher questionnaires. Most parents believed that the effects of changing schools on their own children were neither beneficial nor harmful to achievement, the mean rating for this opinion being a neutral 3.03 on a scale from 1 to 5. There was a tendency, however, for parents of high achievers to state that changing schools was beneficial, and for parents of low achievers to state that these effects were harmful. The correlation in this regard between parental opin-
Parental opinion of the importance of schooling correlated 0.24 with overall primary achievement. Similar findings were made at the secondary level. It was also clearly noticeable at the secondary level that student motivation reflected the importance that parents attached to schooling, the correlation between these two variables being 0.44.

(6) Attitude to Moving Generally

Bourke and Naylor found no support for the United States Army finding of an important relationship between parenteral attitude to moving and actual achievement for secondary students, though there was a very minor correlation (0.06) for this at the primary level. They found a more definite relationship between parents’ attitudes to moving and their opinions of the effects of changing schools. (Emphasis is mine.) The correlation for this was 0.30. “Most parents who expressed a general dislike for moving also tended to indicate that change of school had harmful effects on their children”. Parental apprehension in this regard, however, does not seem to have been borne out by the evidence of actual school achievement, but the possibility of other harmful effects still remains. There was a correlation of 0.23 between parental attitude to moving generally and children’s attitude to change of school, suggesting that secondary students whose parents enjoyed moving tended to enjoy changing schools.

(7) Social Relationships and Behaviour

Most parents believed that their children had little difficulty in making friends. Parents who stated that their children did have difficulty were generally in the frequently mobile category, the correlation between mobility and parenteral opinion of their children’s ability to make friends being 0.28 for 3563 cases in the entire sample. Of those parents who stated that the effects of school change were harmful, most also stated that their children had difficulty making friends, the correlation between these two variables being 0.40. There was no relationship between school achievement and ability to make friends and participate in out-of-school activities. Most secondary school students reported little difficulty in making friends and believed that friendships were not important academically. Mean rating on this 5-point scale was quite strong and consistent at 2.08, with very little varia-
A correlation of 0.30 found between student attitude to school and self-reported ability to make friends suggests—as one might expect—that the more favourable the attitude the easier it is to make friends. Mobility appeared to have no significant effect on the self-reported ability of secondary students to form friendships, except in New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory and Victoria. This finding appears to contradict the opinion of parents in the preceding paragraph. It must be realised, however, that parent opinion was concerned with primary as well as secondary students.

Teachers in general did not feel that changing schools affected a child's relationships either with teachers or other children. Where mobile children did experience poor relationships, teachers also stated that they were more introverted than other children and that mobility was harmful to their achievement. The correlation between relationships with other children and the effects of mobility on school achievement, both variables being based on teachers' perceptions, was 0.27 for 510 teachers. There is no mention in the report of such a correlation based on actual school achievement, as distinct from teachers' perceptions of this.

Teachers did not think that mobile students, on the whole, were any different to static children in seeking attention and in general behaviour, except in Queensland where mobiles tended to be more troublesome. There was a small, but significant, tendency for female more than male teachers to think that mobile children were less well behaved. Teachers were the only ones asked to report on behavioural problems in changing schools, so one cannot comment on the views that parents and students might have had. This is unfortunate in an otherwise very informative survey.

A minor finding of passing interest is that most teachers considered educational standards in their own States to be higher than standards in other States!

The ETASC Project

Description of Project and Variables

Mackay and Spicer's project (ETASC) went beyond the scope of Bourke and Naylor's, in that it included Navy and Air Force in addition to Army children, and encompassed many more schools as well as every grade within schools. Their final sample of 13,891 Servicemen's children throughout Australia and on some overseas bases was nearly four times the size of Bourke and Naylor's. They obtained information by questionnaire from 20,521 Service families with dependent children, from teachers and by interview with a random sample of 243 Service families. Data from a random sample of 255 non-Servicemen's children in grades three, six and nine in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland were also collected for comparison with the Service sample. Considering furthermore that they gathered detailed information on the educational history of 47,369 children, of whom less than a third were in the final sample, it must surely rank as one of the largest and most comprehensive research projects undertaken in Australian education.

As a preliminary step Mackay and Spicer visited a number of Service establishments, and interviewed parents, senior Service personnel, school principals and teachers in order to explore and clarify specific aspects of turbulence in need of investigation. Special test and questionnaire batteries were then developed for the project. These aimed to assess educational achievement, general intelligence, personality, social development, views on the effects of turbulence, use of leisure time and attitudes to change.

Measures of educational achievement in the ETASC project consisted mainly of teachers' ratings in a standard format, together with objective tests in a limited number of curriculum areas, for each of grades three to ten, this approach differed from that of Bourke and Naylor, who relied solely on school marks or assessments (usually expressed in percentages), and combined all school grades into two broad, composite groupings—one for primary, the other for secondary. Because of restrictions on the total time available, Mackay and Spicer could not administer a complete battery of educational achievement tests covering all major curriculum areas at every grade level. In some grades two tests, and in others only one, were administered as shown in Table 2. Teachers' ratings, however, covered all the important curriculum areas for grades three to ten, and were used to supplement gaps in the testing programme. Teachers were also asked to rate primary school children on their attainment of 'general knowledge'.

It is necessary to explain at this point that the teachers' ratings used by Mackay and Spicer
TABLE 2.
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT TESTS
ADMINISTERED TO EACH SCHOOL GRADE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Test Administered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Word Knowledge; Verbal Comprehension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Word Knowledge; Verbal Comprehension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Words in Social Studies; Social Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Humanities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Science</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

were essentially opinions—as distinct from objective marks or similar scaled assessments—of children's current academic performance relative to the performance of other children. For each curriculum area, teachers were specifically asked to compare each child with other children in their experience at the same grade level, and express their opinion as to whether that child was performing in the top-third, middle-third or bottom-third of children generally. These ratings can thus be considered roughly quantitative on a three-point scale, and were used as such by Mackay and Spicer in their analysis, but they lack the discrimination and refinement of wider, more quantitative scales of educational performance, such as percentage marks, that are commonly used in school assessment.

Measures of intelligence and personality were also included in the test and questionnaire battery. Intelligence tests were based on existing standardised tests developed by the Australian Council for Educational Research, but were reduced in length and modified by the project team. Similarly, the personality test, which was based on the sixty item Junior Eysenck Personality Inventory, was reduced in length to a twenty-four item test, comprising two scales of twelve items each (extraversion/introversion and neuroticism/stability). These modifications were made because of limitations of time. A test of cognitive preference (i.e. preferred learning style) in social science, science and mathematics was given to grade eleven pupils.

Social and personal adjustment, attitudes to change and use of leisure time were assessed mainly by questionnaire from parents, teachers and children, interview reports being used to a limited extent to supplement the questionnaire data. Subjective perceptions about the effects of Service life and changing schools on children's educational and general development, and overall prospects for success, were also obtained by questionnaire. Finally, an attempt was made to measure the level of parental satisfaction with both the quality of education received by their children and the educational performance of their children.

The concept of turbulence was extended by Mackay and Spicer to include not only mobility between schools, but also absence of the father from the family. Three different measures of turbulence were used independently of each other in the analysis. These were based on:

(i) number of changes of school;
(ii) total long-term father absence (i.e. for periods of one month or more) during 1969 to 1973; and
(iii) total short-term father absence (i.e. for periods of less than one month) during 1971 to 1973.

On the first two measures turbulence was classified as low, medium or high, depending on the number of school changes or total duration of long-term father absence experienced by each child. Only two levels of turbulence (low and high) were used for short-term father absence.

The scaling of questionnaire items in the ETASC project was not as straightforward as the five-point scale used uniformly throughout the Bourke and Naylor study. Some questions were answered in a simple yes/no format, some by selecting an appropriate response from several options presented, and others by ranking or scoring items on a scale of intensity of attitude or opinion. The number of choices or scale points varied between two and seven.

Some examples of different item types are:

**Do you like school?**

- **YES**
- **NO**

**On arrival at the new school, this child made friends**

- found it did not
- easily difficult to
- make friends making
- but made
- friends
- eventually

**What do you consider are the prospects for educational success for Servicemen's as compared to other children's prospects?**
Which one of the following statements best describes your opinion of the effects of school changes on the educational development of Servicemen’s children?

- Beneficial with few, if any, harmful effects [☐ 1]
- Mainly beneficial, but some harmful effects [☐ 2]
- Mainly harmful, but some beneficial effects [☐ 3]
- Harmful with few, if any, beneficial effects [☐ 4]
- Some beneficial and some harmful effects, but they tend to balance out [☐ 5]
- No effects [☐ 6]
- Undecided [☐ 7]

Below are five things which might harm children’s education. Rate them from 1 to 5, where 1 is the one most likely to harm and 5 is the one least likely to harm children’s education.

- Child changes school [☐ ]
- Child absent from school for four weeks with a minor illness [☐ ]
- Father absent from home for four weeks [☐ ]
- Child removed from school for four weeks to accompany parents on a holiday [☐ ]
- Child’s teacher absent for four weeks and replaced by temporary teachers [☐ ]

Method of Analysis

For the major part of the research, a six-way analysis of variance design was used to compare children who had experienced different levels of turbulence on various educational, social and other criteria. This was done by first assigning children to different levels within each of six factors, according to test and other characteristics, as follows:

- turbulence (2 or 3 levels, as previously described)
- general intelligence (3 levels)
- socio-economic status (determined by rank of father)
- personality on the extroversion/introversion scale (3 levels)
- personality on the neuroticism/stability scale (3 levels)
- sex (2 levels)

Next, the analysis of variance method was used to investigate the relationship between each criterion measure (for example, educational achievement) and each of the six above-mentioned factors in turn, while controlling for the effects of the remaining five factors. Turbulence, of course, was the variable of principal interest in the study, but the extent to which other factors might account for differential performance on educational and other criteria was equally important to assess. Tests of significance based on chi-square were used in parts of the investigation (mainly of questionnaire data) where analysis of variance was considered inappropriate.

Comparisons of Servicemen’s children with non-Service samples in grades three, six and nine were made using chi-square and t-tests for the significance of differences. In these comparisons no distinction was made between different levels of turbulence among the Service children, all of whom were treated as one homogeneous sample at each of the three selected school grades.

Note on Experimental Design

A very important consideration in choosing a level of statistical significance in research is the possibility of error in interpreting the results. Two well known errors which the investigator hopes to avoid are:

- (a) rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true (type 1 error); and
- (b) accepting the null hypothesis when it is false (type 2 error).

The null hypothesis being that there is no real difference between groups—or levels of a factor—and that any apparent differences can be attributed to chance variations in the samples. The probability of making a type 1 error is the same as the level of significance. At the 5% level of significance, for example, there is one chance in twenty of rejecting the null hypothesis when, in fact, there is no real difference between the samples. The 5% level of significance is...
considered reasonable for most exploratory research in education and the social sciences, and was used in both the Bourke and Naylor and the ETASC projects. by being extra cautious and adopting a more conservative significance level, the probability of a type 1 error can be reduced, but the probability of making a type 2 error is thereby increased. At the 1% level, for example, there is only one chance in a hundred of deciding that there is a difference between samples when there is none (Type 1 error), but there is a much greater risk at this level of failing to recognise a real difference that does exist (Type 2 error).

In the light of this discussion, one aspect of the ETASC project's experimental design deserves mention because of the possibility of erroneous conclusion. Analysis of variance is a very powerful statistical technique for examining differences between various levels of multiple factors concurrently, but it has the logistical disadvantage of requiring a large number of cases, dispersed as evenly as possible throughout a great many cells. Even with very large sample sizes it is often difficult in practice to meet this requirement. In the ETASC project, with two levels of sex and three of each of the other five factors, the total number of possible combinations or cells was 486. Quite a few of these were empty or contained only a small handful of cases. The average proportion of unoccupied cells in the project was nearly eight per cent, but in the upper secondary school grades, where samples sizes tended to diminish, the unoccupied proportion was sometimes nearly twelve per cent of all cells in the analysis.

Mackay and Spicer used a statistical estimation procedure to substitute hypothetical means in cells for which no real sample data were available. The rationale and methodology for situations with very few observations per cell, and missing data, are discussed theoretically in Lindquist and Winer, and need not be pursued here. It is sufficient to say that the estimation procedure used by Mackay and Spicer leads to conservative judgements, in that it reduces the risk of finding a significant difference by mistake (i.e. it reduces the risk of a type 1 error). Conversely, however, it increases the possibility that some real differences will go unnoticed and be reported as non-significant (i.e. it increases the risk of a type 2 error).

Judgements made in these situations, although statistically cautious and conservative, would inevitably have been based on hypothetical, non-existent children. Winer's comment that "mathematically elegant methods for estimating missing cell entries" offer "no real substitute for experimental data" is pertinent at this point.

Findings
The main findings of the ETASC project were derived from 228 separate analyses of variance based on test scores, teachers' ratings and questionnaire data for school grades three to eleven. In forty-eight of these analyses, educational achievement in a particular curriculum area was the criterion measure, and in the remaining analyses the criteria were scores on the various measures of social and personal adjustment, interests and attitudes.

Out of the 228 analyses of variance reported by Mackay and Spicer, only fifteen—or 6.6% of the total number—yielded statistically significant differences between the three levels of school mobility as the turbulence variable. This is marginally above the number that could be expected if chance alone was responsible for differences up to 5% of the time. The other two measures of turbulence, namely long-term and short-term father absence, yielded only eleven and twelve significant findings respectively, each of which represents almost precisely 5% of the 228 analyses conducted. On these grounds, Mackay and Spicer concluded that there was no evidence that any measure of turbulence was clearly related to the wide range of children's educational, social, personal and other attributes that they examined.

Results of all analyses of variance conducted are summarised in Table 3.

The result was no different for the particular batch of forty-eight analyses in which educational achievement in a given curriculum area was the criterion. When school mobility was treated as the main factor, and the effects of the remaining five factors (intelligence, sex, socio-economic status and the two personality variables) were controlled, only two of the forty-eight analyses—or 4.2% of the total—yielded significant findings. Short-term father absence as the main factor for turbulence (instead of school mobility) also yielded two significant findings. With long-term father absence as the main factor, four significant differences were
### TABLE 3.
SUMMARY OF ALL ANALYSES OF VARIANCE CONDUCTED AND NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES FOUND BETWEEN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EACH FACTOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors and Levels</th>
<th>Total number of analyses conducted for each factor</th>
<th>Number of significant differences found between levels of each factor</th>
<th>Number of significant differences as percentage of all analyses conducted for each factor (See note below)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Turbulence, as measured by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— school changes (3 levels)</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— father absence (long-term) (3 levels)</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— father absence (short-term) (2 levels)</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Intelligence (3 levels)</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Extroversion/Introversion (3 levels)</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Neuroticism/Stability (3 levels)</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sex (2 levels)</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Socio-economic status (3 levels)</td>
<td>192*</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Fewer analyses were conducted for this factor because rank of father was not differentiated at Year 11—see volume 1, p.74.

NOTE: Because significance was tested at the 5% level in each individual analysis, chance alone could be expected to provide "significant" differences in 5% of all analyses conducted.

### TABLE 4.
SUMMARY OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE CONDUCTED WITH EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT AS THE CRITERION MEASURE AND NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES FOUND BETWEEN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EACH FACTOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors and Levels</th>
<th>Total number of analyses conducted for each factor</th>
<th>Number of significant differences found between levels of each factor</th>
<th>Number of significant differences as percentage of all analyses conducted for each factor (See note below)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Turbulence, as measured by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— school changes (3 levels)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— father absence (long-term) (3 levels)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— father absence (short-term) (2 levels)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Intelligence (3 levels)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Extroversion/Introversion (3 levels)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Neuroticism/Stability (3 levels)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sex (2 levels)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Socio-economic status (3 levels)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Because significance was tested at the 5% level in each individual analysis, chance alone could be expected to provide "significant" differences in 5% of all analyses conducted.
found, representing 8.3% of the forty-eight analyses conducted. These results are summarised in Table 4.77

None of the statistically significant differences between levels of turbulence in the analyses involving educational criteria was related to scores on any of the twelve objective tests. All were related to teachers’ ratings of each child’s performance in the top, middle or bottom third of children at the same grade level in the teachers’ experience. Moreover, there was no consistent pattern in the direction of these differences or the kind of turbulence to which they were related. In the eight analyses where differences were found to be significant, children with low experience of any turbulence variable were generally rated in the bottom third by their teachers. Children with the most changes of school were rated in the top third in grades three and five Mathematics, and children with the most experience of father absence were best in grade four Handwriting, grade five Oral Expression, grade six Reading Comprehension and General Knowledge, and grade nine Social Studies and Humanities.78

It is interesting to note—though not at all surprising—that in the same batch of analyses based on educational criteria, all forty-eight found achievement to be significantly related to intelligence when the effects of other factors were controlled. Each of the other non-turbulence factors also accounted for a much higher number of significant differences than could reasonably be attributed to chance alone. Sex as the main factor yielded twenty-five significant differences on educational criteria, socioeconomic status as the main factor yielded twenty-two, extroversion/introversion yielded thirteen, and neuroticism/stability yielded eleven.79 If chance alone was responsible for producing statistically significant findings up to 5% of the time, no more than two or three significant findings in any batch of forty-eight analyses would normally be expected. These results led Mackay and Spicer to conclude that; there is clear evidence that each of the five non-turbulence variables is significantly related to attainment in some at least of the specific curriculum areas included in these analyses. In contrast, there is no evidence in these analyses that turbulence is significantly related to attainment in these areas.80

(EmpHASIS is mine.)

In their findings for the analyses where general adjustment, attitudes and interests were the criteria, Mackay and Spicer reported that there was; no evidence to suggest that turbulence is a major factor influencing children’s social adjustment, leisure-time activities, or attitudes to change. It seems clear that these aspects of children’s development and behaviour are more closely related to factors such as the child’s general ability, sex, and personality than to either changes of school or father absence.81 They also found that turbulence had no noticeable effect on student interest in the various curriculum areas at all grade levels, nor on the preferred learning styles of senior secondary students.82

In contrast to these findings, the subjective perceptions of turbulence held by parents, teachers and children presented quite a different view. The effects of turbulence on both the overall and educational development of children were more often perceived as harmful rather than beneficial, especially by parents and teachers of children who had experienced the greater number of changes of school. Mobile children were also more likely to be perceived by parents and teachers to be less interested in school than static children.83 It is important to mention that not all the effects of turbulence were perceived as harmful; beneficial effects of changing school and domicile were frequently acknowledged. On balance, however, the parents, teachers and children in the ETASC study considered that the harmful effects outweighed the beneficial ones.84 Teachers especially were reported by Mackay and Spicer to be “much more likely to see changes of school as being predominantly or mainly harmful than beneficial”.85 (Teachers’ perceptions in this regard were not confirmed by the analysis of their ratings of children in the various curriculum areas, as previously discussed.)

Parental satisfaction with the quality of education received by their children, and with the educational performance of their children since their fathers joined the Services, was generally reported as satisfactory or highly satisfactory. Parents of children who had changed schools most frequently, however, were significantly more disposed to express dissatisfaction than parents whose children had changed schools less frequently.86

On the question of friendships, Mackay and Spicer found no significant relationship between
changing schools and children's self-reported ability to make friends, except for two erratic results in grades nine and ten. In grade nine, children with the least experience of changing schools reported greater difficulty in making friends than children who had changed schools more often. In grade ten, children with the highest and lowest number of school changes reported greater difficulty in making friends than children with a medium number of changes. Given that these were the only two significant findings in forty-two analyses conducted for this variable, they could reasonably be attributed to chance. The majority of parents and teachers did not seem to consider that changing schools had any harmful effects on children's ability to make friends, although children who had changed schools most often were reportedly more likely to be upset at leaving old friends, and secondary children with most changes of school were perceived as finding it more difficult to make new friends, than other children.

Comparison with the Non-Service Sample

The non-Service sample was found to be similar in intelligence to service children at grades three and six, but Service children had significantly higher intelligence, on average, at grade nine.* At all three grades there was a significant bias towards higher socio-economic status among Service children. There was no significant difference in sexual composition at any grade. Service children in grade three were significantly more introverted than non-service children, but no differences on this scale were evident in grades six and nine. When the two groups were compared on educational criteria, the only significant differences found were for Humanities (as rated by teachers) and Social Science (as measured by objective test), both in grade nine, were Service children performed better than the non-Service sample.

Since it is a widely accepted finding in education that intelligence and socio-economic status are both positively related to school achievement, one might have expected to find Service children performing significantly better than non-Service children in other curriculum areas at grade nine, but this did not happen. Mackay and Spicer provided no information about the ages, turbulence history or socio-economic status of the non-Service sample, but some details were given for the Service children. Considerably more than half of the 1243 Service children in grade nine had experienced a medium or high number of school changes, including 286 children (or 23%) who had changed schools at least five times, not counting the change from primary to secondary school a few years earlier. Furthermore, 1057 of them (or 85%) were the children of officer or senior NCOs. The lack-lustre performance of children from this background at a critical stage of their secondary education, especially in view of their advantage in general intelligence, would seem to be a very important finding, sufficient to arouse concern among Service parents of secondary students.

The finding of greater introversion among grade three Servicemen's children is not really conclusive because the difference in raw scores between the Service and non-Service samples was very small, and the test had dubious validity. The Junior Eysenck Personality Inventory had not long been developed as an experimental test by its author, who stated in the test manual that too little was known about its validity to make any claims for its use, except for experimental purposes. Eysenck also reported somewhat low reliabilities of the order of 0.5 and 0.6 on the extraversion/introversion scale for the age ranges corresponding to grade three.* For the ETASC abridged version (reduced to less than half of Eysenck's original test) Mackay and Spicer reported a reliability of 0.61 on this scale.

Discussion

Neither Bourke and Naylor nor Mackay and Spicer were able to conclude that changing schools is detrimental to children's education. The few significant findings that did result from their analyses were almost exactly the number that could have been expected by chance variation alone up to five percent of the time. Close inspection of these findings fails to reveal any clear pattern in the order of performance of the three mobility groups, although Bourke and Naylor believed that there was a consistent, but non-significant, tendency for frequently mobile children to have suffered academically when

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* Mackay and Spicer provided only unstandardised raw scores for the intelligence tests, but from this limited information it is possible to estimate that the difference in favour of Servicemen's children in grade nine would have been about ten points on a standard IQ scale.
The findings were just as inconclusive when father absence was used as the measure of turbulence instead of school mobility, as in the ETASC project. Although long-term father absence yielded marginally more than the expected number of significant findings based on educational criteria, the results in these few cases showed that children with the greatest experience of long-term father absence were rated more highly by their teachers academically.

The main conclusion of both research projects was that differences between children in their school performance could be attributed much more readily to general intelligence, sex, socio-economic background and personality characteristics than to the effects of father absence or changing schools. Bourke and Naylor considered additionally that parental opinion of the importance of schooling and student attitude to school (Secondary students only) were more likely than turbulence to account for differences in school performance. They made particular mention that mobile Service parents tended to place more emphasis on the importance of schooling than did static parents.

It is possible that the effects of educational mobility might have been partly obscured by the higher ages of children who had changed schools the most and were made to repeat grades. Bourke and Naylor mentioned a general tendency for frequently mobile students to be older than statics at each grade level, which they attributed to many of these children having had to repeat grades on changing school. (This finding was not subsequently confirmed in the ETASC project.) Bourke and Naylor also observed a non-significant tendency for frequently mobile students to be, on average, more intelligent than their static grade-level peers. This observation is particularly interesting, because older children in a normal classroom who have not changed schools or suffered health setbacks usually tend to be of lower intelligence than others, probably because they have been kept back at some stage on account of learning problems or poor achievement.

In the Bourke and Naylor study, and probably also in the ETASC project, it seems that many of the most frequently mobile children had slipped back a grade for no other reason than mobility, and were being spuriously compared with children over whom they had an advantage in age, maturation and possibly intelligence. If they were also repeating schoolwork with which they were at last partly familiar, then it is surprising that they did not perform better that the statics most of the time. The fact that so few significant differences on educational criteria were found between mobility levels in either research project suggests that the most frequently mobile children were achieving below their true academic potential. This would be consistent with Bourke and Naylor's belief, mentioned previously, that there was a (non-significant) tendency for frequently mobile children to have suffered academically at primary school, relative to statics.

The children most likely to have been adversely affected by mobility would be children of officers and senior NCOs, since these ranks experienced the most postings. Intelligence, as well as mobility, would have been a factor with these children because of the relationship found between this attribute and socio-economic status based on rank of father. It is relevant to mention here that selection for higher ranks is usually based on demonstrated ability or educational achievement, and that children tend to have academic potential similar to that of their parents. Selection might also contribute to above average ability in other ranks and their children, though possibly not to the same extent. In the comparisons of Service children with the non-Service sample in the ETASC project, mentioned earlier, Service children at secondary school were considerably higher in intelligence. The educational comparisons suggest that these Service children were achieving below their academic potential.

Two further possible explanations come to mind for finding so few significant differences between mobility levels in the ETASC project. One explanation could be that the crude three-point scale used for teachers' ratings—top, middle and bottom third on a child's relative performance—might have obscured a consistent tendency for mobile children to drop back, yet remain in the same rating categories. To take an extreme case, a child in a class of thirty, for example, could slip from first to tenth, eleventh
to twentieth, or twenty-first to thirtieth relative to his or her grade-level peers after changing schools. Teachers’ ratings for this child at the new school would not reflect the depressed level of performance. The second possible explanation concerns the analysis of variance design with unoccupied cells. As discussed earlier, the statistical estimation procedure used in this situation leads to conservative judgements, with the risk that a genuine difference between groups might go unnoticed and be reported as non-significant.

In spite of the inconclusive findings of research, a widespread conviction persists among parents, teachers and social workers that, on balance, changing schools adversely affect children’s educational progress. In the Bourke and Naylor and the ETASC projects, teachers clung to this view even more strongly than did parents. Bourke and Naylor expressly warned that the opinions of teachers should not be ignored, since teachers were the persons most likely to be aware of the problems of mobile children. In an earlier study Bourke also wrote that; the possibility that parents and teachers are correct in the belief that change of school depresses academic achievement, should not be overlooked.

Both research reports emphasised that teachers probably compensated with extra help to children after a change of school, and parents with encouragement and sympathetic understanding, thereby alleviating to a considerable extent the worst effects of turbulence. Many mobile parents maintained that their own particular child had not suffered as much from changing schools as other mobile children. Bourke and Naylor saw this as an indication “that parents were not prepared to admit that their child had suffered as a result... of moving quite often” (emphasis is Bourke and Naylor’s); to Mackay and Spicer it suggested that these parents had reduced the harmful effects of turbulence in the case of their own child by taking suitable remedial or compensatory measures.

It is interesting to note that the conviction of Australian teachers that changing schools can be harmful is held just as firmly by teachers of Servicemen’s children in Great Britain, notwithstanding that research in that country has been just as inconclusive. A special committee of the British Ministry of Defence in 1976 reported that HM Inspectors of Schools generally agreed that; over the complete span of compulsory education it was impossible to say conclusively that the attainments of Army children were measurably lower; nevertheless changing school every two or three years was undoubtedly disadvantageous.

Mackay and Spicer believed that parents’ and teachers’ perceptions about the harmful effects of turbulence probably reflected short-term rather than long-term effects. Although their investigation failed to detect significant long-term effects, they admitted the possibility that temporary traumatic and undesirable short-term effects might have influenced parents and teachers to perceive changing schools as harmful. This perception can apply to social as well as educational adjustment after changing domicile, and since social adjustment would have been a major concern for Service parents on a new posting, Mackay and Spicer suggested that children’s reactions might have reinforced or reflected their parents’ negative attitudes to moving.

If harmful short-term effects do exist at the time of a change, and later dissipate, it would be important in future research to control for recency of movement in an investigation of this kind. This was not done in either the Bourke and Naylor study or the ETASC project. It would also be important to survey parents, teachers and children all at the same time. In the ETASC project, the first questionnaire went out to parents in July-August and children were surveyed, tested and rated by their teachers in November-December. The interval between parent and student surveys would have meant that experiences and perceptions of parents and children were not directly comparable, especially for those families who had moved shortly before July.

Perceptions and attitudes were not measured on any scale of known reliability and validity, nor was one constructed with these considerations in mind in either project. For example, interest in school was assessed from yes/no responses to a single question in the ETASC project, Do you like school? The results were then related to personality, intelligence, sex and other variables, and compared with parents’ and teachers’ perceptions. The inadequacies of scaling and measurement for the attitudinal measures in both projects must cast doubt on the validity of the conclusions drawn from them. There is an impression that the ETASC research team tried to achieve too much in too short a
time, with too little resources. A very wide range of attitudinal, psychological and sociological variables seems to have been canvassed with a “shotgun” type of questionnaire battery because the constraints of time and resources prevented a more penetrating analysis of some factors. The problems may have been compounded by having to test children hastily towards the end of the year, when other pressures upon teachers and students tend to assume greater importance and demand more time.

Insufficient attention was paid in both studies to the psycho-social problems of children and their families associated with moving. Neither study was able to identify children in high-risk categories and suggest how their special problems might be ameliorated. As mentioned previously, the personality measures in the ETASC project were abbreviated and of the questionable validity; no assessment at all was made in the Bourke and Naylor study. Also no valid and reliable method of assessing the objective and subjective aspects of friendships, social relationships, loneliness and general personal adjustment to change was used. The four or five questions asked of parents, and the one or two asked of children, in the ETASC project were not really adequate in this regard. It may well be that psycho-social problems in the disruption and readjustment of moving are more serious, at least in the short-term, than educational ones.

These problems should be seen in the context of the total family unit, not just that of the child at school. Measures to improve the morale of the serving member and the welfare of his family at a time of crisis, would have positive transference to his child’s attitude to a new school and to new friendships and social relationships. Mackay and Spicer noted that, during interviews with parents, “the subject of turbulence provided, for some families a convenient arena in which to air grievances, both personal and relation to the conditions of the Services”. They noted also that “confusion as to whether greater loyalty should be given to the Service or to the family was often expressed”. The British Ministry of Defence committee, referred to earlier, expressed the view that parents who were themselves satisfied with and able to cope with the turbulence of Army life could in turn help their children to offset disadvantages inherent in changing schools.

Service housing on transfer to a new posting appears to have been a major grievance because Mackay and Spicer commented at length on this issue. They mentioned, inter alia, that “Service married quarters were often considered too small, and particularly poorly designed for the study requirements of children”, and that there was an inadequate supply of married quarters in particular localities. It is not uncommon nowadays for Service families on a new posting to be accommodated in State government housing localities which do not meet their social and educational expectations. For one reason or another these housing areas often have a disturbing incidence of social and racial unrest, transient and unstable domestic relationships and even criminal activity. If the Serviceman subsequently finds another home in a more acceptable locality, this usually entails another change of school for his children. Thus, a new posting can involve two changes of school in a short period of time, thereby prolonging the short-term effects of turbulence for the whole family, and retarding the educational momentum of children at school.

Conclusion
Two major Australian studies have failed to show conclusively that the educational achievement of children is affected by changing schools. Mackay and Spicer suggested that undesirable short-term effects might influence some parents to adopt a pessimistic attitude based on observations of their child at the time of moving. Although they did not find any long-term effects of turbulence they did not rule out the possibility that some might exist. Bourke and Naylor’s findings were essentially the same as those of Mackay and Spicer, but they noted a consistent tendency, which was not statistically significant, for frequently mobile children to have suffered academically at primary school.

Despite the inconclusive findings of research, the widespread conviction persists among Service parents, teachers and social workers that changing schools is harmful to children educationally, socially and personally. Mackay and Spicer thought that parents were being unduly pessimistic, but Bourke and Naylor, although tending towards the same view, warned that the opinions of parents and teachers should not be disregarded: that they might just be right, after all, in ways that research has failed to demonstrate.
The fact that Service parents do worry about their children's welfare and education can itself become a problem for Service morale, unless suitable measures are implemented to minimise the short-term effects of turbulence at a time of transfer. Lack of suitable accommodation, housing, schooling and amenities of modern family living are among the grievances most frequently voiced by Servicemen on a new posting, and are often blamed directly for their children's problems. Squadron Leader F. H. Parsons, of the British Service Children's Education Authority, wrote that; Morale is a key factor in the efficiency of any fighting force. There are many factors that contribute to good morale but high on the list is adequate provision for a man's family. If a serviceman is worried about his family, his efficiency as a fighting man is likely to be impaired. It is not being suggested here that better welfare and housing provisions would solve all the problems of educational disruption, but they would certainly contribute to a more favourable attitude in the serving member. This would have positive transference to his children, both educationally and in their social and personal adjustment to change.

Research into the psycho-social aspects of disruption and readjustment consequent upon moving, and the identification of particular groups of children likely to be adversely affected, are urgently needed. It may well be that these problems are more serious, at least in the short-term, than educational ones. Neither the Bourke and Naylor study nor the ETASC project addressed these issues adequately. To look at educational problems in isolation from other issues in any other future research will not reveal the complete picture, and may hinder the recognition of suitable compensatory measures, especially for individual children in high-risk categories.

Among the particular groups of children likely to be adversely affected are the most frequently mobile. When the Bourke and Naylor and the ETASC reports are examined closely it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the most frequently mobile children were performing below their true academic potential. It is possible that the effects of mobility may be cumulative, and become progressively more serious throughout the entire school span for children whose educational momentum is constantly retarded by frequent movement. This point was mentioned in a British Ministry of Defence report in 1976. The end result could be a permanent deficiency in basic skills that would become an employment and a life handicap, or a bar to further academic studies.

In 1969 Bourke anticipated the questions implicit in the preceding paragraph when he recommended that a longitudinal study be conducted with a very large original sample. Bourke and Naylor reiterated this recommendation in 1971, and it was taken up again by Mackay and Spicer in 1975. By now all of the grade three children in both project samples should have finished school, and some have probably entered university, college or technical institutions.

The data-base for a longitudinal follow-up study exists, providing that the resources can be made available to undertake such a task. The task is worth undertaking because, to the best of my knowledge, no longitudinal comparison of mobile children with static children has ever been carried out before. The questions raised by parents and teachers will never be satisfactorily answered unless the educational history of a full cohort of children can be traced throughout the entire school span, and extend into tertiary studies and training as well.

NOTES

8. Ibid., pp.17, 30, 31, 108.
10. Ibid., pp. 23, 24, 119.
13. Ibid., p.127.
14. Ibid., p.3.
15. Ibid., vol.1, 2, 7, 9, 25.
16. Ibid., chapter 6.
17. Ibid., pp.21, 33.
18. Ibid., p.28.
19. Ibid., p.27.
20. Ibid., p.30.
21. Ibid., pp.33, 128.
22. Ibid., p.128.
23. Ibid., pp.27, 31, 33.
24. Ibid., p.27.
25. Ibid., pp.27, 28, 34.
26. Ibid., p.15.
27. Ibid., pp.28, 31.
28. Ibid., p.36.
29. Ibid., pp.36, 47.
30. Ibid., p.40.
31. Ibid., p.29.
32. Ibid., p.37.
33. Ibid., pp.48, 49, 53.
34. Ibid., pp.33, 49.
35. Ibid., p.49.
36. Ibid., p.119.
37. Ibid., pp.120, 126.
38. Ibid., p.38.
39. Ibid., p.29.
40. Ibid., pp.31.
41. Ibid., p.39.
42. Ibid., pp.28, 31, 38.
43. Ibid., pp.38, 53.
44. Ibid., pp.38, 49.
45. Ibid., p.41.
46. Ibid., p.40.
47. Ibid., p.41.
48. Ibid., p.47.
49. Ibid., p.47.
50. Ibid., p.48.
51. Ibid., pp.121, 124.
52. Ibid., pp.122, 123.
53. Ibid., p.118.
55. Ibid., Vol.1, pp.3, 7, 8.
56. Ibid., vol.1, pp.17, 32.
58. Ibid., vol.1, pp.17, 18, 36, 37; vol.2, pp.307, 308.
59. Ibid., vol.1, p.23.
60. Ibid., vol.2, Appendix 3—see Test 2 in each test booklet, as for example, on p.473. The additional twelve questions do not form part of the two personality scales, but measure "other aspects" as vol.1, p.33, and vol.2, p.319, refer.
61. Ibid., vol.1, pp.33, 73, 78.
62. Ibid., vol.1, pp.18, 39, 40, 80-86.
64. Ibid., vol.1, pp.56, 59, 62.
68. Ibid., vol.2, pp.163-171, 181-211.
72. Ibid., vol.1, p.34; vol.2, pp.290, 291.
75. Ibid., pp.489, 490.
76. Mackay and Spicer, op.cit., vol.1, pp.103, 104.
77. Ibid., vol.1, p.66.
79. Ibid., vol.1, p.67.
80. Ibid., vol.1, p.66.
81. Ibid., vol.1, p.86.
82. Ibid., vol.1, p.78.
83. Ibid., vol.1, pp.57-63.
84. Ibid., vol.1, pp.105, 106.
85. Ibid., vol.1, p.105.
86. Ibid., vol.1, pp.56, 59.
87. Ibid., vol.1, pp.81, 82.
89. Ibid., vol.2, pp.364-375.
92. Eysenck, S. G., Manual of the Junior Eysenck Personality Inventory, University of London Press, 1965. (pp.11-13)
94. Bourke and Naylor, op.cit., p.128.
97. Bourke and Naylor, op.cit., p.130.
98. Ibid., pp.43, 44, 130.
100. Bourke and Naylor, op.cit., p.34.
104. Bourke and Naylor, op.cit., p.131; Mackay and Spicer, op.cit., vol.1, pp.69, 70, 72, 94, 105-107.
105. Bourke and Naylor, op.cit., p.129.
110. Ibid., vol.1, pp.72, 109.
111. Ibid., vol.1, pp.16, 17.
112. Ibid., vol.1, p.60.
113. Ibid., vol.1, p.72, 109.
114. Ibid., vol.1, p.39.
115. Ibid., vol.1, p.95.
116. Ministry of Defence (Great Britain), op.cit., p.117.
119. Ministry of Defence (Great Britain), op.cit., p.115.
121. Bourke and Naylor, op.cit., p.131.
122. Mackay and Spicer, op.cit., vol.1, p.117.
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By John B. McMillan, Defence Training Centre, Canberra

Synopsis

This article is an overview of the informal organisation. It first looks at human beings, our uniqueness, one with another and our relationships with each other.

The discussion then centres on establishing suitable definitions for the two types of organisation, formal and informal. A short discussion follows each definition. A definition for “the group” is then established.

Roles of each type of organisation are examined and a comparison is made between them. The article is then ready to look at models. One model is presented by Chris Argyris and another in graphic form, by the author (Figure 1). The influence of organisations on the human life cycle is illustrated in Figure 2, and the importance of maintaining a state of equilibrium between the three segments of the model is emphasised.

The styles of leadership and authority is the next feature of the article.

To conclude the discussion, six prime areas of organisations are examined in relation to the informal structure. A short discussion is made on each.

Who or What are We?

As human beings we are unique animals. This uniqueness makes us different from each other in many ways. It spreads over us in our every action, in all our likes and dislikes and is projected onto others through our personality. It is good that we are all different. The richness each of us gives society makes society work and adds tapestry to life generally. The strength of this uniqueness varies from one person to another. Some of us are overt in our behaviours and thereby attract and influence others, at times, very substantially. While those of us who are covert in our behaviours are seldom noticed and blend into societal norms with considerable ease, and bring little, if any, influence to bear on those around us.

The influence our existence has on others is sometimes unconscious both to ourselves and to others! In a word we are unaware of our behaviours. Others try to emulate us because they see features in our behaviour that they like, and wish to have also. Some emulate others and in the process take on a different personality which may be incongruent with their personal uniqueness. I guess it is fair to say we thicken our facade. This unfortunate process makes us different from “ourselves” and after a short while we find life difficult to cope with. We are no longer “ourselves”.

Defining Terms

It might well be asked, what has all this got to do with informal organisations?

Before we tackle this question in depth, a few definitions will be helpful. These will give us a basis from which to operate and examine. Gross (1968) gives us a useful definition of a formal organisation. He postulates that it may be regarded as a group or cooperative system in which there is:

- An accepted pattern of purposes;
- A sense of identification and belonging;
- Continuity of interaction;
- Differentiation of function; and
- Conscious integration.

This definition clearly indicates that it (the organisation) concerns people interacting. This interaction is a core area to the informal structure that we will be examining. Katz and Kahn (1966) state that the term informal has been applied to well-developed structures which nevertheless lack the specialised substructures...
that characterise formal organisations. The implication of this definition is that the informal organisation is a substructure operating at times within the formal organisation.

Another definition that will be helpful is the one that specifically concerns people, particularly people in groups. This article will not attempt to discuss the processes of group behaviour or group dynamics. Any consideration of people involved in an informal organisation would be incomplete without this behaviour receiving a little consideration.

Olmsted (1959) defines the group as a plurality of individuals who are in contact with one another, who take one another into account, and who are aware of some significant commonality. This is a general explanation and most appropriate for our purpose. Indeed the informal organisation consists of more than one person and a variety of commonalities. These commonalities are significant to the way in which the informal structure operates.

Roles
(a) The informal organisation

Faher and Shearron (1970) tell us that the informal organisation can perform three important functions for the formal organisation. First, it can help through establishing informal means of Communication (for example, “the grapevine”, can carry messages that should not go through the formal channels). Second, it can maintain cohesiveness in the formal organisation through regulating the willingness to serve and the stability of objective authority. Third, it helps members maintain their feelings of personal integrity, of self respect, and independent choice. It can serve as a means of protecting the personality of the individual against certain effects of the formal organisation which tend to disintegrate the personality.

(b) The formal organisation

Is that group formally constituted with predetermined norms of behaviour operational and administrative structures to attain certain goals? Such organisations are usually characterised by designated leaders whose duties are specific and directed towards the attainment of these goals.

Another useful definition is provided by Kast and Rosenzweig when they state that “the formal organisation has a planned structure and represents the deliberate attempt to establish patterned relationships among components which will meet objectives effectively. The formal structure is typically the result of explicit decision-making and is prescriptive in nature—a “blueprint” of the way activities should be accomplished”.

(c) A comparison

Again Faher and Shearron provide some useful input. Whereas the formal organisation is a system of consciously coordinated activities, the informal organisation is unconscious, indefinite and unstructured. The establishment of the formal organisation inevitably creates and nourishes informal organisations.

Chris Argyris provides us with a useful model which operates on the dimension of a continuum. On one end of the sub-system the focus is on the individual and his needs (the informal), the other sub-system provides focus on the attainment of the formal objective.

Formal Organization
1a. At the outset interpersonal relations are prescribed, and they reflect the organization’s idea of the most effective structure within which to achieve the organization’s goals.

1b. The leadership role is assigned to the person the organization feels can best perform organizationally defined duties.

2a. The formal behaviour in organization manifested by an individual is “caused” by the individual’s acceptance of organizationally defined reward and penalty (sanctions).

2b. The dependency of members upon the leader is accepted by members because of the existing organizational sanctions.

So simplify the model further the writer suggests that Figure 1 is appropriate.

In this context it is significant to note that we see the informal structure supporting the formal structure. Such a concept will draw opposition from many management quarters. I do not retire from this position however.

Organisations are about people. People comprise organisations, and operate systems. Without people, neither systems, no matter how automated and complex or organisations can operate. I further reinforce this concept by elaborating on a theory highly significant to the
informal structure. To begin, I draw attention to Figure 2.

It is useful and real for us to hypothesise that the behavioural “life cycle” of people is divided into three segments. “Sleep”, “work”, and “home” life. As each develops or deteriorates so does it effect the other two. For example, a person with chronic insomnia is unlikely to have
a happy home life or a productive and satisfying work existence. Likewise a person who is a “workerholic” is likely to put heavy strains on his married life and possibly die of a heart attack or have a nervous breakdown. While, in the third dimension a person who has had a history of family-related problems and whose home life is unstable and virtually unlivable, is unlikely to sleep and work well.

Throughout life one strives to establish an equilibrium in all three segments. To bring about an even balance, a balance with which one can find congruence. It is in this context that the informal organisation plays a most significant role.

Leadership.

So far in this article we have considered our uniqueness as people and the interaction that results from it. We then looked at roles of the informal and formal organisation and compared the two. We then examined some models and illustrated the relationships of the two types of organisation.

I would now like to take a brief look at leadership styles. Kast and Rosenzweig draw our attention to Rensis Likert’s summation of leadership in the formal context. Likert postulates;

Research in organizations is yielding increasing evidence that the superior’s skill in supervising his subordinates as a group is an important variable affecting his success: the greater his skill in using group methods of supervision, the greater are the productivity and job satisfactions of his subordinates . . . Supervisors with the best records of performance focus their primary attention on the human aspects of their subordinates’ problems and on endeavouring to build effective work groups with high performance goals.

This quotation lets us believe that leadership roles in formal groups are all for the goodness and wellbeing of the individual. While theoretically this may be true, the goal centred approach of the formal structure does not allow for too much emphasis to be placed on personal and individual welfare. This deficiency creates a gap in our working life. Many supervisors strive to reach the text book answer to leadership and endeavour to abide by it. Few however, one suggests, are able to maintain a standard that is acceptable to all.

In the wash up, supervisors are themselves human, they are subjective in their thinking,
although many will deny this. They have their informal structures and norms with which to adhere too.

These factors place heavy constraints on the human being and it is partially due to these constraints that our gap in working life is created. Deficiencies of this nature can, as we have said, bring about an imbalance in our life structure. The leadership style provided by the informal organisation can take up the slack and fill the gap rather adequately.

In the informal structure the leaders are chosen by the group—by peers and are held in respect for what they are, and for what they can do. Provided their judgement is kept in reasonable line with their mentors, those who elected them and those the informal group serves their acceptance and effectiveness as leaders is virtually assured.

What do Informal Structures Give Us

The achievable goals arising out of informal structures are many as they are complex and interwoven. These goals can be either "fore" or "against" the formal structure and can be either internal or external in origin of influence. That is, they can come from within the informal structure or from without. Not all influences are necessarily good, productive or positive in nature, as Figure 1 illustrated to us. Some informal structures can be self-destroying and defeating; while others are exactly the reverse. Let us examine six characteristics that an informal structure can have:

(a) Communication

Information can be passed down and up with comparative ease—speed is usually high, very high in most cases and this is sometimes done at the expense of accuracy. It is often said that the grapevine is a wonderful thing—indeed this is the case, it is also misleading, inaccurate and creates "expectation". Luthans (1981). There is very little that can be done to utilise the grapevine purposefully as a means of goal attainment. As a result, rumours probably do as least as much to subvert organisational goals as to foster them. They may well stir up dissent. They are contrary to fact.

Good, sound, accurate communication is a corner stone to a sound organisational structure. It provides a vertical and horizontal path for information and is highly supportive of individuals and the organisation alike. The establishment of these paths in the informal structure is an easy one to maintain and provides a good "stop gap" until formal information channels can be established.

(b) Response to Needs of the Organisation

This is closely linked to communication. The utilisation of the "Old Boy Net" to get things done is a great tool and a satisfier of immediate human needs. The approach through the back door is often productive, in that it is an indicator of what is really inside before you get there. This information can be a useful determinant in the decision making process, "do we proceed with the project further?"

The needs of the organisation are also responded to by staff stability and cohesiveness. Both of these are only attainable through sound management and leadership. Staff respond to needs more readily when they are identifiable as being good, positive in outcomes and useful. Likewise, the informal organisation identifies needs and clarifies them.

(c) Support for Human Resources

The informal structure is "people centred". Their needs, wants and desires are brought to the force. The basic need for people to seek support and be supported in their endeavours is an essential one in any organisation. To be seen and be felt as "useful". The informal structure facilitates this need. Pugh (1973) speaks of esprit de corps in these terms 'Union is strength.' business heads would do well to ponder on this proverb. Harmony, union among the personnel of a concern, is great strength in that concern. Effort, then, should be made to establish it. Among the countless methods in use I will single out specially one principle to be observed and two pitfalls to be avoided. The principle to be observed is unity of command; the dangers to be avoided are (1) a misguided interpretation of the motto 'divide and rule', (2) the abuse of written communications.

(d) Mechanism for Good Industrial Relations

The informal organisation has easy access to people. There are no hidden agendas. The operations of the organisation are understood and developed by the informal structure. Issues of discontent can be identified and processed with minimal delay. Judgements too, are not only seen to be fair but are in fact so. A properly
structured informal body will balance needs against what is achievable. Demands placed on the formal executive structure will be seen to be fair and reasonable. A process of interdependency will emerge. This process will use trust as a base from which to operate.

(e) Participative Management/Organisational Democracy

These strategies can be facilitated by the informal structure by its involvement in the decision making process. The utilisation of such organisational tools as OD, quality circles and team building activities provide for the informal organisation direct avenues of input into the way things are done. The freedom for the informal body to express its views, and the values that can come out of these expressions can be seen as significant in overall development. The team building tool will also strengthen the informal body by making it more cohesive and goal centred.

(f) Dispersion of Power

The likelihood of a “we” and “them” situation, formal v’s informal, management v’s staff syndrome, has all the necessary ingredients when power is divided too much. In some organisations, for example, the military and police, this dispersion of power creates cliques in the organisation. The executives (who have their own informal structure), have increasing difficulty in finding out what is going on at the lower levels. An air of protectionism is created around groups and “over cohesive” structures can develop.

Likewise, this dispersion of power can be seen as positive. The informal organisation as a result of stratification of authority becomes responsible for its own decisions, decides on its own norms and becomes significantly responsible for final outcomes. These processes contribute to the formal organisation in no small way.

Conclusion

This article has been a general overview of the informal organisation. It has attempted to explore the three major core areas, i.e.,

- People;
- Organisations; and
- Groups.

The article has drawn attention to six significant areas in which the informal structure has considerable influence. Although some bias may be detected centring on commercial organisations as such, the informal organisation principles, structure and operation equally apply to all bodies. Some bias may also be detected in favour of the informal organisation. This bias is not without solid foundation. The writer has seen and experienced considerable good emerging out of the formal organisation purely as a result of informal influence. This theory is supported by Elton Mayo whose reference is quoted in Kast and Rosenzweig “Basic to the philosophy of industrial humanism is the design of the work environment to provide for the restoration of man’s dignity”.

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John McMillan has spent 26 years with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the last 5 of which was with its Training and Development centre. In 1974/5 he was contracted to the BBC London for 12 months and on return to Australia in 1975 was seconded to the Technical Training unit of the National Broadcasting Commission of Papua New Guinea under ADAB. John has served in the Army reserve for some 23 years, being commissioned in the Royal Australian Corps of signals before transferring to Infantry where he served with 1 Commando, OCTU, and 3RNSWR. Many years in these units were in a training capacity. John joined the Defence Department in 1983 and is presently acting Executive Officer Training Plans and Policy, TEP Branch. He holds a Graduate Diploma in Adult Education from the Sydney College of Advanced Education.
Jf FOR THE
REATMENT OF
CRISIS-INDUCED
STRESS REACTION
IN THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

By Major G. R. Wardlaw, AA Psych Corps

Introduction

In recent years increasing attention has been paid to the concept of stress and its effects on the individual and, eventually, the organisation (Morano, 1977). In the Army context, most emphasis has rightly been placed on battlefield stress and its effects on morale and combat performance (Bourne, 1969). Hopefully, this concern will stimulate the production of practical guidelines on how to cope with stress and stressful conditions in the operational setting (Wardlaw, 1981).

One aspect of stress research which has received no attention in Service writing is that of reaction to involvement in a crisis situation. Research on the effects of disaster on rescue workers and of being taken hostage by terrorists has found extensive impairment of psychological and physical functioning for a significant proportion of individuals involved in such crises (Dunning and Silva, 1980; Fattah, 1979). Stratton (1983), reporting on police officers involved in particularly traumatic incidents, especially fatal shootings, estimated that approximately one-third experience minimal, if any, problems; one-third experience moderate problems; and another one-third experience severe difficulties which may affect the officer, his family and his job.

Apart from in battle, one might question the relevance of these findings for a Service environment. However, there are at least two situations in which Army personnel may become involved in traumatic situations in the course of their duties. One is being a part of or witnessing traumatic events whilst on an overseas posting, e.g., some members of Army Training Teams have experienced adjustment problems upon their return to Australia because of events they witnessed whilst overseas. The second is that because the Army is sometimes tasked to provide rescue services in a disaster, some personnel may well be affected by a post-crisis stress reaction which will negatively impact both their personal and Service lives. It is argued that the Army should be able to provide timely and adequate support services to such personnel which will enable them to minimize the effects of crisis-induced stress reactions.

Aim

The aim of this article is to describe the effects of crisis-induced stress reaction, outline the treatment avenues which have been found useful in dealing with it, and propose measures by which the Australian Army can prepare itself to cope with such reactions which occur in personnel as a result of their Service duties.

Crisis-Induced Stress Reactions

Traumatic events can represent a major crisis to some individuals. They can be significant emotional events which can cause the individual
to lose equilibrium. Crisis theory presumes that, whatever their level of psychological health, people are for the majority of their existence in a period of equilibrium or homeostasis. When a significant emotional event occurs (i.e., an experience of major influence) which has the potential to upset equilibrium, stress is placed on the individual. Coping mechanisms are then activated. If these mechanisms are unable to meet the situation, upheaval occurs. When the crisis occurs, there is often a painful period of disequilibrium and disorganisation. The person can only exist with the stressful situation for a short period of time and must develop some method of coping and adjusting to the crisis. The period of adjustment involves a reintegration by the individual.

The reintegration period usually begins immediately or within four to six weeks after the event (Stratton, 1983). The re-establishment of equilibrium may be at the same, a higher or a lower level of psychological functioning, depending on the method the individual uses to handle his predicament. It is thought that the level of equilibrium finally achieved by the person in crisis is dependent upon the immediacy of treatment as well as the effectiveness and ability of the people who are intervening.

When traumatic events are of brief duration, psychological disturbances generally subside as the event ends and social cohesiveness and effective coping increase (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1972). More prolonged events are associated with longer term disturbances (Menninger, 1952; Popkin, Stillner, Osborn-Pierce, and Shurley, 1974). The intensity of the experience may influence the time-course of disturbances. It should also be noted that for some individuals there may be long-term sequelae of traumatic experiences (Hamilton, 1982). The problems reported by Vietnam Veterans (Wilmer, 1982) and the increasing number of World War II veterans suffering from a recurrence of combat-like stress symptoms aggravated by conflicts simulating the original trauma (Christenson et. al., 1981) are examples.

Traumatic events associated with combat are typically re-experienced in painful, intrusive recollections or recurrent nightmares or flashbacks during which components of the event are relived. The experience may be set off by an external stimulus or by some ideational stimulus or memory. Frequently, the individual may react with panic or fear of loss of control (Wilmer, 1982). Similar reactions have been reported by civilians in the aftermath of disasters. For example, following their involvement in rescue operations at the site of a major air collision between a Boeing 727 and a Cessna 172 in 1978, 38 of the 80 police officers assigned to these duties sought psychological assistance. The experience of having to bear witness to the horror and degradation of 144 human beings appeared to be an overwhelming psychological event. Uniformly, the officers reported serious sleep disturbances, nightmares, loss of appetite, reduction of libido, anxiety and, in many cases, anger and hostility directed toward inappropriate targets (Davidson, 1979). Similar symptoms were reported by Taylor and Frazer (1981) in their research into the effects on New Zealand Police personnel assigned to body recovery or victim identification duties following the crash of an Air New Zealand DC10 in the Antarctic in November 1979. The study showed that 38.5% of personnel surveyed (182 subjects from a total of 223 personnel involved in the stressful operations) were adversely affected by their experiences. Their symptoms were of cognitive, emotional and behavioural disturbance, most of which diminished over a three-month period.

It would appear, then, that following any severe crisis a significant proportion of personnel involved will experience some form of stress-induced debilitation. Severe emotional impairment is not usually a general response, but results indicate that at a minimum a majority of personnel will suffer increased psychological discomfort characterised by anxiety, nervousness, and somatic complaints (Gleser, Green, and Winget, 1978).

**Treatment of Crisis-Induced Stress Reactions**

There are two schools of thought concerning whether or not organisations should actively seek to become involved in programs designed to prevent or minimize the effects of stress reactions (Ochberg, 1978). One view is that the important thing is to let the participants forget their experiences, to be as unobtrusive as possible, to keep professional intervention to a minimum and to avoid any suggestion that psychological care could be beneficial unless it is specifically requested by the individual. The reasons advanced in support of this view are that many organisations lack adequate facilities for providing such services and that, anyway,
many, if not most, people cope well without professional help and seek only the support of family or friends. In particular, they do not want the additional burden of a medical or a psychiatric label interfering with their attempts to readjust to work and home.

The alternative, and predominant view, however, is that the evidence points to stressed individuals being at high risk of further pain and problems. Many people experience the crisis-induced stress reaction, but simple treatment can reduce both the severity of the symptoms and the time over which they are experienced. Further, since a small number of individuals may experience very severe reactions with considerable negative consequences (some long-term), the organisation owes its employees at least the opportunity for diagnosis and care. Following this line of reasoning, a number of emergency services are now implementing schemes to provide post-crisis counselling services for their personnel.

From the counselling services which have now been exercised in real emergencies, a number of principles of treatment have emerged. The first is that, where at all possible, personnel should be briefed prior to being employed on potentially traumatic duties about the reactions that people have to major crises. This may lessen the impact of some reactions because they are to a certain extent anticipated. The briefing should also include notification that post-incedent de-briefing will include being examined medically and psychologically, so that this experience is anticipated too (New Zealand Police, 1980).

Following a crisis situation personnel should be de-briefed thoroughly and carefully. It is particularly important that no connotation of "services for the mentally ill" should appear. It should be emphasized that stress-induced psychological problems are naturally occurring and transitory states which do not require traditional mental health services (Butcher, 1980). At the de-briefing, personnel should be invited to participate in a brief program of crisis intervention counselling (or some other appropriate name).

In such a program the individual is viewed as undergoing a transition period in which symptoms will dissipate, even without treatment, in a relatively brief span of time (usually less than six weeks). The goal is to reduce the present stress level and enable the individual to re-establish equilibrium in the minimum time possible. A typical program emphasizes opportunities for ventilation of feelings and provision of support through both individual and group counselling sessions (Brownstone, Penick, Larcen, Powell, and Nord, 1977). An example of such a program is that operated by the Chicago Police Department following participation in the rescue operations at the scene of the crash of a DC10 in May 1979. The department conducted voluntary de-briefing sessions for officers involved (Wagner, 1980). The program encompassed two considerations for crisis coping needs. First, it provided an opportunity for officers to talk about their experiences and reactions, utilizing the theory that communicating either prevents symptoms or minimizes the intensity of such reactions as do occur (Galdston, 1958). Second, it allowed the officers the opportunity to learn that stress reactions are normal responses in crisis situations and that, recognizing this, the department provided resources, to help deal with them.

In counselling sessions, the following principles, based on the work of Bard and Ellinson (1974), are considered appropriate:

- The counsellors must be nonjudgemental and patient. Subjects should be put at ease and permitted to tell the story willingly and naturally. This will take longer than any direct questioning, but the quality of information will be superior;
- Subjects should be encouraged to "ventilate". There is a desire to unburden oneself after a traumatic event, and the counselling session is an appropriate time and setting;
- Questioning should be done in a comfortable setting. Subjects should be asked where they would like to be interviewed; letting them make a decision on choice of location of interview is one way of helping them to gain control of their lives;
- If possible, subjects should be able to be counselled privately, although group sessions are also useful, particularly when used as part of the de-briefing process. Subjects should be assured that they need feel no guilt or shame concerning their reactions; and
- Subjects may exhibit a wide range of emotions during de-briefing and counselling. It is important that they be permitted to tell the story in their own words and at their own pace.
Discussion

Many people experience psychological and somatic problems in response to traumatic situations. Crisis intervention counselling, together with appropriate briefing and de-briefing (where possible), has been shown to be an effective way of reducing their distress and enabling them to manage their immediate situation more adaptively.

The Australian Army sometimes requires personnel to undertake duties which put them at risk of experiencing crisis-induced stress reactions. The numbers involved may range from an individual (most likely on an overseas posting) to a large group deployed on such duties as rescue or disaster relief. For both ethical and practical reasons the Army should be able to provide appropriate services to these personnel. This should include a formal system of briefing personnel entering potential crisis situations on the range of reactions likely to be experienced and observed, with emphasis on the fact that such reactions are normal. The briefing should include notification that a de-briefing will be conducted at the termination of the duty and that a counselling service will be available for those who wish to use it. Obviously, this requires the Army to have available qualified personnel capable of providing this service.

The question then arises of who is best able to provide the service. The civilian literature suggests that it is important to avoid giving psychiatric overtones to the counselling and that it is, therefore, desirable to avoid having psychiatrists or other medical personnel directly involved except as a resource to which to refer those few subjects who may have long-term severe problems (Butcher, 1980). However, the service to be offered does require an understanding of crisis-induced stress reactions and experience in counselling. AA Psych Corps is in the best position to provide the expertise. It has the research resources to prepare and deliver briefing material on stress reactions and a pool of experienced interviewers and counsellors able to provide de-briefing and counselling services as appropriate.

It should be noted also that many of the issues involved in this area, relating both to the reactions themselves and to principles of treatment, overlap with those surrounding battlefield stress. It is suggested that this is also an area in which more direct involvement of AA

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On June 18th last year, at the Sydney Annual Waterloo Dinner, Lt-Col. S. H. Watson, CBE, DSO, MC, ED, paid tribute to his old friend and former commander, Brig. C. H. Foott, CB, CMG, an “unusually interesting” man and a “model to officers”. It was through his association with Foott that Watson had been tasked to construct the first pier on the shore of Gallipoli, and for their services at Gallipoli both officers were decorated with the Serbian Order of the White Eagle, a rare honour amongst Australians. To celebrate the completion of the pier, Foott suggested a dinner, and thus the first Waterloo Dinner was held, exactly one century after the famous battle.

Number 6 Field Troop Engineers, 4th Military District, was officially raised on January 3rd 1911, the two officers being appointed to the Troop being Lt. J. Linden (Officer Commanding) and 2Lt S. H. Watson (although he modestly points out that he was “supernumary to establishment”), both of whom were engineer officers with the South Australian Railways at the time. Stan Watson, born on October 24th 1887 to Harry Watson of Plympton, SA was a graduate of the University of Adelaide and the School of Mines, and had joined the SAR Engineer & Staff Corps in 1904. “The 6th Field Troop”, recalled Stan at the Dinner “in its very brief existence . . . carried out a heavy training programme”, one of the guest lecturers being Cecil Foott, Director of Engineers during his various official visits to Adelaide.

Cecil Henry Foott, born January 16th 1976 at NSW and a graduate of the RAE Staff College, Camberley, had been appointed Director of Engineers in 1901. During WW1 he served as DAQMG 1st Division at Gallipoli, where “he was the life and soul of the small group of sappers at the 1st Division HQ ANZAC” as well as Chief Engineer, Australian Engineers. He received the CB and CMG for War services, and was mentioned in despatches six times, as well as receiving the Serbian Order of the White Eagle for services at Gallipoli.

Disbanded on December 13th 1912 under the Universal Training Scheme, the Troop was replaced by an element of the 28th Division Signal Company, with Stan Watson commanding, having been promoted to Lieutenant on July 1st. Ten days after WW1 started, Watson enlisted and was appointed OC 2 Field Company, 1st Australian Division Signal Company, on the Headquarters of the 1st Division AIF. Following training at Broadmeadows, they sailed for Egypt in late 1914, finally landing at Gallipoli on April 25th.

The Australian troops had been warned by Lt-Gen. Birdwood prior to the landing that “on landing it will be necessary for every individual to carry with him all his requirements in food and clothing for three days”. Soon after the ill-fated landing, the Australians came to rely heavily upon supplies and reinforcements from the sea, and it was not long before it became apparent that a pier was required to facilitate this transfer of goods and personnel. Major Macworth, commanding the 1st Div. Sig.Coy, suggested to Foott that Watson would possess the necessary enthusiasm and initiative, and Foott fully concurred. Watson was soon commanding a small party of men from 2 Fd Coy, constructing a pier largely from timber taken from a Bridging Train transport ship. The 64 m pier was built near the spot where the first tows had landed, and was completed by the 17th June.

“It took thirty of us about four weeks to build. It wasn't easy. We were working under intermittent fire from the Turkish artillery, and a number of men were lost through this”, Stan Watson reminisced in 1981. The absence of a piledriver led the enterprising young officer to use an unexploded 9” shell from the Turkish
Cruiser Barbarossa to assist in driving the piles. “I knew nothing about explosives and I was terrified, but somehow I succeeded. And somehow we managed to build the pier”13. Dr C. E. W. Bean recorded that the pier “was the only means of bringing in supplies and evacuating the dead at Gallipoli for several months”14.

“The day after we finished construction was the anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo”, continued Stan, “so thirteen sapper officers had a dinner of bully beef to celebrate that and the opening of the pier”15. It was at this dinner, which had been instigated by Foott, that the new facility was named “Watson’s pier”, Major Macworth having prepared a sign to that effect which was placed at the shore end of the pier. With assistance from Watson’s batman, Sapper G. T. M. Roach, Lt-Col. Foott had designed and drafted a fine menu and wine list (“to starboard”), one of which Watson had signed by the 13 in attendance. These officers, who, during the building of the pier “had fra­ternised together for morning coffee at 11 am . . . came to be called the ‘elevenises’”16.

Little did the officers of the ‘elevenses’ realise that in their midst was a 24 year old Captain, the Adjutant of the 1st Division Engineers, who would later become Chief of the General Staff for an aggregate of 7 years, as well as GOC 1st Army (the most senior field command available then), and be decorated with the Order of the Bath for “saving Australia in late 1941 and early 1942, the time of greatest peril in the nation’s history”16. Captain V. A. H. Sturdee, later Lt-Gen. Sir Vernon Sturdee, KBE, CB, DSO, one of the most important officers in Australian military history, had received his commission in 1908 after passing the Permanent Force examination, for which he had been recommended by Colonel Foott. His first taste of active service was as Adjutant of the 1st Div. Engineers on Gallipoli, taking ‘elevenises’ at ANZAC HQ with Macworth, Foott and Wat­son.

“Watson’s pier” no longer stands in the lonely waters between Ari Burnu and Hell Spit, the wind and waves having long taken their toll; nor are the trenches still in existence. After his return there in 1977, Stan Watson remarked on the remains of the trenches over which 103,000 soldiers lost their lives, describing them now as “crumbled ditches covered with flowers and pines; made fertile by so deep a ploughing”17.

In the evacuation of ANZAC in December in December 1915, “an achievement without parallel in the annals of War”, Watson (who had been in the second wave at the landing) was the second last to leave. For the evacuation he had received the orders, “Watson, the communications must not fail”18 from Colonel White, who reiterated the orders of Lt-Gen. Birdwood prior to the landing — “communications never to be neglected”19. He remained behind with three sergeants and 17 sappers therefore, to ensure a successful evacuation. At about 3.30 am the order was sent to the remaining signal station to send the prearranged signal “evacuation completed, no casualties left ashore, one sent on board” but Watson found the lines to be dead. He then ran under fire to the South Beach where he breathlessly ordered the two Naval wireless operators to send a short­ened message “evacuation completed”.

He then dashed across Ari Burnu to the North Beach, arriving to find all the troops aboard the last lighter, which sailed at 4 am. The few remaining Staff officers sailed at 4.10, Stan Watson being the last officer sent aboard by Captain Littler, the Beachmaster. Captain Litt­ler, of the 52nd Battalion, made an entry to this fact in Watson’s pay book, which is now held by the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. The last man to leave ANZAC, Lit­tler was an officer renowned for always leading “his men in action, his only weapon his walking stick”. He was later killed in action at Mouquet Farm on September 3rd 1916.

This was the beginning of a distinguished military career during WW1 for Watson. He was rewarded with Captaincy a month after the completion of his pier, and was promoted Maj­or in June 1916, commanding 2 Div.Sig.Coy for the duration of the War. As well as the Serbian Order of the White Eagle, 5th Class with swords, of which a mere eleven were awarded to Australians, he also earnt the DSO20 and MC21, as well as being mentioned in despatches22. He thus fulfilled the wishes of General Birdwood, who had written to him in 1916 to congratulate him on his Serbian decoration: “I trust that you will be able to see the whole of this war through and gain still further honours”23.

In addition, many men under him received decorations for their untiring energy, courage and determination in ensuring that effective
communications were maintained. "The provision and maintenance of signal communication was frequently beyond human achievement and endurance", yet the many citations attest to the gallantry of these signalmen, and many victories are attributable to their successful maintenance of communications. Stan Watson does not like to say much about his own citations and achievements however, wishing to avoid "the appearance ... of any possible exhibitionism", so with respect, the details are not here related. He was accorded the rank of Lt-Colonel at the time of his discharge in January 1919, the end of his service also being recognised with the award of the Efficiency Decoration.

The tragedy of the Anzac landing echoed in his mind many times in the ensuing years, the uncertainty of the landing being a continual enigma. Finally, his curiosity demanded satisfaction, so in March 1977 he returned to Gallipoli, finding it quite rewarding to stand in the village of Maidos — the objective of the AIF attack. Standing on the beach however, he felt a feeling of frustration when he saw that the proposed landing site "did provide the essentials for the purpose ... A terrain most suitable for our battle purpose".

Instigated in 1977 by the then newly appointed Commander of the 4th Military District, Brig. Phillip Greville CBE, The Tragic Truth . . . is a partial autobiography set amid historical recollection and factual narrative, and makes interesting reading for anyone with an interest in the Gallipoli campaign. Stan Watson’s feelings about the landing were again voiced on Anzac Day 1981 when he was recorded in The Advertiser as saying "we failed because of a colossal and stupid blunder by the Navy". Written shortly after his return from the Dardanelles, The Tragic Truth . . . is a report by Watson on the failure of the Anzac landing in which he lays the blame for the "hopeless helpless fix", squarely at the feet of Rear Admiral Thursby, RN. He feels that such a tragedy should not be covered up with the shrouds of history, but considers that "it is a right that succeeding generations should know the truth".

Stan Watson’s impressive and unique array of medals and decorations was added to in 1959 when he received a Civil CBE in recognition of his services to transport in South Australia. Immediately after the war he had returned to the SA Railways becoming the General Traffic Manager in 1935; it was while in this post that he received the Coronation medal of King George VI. Soon after he had been appointed Deputy Commissioner of Railways, a position from which he retired in 1952 aged 65.

The original Waterloo Dinner held at Gallipoli was not repeated until 1924, but has become an annual Sapper tradition since that time. As the guest of honour at the 1984 Dinner held at the School of Military Engineering, Casula, as with each passing Dinner and Anzac Day parade, Stan Watson could not help but notice the gradual replacement of the veterans by "our younger brethren". He is the only surviving signaller from South Australia to have served at Gallipoli, and one of only six WW1 signallers from SA still extant today. In 1981 "the ten members of the 1st AIF Signals Association decided that when our numbers got down to five marchers we would give our funds to Legacy and disband". Almost prophetically, an article in The Advertiser prior to Anzac Day 1982, under the title "End of an Era Looms for Anzac Veterans", stated, "When Lt-Col. S. H. Watson can no longer march in the Anzac Day parade down King William Street, an era in Australian history will end". Despite this, the remaining five signalmen, led by their revered President Stan Watson, continued marching until 1984, in which parade they were transported by Army vehicles.

The continued observance of the Waterloo Dinner, a unique Sapper tradition, is a fitting tribute to a man who played a unique part in Australian history, Lieutenant-Colonel Stanley Holmes Watson, CBE, DSO, MC, ED, himself a unique Australian.

NOTES
2. Birdwood W. R. Special Order APRIL 1915.
10. London Gazette, 1 JAN 1919.
11. London Gazette, 1 JAN 1917.
12. London Gazette, 31 DEC 1918 (for 8 NOV 1918).
13. Birdwood W. R. (1916), In The Tragic Truth...
15. Hamilton Sir Ian, Diary Comment 5 OCT 1915, In The Tragic Truth...

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**CADRE BULLETIN**

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which they appear are available at the libraries on most Defence establishments.

Soviet Strategic Defense Programs. *National Defence*; Nov 85: i-xxiv. Released by the US Department of Defense and Department of State, October 1985. Contains detailed diagrams and illustrations of: Moscow ballistic missile defenses — Galosh and new silo based high acceleration interceptors; Hen House, Dog House and Cat House radars; large phased array ballistic missile detection systems; Soviet ABM Space Defence programs; operational antisatellite interceptors; air defence bases; a comparison of USSR and US air defence interceptor aircraft; USSR strategic surface-to-air missiles; and a summary of Soviet offensive force developments.

Conventional Defence Improvements. Mack, Hans-Joachim *NATO's Sixteen Nations*; Oct 85: 16+(7p). A review of the geo-strategic position of and threats facing Western Europe, the NATO initiatives to strengthen conventional and forward defence, and the requirements needed to improve the NATO defence posture.


Towards European Defence Industry. Van Houwelingen, Jan *NATO's Sixteen Nations*; Oct 85: 44+(5p). Shows that if there was genuine co-operation, European NATO countries would achieve improved equipments, technological sophistication and strength in the Alliance and efficiency and prosperity for its members.

The Transatlantic Dialogue and the European Defence Industry. Tebbe, Wolfgang *NATO's Sixteen Nations*; Oct 85: 52+(6p). Reviews past initiatives in European and Transatlantic armaments cooperation, the need to balance national economical interests with international security needs, and the importance of sharing research and technology.

Deterrence: From Fear to Interdependence. Snyder, Edward F. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*; Oct 85: 40-42. Argues that since deterrence by fear is leading inexorably toward catastrophe, there is a need to shift toward a new goal of interdependence and common security as a means of ensuring survival and economic self interest.

The First Salvo. Zimm, Alan D. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*; Jan 85: 55-60 Argues the need for NATO to devise a Western naval strategy to prevent the threat of a Soviet preemptive attack and to win the the "first salvo".

Military Spending Boosts the Deficit. Adams, Gordon: Weiss, Laura *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*; Apr 85: 26-27 propelled by strategic weapons, the growing military portion of the budget is sending the federal deficit to unprecedented levels, Even greater increases are planned for future years.


The Reagan Administration may also be using production of warhead materials as a "back door" to authorizing weapons not approved by Congress.
By Air Commodore N. F. Ashworth, RAAF

If you wish to start an argument among a group of your Service colleagues just get them going on the subject of command, or, if you will, command and control. (It's all the same anyway!) All will claim a degree of expertise, and the higher the rank the greater the expertise. Also, in a group of, say, three, you will probably get four quite different opinions on this most basic aspect of military activity. Hopefully, this article on the subject of command will also evoke such a response.

Few would argue that command is not a most important and pervasive feature of military life. Command, many would claim, is the key to success in military endeavour. Command means discipline, leadership and toughness; it represents strength, direction and purpose; it is that which distinguishes the military from civilian endeavour; it is that which separates the men from the boys. Command in this context represents the very essence of military activity.

Command, when shorn of its emotive content, can also be viewed in the context of its place in organizational matters, and it is towards this more mundane view that this article is directed.

In good military fashion, let me start with a definition:

"Command is the authority granted to a member of a military service to issue orders to a subordinate in the execution of his military duty."

Several issues arise from this definition, the examination of which may help in understanding the concept encompassed by the term "command".

Command relates to the members of a particular organization, in this case a military service. The authority that is command is granted by the organization (certain of) its members, and is applied to other members of that organization. Command does not apply outside the organization, and is limited to matters relating to membership of that organization.

As has already been said, command is the authority granted to some members of an organization to give orders to other members of that organization. Implied within the definition is the obligation placed on the organization to require the subordinates to accept such orders. Such acceptance by the subordinates is in turn a basic requirement of their membership of the organization.

Command is not the only type of authority that may be granted to a member of an organization. There is, for example, financial authority, which covers such things as the authority to incur expenditure and to authorize the payment of accounts. Financial authority, particularly in government organizations like the military, tends to be limited to a select group. Such authority also has its own hierarchy which does not necessarily conform with the normal chain of command. It is not at all uncommon for military commanders to have subordinates who have financial authority beyond that of their commander. There are many
other types of authority, and in many cases these relate to particular professional qualifications. Here for example we have such things as: medical authority, technical design authority, airworthiness authority, specialist authority related to ordnance and explosives, and authority which flows from the disciplinary code. To these must be added those myriad of items where regulations and orders assign particular authority, and responsibility, to particular persons, normally by virtue of their appointment, and often independent of the normal chain of command.

Authority, be it command or other, is given to a member of an organization for a purpose, that purpose being to enable the member to carry out some responsibility. Thus we have the well-accepted concept that authority and responsibility go hand-in-hand, and that you cannot have one without the other. Ideally, the two should be matched. Authority beyond that needed to carry out a responsibility is quite unnecessary, and can lead to unjustified interference in the responsibilities of others. On the other hand, having insufficient authority can make it virtually impossible for a member to fulfil his assigned responsibilities, unless he is able to obtain support by other means from those outside his authority. In assigning authority, in some cases it is the extent and limits of the authority itself that is specified; in others, it is responsibility that is specified, with the necessary authority to carry out that responsibility being presumed.

The grand of command authority in a military service comes from two sources: appointment to command posts, and military rank. When a member is appointed to command a particular element, section, unit or group, he is given the authority to issue orders to members of that element, etc. He is also held responsible for the official activities of the element and the consequence of his own exercise of command authority. Such authority is limited in its application to the members of that element, and may only be applied to matters associated with the officially assigned tasks of that element.

Command authority arising from military rank is somewhat more complex and subtle than that arising from appointment to a post. Within a military service virtually all members are allocated a rank, with the ranks themselves being graded in hierarchical or seniority order. Those of senior rank have command authority over those of junior rank. Military rank even has a grading of authority within a rank level, normally based on relative time in rank.

In order to avoid conflict between command authority derived from appointment to a post and that derived from military rank, care is normally taken to match appointment and rank, with the most senior in rank within any group being appointed to command that group. Also, conflict tends to be avoided by application of the unwritten law that authority due to appointment normally takes precedence over that due to rank. Where command authority due to rank is important, it is in those abnormal situations where authority due to appointment is absent. Situations can arise where the appointed incumbent of a post is temporarily and unexpectedly absent, perhaps as a result of a battle casualty or other mishap, or for which no specific responsibility has been assigned. In such cases, the senior ranking member is expected to “take over” by assuming charge of the particular situation.

At the extreme is the situation where authority due to both appointment and rank has broken down. In such a case, any member who believes he can recover the situation may assume command, irrespective of rank or appointment. Clearly such situations are difficult to deal with and require that the circumstances warrant such an action. Whether command authority is assumed or granted, those who use such authority must, subsequently, accept the consequences of their exercise of command.

The derivation of command authority and its relationship to the chain of command is an important element in understanding the concept of “command”. Command authority operates within an hierarchy or chain of command. Command in this context is that derived from appointment to a post, with the hierarchy, or chain of command, being an hierarchy of posts running from top to bottom of the organization. Command authority at each level is derived by delegation from the level above.

Although the terminology may vary from Service to Service, the general form in relation to the command chain is that for each Service there is a head, or commander, who is responsible for the activities of that Service, and who has command authority over all members of that Service. At the next level in the command chain the Service is divided into a number of major components, each with its own com-
mander. The component commander derives his command authority as a delegation from the Service commander, who also delegates to him responsibility for the activities of his component. This process is then repeated for the next level down, and so on all the way down the command chain to the lowest levels.

Delegation of command authority and of responsibility does not mean that those at the higher levels abrogate or are deprived of either their command authority or their responsibility. Each superior retains his responsibility for the activities of his subordinates, who are accountable to him for their own exercise of command authority. Here, as a means of preserving order in the practice of command, another of the unwritten laws of command comes into play; that is, that a superior should exercise his command authority over his subordinates only through those immediately subordinate to him in the command chain. In other words, orders should only be issued through the chain of command. By-passing the chain of command, which amounts in effect to a withdrawal of command authority from those by-passed, alters the balance of responsibility, accountability and authority.

Delegation of command authority and of responsibility also does not mean that command authority at any level is either absolute or unlimited. Limitations apply at all levels and with all delegations, and tend to affect both the amount of discretion allowed a commander and the matters for which he is held responsible. For those at the lower levels in the command chain, authority and responsibility is normally quite limited.

The maintenance of the balance between command authority and responsibility, both at a level and between levels within the command chain, is essential for the preservation of harmony and organizational efficiency. Commanders at all levels tend to jealously guard what they see as their command prerogatives, and particularly so in a system in which authority and responsibility relationships are based more on precedent and practice than on written guidelines.

All except those at the lowest level within the military regularly exercise that authority which is called “command”. While the majority know well how to exercise such authority and, for the most part, understand its limits, few appear to understand its essential nature. In essence, command is simple. It is not some mystical power, it is not a right or a privilege, it is not the preserve or the prerogative of the few: it is merely the authority to give orders. Nor is command limited to the military. Command, by whatever name it may be called, is a basic feature of all organizations, be they civilian or military, government or private, large or small.

Organizations are arrangements for getting things done through people, and that means giving orders, which is, in turn, what command is all about.

Air Commodore Ashworth graduated from the RAAF College as a pilot in 1954. He has held numerous command and staff appointments including command of the RAAF Antarctic flight, No. 10 Squadron, Officers' Training School and RAAF Pearce. Before taking up his current appointment as Director General of the Military Staff in SIP Division he was Chief of Staff at Headquarters Operational Command.
CADETS at the Australian Defence Force Academy should be taught behavioural science.

An understanding of organizational behaviour is fundamental to the profession of arms in the modern world. Whilst an officer will have to use a range of technological, financial and material resources during his or her career, basic to all his or her activities is the requirement to achieve results through people. In the past, there has been a tendency to assume that officers' "leadership" and "man-management" skills would be acquired by formal training and, more particularly, on-the-job training and experience as a junior officer; but, even if this assumption is still justified, the Services' present requirements for leadership and management go well beyond the skills learned by such means.

Currently, few Service officers are formally taught behavioural science and organizational behaviour. There are no such academic courses at Jervis Bay, Duntroon or Point Cook, and no programme exists for their introduction at the Australian Defence Force Academy. (It seems to have been accepted by the Academy that such courses might be offered in the future, but no time-frame has been indicated.) Whilst staff college students receive some instruction in these areas, the time allocation in such courses tends to be small. In any case, such subject matter is probably better taught in an academic setting, as "education" rather than as "training". And, whatever the form it takes at the mid career level, it would have much greater impact if built on a foundation of undergraduate study.

Definitions

Behavioural science is the study of human behaviour using the disciplines of psychology and sociology. Organizational behaviour is behavioural science applied to the study of work organizations.

The Need for Behavioural Science/Organizational Behaviour Knowledge

Like most academic disciplines, behavioural science/organizational behaviour knowledge provides an intellectual basis for the analysis of later problems and for placing later learning (formal or experiential) in context. That is, such knowledge assists in developing a certain way of thinking and a certain way of approaching issues and problems: it gives an intellectual foundation upon which to build; and without which much later experience would be partly or fully incomprehensible. Thus, having a "discipline" in economics, political science, history, or behavioural science helps a person "make sense" of what is going on around him or her.

This is not only useful in problem solving, but also helps a person deduce why things are as they are. In the case of behavioural science knowledge, for example, it helps a person see why certain social institutions are so strong in the military, why some should continue to be fostered and why some are now dysfunctional. Such analysis assists leaders and policy makers to develop rational social systems, and to avoid undesirable social systems.
In the past, Service officers have tended to believe that formal teaching was not necessary in order to be able to do this, but certain recent Service studies have indicated that there is a need for the study of behavioural science and organizational behaviour.

For example, the Army's Regular Officer Development Committee, in its forecast of the future career development needs of the Army, identified a number of knowledge/skill requirements which fall into this area. In the future, said the RODC, Service officers will have to give priority to the following tasks (in addition to more traditional military tasks):

- foster a greater mutual understanding by both the Army and society;
- meet demands from subordinates for greater personal involvement in and satisfaction from their work, and balance these demands with other organizational pressures, including the need for organizational effectiveness and the maintenance of important military values and norms; and
- manage organizational change.

The relevance of the RODC's recommendations were illustrated by a recent survey of Service officer work attitudes. This found that, whilst career commitment and job satisfaction were generally high among officers working outside Canberra, those in Canberra (at Russell-Campbell Park) frequently had low scores on these variables. Amongst other things, this indicates that the challenges of "man management" in Canberra are greater than those for other military work locations. It is probable that these challenges would be better met by officers who possessed some grounding such as that suggested by the RODC. To put it another way, the needs enumerated above have not been met by the traditional career development means, at least in terms of their expression at the Department of Defence.

**Courses Available in Other Tertiary Institutions**

The need to teach concepts of behavioural science and organizational behaviour is being increasingly accepted in the design of undergraduate courses elsewhere in Australia. Perusal of some of the relevant handbooks in the Russell library showed that at least four universities and two colleges of advanced education offer relevant units as part of degrees in economics or commerce. Table 1 gives some details. This catalogue is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. The point to be made is that the suggestion that cadets at the Academy learn behavioural science is far from being radical, at least in terms of societal/educational norms.

**Proposal**

It is proposed that the Australian Defence Force Academy offer two subjects in its undergraduate course, based on behavioural science content. The aim of the combined subjects should be as follows:

"To understand the psychological and sociological bases of human performance in the military, so providing an intellectual foundation by which an officer can develop his/her knowledge and test his/her judgement of such matters during his/her career."

**Options**

There are two options for achieving this aim.

**Option A**

**Behavioural Science 1: Introduction to Behavioural Science.**

*Theme:* Major concepts and research in the behavioural sciences which reveal the dynamics of human behaviour and the variety of viewpoints that can be used to explain such behaviour.

*Content:* Nature and scope of behavioural science; individual behaviour (perception, cognition, learning, motivation and personality); group behaviour; culture; social class; roles; social institutions.

**Behavioural Science 2: Military Behavioural Science.**

*Theme:* Application of concepts to the Service context, to explain factors which may influence individual performance, group cohesion and morale.

*Content:* Individual capacities and inclinations; leadership; authority and power; individual moral involvement; environmental factors; professionalism; socialization; stress and fear.

**Option B**

Option B is similar in total coverage to Option A, except that military psychology and military sociology are covered separately. Each subject would cover the theoretical and applied aspects of the appropriate discipline.
## TABLE 1
Some of the Courses Offered in Australian Tertiary Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canberra CAE</td>
<td>B Admin</td>
<td>Behavioural science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Administration 2 (Industrial psychology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational psychology A, B, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darling Downs Institute of Advanced</td>
<td>B Business</td>
<td>Human resource management (8 subjects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monash University</td>
<td>B Ec</td>
<td>Organizational behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Newcastle</td>
<td>B Ec</td>
<td>Organization and management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Comm</td>
<td>Sociology of work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of New South Wales</td>
<td>B Comm</td>
<td>Labour relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Queensland</td>
<td>B Ec</td>
<td>Organization behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Comm</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Conclusion

The complexity of modern military social systems requires officers who understand how such systems work and how and why such systems shape human behaviour. The requirement is fundamental to future organizational effectiveness, and is arguably the most important educational need of the modern officer. The omission of the requirement from the academic curriculum of the Defence Force Academy should be corrected as soon as possible.

### REFERENCES


LTCOL Nick Jans is a lecturer in administration at the Canberra college of Advanced Education and is a member of the Army Reserve Staff Group in Canberra. During his service with the ARA, he served with the 1st and 12th Field Regiments RAA, and with Headquarters Training Command, the Royal Military College, Army Headquarters and the Department of Defence (Army Office). He holds a PhD in Organizational Behaviour from the University of New South Wales and has contributed a number of articles to the DFJ in the past.

### COPIES WANTED

The Editor urgently requires back copies of *Army Journal* and *Defence Force Journal*.
MOST people associate wartime escaping from Germany with furtive meetings of the Escape Committee, the forging of “Ausweis”, and tunnelling under the wire. This is undoubtedly due to the widespread showing of such excellent films as Colditz, The Great Escape and The Wooden Horse, which vividly portrayed such activities. Yet this was only one aspect of escaping, and indeed a minor one.

The bulk of the POW population, privates and junior NCOs, were forced to do agricultural work — allowed under the Geneva Convention — and were scattered throughout Germany in small working parties. It was from there that the majority of escapes were made. This is the story of just one of the many hundreds.

Our party of eleven Australians was sent out in October 1941 to the remote little hamlet of Unterwaldbehrungen, which lay in the fold of a wooded hill, and stretched for a quarter of a kilometre along either side of a winding dirt road. An onion-domed church in the centre of the village overlooked a muddy square, complete with water trough and a gaggle of unfriendly geese. The poor birds were plucked for their down, and no sooner had their red-raw breasts feathered over than they again underwent their ordeal. An act which they greatly resented.

The village houses were built on a stone base to a height of about five feet, and then timber beams formed a framework for woven birch and mud panels. The two-storey buildings were surmounted by steep slate roofs.

As is customary in Germany the cows were stabled in the houses, and narrow lanes led off the village road to the barns and sheds. It was there that the farm carts, ploughs and other instruments were stored together with straw and fodder for the cows.

We were barracked in a village house, which had belonged to an unfortunate Jew. The windows were barred, and our guard, a soldier from the main camp, lived with us. He had a room of his own, which he would lock behind him at night. His main duties were to get us out in the mornings for the short walk to our farmer, and to secure us on our return at night.

Thoughts of escape are never far from one’s mind when a POW, but there was no chance of an immediate attempt as winter soon closed in. What bitter months they were — feet constantly aching with cold, ears covered to prevent frost-bite, and hairs in the nostrils frozen stiff and ever tickling. In the barracks, despite a wood-burning stove, damp boots froze to the floor and had to be jerked loose in the morning; and one’s breath condensed on the straw sack pillow, and formed a stiff little patch of ice overnight.

In mid-December, to our huge delight, new English uniforms, greatcoats and boots arrived from the main camp, to replace the tattered clothing we were then wearing. By Christmas,
Red Cross food parcels and mail from home were reaching us regularly. We could now scheme and plan for an escape.

Alan, who in “Civvy Street” had been an international Speedway star, and now occupied the bunk next to mine agreed to come with me; and each night until the small hours we discussed ways and means. We had to formulate our own ground rules, as we had no past experience to guide us — our working party being so isolated that we had not heard of any other escapes on which to model ours.

Initially, we thought of stealing clothing and bicycles from the farms and cycling out, but discarded the idea as, if caught we could be charged with theft in a civilian court. This would remove us from military control and could mean a concentration camp.

The new uniforms, greatcoats and boots we had just received brought us to the decision to travel in uniform, walking by night and hiding up during the day. We now had regular Red Cross food parcels, but still had to build up a secret store of rations.

The Red Cross parcels were kept in a locked room at the barracks, and on returning from work we were allowed in to select one tin each. From time-to-time we staged a commotion in the parcel room, and whilst the guard was attempting to separate two scuffling prisoners the rest of us would each tuck a tin down our trousers. The slack overhang above the ankle gaiter provided a good hiding place, and as we left the room the guard who searched us, fortunately, never reached down below the knee.

The tins we were carrying openly would be pierced by the guard with his bayonet to prevent hoarding. After “Lights Out” the smuggled tins would be hidden in our bunks, before commencing work. In the half-light of dawn as we left our barracks the tins would be hidden in the front of our loose fitting battle-dress jackets.

After walking the short distance to our village farm-house the first job was to collect fodder from the barn for the cows. The farmer would be busy milking, and we were able to hide our tins in a far corner of the barn, under the hay, before commencing work.

So now we had clothing and food for the escape, but we had no idea of where we were in Germany, and little chance of finding out as, naturally, people do not leave road maps around where POWs are about. Sometimes we saw maps in the newspapers, but they were always battlefield maps of North Africa or Russia.

We knew that we were near Mellrichstadt, as we had seen a sign-post near our village giving its distance as fifteen kilometres; but this scrap of information was of no use to us until one day we came upon a map in a newspaper which actually showed Mellrichstadt and the country towards the Rhine. The map was only about six inches square and useless for navigating, but it provided vital information that our course for Strasbourg on the French border was South of South-West.

We had neither compass nor magnet with which to make one, but Alan had a good knowledge of the stars and phases of the moon, which he had been logging for the past three months. Guards were changed from time-to-time and in February a replacement, who happened to be a local man with a house in the village, was appointed our gaoler. After a few weeks the temptation to go home at night proved too strong for him, and we would hear him creeping down the stairs after “Lights Out”, and quietly locking the door behind him. We would lie awake noting the time he went out and when he returned, and established a pattern of his movements. He never went out before midnight, and always returned between three and four o’clock in the morning. Sunday and Tuesday were the nights he stayed in our barracks.

By March the snow was starting to thaw and the weather was getting warmer so we fixed our departure date as the night of April 21st. The Moon would be in its first quarter, the guard out visiting, and it was also Hitler’s birthday.

Our problem now was to get our large stock of food back to the barracks on the night of escape, stealing a rope to slide down from the first-floor window, and “borrowing” a spanner to unscrew the bars.

One of our mates brought back a spanner and tried it on the bolts securing the window bars. It fitted, so he replaced it at his farmhouse, and would “borrow” it again on the night.

I had earmarked a suitable rope to steal from my farmer’s barn, and Alan had his eye on a strip of old cow blanket.

On the day of our departure time seemed to stand still, but at last we got to our final chores.
of feeding and bedding down the cows. We had both left our jackets in the barns so that when leaving for the night we had an excuse for going back there to retrieve them, and collect our food cache.

We still had to walk through the village carrying all our food, a rope and a strip of cow blanket, but this was more easily solved than one would expect. Each week we were granted a bucket of hot water from the farm for shaving, washing and laundry. This little luxury was provided on a Sunday, but we made some excuse for needing it on that particular evening. Once we had the bucket we mentioned that we had forgotten our jackets in the barn, and were able to wander up the lane to our respective barns without raising suspicion.

Once at the barn it took only a few moments to scale the loft-ladder and collect our tins from their hiding place under the straw. Then, carrying a bucket full of tins immersed in hot water and with a length of rope wound around my body I walked down the village street to our barracks. Alan arrived a few minutes after me, looking rather plump, with his strip of cow blanket underneath his jacket.

It was hard to stick to the usual evening routine — the brewing of tea on the pot-bellied stove, the welcome cigarette and swopping of any war news we had heard during the day. We did not want the guard to sense anything unusual in our behaviour and were, for once, glad when it was “Lights Out” and he retired to his room. Then began the long wait, as we lay in bed wondering if by some chance he was not going out as we had predicted, and could we, in that case, get the food stocks back to their hiding place in the two barns.

Our anxieties were quelled shortly after midnight when we heard the guard unlock his door, tip-toe down the stairs and lock the front door behind him. We allowed a few minutes for him to get clear of the barracks, then dressed quickly, emptied the straw from the sacks which served as pillows, and filled them with provisions. Our braces were tied onto the sacks for shoulder straps.

Meanwhile willing helpers had unscrewed the bars of the window and attached our rope, which we slid down with whispered “Good luck!” from our friends. Next our packs were lowered and we crept down the road leading out of the village. The moon which had been shining brightly drew a veil of cloud across her face. Taking this to be a good omen, without incident, we cleared the sleeping village and went out into open fields.

We had decided to travel only a short distance the first night and go to ground in a little copse we had previously noted as providing good cover.

It was still dark when, after thirty minutes walking, we arrived at our destination. We were quite familiar with the area, as we had often passed that way when working in the fields, and settled down behind a fallen tree well hidden from the nearby cart track.

We smoked innumerable cigarettes, and yawned away the time far too excited to sleep and tremendously elated at being on our way; until a watery sun came up and reminded us to go into hiding.

The day passed without incident. Farmers were working on distant fields, and we dozed, confident of not being spotted. At noon we heard the village clock strike, and taking a shadow bearing, we were able to fix a clump of trees on the horizon as our first objective.

We set off shortly before it got dark, and after tough going across ploughed fields reached our target. The moon was now up and for the next hour we were able to steer a course by the Pole Star over open country.

Then we entered thick woods and took a track running roughly in the direction we had plotted from the star. It was very dark as the moon had gone behind clouds, and we were almost on top of someone coming towards us before we were aware of it. There was nothing we could do but bluff it out. So we gave a fervent “Heil Hitler”, got a like response, and pushed on past him. It was too dark for our uniforms to be recognized, but we were worried that we might have been talking within his hearing range prior to the encounter. Anyhow it was too late to do anything except hope that he was not suspicious, or was perhaps poaching and would therefore keep his own counsel.

A little while later we cleared the woods, took a star fix, and managed to put in two hours hard walking over sodden ploughed fields. Shortly before dawn we had to skirt a village where a dog started barking and set off other dogs to add their voice. It was just getting light and we couldn’t sight any suitable cover. There had been recent tree falling in the area and in desperation we went to ground between the
trunks of some pine trees which had been stacked at the edge of a field.

We placed our strip of cow blanket on the ground, lay back to back, which practice gives the maximum radiated warmth, and having first scattered our greatcoats with twigs and pine needles drew them over us.

We had just settled down and were eating some cheese and jam when we heard the baying of a dog. Our immediate thought was that the man whom we had passed in the night had informed the local police who had set a dog on our tracks. It was useless to break cover as it was now broad daylight and we could hear the creak of farm wagons. Better to stay put and sweat it out.

To our great relief the baying stopped after a few minutes. This encouraging us to assume that we had jumped to conclusions we relaxed and were still fast asleep around mid-day when we were awakened by the sound of an axe. A woodcutter was felling a stand of pine about a hundred metres away, and he had an Alsatian dog with him.

The dog was not content to stay with its master and spent the afternoon wandering around the field, eventually lying down about ten metres from us. We were certain that it had spotted us as it pricked up its ears and looked intently in our direction.

Just as it was deciding whether to investigate its master called it, with the result it very reluctantly joined him and they went off in the direction of the nearby village.

There was still an hour or more till dusk which we filled in with a leisurely evening meal of bully beef, wheat germ and chocolate. The food we were carrying was sufficient for twenty-one days. We ate when we made camp at dawn and again before we set out at night. A tin of stew or bully beef might be followed by jam or condensed milk; or creamed rice and chocolate with cheese and malted milk tablets. All meals had to be eaten cold as a fire was completely out of the question. However the food from our Red Cross food parcels was heavily laced with vitamins and we felt no ill effects from this strange diet. We had no water bottle, but drank from streams and puddles as the need arose.

We set off for our third night through lightly wooded country and towards morning we trudged over wide fields which sloped down to a stream, some ten metres wide and running fast. We searched in vain for a narrow point, bridge or fallen trunk to assist our crossing, without success and had to wade through.

The water was deeper than we thought and half-way across we were up to our chests in it, with the fast flowing water making it difficult to keep our footing. When almost at the far bank I stepped into a deep hole and went in over my head, but the current carried me onto shallows where I was able to grab a tree root and drag myself out. Meanwhile Alan had reached the bank some ten metres down stream. We were both soaked to the skin and bitterly cold after our immersion, but could not afford any time to dry off as it was now broad daylight and we were in the middle of bare fields. We squelched off, cursing furiously, and were placated by finding good cover on the valley ridge in a delightful fairy-tale wood. A short search revealed a small glade where we were able to safely strip off our clothing and wring it out. Unfortunately we then had to get dressed again as we were not carrying any spare clothing.

We consoled ourselves by having double rations of cold tinned stew, jam and cheese; and as we were far from any village enjoyed innumerable cigarettes. Normally we did not smoke during the day as the smell of a cigarette can carry quite a distance in the open air. We did our smoking whenever we rested during the long night treks, lying on the ground to light the cigarette under a greatcoat and smoking it cupped in the hands to hide the glow.

Our camouflage received the seal of approval during the afternoon when a beautiful little fawn came within two metres of where we lay without sensing our presence, and later a rabbit came so near that we could easily have stretched out and grabbed it.

That was a good day for us. We had a good undisturbed rest, and had eaten well. Our clothes had partly dried out, and with body warmth during the night's walk would be completely dry by the following morning.

We set off before dark, as we were well away from any villages, and the chance of being spotted was, we thought, remote. Our over-confidence almost did for us, as we suddenly came upon a squad of soldiers who were resting in the lee of a small hillock. Fortunately we were alerted by the bark of the Alsatian dog they had with them, on a leash thank goodness, and we were able to go to ground before they were able to turn around to see what the dog
was barking at. It was then that we realized why the area was so deserted — we were on an army training area.

The soldiers probably assumed that their dog was barking at a rabbit for they made no move to investigate, and we were glad to see them stub out their cigarettes, sling their rifles and move off down the hill singing the marching song of the moment “Und wir fahren gegen England”.

After allowing them a good quarter of an hour to get clear we set off over open country, and were glad to reach the cover of a wood just as the moon rose.

Navigation through woodland country presented various problems, as it was often not possible to see the Pole star through the foliage. Our practice was to take a star fix before entering the wood, noting the position of the moon and the shadows cast. Once in the wood we made our course by co-relating the line of shadows with the bearing angle taken from the star fix. As soon as we came to a clearing or left the wood we took a bearing from the Pole star and estimated, or rather guessed how far we had strayed away from our course when relying on moon shadows for navigation, and allowed for this divergence in plotting our new course.

Once clear of the woods we entered delightful walking country along wide rides cut like firebreaks through the trees. This was deer country and high wooden towers strategically placed at intersections enabled the hunter to slay his deer with the minimum of inconvenience. One of the rides ran in our plotted direction and we enjoyed several hours of easy walking. A pleasant change from the soggy fields we had struggled over the past few nights.

Our walk was enlivened by a bombing raid on some far-off town. It was quite a display with searchlights and flares lighting the sky, and flashes of exploding bombs on the horizon. We tried to estimate the distance by counting the time between the flash and the sound of the explosion reaching us, but were unable to get a result as the bombs and anti-aircraft fire produced a constant roar which did not permit us to identify a particular flash with its own explosion.

As it was getting light we passed through fields strewn with strips of paper about nine inches long and an inch wide, black on one side and silvered on the other. We were puzzled as to its purpose, and months later learned that it was “window” — the RAF device for confusing the German radar.

We went to ground in good cover, and after our breakfast of bully beef and chocolate pulled our greatcoats over us and immediately fell asleep. We woke in the afternoon, and filled in the long hours till dusk with a leisurely meal and discussing our position.

We were not satisfied with the distance we were covering, and had not anticipated that most of the going would be over soggy ploughed fields. We had adequate tinned food for another fortnight. We were in good shape and morale was high. However at the end of the present moon phase our walking time would be restricted to the few hours between dusk and nightfall and dawn and daylight. Between these periods we would have to lie low unless the odd starlit night compensated for the lack of moonshine. We decided to press on for another night and then reconsider what steps we should take to speed our progress.

Our fifth night’s tramp again led through wooded country, and towards dawn we crossed a river by a water-mill and climbed a hill to a wide grassy plateau with rough gravel paths meandering through small copses of trees. We were too tired and overwrought to pay much attention to our surroundings and just wanted to go to ground urgently as it was getting light and ground cover was by no means perfect. Early that morning we had been spotted by a patrol and a dog had been set on us. Fortunately it was some way off and either lost us when we dodged into cover, or else didn’t persevere.

It was with a feeling of great relief that we crawled under a low bush, spread our greatcoats over us, sprinkled with leaves, and fell asleep. Around mid-day we were awakened by nearby voices, and peering from underneath our bush saw the leather shorts and white socks of a youth who was urinating within a yard of our feet. He went off and joined his companions whilst we marvelled at the fact that he hadn’t spotted us. Our bush was only broad enough to cover the upper part of our bodies, and our legs were only hidden by our camouflaged coats.

From then on we had no peace all that day. Courting couples, family groups, and soldiers on leave were constantly passing our hiding place. It was a Sunday and we were in the municipal gardens of Bad Kissingen.
When dusk came we couldn't move on as courting couples, making the most of their off day, lingered in the park — "too much in love to say good-night". It was well past midnight before we were able to sit up and rummage in our sacks for some food. We dared not smoke as we feared that there may be still some people about.

We had no option but to spend the night where we were. It would have been too risky to set off, with the possibility of people being still about. Furthermore we had been on the alert all that never ending day and were dead tired. We were worried at this check to our progress, and now had to work out how we were going to pass through Bad Kissingen unobserved. A stealthy reconnaissance at dawn revealed a large sprawling town lying beneath our plateau, without any fields or woods visible on either side by which to by-pass it.

All that day we remained hidden, and apart from a gardener who appeared briefly on the scene we were undisturbed. This gave us plenty of time to review our situation and decide future strategy. We could hear an engine shunting, and thought we may go down to the railway yards and jump a goods train. Other ideas we discussed were stealing bicycles and riding through the town; or walking through at dusk when our uniforms would not be obvious. If anyone spoke to us we would give a "Heil Hitler", and keep on walking. This was not such a mad idea as it might sound, as there were many foreign workers in Germany wearing all sorts of garb. They were the so called "volunteer" workers from Holland, France and Belgium who were free to wander about after their working hours. We finally decided on this latter plan, ate a meal of wheatgerm, condensed milk, bully beef and chocolate before settling down to sleep.

It was pitch dark when we awoke, and we cursed ourselves for having overslept. Our intention had been to move out shortly before dusk so that we could pass through the town in the half-light, before any possible curfew. It was now midnight as a distant town clock mockingly tolled, and we could only console ourselves for this further delay by reflecting on how this enforced rest would freshen us up for the next stage.

Early next morning we were out of our hide and stretching our legs on the nearby gravel path when we suddenly sensed we were not alone. Three German farmers had crept up on us and now made a semi-circle ten yards behind us.

We both had our boots off, our gear was unpacked and strewn under the bushes so we had no option but to light a cigarette and call it a day. The farmers waited whilst we put our boots on and then carrying our sacks of provisions they took us off to a military gaol in Bad Kissingen. We spent several hours in cells until a guard arrived from the main Stalag. We were feeling bitterly disappointed and angry with ourselves and the guard did not improve matters by telling us that we would be sent to the Russian front to join a labour battalion.

We travelled by train to Bad Neustadt where a Captain and a couple of NCOs had their Kontrol post at the railway hotel. After submitting to a five minute tirade by the Captain, who screamed with rage and shouted with his face only six inches from ours, we were allowed to sit down. The Captain was quite white and shaky after his act, and in the short lull that followed we managed to push the rope and piece of cow blanket we had taken from the farms under the bench seat.

Two barmaids came into the room with beer for the three soldiers, and stayed to marvel at our stock of tinned food, cigarettes and chocolate which had been piled up on the table.

The Captain then changed his tone and with mocking voice told us how futile our attempt had been to escape from the Fatherland. He went on to say that instead of walking out with pretty girls in Switzerland we would be joining a labour battalion on the Russian front. All this was accompanied by mime, and he used one of the barmaids to act out the "pretty girls" theme; to the intense amusement of us all. When we interjected and said that our objective was France and thence England to rejoin the army he put on another nerve-shattering, screaming act which had us hoping he would burst an artery.

Our train arrived in the middle of his tirade and we were hustled out of the room by our guard. One of the girls spotted the rope and strip of blanket we had hidden under the bench seat, and these were thrown after us with further curses and assorted rude language.

After a journey of about three hours, with a change of trains en-route we arrived at the small village of Fladungen. During the course of our journey many people had glared at us,
others had sneered at our bedraggled appearance, and some had made angry remarks. This was a very mild foretaste of what we were to receive when we stepped from the train at the little station of Fladungen. We were met by a comic opera character in a cloak, and peaked cap, with a waxed moustache like the late Kaiser. He was the town gaoler, Ferdinand by name, and looked like a veteran from the Franco-Prussian war. This was his big day, and he had obviously told all the town people of our impending arrival as an angry crowd, some hundred strong, surrounded us, shouting insults, jeering, spitting and trying to kick us. We were rather glad that we only had some hundred yards to walk to the grim-looking old tower which was to be our gaol. Ferdinand, playing the stern gaoler act dismissed the guard, opened the low wooden door at the base of the tower with a dramatic flourish, and directed us by a winding staircase to an upper chamber. Our cell had a wooden plank bed, and the usual slop bucket — no other furniture and no mattress or blankets. The small window was set into the three foot thick stone wall, and was heavily barred. Fortunately we still had our greatcoats, but all our other gear had been taken from us.

Next morning at nine Ferdinand arrived on the scene and handed us a jug of water and a small round loaf of bread, and took us down the tower to a lower floor where there was a hole into which we emptied our pail. The same ritual was maintained for the next two mornings, and then on the fourth morning we were given blankets, a cigarette, hot coffee and a roll. At lunchtime a bowl of hot soup and some sausage together with another cigarette and a bread roll, for our evening meal, were provided. We knew there must be a catch. There was, as sharp on nine the following morning Ferdinand appeared with a jug of water and a small loaf, and took away our blankets. This cat and mouse treatment went on for the remainder of our stay at Fladungen. On the days of food and blankets we spent the entire twenty-four hours curled up on the wooden bed luxuriating in the warmth. The other days were spent in exercising to keep from freezing as it was bitterly cold, and a heavy fall of snow on our third day of incarceration didn't improve matters.

After five days in the Tower we were taken down to a room in one of the town's inns to be interrogated. These small Bavarian towns had no town halls or council chambers.

Our guard from Unterwaldbehrungen was there looking very pale around the gills, and under escort. Two senior officers presided and a bevy of their aides, odd soldiers and, of course, Ferdinand — who wouldn't have missed it for worlds — made up an assembly of twenty odd souls. Not counting the evil-looking character in a leather coat who was seated behind the two presiding officers, and had Gestapo written all over him, and certainly no soul.

All our stock of tinned food, cigarettes and chocolate were stacked on the table in front of our inquisitors, and an anxious glance revealed that the incriminating rope and strip of cow blanket were also there.

Proceedings opened with our Unterwaldbehrungen guard being grilled severely by the two officers in turn. Then an interpreter stepped forward and our ordeal commenced. He started by saying that any lies or concealment of facts would attract severe penalties, and the questioning started.

Once again the two officers took it in turn to pose their questions, which were translated by the interpreter. In the main they wanted to know how we had managed to obtain such a hoard of Red Cross food, if we had had any outside help, and how we had managed to escape — the bars had been screwed back and there was no evidence of our exit.

We had had plenty of time to perfect our story. We didn't want to spoil other escape attempts by telling of our means of obtaining and hoarding food from the Red Cross parcels, or the easily screwed out bars. Nor did we want to get the guard into any more strife than he was in at the present. He was a simple fellow unlike the brute we had had before, and although it was very difficult to feel sorry for any German under any circumstances in those days, we had decided not to mention his nocturnal wanderings.

Our replies were that we picked the lock of the Red Cross parcel store on the night of our departure, and that we were able to give the same treatment to the front door.

They questioned us about the guard. Was he friendly with the prisoners? Did we offer him food from our Red Cross parcels? Where was he on the night of our escape? We answered no to the first two questions; and then, with a prayer that the guard had not broken under
interrogation and revealed all, we said he had been asleep in his room.

We were surprised that they had not associated the rope with a window descent. Blokes at the barracks must have done a good job in screwing back the bars, and we knew that they were going to give the rehearsed reply of being asleep, and having not witnessed our escape.

The questions were barked out at us in a most intimidating fashion, but the interpreter had a mild voice and manner so that if you shut your mind to the screaming German and paid attention only to the mild English you were not flustered into giving an obviously suspect answer. If the question had been directed to me the officer would ask Alan if it were true, and the next question would then be given to Alan with a demand to me as to the veracity of the reply.

At one point the Gestapo man muttered something to one of the presiding officers, and we dreaded that he might be calling attention to the rope and blanket strip and suggesting that we be placed in his charge. However the question was not raised and when we discussed the matter between ourselves later we concluded that the Gestapo were more interested in the possibility of us having had outside help or of us having bribed the guard.

We were escorted back to our tower still not knowing how long our stay there was going to be. The same routine of one good day then three days on bread and water without bedding continued. From our room at the top of the tower we had a splendid view of the picturesque roofs and gables of the mediaeval town, and we whiled away the time by telling each other our life stories, and conducting a flirtation with a girl who lived in a house below our tower.

At first she turned her head away and stalked inside when we blew kisses to her, but subsequently when she came out into the yard to feed the chickens or do some other chore she would steal a glance up at our window. Within a few days she would wave furtively to us, and eventually would blow us kisses and give us a lovely smile. It was all rather silly, but for us it was wonderful therapy to feel that there was someone human out there.

Finally after we had been in the Tower for fifteen days a guard arrived and took us off to our new quarters at Stockheim where some forty Australians were billeted in an old factory, and worked at the nearby timber mills. This was known as a “strafe lager”, reserved for escapees and others who had kicked against the traces.

It was a great delight to be amongst one’s own again, and catch up with the latest war rumour. They all knew about our escape from Unterwaldbehrungen, as one of the fellows from there had passed through Stockheim on some mission with his farmer. He had met one of our present company and given a graphic account of the happenings the day after our flight.

Our absence was not noticed when the guard let the prisoners out at dawn to go to their farms. It was not until mid-morning that Leo, my little farmer, and Alan’s farmer caught up with our guard at the village inn, and wanted to know why we hadn’t turned up for work. Then things really happened fast. They were all recalled to the barracks and questioned by an officer who had driven in haste from the main Stalag. He couldn’t break down their story that they had all been asleep when it happened, nor could he detect where we had exited as the bars had been neatly screwed back and the spanner returned to the farm without being missed.

Our guard had received a terrific blast from the officer, who then put on a long face and announced that Alan and I had been shot that morning near dawn. His story was that we had been crossing a road, and failed to stop when challenged by a patrol. He wasn’t at all convincing but they pretended to believe him, and with dire warnings, that a similar fate could be expected by anyone else who made a break, he went off in his car with our white-faced guard.

That afternoon a new guard arrived from the main Stalag, and he was very meticulous. He locked their boots in his room each night and handed them back in the morning; and took other precautions which he hoped would save him from the fate of his predecessor.

In 1949 I was in Europe, and obtained with some difficulty a visa for the American, French and British occupied zones of Germany.

I motored down from Brussels to Unterwaldbehrungen where I called on Leo, my mean little farmer, who immediately asked if I had brought his rope back. The hapless guard had returned to his farm only the year before. He had been sent to the Russian front, as punishment for our escape, where he had been captured. He had been retained for three years after the war to clear bomb debris at Stalingrad. He had had a pretty hard time but we chatted
WE WALKED BY NIGHT

without animosity, and I gave him a bottle of Scotch I had in the car.

Navigating the little back roads that lead to Fladungen needed great care. The town was very close to the Russian occupied zone, and in those days there were no barbed wire fences to define the zones. If you strayed over in error you risked arrest and possible imprisonment by the Russians until your Embassy could negotiate your release.

The grim tower still brooded over the mediaeval town, but there was no sign of Ferdinand. The people no longer jeered and spat — they fawned instead which was infinitely worse.

THE DEMAND FOR ENERGY IN THE SOVIET UNION, Publishers: Rowman and Allan Head, Author: David Wilson, Cost: $37.95

Reviewed by: Capt J.D Taylor

THIS publication was hard to become involved with because of the terminology, and since I haven’t attended any specialised petroleum courses, my interpretations of the subject matter are therefore limited.

The book contains many charts and tables which show figures on the following topics:

a. Forecasting fuel supply and Demand;
b. The Household and Municipal Sector;
c. The Iron and Steel Industry;
d. The Construction Materials Industry;
e. The Chemical Industry;
f. The Oil Refining Industry;
g. Transport and Agriculture;
h. Foreign Trade in Fuel; and
i. The Future Supply of Fuel.

The most exciting aspect of this book is that a CIA report of April 1977 stated that the USSR had an energy crisis. Its reserves of oil were said to be running out, and because its oil-finding and producing technology level was 40 years behind the USA, there was no way that it could find the necessary amount of new oil sufficiently quickly to prevent a downturn in production. The report stated that the crunch would be felt in 1985 when the Russians would have to import large quantities of oil.

But oil production has not declined, nor has it peaked. The CIA report findings were never accepted by the Soviet fuel industry, particularly in Western Europe and in 1980 the report was ditched.

The CIA’s misconceptions about the technological standard of the USSR’s oil producing equipment and management were false. Suffice to say that the Soviet petroleum industry is far more advanced than most Western observers had believed possible. In some fields, such as automatic welding machines for large diameter pipelines, laminex pipe and drilling rigs are several years ahead of the Americans.

During the period 1960 to 1980 there has been a massive change from coal to oil and gas by Soviet power stations, with the share of hydro-carbons in their total fuel consumption rising from 19.8% to 59.4%. The consumption of fuel oil has grown particularly strongly, at an average annual rate of 14.8%. An important reason for this is the declining quality of coal, especially that of the Donbass steam coal used by Soviet power stations, with the share of hydro-carbons in their total fuel consumption rising from 19.8% to 59.4%. The consumption of fuel oil has grown particularly strongly, at an average annual rate of 14.8%. An important reason for this is the declining quality of coal, especially that of the Donbass steam coal used...
by most coal-burning stations in the European USSR. The ash content is increasing, as is the moisture content, and the calorific value of coal burned in Soviet power stations is only 5,500 KCALS/KG compared with 6,650 in the USA.

The Western Siberian basin is the world's largest oil and gas-bearing province, covering 3.35 million sq km and contains a larger volume of oil and gas than any other such basin including the Persian Gulf. About 55% of the region is potentially oil and gas bearing, and a further 17% is marginally promising. At the beginning of 1982, proven plus probable reserves of gas amounted to 30,000 bn cu m and estimated proven plus probable reserves of oil amounted to 8,500 million tons in all. The region had about 32,700 million tons of oil equivalent of hydrocarbons, with perhaps a further 100,000 million tons of oil equivalent of potential reserves. Gas should overtake oil as the most important fuel in 1990 (it passed coal in 1980) and by the end of the century it should be accounting for over 40% of total fuel production. Oil production should continue to grow very slowly as output by Western Siberian peaks and new fields in Eastern Siberia and the Barents and Kara Seas are opened up. The Russians are believed to be pacing the exploitation of their oilfields so that increases in production should be maintained into the next century.

The author has gone into a great deal of research into the subject matter of this book, producing excellent facts and figures relating to the Energy situation in the Soviet Union. The book could be useful for the technically minded and others interested in assessing energy as an element for a nation's Military Operations.


Reviewed by Captain S. R. Taylor, RAAOC Centre

The book, War and Order, grew from a conference held at the University College, London, during November 1981. The conference, entitled 'Researching State Structures', was designed to bring together researchers who, for many years, had been gathering information on the 'British State Structure'. The book can be best described as an edited collection of papers presented at the conference, the theme of the papers being how to collect and interpret information on British state structures with a view of exposing the design and function of these structures.

No specific social or political comment, in its own right, is made by the book, but by implication it clearly comments that increased social and political control, real or implied by Government policy, must be feared and resisted by all. The book itself is a 'text book' on how to expose what the true purpose, or indeed the possible applications of certain state structures are. The Editor of the book has described one of the main reasons for publishing the book as an encouragement to other to undertake active research into the subject.

In a general sense the authors of the papers presented in the book believe that as the British enter an era of (suggested) increased police activity, in terms of social and political control, and possible Government use of catastrophic weaponry such as nuclear arms, there is a need for an increasingly alert and informed response from those in society who value 'liberty and democracy'. The book implies that the British are heading for an 'Ordwelian State Society', indeed suggesting that in many cases that point has already been reached, and that the only way that the people can be saved is by exposing all government structures, with of course, specific concentration on secret government organizations before too much power is obtained by the State.

There is an emphasis throughout on methods of penetrating official secrecy: with papers on how Signals Intelligence may be employed against establishment organizations, on legal aspects of state research, and on the use of public sources of information. A recurrent topic is the official planning for military and civilian control of Britain in the event of nuclear war, other topics include police computer systems and telephone-tapping. It is of some interest to note the authors interpretation of increased Police use of their computer files in terms of routine checks and crossreferencing of inquiries which with merely an unsophisticated inquiry 'flagging' system added would turn the computer system into an enormous surveillance fa-
licity for some secret Government organization. This being possible without even the Police being aware of the capability.

Fears are also expressed about the new British computerized telephone switching equipment which will be installed in the near future and will by design rather than purpose provide any secret Government organization with a completely untraceable and undetectable telephone tapping capability. The inference being that while all these increased capabilities are being provided for noble and worthy causes there is the unexceptable risk that the systems may be misused by Governments as a whole or by independent government agencies with or without the Governments concurrence. An example of where the authors believe this has already occurred is their description of a secret central telephone tapping facility in London uncovered by activists who believe that the facility has the capability of tapping up to a thousand lines simultaneously.

The book is clearly a manual for the activists in the British society, but there would be appeal to Australian political and social activists from the point of view of examining the techniques used and there possible application for research of the Australian state structure. At $14.95 it is difficult to justify the expenditure, as a curiosity it is worthy of a passing glance.


Reviewed by: Captain T. F. Rayfield

A n essential element of deterrence is the maintenance by the adversaries of a high level of assured destruction capability, ie the ability to inflict overwhelming damage upon an aggressor and the will to use it in the case of attack.

The (Sanskrit) Buddish philosophy of the chain of dependence or more succinctly the chain of causation expounds the theory that all events are interrelated without any real, permanent, independent existence of their own, ie one interrelating group of events produces another.

It is a function of the terrible striking power of the 20th Century that many nonnuclear pow-
lems Britain faced in her 'special nuclear relationship' with the US. However, for general reading it offers little, other than for those intimately interested in nuclear matters.

THIS IS THE SAS: A Pictorial History of the Special Air Service Regiment by Tony Geraghty.

Reviewed by Brigadier P. M. Jeffery, AM, MC

SINCE its inception in the Western Desert in 1941, the Special Air Service Regiment has enjoyed a degree of prestige and mystery unrivalled by any other military or security organisation. Recent events, such as the storming of the Iranian Embassy in London, have only served to enhance this image. Tony Geraghty's history of the SAS aims to enlarge public knowledge of the Regiment, focussing primarily on the British units. The author does so using a pictorial record of its activities from wartime North Africa up to and including The Falklands conflict.

The book begins with a description of the inception of the Regiment, when a Scots Guards Lieutenant named David Stirling made a brazen uninvited entry to the office of General Auchinleck, and personally presented a proposal to parachute four-man patrols behind enemy lines. His reward, a promotion and command of the first Special Air Service detachment, was to set the scene for a history of dramatic and sensational unconventional operations throughout the war, which eventually prompted the raising of a second regiment. These early days are well illustrated in the book with some outstanding wartime photographs.

The format used in the opening chapter of the book is followed throughout — that is, a brief explanatory text followed by a series of graphic photographs with detailed captions and anecdotes. Where the author has managed to obtain them, sequential photographs are used to illustrate particular operations and these bring the story home with great impact.

The history of the Regiment is traced through Malaya, Aden, Borneo, Oman and the Falklands. These chapters describe the adaption of the SAS troopers to the deserts, jungles and mountains where they fought. Again, the author allows the photographs to tell the story, both of the soldiers and of the people whom they lived with or fought against.

The emergence of terrorism as a political weapon in the late 1960s changed the face of society, and the SAS changed with it. The famous attack on the Iranian Embassy in London in 1980 is told in well illustrated detail and highlights the extraordinary talents the Regiment employed in meeting this type of operation. A chapter on the selection and training of soldiers of the SAS, aptly sub-titled 'The Long, Hard Road', details the daunting process of training selected volunteers to the levels required for such missions.

The Australian and New Zealand SAS are discussed in separate chapters, but unfortunately that dealing with Australia is very sketchy. The photographs, which the author states were provided by the Regiment, are not particularly flattering, and as such do not accurately reflect the skills and roles of the Australian SAS.

The book is bound to be commercially successful, given the present popularity of publications of this type. Nonetheless, it presents a most interesting and useful pictorial history of the SAS, and will find a place in the library of many military readers.


Reviewed by Capt. B. W. Fagan

THE publication by David Scott is an enlightened insight into the intricacies, background and direction of voluntary organizations in the Western World and certainly achieves the aim of the author to encourage a more critical and appreciative attitude to these organizations and their social and political significance.

The obvious social and political significance of these organizations as this author portrays them in the early part of this work makes the reader look at this aspect of our society in an enlightened way as both users and part of the voluntary workforce. The transfer of thirty years experience in this field tends to make the reader take a more critical look at himself and
his social setting. One's own experiences and involvement in this field seem to fall into an overall context and understood in the light of current government policy and the trends that indicate the future or explain changes in the past, especially in the field of government welfare.

This book traces the history of these organizations in general terms and shows how volunteers are more inventive than government bureaucracy, and opposes the view that they are not serious expressions of good intentions or a viable means of social reform, even though the author sees a need for greater effectiveness in the area of social reform. Examples noted in the text indicate most of the current welfare originated in the voluntary sector and if trends continue in their present direction, most of these agencies will turn the full circle in the near future with the difference being the source of funding. The author indicates ways that these bodies have bridged gaps in this area of society that government bureaucracies wouldn’t or couldn’t attempt to do.

The incompleteness of government agencies has created the majority of voluntary organizations and in most cases they are complementary to government agencies and the author suggests they are normally the ones that introduce the public to the intricacies of the government facilities as well as being the most effective and knowledgeable critics of official services.

Mr Scott predicts in the light of current policies showing the Government’s need to reduce the volume of public pension and welfare coupled with high unemployment, more groups in the community who need help will have to turn to the voluntary sector for welfare of one type or another as a second best provider. This second best provider will also then be fulfilling an increasingly important need for self realisation, fulfilment, identity and insight for those involved in this field. Predictions that this increased use of the voluntary sector will continue with even greater momentum in years to come as volunteers take over much of the task of welfare from the bureaucracy and provide a more local and co-operative approach to welfare needs, can already be seen to be happening in the Australian society.

This change in structure of welfare is going to require an ever increasing degree of sophistication and expertise in these volunteers in the administration, management and understanding of this field.

This book will provide the volunteer with background information and a starting point or direction for wider study and reading from the detail of the text or its extensive bibliography.

The casual reader can however skim some of the more detailed information contained in this publication and still acquire greater insight and understanding of the role these organizations play in our society.


Reviewed by Major A. J. WIBER, Sup Div HQ Log Comd.

The preface of this volume introduces it as one of a series, designed for those who wish to improve their knowledge of military weapons and equipment. It assumes no mathematical knowledge or technical expertise beyond school level mathematics and as such, provides a readily understandable framework for the communication requirements of command and control systems.

Although there are a number of specialised texts which treat the various aspects of communication in isolation and at varying depths of detail, this treatment covers the spectrum of current radio communication methods, answering most of the questions which would occur to the non-technical user. In achieving this, it compares and contrasts the advantages and disadvantages of each of the methods treated and relates the treatment to in-service (UK) equipments.

For the reader who wishes to gain an understanding of the framework, within which command and control systems operate, this does not meet the requirement. However, it does illustrate, against a skeletal background of command and control requirements, the communications methods available to make those systems operate. There is treatment of the characteristics of the various communication
methods available and clear tabular presentation of the advantages and disadvantages of each. In achieving this, the book provides lucid descriptions of the technical operations of radio, removing, for the lay reader, many of the mysteries of communication. The text is well illustrated with explanatory diagrams and examples of equipments which employ each of the methodologies discussed.

The approach taken is one which makes the book highly readable and readily digestible. It is recommended reading, for those who wish to gain an understanding of the capabilities of various communication systems, where these may influence the design of other communication dependent systems. It is also recommended for the technical reader to provide an overview of the spectrum of communications systems, available in a form which allows input to planning and operations functions in readily understandable language.


Reviewed by A. Argent.

WHY should a former Brown Job be reviewing a book about the Navy? Some of the claims are pretty slender — applied for the Naval College when age 13, some pleasant and not so pleasant experiences in HM and HMA ships, flying with RN and RAN pilots and since sending in my papers, quite some time in going down to the sea in small ships. A stronger claim is that I've long believed, to misquote slightly King Charles II's preamble, "It is upon the navy under the providence of God that the safety, honour and welfare of this Commonwealth do chiefly depend." But probably the strongest claim is, simply, that this is a most enjoyable book.

Lombard-Watson left school and entered the Royal Navy College, Dartmouth at the age of 13, in 1926. Every boy in his class who went on into a civil occupation was to be killed in action in the Second War. There may be a message there but he does not expand upon that bare fact.

After his four years at Dartmouth, Lombard-Watson joined the battleship Queen Elizabeth as a Naval Cadet and a few months later was promoted midshipman. In the run up to the Second War he had two tours in the Mediterranean, the first in QE the second in a destroyer. He had more than his share of fortune and misfortune which included hitting a rowing boat at night in his picket boat and drowning a Maltese boatman (the bereaved family was not at all distressed at his death, he was a wastrel, they said); officer at the watch when his destroyer hit Turkey; killing a man in self-defence in a set-up barroom brawl in Marseilles; putting his captain's speedboat at the bottom of Grand Harbour Valetta at night when carrying an unauthorised (female) passenger; shooting duck with his C-in-C in Albania; showing the flag in the Black Sea.

In between Mediterranean tours he was the navigator of a North Sea trawler from Yarmouth to Hong Kong. With sails and a small engine giving 7 knots, the voyage took three months.

When war came he was just finishing two years as ADC to the Governor-General of New Zealand and on return to the UK was appointed first lieutenant of a sturdy World War One destroyer under a very experienced RN commander. There was no phoney war for the Navy. Before Dunkirk his destroyer saw two U-boats go down. His ship took soldiers off the quay of Dunkirk and soon after this he hit a mine and was consigned to the wreckers. Following some hard escort work in a new Hunt Class destroyer, Lombard-Watson got his first command, a 900-ton corvette HMS Guillemot. His flotilla convoyed ships down the east coast of England from Harwich to London. Their enemy by day was the Luftwaffe, by night E-boats. It was during this time that a new lieutenant joined Guillemot — Lieutenant Nicholas Monsarrat, RNVR. Readers of the Cruel Sea will soon recognise the source of Monsarrat's commanding officer of Compass Rose. Readers should also go to Volume 2 of Monsarrat's autobiography — Life is a Four-Letter Word for a graphic few paragraphs on what commanding men in war and leadership is all about.

Lombard-Watson’s next command took him to the Mediterranean. Here he commanded another Hunt Class destroyer, HMS Rockwood, and, amongst other things, was on the Malta run and escorting convoys supporting the 8th Army. One of the destroyers carried a special consignment of diabetic pills for an 8th Army officer who in 1898 won a DSO commanding
gun boats, had a CB from Jutland and command­
ing a Light Cruise Squadron in the Baltic in 1919. At age 71 he was too old for the Navy in the Second War but somehow he managed to join the Army and get another DSO, forty­
six years after his first.

In September 1943 Rockwood went to the muddled Agean War. It was an expensive side­show which was to cost the British, particularly the RN, dearly.

Rockwood was hit by a glider bomb and for a while she had to seek refuge in the “neutral” waters of Turkey. She could not be repaired in the Med and on the slow eturn voyage to the UK Lombard-Watson took her into action for the last time when they came upon a U-boat on the surface. His story ends there, but the blurb tells us he stayed on in destroyers (in “Life is a Four-Letter Word” his old Number One tells of sailing in his latest destroyer at Cape Town in 1952) and served in the Korean War in HMS Newcastle.

This is a thoroughly readable book, in fact one of those about which reviewers used to write “unputdownable”. Beneath its humour and its understatements a message comes out loud and clear — there is no substitute for good hard, training.

PADRE — AUSTRALIAN CHAPLAINS ON GALLIPOLI AND FRANCE, by Michael McKernan, Published by: Allen & Unwin Australia, price: $19.95.

Reviewed by: J. P. Buckley

THIS book describes the wonderful work done by Army Padres during the First World War 1914-18.

The story opens with the selection of the few chaplains appointed in the early stage of setting up the A.I.F. Most of those posted to units were first-class men — some were to become legends during the Gallipoli campaign; some were to be highly decorated. Dexter won the D.S.O., M.C. and D.C.M., John Fahey won the D.S.O.

Many served not only on Gallipoli, but continued on in France. Gillison was to be killed on Gallipoli. Most of the Padres were highly respected and valued by the troops. They kept diaries, and almost all of them wrote home to their Church leaders, families and Church newspapers.

The eye-witness accounts give a real and sometimes horrifying account of the grim battles — better than anyone else, the chaplains knew the cost and the ugliness of war; night after night they buried the dead and comforted the wounded.

Michael McKernan has made a substantial contribution to the history of the A.I.F. by seeking out the excellent stories set out in the diaries of the padres. Unfortunately, historians and writers about war have neglected, or more accurately, ignored the important efforts made by the chaplains.

Whilst the book cannot completely cover the work of all the chaplains, it does give a very clear picture of what several achieved in their service and dedication to the soldiers. It tells how these men of God thought about war and about life in general. Some bore witness to lives of holiness and faith and to a never-ending desire to serve the troops. This applied to all denominations.

Stories are told of many of the great chap­lains, John Fahey, for example, who against orders insisted on going ashore with his soldiers on Gallipoli. He was to serve until November 1917. Returning to Australia in 1918 he was elected as the first President of the R.S.L. in Western Australia.

Then we were told of the other great padres—“Fighting Mac” McKenzie, Andrew Gillison, William Dexter, Ernest Merrington, Murphy, Plane, Tucker (who was to be Founder of the Brotherhood of St. Lawrence, which has become one of our best loved welfare agencies), Green and many others.

McKernan has great talent for researching and more importantly, writing about the con­tribution of the Churches in wartime. I men­tioned in my review of his The Australian Peo­ple and The Great War which includes an excellent description of the activities of the Churches (December 1984 Edition of Mufti) that McKernan should write another book about the magnificent contribution made by some members of the Army, Navy and Air Force to the Church during the post World War I years. Names which immediately spring to mind are Sir Edmund Herring, who was a great Christian and a great soldier. He was Chancellor of the Anglican Church in Victoria for 40 years; General Sir Harry Chauvel was a Church Warden
at Christ Church, South Yarra, for over 25 years and a lay Canon at St. Paul's Cathedral. Likewise, Generals Sir Julius Bruche and Sir Sydney Rowell were prominent members of the Congregation at Christ Church. Further East in Toorak Rd., Lieut. General Edgar and Lieutenant General Sir Henry Wells were well known at the Toorak Presbyterian Church. Edgar was the senior layman there for many years and his wife devoted her life to the Inland Mission.

The army officers I have mentioned are but a few who were great soldiers and devout Christians, who contributed so much to the spiritual and general welfare of the Church.

As Sir Edmund Herring was to say (at the Shrine of Remembrance) “... the most devoted peace lovers are those who suffered the horrors of war.” He was so right!

McKernan has written an excellent book about a most neglected subject. I congratulate him on his contribution to Australian military history.

I hope he takes up my suggestion to write about the soldiers, sailors and airmen who made a devoted contribution to the Church in the postwar years. Some of the recent crop of soldiers continue to play an important role in Church administration and leadership. I won't mention their names because they go about their duties without looking for kudos or publicity. I hope our Church leaders are aware of and take pride in the devoted service of many of the present servicemen and more particularly the many members of the R.S.L. who work so much for the spiritual and general welfare of the Church.

A SPECIAL KIND OF SERVICE — 2/9 AUSTRALIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL, by Colonel Joan Crouch ARRC, published by Alternative Publishing Co-Operative Ltd, price $19.95

Reviewed by J. P. Buckley

THE 2/9 Australian General Hospital was raised in South Australia in 1940 and two months later, sailed for the Middle East. The staff of the Unit came from all States.

The Hospital served in Amiriya and Nazareth in the Middle East, Port Moresby and MO-ROTAI. The author Colonel Joan Crouch served with the 2/9th in New Guinea and MO-ROTAI and served later during the Korea War, as Matron of the British Commonwealth Communications Zone Medical Unit in Korea. She completed her outstanding Army career as Assistant Director of the Army Nursing Service in Victoria.

Colonel Crouch is very well qualified to write the history of the March. Not only was she an excellent member of the nursing Service, but this story shows that she had done her research with dedication and success. I like the simple, straight forward manner in which the story unfolds. There is something of interest in every page.

It was my good fortune to be on the same troop ship Strathalan as the 2/9th on our return from the Middle East in February/March 1942. The 2/2nd Australian General Hospital were also in the same ship. We got to know the staff of both hospitals very well and watched their performance later with considerable interest and pride.

The story of the 2/9th records their courage, compassion and dedication for the sick and wounded soldiers, often under the most shocking conditions in the desert — sandstorms, intense heat, primitive conditions for accommodation — followed by the floods, humidity, disease and the myriads of unpleasant insects in the tropical areas.

Shortages of equipment and long hours of duty in muddy wards with leaking tents and huts, tested the skills and endurance of staff. Their only interest was to do the best for their patients. In doing so, the 2/9th won a proud record for its outstanding service during the Kokoda Trail campaign, when it was the only General Hospital in New Guinea.

This story gives more detail of the overseas service of our gallant nurses and hospital staff than any other book I have reviewed. It has over 50 photographs which assist the excellent narrative.

Joan Crouch deserves commendation for her outstanding effort in producing A Special Kind of Service. "Special" in something “very special” indeed.

Like all old soldiers I salute the wonderful women who contributed so much to welfare and wellbeing of the sick and the wounded — Joan has reminded us all of what we owe to them.